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REPORTS

FROM

COMMITTEES:

EIGHT VOLUMES.

—(3.—PART III.)—

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.

Session

12 *December* 1854 —— 14 *August* 1855.

VOL. IX.—PART III.

1854-5.

REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES:

1854-5.

EIGHT VOLUMES:—CONTENTS OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.—PART III.

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FOURTH REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL;

WITH THE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
17 *May* 1855.

Lunæ, 29° die Januarii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT a Committee be appointed to inquire into the Condition of our Army before *Sebastopol,* and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army.

Veneris, 23° die Februarii, 1855.

Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir George Lewis.
Sir John Pakington.	General Peel.
Colonel Lindsay.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Ellice.	

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Seven be the Quorum of the Committee.

Jovis, 1° die Martii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to report Resolutions, and their Minutes of Proceedings, from time to time, to The House.

Ordered, THAT Sir John Hanmer be added to the Committee.

Veneris, 30° die Martii, 1855.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House.

Veneris, 20° die Aprilis, 1855.

Ordered, THAT Mr. John Ball be discharged from further attendance on the Committee.

Lunæ, 23° die Aprilis, 1855.

Ordered, THAT Captain Gladstone be added to the Committee.

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FOURTH REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to Inquire into the Condition of our ARMY before SEBASTOPOL, and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army, and who were empowered to report their Opinion and the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House;

HAVE examined several other Witnesses on the subject of the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to Report the MINUTES of EVIDENCE so taken before them to The House.

17 *May* 1855.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Mercurii, 2° die Maii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Thomas Tassel Grant, Esq., called in; and Examined.

T. T. Grant, Esq.
2 May 1855.

17641. Lord *Seymour*.] WHAT office do you held?—I held the office of Comptroller of Victualling and Comptroller of the Transport Service till the nomination of the present Board of Transport.

17642. You are at the head of one department at Somerset House, are you not?—Yes, one of the five principal offices.

17643. How long have you held that office?—I have held it since the commencement of the year 1851.

17644. How long have you been in the service of the Admiralty?—Upwards of 40 years.

17645. And how long have you been in the Victualling Department?—I have been in the Victualling Department altogether about 26 years.

17646. The transports were in your department also, were they not, until the late arrangement?—Until the appointment of the new Transport Board.

17647. Then you were present with Captain Milne when he opened the tenders for the transport service?—Yes. He did not open the tenders himself. I will explain to the Committee, if they wish, the course adopted on that occasion. When a requisition is made for the conveyance of troops or stores, it is then sent to Lloyd's, the Jerusalem Coffee-house, and also to the Exchange, stating what number of vessels is required, and for what service, and requesting that tenders may be given in by a certain day and at a certain hour; the tenders are then put into what is called the tender-box, and exactly as the clock strikes one the tender-box is removed from the hall and brought into the board-room. A clerk attached to the contract office then enters the board-room, and takes possession of this box; the keys of which are delivered to him.

17648. *Chairman*.] What individual do you refer to?—One of the gentlemen connected with the Contract Office. He then opens the box, and opens the tenders and sorts them; then two clerks belonging to the department come into the board-room; each of whom has a paper, upon which he inserts the particulars of the tenders, as they are read by the contract clerk; after all the tenders are taken down they exchange papers, and then I, as the comptroller of victualling, or the comptroller of the transports, take the tenders and read them over, and any discrepancy in the two papers is at once rectified.

T. T. Grant, Esq.

2 May 1855.

17649. What are those two papers?—They are called treaty papers; showing the name of the person who tenders the ship, the name of the ship, the rate of tonnage, the price, and other particulars connected with the service which the ships are tendered to perform.

17650. What is the other?—The other is just the same, so that there should be a check, and not upon one person alone, but upon two, and so that there should be a record in the Transport Department, or in the Victualling Department; one of these papers is retained in the Contract Office for the purpose of having the charter-party drawn and made out.

17651. How can a discrepancy arise between those two papers, that you say are exactly alike?—One clerk reads the contents of the tenders, and it is possible that the two other clerks may insert in their papers different figures or prices; therefore, to ascertain that there is no mistake made by them or by the clerk who reads the tenders, they exchange papers. I then take the tenders themselves, and read the contents of them, and each clerk checks the entry of the particular tender which is read, so that if there is any error in the reading or the copying, it is immediately rectified. This practice is adopted to prevent mistakes; it is a double check.

17652. Lord *Seymour*.] The answer which you have given refers both to the victualling and the transport, as if the same system of tender was pursued in each; is that the case?—Yes.

17653. As this involves also the question of contracts for victualling, will you state to the Committee whether it is open to every one to tender?—Decidedly it is, by public advertisement in the newspapers.

17654. Stating a certain day by which the tenders must be sent in?—Yes.

17655. Is it understood that you are not bound, or that you are bound, to take the lowest tender?—No; it is left entirely to the discretion of the Admiralty which tender they will accept.

17656. In cases where they do not take the lowest tender, is any record kept in the office, which may be examined afterwards, to see upon what grounds they reject the lowest tender?—Most decidedly; with regard to the victualling stores in particular, if the lowest tender is not accepted, it is then stated in the treaty paper why it is not accepted. Samples are produced, for instance, of sugar, or peas, and the receiving officers at the Victualling Yard, at Deptford, select what they consider good and fit for the service; they do not always select the cheapest; they know nothing of the prices; they merely examine the samples, and select those which they consider good and fit for the service. They are generally asked, why they did not accept this sugar? and they say, "We do not consider it good and fit for the service; it is not sufficiently good; neither is this; but this is;" and then it is accepted upon that; and the others that are rejected are written, "Unfit."

17657. Who judges of the samples?—What are termed the receiving officers, at Deptford, and who also have the assistance of gentlemen connected with the Custom-house Department in London. With regard to rum, the senior gauger was recommended by the Board of Customs, to assist in the selection of that article. Two gentlemen were also recommended by the Customs to assist in selecting tea, sugar, cocoa, as well as other articles, in conjunction with our own officers.

17658. This system has been pursued for many years, has it not?—No, not for many years; it is only for the last two or three years, I think, that we have called in the assistance of the Custom-house officers; we thought it would be more satisfactory to have the opinion of persons unconnected with the Admiralty to give an opinion as to the qualities of the several articles that we wished to purchase.

17659. Did that alteration arise from discovering that some of the supplies sent in and accepted were not of a satisfactory quality?—A great deal of consideration was given to this matter by myself. I then recommended to the Board of Admiralty that this course should be adopted, as I thought it would be beneficial to the service to have the assistance of such individuals.

17660. Did it not arise from any complaints?—Not from any general complaints; there were individual complaints of certain stores, certainly; in some instances there were complaints of certain stores; in small quantities; but not often.

17661. After you have accepted the sample and got the supply, how do you ascertain whether the supply is in accordance with the sample?—We have also made an arrangement at the same time that those officers should attend at Deptford Victualling Yard for the purpose of ascertaining that the bulk of the articles tendered is exactly in unison with the sample that they had previously accepted at Somerset House in conjunction with our own officers at Deptford; for instance, to examine the bulk of the article from the sample, which is at the moment of its acceptance sealed up, and the officers affix their seals to the tin cases in which the samples are put, and those samples are then sent down to the Captain Superintendent at Deptford Victualling Yard, who keeps them in charge till the bulk of the articles is received at the establishment. Then a day is fixed for those officers to go to Deptford to examine the articles in question.

17662. With regard to very large supplies, such as salt beef, that is not all received at Deptford?—No, it is not.

17663. It is received at other places?—Yes.

17664. Do you send the same officers down with the sample to that place to examine the large quantities sent in, and to see whether they are of the same quality as the sample?—That is an exception; we do not employ Custom-house officers to receive salt meat; we have in our other establishments, both at Plymouth, as well as at Gosport, a naval officer in conjunction with our officer, the master attendant, who has been accustomed to eat salt beef, and to see it; and he, in conjunction with the storekeeper of the yard, and the butchers who belong to the establishment, are considered sufficiently competent judges to know whether the meat is good and fit for the service in every respect.

17665. *Chairman.*] You do not buy that by sample?—No; we buy it upon the judgment of those two or three persons at the outports.

17666. Captain *Gladstone.*] Do you buy beef or pork by a particular brand, or mark, on the cask?—No; we put out public advertisements latterly; during the last three or four years, we have merely advertised for salt beef, or salt pork; we take English brands, or Irish brands, or American brands, or Dantzic brands; indeed, in point of fact, it is thrown open.

17667. The brand is supposed to designate the quality, is it not?—In many instances the brands do designate the quality.

17668. *Chairman.*] But you pay no attention to the brand?—If the meat is considered good and fit for the service, the process is this: that on a cargo of salt meat being landed at any victualling yard, it is taken out of the vessel, and every tenth cask, indiscriminately, is rolled into the seasoning or examination-house; the pickle is then drained out, the head is taken off, and each individual piece is taken out of the cask under the examination of those officers, and if the meat is found to be good, sound, and sweet, and the weight is equal to the terms of the contract, then the whole cargo is accepted. If, on the contrary, two, or three, or four of those casks are found to contain tainted meat, or meat not properly, as they term it, messed, not having a sufficiency of salt, or not being properly cured, the whole cargo is rejected.

17669. Lord *Seymour.*] Having accepted the supplies, supposing afterwards that the supplies are found, on board ship, not to be of a good quality, to whom can the officers of the ship make a complaint?—We receive this meat subject to a warranty of 12 months after the date of the receipt of it, and if any complaint is made a survey is held on board the ship, and then the full particulars are stated, that is to say, the victualling yard from which it was received, the brand, the date, and the whole of the particulars, and if we find that this meat is condemned within 12 months, we then call upon the contractor to repay us the value of this meat.

17670. Has this system been adopted with regard to all the supplies that have been furnished by the Admiralty for the army in the Crimea?—Entirely the same system.

17671. Have you received any complaint during the time that the army has been in the Crimea, from the commencement of your furnishing those supplies?—No; I am not aware of a single complaint.

17672. If there had been a complaint would it have been brought to your department?—Most decidedly; I think we have had one complaint respecting the wine, at the commencement.

T. T. Grant, Esq.

2 May 1855.

17673. *Chairman.*] Will you first state what kind of supplies have been furnished by the Admiralty to the army?—Yes.

17674. Lord *Seymour.*] Have you any return of the amount of the quantity and kind of stores?—Yes; we have supplied 13,414,440 lbs. of biscuit; 343,000 gallons of rum; salt beef, 4,700,000 lbs.; salt pork, 5,000,000 lbs.; raw coffee, 300,000 lbs.; whole roasted coffee, 216,000 lbs.; ground coffee, 311,639 lbs.; sugar, 1,352,000 lbs.; rice, 1,347,000 lbs.; tea, 94,573 lbs.; chocolate, 20,002 lbs.; port wine, 2,400 dozens; brandy, 971 gallons; boiled mutton, 3,136 lbs.; essence of beef, 17,924 quarter-pints; sago, 6,732 lbs.; arrowroot, 6,044 lbs.; oatmeal, 424 gallons; concentrated milk, 1,679 gallons; chocolate paste, 1,679 pints; Scotch barley, 116,849 lbs.; preserved beef, 47,370 lbs.; preserved potatoes, 153,380 lbs.; dried potatoes, 30,070 lbs.; onion powder, 4,020 lbs.; dried vegetables, 1,676,640 rations; lemon juice, 46,493 lbs.; hay, 5,204,080 lbs.; and oats, 321,996 lbs.

17675. Mr. *Layard.*] You have the dates, have you not, at which those supplies were furnished?—Yes.

17676. Lord *Seymour.*] Those supplies which you have now read include the whole period in which the Admiralty have furnished supplies; or to what period are those figures applicable?—We commenced making this supply about the middle of March 1854.

17677. What period is included in those amounts which you have read?—The last account which I have here is the 1st of May 1855, when we had shipped 13,414,440 lbs. of biscuit.

17678. Those numbers which you have read refer to the whole amount which you have supplied of those various articles during the year?—Up to the present date; but we are under an engagement, nevertheless, to send out monthly a million and a quarter pounds of biscuit, 600,000 lbs. of salt meat, 45,000 gallons of rum.

17679. Those supplies which you have given are those which you have furnished to the army, exclusive of the supplies for the navy?—Totally so; unconnected entirely with the naval service.

17680. The naval service is quite a separate affair, is it not?—Yes, quite so.

17681. When we read, for instance, of these 153,000 lbs. of preserved potatoes, that was the quantity supplied for the army?—Entirely.

17682. You stated that you had received no complaints as to the supplies furnished, excepting, you were going to say, with regard to port wine; will you explain that?—I am justified in saying that, to the best of my recollection, we have only had one statement complaining of any of the provisions that we sent out, and that was of the first quantity of port wine, the particulars of which I can give the Committee, if they wish it.

17683. What quantity was it; you stated that you supplied altogether 2,400 dozens?—The first quantity that we sent out was 100 dozen, upon a requisition, dated the 28th of February.

17684. *Chairman.*] By whom was that requisition made?—It was made, in the first instance, by Dr. Andrew Smith to the Ordnance, and the Ordnance then sent the requisition on to the Admiralty, and the Admiralty sent it to my department to be complied with.

17685. Captain *Gladstone.*] Was that wine approved of by Dr. Andrew Smith?—No, it was not; we are in the habit of furnishing port wine for the service of the navy, and the course adopted is to obtain it by contract, or the captain-superintendent at Deptford is directed to instruct the storekeeper, and also the medical storekeeper and surgeon of the yard, to select samples of what, in their opinion, is good and fit for the purpose intended. We then select samples, and when the purchase is made, the wine is delivered into the establishment, and is bottled and sent to its destination. When this requisition came, which was the first requisition, I ordered the same course to be adopted with regard to the army that had been adopted previously for the navy. It appears that this wine was sent out, and, I think, was landed at Varna, and the medical officers there found fault with it, inasmuch as they said that it was new and sweet, and they thought it was, what they termed, Cape Pontac, and not real port wine. That complaint was sent home, and in the course of the service it was sent to me. I immediately sent it down to the captain-superintendent at Deptford, and requested that he would call upon

upon the officers to report upon this wine, and they did report upon it, and the report I considered very satisfactory.

17686. *Chairman.*] Were those the same officers who had furnished the wine?—Yes.

17687. You referred the matter to the persons complained of?—The report came to me, and the only course that I could adopt was to send it down to the captain-superintendent at Deptford, who had been directed to take the necessary steps to purchase the port wine, to take such measures as he thought right to get a report from the officers.

17688. It was referred to the persons complained of to decide upon the truth of that complaint?—Decidedly; I have got their report amongst my papers, but at this moment I cannot lay my hand on it. No portion of this wine having been returned to this country, not any other course could be adopted.

17689. Mr. *Bramston.*] Who was the captain-superintendent at Deptford?—Captain Austin, the officer in command of the North Pole Expedition.

17690. Lord *Seymour.*] He was the person who procured the wine, was he not?—He was the person who directed it to be procured, under his superintendence.

17691. He was also the person to whom you referred the complaint respecting the wine?—Certainly. On the 17th of October 1854, the War Office complained that the wine shipped in the "Belbic" steamer, in April 1854, was new and sweet, and apparently of an inferior quality, strongly resembling the flavour and appearance of Cape Pontac; that letter was referred, as I stated before, to the captain-superintendent at Deptford, and he reported that it was selected from many samples for its superior quality, being full-bodied, fruity, and well suited for hospital purposes. It may not have been in the best condition so recently after a voyage out, but for its genuine quality the officers could readily vouch; upon which I reported to the Board that it was selected for its superior quality, being full-bodied and fruity, and well suited for hospital purposes, and that the officers at Deptford Victualling Yard had been assisted in the selection thereof by the medical storekeeper, and that they could not account for its condemnation by the surveying officer at Varna; and I enclosed for the War Office a copy of the report received from the captain-superintendent at Deptford.

17692. *Chairman.*] What steps were taken when the wine was bought, by sample, to ascertain that the wine bought agreed with the sample?—The officer that selected the samples completed the purchase, and ordered the wine to be sent in to the establishment at Deptford, not in bottle, but it was sent in in cask; and on the wine being received there, it underwent the usual survey, the officers examined the wine, and were satisfied that this wine was equal to the sample which had been selected.

17693. Have you evidence of all that?—I cannot say that I have written evidence; but that is the course of the service, not only with regard to port wine, but every other article that is purchased in the way that I now describe; after those complaints, no wine was purchased for the army service until a sample had been sent up, and that sample sent to Dr. Andrew Smith for his approval; and upon his approval being obtained, the purchase was effected; but the fact is, that the wine which we subsequently purchased was in bottle, and at a very great expense. I think we paid for the samples which Dr. Andrew Smith selected at the rate of 40 *s.* a dozen. For that which we had selected ourselves, we only paid at the rate of 25 *s.*, without the drawback; that which was chosen by Dr. Smith was a very superior wine, an old and mellow wine.

17694. Did you pay 25 *s.* in the wood?—Yes; without the drawback.

17695. It was not bottled?—No.

17696. Lord *Seymour.*] It appears, from what you have stated as to the purchase of this wine, that in purchasing the first quantity of port wine, you departed from the usual system of having a sample, and purchasing by the sample sent to Somerset House?—No; that is the usual system whenever in cases of emergency we want to buy sago, or articles of that description, which are not considered rations, for the navy, orders are given to the captain-superintendent at Deptford to make the best purchases of such as he may consider good and fit for the purpose; the samples are not sent to Somerset House at all.

T. T. Grant, Esq.
2 May 1855.

17697. With regard to those articles which are for the medical department and for the navy, the selection of them is left to the captain-superintendent at Deptford?—Those we are obliged to purchase, otherwise the Director-general of the medical department of the navy supplies many articles of his own, that is to say, sago and arrowroot; but when we were called upon to supply those articles for the army, we took the course that we generally take with regard to purchasing other similar articles.

17698. You stated that port wine was one article complained of out of that large quantity of supplies furnished to the army; have you received complaints of any other article?—I cannot call to my recollection that we have received a single complaint of any other article.

17699. You have described the mode in which the Admiralty proceed to judge of the quality of the articles; will you now state who is responsible that the quantity of articles sent in shall accord with the quantity that is afterwards to be paid for by the Admiralty?—Previously to the shipment of any article that is sent out for the army service, we take care that the quantity is equal to that demanded; and on the shipment being effected, we require the master of the vessel to sign three receipts, and one receipt is sent to the consignee, the second receipt is kept by the captain-superintendent to be transmitted to London with the storekeepers' accounts, and the third receipt is sent to my office in London, as a check upon the storekeepers' accounts. At the same time, with regard to the army service, we immediately inform the Treasury, or the Ordnance, or the War Department, that with reference to their requisition of such and such a date, the purchases have been effected, or the provisions have been prepared, and that they have been shipped in such and such a vessel, and consigned to such and such parties, as they stated in their requisition.

17700. Before we come to your correspondence with the other departments, will you state more distinctly who is responsible for the quantity delivered in; do you trust to the bill of lading which is signed by the captain who receives it?—The individual who is responsible is the store-receiver at Deptford, who is responsible that the quantities which he receives are correct.

17701. Supposing they are received at Portsmouth or at Cork, who is responsible then?—Then the storekeeper; latterly we have had a store-receiver, since the commencement of the war; for we found the pressure so great at Portsmouth and Plymouth that I recommended to the Admiralty that we should adopt the same course in those two yards as at Deptford; but previously to the introduction of the store-receivers at Plymouth and Portsmouth, the storekeepers, in conjunction with the master-attendant of the establishments, received the goods, and were responsible that they were equal in quality and in quantity to that which was contracted for.

17702. Then the store-receiver at the outport is responsible for the quantity?—Decidedly.

17703. During your experience of the victualling department of the Admiralty, has it ever occurred that the quantity said to be delivered in has not agreed with the quantity of any article actually delivered in?—I am not aware at this moment of any instance whatever.

17704. To the best of your belief, have none such occurred?—No; to the best of my belief, there is such a complete check upon the store-receiver, because on his receiving a given quantity of goods or provisions, he makes it over to the storekeeper, and the storekeeper debits himself with the quantity; the storekeeper also takes care that the quantity which he receives is actually and *bonâ fide* quantity delivered, otherwise he would be deficient in his accounts.

17705. When the Commissariat request you to send out a certain amount of supplies, you immediately advertise to obtain them, do you not, unless you have them in store?—Precisely.

17706. You then proceed to take up freight to send them out, or send them out in any vessels that may be going?—Yes; we take means to do so.

17707. Do you always and invariably acquaint either the Ordnance or the Commissariat at the time when you have despatched such stores?—Directly a vessel is completed we immediately write to the department that made the requisition, stating that the articles are shipped, giving them the quantities that are shipped, and the prices that those articles have cost the Admiralty.

17708. Do

17708. Do you give them the date when you despatch them, and the quantity, and the cost?—Yes.

17709. Did you send such an answer as that to the War Department during last autumn?—Yes; invariably.

17710. Was it sent to the Secretary-at-War, or to the department of the Secretary of War?—It was sent from my department in the first instance to Whitehall, for the purpose of obtaining the signature of the Secretary of the Admiralty.

17711. Afterwards where did it go to?—Then it is brought back to my department, and I despatch it to the Secretary for War; I do not correspond with the Secretary of State himself, under the existing orders. I can only correspond with him through my own Board of Admiralty.

17712. You believe that it went to the Minister of War?—I have every reason to believe that it did, because we are very particular as to that.

17713. As the Secretary-at-War is responsible for all the expenditure, did no copy of this go to him from your department?—If the Secretary for War made a requisition, it went directly to the Secretary for War; whatever department made the requisition, then, of course, we sent it to the party that did make it.

17714. Whatever department sends a requisition gets an answer when that requisition has been fulfilled?—Yes.

17715. Did you, in the course of the autumn, keep the Secretary of War informed of all the supplies that you were furnishing for the service of the army?—Yes; immediately upon the cargo being completed, a letter was written to the Secretary for War, stating that we had shipped, as we are doing now, 1,250,000 pounds of biscuit monthly, and other articles, in such and such a vessel, consigned to such and such parties, according to requisition.

17716. *Chairman.*] You gave that information to the Secretary for War, without reference to the requisition coming from him; from whomsoever the requisition came you sent the requisition?—Exactly; when it came from the Treasury, of course the answer went to the Treasury; but immediately on the Commissariat being transferred to the Secretary for War, of course our communications went to him.

17717. Without reference to the person from whom the requisition came, did you whenever you supplied the army acquaint the Minister for War that you had so done; or did you merely acquaint him when the requisition came from him?—No; we acquainted him directly he became responsible for the supplies of the army; we then communicated that information to the Secretary for War direct; we never made any shipment for the army service after the Commissariat was transferred to the Secretary for War, without acquainting the Secretary for War that we had done so.

17718. Mr. *Layard.*] Before that whom did you acquaint?—The Secretaries of the Treasury.

17719. When your communications were with the Treasury, whom did you address in the Treasury?—The Secretaries of the Treasury.

17720. Lord *Seymour.*] Amongst the supplies, the account of which you have read, did you include the supplies of forage which you have furnished?—Yes.

17721. Have you got the dates when you sent those supplies?—Yes; I can furnish them.

17722. Forage is a supply which the Admiralty do not usually furnish?—No; very seldom indeed.

17723. Therefore it was a new service?—Yes; it was a new service to us entirely.

17724. Having that new service, what means had you for the due performance of that service?—Upon our being directed to send out a certain quantity of forage with the horses that were embarked, we advertised for forage; I think the original order was that we were to send out six months' rations for each of those horses so embarked; but when the horses were embarked we found that the vessels would only contain a certain quantity of forage; some more and some less; and after those horses were despatched we had a report that there was a certain quantity of forage remaining in store that we had no means

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of shipping, and requested directions; we received directions subsequently to ship it for the Crimea.

17725. Who selected the forage?—We attempted at first to go to public contract to obtain this forage, but, strange as it may appear, I think we only had one tender, and that was only to a very small amount. We then thought it desirable to write to some eight or nine, or ten or twelve, I forget the exact number of individuals, in the corn trade, requesting that they would send us in tenders of the quantity which they would undertake to supply, regularly pressed and packed, and subjected to such inspection as the Government or the Admiralty might think proper to institute; we received offers from those several individuals, but as it was not supposed that the naval authorities could know a great deal about forage, the Admiralty then suggested that we should obtain assistance of military officers; and they attended, and, in conjunction with our officers, inspected the hay; and that which was good was accepted, and that which was not good was of course rejected. There was a great quantity of hay tendered by those individuals that was not considered good and fit for the purpose, and that was rejected.

17726. The military authority who was present had the power to reject the hay if he thought fit?—Yes.

17727. When was that system adopted?—From the commencement.

17728. Captain *Gladstone.*] What is the system under which the hay is examined; at what period is it examined by the military officer; before it is packed or pressed?—No; we require it to be sent in packed, and then we take, every now and then, a bundle of this hay from the stack which is sent in, and it is opened; the bands are cut and the hay is examined, and surveyed.

17729. A certain number of trusses?—Yes; as many as the officers think desirable, so as to satisfy their minds that the hay is good.

17730. Is not that a very troublesome operation?—It is.

17731. Would it not be more advisable to have some person to attend at the packing of it, to see that the quality was good?—No; one or two individuals wished us to do that, but there was a difficulty when we thought about it, because the hay was obtained from different parts of the country, and it would have been necessary to have sent three, or four, or five, or eight, or ten, individuals down to be constantly on the spot, to see that this hay was actually and *boná fide* packed, and was good; at the moment we had no means to do that. Some was bought at Liverpool, some in Ireland, some at Dublin, some at Haulbowline, and in different parts of the country; at Portsmouth and Southampton; and we thought the better plan would be to let the contractor send the hay into the department, and then for the hay to be subject to such examination as we thought proper to institute.

17732. It was always examined by a military officer, was it?—Always.

17733. Did you receive accounts of all the hay that you sent out having arrived at its destination?—We have received accounts of a certain number of those vessels having arrived with hay. I do not think we have of the whole of them; certainly not all.

17734. Not all that you ought to have received?—No, not all that we ought to have received.

17735. Lord *Seymour.*] You have been asked respecting the mode of obtaining these various articles, as to your security that the quantity is delivered, and as to the persons who are responsible; will you now state from whom you receive the acknowledgement that the goods have been received at the place to which they were sent; for instance, in army stores for the Crimea?—The Admiralty consider, after they have obtained the bill of lading, and the three receipts from the master, and taken the course I have before explained, that their duty and responsibility for the shipment is complete; but at the same time we take care that the freight for those cargoes is not paid until we receive in the office the bill of lading, signed by the consignees, stating that the goods have been delivered, that they are equal in quantity to that which is stated in the bill of lading to have been shipped, and that the cargo has been delivered in good condition. On receiving that document, the freight for the goods is paid by the Admiralty; we conceive that it is for the commissary or the consignee, whoever he may be, to render his accounts to his own department that those articles have been received, and that they have been delivered

delivered in good condition, and so forth. At the same time, at the end of the quarter we make what is termed a declaration of the stores that have been shipped by the Admiralty to the department that orders them, giving a detail of the shipment and the price, requesting payment for the same.

17736. Supposing, for instance, you are requested to send out a large quantity, such as you have been required to send out, of preserved potatoes to the Crimea, you have, as I understand you, no receipt from the Crimea showing you that those things have arrived, and have been delivered?—That is not a part of the Admiralty business; we know that a great many of those things have arrived and have been delivered, but it is not a part of my business to know when they were delivered.

17737. *Chairman.*] You stated, did you not, that you have a receipt from the consignee?—He gives that to the master of the vessel, and the master of the vessel is responsible to us that he has delivered his cargo.

17738. Does he not bring that receipt from the consignee before he is paid?—Yes.

17739. Then are not you acquainted with the arrival of the goods by that receipt?—Decidedly.

17740. Captain *Gladstone.*] Has the freight been paid for the hay, the arrival of which you have not heard of?—Decidedly not.

17741. Lord *Seymour.*] Before you make a payment, you receive a receipt from the consignee, given to you by the captain, but you do not pay, perhaps for a year after, in many of these cases?—Possibly not. We have just got over the twelvemonth; but, as the Committee may be aware, I have now nothing to do with the transport business: it rests entirely with the transport authorities.

17742. You stated that you receive a receipt from the captain?—Yes.

17743. You sent out, did you not, many vessels in February and March 1854?—Yes.

17744. Some of those captains were not paid for nine or ten months afterwards, were they?—No.

17745. Not for a year?—There may be some cases.

17746. Therefore it would take 10 months or a year before you would be officially made acquainted, by the letter of the consignee, when those goods arrived at the Crimea?—Yes; I should have considered it my duty, if any great lapse of time had taken place after the shipment of those stores, to have written to the broker, or the owner of the vessel at any rate, to know whether those stores had been delivered.

17747. You stated, did you not, that you do not receive the acknowledgments of the consignee till the captain comes to be paid?—As regards army stores, the brokers send in the bill of lading. I ought to have stated, that whenever a vessel is taken up for the conveyance of army stores, or our own stores, there is a debtor and creditor account opened with the vessel immediately, and everything that is put on board of her we take an account of, and which account corresponds with the bill of lading, and when the bill of lading comes back properly receipted, then the freight of those stores is paid, but if it is not properly receipted, then, of course, the money is not paid.

17748. But that bill of lading may not come back for 10 months?—It may not.

17749. Therefore you may be, during the whole of those 10 months, ignorant whether or not the stores ordered have been received?—As regards army stores, but not as regards naval stores.

17750. With regard to naval stores, you have an advantage. You hear of the arrival sooner, do you not?—With regard to navy stores we hear sooner. Whenever we determine to send out a cargo of provisions to any part of the world, we write a letter to the consignee stating that it is our intention to send out such and such articles of provisions, and that on those provisions being shipped, another letter will be written, stating when they are shipped; and we also require that the consignee, or the authorities to whom they are sent, shall send to us periodical returns, stating whether those ships have arrived or whether they have not arrived; if they have not arrived they always specify that they are not arrived. We then watch the proceeding, and if they do not arrive within a certain time, and the next letter comes still showing that they are not arrived, then we should take measures to ascertain what had become of them.

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17751. Therefore there is a better system of check as regards the stores sent out for the naval service than you have with regard to any stores that you send out for the army service?—It appears to me to be so.

17752. Captain *Gladstone.*] Can you state why the coffee was sent out green?—The first requisition that was made to us to send out coffee was for coffee in an unroasted state; it certainly did appear to me strange at the first moment that we should send out raw coffee.

17753. Had you any correspondence with Commissary-general Filder on the subject?—Yes; and before I gave orders for the purchase of unroasted coffee, I thought it desirable to address a letter to Commissary-general Filder to know whether he was quite correct in asking or requiring that unroasted coffee should be sent out.

17754. What was the date of that letter?—It was on the 27th of February 1854 that I wrote.

17755. Will you just read the letter?—I have not got a copy of my own note, but I have Commissary-general Filder's note in answer to mine, which is dated the 28th of February. He says, "I was unable to answer your note of yesterday till I had consulted some military officers on the subject to which it relates. The soldiers will, no doubt, find some means of overcoming any difficulty that may arise from the want of mills and coffee-roasters." The coffee should, consequently, be unburnt, as before proposed.

17756. *Chairman.*] Where was that letter written from?—From the Treasury.

17757. Then your letter was received by him while he was in England?—Yes; I am bound to say this, that Commissary-general Filder called upon me a few days afterwards, on the subject of supplies of biscuit and other articles, requesting that all the stores that he would require should be sent out in very small packages; I think not exceeding 100 lbs.; he also referred to the coffee question again, and said, "We are quite right about the coffee, inasmuch as it is not intended as a regular ration for the troops; it is a kind of extra ration for them, supposing they choose to purchase it, and I should like it to be sent out in small packages, inasmuch as we do not know when it will come into use; in all probability we shall have to put it in bags and to take it a good way up the country and on mules' backs, and therefore if we have it in a roasted state, in all probability the thing will get spoiled, and the better plan will be to send it to us certainly in an unroasted state."

17758. Captain *Gladstone.*] Did you propose to supply coffee mills at any time?—Yes, I did.

17759. *Chairman.*] Did you supply any?—We had a number of mills that we supply the navy with for grinding pepper, and it struck me that they might be made applicable for the purpose of grinding coffee; indeed I tried the experiment, and found it answer the purpose very well.

17760. Did you ascertain how long it took to grind a pound of coffee by one of those mills?—I did not try it; they are small mills; I proposed them to the Treasury, and they gave an order that a small supply might be sent out.

17761. What number was there sent out?—They ordered only six, to the best of my recollection.

17762. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated that they were small mills, did you not?—I should say that they were about that size (*describing the same*); common pepper mills.

17763. Are you acquainted with those small mills that the Turks use?—No, I have never seen them.

17764. They were very small?—Yes; six would go a very small way for grinding coffee.

17765. Captain *Gladstone.*] When did you make the suggestion as to sending out coffee mills?—I made the suggestion on the 5th of July 1854.

17766. Did you repeat that suggestion at a later date?—No, because we got an order to send out six upon that suggestion.

17767. Supposing it had been determined to supply coffee mills, would it have been the duty of your department to have supplied them?—If the War Department or the Treasury had made any requisition to us of any kind we certainly should have complied with it.

17768. General *Peel.*] If a large supply of mills had been required, would not

not the proper course have been to apply to the Ordnance?—I fancy that would have been the better course, rather than applying to us.

17769. *Chairman.*] You are not aware that any application was made for more pepper mills, and that they were sent out?—No.

17770. Mr. *Layard.*] Who sent out the six coffee grinders?—I did. I said we had pepper mills in store, and they could be supplied if the authorities thought proper to send them out; and in answer to that, we were directed to send out six of those mills.

17771. Do you know on what grounds the calculation was made that six mills would be sufficient?—I have not the slightest idea.

17772. *Chairman.*] You stated, did you not, that you sent out some roasted coffee?—Yes.

17773. By whom was that requisition sent to you?—The first requisition for roasted coffee was sent to us by the Treasury.

17774. How was it packed?—In tight casks, barrels, &c. When the requisition was sent to us for roasted coffee it struck me that it would be very desirable to roast it in our own establishment, to ensure its being genuine and of proper quality, and because we found that buying it in a roasted state was very expensive. I think it cost us about 16 *l.* per ton more buying it roasted than it would cost us to roast it in our establishment. I put myself in communication with the officers of several victualling yards, to ask them whether they considered that the rotary kilns we had for roasting cocoa and peas and drying wheat could be made applicable for roasting coffee. They tried the experiment, and found it answer admirably well. We then went a step further, and being at the Clarence Victualling Yard, I proposed that we should try whether the same apparatus we had there for grinding malt could not also be made applicable for grinding coffee. We tried that experiment, and it answered very well.

17775. What was the date of that?—That was on the 6th of January 1855.

17776. So that you did not send out ground coffee till the 6th of January 1855?—I think that was the first consignment.

17777. How was the roasted coffee packed?—The roasted coffee in the berry was packed in what we term tight casks, that is to say, they are water-tight and air-tight, in small packages; as to the ground coffee, we had proposed that it should be packed in tin canisters, and that the tin canisters should be so formed that they might be made applicable for culinary purposes after the coffee was removed from them; those canisters were then put into battened cases, to prevent them becoming injured.

17778. How did you pack the green coffee?—It was put into tight casks also.

17779. So that between the packing of the roasted and unroasted coffee there was no special difference?—No.

17780. What was the weight of the barrel in which the unroasted coffee was placed?—It varied from about 200 lbs. to about 90 or 95 lbs.

17781. Could two of them be very easily carried by a horse?—It was supposed that two of them could be carried.

17782. Mr. *Layard.*] Was the calculation made with reference to our horses, or the horses in the East?—I think Commissary-general Filder stated that his wishes were that a mule or a horse should be able to take two of them, slung on either side.

17783. *Chairman.*] Those packages being air-tight, was there any possibility of the aroma of the coffee escaping?—I cannot positively say whether there was or was not; it is of a very volatile nature, and the aroma of the coffee passes off very quickly.

17784. It is not more volatile than air?—Perhaps not; we have not received any reports yet respecting the coffee sent, either the ground or roasted coffee, whether it has answered.

17785. Lord *Seymour.*] When was the first roasted coffee sent out?—In July 1854 we sent out some roasted coffee, 5,000 lbs.

17786. To be tried?—It was not stated for what purpose.

17787. *Chairman.*] Have you received any account of that coffee?—No.

17788. Lord *Seymour.*] Did you send any more roasted coffee, and if so, when did you send it?—Yes, we did send out more roasted coffee, but after that we sent out unroasted coffee.

17789. According to the requisition of the Commissariat?—Yes

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17790. *Chairman.*] So that they sent out unroasted coffee without having heard that the roasted coffee did not answer well?—I am not aware that they have received any communication to that effect.

17791. Mr. *Layard.*] When was the last batch of unroasted coffee sent out?—I think the last batch that was sent out was on the 4th of October 1854.

17792. Unroasted?—Yes.

17793. Has no unroasted coffee been sent out since that time?—Thirty-nine thousand five hundred and thirty-four pounds, that was the last, was sent out on the 4th of October by the "Lion" steamer.

17794. Captain *Gladstone.*] You stated that Commissary-general Filder gave instructions to make the packages not more than 100 lbs. in weight; that I presume was confined to light articles, and did not include beef and pork?—No; he wished the packages to be as small as possible; for instance, we are now shipping, under a requisition, about 45,000 gallons of rum every month, and a large portion of it is sent out in 10-gallon casks; so that it is necessary to manufacture about 5,000 casks nearly every month for the shipping of this one article alone.

17795. What was the weight of the beef and pork casks?—The tierces weigh 304 and 320 lbs. respectively.

17796. How old is the rum that is supplied to the navy?—Not above a few months perhaps; we have it in store above three months before it is shipped.

17797. Is it difficult to get it old?—We buy it by sample; it is comparatively new.

17798. Is not new rum considered rather injurious to health?—I believe that what is termed new rum, that recently manufactured, is considered injurious, particularly in the West Indies.

17799. Did you supply the army with rum of the same age as you had been in the habit of supplying to the navy?—Yes; we took it from the same vats.

17800. Have you sent out more than one supply of preserved meat?—The first supply that we sent out was on the 8th July 1854; we sent out a second quantity on the 26th January 1855.

17801. Have any further contracts been made?—No further contracts have been made.

17802. For what reason?—The Admiralty, indeed the Government, after the experience that we have had respecting preserved meats; of the trickery and roguery, if I may use the expression, to which we have been subjected, thought proper to introduce into their advertisements a very stringent regulation, which was that although the meat was to be received in the first instance at our victualling yards at home, yet the final receipt of it was not made till its arrival in the Crimea; and the Government required that an agent should be sent out to the Crimea to be present at the time the meat was received there, and if it was not considered good, and fit for the use of the troops, the meat should be then turned over to this agent, for him to be bound to remove it immediately.

17803. Did the contractors refuse to comply with those terms?—Invariably; we wrote letters to several contractors, embodying what I now describe; but every one of them stated that they would not comply with those terms, and therefore refused to send any meat under those restrictions.

17804. Therefore no more is likely to be sent out?—No more is likely to be sent out.

17805. *Chairman.*] Have any peculiar plans been submitted to the Admiralty for packing that preserved meat?—I believe most of the methods adopted by the different manufacturers are nearly the same; they only vary slightly.

17806. You are not aware of a plan having been submitted to the Admiralty for having a canister with a screwed top instead of a soldered one?—Some time ago, I think there was a letter written to that effect by an individual, stating that he thought that he could introduce a canister that would be very superior to the common preserved-meat canister, and that it would tend to preserve the meat as well as by the process generally introduced by other manufacturers. The subject was then brought under the consideration of the proper authorities, and I think we sent it to the officers at Deptford particularly to report upon it, and they reported against it; they said that they did not conceive that it possessed any advantage over the canister then in use, and the Admiralty decided not to adopt the plan proposed by him; he was at the same time told, if I remember

remember rightly, that if he chose to send in a certain number of those canisters for an experiment, an experiment would be tried, and the matter would be then taken into further consideration.

17807. Can you put in any further papers respecting the contracts for preserved meats?—Yes, if it is necessary.

17808. Lord *Seymour.*] You were one of the officers at the Admiralty who superintended the Transport service?—Yes.

17809. When a requisition for a vessel to be sent out was made from the War Department, you can give to this Committee, can you not, the date of the requisition, and also the date when the vessel actually sailed?—No doubt the Transport Board can; I cannot in my department.

17810. If, for instance, an application was made last August for a vessel to be sent out with warm clothing, you can give the answer of the Admiralty as to when the vessel was ready to sail, so that this Committee may clearly understand whether the delay occurred with the Admiralty in providing the vessel, or with the Ordnance in providing the clothing?—Certainly.

17811. *Chairman.*] Will you direct your attention to the mode of receiving tenders; I did not gather entirely from you what took place; when a tender is accepted to whom is it entrusted, so as to keep the tender and the sample connected with that tender together?—No tenders are accepted except under the authority of the superintending Lord of the Admiralty. If he approves of a tender being accepted, he writes "Approved," and signs his initials to it.

17812. Supposing there is a tender to the Admiralty, proposing to furnish you with a certain amount of coffee, do the sample and the tender come together, or how is that tender connected with that sample preserved after the tender is accepted?—The sample itself is sent down to the officer at the yard who is to receive the bulk of the article, and a letter is also sent down.

17813. Is the sample sent down immediately?—It is sent down immediately; the next day, if the Admiralty boat then goes to Deptford.

17814. It is never out of the sight of the authorities of the Admiralty?—Never further than this; when the store-receiver, and the other officer I mentioned, accept a sample, before they leave the room they put the sample, if it is sugar, or cocoa, or coffee, into a tin; that is immediately done up, and put up in paper, and they affix their seals to it, and it is directed by the store-receiver, and there is a box expressly for the purpose, and these samples are sent down to Deptford, to the care of the captain-superintendent of the yard, and the Admiralty in London have no further cognizance of the sample after that process has been carried out.

17815. When a tender is sent in and accepted, upon producing certain samples, what is done with that tender then?—It goes immediately from our department to the Contract Department, and the contract is drawn up upon that tender.

17816. What precaution is taken to make that department understand that this sample is connected with this contract?—Because the tender and treaty paper go up to that department with the signature of the superintending Lord, showing that he has accepted such and such a tender. He not only signs the tender, but he also signs the treaty paper, which is the paper that I have before explained, on which all tenders are inserted, and then against the tender accepted he writes "Approved," and signs his initials.

17817. You state that the coffee is put into canisters, and sealed with the seals of the officers?—Yes, or with the official sample seal.

17818. Thus canister A is connected with tender A?—Yes.

17819. How does the other authority to whom you send the canister know that it really belongs to tender A?—They know nothing about it; all their business is to take care that the article that is sent in in bulk is the same as that which is sent down as the sample; and a copy of the contract, when drawn, is also sent down for their guidance, and therefore they receive the article upon the contract that is drawn in London, which contract, of course, embodies the particulars of the tender.

17820. Among the articles supplied by the Admiralty, is there any clothing for the army?—No.

17821. General *Peel.*] It has been asserted, or insinuated, that after the

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tenders had been accepted the samples have been changed; is that, in your opinion, possible?—I do not conceive that that is possible.

17822. Mr. *Layard.*] In answer to a question put by the Honourable Chairman, you stated that the article tendered for was sent down to the authorities where the bulk was to be received; but that, I presume, is the sample which is selected by the Board, is it not?—Yes.

17823. What the Committee wish to ascertain is this, whether the tender and the sample are always kept together, so as to avoid the possibility of a change of the sample during the process of its going through your department?—The tender, immediately on its being approved of by the superintending Lord, goes at once to the Contract Office, for the contract to be drawn upon it; it goes to the Contract Department.

17824. From whence?—From my department.

17825. With the sample?—No.

17826. Where does the sample remain?—It is immediately done up by the individuals who select the sample.

17827. Who are the individuals?—The store-receiver is our own officer at Deptford, in conjunction with the officers of the Customs, who attend to make the selection with him, and then, in their presence, previously to their going away from the office, or before they leave the room, the samples are put into this tin box, and they are sealed up in their presence, and directed.

17828. Are all the samples put into the same tin box?—No; each sample is put into a separate box.

17829. How do you know to which sample the tender refers?—Because the tender shows what mark has been placed on the sample by the person tendering. The other samples that are not accepted are directed to be taken away by the persons who tender them; we do not keep them.

17830. Are those returned the same day that they are sent in?—Latterly, at least during the last two or three years, we thought it desirable to insert in our advertisements, with regard to those samples not accepted, that the individuals who tender them should be requested to remove them forthwith, and some do immediately remove them.

17831. Is it left to the option of those who send them in?—Entirely; they are requested to do so. Some do not come till perhaps the following morning to remove them.

17832. Are those samples kept in the same room?—Those that are not accepted are always locked up, and kept locked up until the individuals call to receive them.

17833. In whose care are they?—They are generally locked up in the board-room; and what is termed the head messenger of the department has the charge of that key.

17834. Who is the head messenger?—The head messenger in my department is a person of the name of Brookman.

17835. Is it possible that he could change the samples?—It is impossible, without breaking the seals of those samples that are accepted.

17836. Has he the care of the seals?—No; they are the private seals of individuals, or the official sample seal.

17837. Are there no corresponding seals in the office of any kind?—Certainly not.

17838. It would be impossible, in your opinion, for him to break a seal and re-affix another seal?—I should think so.

17839. Are you convinced of that?—That is my impression.

17840. Could he have access to the seals?—No.

17841. *Chairman.*] Could he have access to the canisters?—It is decidedly his duty to pack those canisters, and to take care that they are sent down to the victualling yard; it is his duty.

17842. Mr. *Layard.*] Are the Committee to understand, that after a sample has been approved by the Board, that sample which is approved, with the others that are disapproved of, are handed over to the head messenger?—He has the charge of the accepted samples after having been sealed up and directed by the officers, and also of the unaccepted samples, till the individuals call to receive them.

17843. Do you think it possible that any change should have been made during that period?—I cannot conceive that it is possible, further than this, that if the individual chooses to break the seals that have been affixed to those samples, and to change them for other samples, it is most decidedly possible for him to do so.

17844. Have any representations been made to you upon the subject of the possibility of that change being made?—I do not recollect any statement of that kind.

17845. Have none whatever been sent to you?—I cannot say positively, as I do not recollect; there have been several letters on different subjects connected with contracts at different times, but I do not recollect any particular case.

17846. Are you aware whether an impression has got abroad that some change, or some unfair play does take place with regard to samples and tenders in that department?—I do not think so; I do not recollect any case of that kind.

17847. When an advertisement is issued for tenders, are more than two or three subjects inserted in the tender, or only one?—For rum we generally advertise alone, because latterly, in consequence of increased competition, we have sometimes as many as 270 or 280 samples of rum, and the whole day, or the greater part of the day, is occupied in selecting the samples, and therefore, with regard to rum, we generally keep it entirely by itself; but in the advertisements with regard to other articles, we generally put the tea, chocolate, tobacco, and sugar together, because the Custom-house officers, who assist us in selecting the samples, are thereby saved the time and trouble of coming two or three times.

17848. In that case, are the things accepted in gross, or is each article accepted according to the tender specially made with regard to that article?—Entirely according to the tender that is made.

17849. That is to say, each article is taken separately?—Yes, entirely.

17850. You do not take the whole number of things together?—No, they are kept totally separate.

17851. You compare the tender with the sample, and take each article according to the sample and the offer made?—Exactly.

17852. It has been stated to me that it is possible that persons may be given to understand that when several articles are included in an advertisement, only a certain portion are intended to be taken up, and therefore having that knowledge, they know exactly those that will be taken up, and make their tenders accordingly; do you think that is possible?—I should say it is quite impossible. We do not know ourselves, and particularly during the war, for though we may advertise for 20,000 gallons of rum, we may take up 60,000 or 70,000 gallons, simply because, after the advertisement has appeared in the public prints, we may have a requisition from abroad, or from the army, which would perhaps double or quadruple the quantity that we advertised for, and therefore, on the day of the contract, a quantity is then accepted, according to the wants of the service, and this constantly occurs.

17853. Your impression is, that no unfair play could take place after the tenders are sent in?—I conscientiously believe that no unfair play can take place, or does take place.

17854. Supposing that the samples are rather bulky, how are they sent?—We only require a small quantity, about 2 lbs. of tea or sugar.

17855. How is liquid sent?—It is generally in pint bottles, according to each party's mark.

17856. Where is that put?—We have a basket or box made on purpose for it, so as to prevent the glass breaking.

17857. When it is put into the box the thing is perfectly secure?—I think so. I do not know a single instance of a sample of rum having been broken in sending it from the Admiralty to Deptford.

17858. You stated that a box is kept at the Admiralty, and that when tenders are made the tenders and the samples are put into the box?—Not the tenders; they never go out of the office at all; they go away from the board-room into the contract-room.

17859. But I mean before they get to the board-room?—There is a tender-box placed in the hall, and the people put in their tenders exactly at the hour specified;

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specified; we are particular to a minute; because it is desirable to draw the line very closely; some individuals will come in a minute afterwards and wish to put in tenders, and say that they were delayed and did not find the tender-box, and make excuses; therefore the invariable rule is this, that no tender whatever is to be received after the clock strikes the hour of one.

17860. Do the samples accompany the tenders then?—Usually the samples are immediately brought into the board-room and placed there till the tenders are taken down, and then the selection takes place.

17861. Then it is necessary for the protection of the person who makes the tender that his sample should be sent in almost the very moment before the tenders are opened?—No, he may send it in at any hour he pleases before one.

17862. Supposing, for instance, a tender is placed in the box and the sample is sent into the board-room the day before?—That is very rarely done.

17863. But supposing that to be the case, under whose care does the sample then fall?—I should say then, as it is brought into the board-room, I should consider it under my charge.

17864. At night it is under the charge of somebody, is it not?—Just the same as all our books and vouchers and everything else; there are watchmen in the building who have charge of the rooms at night.

17865. *Chairman.*] How do you know what sample refers to what tender?—The tender states how each sample is marked, the package is undone, and we put the contents of it into a square box; a table is fitted up expressly, lettered "A," "B," "C," "D," &c., and the individuals who examine the samples are then called in to make their selection without knowing the individual who sends in the samples or the price.

17866. Those you say are put into a canister and sealed with the seals of the persons choosing them, then they are sent to the department which takes the gross produce in; how do they know that the seals are the seals of the persons using them?—They cannot know that; certainly not.

17867. You might send down any canister with any seals containing samples, and the person who receives that canister would not know that they were the real seals of the persons purporting to send them; why should that be so?—Simply because it would not do to have the officers up from Plymouth, or from Portsmouth, to select those samples; it would draw them away from their work; therefore we always have, as I said before, a store-receiver from Deptford, in conjunction with the Customhouse officer, to make those selections.

17868. When a thing is sealed, say with three seals, and it is sent to the person who opens them, how does he know that those three seals are the seals of the person sending them?—He does not know.

17869. Then if a person intended to impose upon the Admiralty he would take a canister, and put three seals upon it, not saying that they were the same seals, and send them on; how then would the persons to whom they were sent know that any trick had been played with that canister?—I do not suppose they would if the parties chose to be rogues.

17870. All precautions of this sort are taken against rogues; you do not take precautions against honest men, and when you take a precaution you take one which you think will preclude the possibility of a rogue attaining his ends; I have shown you a means by which a rogue could attain his ends?—Yes.

17871. Mr. *Layard.*] Have you ever heard it asserted that persons in the Admiralty have taken bribes with regard to contracts?—No; no instance ever came to my knowledge.

17872. Did you see an instance, mentioned the other day in the press, as to a contract for a lighthouse?—That did not come under my observation.

17873. That has never been brought to your knowledge?—Never to my knowledge.

17874. General *Peel.*] Supposing it was possible for the sample to be changed, what would the effect be; the Board select the sample, do they not?—Yes.

17875. And they inform the person sending it that his tender has been accepted?—Yes.

17876. Then I understand that the sample is sealed up, and forwarded to the place where the bulk is to be received?—Yes.

17877. The

17877. The contractor would naturally send in the article according to the sample which he had sent in?—Yes.

17878. Therefore if the best sample had been selected, and it was afterwards changed for a worse, the article supplied would be better than the sample they had received?—Yes; if there was any discrepancy between the sample sent down, and the bulk; if the bulk was inferior to the sample, it would be rejected, and that is constantly the case; the officers, I conceive, would be perfectly satisfied if they found that the bulk was superior to the sample.

17879. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing a man sends in a sample of a certain quality, which is accepted, and after that sample has passed though the Board, having been accepted, by indirect means he gets that sample changed for one of a worse quality, and that worse quaiity goes, under the sanction of the Board, to an officer elsewhere, then, of course, the bulk supplied would be according to the worst sample, and not according to the best, and the contractor would have the price affixed to the better sample?—No doubt of it.

17880. General *Peel.*] My question was founded upon a supposition; I understood you that it was impossible to change a sample which the Board had decided upon?—Not without you admit people to be rogues; and, in that case not any precaution that can be taken would, in my opinion, preclude the possibility of a rogue attaining his ends. It is possible to change it in its transit from London down to the port; it is possible to change it after it arrives at the port, where the bulk is to be delivered; but it appears more feasible to me, with a view to cheating the Government, if I, as a contractor, contract to send in a certain quality of goods, and my sample is accepted, and I wish an inferior quality to be received, for me to go down to the port, to make arrangements there to change the sample, and get the bulk received upon that sample.

17881. *Chairman.*] You stated that the tenders and the samples are in the custody of a messenger for some time?—The tenders are never.

17882. But the accepted samples are, as well as the unaccepted samples?—I would wish the Committee clearly to understand this, that the samples never leave the board-room until they are actually accepted, and until they are actually packed and sealed; it is possible for a person who conveys the sample down from my office to Deptford to change the sample; I admit that fully; but the whole business is transacted, not only in my own presence, but, generally (except during the tremendous pressure that has come upon us during the war,) in the presence of a Lord of the Admiralty; he himself is present during the time that these samples are selected and packed.

17883. Do not you think that more precaution might be taken as to the samples after they have been decided upon?—I hardly know what additional precaution could be taken.

17884. Are not the accepted and unaccepted samples placed in the hands of a subordinate officer to be sent to the place for which they are intended?—Yes; this man is what is termed the Board-room messenger, he is the head messenger of the department; has held the situation for a great many years, and was selected by my predecessor on account of his being considered a thoroughly honest man, and that is fully my impression.

17885. I do not cast any imputation upon anybody, but I ask you whether between the event to which I allude, namely, the acceptance and sealing up of the tender and the sample, and the time that they go to the person who receives the bulk, there is not a possibility of their being changed?—There is decidedly a possibility of their being changed.

17886. You see also the advantage to the contractor of a change if an inferior article is substituted for a superior one; the same price being affixed to the inferior as to the superior article the contractor would gain in that degree?—One great check is this, that the individuals, particularly as regards Deptford, that select the samples are the individuals that receive the bulk, and therefore if they found the bulk to be inferior to the sample they selected, of course they would take notice of it.

17887. Have they never taken any such notice?—No; they have rejected a great number of articles as being inferior to the sample.

17888. Have they been rejected as not agreeing with the samples?—Yes, but not in one single instance did they ever find fault with the sample that was sent; the bulk has been rejected very often.

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17889. Because it did not agree with the sample?—Yes.

17890. Have you never heard of any objection being made to the sample?—Never.

17891. No tricks have been played with the samples?—Never; it would have been the duty of the captain-superintendent of the yard, particularly at Deptford, to have reported the circumstance, supposing he had the slightest idea that any tricks had been played with the samples.

17892. It has never been brought to your notice that there is a suspicion abroad upon that very matter?—I do not recollect that it has been. As I said before, there were several complaints of one kind and the other about the contracts, and therefore that has induced the Admiralty to be, perhaps, more stringent during the last three or four years than they were before. My impression is, that we have taken almost every precaution that is possible, so as to insure the whole business relating to contracts being conducted in an honourable, true, and proper manner.

17893. Mr. *Bramston.*] How long have you been the comptroller of victualling?—I have been so since 1851.

17894. Mr. *Layard.*] Did the Admiralty furnish provisions to the troops during the last war?—To a great extent they did.

17895. But not entirely?—I do not think they did anything approaching to the extent that we have done in the present war.

17896. Why was the system adopted during the present war; was it merely upon the breaking out of the war, or had they done so during the Kafir war?—We had occasion to send out a small supply of beef and pork, I think, in the Kafir war, but nothing approaching to the requisitions that have been made upon us for the present war; we were asked whether we would undertake to supply certain articles of provisions for the army service, and, of course, under the emergency of the times, the Admiralty considered it desirable to lend all the assistance that they could.

17897. The Admiralty had the means of procuring those supplies which no other department of the Government had?—Precisely.

17898. And those means were put into execution to supply the army in the East?—Yes.

17899. Had you the superintendence of the shipping of medicines and medical comforts?—Not personally.

17900. But your department?—A certain portion of medical comforts were shipped by the department at Deptford, and other portions were shipped by the Ordnance, independently of the Admiralty altogether.

17901. It has been stated, I think, that they were shipped under the superintendence of your department of the Admiralty?—Certain portions of them; the port wine that was spoken of by me was shipped entirely by the superintendent of the Deptford Yard.

17902. Has all the port wine been shipped by you?—No; I do not know what port wine has been shipped, but 2,400 dozen were entirely shipped by us.

17903. Are the Committee to understand you that the medical comforts were supplied by the Admiralty?—A certain quantity of medical comforts was supplied by the Admiralty, such as sago, arrowroot, rice, concentrated soup, and some things of that nature.

17904. You superintended the shipping of all those things, did you not?—Yes, the officers under my control.

17905. When persons brought articles to be shipped, did they at the same time produce the order which they received from the Government for those articles?—Many of those articles, as I said before, were purchased under the orders of the superintendent at Deptford, and the people from whom those articles were purchased, of course delivered them into that department. We had previously given instructions to the captain-superintendent to make those purchases with reference to the requisition made upon us.

17906. Were you apprised, for instance, by the medical department that a certain amount of stores or articles had been ordered, and that they were to be shipped by you?—Yes.

17907. Having been thus apprised, did you take care that the amount shipped corresponded with the amount stated in that communication?—Certainly.

17908. Whose duty was that?—That of the captain-superintendent and the officers

officers acting under him; they took care that the quantities corresponded with the quantities which they had purchased, and which they were ordered to purchase.

17909. Are you under the impression that all those medical stores which were ordered have left this country?—I may say that I am positive that all we were under orders to obtain and ship have left the country.

17910. You do not think it possible that any port wine, or other articles, have never left England?—Not of the 2,400 dozen.

17911. But the articles that had been purchased by the medical department?—I know nothing about the purchases made by the medical department at all; all that has been demanded from me has left England; and moreover, all that we had purchased ourselves has been delivered, and we have documents to show that the vessel has arrived in almost every instance.

17912. Would it have been your duty, or that of another department, to place a supercargo or an Admiralty agent over any cargo sent out?—It has never been the custom, for the Admiralty, to send out a supercargo or an agent; the stores are always put in charge of the master, and he is responsible to the Admiralty for the safe conveyance of them, and that they are delivered in good order.

17913. Of late, supercargoes or agents have been sent out, have they not?—Not by us; not by the Admiralty at all.

17914. You stated that officers were employed to examine the hay; did you mean cavalry officers or artillery officers?—The officers employed at Deptford were artillery officers; those that were employed to examine the hay at Liverpool and at Manchester were cavalry officers.

17915. You stated that you thought it better to wait till the hay had been brought into the department before it was examined; what do you mean by the hay being brought into the department?—I thought it better that it should be examined at the place at which it was shipped, so that there could be no chance of the hay being changed, or any alteration made in it after it had left the place where it was bought. By delivering it at the port of shipment, if the hay received any damage in the transit, the contractor would be responsible for it, if it got wet it would have been rejected; but if we had received the hay on the contractor's premises, it would then have become our property, and we should be responsible for any damage that took place with regard to it subsequently.

17916. With regard to the receipts of the consignees, would they state any detention that might have taken place on the voyage, or after the arrival of the ship at its destination?—They would not state that on the back of the bill of lading, but merely that the cargo had been received, and that the quantities were equal to those specified in the bill of lading; our own officers make any remark that they think right respecting the cargo; for instance, if they found a quantity of rum had been taken out, they would take notice of that; it does sometimes happen that casks are spiled.

17917. Have you had any representations with regard to goods having been detained for a long time on board ship?—No; I am not aware of receiving any remonstrances of that kind.

17918. Would those remonstrances come to you if such had been the case?—For the army service they would certainly not have come to me.

17919. With regard to the detention on board ship of any cargo shipped by you, you would not be responsible for that detention?—No, certainly not; any complaint would go to the War Department, or to the Ordnance, or to whatever department the goods belonged.

17920. Would not that be within the knowledge of the Transport Board?—Most probably the Minister for War would send those statements to the Transport Board; they would not come to me.

17921. What steps are taken in this country to ascertain that the meat, either salt or preserved, is of good quality?—We know nothing until the meat is delivered into our establishment; we then take every tenth cask and open it, and examine it to see that it is good and contains no improper pieces, and that it is well salted and pickled, and that the casks are good.

17922. Is it not the fact that animals may die of disease, and yet that not be apparent in the meat when salted?—It is possible in private slaughter-houses that meat may be packed from animals that may have died from disease;

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we have no means of ascertaining that fact; but I believe the meat of animals that die in that way will not take the salt.

17923. Does not your department send any one to see the animals which are slaughtered for salting?—No. We get meat from all parts of the world; from Germany, Hamburgh, Dantzic, and America; therefore we could not do that. This year, I think, we have bought altogether 160,000 tierces of meat.

17924. Do you consider that the test you adopt is sufficient to ascertain the quality of the meat?—Quite so.

17925. Do you remember the case of Mr. Goldner?—Yes.

17926. Are the preserved meats now subject to the same test?—The preserved meats are subjected to a severe test; when there is a quantity of preserved meats delivered into store, a certain number are selected for examination.

17927. It appears that in that case the test was not sufficient?—The test certainly turned out not to be sufficient, as large quantities were found afterwards to have become not only putrid, but improper substances were found in the canisters.

17928. There the test was not sufficient?—In that instance it was certainly not sufficient.

17929. If it was not sufficient in that case, it may be so in others?—The proof that the test is sufficient in regard to salt meat consists in the fact that comparatively very small condemnations take place—I do not remember, in the whole course of my experience, a single cask of salt meat being condemned as containing improper parts of animals, or improper pieces, or anything of that kind. It has been condemned simply because it has lost its pickle, from being exposed, perhaps, to the sun of the tropics, and from age; but I am not aware of any single instance of a cask of salt meat having been condemned on account of its containing improper pieces.

17930. Mr. *Drummond*.] Are the contractors for meat, which I suppose is your largest contract, generally the same persons?—No; and latterly they have been very numerous.

17931. Is there any rule in the office that no person shall contract unless he receives a letter of approbation or a certificate from some other person?—No.

17932. The contract is entirely open?—Entirely so.

17933. You have stated that the mode of examination is not very perfect in the case of preserved meats. You have been so long in the office that you probably remember, a good many years ago (without naming anybody), a person, who was a contractor, and a Member for a county, who made an enormous fortune by a very summary process; namely, converting Irish bulls into English oxen?—I do not recollect the exact particulars.

17934. Were there the same regulations then that there are now to prevent frauds?—I really cannot answer that question; being then comparatively a subordinate in the department, I am not aware what regulations existed with the old Victualling Board.

17935. Are the things which you have enumerated, such as chocolate, sugar, tea, coffee, flour, beer, wine, condensed milk, and arrowroot, subjected to any analysis?—No; they are only subjected to an inspection according to sample; all the medical comforts that are purchased are subjected to the approval of the medical storekeeper of the victualling yard, as well as to other officers of the yard.

17936. If Mr. Wakley were medical storekeeper he would probably find that three-fourths of the articles bought under those names were not genuine?—Possibly he might; we have found it so ourselves, consequently we have very large manufactories in our different establishments to prevent fraud. I induced the Board to introduce a mustard manufactory, on account of the mustard delivered under contract being adulterated; some of it was not mustard at all; it was made of pepper, and other things, coloured with turmeric, and very little or no mustard seed. I recollect a communication I had, with a large manufacturer, who told me that the mustard bought some time since was bought at so low a rate that he was actually paying for the raw material more than was paid for the manufactured mustard. I brought that instance under the consideration of the Admiralty, and they thought proper to introduce a mustard manufactory; but that is only one instance. We have also a manufactory for flour and oatmeal; some years ago we found that there was a certain quantity of plaster of Paris mixed with the oatmeal furnished under contract, and put

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on board some convict ship, and the convicts became ill, and the surgeon-superintendent thought it desirable to return into port. It was thought desirable to have the provisions analysed, and it was found that the oatmeal contained a certain quantity of plaster of Paris, or some deleterious substance of that kind, and it was then that the Admiralty of the day thought it desirable to introduce an oatmeal manufactory also. It was a question the other day, whether we should not introduce a manufactory for vinegar, because we had ascertained that vinegar was likely to have a large quantity of sulphuric acid mixed with it, which was deleterious and bad; but that is not carried out at present on account of the tremendous pressure upon us. But to give the Committee some idea of what the manufactories are, since the breaking out of the war, we have had manufactured 20,275,000 pounds of biscuits, and 3,584,000 lbs. of flour; 545,720 lbs. of oatmeal; 1,105,979 lbs. of chocolate, 13,930 lbs. of mustard; 58,854 casks, a great portion of them for the army service; 44,658 beds; and we have ground 34,258,295 lbs. of wheat; this we have done in our three establishments at home, independently of our establishment abroad, at Malta, where we have a large manufactory likewise.

17937. It has been stated in evidence that the wine that was sent out was a mixture of alcohol and logwood?—The only complaint we have had of wine is what I have already stated, that wine was received under the approval of the medical storekeeper, who considered it in every respect good and fit for the purpose required.

17938. Are you sure that you ever sent out any tea?—Yes, large quantities.

17939. Something under the name of tea?—We have had no complaint of the tea that we have sent out either for the service of the army or the navy.

17940. Are you sure it was tea?—The gentleman that selects our samples has been strongly recommended to the Admiralty; he is one of the principal officers of the customs, and is a tea taster; the process that the samples undergo is this, they are placed in boxes, and he selects certain quantities of these samples, and tests their quality by placing each in a different teapot, after subjecting them to that test he decides which sample is the proper kind of tea to have; he does not know the name of the individual, nor does he know the price of the tea he has recommended.

17941. Does that same person afterwards compare the bulk with the sample?—Yes, in connexion with our own officer.

17942. What do you do with the arrowroot?—We either get it from our own medical director-general, or we purchase it.

17943. You might get it from the West Indies direct without any fraud?—We have obtained it from the Medical Director-general of the navy.

17944. And the condensed milk?—There are comparatively small portions of it; we bought some for the Arctic Expedition, and it was highly approved.

17945. It might be horses' brains for aught you know to the contrary?—It was impossible; the reports of it were highly satisfactory.

17946. *Chairman.*] Do you recollect certain complaints that were made of compressed hay, in which they said animals were included?—I recollect the circumstance well.

17947. Was any inquiry made about it?—Yes, every inquiry.

17948. What was the result of that inquiry?—The result of it was simply this; that in one of the trusses of hay an animal was found, and the individuals that inspected the hay admitted that the truss in which the animal was found was certainly some of the best hay that had been tendered by any of the contractors; they were, I believe, thoroughly convinced that this animal, which could hardly be called one (it appeared to be a lamb just dropped), had been packed away inadvertently in this bale of hay without any intention of fraud whatever, inasmuch as that bale weighed 150 lbs. and upwards, and this animal did not weigh above two pounds and a quarter, and a part of the wool of the animal was seen protruding from the upper portion of the bale of hay. I really believe that it was put in there merely by accident in making up the rick. It caused a great deal of talk at the time.

17949. Mr. *Bramston.*] Why was the hay condemned?—The circumstance created such a disturbance at the time that we rejected the whole of the hay that was delivered by that individual.

17950. Captain *Gladstone.*] Are you now sending out hay for the army?—No.

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17951. Do you know anything of the case of the "Dunbar" transport, which is in London now, and which had Admiralty stores on board, and which had been already sent out to Constantinople, more than once, and brought back?—No, I do not.

17952. Have you been able to attend to all the requisitions made to you for the service of the army?—I am bound to say that by the extraordinary exertions of the officers at the three victualling establishments at home, Deptford, Gosport, and Plymouth, we have been able to comply with the whole of the requisitions that have been made upon us. I know that the captain-superintendent at Deptford is generally at his work at five o'clock in the morning, and I know him also to be at his work as late as 12 o'clock at night, and he rarely leaves the establishment; and by the exertions he has used, as well as the other officers in the establishment, and also the officers at Plymouth and Gosport, in working night and day we have been able to comply with all the demands that have been made upon us.

17953. In fact the Victualling Board has very nearly entirely victualled the army, with the exception of a very few articles?—I think, in round numbers, I may say that we have supplied an army of very nearly 40,000 men, for eight or nine months, with all the requisite staple articles of provisions.

17954. Before the institution of the Transport Board, did you make any recommendations as to the formation of a new Board, or as to the conduct of the transport service?—I did, as regards the business, but not as to the formation of a Board; and I did so on account of the tremendous requisitions coming in upon us for the army service, together with the heavy demands for our own service, the navy. The number of men voted for the navy, which had the year before been only 45,500*l.*, had increased to 58,500*l.*, and our estimates, which before amounted to about 615,000*l.* for victualling, amounted to 1,070,000*l.*, and as the business of the Transport Department also greatly increased, I considered, in justice to the public, and I may say to the service, and to myself, that it was impossible for one individual to conduct, in a satisfactory manner, those two establishments. I felt it my duty to bring the subject under the notice of the superintending Lord of my department, and I have reason to believe that he mentioned it to the then first Lord of the Admiralty. The Superintending Lord then undertook to conduct and to be responsible for the business connected with the Transport Department, leaving me to devote the whole of my time to the carrying out of the heavy requisitions for army service that had been put upon us, as well as controlling the additional duties connected with provisioning the greatly increased fleet.

77955. Was that in accordance with your suggestion?—Yes; the suggestion I made was to the effect that an individual should have the supervision of the transport business, separate and distinct from that of the victualling service.

General Sir *Hew Dalrymple Ross*, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

General Sir *H. D. Ross*, K.C.B.

17956. *Chairman*] WHAT position do you hold in the Ordnance now?—I am Lieutenant-general of Ordnance.

17957. When were you appointed?—I was appointed on the 6th of May last year.

17958. At that time was Lord Raglan in England?—He left in about the middle of April, and my patent was not made out till the 6th of May, since which time I have performed the duties.

17959. Are your duties now the same as the Master-general's duties were?—Not precisely so; the patent of Lieutenant-general makes me also a Board officer; but upon my undertaking the duties for Lord Raglan, I was informed that it was his wish, and that of the Government, that I should assume the duties of Master-general during his absence, with the understanding that it was a temporary arrangement, and that I should conduct the duties of the office as Lieutenant-general, according to the patent, which has been of long standing, and I have done so from that time.

17960. Have you found that any public disadvantage has arisen in consequence from the absence of the Master-general?—Unquestionably. I believe that he would have executed the duties more efficiently than I can.

17961. Do you believe that the Lieutenant-general can perform the duties of the

the Master-general of the Ordnance?—There is no doubt of it; but I believe that the position which the Master-general holds in the country made him more efficient and more competent to perform them.

17962. Lord *Seymour.*] Are the Committee to understand that you are now exactly in the position that the Master-general of the Ordnance occupied?—No. I am in the position of Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, but in the absence of the Master-general his duties devolve upon me.

17963. Have you the power, as Lieutenant-general, which the Master-general would have if he were here?—Quite so; so far his powers are delegated to me.

17964. The Master-general is supreme over the Board, is he not?—Yes; and that power I do not possess, because I am a Board officer.

17965. That is a power which belongs to the Master-general?—Yes; and that cannot be delegated by him.

17966. The whole of the military management of the Ordnance corps, the artillery, and the engineers, is completely under you now, is it not?—Quite so.

17967. With regard to those civil departments of the Ordnance, which supply stores of all kinds, are they also completely under your superintendence?—The rule is, that upon many points it is necessary to have my approval; generally speaking, the working is entirely with the departmental officers, the Clerk of the Ordnance, the principal Storekeeper, and now there is a Surveyor-general; for a long time there was none.

17968. Since the Ordnance Estimates have this year risen to about 7,800,000*l.*, and a large portion of it is for the supply of stores, who at the Ordnance is responsible for the supply of those stores?—The Comptroller of Stores is the person who has the supply, and, consequently, he is the most competent person to explain how, and by what authority, he produces these supplies.

17969. You do not consider that that portion of the duties relating to the supply of stores comes under you?—Not immediately; although, upon many occasions, I have been present at the Board, in consequence of the absence of other members.

17970. It is the practice at the Ordnance that the Master-general does not attend the Board, is it not?—Yes.

17971. But you do attend the Board?—Yes.

17972. You were appointed on the 6th of May?—Yes.

17973. Shortly after, the Surveyor-general left the Ordnance, did he not?—He did.

17974. Your chief engineer also left the Ordnance, did he not?—Yes; but he is not a member of the Board; he is the Inspector-general, commanding the corps of engineers and sappers.

17975. With regard to the Inspector-general, he is consulted, is he not, upon all questions relating to fortification?—He is, but he is not a member of the Board; they refer to him.

17976. Whenever a large expenditure is made annually for improvements and construction of fortifications, that expenditure is made and recommended by the Board of Ordnance, with the sanction of the chief engineer, is it not?—Yes, it is; in the first place, the Board of Ordnance are called upon to have such and such works brought forward, and the Inspector-general of Fortifications is called upon for the plans and estimates for those works, and then the Board carry them out.

17977. Though you were a Board officer you did not give much attention to that portion of the business of the Board relating to the supply of stores?—I necessarily was at the Board, and so far I feel myself responsible. If I had not attended the Board while there was only one other Board officer present, the work would have stopped altogether.

17978. Is it necessary for two persons to make a Board?—Yes.

17979. I believe a record is kept of the proceedings of the Boards of Ordnance?—Yes.

17980. Therefore if this Committee desired to know how many Boards met during the months of August and September last year, they can obtain that information?—Unquestionably; the secretary to the Board would supply that information.

17981. Mr. *Layard.*] Of course you know the constitution of the Board of Ordnance?—There is a regular book of instructions.

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17982. The Ordnance Office is responsible, is it not, for that which relates to the artillery?—For the whole supply of the army as well as the artillery.

17983. It is chiefly intended for that which its name denotes, ordnance, is it not?—It includes the whole materiel of war, for the army and the naval services.

17984. Then do you think it is necessary that some of the members of the Board of Ordnance should be officers of artillery, or not?—That is a question that I believe it would not become me to answer, but it has often been considered a necessary and essential point.

17985. Is the Master-general an artillery officer?—No.

17986. Who is the senior officer of the Board?—I am, as Lieutenant-general, senior officer of the Board at present.

17987. Are you an artillery officer?—I am.

17988. On the return of Lord Raglan, would you still hold the same office?—No; I received the appointment as a temporary arrangement to fulfil the duties of the Master-general during his absence, and on his return I should, of course, relinquish it.

17989. Who has the office of Master-general in the Ordnance?—Lord Raglan.

17990. Who is the Surveyor-general now?—Colonel Bruce.

17991. Is he an artillery officer?—No.

17992. Who is the Clerk to the Ordnance?—Mr. Monsell.

17993. Is he an artillery officer?—No.

17994. Is there any artillery officer on the Board of Ordnance except yourself?—None.

17995. Is there any person who has had any acquaintance with artillery?—None, with the exception of the Comptroller of Stores.

17996. I presume the Board of Ordnance has the management and the direction of the artillery amongst its various duties, has it not?—No; the Master-general specially has, and the Board has to a certain extent; but the military branches of the service are especially under the Master-general, and he is colonel of the regiment of artillery, and of the corps of engineers.

17997. Is it not advisable that there should be at least one artillery officer in the department which has the special direction of the artillery?—I should be very glad to see that it was so.

17998. Were you obliged to refer to Lord Raglan upon any matters whatever connected with the Board before taking any decision?—No, I have taken every decision upon my own responsibility.

17999. Have you the power of doing anything you like without referring to Lord Raglan?—Yes. I have communicated with Lord Raglan, but I have received no orders from him.

18000. Have you ever had any representation made to you with regard to the fusees used in the Crimea?—Not to me; but I know that there has been a complaint that the fusees of the 13-inch shells have been defective, and it is to be accounted for in this way, that 13-inch mortars are not usually employed in sieges; it was not contemplated that they should be, and those that had been employed had been chiefly derived from Malta, and those fusees probably had lain there since the last war.

18001. Could not others have been deposited there?—I should think not, from what I have heard.

18002. Did you receive no report with regard to the fusees after the opening of the fire on the 17th of October?—None that I am aware of; no official report; I know that there has been a report of later date to the Director-general of Artillery, stating that the fusees of the 13-inch mortars had failed; not all, but a great number; but I believe they were afterwards more successful, by adopting a mode which has been long in practice, of preparing the fusees in a different manner from cutting them.

18003. Were no complaints made of the fusees in the month of October?—I am not prepared to speak to the particular time.

18004. Were no objections made as to the fusees which were applied to other shells besides the 13-inch shells?—None that I have heard of.

18005. When was the constitution of the committee which has to inquire into inventions changed?—I think shortly before the Duke of Newcastle left office; in January perhaps; I am not quite sure.

18006. What

18006. What change has taken place?—The former committee was composed of artillery officers, who, I believe, executed their duties with honesty and with the firm intention of doing justice to the public, but a clamour was raised against the way in which they were obliged to put aside a number of idle proposals, and it was carried, I believe, to the Duke of Newcastle, in such terms that he thought it was necessary to make a change, and to make it as palatable to the public as possible, he extended it, and in place of its being an artillery committee, he gave it the name, and he changed it into the Ordnance committee, associating with it a great many other officers who had not been in it before, especially the scientific instructor at the Woolwich Academy, the chemist of the Arsenal, the professor of mathematics, Mr. Gregory, and Mr. Wheatstone, who are civilians.

18007. Is it your opinion that by placing those scientific men on this committee, the committee was rendered less efficient?—I do not say that it was rendered less efficient, but I think the same object was gained before, for whenever there was a difficult question before the committee they called in whatever science was necessary: if it was a chemical question, they called in the chemist of the Ordnance; if it was mathematical, they applied to the Board to have the professor of mathematics at the Academy at Woolwich, who was occasionally called in. Not long before the change, Professors Graham and Playfair were called in, upon the Boulet Asphyxiant of the French, and made a report. The same system was, therefore, working then, though upon a smaller scale than it is now.

18008. You think that it was not necessary to make that change?—That has been my opinion.

18009. Do you think, before the change, that inventors had a fair chance?—I think that inventors are more easily set aside now than they were before, because this powerful body puts it aside without a question.

18010. Inventors are more satisfied now, are they not?—I hope so.

18011. General *Peel.*] The Master-general is always a military man, is he not?—Always.

18012. He has the charge of the military branches of the service?—Yes.

18013. You were appointed as Lieutenant-general of Ordnance in consequence of your high position in the artillery, and your distinguished services?—I was placed there, I believe, as being Adjutant-general, and having been in the artillery for a number of years.

18014. You had passed through every grade and branch of the artillery?—Yes.

18015. The duties of the Board of Ordnance are entirely of a civil nature, are they not?—Quite so.

18016. And they have no reference to military matters?—No.

18017. There is no necessity for the members of the Board to have any knowledge of artillery?—Not at all; but they ought to have a knowledge of the working of the manufacturing departments under them.

18018. There is what is called at Woolwich the Reference Committee, to which all references, with regard to discoveries, are made?—That is the committee that has been just talked about, which is the Ordnance committee.

18019. *Chairman.*] Will you explain what you mean by the manufacturing part of the duties of the Ordnance?—The whole preparation of all descriptions of ammunition and stores, for the supply of both the army and navy.

18020. Is it not a part of the education of an artillery officer to be acquainted with the power of gunpowder?—Unquestionably.

18021. Is the manufacture of gunpowder any part of the duties of the Board of Ordnance?—Yes, certainly; the whole of the gunpowder manufacture is under the charge of an artillery officer, but the Board provide the materials.

18022. But under the superintendence of the Board of Ordnance?—Yes.

18023. Then they ought to know something about the manufacture of gunpowder?—No question.

18024. As an artillery officer has to do with the use of gunpowder, would he not be a person that would know something about the manufacture of gunpowder?—Every artillery officer does, more or less, know a great deal of it.

18025. Do you consider the manufacture of gunpowder a civil accomplishment?—It is made a civil employment, but an officer is placed at the head of

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it, and the officer is now Colonel Dickson. Another officer is acting for him, in the charge of the gunpowder manufacture, at Waltham Abbey.

18026. So that a civilian, not having received anything of a military education, is in reality placed above the artillery officer who looks to the manufacture of the gunpowder?—It is pretty much like other Boards whose members are not professional.

18027. Will you explain the precise nature of your own duties?—My own duties are these: I preside at the Board, and I have the whole charge of the military control and government of the artillery, and the corps of engineers and sappers.

18028. Then in reality in you are centered all the powers, or pretty nearly all the powers, of the Master-general?—Very nearly so.

18029. At present his absence does not in any way impede the progress of the public service?—I have already stated my feeling upon that subject.

18030. My question has reference merely to his absence; supposing you possessed all the mental qualifications of the Master-general, would any mischief arise to the public from his absence?—If he were present, according to the present constitution of the Ordnance, I should not be in my office.

18031. But with regard to the public, no disadvantage has resulted in consequence of the absence of Lord Raglan?—If the same power be given to the Lieutenant-general that was held by the Master-general, I conceive that it would make very little difference.

18032. Does the existence of the Master-general in the Crimea aid you in the performance of your duties?—Not in the slightest.

18033. So that if there was no Master-general, you could perfectly well perform the duties of your office?—Perfectly so, as regards the routine of the office.

18034. Have not the members of the Board to judge of instruments, projectiles, and all new inventions?—No, they are generally referred to a committee upon projectiles, and their report is forwarded to the Master-general or to me.

18035. General *Peel.*] Will you describe what takes place upon any new invention being proposed?—Upon an inventor sending in a proposal, it is sent to the Master-general or the Lieutenant-general, and he puts it before the Ordnance committee, who after having considered the merits of the proposal and having seen the inventor himself, and probably having canvassed the whole subject, decide whether it is one worth being put to trial; if such is their opinion, an opportunity is given to the projector to have his experiment proved; and then a report is sent to the Lieutenant-general, who puts it before the Board to allow the expense, or otherwise, of carrying the experiment out.

18036. *Chairman.*] Of whom is that committee of the Ordnance composed?—Of officers of the Ordnance corps, and other scientific members.

18037. Are the members of the Board a portion of that committee?—No. The Master-general has no power over finance, and therefore any invention recommended by the committee is referred to the Board, who have the power of carrying it out, and who find the means through the Treasury.

18038. Are the members of the Board members of the committee of Ordnance?—No.

18039. Lord *Seymour.*] Some years ago there was a Master-general and a Lieutenant-general, was there not?—Yes.

18040. The Government, then, for the purpose of economy, reduced the office of Lieutenant-general?—Yes, they did.

18041. Leaving the Master-general?—Yes; but his position changed. He was before a member of the Cabinet; after that he was merely Master-general.

18042. Then they might have adopted the other course; they might have abolished the Master-general's office, and left the Lieutenant-general, might they not?—Unquestionably.

18043. But one such officer at the head was necessary for the management of the military affairs under the Ordnance?—I presume it was considered a great department, having a great responsibility, a great amount of expenditure, and of great value in all its administrative powers.

18044. Mr. *Layard.*] Do not the artillery particularly look to the Master-general

general of the Ordnance as their chief head?—He is their chief entirely, and solely their chief; he is the Commander-in-chief over the artillery.

18045. Yet he is not an artillery officer?—No; and I do not know that there is an instance of his ever having been so.

18046. Lord *Seymour*.] With regard to the Ordnance corps that are in the Crimea, were they supplied with clothing in a different manner from the army in the Crimea?—The clothing of the Ordnance corps has always been in the Ordnance, and not with the colonel of battalions.

18047. Then even in the Crimea they were supplied under their own officers?—Yes, entirely.

18048. Have you heard whether they have suffered from want of clothing?—Never.

18049. While in the Crimea?—No; I believe the only thing that they might be short of was boots; there has been no complaint whatever.

18050. The Committee have heard that there have been great complaints as to the condition of the army generally?—That has not been as to the artillery.

18051. Since last summer the whole purchase of clothing of the army has been brought under the Ordnance, has it not?—I can hardly say yet; it is talked of.

18052. That scheme, which was announced to the House of Commons in June or July last, has not been brought into full operation?—I believe not into working operation; but Sir Thomas Hastings will be able to answer those questions better than I can.

18053. You can answer for the clothing of the Ordnance corps as they are under you?—Yes.

18054. Taking a great interest, as I know you do, in the efficiency and the comfort of the artillery, to the best of your belief the artillery has not been in want of clothing?—I am quite of that opinion.

18055. With regard to the horses of the artillery, they are provided for also under their own system, are they not?—Under my direction, and they have been throughout the war.

18056. Have they a Commissariat for themselves?—No; in the field they draw their rations from the Commissariat.

18057. Have you heard that they have found great difficulties in obtaining supplies?—They have had great difficulties to contend with; in the first place, they landed all in excellent order, and they went out there well; the men were well, but during the operations of the siege it was thought necessary to keep the batteries that belonged to the divisions upon the heights, and they were exposed to extreme cold; and they could not get any cover. They had, in addition to their own work, the whole of the battering trains to lead to the trenches; and when they were not employed in that way they were employed in carrying out provisions for the artillery, and not unfrequently for the infantry, and having to do that they could not get forage from Balaklava. Latterly, a great portion of them was sent down to Balaklava, only keeping enough for the duties of the batteries on the heights, and from that time they got into the fine condition in which they now are, in a perfectly efficient state. Colonel Dacres has informed me by letter that he has all his guns and most of his ammunition waggons well horsed, and ready for service.

18058. Do you know how many horses the artillery lost during the winter?—I cannot exactly say the number, because I only received notice last night to attend this Committee. There have been sent out altogether to the Crimea, in men and officers, 6,781, and 3,554 horses; there are under orders at this moment 1,476 men and officers, embarking and on their way, and 1,215 horses; making a total of men and officers in all 8,257; and there have been altogether 4,769 horses and mules; not all from England, but a portion from Spain, and other parts.

18059. How many horses had you actually landed in the Crimea belonging to the artillery corps?—I can give the Committee a return of it to-morrow.

18060. And will you also state how many have been lost in the Crimea?—Yes.

18061. Whatever number you have lost you have now, you believe, sufficient number to render your corps efficient?—Yes; they will be now well horsed.

18062. Is your system of provisioning your troops the same as that of provisioning

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visioning the rest of the army?—Quite so; they draw their rations from the Commissariat.

18063. When they are in the field the system is just the same?—Just so; in the field a Commissariat officer is attached to a battery or troop, who supplies the rations.

18064. Can you state how the artillery force were supplied during the winter?—They have been generally supplied very well; there have been a few days occasionally when they have not been so well supplied, but, generally speaking, I have had no complaints as to their supply.

18065. If they had had cause to complain, would those complaints have come to you?—I should have heard of it; I do not say that they have always been on full rations; that is hardly to be expected in war. I have never received a complaint that the men were starving, or in great want.

18066. Have you lost many men of the corps there?—Yes, we have lost a good many. By the last return I have seen, it appears that about 750 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, had died of disease and wounds.

18067. Can you state what number of men landed?—Yes; I will furnish a return.

18068. Will you state how many artillerymen landed in the Crimea, how many were lost in battle, and how many were left effective at the end of January last?—I can furnish that.

18069. Some years ago a charge was made as to the medical department of the Ordnance; they used to have a separate medical department of their own?—Yes.

18070. That was abolished, I think, and it was brought under the general medical department of the army?—That has been so for some time.

18071. Can you state to the Committee, from your knowledge of both systems, how the alteration has worked?—Most mischievously towards the artillery. It is only recently I have received a letter from Colonel Dacres, complaining that he had no knowledge, from not having medical officers at the different hospitals, of the men who are sick there, how they are disposed of, what has become of them, or whether they are sent from one hospital to another, or whether they are sent home; in short, that he is in utter ignorance. I put that before Dr. Andrew Smith, and he says that he has made some arrangements to send out to have that corrected, but the thing cannot be corrected as it was formerly.

18072. *Chairman.*] Could not it be made a part of the duties of every medical officer in charge of an hospital to make reports of the number of men that he has from the different corps of the army?—It might be theoretically, but practically it has never worked; the Ordnance corps are still nominally possessed of an Ordnance medical department; it is under the same head as the army; but they do not get the same promotion as the others do, and the consequence is that the junior part are getting promoted into the line occasionally; and I cannot prevail upon Dr. Andrew Smith to adopt a plan by which the old men should be removed and the young be allowed to rise in their own corps.

18073. Supposing it was the duty of the regimental surgeon in command of the hospital every week to send in a return of all the men in his hospital, marking the corps to which they belonged, would there not be, by that means, a mode of communicating to the different officers in command where their men were?—I complained that the commanding officer of artillery, being at headquarters, has not a report from the medical officers at the different stations of the men who are there.

18074. The fault that you find is, that no report is made; not that the surgeon from the artillery is not there?—I complain that the general commanding the artillery has no surgeons of his corps at the general hospitals, Scutari, &c., to look after the sick, and regularly to report to him their state, how disposed of, &c.

18075. Then the remedy would be to command that there should be a proper report made, and not to put, as you suppose, an artillery surgeon into the place?—My opinion is that the work was better done when it was done by the surgeons of the corps.

18076. Could not you attain the same end by different means; if you insisted that there should be a weekly report made by the surgeon in charge of

of all the persons in his hospital, giving the different corps to which they belonged, by that means every officer would learn where his men were?—It is not at all so, and I give you the complaint as I had it.

18077. General *Peel.*] You are supposing that the artillery should always have a separate hospital of their own?—No; but their own medical officers.

18078. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you the superintendence of the siege train when it was sent out?—Not immediately; it was sent out under the Director-general.

18079. You were then in office, were you not?—Yes.

18080. Were any horses sent out with the siege train?—No; nor are they ever sent out.

18081. Do you depend upon the resources of the country?—Yes, or the horses of the batteries.

18082. Supposing that the siege train had had to be moved into Bulgaria, how would it have been moved?—It would have been moved by means to be found in the country.

18083. Of course the army would have depended alone upon those means to move their artillery?—Certainly.

18084. Were you informed that there were no means there?—No; that was not a question that would come before me, but before the Commander-in-chief in the country.

18085. How many men were sent out with the siege train?—I cannot tell at this moment; there have been no less than three siege trains sent out, and 19 companies.

18086. Can you give a return to the Committee of the number of guns forming the siege train, and the number of men appointed to serve those guns, on the day of opening the fire, on the 17th of October?—I can, certainly.

18087. Do you know how many hours out of the 24 those who were engaged with the siege train had to work in the trenches at that time?—I am not prepared to say; I believe it was very nearly eight hours in the trenches and eight hours off.

18088. You are aware, are you not, that the trenches were, in some instances, nearly an hour's walk from the tents?—No, I am not sure of that; I know it was a very great way.

18089. The men took turn and turn for eight hours; but out of those eight hours they had to walk there and back, which took them nearly two hours?—I think it is very likely.

18090. Were you not made acquainted with the fact of their being greatly overworked?—Yes; and I took every means to supply their wants, by sending, in every instance, more men than were asked for.

18091. Was the siege train originally sent out furnished with men in sufficient numbers?—I was not consulted as to the number; I provided for it.

18092. Whose duty was it to see that the siege train was sufficiently supplied with men?—The officer who went out in command, General Cater.

18093. If there was a deficiency of men, it was owing to his not having provided them?—Yes; but it must be borne in mind that the siege was not expected to be what it turned out to be; the appliances sent out were quite equal to whatever had been supposed to be necessary.

18094. Supposing a certain number of guns had been sent out, it would have been necessary to send out men to work them?—Yes; and there was supposed to be a sufficient number sent out.

18095. With regard to the contracts for Minié rifles, do they come under your immediate superintendence?—They come under my cognizance; but that would more properly be explained by the head of the store department.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., C. B., called in; and Examined.

18096. *Chairman.*] YOU are Storekeeper-general, are you not?—No, I am Comptroller of Stores and Principal Storekeeper.

18097. How long have you held that office at the Ordnance?—About nine years and nine months.

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18098. In that position you are one of the members of the Board of Ordnance?—Yes.

18099. Before that you were at Portsmouth?—Yes, for nearly 14 years. I commanded the gunnery-ship, the school of gunnery at Portsmouth, and I also superintended the Naval College at Portsmouth.

18100. Therefore your former experience qualified you to judge of those questions that came before the Ordnance relating to the fitting of ships with guns?—Yes, I was placed at the Ordnance expressly for that purpose; and I should observe, at the same time, that the naval ordnance business at the Ordnance in war is about three-fifths of the portion of work done, and in peace considerably more.

18101. Lord *Seymour*.] Then you have had to provide for the fitting out of the naval expeditions, as well as for the military expeditions in this last year?—Precisely so.

18102. That has all come under, as I understand, the Board of Ordnance?—Yes; on requisitions from the Admiralty.

18103. Then you also had to provide supplies of every kind?—Yes.

18104. And supplies called Ordnance stores?—Yes; but not of my own proper motion; but only under the sanction of the Treasury, and requisitions from various departments of the State.

18105. Have you had any requisition to supply clothing for the army generally?—No; the question has been talked of, and I had a paper sent to me to consider; and I gave an answer to Sir Charles Trevelyan, but no general measure has been founded on it, or carried out; but under Mr. Sidney Herbert, when Secretary-at-War, we made some clothing, with a view to that measure, to see how it would work; then in reference to the militia, we supply all the clothing for the disembodied militia, but not for the embodied militia.

18106. If the House of Commons imagined that the system of supplying the clothing by the colonels had been abolished, and the Ordnance were allowed to supply the clothing, that is a mistake?—Yes.

18107. The colonels are still supplying the clothing?—No; I cannot describe how the thing is working; but it has not been placed in the hands of the Ordnance. I understand that some arrangement has been made which has put an end to the supply by the colonels, therefore I conclude, theoretically speaking, that the supply by the colonels is abolished; but in some way it goes on; we do not supply clothing for the army.

18108. The old system has been abolished, and a new system has not been adopted?—That has not come to my knowledge.

18109. The old system has been abolished?—I ought not to say that.

18110. In fact you, as one of the members of the Board, are not acquainted with any change having been made?—Officially, nothing whatever.

18111. You supply, as you did before, great coats for the army?—Yes; that applies to the clothing supplied in peace, for we have had various requisitions for clothing for the army directly to ourselves, and to pay for clothing, given, in some instances, to foreign contractors to supply; we have also had to make very large supplies of boots and shoes to the army.

18112. Usually, in the common course of things, who supplies boots and shoes for the army; do the Ordnance supply them?—No, the colonels; but since the war we have supplied a very large number, as many as 180,000 pairs in the year.

18113. When did you first get a requisition from the Commissariat, or from the Secretary-at-War, to supply those boots and shoes to the army?—I cannot give the date, but it was early in the year. I had a communication with Colonel Maule, before he went, on the subject, and I consulted him specially as to shoes for the Highland regiments. He left in April; so I consider it was antecedent to April.

18114. It must have been before the end of March of last year?—Precisely.

18115. We have been told in this Committee that an application was made to the Ordnance in the course of last summer to purchase warmer clothing for the troops for the winter?—Yes; I think it must have been in June. I will give you a reason (I cannot recollect the date): I went in the end of July into

into the country, and before I left the Ordnance I had made all the arrangements for the supply of the warm clothing of that particular order; there were others afterwards.

18116. What was the amount of that order?—That order, I think, comprehended 90,000 Guernsey frocks, and about 47,000 pairs of lambswool drawers.

18117. That was made as early as June, in 1854?—Yes; we had also a requisition at the same time for 80,000 pairs of stockings and some cholera belts, about 60,000.

18118. That was made to you in June?—Yes.

18119. How did you proceed upon getting that requisition for that large order?—I must enter into some explanation; the requisition was immediate; and we have two ways of proceeding in getting supplies. If we have no immediate pressure, if it is an ordinary supply, we go to contract, which takes from 14 to 16 days before it returns, and we are in a position to order articles; but when the case is pressing, we, having a list of contractors for every article registered at the Board, take out four, five, or six, or sometimes not more than three, and send round to them, and say, "What will you supply such and such an article for? Send in a pattern, and price." In this instance that course was adopted, and Mr. Kinnaston was one of the persons applied to. His patterns came to me, and I caused them to be submitted to the medical department, and finally those patterns were adopted, and a supply was ordered; Mr. Kinnaston undertook to go directly into the manufacturing districts, and having selected the patterns, the articles sent in were received by them. I should explain that the system of inspection at the Tower stands thus: there are three inspectors, with salaries varying from 300 *l.* to 500 *l.* a year, with viewers for every article received by them.

18120. When did Mr. Kinnaston undertake to provide articles?—It must have been about June; he was to provide them as quickly as he possibly could; we reckoned that he would be able to get them in in about six weeks from June.

18121. Then you would have had them before the end of August?—No, early in August.

18122. By what time did you really get them all ready?—I have not got the date.

18123. Will you be so good as to supply the exact date when you received them?—Yes.

18124. Were they to be sent to the Tower?—Yes.

18125. That is where they are viewed?—Yes.

18126. Were they viewed under the general system of viewing at the Tower, or were they viewed under some other system?—Those articles were viewed under the usual system.

18127. When you had got them in, what was your mode of sending them out; had you a vessel entirely made over to you, as the Ordnance, to send them in, or did you put them as a mixed cargo with other things that were going out from this country?—After the articles have been inspected, they are then packed, and as soon as the articles were packed and the tonnage calculated, an application is made to the Admiralty for a conveyance to send them to the East.

18128. When did you communicate to the Admiralty that the warm clothing was ready, and that you could put them on board?—I believe it was at the end of August or the beginning of September.

18129. You made a requisition to the Admiralty for the means of transshipping those goods, did you not?—Yes. I will supply the date.

18130. What answer did you receive from the Admiralty as to that?—I cannot state; I can put it in to-morrow; they do not give answers; the letter runs thus: such a quantity of tonnage is provided in such a ship; that is the tenor of the letter.

18131. When did you get an answer that there was such tonnage provided?—I will supply that.

18132. Did they state to you the amount of tonnage they had, and in what ship?—Yes.

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18133. Have you your stevidore under the Ordnance, who sees to the packing of those goods?—Not exactly so; we have a superintendent of shipping, who is charged with all naval affairs at Woolwich, and he has under him a permanent assistant, called a stevidore, but he is, in point of fact, his assistant; then in each ship which conveys Ordnance goods we have a stevidore, according to the system of loading ships in the river, who attends with the cargo, though he cannot say, "I will have it put here, or put there;" that is under the regulation of the master or mate of the ship; but he may say, "I will not have it put there, because it is in a way to be damaged;" his power does not go beyond that; but if anything goes wrong he would go to the superintendent of shipping, who would make a representation to the Board of Ordnance, and steps would be taken to remedy the evil.

18134. When you have goods of any kind, either heavy or light ones, put on board a ship, have you an officer of your own present to see them put on board?—The stevidore.

18135. Does he send to the Ordnance a document proving that he has seen them put on board?—No; the thing stands thus: the lighterman, who is a man of property, is answerable for everything put on board his lighter. Then it runs thus: that he sends a lighter to take, say, 30 tons of those bales, enough to load one lighter, or 40 tons, to the ship which they are to be shipped in; and when the lighterman has his vessel full, the checking clerk in the Tower, the issuing clerk, gives him a bill, showing what he has in his lighter, which he has checked as it came in to him, and that document he takes with him to the ship, and delivers it to the mate or master of the vessel, as the case may be. Perhaps the loading may be going on for 10 days in that way with various lightermen. Every lighterman takes one of those bills for every cargo of goods, and the lighterman in chief is answerable. Consequently, when the vessel is laden, the master goes up to the Tower with all those pieces of paper, describing what he has received; that is again compared with the books at the Tower, and a bill of lading is made out for the ship, one of which is given to the master of the ship, and the other is sent to the persons to whom it is consigned; we also send three copies, one to the Secretary-at-War, one to the Commander-in-chief, and one to Lord Raglan; and in that way a check is entirely kept between the issuing branch of the Tower establishment and the people who receive the goods.

18136. When the goods have actually sailed, you are made perfectly aware of their having so sailed?—Precisely so; a report is brought up to say that on such a day a ship, laden with such stores, sailed for her destination.

18137. When they have sailed do you receive from the consignee an account of their arrival?—We receive an acknowledgment of all the things consigned to the Ordnance commissary or to the Ordnance storekeeper.

18138. For instance, in the case of the warm clothing, supposing it to have been sent out in September, from whom should you have received an account of its arrival?—I think the warm clothing would have gone to the Commissary-general, and in that case we should not have had an acknowledgment; we should have only obtained a knowledge of the things being received when the owner of the vessel applied for the payment of his freight, and then, on the face of that document, which the master takes, is written, say, the "Childe Harold" has arrived with such and such things on board, but minus so many articles, described in the bill of lading, and then that vessel could not be paid her freight, a deduction would be made of the value of those things from the freight.

18139. If you sent shot and shell you would get from the consignee an immediate acknowledgement, sent to you direct, that they have been received?—By the first post afterwards.

18140. When you send things, such as warm clothing, which belong to another department, you do not get an immediate receipt?—No.

18141. *Chairman.*] When you make your requisition to the Admiralty for transport, do you tell the Admiralty the quality of the goods, and the urgent necessity there is for carrying them rapidly to their destination?—We describe the goods as heavy and light; heavy being more a matter of weight, like shot, and light being a matter of measurement, which is calculated on known principles.

18142. When

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18142. When you sent the warm clothing, which it was of great importance should be sent rapidly, did you tell them that it was warm clothing?—I will not say that; it is possible that we did, but I think it is more than probable that we should describe it as so many tons light.

18143. Not stating to the Admiralty that it was urgent that they should go rapidly, that it should go in a steamer or in a sailing vessel?—Yes; whenever things are of an urgent nature it is invariably stated to the Admiralty in the requisition that those things are pressing.

18144. Was that done in the case of the warm clothing?—I will not say that it was, but I can look and ascertain.

18145. Lord *Seymour*.] What further requisition did you receive in regard to warm clothing?—From Almond & Co. we had waterproof capes, 20,000; I have not got the date of it, but I will add it; leggings, 40,000 pairs; leather mitts, 20,000 pairs. Gilpin & Co., paletôts lined with fur, 40,000. Oliphant, Groves & Wright, 10,000. Almond & Co., gauntlets, 21,000. Almond, brown boots, 2,300; Hibbard & Co., 7,000; William Jones, 1,200; E. Kendal, 8,000; J. P. Rowe, 1,500; E. Davis, 1,000.

Jovis, 3° die Maii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Sir John Hanmer.
Captain Gladstone.	Mr. Drummond.
General Peel.	Mr. Bramston.
Sir John Pakington.	Col. Lindsay.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R.N., C.B., called in; and further Examined.

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18146. Lord *Seymour*.] YOU were asked yesterday respecting the requisitions for the warm clothing; have you now got the dates with regard to the warm clothing?—I have.

18147. General *Peel*.] It appears that on the 21st of June 1854, a requisition was made to the Board of Ordnance, on the part of the Secretary for War, for warm clothing for the troops in the East; was that requisition in writing, or was it verbal?—I cannot say whether it was in writing, or verbal, because a large number of communications which we received from the Secretary for War, and from the Secretary at War, had been merely verbal, and I could not trace the written requisition; but still it may be in the office; but many applications have been in writing, and many verbal.

18148. *Chairman*.] Do you mean to state that a requisition has been sent down from the Minister for War to you, in words, and not in writing?—Frequently.

18149. And accepted by you and acted upon?—They were brought by a member of the Board of Ordnance, the Clerk of the Ordnance, and they were communicated to the Board verbally by him, and acted upon at once; and in some instances directions were given by him to the Secretary, without any communication being made to the Board.

18150. Lord *Seymour*.] Do you mean that after a requisition had been sent and made verbally, it was not completed by being sent specifically in writing?—I believe it will be found that all the verbal communications were finally covered in writing, and sanctioned by the Minister for War, but not at the time. I recollect when the Duke of Newcastle was retiring from office a search was made for all the various communications which had been made, and finally a covering order to sanction those proceedings, was given.

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18151. Could you state, whether or not, this requisition which as you say was made, verbally, on the 21st of June, was made afterwards in writing?—I am not sure of its being verbal.

18152. Afterwards do you think you had it in writing?—I have no doubt of it, for this reason, that when the Duke of Newcastle was retiring all the verbal requisitions, which had been given, were covered by a sanction from his Grace.

18153. But that was some months afterwards, was it not?—Yes.

18154. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you state to the Committee whether, at the time those verbal communications were made, any record was kept of any of them in the office?—The very act of the execution of them was a record in the office.

18155. How was that?—Because, if we are to set forth that such a thing was to be done, and such a purchase was to be made, it was of course stated that it was made in the department, and made by the order of the Minister for War.

18156. Your office might have taken upon themselves to give an order in the name of the War Office, without having any minute or record of any such order sent to you from that department?—I might have done so, but I think it is quite as improbable that I should do it, as that any Member of this Honourable Committee would do it.

18157. In those matters it is necessary, is it not, to proceed in a proper business-like way?—Yes.

18158. General *Peel.*] As the requisition from the War Office states the articles, namely, 60,000 Jersey frocks, and 150,000 pairs of worsted socks, it must have been in writing; it could not have been a verbal communication?—I received a verbal communication on that point from the Clerk of the Ordnance. I cannot charge my memory that I saw a written one; still that does not show that there was not one, because having received that verbal communication, and knowing that it was pressing, I acted upon it directly; the consequence of the action is that the Storekeeper at the Tower makes this proposition. I have no recollection that I saw a written requisition to that effect; but as I said before, it may have existed.

18159. *Chairman.*] Does it depend upon your memory; is not a record kept in the office, and ought you not to be able to put your hand upon it?—We can put our hand on any requisition, and also on the covering requisition.

18160. Supposing a requisition was sent down, ought it to depend upon your memory to satisfy the Committee whether it was sent down, or is there not in the office a record kept?—Of course if a requisition was sent the requisition will be, not in my office, as the Principal Storekeeper and Comptroller of Stores, but it will be in the office of the Secretary of the Board in the record-room.

18161. If the Committee send to him, he will be able to send it, will he not?—I think so.

18162. General *Peel.*] It appears that on the 27th of June the Board directed information to be obtained as to the supply of those articles?—Yes.

18163. You stated yesterday, did you not, that in fact before you left London you had placed the whole thing in train for the supply of those articles?—Yes, as the Committee will perceive by that paper, everything was in train before I left London.

18164. Will you state to the Committee whether that supply was proceeded with without being counteracted by any other member of the Board of Ordnance?—No. I went down into the country on the 18th of July, and on the 20th I received a letter. I cannot now say whether it was from the secretary, from my own chief clerk, or from the clerk who is at the head of the Contract Department. I left word that I was to be called if I was wanted, and he wrote to me and, "I am sorry to disturb you, but if you can come up pray do, for we are all getting into perplexity about the supply of the warm clothing, and I am anxious for your presence." I came up and I found that the supply, as proposed and sanctioned by the Board in that paper had been stopped, and that further orders had been given for supplies, and that they had been made not in either of the two ways which I described yesterday, but various parties were called upon to send in specimens of clothing with the prices attached. On my return I stated that it was impossible that we could give up the agreement, that we could quash the agreement with Mr. Kinnaston, which

which had been made with the Board's sanction on fair terms, and finally, that agreement was carried out with exception of 10,000 pairs of stockings, which were returned.

18165. Was this superseding of your order done by a minute of the Board, or by the action of a single member of the Board?—I have never seen a minute of the Board upon it. I did not look for it, because finally after discussing the question on my return the agreement with Mr. Kinnaston was carried into effect, and the things that he furnished were lost in the "Prince."

18166. The Board at the time consisted of the Lieutenant-general, the Secretary to the Ordnance, and yourself, the Storekeeper, did it not?—Yes.

18167. Which member of the Board was it, that ordered the supply of those articles to be stopped?—I believe the Clerk of the Ordnance, but the order was not given to me; I know it only on hearsay.

18168. Lord *Seymour*.] You state that when you came back to town, you found it impossible to quash the agreement?—Yes.

18169. Had there been then a question of quashing the agreement?—Yes, there had been; I have no official record in writing, but Mr. Stacey, the storekeeper at the Tower, through whom I had negociated the supply, and whose paper I will read, said, "Sir Thomas, it is rumoured I am told, that this agreement is to be quashed. I have acted on the Board's order and the integrity of the Board, for good faith is involved in carrying out that agreement, I am satisfied with the moderation of the prices; I can assure you nothing can be more moderate; I think it is desirable to go on." I stated this first to Sir Hew Ross, but more especially to the Clerk of the Ordnance, Mr. Monsell, and finally by conversations at which I was not present, between Mr. Stacy and them, without reading any absolute minute of the Board, the contract resumed the original course proposed.

18170. When you were in the country, you received a letter from the Ordnance requesting you to return, and you immediately came back?—Yes; I went down on the 18th and I received a letter on the 21st, and on the evening of the 23d I left home, having resolved to go up directly to town on Sunday evening, though it was my original intention to wait for the post till the Monday morning.

18171. Having come back to town, you naturally communicated with the members of the Board of Ordnance who were then in town, did you not?—I walked into the board-room on Monday and I found them there with those other articles spread out for patterns, and of course immediately I said to them, "This agreement has been entered into by the decision of a minute of the Board, and I do not see how it is possible with any good faith that we can abrogate it."

18172. Had the Clerk of the Ordnance been absent when you entered into that contract?—No.

18173. He had been himself a party to the agreement which had been entered into?—Expressly so; because he communicated verbally with me, that the Duke of Newcastle desired those things to be provided immediately, and speaking of it as an urgent service, I immediately communicated with Mr. Stacey, in whose long experience and known integrity, I had the fullest reliance; this paper will show what I did.

18174. Before you go to the paper, how did it come to pass that the Clerk of the Ordnance, having agreed to the contract on one day, raised a question afterwards of quashing it?—I do not know..

18175. Was it not brought before the Board and discussed?—I did not go into anything that was calculated to raise any unpleasant feeling; I looked merely to the maintenance of that agreement, and to forward the required supply in the best way I could.

18176. The Ordnance had agreed at the Board, to enter into a certain contract, and then, as I understand, entered into that contract; then one of the members goes out of town, and he is brought back to town by a sudden letter, and is then told that there is a question of quashing the contract which was agreed to before?—Yes, but the word agreement should be substituted for that of contract.

18177. Then did younot ask naturally what the reason was to make it desirable for the public service that the contract should be quashed?—I never could

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could understand why it was done; and I have not the most remote idea why it was done.

18178. *Chairman.*] Did you ask why it was done?—No.

18179. Why did you not ask?—Because I carried the point which I had in view, the maintenance of the agreement.

18180. Before that, you must have had some discussion; and did you not learn then what induced Mr. Monsell to wish to quash the contract?—No, I did not ask him about it; I felt satisfied in carrying the agreement into effect, and ensuring an early supply of the things that were wanted; and I felt that I had done all that was necessary on my part.

18181. Lord *Seymour.*] Was it not probable that if a member of the Board wished to quash a contract into which he had entered, he must have had some grave and serious reasons for wishing to quash the contract?—I have told to the Committee exactly what passed to the best of my belief.

18182. *Chairman.*] No, you have not; you have only told the Committee the conclusion of what passed?—I went in to the Board-room, and stated that this agreement ought to be upheld; and finally, after my stating that, it was maintained.

18183. All that conveys the idea that there was some argumentation?—There was none.

18184. Then what were they considering?—They did not immediately concede, and say, "This shall be done."

18185. Did you not hear what took place between them?—I really cannot now charge my memory with anything more than that; I have stated the general results of the case.

18186. Lord *Seymour.*] You had gone thus far; had not instructions been given to the contractor, Mr. Kinnaston, to stop the supply?—I think it may have been communicated by Mr. Stacey before I came, but not through me.

18187. Will you state to the Committee whether, as a fact, the contractor, Mr. Kinnaston, had been told to stop, and not to proceed in furnishing this supply?—Yes; I only infer that; because Mr. Stacey, when I came up, communicated to me that the agreement was stopped. I did not go any further. I concluded that it was stopped by the authority of the Board; and I then talked to him upon the subject, and he said, of course, in carrying out the Board's order of the 21st of June, I pledged the Board to fulfil on their part the terms agreed between Mr. Kinnaston and the Board.

18188. Are the Committee to understand now that Mr. Stacey told you that the contract had been stopped?—Yes.

18189. But he did not tell you on what grounds it had been stopped?—No.

18190. *Chairman.*] By whose order was it stopped?—As I have before stated, I have never seen an official statement.

18191. By whose orders was it stopped?—I cannot tell; I was not present.

18192. Do not you know anything that occurs at the Board, but that which you beheld with your own eyes, and hear with your own ears?—No, communications are not made to me of the minutes of the proceedings of the Board whilst I am absent.

18193. You do not see what occurs?—No.

18194. Lord *Seymour.*] It could only have been stopped by one of the members of the Board?—I believe so.

18195. Had Mr. Stacey, on his own authority, power to stop it?—No.

18196. Had any other person in the department of the Ordnance, except a member of the Board, power to stop it?—Certainly not, it must have been either Mr. Monsell or Sir Hew Ross.

18197. *Chairman.*] Were you not informed which of them it was?—No, I was not.

18198. So that now you are perfectly in the dark as to who it was that stopped that contract?—I believe it may have been the act, not solely of Mr. Monsell, but the act unitedly of Mr. Monsell and Sir Hew Ross.

18199. General *Peel.*] If it was in consequence of an order from the Board, there would be a minute of the Board's proceedings of that day, signed by two members of the Board, would there not?—Certainly.

18200. Then you would only refer to it, in fact, when the question next came before you; it is always usual, is it not, that every order that has been given,

given, and every transaction that has taken place, is placed before the Board?—Yes.

18201. *Chairman.*] You were not allowed to see the minutes that were made during your absence?—I did not say that. I said that it is not usual for minutes to be sent when we leave town; during the period that we are absent, the minutes of the Board are not sent to us.

18202. But when you came home were you not able to read the minutes?—I might; but I saw no reason for reading them; the thing was so clear before me that the agreement had been stopped.

18203. How was it clear before you?—Because, as I have just stated to Lord Seymour, Mr. Kinnaston's agreement was stopped; Mr. Stacey told me so.

18204. But you had no official authority for the statement?—No; but I did not consider it necessary to do more after a certain conversation, either on that day or the next day; and the contract with Mr. Kinnaston proceeded.

18205. The Committee want to know why it was stopped?—I cannot tell.

18206. Mr. *Layard.*] Are minutes always regularly kept?—They are, but I would not undertake to say that there is a minute on this point, because, since the change of the constitution of the Board of Ordnance, though it is not perfected officially, the Clerk of the Ordnance, being a member of the Board, who is in immediate communication with the Secretary for War, he brings messages to the Board; and not only that, but he sometimes, upon the authority of the Secretary for War, acts in his own room in a way that it was not usual antecedent to this change.

18207. Lord *Seymour.*] You speak of some change in the constitution of the Board; to what change do you refer?—The Secretary for War now manages the details of the Ordnance Department; when I say the details, perhaps that is wrong, but he gives orders for what is to be done upon various points through the Clerk of the Ordnance; and perhaps I may say that I felt the impropriety of this some time ago, and I spoke to the Clerk of the Ordnance on the subject; and I did not only do that, but some time ago I wrote him a letter, expressive of the dissentient view that I took of the line he was taking in conducting the business, and amongst the things which I objected to was this, that he brought down messages from the Secretary for War, which were treated as binding on the Board of Ordnance, and which only remained recorded by his word of mouth. I said on that occasion, both verbally and also in my letter, It appears to me that the public business should always be recorded in writing, and though of course whatever the Secretary for War may say this Board will immediately comply with, still, it appears to me, when the service will admit of it, it would be well that it should come, as a large portion of it does, in regular written communications; but when circumstances arise of such a pressing nature that the Secretary for War finds it necessary to give you a verbal order, I think that you ought to record that message, and place it before the Board authenticated by your own signature, so that it may appear on the records of the Board, and be a proof, in the event of any question arising, the thing should or should not have been done.

18208. This answer which you have given the Committee contains the substance of a letter you wrote?—Yes.

18209. Can you submit that letter to the Committee?—No; I wrote it to Mr. Monsell.

18210. Have you not a copy of it?—No; I had really not time to make one.

18211. General *Peel.*] Are the Committee to understand that, in consequence of the change in the constitution of the Board of Ordnance, the business is now carried on by verbal communications, and orders from the Secretary for War are not carried out by minutes and orders of the Board, as was formerly done?—It is carried on on both principles; things of ordinary occurrence, and in the routine of the office, go on in the usual way; a very large portion of the business is carried on in the way you have named, that is by verbal communications.

18212. Formerly, under the Board of Ordnance, no business could have been transacted that would not have appeared at once on the face of the proceedings and minutes of the Board?—Certainly not.

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18213. You do not think this is an improved way of carrying on the business of the Board, to supersede the authority of the Board by the authority of the Secretary for War?—No; I think as long as it continues a Board, the Board should be left as it was, with a power outside deciding by plurality of votes as under the Master-general. The Secretary for War should have the same position; but I think he should record his wishes, in writing, as a guide to the Board. That has not been done always; but when the Secretary for War has not time to write a letter or make a written minute, I have told the Clerk of the Ordnance, and written to him to say, that I considered the public business could not be safely transacted unless a record of the message, authenticated by his initials, were laid before the Board, and placed with the Secretary as a record of the proceedings of the Board.

18214. Lord *Seymour*.] When you came back to the Board, finding that the contract had been stopped, what course did you take?—I spoke on the subject both to Mr. Monsell and to Sir Hew Ross; and I stated, that the agreement having been entered into, the Board was pledged to carry it out.

18215. Was this decision of yours approved by the Board?—Finally it was.

18216. After what time?—I think it must have been the next day; I do not think it was adopted on that day.

18217. Then the decision being approved, was a record kept of that decision?—If there was a record it will be in the office, but I doubt it very much, because the whole proceedings being irregular no minute was made, for the Board was not sitting as a Board at the table at that time, but those garments for an additional supply were spread round the room with the prices attached, and the whole proceeding assumed more the character of a conversation than of an official proceeding.

18218. It appears to the Committee that it is doubtful whether the requisition was regular; it is quite clear that quashing the contract was irregular, according to your statement; it is clear also, that the decision afterwards taken was taken in an irregular manner, and not, therefore, made the subject of an official record?—It is possible; I have no recollection that a minute was made of it; I do not think that there was.

18219. Did you send to Mr. Stacey, to tell him that the contract was to go on?—I found him, on my return, in the board-room, therefore I concluded that he had been previously summoned there on this business, to meet the members of the Board.

18220. Did you then tell Mr. Stacey that the contract was to go on, although it had been stopped?—Not till, I think, the next day; I had a conversation with Mr. Stacey, and I quite agreed with him that the agreement should go on, and it ought to go on.

18221. Several days having been lost by this proceeding, did the contract then immediately go on?—Yes.

18222. Did you see Mr. Kinnaston?—I did not see him; but I saw Mr. Stacey, and the agreement went on immediately, and no delay, I believe, in the shipment of the goods, took place in consequence of the transaction.

18223. But some delay in getting the goods ready had obviously taken place?—Yes.

18224. Will you state, the contract now going on, when the goods were given in to the Tower; were they given to Mr. Stacey at the Tower?—Yes.

18225. At what date were those goods given by the contractor?—If the Committee will permit me now to read this paper, it will give them all the information that I have obtained from Mr. Stacey, the Storekeeper.

18226. *Chairman*.] What is the date of that paper?—This was not prepared for this occasion, I should say; it is dated the 25th of April 1855, signed, George Stacey, storekeeper: "On the 21st of June 1854 (O-377)," that is the office number of the order, "The Board desire us to inform them what would be the best means of obtaining the following articles, in what time, and at what price; viz., 60,000 Jersey frocks, 150,000 pairs worsted socks." On the 27th June the civil officers report that they had conferred with Messrs. Kynaston & Son, a house on whom reliance could be placed, who stated that if it were made known so large a quantity was wanted by the Government, in a very short time, it would certainly materially affect the price, and that the civil officers had directed

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directed them to ascertain quietly what quantities could be obtained in a short time, and they soon produced samples of the following articles, which they undertook to deliver in a few days: viz., 1st, 60,000 pairs socks, four samples, at 8 *d.*, 8½ *d.*, 9 *d.*, 9½ *d.*, per pair, and 90,000 pairs at 8½ *d.* per pair, part to be delivered by the 1st, and the remainder by the 10th of August; 2d, 24,480 Jersey frocks, at 2 *s.* 8 *d.*, 2 *s.* 10 *d.*, 3 *s.* 1 *d.*, 3 *s.* 4 *d.*, and 3 *s.* 6 *d.* each, deliverable in a few days; 3d, 35,520 Jersey frocks, deliverable between the 1st and 10th of August. It was also stated in the Civil Officer's Report that the above offer was made in the supposition that "an answer would be given in a short time, as the holders would not be able to keep them should orders flow in." If time could be allowed a saving would be made, as a larger quantity might be manufactured at a lower price. The Board, by order, 27th June 1854, adverting to the order, 21st June (O-377), direct information to be obtained as to the supply of 50,000 pairs of drawers, in addition to the Jersey frocks and socks. Pattern drawers were, on the same day, transmitted to the Board by the civil officers. On the 5th July 1854 (S-256), the Board ordered the civil officers to provide the articles, as proposed in their report, 27th and 28th June, minus 50,000 pairs of socks, relative to which further instructions were to be given. Orders to Messrs. Kynaston & Son were given accordingly. On the 11th July 1854 (O-435), the Board ordered that, before the woollen shirts, drawers, and socks were purchased, the patterns were to be submitted to Dr. Smith, and for which purpose they were to be forwarded to the Board; Dr. Smith selected a set of patterns; but we believe those ultimately sealed by the Board were not exactly those selected by Dr. Smith on the 24th of July.

18227. The patterns of those orders were submitted to Dr. Andrew Smith, were they not?—Yes, they were.

18228. But not submitted to him until the middle of July?— On the 5th of July.

18229. Until they had been approved by him, the contractor could not proceed?—No.

18230. Therefore we have now got to the 5th of July before the contractor could proceed with this contract?—Yes.

18231. Then they were submitted to Dr. Smith; but you state, do you not, that the Board did not quite agree to the suggestions of Dr. Smith?—We did not demur to anything; if they were not the same, it was accidental; there was no intention of deviating.

18232. But there was a deviation, was there not?—I have no doubt there was, because Mr. Stacey says, "On the 24th July 1854 (O-2121), the Board repeal the order to procure 90,000 Jersey frocks and 100,000 pair socks to sealed samples sent therewith, and desired the civil officers to make the most advantageous terms with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons with reference to the return of the articles not approved, which were contracted for upon the Board's order, 5th July 1854 (S-256)."

18233. Lord *Seymour*.] There was another delay, apparently there was some disapproval of the pattern of the 5th of July, and then on the 24th of July, the Board repeal the order to proceed with the goods according to that new pattern?—No; that is a second order, as I take it; I do not think that this relates to the first order; this is an additional order; the first order relates to 60,000 pairs of socks, 24,000 Jersey frocks, and 35,000 Jersey frocks. Then there is this, "Note.—Much demi-official correspondence took place, and Mr. Stacey and Mr. Pew attended on several occasions to give an opinion upon the patterns. The socks first ordered were according to the regulation pattern for the army. The pattern chosen by the Army Medical Board was much thicker and heavier." It appears to apply to the socks.

18234. They were the first ordered?—Yes.

18235. Therefore that applies to some of the first orders given?—Yes.

18236. And the socks were not finally settled upon till the 24th of July?—No.

18237. Therefore, till then the contractor could not proceed?—No, not in sending them in; we knew that he had them ready to send in.

18238. It was impossible for him to provide that very large order till he knew according to what pattern he was to provide them?—Yes; but a certain portion, half of the pattern, was taken on the original contract, and another portion upon the new pattern. "The Board, by their order, 29th July 1854 (O-478),

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(O–478), direct the civil officers to procure 40,000 pairs woollen drawers; other contracts having been entered into by the Board for 32,500 pair, the Board by their Minute, 21st November 1854 (O–5154), further ordered the total number to be made up to 90,000, and 17,500 pairs were accordingly ordered of Messrs. Kynaston. On the 16th August 1854, the civil officers report arrangements made for procuring the 90,000 frocks, and 100,000 pair socks, which were sanctioned by the Board's Minute of 23d August 1854 (Q–1183)."

18239. Then on the 16th of August, they report that an arrangement had been made to procure that which had been agreed to be procured on the 24th July?—Yes, exactly; I will finish this paper, "Showing that Messrs. Kynaston and Son, would take back the socks of the regulation pattern, less 10,000 pairs, and supply 100,000 at 10 *s.* 4 *d.* per dozen, of the strong pattern approved by the Board, and the Army Medical Department."

18240. On the 16th of August, Mr. Kynaston undertook to complete the order according as it was required?—Yes.

18241. When was the order for those socks completed?—The application for the tonnage was made on the 7th of August.

18242. But it was on the 16th of August that Messrs. Kynaston undertook to complete them?—A portion of the socks were ready, and the Guernsey frocks were ready.

18243. Keep to one article, for simplicity's sake?—I cannot do that, because the Guernsey frocks and jackets were ready first, and the application to ship them was made first.

18244. Have you not any record of the date when the things were given in at the Tower?—I have a statement here, of the blankets, rugs, and warm clothing sent to the East since the sailing of the "Prince"; there were sent out in the "Prince," on the 18th of October, great coats, 2,500; blankets, 16,000; rugs, 3,700; woollen frocks, 53,000; lamb's wool drawers, 17,000; socks, 35,700; and the date of her arrival at Balaklava was the 8th of November.

18245. I want to know when those things were delivered to the officer at the Tower?—I can only answer that by saying that we never make an application for tonnage till the articles are packed ready and measured, and consequently as we made our first application on the 7th of August, it is quite clear that everything must have been packed to load that vessel.

18246. *Chairman.*] Before you go to the packing, I want to inquire by whom the articles received are seen to agree with the sample?—There is a large establishment at the Tower, consisting of an inspector and three officers, with salaries varying from 500 *l.* to 300 *l.* a year, who have under them, in all the various articles supplied for the public use, inspectors and viewers versed in the trades, and who are selected for their ability, and consequently, if a contractor furnishes any goods, if, for example, they are kerseys, the kersey is placed over a reel, and examined in various ways by weight, by measurement, and by passing it over the reel to see whether there are any holes in it; the same system is carried out with regard to every article that is received.

18247. I want to trace the sample from the time of its arrival to the time of the comparison of the supplied goods with the sample?—With reference to the sample, the sample is given in to the charge of the Storekeeper at the Tower, and by him placed in the pattern-room.

18248. When you approve of a sample, it is sent from the Board of Ordnance to the Tower?—Yes, and sealed with the Board's seal.

18249. Then it is put into the hands of the Storekeeper?—Yes; and he puts it into the pattern-room.

18250. You state that it is sealed by the Board of Ordnance; is that seal lying about?—Yes, it is.

18251. Can anybody get at that seal?—Yes; but the article is simply stamped and sealed up in a cover, and sent to the Storekeeper, and it remains in his hands.

18252. What precaution is taken that the article is not changed from the time that it leaves your hands till it gets into the hands of the Tower Storekeeper?—I do not see who can have an interest in changing it.

18253. I will point it out to you: supposing a contractor had sent in a good article, and you had chosen the good article, but in the mean time, as a sample, there is a bad article substituted, for which the contractor is paid the same price

price that you agreed to give for the good article, the bad article then comes to the Storekeeper?—That would answer, if it was a single case; but our patterns are not for single cases; all the patterns are agreed upon, and one is fixed on, and sealed for the Government contracts, till the patterns are abolished, and new ones are established. I admit, if you were to send a parcel of goods down to Woolwich, *pro hâc vice*, there might be an interest in changing it; but who is to know anything about this pattern; the people who contract are shown the pattern, and the specification, as guides for the supply.

18254. Then the person who contracts to furnish the article does not send a pattern?—No; we have the pattern, and they must conform to it.

18255. The pattern is sent down to the Storekeeper, to see that the contractor supplies an article that agrees with the sample?—Yes, not inferior to the sample.

18256. How does the contractor know; is the sample put into his hands?—When we tender, we state that the specification and the pattern may be seen at the Tower or Woolwich, and that certain things are wanted; and the contractor who tenders goes to those places, looks at the pattern, and at the specification, and then sends in his tender.

18257. I will state what I have heard. At the hospital at Scutari, there were issued socks, of the size of children's, to our soldiers; is that possible, do you think?—I should say if we had proceeded as we do in ordinary times, that it would not have been possible; but there was a great deal of hurry, and a great pressure in this business; and part of the things were sent out through the packers, Messrs. Howell & Hayter. It is possible, but I do not think it is probable.

18258. Have you never heard of it?—Never. Yes, by the bye, I did hear that there had been some socks, not the full size, sent out.

18259. Lord *Seymour*.] It appears from your evidence that though you have the date when you applied to the contractor, you do not seem to keep any record of the date when the goods ordered were delivered into the Tower?—It may be obtained from the Tower, but it would be of no use at Pall-mall to know it.

18260. It might have been of use, for this reason: you urged that those goods should be delivered in from the 1st to the 10th of August?—Yes.

18261. Unless you know when they are delivered in, how can you possibly see whether the contractor has or has not done his duty?—But we do not do it; we do not keep a record of it at Pall-mall; a record is kept at the Tower, and if I wanted to know, it would be only to telegraph and ask the question.

18262. As a matter of business, when you have given a great order for 80,000 pairs of stockings and 60,000 belts, have you no return from the Tower, showing when the contractor delivered those goods?—All that may be traced.

18263. Is it not sent in as a matter of course?—No.

18264. All that you know is, that on the 7th of August there was an application for tonnage to the Admiralty?—There had been a report that such goods were ready for embarkation, and in that way we received a report from the Storekeeper at the Tower.

18265. Do you state in your application to the Admiralty what things are to be taken, or do you say merely that they are heavy, or light goods?—We state "heavy" and "light." When heavy, we say whether they are guns, shot, or shells, and so forth; and though we state generally only the term "light," we accompany it with the names of the principal articles: for example, blankets, and rugs, we do not go into detail with to the Admiralty; all that they require to know is, that there is such a portion of heavy, and such a portion of light, but we do add the names.

18266. You applied, on the 7th of August, for tonnage for certain light goods; did you state to the Admiralty what those goods were?—I believe so.

18267. Under the heads that you have in that paper?—Yes; the whole of them may not have been named.

18268. What number of socks were there in that application of the 7th of August?—Thirty-five thousand seven hundred.

18269. That was out of 80,000 to be sent, and you applied then to send out 35,000?—Yes; but in three days afterwards the "Jura" was to sail, and she might be taken as connected with the same shipment.

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18270. When did you apply for the "Jura"?—At the same time, I take it, as the "Prince."

18271. Have you got the requisition there that you sent to the Admiralty?—No, I have not a copy.

18272. *Chairman.*] Do you ever keep a copy of those things?—All those records are in the record-room of the Board; if we kept copies we should require a double establishment of clerks.

18273. Lord *Seymour.*] Have you a record in the office?—Yes.

18274. You applied for the tonnage; does the requisition say for what amount of tonnage; you state that there were two vessels, that the "Prince" could not take the whole?—Yes, I think I have a paper that will show that. I can state that from the 7th of August to the time of the sailing of the "Prince," from memory, I should say that eight or nine other requisitions for tonnage had been made.

18275. Can you show all your requisitions for tonnage, and state whether they were for heavy or light goods?—Yes; it is all kept in a book.

18276. I wish to call your attention to this; yesterday, in your examination, at Question 18119, you stated the requisition was immediate; that the case was pressing and immediate, and therefore you did not go to the system of contract, but applied to Mr. Kynaston; did you in making that requisition to the Admiralty, state that the case was pressing and immediate, or urgent?—No; I do not know whether that was done; but I was frequently in communication with the Lord of the Admiralty who presided over the Transport Service, and I have no doubt that I made a communication to him that the wants of the army, with regard to warm clothing, were urgent.

18277. Was the application made in writing for the tonnage?—Yes.

18278. Is it customary on the part of the Board of Ordnance when there is any pressing necessity, to remark in that application that it is urgent?—Yes, it is generally the case; but I would remark, that when this requisition was made from the Secretary for War, I considered it to be more urgent than it appeared to be afterwards; the communication to me was, that we were to get those things to go out by the middle of August, and therefore the urgency in making the application was made known to Mr. Kynaston, and then subsequently on the 7th of August an application was made, stating that so much tonnage was ready; it may or may not have been stated as urgent to the Admiralty, but I have no doubt that in my communication with the Lord of Admiralty I did state so.

18279. You are not sure whether or not in the written application for tonnage it was stated to be urgent?—No, I am not sure.

18280. Having applied for tonnage on the 7th of August, when did you receive the next letter from the Admiralty, stating that there was any tonnage available for your purposes?—For the "Prince," the entry is that we applied on the 7th of August and on the 2d and 15th of September, and the date of the shipment is the 16th of October.

18281. Are the Committee to understand that you did not apply for the "Prince," or any particular ship?—No; but that is the name that guides me.

18282. When you apply for tonnage, do not you receive any answer from the Admiralty, stating that they have such and such tonnage, and that it will be available in the river on such and such a date?—Exactly so.

18283. When you applied on the 7th of August was their answer this, that they would have no tonnage available till the 16th of October?—They made no reply; the custom is to write to us when they have tonnage at their disposal, and that would be, of course, antecedent to the 16th of October.

18284. *Chairman.*] You remained quiet, did you, till you received your answer?—No; it appears that we made three applications in the interval. We had made between the 7th of August and the time that it was ordered, nine applications, or rather nine applications not repeated, but nine applications for tonnage to take things to the East.

18285. For the same goods?—As those goods had not been sent, every one of them must be considered as a refresher, because they were to go to the same place and the same persons.

18286. Did not the requisitions state a new quantity?—Our first requisition would, perhaps, be for 400 tons, and the next requisition would, perhaps, be for 300 tons in addition.

18287. But

18287. But that is less than the former one, which shows that it was a different requisition?—Exactly; but I happen to remember that there were nine different applications for articles.

18288. What the Committee want to know is, whether those nine different applications referred simply to the goods which the "Prince" eventually took out, or did they refer to different goods?—They all referred to the warm clothing which was intended for the troops.

18289. The warm clothing might be in nine separate parcels. I want to know whether those nine requisitions applied to that set of parcels which the first requisition applied to?—No; the requisitions from the 7th of August to the 15th of September, included all the things which were shipped in the "Prince" and the "Jura."

18290. How could that be, when your first requisition was for 400 tons, and the second for 300 tons?—I put that as an illustration of our proceedings.

18291. Yes; but it shows that it cannot have been the same?—I think you will see when I can find my paper, which I have missed, that it is precisely as I state; it will show that those requisitions have been made, and that all the things that were in those requisitions went in the "Prince" and the "Jura" to Balaklava.

18292. Lord *Seymour*.] You state, do you not, that you do not receive any answer from the Admiralty as to tonnage being available, or when they could place it at your disposal; they only write whether it is actually available?—Exactly.

18293. I find that a vessel left Woolwich on the 11th of August, for instance, the "Golden Fleece," I find that the "Harbinger" sailed on the 11th of August from Devonport, and that the "Australian" sailed on the 8th of August, and that the "Cottingham" sailed on the 9th of August; the "Golden Fleece" is stated to have departed from Deptford?—The probability is that she carried the battering train; the "Harbinger" sailed, under Captain Henderson, for Turkey, carrying out the battering train, and that will account for nothing going out in her; the "Sydney" sailed also at the same time, taking the battering train too; and the "Golden Fleece" took out beds, of hair, 300; bolsters, hair, 300; sheets, 3,500; then she must have taken something else.

18294. *Chairman*.] Among your nine requisitions, did you include those things?—Really I cannot state.

18295. Lord *Seymour*.] There were two or three of those vessels sailing during this period when it was desirable to send out this warm clothing, but carrying heavy stores from the Ordnance; were those sent out upon requisitions made beforehand?—Very probably; the battering train was a thing urgently demanded, and vessels were appropriated specially for that battering train, which was as urgently wanted as the warm clothing.

18296. This supply being urgent and immediate, and so urgent and immediate, that the usual system of contract was departed from, in order to complete it, yet the result was, that the things did not sail till the 16th of October?—Yes.

18297. That was the first lot that went?—Yes; but it was ready before; having been reported ready on the 7th of August.

18298. When it was stated to you that a vessel was ready, namely, the "Prince," to take the goods, was that vessel sent down to Woolwich?—Probably to Woolwich.

18299. Do your packers, Messrs. Howell & Hayter, go down there?—Yes, some of them; I see here there is a notice from them, showing that they have sent some things to Woolwich.

18300. Are they the Ordnance packers?—No; Messrs. Hayter & Howell are the packers employed under the War Office; the Secretary at War sends out the army clothing under the system of contract; under the colonels.

18301. Then who were employed instead of the usual Ordnance packers?—Sometimes the things that we were to send out were things supplied by the army clothiers, who are still, to a certain extent, employed for the purpose of supplying the troops with clothing.

18302. Were Messrs. Howell & Hayter, on this occasion, as they were Ordnance stores, employed on your account, or did you consider that you had made over the things to the Secretary at War?—No; it is quite the contrary; the Secretary at War conducted this business; he formerly conducted it; and

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he was answerable for sending out, to a certain extent, clothing to the regiments; then the persons employed to send out the clothing were his packers; it is a peculiar business in London that Messrs. Hayter & Howell have, and when a pressure came upon the Ordnance Messrs. Hayter & Howell were employed to send out those things to the troops; and, in some cases, where we were pressed to complete things for ships that were ready, and waiting, we put the work into the hands of Messrs. Howell & Hayter, because we could not get fast enough through it by our usual process.

18303. Then they were, to that extent, your packers?—Yes.

18304. Did you pay them for it?—Yes, we pay everything for the Secretary at War.

18305. Did they report to you what they had packed, and where they had packed it?—Yes. I have a note here: "Tonnage applications entered in pencil against the several shipments in this return which were made by us, Hayter & Howell." Here we have throughout this book a verification by them of what they have done, and of course we also compared the directions given for such things as they were packed.

18306. The "Prince" sailed on the 16th of October; you spoke of another vessel which you applied for at the same time?—The Admiralty appointed, about the same time, the "Jura."

18307. When did she sail?—On the 21st of October.

18308. She was not lost, was she?—No, she reached Balaklava on the 21st of November.

18309. What did she take out?—She took out blankets, 4,100; rugs, 7,975; woollen frocks, 21,800; lambs' wool drawers, 18,500; socks, 16,200.

18310. Was there any other vessel that sailed with warm clothing?—Yes, the "Ottawa" sailed on the 6th of November; that was the date of the shipment; the "Cleopatra" sailed on the 8th of November; the "Brandon" on the 13th of November; the "Holyrood" on the 25th of November; the "Metropolitan" on the 24th of November, and the "Manilla" on the 25th of November.

18311. All those vessels took out warm clothing, did they not?—Yes. "By the paper before me it appears that by the 30th November there had arrived at Balaklava, 11,675 great coats, 9,500 blankets; 12,450 rugs; 24,200 woollen frocks; 18,500 lambs' wool drawers; 35,156 socks; to which may be added 2,575 watch coats and 20,980 pairs of boots."

18312. *Chairman.*] To whom were they consigned?—To the Commissary-general.

18313. Does he send you an acknowledgment of the receipt of them?—I stated yesterday, that the Ordnance Commissariat acknowledge all receipts by the first post afterwards, but with regard to the Commissary-general we have no control; he does not render any account to us.

18314. You do not know that those things arrived?—We do in almost all cases, because when a vessel reaches the Ordnance Commissary or Commissary-general compares the things delivered with the bill of lading sent (which we send by post) as well as by the ship.

18315. Do you send it to the Commissary-general?—Yes.

18316. He is not under your orders, is he?—No; but the Commissary-general, on the face of the bill of lading, writes off "I have received," if he has done so, "all the things stated in this bill of lading;" and if he has not he says, "I have received all the things, except such and such things;" those things are valued, and a charge is made against the freight of the ship to the amount of their value.

18317. Is that your mode of getting a receipt for your goods?—Yes, that is the only mode we have; we cannot direct the Commissariat to do anything.

18318. That is the mode of obtaining a receipt?—Yes; and the effect is, that you get a substantial guarantee that the goods shall be delivered; and then you never pay till you have that bill of lading. If the owner of a vessel comes and says, "My vessel has been a long time engaged, I have such and such a claim;" the answer would be, "Till the bill of lading is presented you cannot be paid."

18319. What receipt did you get of those things which you have read to the Committee?—I cannot charge my memory with that. I conclude that whenever the bill of lading certified they had been delivered, the freight was paid, and that was our receipt.

18320. So

18320. So that you conclude that those things have been received, because you see them down on that paper, and that they would not have been down there unless the bill of lading had been received?—Exactly so. I may read this: "Besides the warm clothing as above, the regimental clothing for the ensuing year was sent out between the 6th and the 22d of December, and would arrive between the 1st and 20th of January."

18321. Lord *Seymour*.] The Ordnance have nothing to do with the regimental clothing, have they?—No, but we pay for the packing; we receive it and send it off.

18322. Do you receive the regimental clothing?—Not the whole; but we embark it in some cases.

18323. Who receives the regimental clothing?—Messrs. Hayter & Howell in some instances; they having been appointed for the colonels of the army; that is carried out under the Secretary for War; in some instances the things have come to the Ordnance. I cannot say so explicitly that we do not do anything; but the general rule is that they carry on the regimental business.

18323.* In some cases they come to the Ordnance, and in some they go to the Treasury; to Messrs. Howell & Hayter?—Yes.

18324. Is that because the clothing of the army is now in a state of transition; or was it always the case that some of the things went to the Ordnance and some to Messrs. Howell & Hayter?—No; formerly they did not come to the Ordnance; but I suppose it is a special case in consequence of the army being under peculiar circumstances. I speak now upon supposition to a certain extent, but I believe the colonels used to find the conveyance, and pay for the conveyance of the clothing to the regiments.

18325. You are speaking now not of the extras of which we have been speaking, such as warm clothing, but of the common clothing of the regiments?—Yes.

18326. And that clothing used to be not only furnished by the colonels, but carried to the regiments at the expense of the colonels?—Yes, I believe so. "Besides the warm clothing as above, the regimental clothing for the ensuing year was sent out between the 6th and 22d of December, and would arrive between the 1st and 20th of January. This was notified in orders by Lord Raglan as an extra supply, presented to the army by the liberality of Government."

18327. Any extra supply comes necessarily to the Ordnance, does it not?—Yes. "The above warm clothing was sent out in bulk. On and after the 16th of November, each draft that has gone to the Crimea has taken out a complete outfit of warm clothing for each man."

18328. *Chairman*.] How could you send out clothing in any other way than in bulk; what is the meaning of that statement?—I suppose it means that it was packed ordinarily as a bale of goods is packed, and not packed up in cases.

18329. So that if it were in cases, it would not be in bulk?—I did not write this return; and I think these words, "The above warm clothing was sent out in bulk," might be omitted.

18330. Lord *Seymour*.] You were asked yesterday to state the dates when the requisitions came to you for a supply of waterproof capes?—I am afraid I cannot give the dates.

18331. Was not a requisition made to you by the Secretary at War?—Yes.

18332. You do not know the date of that?—No, I do not; but I can speak as to this: I had a conference upon that subject, and the Secretary at War did it, not the Secretary for War.

18333. How soon was this application made to you?—It must have been in November.

18334. *Chairman*.] What paper are you referring to?—This is merely a record of my office.

18335. In that record, have you not the dates?—No; it is merely a memorandum for my own satisfaction; it is not an official document; merely a thing that I got up with some notes for my own guidance in the transaction of my business.

18336. Lord *Seymour*.] You were asked yesterday about the waterproof capes,

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capes, and you stated you had not got the date, but you said you would furnish it?—I will make a note of it.

18337. As to the supply of hospital furniture, it was stated by Dr. Andrew Smith, in answer to Question 8055, that "hospital furniture and clothing for the sick, and all things of that kind, were supplied through the Ordnance;" how early were you made acquainted that there was a hospital at Scutari, and that you would be called upon to supply all the hospital furniture for that establishment?—I have no document here to show that; I can get it.

18338. When the army was known to be going to the East, I suppose that application was made to the Ordnance to provide those things that are requisite for the hospitals of an army?—We had several requisitions from Dr. Andrew Smith.

18339. When the army was going to the East, as the troops were sent as early as March 1854, had 10,000 men being first sent, who were shortly afterwards increased to 20,000, was not it brought to the notice of the Ordnance that a large amount of hospital stores would be required for the use of the army?—I should like to look at the requisitions; we received so many that it is impossible I can give a definite answer.

18340. Will you be good enough to furnish an answer with regard to that class of stores called Quartermaster-general's stores, tents, and everything of that kind; and those, I believe, were supplied by the Ordnance?—Yes.

18341. When was your first application to supply those, and what quantities were you called upon to supply?—I think we must have been called upon to supply the troops, as they went out; because all the regiments leaving England took their tents and camp equipage with them; generally speaking, the regiments at Gibraltar and Malta had their camp equipage with them; and I will presently show that that includes a variety of articles; and I have no doubt that the requisition must have been made at the very time the army began to move.

18342. You could probably bring a paper in some form, so as to show when those applications were made, and when the things were sent out?—Those went out with the troops.

18343. For instance the tents; we have heard a good deal about them: how did you proceed to supply tents for the first 10,000 men at Malta?—Perhaps I may now read this: this is, "Proportion of tents of camp equipage, for a regiment of infantry and a regiment of cavalry." On a requisition made in 1844, by the late Duke of Wellington, the whole of the tents and camp equipage were revised; the stations at which they were placed were assigned, at home and in the colonies; and when we had to move, of course nothing was to be done but to give the regiments their tents, from the nearest depôt which had been established; when I use the term camp equipage, I mean the articles comprised under the head of camp equipage which are all set forth in this official document, showing what is to be supplied to each infantry regiment and each cavalry regiment, when it moves.

18344. Thus the whole system of camp equipage had been carefully reconsidered and revised in 1844?—Yes.

18345. With regard to tents, how did you proceed; had you them ready, or had you to provide them for the first 10,000 men?—No; we had tents in England for 50,000 or 60,000 men, under that arrangement.

18346. Had you no difficulty in providing tents?—None.

18347. Amongst those had you any very old ones that had been long in store?—I think not, for this reason, that the tents were revised in 1844, and the storekeepers at all the stations had strict orders to examine them once a year, and to report any which might require repair, and any which had become so old that it is necessary to cast them aside; under those circumstances, I believe, that if, from any casual movement, such as encamping in Ireland, or in the North, the tents had become unserviceable, a report would have been made to a board of officers, who would have condemned them on the original order, and have made applications for new ones.

18348. There ought to be an annual survey, so that, as regards the tents, none that are inefficient should be sent out?—Clearly.

18349. Then were the tents which were sent out with the first 10,000 men good and substantial tents?—I believe quite fit for the purpose.

18350. Have

18350. Have you any return of the oldest of those tents, to show how old some of them were?—I do not think we have, because they were revised by a person very well skilled, and understanding those matters; a man of great judgment and experience, and he was sent specially in 1844 to examine into the state of the camp equipage. When I joined the Board in 1845, the present Mr. Stacey was then the second person in the Principal Storekeeper's Department, but he was absent in Ireland, and when he came back he stated to me that his revision of the tents had been made with great accuracy and with great care, and that he considered when the things that he had suggested were carried into effect, those tents would be placed in a fit and proper state.

18351. Had you any store of tents at Malta?—Under the regulations of the late Duke of Wellington we have a proportion of tents in all the colonies.

18352. You have considerable stores at Malta?—Yes; we have a regular store at Malta.

18353. For the force there?—Yes.

18354. Were any of those tents sent on to the East?—I think some of them were; I believe the regiments from Malta and Gibraltar took with them their proportion of the tents that were at those places.

18355. That would only be the tents that belonged to the regiments at Malta?—No; each regiment going from England took their tents with them.

18356. Then if any old tents were sent out, that ought not to have been sent, the responsibility rests upon the storekeeper at the depôt from which the tents were sent?—I think so.

18357. And who ought to make an annual survey, and an annual report, upon the state of the stores?—Yes; not only of the tents, but of everything under his care.

18358. That applies also to harness, does it not?—Yes, everything.

18359. There is a large store of harness at Woolwich, is there not?—Yes; but the old is nearly all used up.

18360. A great deal of it was very old, was it not?—As old as the year 1815. Since that time it had never been used, but by making that harness up with new pieces by workmen employed in the department, efficient sets of harness had been obtained at, perhaps, about one-sixth part of the price at which you could have purchased them in the shops.

18361-2. You have not heard any report of its being defective?—No.

18363. With regard to the form of application by Dr. Andrew Smith, when he wanted furniture for the hospitals abroad, he applied to the Board of Ordnance, did he not?—He sent in a requisition, but I will explain: by the regulation, Dr. Andrew Smith had nothing to do with us at the Ordnance, he should go to the Secretary at War, or the Commander-in-Chief—I do not know which—and we should have information of what should be done; but Dr. Smith, in the beginning, came to me one day, and he said he had had much trouble in moving from place to place. I replied, You shall have no difficulty here if you sign a requisition, and state that it is urgent, and that there is no time to lose, I will undertake to represent the same to the Board of Ordnance, and your requisition shall be immediately complied with; it shall then be sent on to the Secretary for War, and if he does not disapprove we shall proceed with it; and that, I think, relieved Dr. Andrew Smith of many difficulties, and that is generally how the case has stood since that period.

18364. Were you ever prevented proceeding by any objections on the part of the Secretary at War?—Never.

18365. Therefore there was no difficulty on that score?—No.

18366. Will you bring the date of the application, and the mode in which you proceeded to comply with the application?—I can tell the Committee how we proceeded.

18367. How did you proceed to comply with that application?—If we had the articles in store, we merely, upon the requisition, wrote off to the Tower, putting a T. against the article to be supplied at the Tower, or at Woolwich, and if we found that we had nothing in store, we went, as I said before, either to contract by competition, or we went into the market and bought them.

18368. Supposing Dr. Andrew Smith said to you that he wanted 2,000 beds to be sent to Scutari, you would then send to the Tower, would you not, to see if they were in store?—No; we should have looked at the book.

 18369. Finding

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18369. Finding that they were at the Tower, you would at once send down and tell them to prepare them?—Yes.

18370. You would also make application to the Admiralty to provide tonnage?—As soon as we knew that they were packed.

18371. Then your own packers would put them on board?—No, our own packers would have nothing to do with putting them on board; the issuing branch of the Storekeeper's Department would do that when they were marked off. They are all marked with the name of the article they contain; the bale is marked with the name of the article, and the person to whom it is consigned. That being done, the issuing clerk would take an order for the issue, and place those things in barges successively, which barges would convey them to Woolwich, or wherever the ship was lying.

18372. Did you receive a reply from the persons under you, showing when those things had been actually put on board?—No, we waited a report from them that they were ready.

18373. Then, having got the things packed, and having also got from the Admiralty the means of putting them on board ship, did you receive, from your own officers, an account of when they had actually put them on board?—Yes; as soon as the ship is loaded, the Storekeeper at the Tower makes a written report, to say that such and such articles have been embarked in such a ship, and a copy of that document is sent to the consignee, and also to the Secretary for War, to Lord Hardinge, and Lord Raglan.

18374. Those things being for the use of the hospitals, Dr. Andrew Smith has told the Committee that he did not receive from the Ordnance any information of when the things were actually put on board, so that he was not aware when they were sent?—But as he was in continual communication with the officers at the Tower, and had a person there from his own office to assist in looking after those things, I do not see any particular advantage that would have been derived by making out a return, which would not have done any good; indeed he never asked for it.

18375. Would it not have been an advantage if the person who is responsible for the whole medical department of the army had been made acquainted when the beds were shipped for his hospitals abroad?—I think he was aware of it; if he had asked the Board to do it, we should have done it; and I believe (I speak now from recollection), that hearing that some question had arisen about it, I desired that Dr. Smith should always be informed, which has been since done.

18376. *Chairman.*] Do you mean some question that arose in this Committee, or before?—It was before the appointment of the Committee.

18377. Lord *Seymour.*] Dr. Andrew Smith was asked, "Did you receive the invoice?—No." "Was any bill of lading sent to you?—No; I must mention that I was not considered to have the slightest power or control over the shipping." He considered that his responsibility was over when he had made the application for those stores to be supplied?—Yes, but we carried out the cases for the Medical Department, in reference to bills of lading and consignees, precisely as we had done all the other things; and we made sure, from the writing on the bill of lading, on which the freight was paid, that those things had reached their destination. If Dr. Andrew Smith had said at any time to me, I wish to have a statement of them, I would have given it directly.

18378. He was asked this question (8121), "You do not hold yourself, as the chief of the Medical Department in this country, responsible for the stores to be supplied by the Board of Ordnance, which stores include every hospital necessary and comfort, except medicine?" and his answer was, "No, I do not; they would not allow me to be responsible for them." He considered himself in no way responsible for them?—Yes; I do not want to throw any responsibility off the shoulders of the Ordnance; if we had the requisition, we were bound to supply those things, to consign them properly, and to see that they were delivered like any other goods that we have had to do with; I should consider that the head of the Medical Department would have called upon his own department to make this return of the time when those things have reached the hospital to which they were sent.

18379. A statement has been made to the Committee with regard to the beds going to the hospital, that the legs did not go, by some mistake; can you explain

explain how, under your Ordnance system, with your accounts of what has been shipped, such a thing could have happened without your knowing it?—Very easily; not in the common course of things, but in the case of a pressure, it has frequently happened, and here is a report (*producing the same*) that will show the Committee that. When tonnage has been carried for the conveyance of certain things to a given point, after that, to use a technical phrase, things are shut out, and they cannot be taken by the vessel, and the thing became so common, that I directed an order to be given to the storekeepers on the sailing of every vessel, not only to send a bill of lading, to show what had gone, but to report whether anything in their stores had been shut out; that shutting out has grown to an enormous extent, and in some instances, we have had information that tonnage was ready for us; and of course we are generally told, take care that you do not give cause for demurrage in that case, thinking the demurrage of barges less costly than that of ships, and to prevent being called to account for delaying the ship, we have embarked the goods and sent them down, and they have waited sometimes two or three days to be shipped. Now, in the special case of the bedsteads, the goods were sent down, and I think they were to be put into the "Robert Lowe;" after they were put into the "Robert Lowe," we were told that they could not all be taken; that some cylinders for blowing up the ships that had been sunk at Sebastopol, were of more importance, and those goods must wait. Then those bedsteads, I know, remained in the barge all night, and some of them could not be taken in the other vessel in which they were finally ordered to be shipped; they went out in two vessels, part in the "Robert Lowe," and part in another ship, whose name I do not remember; they were counted out from one vessel and placed in the other; and at this moment, it is not traced whether those bed legs are not in the hospital at Scutari. I have reason to believe that they are. It has happened that the bedsteads were of two patterns, and I believe that they all went in one of those vessels, and that they were taken on shore at Scutari, and placed in the hospital, and that finding a difficulty in putting the bed legs to them, as they were of two different patterns, they cast them aside; but if an intelligent person had been employed to look them over, the bedsteads would have been made complete.

18380. To whom were the things that were sent to the hospital at Scutari consigned?—I cannot exactly say; I think it would be to the purveyor.

18381. *Chairman.*] You do not know his name?—No.

18382. Lord *Seymour.*] Would not those stores, which were sent out by the Ordnance, be consigned to any one under the Ordnance, who would receive them there?—No; at that time we had not any storekeeper at Scutari.

18383. Have you any storekeeper at Constantinople?—There is one at Constantinople; he has been recently sent out.

18384. When was he sent out?—About two months ago.

18385. Then, in fact, stores under the Ordnance were being sent out during the whole of the autumn, without there being any Ordnance Storekeeper to whom they were consigned at Constantinople?—The army stores were consigned to the Commissary-general; that is, the quartermaster's stores, and his own stores, the Ordnance stores, were consigned to Mr. Young, the Ordnance Commissary, part at Balaklava; and we did not consign anything to Constantinople; I think we have not consigned anything to the present storekeeper; yet he is looking out for a storehouse.

18386. Was there not at Constantinople any depôt of the things that were sent out by the Ordnance, to be sent on when they were wanted?—No; they were sent in a vessel, to be under the direction of the officer in charge of the transport duties there, Admiral Boxer. We have no storehouse there.

18387. They were sent in a vessel, to be under whose charge?—They were sent out, to go on to Balaklava, or to await such orders as the General Commanding-in-chief might leave as to the stores for the army.

18388. If you had sent out from England boots and shoes, in the autumn, to whom would they have been sent?—We should have sent them to Balaklava, not to Constantinople.

18389. But supposing the army was not at Balaklava, to what place would you have sent them then?—We had various places of consignment; and we should have sent them first to Malta, next to Gallipoli, next to Scutari, next to Constantinople, next to Varna, and next to Balaklava.

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18390. Had you at each of those places to which you have sent the things any one to take proper charge of them?—Yes, the Commissary-general was there, and the Ordnance Storekeeper.

18391. Then you expected the Commissary-general to take charge not only of the Commissariat stores, but of the Quartermaster-general's stores, and all the Ordnance stores?—Not the Ordnance stores; that would be Mr. Young, the Ordnance Commissary.

18392. But as to the Quartermaster-general's stores which you sent out, who would take charge of the boots and shoes?—The Commissary-general.

18393. Those are not Commissariat stores?—I take it that they would go to him; they are not Ordnance stores, certainly; the Commissariat receives everything for the army, both provisions and clothing.

18394. *Chairman.*] Can you supply the Committee with a list of the Commissariat stores, as distinguished from the Quartermaster-general's stores and the medical stores?—Yes.

18395. Lord *Seymour.*] Boots and shoes do not seem to be the Ordnance stores, they are not the Quartermaster-general's stores, and they do not appear to be the Commissariat stores; I want to know who takes charge of them?—I conclude the Commissary-general.

18396. *Chairman.*] Were they not originally supplied by the colonels of the regiments?—The colonels of the regiments supply a certain fixed proportion, and in the return before me it appears that we have had 48,000 sent out by Messrs. Hayter & Howell on that account; a great many complaints have been made of the boots and shoes. I take it that those were boots and shoes which did not undergo the rigid examination which the boots and shoes supplied by the Ordnance do; it is possible that the complaints which have arisen have been of those boots and shoes which were not subjected to the rigid Ordnance inspection.

18397. You suppose that the complaints have arisen with regard to the colonels' boots and shoes, and not as to those supplied by the Ordnance?—Yes; because I see, from time to time, when I go to the Tower, that though there may be bad boots and shoes, it is utterly impossible that anything so infamous as those which have been described by various statements could have passed through the Ordnance; the inspector is a man of high character and great experience, and if the Committee were to see the mode of inspection, I think they would admit that it is utterly impossible that such things could take place; the boots are slit open and examined, and if a certain number are found bad out of 100 pairs, the whole number are condemned. The individual who looks over them is the chief inspector, a person of great experience, and he has under him manipulators thoroughly up to their work, and during the time that I have been at the Board, I have never been able to trace to one man a complaint that there had been any failure in the execution of his duty. I have had a great many complaints from contractors that our surveys and inspections are far too rigid, and unjustly so, but I have not been able to trace to any single individual a failure in duty, and I have only been able to trace out one instance of anything like a bribe being offered to those people.

18398. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you suppose that the statement which I have received that a large portion of the soldiers' shoes were made of bad materials, and that the soles were filled up with shreds instead of solid leather, may be a true statement?—I am afraid that the Honourable Member has not served so long an apprenticeship to shoemaking as I have. I am a bit of a shoemaker, and I know that no shoe can be made without the strips being put in; therefore, it is quite possible that it may have taken place; but whether the strips are put in in a proper manner, and of proper material, is the question.

18399. The report is that the shoes went to pieces at once?—Yes; but that I believe to be utterly impossible, under the system of examination at the Ordnance. I repeatedly go to the Tower; and I never fail to look through the stores; and I see the whole business so conducted, that I have no hesitation in vouching for the faithfulness with which that very important duty upon which the contract system rests is performed; they are men who, for their station in life, are highly paid, their wages being from 42*s.* to 30*s.* a week; they are of different gradations; and I have the strongest belief that the boots and shoes which have been supplied by the Ordnance have been good and useful articles.

18400. You

18400. You alluded to a bribe having been offered by a contractor?—I tried to search the thing out; it was only a rumour; but if I could have searched it out, there would have been a record of the thing; there was only that rumour in one single instance.

18401. Lord *Seymour*.] You stated, did you not, that during the last nine or ten months you have supplied boots and shoes for the army from the Ordnance?—Yes, to a certain extent.

18402. To what extent?—I can give you those supplied by the colonels; "Gross Return, since the 1st of June 1854."

Howell, up to December 1854."

18403. That is from June to December?—Yes. In this Return, signed by Messrs. Haytor & Howell, there are 48,363 pairs of boots supplied on the part of the colonels.

18404. You can state what you have supplied, can you not?—I should think then we must have supplied upwards of 130,000 pairs; I will try if I can find it out.

18405. When you sent them out, to whom did you send them in charge?—We consigned them to the Commissary-general.

18406. It has been stated to this Committee by Captain Tullan, in answer to question 17089, that he received, on the 22nd of August, at Constantinople, 24 barrels of boots and shoes, and that he received them from Lieutenant Keatley, who was Admiral Boxer's flag-lieutenant; was he under the Ordnance in any way?—No.

18407. Then if this gentleman, Lieutenant Keatley, had got possession of those barrels of boots and shoes, you cannot understand it?—Yes, I can to a certain extent. I have seen, when acting on expeditions, that vessels in the act of unloading have been taken off and sent on other services, and a portion of their cargoes has been left in. I think that when the ship in which that may have happened had got back to Constantinople it might have been reported to Admiral Boxer that the vessel they were going to load was encumbered with so many barrels of boots and shoes.

18408. How come they to be put on board of this vessel; Captain Tullan objected to take them, but Lieutenant Keatley, the flag-lieutenant of Admiral Boxer, said that he must take them, and gave him a paper desiring him to take them to the army?—Then if he were going to Balaklava, Admiral Boxer must know that the boots were useless at Constantinople, but they might be very useful to the army under Lord Raglan; therefore he might say, and I would have said, if I had found in any transport lying idle at Constantinople 24,000 pairs of boots and shoes, the first vessel in which I could have found a passage for them I should have put them on board; but I should have, before that, have written to the Commander-in-chief, to say, "I have found so many pairs of boots and shoes, and knowing that they are not only useless here, but they are in the way of other business; I have forwarded them to the Commissary-general, being fully persuaded they will be useful to the army under your Lordship's command."

18409. You would not have put them on board a transport without sending a letter to some authority to take charge of them when they arrived?—Certainly not; I should either have written to the Commissary-general, or to the General commanding, or to the Quartermaster-general.

18410. *Chairman*.] What category do boots and shoes come under; are they Commissariat stores?—They are consigned to the Commissariat; but so soon as they are taken out they would be put in his stores, and be disposed of under the direction of the Quartermaster-general.

18411. Whose duty would it have been to have received those boots and shoes that were put on board that vessel?—I should say anybody's. But suppose you go to a man and say, here is a paper I have received accompanying things useful to the army, I am desired to deliver them here; I do not know who they are consigned to, but I come to you as the representative of the Commissary-general, and you being the Commissary here, I tender them to you, and it would have been his duty to have received them.

18412. His refusal of them would be breach of duty?—Such is my opinion.

18413. Lord *Seymour*.] You think that the Commissariat ought to have received them?—I think that any public officer at Balaklava ought to have received them. Whenever the boots and shoes reached a place within

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10 or 12 miles of the army, and the officer was in communication with the army, my firm belief is that the master of the vessel who tendered them to any public functionary made it the duty of that public functionary to receive them; and if I had been the naval man in command, I would have called any officer who had refused to a severe account.

18414. Do you apply that generally to stores?—It appears to me, that in the transaction of public business, it is a very bad principle to permit that people are to stand chaffering about straws, when the great object is to accomplish something useful, and the great object in this case being the maintenance of the army in a state of efficiency.

18415. Suppose there is a large quantity of gunpowder sent, that is essential, would you have the Commissary take that into his store?—There would be an Ordnance Commissary on the field, and it would be his duty to take it.

18416. Is the Commissary officer to depart from the general regulations as to the stores of his department, and take charge of any other thing which, in his opinion, may be wanted for the army?—I think it is a question of opinion; but with regard to any stores which were absolutely wanted, and which persons on the spot knew were wanted, it is a grave dereliction of duty to cast them aside, without considering how they could be put into the possession of the army.

18417. Captain *Gladstone.*] Has any information reached you with regard to those boots and shoes which were carried backwards and forwards, which has not come before the Committee?—None, whatever. I would qualify what I have stated; throughout the whole department of the Ordnance, the officers are bound by certain regulations, but it is a case of frequent occurrence, that cases come before us where officers do things which they are not ordered to do, but acting on the principle I have stated of public duty, and in all those cases since I have been upon the Board, invariably where a good discretion has been exercised, the answer has been, "Your conduct is approved; you did perfectly right in departing from the strict regulation." One of those things occurred the other day with regard to Corfu; the Ordnance do not in the regular course of things supply blankets and bedding to people returning home, and the Admiralty should supply them; there being a difficulty in obtaining them, these were issued from the Ordnance stores to the ship which was taking the invalids home; and the reply was to the storekeeper, "You have done perfectly right in using the discretion you have used."

18418. General *Peel.*] You stated that when a good discretion has been exercised you approve of what has been done, but the man does it at the risk of his discretion?—Yes.

18419. And if it turns out badly he becomes responsible?—Yes; but if an error had been committed with a right intention, he would probably be admonished to be more discreet in future.

18420. Mr. *Drummond.*] You would not allow mere routine to stand in the way of an essential duty?—Certainly not.

18421. Mr. *Bramston.*] Are the supplies for the artillery sent out from the Ordnance differently from what they are for the other portions of the army; for instance, it was stated by Captain Shakspeare that the artillery received their warm clothing from the Ordnance Commissary, Mr. Young?—Yes.

18422. Are the supplies for the artillery sent out differently from what they are for the other portions of the army?—The same stores and supplies are sent out; but everything sent to the artillery is sent and consigned to the Ordnance Commissary, Mr. Young.

18423. Warm clothing and everything?—Yes.

18424. Therefore, you would have a receipt from the Ordnance Commissary specially for the receipt of those things?—Yes, an acknowledgment.

18425. General *Peel.*] Was the amount of warm clothing to be sent to the artillery decided upon by the Secretary for War, or was it decided upon by the general commanding the artillery?—It was decided upon by the Lieutenant-general and the Board.

18426. Then it is done upon a different system?—Yes; but in all cases, the object is to assimilate the artillery, as much as the differences of their appointments admit, to the same rule which is established, in similar cases, by the Secretary-at-War for the time.

18427. The evidence we have is, that the artillery were much better off, and much better supplied with warm clothing, and earlier, than the other regiments of

of the line?—I think that will be partly accounted for in this way; that vessels were sailing with the battering train, and other things, being especially Ordnance stores, and very probably Captain Riddell, the quartermaster at Woolwich for the artillery, in the interstices between the guns and other things, placed these stores; and I think so for this reason, that the other day a most important store was shut out; that is, litters for carrying the sick on; the moment I found that those litters were shut out, I went to Woolwich, and saw the superintendent of shipping, and other persons, and inquired whether it was not possible, as these were very light things, to find stowage for them in the next steamer that was going out with the battering train; and, I think, we succeeded in getting, exclusive of the tonnage which the vessel was appointed to take, about 60 or 70 of those litters into the ship, between the interstices; and I think it is probable that the artillery clothing was sent out in a similar way. Captain Riddell has been very assiduous to take every opportunity of pushing forward the clothing for the artillery in the Crimea.

18428. Were the battering trains sent out in sailing vessels? — No, in steamers; and there were not only these, but, at various times, we sent out three or four different additional batteries of field-guns; and there have been many opportunities of vessels going from Woolwich.

18429. *Chairman.*] I want to learn from you the course of proceeding in every case of contract which you enter into with any person; what is the first step you take?—The first step we take is to send out an invitation to all the world to supply us with all we want; this is done once every year; the next step is to consider the character of all the persons who reply to us, and who offer to make tenders; then they send in to say that they are willing to supply such and such things; about 10,000 articles.

18430. Do not you call that a tender?—No; that is not exactly a tender; then we examine into the character of those people, as to their skill in their trades and business, and also as to their capital; and, having satisfied ourselves upon those points, their names are inscribed in a book, which is kept for that purpose.

18431. When you say "we" you mean the Board of Ordnance?—Yes; then when that has been done the next thing is, when we want an article, to say, we want so many boots and shoes, so many tin pots, so many beds, and whatever it may be; a tender is sent in, and then the people being on the list, unless there is some note against the individual that he has performed some contract ill which has been entrusted to him, the lowest tender is taken, and in that tender which goes out, the persons are informed that they will see at the Tower, or Woolwich, as the case may be, patterns of the articles to be supplied, and specifications.

18432. Are the tenders sent in without seeing the pattern?—No; the onus on the man is, that he sees it, and it rests with him; we have nothing to do with that.

18433. Has a man who presents the tender an opportunity of seeing the pattern before he presents his tender?—No; first of all he offers to contract; afterwards we send out a paper which we call a tender; on it he writes what he will do, and on that paper we tell him where he will find the patterns and specifications; then afterwards the proceeding is at the Tower; take for example, a blanket; first of all it is passed over a treddle to see that the weaving of it is good and proper; in the next place, it is doubled up and weighed; in the next place, there is a table marked off with lines, one that shows the breadth of it, another which shows the length of it. Every article we receive, is examined before it is received; I think that is the course that we take; we also test blankets as to dampness. Some few years ago a firm sent in a large supply of blankets, and on examining them we found that they were not as dry as they ought to be; then that being the case we tried one of them, and we found that the contractor would have gained, if they had been passed without weighing, somewhere about 400 *l.* or 500 *l.* for the 11 ounces of water which were in each blanket.

18434. Supposing the case was, as it has been stated, that children's socks were served out at the hospital at Scutari, can you explain how that could have happened?—I cannot account for it.

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18435. You stated, did you not, that it might have happened in consequence of the pressure of business?—I do not deny it, but I cannot account for it.

18436. Can you account for that accident having occurred?—No, I cannot account for it, and I do not understand it. As I said before, if we had been carrying on the ordinary business with the ordinary pressure, I should have said it was impossible that it could have happened; but I know that there has been an enormous pressure, and how those gentlemen have got on at the Tower, I do know not. They have often been at work from six o'clock in the morning, to meet the pressure, till nine at night; and independently of that, from the pressure to forward the goods, we were obliged to avail ourselves of Messrs. Hayter & Howell's assistance in many cases.

18437. General *Peel.*] Is not this the substance of your answer, that it is your opinion that any stores having passed through the ordinary examination at the Tower must have been equal to the pattern on which the contract was made, but that stores have been supplied during the late pressure of business, without undergoing the customary examination?—Yes; when I went to Messrs. Hayter & Howell, being authorised to employ them, they said to me frankly, "We will give to you such general inspection as we can, but we do not pretend to give you the inspection which you apply to your stores at the Tower;" and it is quite possible that in that way those socks may have gone out.

18438. *Chairman.*] If it is proved before this Committee that children's socks were issued at Scutari to the men, what course of proceeding would the Ordnance undertake, in consequence of that?—Supposing we had nothing to do with Messrs. Hayter & Howell, the course would be obvious; to deal with the inspector, and the whole of the men employed in inspecting socks; to call upon the storekeeper at the Tower, to know how this had happened; but we are at this instant in this position, that Messrs. Hayter & Howell have been employed, by the direction of the Secretary-at-War, in packing; and it was absolutely necessary that they should have been employed; and I do not see how it would be possible to fix the thing upon the establishment of the Tower, because they would fairly say Messrs. Hayter & Howell examined the things partially for the Board, and measured them, on the understanding that they could not give them that rigid examination that we do; and it is possible that those things may have been passed.

18439. Is there no means of ascertaining whether those goods had been examined by Messrs. Hayter & Howell?—No; when I saw Messrs. Hayter & Howell, in the first instance, they stated expressly that they could not give that rigid examination which we give to the stores, but they would give a general examination; and I believe that they did do so; take for example the paletôt, lined with fur; we had a great many anonymous complaints about those, and we sent Mr. Pew to inspect them twice or three times; and Messrs. Hayter & Howell, on that particular article, said that they could not give the vigilant inspection that we did; we were obliged to entrust this to them, we were so pressed; it was late in the season, and if we had detained them till we could have examined them, they never would have reached in time. When I received those anonymous representations, I made them known to my colleagues at the Board. I had previously sent the chief inspector, to look to what was going on at Messrs. Hayter & Howell's; and he said that they seemed to be giving a very fair inspection to that particular article of which I have spoken; and that the paletôt was an excellent article, and, in his opinion, worth more than the contract price.

18440. General *Peel.*] Should you be able to ascertain whether any particular articles, such as socks, issued at any specified place and date were furnished by the Ordnance, or through the medium of Messrs. Hayter & Howell; if I state to you the date at which they were served out, could you answer the question of the Honourable Member?—I do not think that the dates would help me in that case. I can inquire.

18441. Cannot you tell whether the socks in store at Scutari were supplied by the Ordnance, or through the medium of Messrs. Howell & Hayter?—We will endeavour to find out, but I cannot say that we shall be able to do so.

18442. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated just now, that when a contract was badly executed, a mark was put against the name of the contractor, and he was not employed again?—Yes.

18443. Has

18443. Has that often happened?—Not often.

18444. Has it ever happened?—Yes; sometimes a contractor's name has been erased from the list.

18445. May it not sometimes happen that a long time elapses before the bad execution of a contract is detected?—No; not as to stores; as to buildings it might, but as to stores it could not, because they are brought in from time to time; if a contract is entered into we generally fix the time; we generally fix that they shall be brought in in three months, and at the end of that time you know whether a man has done his duty, or whether he has not; supposing a man had a contract to furnish us with something in three months, and he did not do it under five months, and he had been told when he took the contract that it was imperative that we should have the things quickly, it would be a grave cause to consider whether he should be employed again.

18446. You have now made your answer to my question turn entirely upon the point of time; my question relates to the quality of the articles supplied; with respect to the stores, may it not happen that the bad quality of those stores is not detected till a long use of them has shown that they are not good?—No; the contractor would be totally absolved, we having accepted the article.

18447. Then are the Committee to understand you to say, that as soon as you have accepted an article to be provided by contract, the contractor is absolved?—Yes, as to all pecuniary penalties.

18448. But not as to the mark against his name?—No; in that case, supposing after the report came that a man had contracted to supply something of particular nature, and he had sent in a sample of one, which on trial proved not to be the thing he had contracted to supply, then his name would be removed.

18449. Supposing the articles are bad ones instead of good ones?—Then his name would be removed directly.

18450. To repeat the question, may it not happen that some time elapses before the badness of that article is detected?—Yes; I can give the Committee an illustration; some years ago the Guards were supplied with great-coats, which had all the appearance of being a very good article; it was so well got up that the inspectors were deceived by it, and they passed the article; the coat ought to have worn, in the common course, three years, instead of which, before it had been in the hands of the Guards 12 months, it was discovered that the material, instead of being wool, as they were bound to make it, had been made of shoddy, and then the name of that contractor was, of course, removed from the list.

18451. You have given an illustration which comes within my question; in such a case the contractor's name was marked?—Yes.

18452. That happened with regard to a regiment quartered in London, and was very easily detected; but supposing it had happened with a distant regiment, is it certain that that would have come to your knowledge at all?—I think so, because we have every now and then applications from regiments as to things which have not been of good character; therefore I conclude that in almost all cases where an article supplied to a regiment by the Ordnance is not good, we hear of it.

18453. You think that you always hear of any defects in the contracts that you have entered into?—I think so generally.

18454. General *Peel.*] Do you put a mark to the viewer's name, as well as to that of the contractor in that case?—Yes, we should in that case.

18455. You stated, did you not, that all the goods are inspected upon delivery?—Yes.

18456. Therefore, as they have passed that inspection, the contractor is no longer responsible?—He is not.

18457. You take upon yourselves the whole responsibility, having passed the goods?—Yes.

18458. In ordinary cases the goodness or badness of an article would be discovered at once?—Yes.

18459. But whenever you have not discovered it at the time of the inspection, you could have no pecuniary claim upon the contractor?—No.

18460. *Chairman.*] It has been stated that a contract for blankets was entered into by a manufacturer in the north, and that time was of the essence of that contract. I think he was bound to deliver them by the 18th of November, and he did deliver them on the 18th of November, and the price was consequently

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consequently very much enhanced because of the quickness of the delivery, and they were afterwards kept two months at Portsmouth without a ship, upon whom would the responsibility fall as to keeping them there?—I have never heard of that circumstance, but supposing the blankets had been sent there, which I rather doubt, to wait, then, if the Admiralty did not assign a conveyance, it would rest with the Admiralty; but I have very much reason to doubt that that fact can be substantiated, for this reason, that blankets have not been an article in which we have been deficient; for before that lamented friend of mine left the Ordnance, Colonel Maule, one of the noblest men that I have been associated with, he conferred with me about the supply of those things, both as to shoes, and as to blankets and things that were likely to be used in the Crimea; and after conference with him at a very early period, as he left in April, a very large contract for blankets was issued, one which I thought at the time beyond what the probable wants would be, but which opinion has proved incorrect; but we have never been pressed about blankets.

18461. Your belief is, that the information which I have received is inaccurate?—Yes; I think so.

18462. Mr. *Layard.*] A gentleman wrote to me, about a month or five weeks since, saying, "I saw at the Gun Wharf, at Portsmouth, stores, and a number of Government packages, marked 'Winter clothing, for the 46th and 20th regiments;' and the other day I saw in the Government store at the dockyard a number of bales, marked 'Great-coats for the Crimea'"; how is it that those have not gone out?—First of all the answer would be this: that we had received an order not to send any more winter clothing out after a certain date, and this gentleman may have visited Portsmouth subsequently; I have been so much accustomed to hear unfounded charges made, that I have become a greater sceptic than I was 10 years ago.

18463. *Chairman.*] Then it is for your benefit that the questions should be put to you?—Yes; and my aim is to answer every question put to me in the most perfect good faith.

18464. Lord *Seymour.*] Do not tools for the army form one portion of the supplies furnished by the Ordnance?—Yes.

18465. The Committee have been informed that there are two sorts of tools furnished, one set by the Ordnance, and a much smaller amount which it is believed is furnished by the colonels of the regiments?—Here I have a statement of all that has happened about the tools: "Proportion of tents and camp necessaries for a regiment of infantry, approved by Board's Order, 16th February 1848." That is nothing more than a transcript of the requisition from the Horse Guards for every regiment. "Round tents with poles and valises, one for 15 men and four extra per regiment, or battalion for Guards, namely, three for the quarter and one for the rear-guard; tent-pins, 42 per tent; valise for tent-pins, one for two tents; mallets, two per tent; billhooks, one per five men; camp colours complete, with poles, flags, and covers, one per company, and two extra per regiment or battalion, viz., one for the quarter and the other for the rear-guard; blankets, one per man; haversacks, one per man; canteens and straps, one per man; light camp kettles, with bags, one per five men; hospital marquee complete, with poles in eight pieces, inside and outside roof, eight walls, 184 pins, two mallets, valise for marquee, and bag for pins, one per regiment or battalion; medicine panniers for the surgeon, two per regiment or battalion; pack-saddle, with baggage straps for the surgeon, one per regiment or battalion; bridle bât-horse for the surgeon, one per regiment or battalion; pack-saddle, with baggage-straps, for the serjeant-armourer, one per regiment or battalion; bridle bât-horses for the serjeant-armourer, one per regiment or battalion; intrenching tools, spades for the serjeant-armourer, five per regiment or battalion; shovels, five per regiment or battalion; pickaxes for the serjeant-armourer, five per regiment or battalion; felling-axes, five per regiment or battalion." The list of what are called improperly intrenching tools for the regiment should be called camp equipage. The tools are supplied, or they used to be supplied, by the colonels of the regiments, but we have recently had an order to supply them.

18466. *Chairman.*] What is the date of that order?—Within the last year. "Note.—In Ireland the Flanders kettle may be issued with the ligh camp-kettle,

kettle, in the following proportion, namely, light camp-kettles, one per four men; Flanders kettle, one for six men." The next is, "Proportions of tents and camp necessaries for a regiment of cavalry."

18467. Lord *Seymour*.] What you have now read is for a regiment of infantry, is it not?—Yes; then again we have (for a brigade of guns) the proportion of tools also.

18468. With regard to the sappers and miners, what is the proportion?—Intrenching tools are quite a separate thing from these; these are regimental tools; the intrenching tools are supplied on the demand of the commanding engineer, through the inspector-general of fortifications.

18469. How were the regimental tools supplied?—The regimental tools are put apart with the tents, according to the decision of the Horse Guards, at the different depôts.

18470. Will you explain how they are provided in the first instance?—Whenever a regiment is ordered upon service, we have a requisition from the Quartermaster-general that such a regiment is going abroad, and then we supply the stores from the nearest depôt, according to this rule, and they send them to the ship in which the regiment is going to embark, or rather they send them to the place where the regiment is going to embark, and the colonel of the regiment takes charge of them.

18471. Are the Committee to understand that the Ordnance, upon requisition, supply those regimental tools from their depôt?—Yes.

18472. How do the Ordnance obtain regimental tools?—I have here a memorandum showing the nature of the business entrusted to the committee for the revision of patterns, and the progress made by them; and upon that the Board's Order, dated 31st July 1827, constituted the following persons a committee for the revision of all patterns, excepting those relating to artillery, which the Master-general had previously referred to a select committee of artillery officers.

18473. That has been the system pursued from 1827 to the present time?—A revision took place in 1844, but founded upon one and the same principle, "namely, the chief clerk to the principal Storekeeper, the Storekeeper at Woolwich, the Storekeeper at the depôt in Tooley-street, and Mr. Pew, added to the committee by subsequent order."

18474. Those are the people who fix upon the pattern?—Yes.

18475. Who are they?—Mr. Porrett, the chief clerk to the principal Storekeeper; Mr. Stace, the Storekeeper at Woolwich; Mr. Stacey, the Storekeeper at the depôt in Tooley-street, since abolished; and Mr. Pew, who is the chief inspector, was added to the committee by subsequent order.

18476. When was that?—It does not state.

18477. Have those persons since 1844 been the committee, and responsible?—All those who survive are. "And having directed them to state to the Board what officers it would be necessary to call upon to assist in the business, the Board requested the attendance of an officer from all the departments interested in the improvement of the patterns respectively appertaining to them. This revision became necessary in order to put out of the service and the accounts a variety of stores which had become obsolete or unnecessary. To obtain a set of uniform patterns for all the branches of the service, instead of the various patterns of the same description of articles in use, and to introduce as much as possible modern improvements and inventions wherever they could be adopted with advantage. The committee have made 13 reports," which are to the Ordnance: "First, fire-engines; in the consideration of which they were favoured with the opinions of General Millar, R. C. D., Colonel Jones, R. E., and of Major Rice Jones, R. E.; Second, camp equipage, Colonel Haverfield, Assistant Quartermaster-general, and Colonel Sir Alexander Dickson. The bill-hook, felling-axe, saddle, water deck, and corn sack were submitted first to the personal consideration of the Quartermaster-general, and by him to the Commander-in-chief."

18478. Has there been any approval of a pattern since then?—Continual revisions are going on.

18479. When was the last revision; was it in 1844?—No; that was partial.

18480. I understand from the paper which you have now read, it was considered desirable to do two things, namely, to get rid of obsolete stores, and to have one uniform pattern?—Yes.

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18481. Have the obsolete stores been got rid of in regard to these tools?—Yes, everything that has been reported obsolete has been got rid of.

18482. Has there been one uniform pattern adopted?—Yes.

18483. If it has been stated that there was a heavier kind of pickaxe which had come out of the old stores and was not of a modern pattern, but was inconvenient and heavy, how do you account for that?—When this revision took place, I do not believe that the committee turned everything out of the service; I believe that they retained all that they found useful of that pattern; a pickaxe of nine pounds is the usual pattern used by the navigators and excavators in this country, but for the purpose of service in the field, lighter patterns have been adopted. I believe a heavier pickaxe was used in the Peninsular War, and it is possible that many of those pickaxes have remained in the service up to the present time, and that they were at the time that this Committee sat, declared to be useful articles, and it would not have been within the province of the Board of Ordnance to reject that which had been declared good by the committee, and that committee was composed of the most distinguished men of the Engineer's Department who had been continually in the field.

18484. Were those distinguished men of the Engineer's Department practically acquainted with the nature of iron, for instance, which is very essential if they are to judge of a tool?—I consider that they were, because they did not only, it appears, rely upon their own judgment, but they called in (as is the case upon every committee that sits upon similar matters) practical men versed in the trade; now, the engineers have a party of men, the sappers and miners, who are eminent for their intelligence, and perfectly versed in all these things.

18485. You have stated that there is an annual survey of the stores that are in the keeping of the Ordnance?—Yes.

18486. There was therefore, I suppose, a survey of the tools in store?—Yes.

18487. You state that a practical man of the sappers and miners, or of that class, would be called in to give his opinion?—I do not know that at the annual survey it is so; the storekeeper would only look to see whether the handles were good and serviceable, and the iron in a good state.

18488. You believe that nothing could have got into the store, but what would be serviceable?—That is my impression.

18489. You think that the system of inspection upon the pattern was so well contrived for obtaining a good article, that it could not be improved upon?—That is my belief.

18490. The pattern having been adopted, how do you next proceed?—The pattern having been adopted, you say to the person who contracts for the article, it must be as good as that, and not only must it be as good as that, but it must follow the terms of this specification; it must have the steel up to four inches and a half; it must be such a breadth in such a part, and such a thickness where the helve is brought into the pick; the pick must be free from shakes, and a piece of good solid wood. I would remark, that one of the witnesses before this Committee has stated an impossibility; I do not mention it to throw any blame, or suppose that it was said for the purpose of doing that which was wrong; but Sergeant Dawson states that on a pick being used the helve came out. Now that is really quite impossible, because the helve is fitted into the opening in the pick, and it is then shaped so that the butt-end of it is considerably thicker, and every blow which you give with the pick-axe inserts the helve more firmly into the pick.

18491. *Chairman.*] That argues that the wood is not so small as to go through the hole?—Yes, exactly; but then it would be impossible that they could be passed; they would be rejected immediately if that was the case.

18492. Lord *Seymour.*] Sergeant Dawson was asked this in Question 5569, "How were the pickaxes?" and his reply was, "The pickaxes were generally bad." "Did they break, or what was the matter with them?" "They came off the heads." You state that that is impossible, do you not?—Yes, because every blow will fix the pick more firmly on the helve.

18493. Mr. *Layard.*] It would be impossible, supposing the tools to be properly made?—Yes.

18494. Lord *Seymour.*] A large quantity of picks being ordered, for instance, according

according to your pattern, they are delivered as usual at the Tower?—No; at Woolwich.

18495-6. Who receives them?—The storekeeper.

18497. How does the storekeeper proceed to examine several thousand picks, and see that the quality of the iron accords with the pattern?—This thing took place before the army went out. In one of my inspections at Woolwich, I went down, and in passing through the stores I saw a large number of pickaxes ranged along together, and I asked when they had been sent in, and whether the supply was a good one. The reply was, "The supply came in about four or five days ago, and the contractor has had notice to remove the whole of them, because we found there were such and such defects in them." Then the next course is this, the deputy storekeeper, the storekeepers, chief clerk, are the surveying officers, employing under them the masters of trades, who work in the various manufactories and workshops at Woolwich, who are called in, according to their different trades, to inspect the articles which are passing under revision. The other day I was down there; they happened to be trying a pick on a piece of granite on which the pick is stricken repeatedly, and if the steel gives way in a certain proportion they are cast aside.

18498. Is every pick tried on a piece of granite?—Yes; then, again, that is not all; they also cut a certain number of them to see how the iron and the steel are connected together, and whether it is according to the specification. The next tool that I will speak of is the bill-hook; that is tried upon a very large piece of wood; it is struck vertically and transversely, and in various ways. To show that the accounts which are given by persons who do not understand tools are not always correct, I may mention, that about 14 days ago I visited Woolwich on business, and seeing some bill-hooks in the storekeeper's office, I called upon him to tell me why they were there; and he said, "these are bill-hooks which were rejected by a troop of artillery which is just gone out." I looked at them and found them apparently perfectly good; and he said, "You would not have thought them good if you had seen them the day before yesterday, for they were full of hacks upon them; but on examination we found the steel good, and we have ground them up." On going through the storehouse below I came to the place where these bill-hooks are proved; I desired that three of them might be brought; they were brought, and in my presence those which had been condemned as being too bad, went through the whole test, without one losing the smallest particle of steel.

18499. *Chairman.*] Do not you think that the test was deficient, and that it was not the fault of the men who tried them?—The test was a very severe one; I saw it applied, and they stood it. I believe that an unfair test must have been applied previously to their being reground.

18500. You think that the statement made to this Committee, that the bill-hooks supplied to the army in the Crimea broke off in large pieces when struck against wood is incorrect?—No; but I think it is quite possible that a very large proportion of bill-hooks have been ill-treated, and have been used by people who did not understand the management of tools; and I can speak from experience, that good tools in the hands of people who do not understand them may be destroyed readily.

18501. How can that be in the case of a bill-hook, and in cutting wood?—It does not follow that those soldiers cut wood; they might have attempted to use them as wedges. I saw those bill-hooks which had been condemned; we had received a letter to say that they were unfit for the service; it was merely an accident that I saw them subsequently in the storekeeper's office. I saw them tried against the hardest possible piece of wood, and they stood the test.

18502. Lord *Seymour.*] The Committee have obtained the evidence of three or four general officers and captains, and of Sergeant Dawson; and every one who has been asked about the tools, I think, without exception, has stated that the tools were very bad; how, with your system, do you account for that?—My firm persuasion is that there may have been some bad tools amongst them, but that the greater mass of the tools have been very good, I have no doubt.

18503. Here is a statement by Sergeant Dawson, who, though he may not have been a judge of other tools, must at least have been, with the soldiers with him, a judge of the bill-hooks. He says, "We had the trouble of carrying them, and they were of no effect; they would not cut a piece of wood; pieces

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snapped out, three inches long, right along the edge of the bill"?—I believe that our tools were generally good; but with regard to the bill-hooks, you will observe that the proportion of tools supplied by the colonels of regiments is larger; and it is quite possible that some of those bill-hooks which were bad belong to the pioneers' tools.

18504. General Evans, General Bentinck, the Duke of Cambridge, Captain Shakespeare, Captain Wrottesley, and other officers, all spoke as to those tools; they could not all have happened to see the same bad bill-hooks; there must have been a very general distribution of bad tools?—It may seem odd that I should entertain a different opinion; but I believe that good tools in the hands of persons who do not understand their use, may very soon be ruined. Then, again, they had no means of grinding them, and we proposed that grindstones should be sent out to keep them in order; but an element which enters into this case is that of weight and carriage, and directly the General commanding said that it was impossible that we could send out stones; that they would require for every one a mule to carry it, and then we sent out whetstones to meet the case; but I believe the hard manner in which the bill-hooks are used by the troops, will always bring you into difficulties.

18505. The bill-hooks are specially intended to be used by the troops for cutting fuel?—To cut small wood; but if this takes place, that the bill-hook is used as a wedge, which I am told is very frequently the case, and they drive down one bill-hook by using the other as a hammer, you will not have those tools in very good order.

18506. But this has been told as to cutting wood, and as the men depended entirely upon the bill-hooks to get fuel, the bad quality of the tools supplied for that purpose, appears to have been one very great cause of inconvenience to the troops; does not that seem so?—I do not come entirely to that conclusion; I have seen tools which have been returned into store, condemed by the troops in this country, subsequently under my own eyes proved to be good tools. I have also seen in this country another thing: one regiment went out, and a report was made that the swords turned round in a charge, and the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge, commanded an investigation to be made, under Major Custans, and another experienced officer, and similar swords which had been condemned as perfectly useless were submitted to their inspection, and the reply was that the swords were excellent swords; and it appeared that instead of trying them, according to the test applied to swords, they had been applied in this way (*describing the same*). If a man chooses to act in that way, either with a sword or a tool, and apply an improper test to it, he will ruin it. That was a most grave charge against the Ordnance; it was thoroughly refuted by the cavalry officers who made the inspection.

18507. Do you think that all those general officers, who have given this evidence, have given it upon some improper tests applied to the tools?—I think the troops misused the tools, and that the general officers finding that the men complained of the tools, had very fairly come to the conclusion that they were bad.

18508. Was any complaint ever made, as has been represented to the Committee, of the tools even at Chobham; did you ever hear of that?—I have never seen a report of that description.

18509. The Committee have it in evidence here that at Scutari a committee sat upon the tools and condemned them all?—We have a copy of that report, which does not speak in that sweeping way.

18510. General Bentinck, at Question 1944, with regard to the tools, was asked: "Were the tools, with which they were supplied, good and efficient"? And his answer was: "No, I think not; they are not in sufficient quantity, and not of a good material. We had a Board upon them at Scutari before we started, and the Board unanimously condemned them all; they were of very inferior quality"?—I have not got that report here.

18511. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Has it never reached you?—I will not say that.

18512. Lord *Seymour.*] Then there was one at Yenna Bazaar, near Varna, and there Captain Shakspeare said: "I was myself the President of a Board, at Yenna Bazaar, to report upon the intrenching tools of the troops, and I think we condemned them all, with the exception of the pickaxes. That included spades, axes, and especially bill-hooks"?—The report of the Brigade-major of Artillery, dated Varna, 14th August 1854, states that the tools supplied to

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to the artillery, except bill-hooks, are generally serviceable. The strongest evidence of the character of the tools is found in this report of the committee of Engineer Officers, dated Varna, 8th August 1854: the quantity to which it refers is not stated, but it must have been considerable, in proportion to those reported on by the various regiments. After objecting to the bill-hooks, it proceeds to pronounce the pickaxe, shovel, and spade to be useful and good.

18513. You are now referring to a report made by Captain Wrottesley, of the Engineers?—First of all I referred to the artillery report.

18514. It is not evident by the report of Captain Shakespeare. Captain Wrottesley afterwards stated that the tools supplied by the Ordnance were generally good, with the exception of some of the cutting tools, which they found, especially the bill-hooks, were very bad; that is Captain Wrottesley, of the Engineers?—I have read that.

18515. It seems to omit the report at Scutari, it omits apparently this report that we have had of Captain Shakespeare, and it does not even reply to the report of Captain Wrottesley as to the bill-hooks?—Then the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, the Inspector-general of Fortifications, may be considered as worthy of some consideration; the Duke of Wellington revised the thing, and instituted a committee; and at no time could you have selected a much more distinguished set of men, and they take all the appliances of practical men to assist them; and upon their report, the specifications and patterns were fixed; and the patterns might now be produced, cut into parts, as they are to show how the examination takes place. And I think if the Committee saw that, they would see that everything which could be done with the view of making a careful investigation, is done.

18516. *Chairman.*] The Committee are to assume that all the evidence they have received upon this matter is incorrect, and that general officers, artillery officers, engineers, and privates, who used the tools, were all of them in error, and that the tools were absolutely good, according to your statement?—I believe that a very large proportion of them were thoroughly good tools; and it perhaps may not be known to the Committee (one officer stated that the tools were without steel); this thing is certain, that working in thoroughly stony ground for 48 hours will destroy the steel of any pickaxe; and if it so happens that people, from weariness and so forth, keep in the trenches tools which are worn out, and which ought to be cast aside, that is a want of look-out in the trenches.

18517. Lord *Seymour.*] The complaint here was that the bill-hooks were very bad, and that the steel was tempered too hard?—In stating my belief that the tools are generally good, I do not say that there have been no bad tools whatever.

18518. Mr. *Layard.*] Are you aware that the tools were condemned at the time of the Portuguese expedition?—No, I am not at all aware of that.

18519. Lord *Seymour.*] Who was the contractor for the tools?—Some of the most respectable people that we have.

18520. Will you mention their names?—I will make a return of them.

18521. Will you furnish to the Committee the names of the contractors, and the price at which they contracted for those various tools?—Yes. I have here a letter from a gentleman who was with me, relative to the contract about shot and shells. He said, "I have lately been into the manufacturing districts, purchasing tools for the French; and when I went down into those districts, they first supposed I was going to purchase tools for the Board of Ordnance, and they told me, If you are going to put out a contract for the Board of Ordnance we will have nothing to do with you, for the tests are too rigid to which the tools received by them are subjected; and we will have nothing whatever to do with you." He made eight large purchases for the French Government, and this is his letter to me: "In reference to the conversation I had the pleasure to have with you on Saturday last, I have the honour to inform you that, having been lately in Staffordshire, buying pickaxes and similar tools, to a very large extent, I have found the severity of the Ordnance test has operated very much upon the makers in that neighbourhood; and to so great an extent, that in more than one instance, I was asked, before my patterns would be entertained, if the articles were for the Board of Ordnance, as if so, the persons with whom I was in communication would not take an order."

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18522. But that test may refer not only to the quality, but to the exact pattern and to a number of minute details?—No, there are no very minute details in the specification. I see that the first complaint was made on the 13th of May 1854. The first complaint from the Guards, dated Scutari, 13th May 1854, was received the latter end of that month.

18523. *Chairman.*] So soon as they began to use them?—Yes; that the spades were too light, felling and pickaxes were wanting in steel, and the bill-hooks were generally good. Then the second report was dated the 1st of September, received through the Inspector-general of Fortifications, of a survey held at Varna by order of Brigadier general Tylden, Commander of the Royal Engineers; it stated that the bill-hooks were badly tempered; carpenters, sawyers, and smiths' tools inferior; pick-axes good, though rather heavy; the shovels and spades are very good, and the felling-axes are good in shape, quality and weight.

18524. Lord *Seymour.*] General Tylden was the chief engineer out there, was he not?—Yes.

18525. Under his report you have an accouut that the bill-hooks were not good?—Yes, he says so.

18526. And does not that seem to show that the tests that you adopted did not answer in every respect in procuring a very good bill-hook?—Yes. I do not defend the bill-hook altogether; still I see the evidence is contradictory, and I am not brought to the conclusion that they have been universally bad.

18527. *Chairman.*] The Committee have not found the evidence contradictory at all, more especially with regard to the bill-hooks, that has all been one way?—The bill-hooks are at first said to be generally good; then the third complaint was on the 13th of September: "Boards of Survey held by different divisions of the army received through the Duke of Newcastle. Those reports varied in character; the general opinion may be said to be unfavourable, the tools being spoken of as inferior in metal and of too slight construction." On the 22d June a committee was appointed, consisting of Major-general (then Colonel) Jones, R. E., Major-general (then Colonel) Torrens, Assistant Quarter-master-general, and Mr. Stacey, Ordnance storekeeper at the Tower, to examine the patterns and specifications. On investigating the first complaint, the patterns were found to be those established by two committees in 1827; the first consisting of the late General Miller, the chief clerk under the principal storekeeper, the storekeeper of the Royal Arsenal, and the storekeeper of the military depôt, Tooley-street; and the second, comprising Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, General (then Lieutenant-colonel) Paisley, Colonel Sir John Jones, and Brigade-major Rice Jones; certain alterations were suggested by the above committee and ordered to be carried on the 13th of September 1854.

18528. Lord *Seymour.*] That does not say a word about the quality; that is about the settlement of the pattern; is it not so?—Yes; showing that the patterns were decided by men who understood their business.

18529. *Chairman.*] Showing that the pattern that you have now was the pattern then decided on by you in 1827?—Yes; the tools were supplied between the years 1843 and 1854 by various contractors; namely, pickaxes by Mr. Perks, of Wolverhampton, Messrs. Sandford, Owen & Watson, Rotherham; shovels by Messrs. Sandford, Owen & Watson, Mr. George Robinson, of Stourbridge; bill-hooks and felling-axes by Mr. Elwell, Wednesbury. The patterns were produced and approved. The quantity and quality of the steel were tested by filing, gauging, weighing, grinding, and breaking. The Board ordered a committee to institute an examination of all tools at Woolwich, Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, Chester, Edinburgh, Dublin, and Cork on 19 September 1854. The serviceable and unserviceable were separated; the condemned to be replaced by patterns to be approved. After that the next step was taken. An experienced officer of engineers, Major Ord, and Mr. Stacey, were selected to examine all tools, both in respect to pattern and quality, and to report what improvements could be made to obtain really good and efficient articles; to examine practical persons, civil and military, if required. Men have been constantly engaged in the necessary inquiries, and lists of various tools, recommended by them from time to time for general

army

army and engineer field service, have been approved, and ordered to be adopted, to govern future supplies. Intrenching tools and axes were issued to all regiments, on embarkation, as part of their camp equipage, according to established proportion, but no spare supplies were sent out expressly as regimental reserves.

18530. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to hose tools, pickaxes, for instance, have you not had works going on both at home and in the colonies in which pickaxes would be frequently used?—Certainly.

18531. For instance, at Gibraltar, have you works going on there in fortification?—Those would be constructed by contract; but we have had works going on at Chatham continually, and we have had works going on at Chobham, and from the Commanding Engineer in both cases we have had no complaints whatever of the intrenching tools.

18532. Mr *Layard.*] But you have had complaints of some of the tools used at Chobham?—I am speaking not of the regimental tools, but of the intrenching tools, pickaxes, shovels, and spades.

18533. Then, so far as intrenching tools go, you have had experience of them for many years past?—Yes.

18533* You have had no reason to find fault with them?—No, I have had no complaint.

18534. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the tools served out to regiments, those in times of peace are not much in use?—No; not to give them a test unless the regiments are encamped.

18535. Except at Chobham, the troops have not been encamped?—At times they have been encamped for sanitary purposes, and for repairs in barracks.

18536. Had you to supply the troops at the Cape with tools?—Yes.

18537. Have you never had any complaint of your tools from the Cape?—Never.

18538. Are you quite sure?—Yes, I am quite sure; I have no recollection of it, but I will inquire.

18539. Mr. *Drummond.*] Is your pattern for bill-hooks with a cutting back? No.

18540. Do not you think that, instead of all those fine gentlemen, whose names you have given us as a committee to examine and prove these things, that two or three good country woodmen would be better judges?—I quite agree with the Honourable Member; and they have all of them authority to examine before them people who have practical knowledge of these things, to test any articles that they adopt.

18541. You stated just now that tools will break, of course, more in the hands of persons who do not know how to use them than in the hands of those who do; is it not the fact that the greater part of the common soldiers are weavers, tailors, cobblers, and all sorts of people, who have never been accustomed to the use of tools?—No doubt that is very largely the case.

18542. *Chairman.*] A great number of them are agricultural labourers also, are they not?—Yes; but I suppose the larger number are not accustomed to the use of tools.

18543. Mr. *Layard.*] Are not the artillery taught the use of tools?—They are not taught it, but I dare say that you would find more men in the artillery who know how to use tools. "Intrenching tools and axes were issued to all regiments on embarkation, as part of their camp equipage, according to established proportion; but no spare supplies were sent out expressly as regimental reserves; such reserves were to be obtained from those demanded by the Inspector-general of Fortifications for the Royal Engineer Department; these reserves were considerable, including every description of intrenching tools. A considerable proportion had also been ordered to be kept as a depôt at Malta. Large numbers of troops for Turkey embarked at Portsmouth, Devonport, Dublin, Cork Harbour, and Leith, from which places the tools for camp equipment were issued, and not from Woolwich and the Tower; these stores comprised, in part, tools provided many years ago, and probably some of the pattern and quality of the Peninsular War. Those sent to the Engineer Department were supplied from the Tower and Woolwich, and are of a superior kind. The complaints alleged against the quality of the tools are so universal, as

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not to admit of denial in general terms. Looking into the question, it will be found that little blame attaches to the Ordnance; the tools of which complaint is made are termed intrenching tools and pioneer instruments, and are supplied in part by the Government for camp purposes of a regiment, and in part by the colonel of the regiment. Proportion of intrenching tools supplied to each infantry regiment by the Ordnance, viz., shovels, 5; spades, 5; pickaxes, 5; felling-axes, 5; bill-hooks, 1 to every 5 men. Pioneers' tools supplied to each regiment of infantry by the colonel, viz., spades, 8; pickaxes and mattocks, 6; axes, felling and broad, 5; bill-hooks, 11; saws, 5."

18544. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that a certain quantity are supplied by the Ordnance, yet a large proportion of the regimental tools are supplied by the colonels of the regiments?—Yes.

18545. Can you state whether, or not, you are aware how the colonels of the regiments obtain those tools?—I have not an idea; I know that many of them are carried for display only.

18546. They do not come, at any rate, to the Ordnance for the assistance of any practical man connected with the Ordnance to assist them in the selection or purchase of them?—Not at all; I may name, that a short time ago a friend of mine, in command of a regiment of militia, came and said, "Can you supply me with such and such axes, like one of the regiments about town;" and I said, "Are you aware that they are things entirely for show, and they can be applied in no way to use?" And that is the character of a very considerable proportion of the tools.

18547. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated, did you not, that a considerable proportion of the tools of the regiments are supplied by the colonels?—Yes.

18548. Are you clear upon that fact; I have reason to apprehend that you are mistaken?—Yes; there are five shovels supplied by the Board of Ordnance, and eight shovels by the colonels; of pickaxes we supply five, and the colonels six; of axes, felling and broad, we supply none, and they supply five.

18549. Practically, are you sure that the colonels supply more tools than those tools to which you have adverted, as being used for show by the pioneers?—Yes; a certain proportion of them. I have it here stated, that more than one-half of the whole proportion is supplied and furnished by the colonel, and is no way subject to the control of the Ordnance. It has long been admitted in the service, that nothing can well be conceived more inefficient than pioneers' tools. A cause then for which the Ordnance are in no way responsible, has operated largely in giving rise to the complaints that have been made. Referring to the tools supplied to regiments by the Ordnance, of which the general opinion is unfavourable, it is to be observed, that the use to which this small number of tools is subjected by soldiers unaccustomed to handle such implements, is hardly to be taken as fair evidence. The Quartermaster-general, Major-general Freeth, remarks, on the 17th of July 1854, as follows: "It may be observed, the spade only is intended for rough work, the shovel being properly used for throwing out the earth loosened by the spade, and the pickaxe is purposely made light, to save labour." And Lieutenant-general Sir John Burgoyne observes (Sebastopol, 29th October 1854), "Great caution should be used in drawing results from trials at Chatham and Woolwich, where the work is not under trying circumstances. The use that a clever sapper, an artizan full of health and vigour, and in broad daylight, easy soil, and everything wanted at hand, makes of his tools, is no trial of what is required by an ordinary soldier, jaded and weak, on a dark night, in a very rocky soil, and perhaps under fire; the same tools used over and over again, and very roughly used." That is from Sir John Burgoyne. I have here the opinion of the Inspector-general of Fortifications, on a letter referred to him by the Secretary for War, dated the 25th of April, made in accordance with the desire of the Honourable Board, on a letter from the Minister for War, as to the character of the tools at present issued to the army in the East, and also whether it might not be expedient that private contracts should be entered into by the Government for a supply of the best tools. I have no reason to believe that the tools issued by the Ordnance Department for the use of the army are habitually of a very inferior description. Reports have occasionally been made (from of old) on defects in tools, and the Board of Ordnance have universally applied a remedy. I believe

I believe there cannot be a better system than at present practised of making contracts with respectable manufacturers on good specifications. It is only necessary to have a proper examination of the articles when delivered, to see that they are according to agreement. Sappers, and men who understand the use of tools, find much less fault with them than those who, not understanding, misuse them.

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Thomas Tassel Grant, Esq., called in; and further Examined.

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18550. *Chairman.*] THE Committee desire to know what seal is affixed upon the samples by the persons looking to them?—The seal of the Store-receiver.

18551. Is not that the seal (*handing the same to the Witness*)?—No, that is an official seal, I think; that is not what we call the contract seal.

18552. Does not that seal lie upon the table, so that anybody can get at it?—Yes; but I do not call that the contract seal.

18553. That is not the seal used to seal up the samples?—No.

18554. What seal is used; the private seals of the individuals?—Yes, the private seal is used, and another seal, called the contract seal, which is always under lock and key.

18555. When the samples are chosen, selected, and sealed, they are put into the hands of the messenger, are they not?—They are left in the Board-room, till the next morning, when, generally, they are sent down to the department which is to receive the bulk of the articles so selected.

18556. They are left in the Board-room in a press, are they not?—Yes; they are locked up.

18557. Who has the key?—The head-messenger keeps the key.

18558. He is the person who sends them down to Deptford?—Yes.

18559. So that he has a perfect command over them, except so far as the seal is concerned?—I should say so, decidedly.

18560. If you are mistaken about the seal, and this is the seal, he then would have complete command over the sample, because he has complete command over the seal?—Yes; but there is a private seal also used.

18561. You are quite sure that the private seal of the person making the selection is upon the sample?—Yes, quite sure; the officer making the selection seals the package with his private seal or with the contract seal.

18562. You are quite sure about the private seal?—Yes, I am.

18563. You are quite sure they are sealed at the moment the choice is made, and the samples are not left in the hands of the messenger till the next morning, and then sealed up?—I am quite sure of that.

18564. Mr. *Bramston.*] Are they always sealed up in your presence?—Yes.

18565. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You were asked a good deal yesterday about the supply of coffee; the Committee wishes to know whether you received any communication from the Crimea, to the effect that if the coffee was sent green, the grinding it and roasting it might afford amusement and occupation to the soldiers?—I had a private note from Commissary-general Filder, previous to his leaving for the Crimea, on my writing to him to ask him whether he was quite sure he was right in asking that unroasted coffee should go out; and in answer to which he said he was quite certain that he was right in having unroasted coffee sent out, as the soldiers would find means of roasting it, and also grinding it; but I never received any communication from the Crimea direct, to state that it would afford amusement to the soldiers.

18566. Did you receive from Commissary-general Filder, or from any other official person, from any place, either the Crimea or otherwise, a letter to the effect that I have stated, namely, that the sending out of unroasted green coffee would afford amusement and occupation to the soldiers?—I think I am correct in saying that in a subsequent conversation which I had with Commissary-general Filder he made use of that expression, because in speaking of this matter subsequently with some of the gentlemen connected with my department, I think I am correct in saying that they brought it to my recollection that he made use of an expression of that description; but I received no letter from him or from any other party stating it.

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18567. Any such conversation, I understand, must have taken place after you had remonstrated upon the hardship to the soldiers of sending out the coffee green?—After I had submitted whether it was desirable to send out green coffee, we had this conversation.

Veneris, 4° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
General Peel.	Captain Gladstone.
Sir John Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., C. B., called in; and further Examined.

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18568. Lord *Seymour*.] THERE was one or two questions which you did not answer yesterday, and which you stated you would answer to-day: one was, when the application was made for the waterproof capes?—The paper is now in hand, in the office, and I was not able to bring it down with me; I have brought down some.

18569. With regard to the hospital furniture, you stated that you would like to look at the requisition?—That requisition is also in the hands of the clerk, being copied now.

18570. With regard to the Quartermaster-general's stores, of what do they consist?—I have a letter here from the Quartermaster-general which will describe them.

18571. Who is the Quartermaster-general?—Major-general Freeth: "Coles-hill-street, Eaton-square, 5th May 1855. Dear Sir Thomas,—You are right in your general list of what are usually denominated as Quartermaster-general's stores, which, in fact, include the whole of the articles in the printed lists for cavalry and infantry, to which may be added boots and shoes, horse-shoes, and forges for the cavalry."

18572. It seems that boots and shoes are Quartermaster-general's stores?—Yes.

18573. That being the case, Major-general Freeth, being the Quartermaster-general, could explain to the Committee, could he not, why the Quartermaster-general's department at Varna did not take the boots and shoes in when they were carried to that place?—I think so. If the Committee will allow me, I wish to put in a paper relative to the bedsteads shipped in the "Robert Lowe." I desired Mr. Roper, my chief clerk, to write to Mr. Stacey about it. 'The bedsteads legs for Scutari. Sir Thomas says you gave him a paper on this subject, which he has mislaid; can you furnish him with a copy of it?" This is from Mr. Stacey, the storekeeper at the Tower; he has retired within the last week. "The paper referred to was a memorandum of mine to Mr. Stacey, enclosing an extract from a letter from Rowe, late a foreman here, but now at Scutari, stating that he was employed in unloading both the 'Robert Lowe' and 'Manilla,' and found the bedsteads charged as having been shipped from the Tower were complete in each of those vessels; a fact further corroborated by the circumstance of the bills of lading of the latter vessel being now before me, receipted at Scutari, and acknowledging the receipt there of all the parts of bedsteads charged as having been shipped in the 'Manilla,' including the 30 bundles of legs stated before the Committee have been in dispute on board that vessel, and comprising 467 bedsteads: 200 bedsteads were acknowledged to have

also been shipped in the 'Robert Lowe,' and complete the 667 iron bedsteads charged in these two vessels conjointly, and annuls Dr. Smith's statement of the deficiency of the number of legs for the whole. *E. C. King.* Tower, 3d May."

18574. Are the Committee to understand, not only that the "Robert Lowe" took out the bedsteads complete, but that no bedsteads incomplete arrived at the hospital?—Precisely; those are the only two vessels as to which the question has arisen. I have another paper in corroboration of that which I have just put in, which is authenticated by my chief clerk: "Information has just been received from Scutari that Lord William Paulet can supply as many bedsteads as are required for the civil hospitals, and that not any more need be sent out from the Tower for that service."

18575. You believe that those bedsteads went out complete?—Yes.

18576. And if any difficulty has arisen there, it has been from their applying legs belonging to one pattern to the bedsteads belonging to another?—Yes; that is my belief.

18577. *Chairman.*] Were those the only bedsteads sent out?—I am not sure of that; but those are the only cases in which any question has arisen as to the correctness of the bedsteads; no other question has arisen.

18578. At least none that you have heard of?—None that I have heard of. I have other papers which Lord Seymour wished to have put in: first of all, here is a statement of applications to the Admiralty for tonnage to the East, in which it was mentioned that the conveyance was urgently required; in putting that paper in, I wish expressly to state, that with regard to my personal communications with the Admiralty on this business, I have no complaint whatever to make; whenever there was a delay, my belief is, that steam-vessels were not to be had, and we had an order from the Secretary for War not to send any articles destined for the Crimea in sailing vessels, but all were to go in steamers.

18579. You had a distinct order from the Secretary for War not to embark anything that was required for the army in sailing vessels?—Yes; not from the beginning. I think it must have been about seven months ago, or perhaps eight months ago, I think quite as early as September; if it is desired I can verify that.

18580. Captain *Gladstone.*] Between the 7th of August and the 16th of October did the Ordnance Board ship no stores?—No stores in sailing vessels.

18581. But in steamers?—I think we did, certainly.

18582. Could not the warm clothing have been sent out in some of those vessels?—On the 7th of August we applied for 100 tons.

18583. Was that the first application on the 7th of August?—Yes. On the 12th, 10 tons; on the 14th, 96 tons; on the 25th, 200 tons; on the 2d of September, 200 tons; on the 8th of September, 89 tons; on the 9th of September, 75 tons; on the 13th of September, 5 tons; on the 15th of September, 200 tons; on the 16th of September, 87 tons.

18584. Did you receive no answer from the Admiralty until a few days before the 16th of October that steamers were available?—We received no written answer, because they had no vessel, I apprehend.

18585. Were no Ordnance stores shipped between the 7th of August and the 16th of October?—No, the vessel sailed on the 18th of October.—(*Two Papers were handed in.*) I will now read this: "Date of first requisition from the Secretary of State for War, for warm clothing, and the number of articles: 5th July 1854, 150,000 worsted socks, 90,000 woollen frocks, 50,000 flannel drawers." There may appear to be a discrepancy. I have stated something that was done in June, but it was done on a verbal communication, made to me by Mr. Monsell from the Secretary of State for War, authenticated by this written communication of the 5th of July.

Vide Appendix.

18586. Lord *Seymour.*] Are the Committee to understand that an application was made about the 21st of June, but that a requisition in an official form did not come till the 5th of July?—That is the fact; but I have another paper here to show that we commenced acting on the verbal order, and that no time was lost in the preparation of those things.

18587. You commenced giving the order; the order was subsequently stopped by another member of the Board; you then came back to town, and the order was continued?—Yes.—(*A Paper was handed in*).

Vide Appendix.

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18588. *Chairman.*] Was any delay occasioned by the proposal of Mr. Monsell to stop the contract?—I think not. I stated that yesterday.

18589. You stated, did you not, that some days were lost?—I find, on reference to the papers, that the note of Mr. Monsell, the clerk of the Ordnance, for stopping the agreement with Mr. Kynaston, was dated on the 17th of July. I left London on the evening of the 17th, and returned on the 22d, in consequence of a summons. But I would correct one thing: I styled the communication between Mr. Kynaston and the Board a contract; now, according to the statement that I made yesterday, it was not a contract, but an agreement. We did not go through the usual forms of contract, but we adopted a plan, which is adopted sometimes, of making an agreement in the urgent cases which I explained yesterday.

18590. But that agreement was as binding as a contract, was it not?—Yes, precisely; but I only wish to be correct as to the term.

18591. Lord *Seymour.*] On the 17th this letter was written. You left London on the 17th, did you not?—Yes.

18592. When did you return?—On the 22d.

18593. Between the 17th and the 22d was the contract stopped?—I think it was continually going on, because Mr. Kynaston must have felt that he could enforce that agreement with the Board; in fact, before I left town, I understood that everything was in train, or I should not have left. I have a paper here relative to the clothing required to replace that which was lost in the "Prince." Messrs. Neville & Company were authorised to supply, on a commission of 2½ per cent., all the warm clothing, to replace that which was lost in the "Prince."

18594. At what date was that?—That date is to come.

18595. You have referred to Major-general Freeth, the Quartermaster-general, and his letter, confirming what you have stated as to the stores; when the army left this country, who made a requisition to the Ordnance for the supply of that class of stores called Quartermaster-general's stores?—Major-general Freeth; we have had one more recent requisition from the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea.

18596. Major-general Freeth applied to the Ordnance, did he not, in March 1854?—Yes; I think as early as that, or soon afterwards.

18597. You supplied, did you not, every requisition made to you by the Quartermaster-general?—Yes.

18598. Then, if there was any deficiency in the quantity of the Quartermaster-general's stores, the blame for that would rest upon the Quartermaster-general for not having made application for a sufficient quantity, I mean the Quartermaster-general's department?—I should say, that if the Quartermaster-general did not make the requisitions, he would be to blame; and the Board of Ordnance, if they did not fulfil them in time, would be to blame.

18599. *Chairman.*] You have stated that the Board of Ordnance did fulfil all the requisitions that were made?—I believe so; but at the same time those requisitions might not have been completed at so early a period as the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea may have wished; the stores may not have reached him, because there had not been the conveyance to forward them, and various other causes which, in my opinion, would exonerate both the Quartermaster-general and the Board of Ordnance.

18600. Then whose duty was it to find transport?—The Admiralty's.

18601. Then the blame would fall upon the Admiralty?—Yes, unless it so happened, which is frequently the case, that transports were not to be found.

18602. Then, according to your statement, the blame would fall nowhere?—I have honestly stated to the Committee how the thing stands. If we made a requisition to the Admiralty to send out stores in November, and it so happened that they could get no steamers, and there being no other vessels allowed to go to the Crimea, if they could not get any between that and the date at which they furnished them, I think that the Admiralty would be quite exonerated.

18603. Lord *Seymour.*] A statement has been made to this Committee with regard to one class of articles, namely, horse-cloths and nose-bags; it was said that the horses suffered very much, and were not able to be fed with

with barley, because there was a deficiency of nose-bags in the Crimea, and that the barley was therefore thrown upon the ground, and the horses were obliged to pick it up as they could with the dirt. Now so small a matter as nose-bags may, though it appears trifling, very much interfere with the condition of the cavalry?—No doubt of it.

18604. It has been stated that there was a deficiency of horse-cloths and nose-bags, and that those are Quartermaster-general's stores?—Yes.

18605. Have you any document to show what application was made to the Ordnance for the supply of those articles, namely, horse-cloths and nose-bags, since March 1854?—I will make a note of them, and supply an answer.

18606. Am I right in saying, that the Quartermaster-general has no stores in this country of any kind?—None.

18607. The stores are in the hands of the Ordnance?—Yes.

18608. But when articles are sent to an army abroad, attached to the army, some one in connexion with the Quartermaster-general's Department, who can take charge of the stores?—I believe all the stores are in the charge of the Commissary or the Ordnance Commissary, and the Quartermaster-general's stores are in charge of the Commissariat.

18609. Not of the Ordnance?—No; we only take charge of that which pertains to the Ordnance. I was asked yesterday whether we had any information of the change in the War Department. I hold in my hand a paper relating to that subject.

18610. Who would be the consignee of those Quartermaster-general's stores?—He would be the Commissary-general, or the Commissary in command at the place where the vessel arrived.

18611. Then if the Committee have been told by Captain Tallen, who was the captain of a transport, and who embarked those boots and shoes at Constantinople, and took them to Varna, that neither the Quartermaster-general's Department nor the Commissariat Department would take them, that seems to show, does it not, that there was at Varna a Quartermaster-general's Department as well as a Commissariat Department?—Yes.

18612. Then it appears that those being Quartermaster-general's stores, according to your statement they should not, even there, have been taken in charge by the Quartermaster-general's department?—I think not, because the Quartermaster-general's stores, as I understand, are taken charge of by the Commissariat, and issued by the Commissariat on demand, as they are required by the troops.

18613. The Ordnance provided those boots and shoes, did they not?—Yes.

18614. How did you proceed to obtain them?—We put contracts out in the usual manner, and commenced with the lowest tender, and accepted them up to a certain price, which we thought was the highest to which we should go.

18615. If it has been stated that those boots and shoes were so small, in many cases, that the men could not put them on with the thick stockings that had been given to them, upon whom does the responsibility of that rest?—I suppose it rests upon the Commander-in-chief, who sanctioned the size-roll of the shoes to be used throughout the army, which is of old date; there is a certain number of sizes, according to the number of men composing a regiment; so many of No. 2, so many of No. 3, so many of No. 4; and I think there are eight sizes.

18616. The shoe commonly given to the soldier is made according to the stockings that the soldier commonly wears?—Yes.

18617. If you give him a much thicker stocking, that will alter the fitting of the shoe?—Yes; but it could not bear in this case, because a large number, 40,000, I think, of Canada boots were sent out, and the thick stockings were sent to be worn with those boots, and not with the ordinary ankle boot.

18618. Then you mean that you sent to them a quantity of boots and shoes, which those boots and shoes were of no use to them to wear with the warm stockings?—I should say that they had 130,000 pairs of boots sent out by the Ordnance, for the ordinary purposes for which the Government gives those boots and shoes to the troops when abroad.

18619. *Chairman.*] The ordinary purpose being to keep near them?—Yes.

18620. Captain *Gladstone.*] In ordinary weather?—Yes.

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18621. Lord *Seymour*.] Was any difference made in the pattern that was sent to the Ordnance for procuring the boots and shoes, or were the shoes procured according to the usual pattern supplied to the army?—The boots and shoes were sent out before the question of thick stockings arose, and they were sent according to the usual pattern; then the thick stockings were sent to be worn with the Canada boots, coming up to the knee for the infantry, and well up the thigh for the cavalry, and of the same sizes as those boots and shoes which are worn by the troops in Canada; those boots were intended for winter service in the trenches, and for all ordinary purposes.

18622. You have stated, have you not, that a great quantity of thick socks were sent out?—Yes.

18623. Those thick socks were surely meant to be worn with shoes?—Yes.

18624. Were any shoes sent adapted to those socks?—The shoes were sent out before any question arose, according to the size-roll, which has been in use in the army for 50 years.

18625. Then they were not adapted to the new sock?—Yes, I think so.

18626. I thought it was a warm sock?—It was, but still there was nothing peculiar about that sock in its size.

18627. *Chairman*.] Was it not thick?—Not so thick but what you might put an ordinary shoe over it; the shoes are not made so tight to prevent you from putting the difference between one woollen sock and another into them.

18628. You did not hear that the shoes were too small for the men?—I yesterday endeavoured to explain that there are two sorts of shoes sent out, and of this the Committee may satisfy themselves by an inspection at the Tower of hundreds of those boots now in store; and if they take different individuals there, they will find men of all sizes who are able to put on those boots with the ordinary worsted stockings with perfect comfort.

18629. But can they put them on with a thick worsted stocking?—I before stated that the thick worsted stocking was supplied for a special purpose to be worn, not with the ankle boot, but with the Canadian boot, which is of a larger size and constructed for a special purpose.

18630. You stated just now, did you not, that there was a thick sock sent out intended to be worn with shoes?—Yes; the troops, except the Highlanders, had no shoes, but all ankle boots, and I believe the complaint that the boots were too small originated in the ammunition boots which were sent out, and which do not go through the same rigid survey as the Ordnance boot.

18631. Then you suppose that the complaint which you have heard, of the shoes or boots being too small, applied to the ammunition boot, and not to the boot that was sent out by the Ordnance?—I think so.

18632. You have no proof of that?—I have a proof of it, so far as this is a proof, that I know, from constant examination, that the boots and shoes for the troops are made on a long-established specification, which had been found to answer in all the different climates in which British troops serve, both at home and abroad; and therefore, as I know that the inspectors, and the same viewers, have inspected and viewed those articles, I have come, I think, fairly to the conclusion, that the boots and shoes have neither been bad nor too small, but of the proper size.

18633. Who supplies the ammunition boots?—The colonels of the regiments.

18634. Then you suppose that the complaint which has been made originated in the fault with those boots?—I think so.

18635. General *Peel*.] Has the usual course been pursued in the purchase of warm clothing?—Not in all cases; the mode of purchase originally, in all articles of clothing through the Ordnance, was on the responsibility of the Board of Ordnance; but in the case of the warm clothing, purchases had been made by the Secretary for War; for example, a certain number of sheepskin coats were purchased, and all we had to do with that was to pay for them; and also with regard to the dresses that were allowed to the officers, they were purchased by the Minister for War himself, and we had, in that case, nothing to do but to pay for them. The arrangements were made independently of us; and the same remark applies to several purchases which were made by the Secretary-at-War; those purchases did not pass, in the usual way, under the checks of the Board of Ordnance; but they were ordered by the Secretary-at-War, and paid for on his order. Then, again, in some instances, the clerk of the

the Ordnance ordered some cholera belts out of the usual course. That, I believe, is the case as it stands as to the warm clothing.

18636. What effect had that departure from the usual course upon the prices of those articles?—The practical result was that we were bidding in the same market against ourselves.

18637. *Chairman.*] How was that, when you did not bid; can you give any instance?—I take for instance the fur caps; in the case of the fur caps we were in treaty with parties to furnish fur caps at 5 *s.* 10 *d.* apiece.

18638. Then you did propose to furnish the army with some portion of the warm clothing?—I have never said that we did not; I have only said that, in addition to the purchases I have just stated, purchases were made by the Ordnance, on the order of the Secretary for War; but I spoke of two things which were purchased without the checks of the Ordnance, for which we paid on his direction; and I then stated that in addition to the purchases made by the Ordnance, that the Secretary-at-War had purchased, in some instances; and I also said that, in addition to the ordinary purchases by the Ordnance Board, that the Clerk of the Ordnance ordered some cholera belts. With regard to the fur caps, we were in treaty with parties to supply the whole number of fur caps, at 5 *s.* 10 *d.* In the interim, whilst that treaty was pending, the Secretary-at-War purchased fur caps for 6 *s.* 8 *d.*, and consequently the parties with whom we were in treaty said, "Your Government have raised the price of the article by making that purchase, and therefore we are off our bargain."

18639. Since you have been in the Ordnance, has the British army undertaken a winter campaign?—No.

18640. When did the Ordnance hear that the army in the Crimea would winter there?—I thought so at a very early period, but I do not know that the Ordnance knew anything of it.

18641. When was it officially communicated to them?—Never directly; inferentially; when things were ordered, we concluded that the army was to winter there.

18642. Then there was no statement made to the Ordnance to provide winter clothing, because of the necessity that would arise for the army wintering in the Crimea?—I can only state that we did not receive any order. I will not venture any opinions.

18643. That is not an opinion, it is a matter of fact?—There was an order to provide winter clothing at various times, but we were not told that provision was to be made because the army was to winter in the Crimea.

18644. Is not there a discretion left to the Ordnance to supply the army with what may be necessary in their opinion?—No; we are an Executive Board only.

18645. You never exercise any discretion, but you fulfil the orders sent to you?—That is our duty: but we sometimes make proposals for the consideration of the Secretary of State for War, and sometimes for the Treasury, but our duty is expressly executive.

18646. Can you tell the Committee on what department of the Government it falls to provide, then, for the wants of the army, supposing they should arise?—I cannot, indeed; it does not fall within my province. I have here a list of the articles obtained by the Board of Ordnance, without a regular official authority from the Minister-at-War.

18647. They have been obtained without a regular official authority?—These are articles covered. I have here a letter from the Secretary-at-War, dated the 7th of February 1855, which sanctions the purchase.

18648. Lord *Seymour.*] How early were some of those articles supplied?—The 20th of November 1854, 300 cast-iron stoves.

18649. *Chairman.*] Is that the earliest one?—Yes.

18650. Lord *Seymour.*] The application for cast-iron stoves was made by word of mouth?—Yes.

18651. No written requisition was sent till February?—No. Then on the 20th of November, $\frac{0}{5137}$, 25,000 fur caps; the 21st, $\frac{0}{5146}$, 300 heather stoves; the 22d, 300 ditto; 22d, 100 ditto; 40,000 Minié rifle muskets at Liege.

18652. That is as early as October?—Yes, the 31st of October 1854.

18653. *Chairman.*] Is the price of the Minié rifle affixed?—No.

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18654. Lord *Seymour.*] You first of all thought that the first application made by word of mouth was in November; it now appears from that paper that an application was made to provide Minié rifles in October?—Yes; but it is just in consequence of the way in which the list is made up. It begins with the 20th of November, with a variety of stores, and then underneath is written an order for the muskets.

18655. Are the Committee to understand that an order was made for you to send to Liege for muskets in October, and that the former requisition respecting that order was not sent to you till February?—No. Then there is the purchase of gunpowder, and also a shell foundry at Woolwich, at an expense of 10,000 *l.* Then the covering order is dated "War Department, 7th February 1855." (*Three Papers were handed in.*)

Vide Appendix.

18656. The Duke of Newcastle stated to the Committee that he had ordered rifles to be obtained at Liege; I think rather against the opinion of the Board of Ordnance?—Not against the opinion of the Board, but against my opinion. I have some papers which will explain the whole of this transaction fully; but I have observed that his Grace states that I had a strong dissentient opinion to the course which he was pursuing in purchasing 20,000 rifles. With the greatest respect, I beg to state that that is not the real state of the case, which stands thus: an officer was sent to inquire in Belgium as to the possibility of purchasing Minié rifles within a reasonable time, and that officer wrote to the Board a proposal that this Government should give to the fabricants in Belgium a running order for 350,000 rifle muskets. I happened to be more intimately acquainted with the gun trade in this country than any other member of the Board, and I saw distinctly that if such an order as that were given it would destroy the gun trade, both in London and in Birmingham; and to my mind that presented itself in the most serious aspect, and though I aimed to keep out of discussions, I felt it a conscientious obligation to enter my protest against the adoption of a measure which I conscientiously believed would produce an evil result, which I have named, namely, the destruction of the gun trade in London and Birmingham, and not only destroy that trade, but prevent, in point of fact, the obtaining of so many arms as we might obtain if we fostered our own trade; and after a considerable discussion at the Board, I stated that I had no objection to go to the Duke of Newcastle for an authority to take a certain number of rifles to meet the pressing occasion, but I could not consent to the proposal of ordering 350,000. Finally, after waiting a few days I had an audience, in the presence of other members of the Board, with the Secretary for War, and I then repeated to him what I have now stated, adding that I thought it a thing on which the salvation of this country might hinge, and therefore I took the liberty to express myself strongly; and my belief is, that if an invasion of this country took place, if you had in London no gun trade, and you could not arm your population, that a great evil must result from it. I say again, that if any invasion took place, in Birmingham you have a gun manufacture, which would furnish you with means of resistance almost illimitable, because, although we can only get those superior fire-arms in a limited degree, an inferior arm, which will last for two or three years, we could get almost *ad infinitum.* The Duke of Newcastle was good enough to hear all I had to say on the subject, and finally he said, "Well, at all events, the order for 20,000 stand of arms will have no injurious effect upon the trade." I replied, that so far as that order went, I had not any objection to offer; and that is the way in which the question stands. With great respect, I submit that that is an essentially different view of the case from the way in which the Duke of Newcastle's evidence puts it before the Committee. I should be sorry that my name should stand recorded on the Minutes of this Committee as having opposed the obtaining of 20,000 stand of arms *pro hác vice* to meet the special occasion, but I should be glad to have it recorded that I was the opponent of a plan which, if it had been adopted, would have destroyed the gun trade in this country, because people would have withdrawn, as I know from an examination of the gun trades in London and Birmingham, their capital from it; and I can now show, that instead of withdrawing their capital from it, they have embarked it largely; a paper that I have before me will show the Committee how much more prosperous a state the supply of arms is in for the Government than is generally supposed.

18657. First

18657. First of all, when was the date of this requisition from the Duke of Newcastle, directing you to apply to Liege for rifles?—The 31st of October 1854.

18658. Then you received those directions?—Yes, a verbal order.

18659. You remonstrated, did you not?—No, my remonstrance had preceded this.

18660. When those directions came, did you immediately comply with them?—Yes.

18661. Did you send some one to Liege?—Directly.

18662. Whom did you send to Liege?—Captain Dixon was sent by the Board, not by myself.

18663. For what quantity?—To form a contract for the setting up by the 1st of May 1855 of 20,000 Minié rifles.

18664. At that time, for what number of arms had you contracted in England to be provided before the 1st of May?—I have before me a statement of the total number of rifled arms which had been ordered to be set up at Birmingham and in London.

18665. Before you read that, will you state the quantity of arms that, according to contract, you were to receive by the 1st of May 1855?—I can give them in, in different sections. First of all, there were 22,500 Minié rifles that have been provided, and they were to be provided, I think, (I speak now on probabilities) by the 1st of January 1855.

18666. And they were provided?—Not entirely; a proportion was completed, I think, by the end of February.

18667. Will you go now to any others that were to be provided?—Yes; we also provided 5,000 rifled muskets of the pattern 1851.

18668. Had you any other outstanding contract?—Yes; large ones. Then we provided in that time also 2,000 artillery carbines; they are of the same bore, but not of the same length, but it is the same aim for the artillery. I should explain that in the gun trade the supply of materials is one thing, and quite as necessary as the setting up of the musket. I hold in my hand "A statement of materials, exclusive of small articles, contracted for, for rifle muskets, pattern 1853 (subsequent to the provision of 22,500 muskets, all of which have been delivered), also a statement of contracts entered into for setting up." Now at Birmingham we have contracts ordered to the amount of 152,000 barrels, of which 83,099 have been delivered, and to be delivered monthly, 12,760.

18669. That was during last year?—Yes. Locks, 154,000, of which 44,591 have been provided, and 10,580 are to be provided monthly: sights, 175,825, of which 47,999 have been provided, and to be delivered monthly, 14,150: bayonets, 186,000, of which 25,436 have been delivered, and 17,000 to be delivered monthly: ramrods, 205,000, of which 35,003 have been delivered, and 32,000 are to be delivered monthly: bands, 169,800; delivered, 42,077; to be delivered monthly, 17,600.

18670. *Chairman.*] It appears that you have ordered a larger number of musket barrels than of sights?—No, it is the contrary; 152,000 barrels, and 175,000 sights.

18671. Then as to bands?—We have ordered 169,800. It is not necessary that we should keep them exactly to the same point, because in taking a contract, we know that we should have to take on other contracts in the same divisions, and it was convenient to give those individuals probably a greater number, because some of them were making experiments, and laying out their capital for the benefit of the Government, and they said, "We will not do that, unless you give us some more bands." Then we have at this moment in Birmingham setting up 48,400 in the hands of the setters up, and ordered to be set up, of which they have delivered 10,181, and we shall have delivered monthly 6,840. In London, we have at this moment for setting up, 10,000, 2,000 of which will be delivered by the middle of June. Therefore we have now in the hands of the setters up, 58,000 Minié rifle muskets, and the Board have made an arrangement for the provision of a sufficient set of materials so as to leave a surplus of 30,000 sets in store, after 140,000 muskets are set up. It would be right, perhaps, to observe here upon the question of materials, that we had conference with the East India Company, and it was agreed between us, that materials should be obtained by the Government, and that the proportion in which the East India Company should receive them should be one-third. Therefore,

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the number of muskets that I have named, must be diminished for the use of the Government by a third, but we are to have 60,000 actually sent up before we issue 15,000 to the Company.

18762. Lord *Seymour*.] By that arrangement the East India Company will receive the same arms as the troops here receive?—Precisely so.

18763. So that if any English troops are sent to act in India the same arms will be applicable to the Indian army as to the Queen's regiments?—Precisely; with this additional advantage, whether the East India Company had done it, or the Government, would have been immaterial, but by one party making the contracts, you avoid the squabbles of competition which are generated by the double system.

18674. When the Duke of Newcastle made this application to you, his Grace was aware, was he not, of the large outstanding contracts that you had at that time?—I very much doubt it.

18675. Had not the subject been officially fully brought before him?—It may have been.

18676. Not by the Ordnance?—Not by myself; but it may have been done by the clerk of the Ordnance, who had the principal communication with the Minister at War. I cannot say, but with the exception of the occasion which I have stated, I think twice, I never saw his Grace upon one question relative to the army.

18677. You are the Comptroller of Stores, are you not?—Yes.

18678. Those supplies, specially for some years, were under your general superintendence?—Precisely so.

18679. Therefore you were the authority at the Ordnance who were necessarily officially acquainted with those details?—Undoubtedly.

18680. You state that no application was made to you for the information before the order came for those Minié rifles?—No; I think about that time, because it is probable that the discussion, to which I have alluded at the Board, may have been conveyed to his Grace before the order for the 20,000 rifles was given; but I do not know, for this reason, that I was not communicated with.

18681. *Chairman*.] When the order for the 20,000 was given, did you inform his Grace of the outstanding orders that had been issued by the Ordnance?—In the conference that I have named before, which I had with his Grace, I endeavoured to explain the state of things, as I have endeavoured to do to this Committee.

18682. Then according to your statement, his Grace, so far as you were concerned, was informed of the state of things in the Ordnance?—Now I recollect that in that conversation, which took place at the War Office, I must have explained the whole of those circumstances; I believe I did; I endeavoured to do it, and I found my belief on this. On that occasion I stated that the gun trade in Belgium is carried on precisely on the same principles as the gun trade in Birmingham; consequently as this is a new arm, you will, in Belgium, have to meet all the difficulties which we have nearly overcome in Birmingham; and my belief is, that though you are now in a state of nervous anxiety about the supply of muskets, you really in June will not be a bit better off with the muskets than you would be if you left this contract untouched; and what I foresaw has proved true; we have not yet received one musket from Belgium.

18683. Lord *Seymour*.] Have you sent over some of your viewers to Belgium, to teach them what was required to make a Minié rifle?—Yes.

18684. In fact, you have been teaching the Liege manufacturers to produce the improved arm that we have, so that they can send it to all parts of the world?—No doubt of it.

18685. And although we have been teaching them how to make it, so that the enemy may buy it in the market, we have not obtained them ourselves?—Not now; but we shall.

18686. Have none of those come yet that were to come on the 1st of May?—None.

18687. At question 15307, it is stated by the Duke of Newcastle that he gave a second order. He states that he gave a second order for 20,000 rifles, in order to prevent the execution of an order for 10,000 which had been given by the Russians?—That was stated, and I believe on the authority of Captain Dixon;

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Dixon; but I have seen in my intercourse with the people of Belgium so many statements made, of course to give value to themselves, that at the time I doubted it, and it may or may not be true.

18688. *Chairman.*] Are the Committee to understand that you believe that we taught the Belgium artificers how to make the Minié rifle?—I will not say that; but that we improved them certainly, because some of our best hands have been selected to go over to that country to view the work of the Belgians, and of course they will not pass work which would not be received in this country, and they have given a finish to the work of the Belgians which they did not possess before.

18689. Then they might with their previous knowledge have undertaken to supply the Russian Government with Minié rifles, not perhaps, so finished an article as that which we require, but still Minié rifles?—Certainly.

18690. Lord *Seymour.*] Was it a much improved rifle, the pattern for which you sent over to have made there?—Yes.

18691. It was a rifle which had been improved after great consideration in this country?—Yes.

18692. There is very great nicety required in the sight and finish of the weapon, is there not?—Yes.

18693. And it was said to be the most efficient weapon ever produced for warfare of that kind?—Yes. I should add that in consequence of withdrawing our better hands for Belgium, I have been obliged to break a promise which I had made to the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, that 2,000 rifled carbines should be completed, because the men employed in that service, making the carbines, were withdrawn to go to Belgium and America.

18694. *Chairman.*] Have we sent any order to America?—Yes, for 20,000.

18695. Where are they to be made?—In one of the principal factories.

18696. Lord *Seymour.*] Last year we were to set up some machinery to make Minié rifles for ourselves; have we made any yet?—Nothing; the walls of the factory itself are not up yet.

18697. I thought we were to have had some made in a year?—People deluded themselves with that idea, but I never entertained that idea.

18698. But many witnesses who were examined before the Committee last year were rather deluded upon that subject, were they not?—I have always thought so; and I thought so at the time.

18699. You have not been deluded upon this subject: can you give this Committee any instance of any improved Minié rifle being produced by machinery in our own Government manufactory?—I take it that we shall not have any arms turned out till October from that factory; you may then possibly have some. I will not vouch for that; but it is possible by October, with great exertions (as the machinery has been imported from America), that we may be at work by the end of August or the beginning of September.

18700. *Chairman.*] You state that machinery has been imported from America; is that improved machinery to make guns with?—Yes; there was a vote of the House of Commons upon that subject.

18701. Lord *Seymour.*] You have still, for general purposes, been depending upon the Birmingham and London manufacturers?—Yes.

18702. When you sent to make this contract at Liege, did you contract for the entire arm?—No; it was done precisely on the same terms as we contract at Birmingham, viewing the materials and viewing the article when it is set up.

18703. You made a contract for the barrel, and a contract for the lock, and a contract for the sight?—Yes.

18704. And a contract for setting up?—Yes.

18705. You have not made any contract in England for the entire arm, have you?—No, it is a thing that should never be resorted to; it is not my own opinion merely, but from the great intercourse I have had with the gun trade, a most respectable man, Mr. Whitton, who is at the head of it in this town, and another at the head of it in Birmingham, have told me: "Depend upon it, the plan of viewing the different parts of a gun requiring such nicety, is the only one which ought to be adopted, you cannot detect fraud without."

18706. Mr. *Drummond.*] Will you be so good as to tell the Committee whether you sent the order for 20,000 rifle sights on the 21st of February, and that the manufacturers never received the pattern till the 16th of March?—I believe

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believe any delay which arose in giving out this contract was dependent upon some changes which the Committee of Small Arms suggested to be made, and principally to be carried out by Mr. Westly Richards, who was to supply us with the patterns which showed those alterations; and that any delay that took place was, first of all, in making pattern guns, and in preparing articles to be put into the hands of the manufacturers as guides to make the articles by.

18707. Lord *Seymour*.] Do you mean that the Committee of Small Arms recommended any details as to the making of that gun?—Yes.

18708. Mr. *Drummond*.] On the 25th of June you entered into a contract again for 90,000 rifles, and there was no pattern delivered till August the 30th?—I doubt it very much; I cannot contradict it.

18709. It has been stated that the order for the bayonets for those rifles was given on July the 10th, and the pattern was never sent till the 11th of August?—I cannot contradict it in any other way than by stating that I do not think it is likely, and for this reason, that when those contracts were made I went down to Birmingham, and I saw all the material makers in classes, and had intercourse with all of them singly and collectively; and I told them that if they had any complaints whatever to make in the execution of their contracts, or if they met with any delays whatever, it would be their business to call upon the Inspector of Small Arms at Birmingham, and if they did not meet with an immediate remedy for the evil that they complained of, they had only to write to me, and if they did not receive redress, to come up and communicate with me personally. Now no such complaints have ever reached me.

18710. It was stated by both the Honourable Members for Birmingham, and by one of the Honourable Members for North Warwickshire, in the House of Commons, that they had remonstrated; that they had complained that in consequence of not getting those proper patterns, the contractors were kept the whole of those months unable to set about their work at all?—I have stated the only thing I can at present. I can refer to dates hereafter; but as I was the person in constant communication, and, as I may say, I was the person who worked the gun trade both at Birmingham and in London, and I think that those facts would have been in my recollection if they had occurred.

18711. The last improvements adopted by you were introduced by Mr. Westley Richards; were they not?—Some of them; after all, the arm itself was decided upon by a committee of military officers, and, subsequently, a change was proposed which, I thought, had been named in the Parliamentary Committee, that bands should be substituted, instead of pins and screws, to pin them.

18712. Lord *Seymour*.] You mean, that that was suggested by many of the witnesses in the Committee?—Yes.

18713. Mr. *Drummond*.] Did not Mr. Westley Richards furnish to you, at his own expense, several patterns?—Yes.

18714. He furnished five, did he not?—Five or six.

18715. Have his expenses ever been defrayed by the Ordnance?—When this Minié rifle was under consideration, Lord Hardinge was at the Ordnance, and he took unwearied pains to make inquiries of all the best gunmakers what should be done; he talked to me on the subject, and it ended by a certain number of them, including Mr. Westley Richards, being written to, to furnish the pattern that was considered the best suited for a military arm; Mr. Purday, Mr. Wilkinson, and, I think, some six or seven others, Mr. Lancaster amongst the rest, to make the arms, and send them in, for consideration, to the Committee; when that Committee was drawing to a close, the gunmakers were called upon to give in their expenses, and Mr. Westley Richards, at that time, said that he would not put in any claim; subsequently he was employed by Lord Hardinge, on various other subjects, and he went to a good deal of expense; and, finally, he was again, in my presence, called upon by Mr. Monsell, to give in a statement of his expenses; we both said to him, "Whatever you may justly believe to be your due put it before the Board." Mr. Westley Richards did so; and I think he has been paid about something more than half the claim which he sent in.

18716. When were the first materials given out to be set up?—I can furnish that.

18717. The

18717. The first order was on the 21st of February; were any materials given out to be set up before the 25th of November, in the same year?—I think it is very probable.

18718. General *Peel.*] Can you, with regard to the various contracts referred to, obtain information as to the dates on which the patterns and materials were furnished, and also state, after inquiry, whether any complaints have been made by the contractors, of delay?—I will furnish an answer to that question.

18719. Mr. *Layard.*] Was any attempt made to obtain rifles from Prussia?—No, I think not; we had some report from Captain Dixon, that some parties who he applied to were ineligible.

18720. Was a representation made to the Board of Ordnance from Cologne, that rifles could be obtained there?—Yes, there was.

18721. Who was sent to obtain those rifles?—I think we declined them.

18722. Was anybody sent to Cologne?—I do not think there was; there may have been; I do not recollect, because a great deal is done when I am not at the Board; I cannot answer whether it was done.

18723. Who is the person from whom that is to be ascertained?—The clerk of the Ordnance, if I did not do it; it is probable that he gave the order.

18724. Could he give any such order without the knowledge of the Board?—Since the practical change in the constitution of the Board, he may have done so; it used not to be the practice of the Board; it was the practice of the Board formerly that everything should be done at the Board table, or if anything was done out of the Board-room, that it should be brought forward at the next Board-day, before the officers who were not present at the time.

18725. You know nothing about that transaction?—No.

18726. It does not appear clear to me what the relative power of the clerk of the Ordnance and the other members of the Board are; you have spoken frequently of a change, but I have not yet been able to clearly understand what that change was; will you explain when it took place, and the nature of it?—With regard to a question I was asked yesterday whether we had received any information that the constitution of the Board of Ordnance was changed, I should say no, we have not received any such information; but practically speaking we have, because the clerk of the Ordnance, who is in communication daily with the Secretary for War, communicates verbally to the Board; and as I stated yesterday, frequently it happens that no records are made of those communications; they are made verbally, sometimes to the Board, and sometimes to the Secretary, and it may be in your recollection, as I stated yesterday, that I had felt that such a system was not a good one, and that I had written to the clerk of the Ordnance to express my opinion upon that point.

18727. I want to know when this change took place, the nature of that change, what the Board was before, and what it was afterwards?—Before the Secretary for War became exclusively Secretary for War, and not Secretary for War and the Colonies, the constitution of the Board was then a meeting together of the individuals composing it; transacting the business by a plurality of votes.

18728. *Chairman.*] And everything was recorded?—Yes; but now, since the separation of the Secretaryship for War from that of the Colonies may be perceived by the paper I have handed in, the Secretary for War has conducted the business by verbal directions, given through the Parliamentary Member of the Board, who was more immediately in communication with him than any other Member.

18729. Mr. *Layard.*] Is that the only change that has taken place?—I do not know of any other, but that is a very essential change; there is one other, that is, that Sir Hew Ross has become Lieutenant-general.

18730. With regard to the constitution of the Board, and its mode of doing business, that is the only change that has taken place?—Yes.

18731. When the change took place in the War Department, was any official notice given to the Ordnance of such change?—None that I can trace, or that I have the slightest recollection of; if such a paper had been issued by the Secretary for War it must have been placed on the Board table.

18732. Do you mean to say, that suddenly, without any previous intimation, the whole of your mode of doing business was changed, and that instead of doing it as you had done before, deciding by a majority of votes, you acted afterwards upon the mere verbal communication of Mr. Monsell?—Yes, from the Secretary for War in many cases, not in all; much business was carried on

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in the usual way by a plurality of votes, but those measures which emanated from the Secretary-for-War, and which produced a considerable effect, such as the purchase of arms, gunpowder, and various other things, and putting up an additional factory at Woolwich, in all those things the Board was called upon to act on the verbal communication made by the Clerk of the Ordnance to the Board, and sometimes not to the Board, sometimes to the secretary, and without any record being made, excepting, as I believe, in one case, which I stated yesterday, when some business was to be stopped, and the Clerk of the Ordnance on that occasion did make a minute, and affixed his initials to it.

18733. Are the Committee to understand from what you have just stated that by far the most important business was carried on in this verbal way?—I will not say the most important, but a considerable portion of important business.

18734. You stated, did you not, that the Board of Ordnance was in no way apprised of this change which then took place?—No.

18735. You had no knowledge of it?—No, not at all. I was informed of it in this way: at the opening of the Session of Parliament it was announced that the constitution of the Board of Ordnance was to be changed.

18736. That you knew only through the public press, as the public generally did?—Yes, in no other way.

18737. Did it not occur to you, without saying that a total alteration had taken place in the way of doing the business, that it would have been advisable to have informed the members of that Board that a change had officially taken place?—I think it would have been better if such had been the case.

18738. Were you perfectly satisfied in taking verbal messages upon such important questions as those you have just mentioned to the Committee?—If I had considered the business to have endured so long as it has done, I should perhaps have expressed myself still stronger than I have done, that the system on which the business had been previously done should be maintained.

18739. If anything had gone wrong, they would have looked to you as the responsible person, would they not?—Certainly.

18740. Mr. Monsell may, with the best intentions in the world, have forgotten what he had to say, or have made a mistake in a number, and you, upon his mere verbal assurance, would have carried on this business, and would have been held responsible for the results?—Yes; but feeling that a change was to take place, I perhaps held back longer than I should otherwise have done; but I felt so uneasy on the subject, that I, on the present Secretary-for-War coming into office, wrote to his private secretary. I was then very ill, and I stated that I was ill in consequence of the excess of business I had been subjected to, and that I had important communications to make. I said I wish to see the Secretary-for-War, not upon personal or trifling considerations, but I had important communications to make relative to the business of the department. I received no answer to that letter; and when I recovered, I called upon the private secretary, and I said, "Does the Secretary-for-War wish to see me?" and he said, "I think not." Some things had made me uneasy which happened, important things, and I wrote to the Secretary-for-War; the first was immediately after the change took place. I wrote first a letter to the private secretary, asking for an interview: I am speaking of Lord Panmure's secretary.

18741. *Chairman.*] You wrote to the private secretary of Lord Panmure?—Yes.

18742. And the second communication was to Lord Panmure himself, was it not?—No; the second was in person to his private secretary, to ask him whether Lord Panmure wished to see me.

18743. I am talking of the letter?—The first was a letter.

18743*. Mr. *Layard.*] To whom was that addressed?—To the Secretary-for-War's private secretary, and my personal communication. I received no answer to that letter, and thinking that it implied that there was little confidence in me on the part of so high an officer of state, I felt it then necessary to write to Lord Panmure himself, and in that letter I enclosed a document which I had prepared for his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, pointing out my reasons for dissenting from the arrangement that my colleagues had arrived at: the latter was prepared for the Duke of Newcastle, but it was sent to Lord Panmure. When I prepared that letter for the Duke of Newcastle, of course I thought it right to show it to my colleagues, and I said, "I differ from you in the views you take,

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take, they appear to me to be erroneous, and to entail expenses; I therefore put this letter into your hands, and if you still maintain that you ought to carry this measure out, which I dissent from entirely, then I shall send this letter to his Grace." I had no immediate answer, but a day or two afterwards the resolution of having a foundry on a large scale was abandoned by my colleagues, and in the minute it was stated, instead of a large one, a small model foundry, to be useful in instructing people, should be put up; subsequently, on visiting Woolwich, I found that this foundry was on a much larger scale than any model foundry ought to be, and on that I searched into the papers, knowing that certain papers had been passed over by me, and I found from the report of the engineer to whom that particular construction was intrusted, that the foundry was constructed on a scale to make 150 tons of shells in a week, I think, or a month; but in his letter he stated the position of that foundry as ill calculated to make so large a quantity; then, when I found those papers, and perceived that the factory had been carried out very much as originally intended, I then wrote again to Lord Panmure.

18744. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You were telling the Committee about your letter to the Duke of Newcastle which you submitted to your colleagues; you have not stated whether it was sent to the Duke?—No, it was not.

18745. Will you just resume your statement. When you wrote to Lord Panmure, what became of that letter?—I wrote to Lord Panmure, stating (I now speak from memory, but I have a copy of the letter), "I some time ago stated to your Lordship that I wished to see you, and I have important communications to make to you; I enclose you one to show that they are not of an unimportant character"; and I think I added that I still entertained the opinions expressed there. I sent it because I had found recently, on examination at Woolwich, that the foundry was not reduced to the same scale of a model foundry, but it was carried out on a larger scale than the engineer who was employed thought right.

18746. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you get any answer to that letter?—No.

18747. What was the date of that letter?—It must have been about three weeks ago, I think.

18748. How long did you wait between the communication to the private secretary and the letter which you wrote to Lord Panmure?—Those two things do not hinge together in my mind; I wrote the second letter because I found that the agreement which had been made touching the foundry, and which induced me to sign the minute, had been departed from, and instead of being made a model foundry, it had been constructed on so large a scale that the engineer who was conducting the work had stated officially in a paper which I subsequently found, and which had not been transmitted to me, that the foundry was on too large a scale for the site.

18749. You state that you forget the date of the first letter?—I can get the date of all the letters.

18750. Do you recollect about what time it was?—The first letter must have been somewhere in January; either the end of December or the beginning of January.

18751. Immediately after Lord Panmure came into office?—Yes; I was then confined to my house, ill.

18752. Have you never received any communication from Lord Panmure?—No.

18753. Have you never seen him?—No.

18754. Not since he has been in office?—No.

18755. Who was his private secretary?—Mr. ———.

18756. Did he say that he had communicated your letter to the Duke?—I did not ask him, but I asked him if the Duke wished to see me. In my letter to Lord Panmure, I stated that I had written to his private secretary.

18757. He assigned no reasons for the Duke not having seen you?—No.

18758. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You never received any answer to either letter?—Not any.

18759. Mr. *Layard.*] Did this change in the communications take place immediately upon the separation of the War-office from that of the Colonies?—Yes, I think almost immediately. I very soon began to perceive that the business took a different course; that points which used to be discussed at the Board were treated elsewhere, and carried into effect sometimes without my

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knowing anything about it. I should remark, that with the exception of the time when I was ill, and then the office papers were sent to me daily, my attendance at the Board and in the Ordnance Office for the last twelve months has been from eleven in the morning till seven in the evening; and twice a week, while I was left in discharge of the duties, I went back from nine till eleven.

18760. When this separation took place, were any additional powers given to the Minister for War over the Ordnance to those which had been held by the previous Minister for War in the Colonies?—I am not aware that any were given, but of course when the Secretary for State gives an order to the Board of Ordnance, I apprehend that that order would justify us in doing what we were called upon to do.

18761. You think that no additional authority was given?—None.

18762. How do you account for this new mode of doing business?—I perceived that all the powers outside the Board which had been vested in the Master-general had been transferred to the hands of the Secretary for War.

18763. Were your replies or the replies of the Board verbal?—No; almost all our replies, in fact all our replies when we did reply, were in writing to the Under Secretary.

18764. Were your applications in writing?—Yes.

18765. Have you ever made any verbal applications through Mr. Monsell?—Not as a Board, but as to the Clerk of the Ordnance, who had personal communication with the Secretary for War, I cannot tell what passed between them. As many consequences ensued, I infer that a good deal was decided upon, about which we as a Board knew nothing.

18766. In fact the business was carried on in such an indefinite way that you did not know whether applications were made in writing or verbally?—All our applications from the Board were made in writing; there might have been applications that did not come to the Board. I can illustrate this by the fact, that there has been a great deal going forward relative to Aldershott of which I know little or nothing.

18767. How did that happen?—I conclude that it is owing to the new system of carrying on the business; I really cannot tell, I only know the fact.

18768. Do you think that you ought to have been apprised of it?—It appears to me that where there is a Board, all the business transacted at it should be transacted at the Board table, and if we had come to any erroneous decisions, as in the case of the Master-general, they should have been submitted for the consideration and approval or disapproval of the Secretary for War.

18769. *Chairman.*] Will you state to the Committee whether the authority of the Board is ever used without the authority of the Board being expressly given?—Yes, I think there are instances of it.

18770. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you mention those instances?—Yes, if I am bound to state one instance, I can do so; it is not pleasant to speak of it; but one instance occurred in the construction of the new laboratory. The laboratory is a parallelogram, and round it are certain buildings; it is covered in by what is called a saw roof, then divided into bays, and two bays were added to that laboratory without the sanction of the Board. I happen to know that, because I went down and saw the work going on, and I said to the engineer, "You are enlarging the building;" he said, "Yes, we are adding two bays to it, which are wanted." I said, "I am not aware of any order having been given by the Board for this enlargement;" he said, "Yes, Mr. Monsell, when he was down here the last time, ordered it to be done." I should premise that the addition to the building is a useful one; but some months afterwards this question came forward as to the payment for this work, and amongst the checks that existed, the question was again brought before me; and when I considered that if I disallowed it, the disallowance would fall upon the engineer officer as a charge upon him, I felt it right to affix my signature to sanction that expenditure; that was one instance.

18771. What was the expenditure?—I think something under 2,000*l.*

18772. Can you give any other instance?—I do not recollect any other.

18773. Was that order given verbally, or in writing, by Mr. Monsell?—Verbally.

18774. Did you never receive any written order?—No.

18775. The thing was done entirely upon Mr. Monsell's personal responsibility, was it not?—Yes.

18776. How

18776. How far was the Board responsible for it?—Of course the Board are responsible. I made myself responsible, and the Board must be considered responsible for every act that is done.

18777. How far are the Board responsible for acts done in the name of the Board, but without its authority?—It appears to me that we must be answerable. I felt uncomfortable about the thing, but it was not a pleasant thing to raise the question with the Minister for War, and to ask for an answer, as was my intention. I am sorry to state this before the Committee instead of before the Minister for War.

18778. Did you make any representations to Mr. Monsell on the subject?—I mentioned that it had been done without the sanction of the Board.

18779. When was that?—The document of the engineer who was employed to carry on the work will show that.

18780. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was it this year?—Yes.

18781. General *Peel.*] Under the ordinary working of the Board of Ordnance, before an account was passed or a bill paid by the Surveyor-general of the office, was it not necessary to show the Board's authority for the performance of the work, or the ordering of stores?—Yes.

18782. How was this authority shown when a system was carried on by those verbal communications?—I look upon it with regard to all the orders that I have put in, covered by a sanction, that none of those orders could have been properly paid till the sanction of the Duke had been given.

18783. Are the Committee to understand you that that covering order was made to relieve the members of the Board of Ordnance from the responsibility which they had incurred?—No doubt of it. I felt the weight of that responsibility so much, that I more than twice urged Mr. Monsell to get that covering order from the Duke, as I had no communication with him myself.

18784. Mr. *Layard.*] Did the Board ever make any minute in the record of their proceedings to the effect that such works had been undertaken without their sanction?—No; I have just stated that, thinking it would be very severe on the engineer, I took upon myself to affix my signature, authorising what had been done.

18785. You might have paid the engineer, and at the same time you might have stated upon the minutes, that though you sanctioned the work ultimately, it had been ordered without the sanction of the Board?—I do not think I did so.

18786. Was any such minute made?—No.

18787. You stated just now with regard to the foundry, that the minutes had been altered?—I did not mean to say that the minutes had been altered; I meant to say that the foundry had been made on a larger scale than the original minute to which I affixed my signature justified, as it was only to be a model foundry.

18788. Who was responsible for the work being carried out on a larger scale?—That is one of the things which has been done more under the sanction of the Clerk of the Ordnance than is usual, and not by the Board.

18789. You state, do you not, that in defiance of the minute of the Board, an order was given to make this building larger than the Board had determined it should be?—I will put it in this way, the building is larger than the minute justified.

18790. That order was given by the Clerk of the Ordnance, was it not?—I believe so; it was so reported to me by Captain Collinson, the engineer. When I asked what authority there was for it, he said he had the authority of the Clerk of the Ordnance.

18791. Is it customary for the Clerk of the Ordnance to carry out the minutes of the Board?—No; the constitution of the Board is, that a minute should be signed by two of the members of the Board, and it should be carried into effect by the secretary.

18792. Who is the secretary, or who has been the secretary?—Mr. Wood.

18793. Supposing a minute to have been made of the proceedings of the Board directing certain work to be done, the secretary is answerable for that work being carried out in accordance with the minute?—No, I mean this, that when a minute is made, when a thing has to be done, the secretary is answerable for bringing that minute into the form of a letter, directing the persons charged with the duty stated in the minute to carry it into effect.

18794. Who is responsible that that minute shall be carried out according to

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its terms and meaning?—The engineer, or the head of that department to which it may have been addressed.

18795. Supposing an order is given for a certain work by a minute of the Board, when that work is completed, how does the Board know that it has been carried out in accordance with the minute which they had made?—Does the Honourable Member mean a case of building?

18796. Yes?—In that case, perhaps, it would be better that I should describe how we should proceed. When a work had been determined upon by competent authority, we do nothing without the sanction of the Treasury or the Secretary of State. Then a plan and estimate of the building is drawn; and if it is a military building it goes to the Commander-in-chief, and to the Quartermaster-general. It is submitted also to the Secretary for War. And when all those approvals have taken place, it is then sent to the commanding engineer of the district in which it is to be executed, and to the general commanding, who examines the site, with the medical authorities, and sees that everything is fit and proper for the purpose intended. Then, when all that has been decided on, tenders are called for, and parties are referred to the plans and specifications in the hands of the engineer of the district in which it is to be executed. When these things have been done, various contractors send in their offers to execute the work; and in that case we differ from the rule that we follow in regard to stores, for there the people's names are recorded, and after their capabilities have been considered, the lowest tender is taken, unless in very special cases. But in the case of buildings, unless we know the contractor who offers, we take the lowest tender, and send it down to the commanding engineer, to know whether the man is competent, both as to capital and as to skill. And we not only do that, but we further order inquiries to be made whether his securities are solvent, and men of real substance.

18797. How do you know when it has been carried out?—I will state that when the building advances the contractor contracts to do the building for a lumped sum, and an engineer from the civil part of the Ordnance measures off monthly the work that has been done, and they certify that so many rods of brick-work have been done, and the contractor then passes that certificate to the surveyor's branch of the clerk of the Ordnance. They are blended now together, and quoting the authority under which that work was undertaken. Then that branch of the clerk of the Ordnance, which was the surveyor's branch, examines to see whether all the existing orders of the Board in reference to that specific contract have been complied with; and if they have been complied with, the clerk of the Ordnance prepares a bill up to the amount which the regulations allow. You do not pay in full; you retain so much back; and then that bill is brought before the Board, and is signed by two members.

18798. But the Board is not made aware how the work proceeds, or, at its termination, what amount of work has been done?—Yes, it is; it states upon it, that, having performed such an amount of work, he is entitled to such and such money, according to the contract.

18799. Then if, as you state, there was a discrepancy between the estimate and the work done, either in the case of the foundry or the laboratory, would the Board have been made acquainted with that fact as the work was in progress?—They ought to have been so; but I should say that this work was carried out in a manner somewhat different from usual.

18800. You say that they ought to have been made acquainted; why were they not?—In point of fact, when the work had to be paid for, the bills went to the clerk of the Ordnance.

18801. Then that was not in the regular process?—It was so little different, that it is not worth noticing; the bills went as usual to the clerk of the Ordnance for examination; when they did get into the office, then the error was discovered in the office, as well as by myself personally.

18802. *Chairman.*] You state that a discrepancy took place between the work done and the Minute of the Board, and that there was more work performed than the Board justified?—Yes; two bays were added.

18803. Was that additional work ordered by a verbal order on the part of the clerk of the Ordnance, or by a written order?—By a verbal order.

18804. To the Engineer?—Yes.

18805. The engineer usually has a written order for his work, has he not?—By the

the orders of the Board, after a work is undertaken no variation can be made, excepting by an authority given in writing; no alteration of the specifications or the plans of the work can be made.

18806. Then the engineer received a verbal order from Mr. Monsell, when, under the usual system of the Ordnance, he ought to have received a written one?—He ought to have received a written order from the Board.

18807. Then if he went to work without that order, did he not go to work upon his own responsibility?—Yes, he did.

18808. Mr. *Layard.*] Had the engineer never been apprised of the Minute of the Board on the subject?—Yes, he had, of course; the Minute of the Board for building that is merely a Minute saying that such and such plans and specifications are to be carried into effect; all that has been very well done; those two bays have been made like the others.

18809. Why did he depart from the Minute?—Because the Clerk of the Ordnance sanctioned it.

18810. You have just stated that the engineer cannot depart from the Minute of the Board?—He ought not, and in ordinary cases he could not do so; I never knew another instance since I have been at the Board.

18811. You stated that the Board is made acquainted from time to time of the progress of a building by the accounts sent in, which are passed to the clerk of the Ordnance and subsequently sent into the Board?—Yes.

18812. You have stated that in this case the Board were not made acquainted with the building as it was in progress?—Yes; it was made acquainted with the building as it was in progress; there was no irregularity in the work except that which I have stated, that, on the authority of the clerk of the Ordnance, two bays were made.

18813. Take the case of the foundry?—That is a different thing; that I think will not go in with this; they are two essentially different things.

18814. In either of these cases was there any irregularity in bringing the accounts to the notice of the Board, as they ought to have been, at stated times?—I cannot say that there was any irregularity in bringing it to the account, because though the engineer thought that the authority of the clerk of the Ordnance was sufficient, and he added those two bays to the laboratory, when the time came round for those papers to come into the office of the clerk of the Ordnance, then it was discovered that, I think, 1,800 *l.* had been expended for which there was no authority. I think a little before that, I do not know now which was first, I went down to Woolwich, and saw those bays added; and the engineer then told me that he had added them. I asked him why, and he said that Mr. Monsell sanctioned its being done.

18815. Was no official representation made by the Board officially to the Minister-of-War upon that subject?—I have no knowledge of such a communication having been made.

18816. You did not propose to the Board to make it?—No.

18817. You merely paid the money, and guarded the Board by that minute?—Yes.

18818. What you have just stated referred to the laboratory?—Yes.

18819. With regard to the foundry, what irregularity took place there?—There are two put up; the one in the laboratory is that which I spoke of; it was intended to be in the beginning a large foundry. I gave my reason in the paper I spoke of why it should not be adopted; but finally, as my colleagues told me, the Minister-for-War was desirous that this should be put up, and finally there was an order that it should be put up, a verbal one, and as I thought it might look contumacious if I refused to affix my signature, I did it on the understanding that I meant to send my paper to the Duke, but I did not. The factory was to be confined to a mere model factory to instruct others, by-the-by, who did not want much, because the founders are so well skilled themselves.

18820. So far as I understand you now, very great irregularity took place in that matter; and you were induced, by promises made to you, to withdraw what you thought a right and proper complaint?—Yes; I thought there might be some advantage, as the Minister for War, I was told, was desirous, in point of fact he wished, this foundry to be put up; and I felt, from previous occasions on which I had given different opinions, the moment I had given the opinion in the Board-room, perhaps at variance with that which was desired to be carried out,

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out, the Minister for War gave his sanction, and I was not desirous of contending on the point where it was possible that some good might arise, as it might place me in unpleasant circumstances.

18821. Supposing the thing had gone wrong, and Parliament had refused its sanction to the expenses, you would have been looked upon as partly responsible for what had been done?—No; I think that I have just stated that the Secretary for War had taken that responsibility on himself.

18822. *Chairman.*] By the covering order?—Yes. Here at the end are the words, "Service undertaken without a regular official authority from the Secretary for War, 18 November 1854, a shell foundry at Woolwich, at an expense of 10,000 *l.*"

18823. Mr. *Layard.*] Did this departure from the usual course in this matter take place in any other instances whatever?—I think there are other instances; I think if it be called for, it will be seen that almost all the new works at Woolwich have exceeded the estimate laid before Parliament.

18824. Is that on account of any departure from the usual and right course?—I infer that, but it is a case for examination; there may have been a rise in the price of materials; there may have been some other things to justify it. I speak on the information given me by the engineer. Whether it was the last time or the time before that I was down, I do not recollect; but he said to me, "But you will understand that this building" (speaking of the laboratory) "certainly will be a good deal in excess of the estimate."

18825. Captain *Gladstone.*] Was not the work done by contract?—Yes; but there have been deviations from that.

18826. Mr. *Layard.*] Did that increase of outlay depend upon any change of plan, or any increase in the size of the building, or merely upon any rise in the price of materials which could not have been anticipated when the orders were given?—In this instance I must again state that it is a part of the business that has been done; a good deal that has not been brought from time to time absolutely before the Board. I know more of any changes which have taken place in this business by my own observation than from the papers brought before me.

18827. Ought it to have been brought before the Board?—Yes, I think so; but it is possible that the statement made to me in conversation with the engineer may not be borne out by the facts, but his statement was as if to prepare for the thing when it came under consideration, that the estimate which had been submitted to Parliament must be exceeded.

18828. As yet the account has not been sent in officially?—No; or, rather I should say it may stand thus ——

18829. Has that increase of expense, according to your knowledge, arisen from a mere rise in the price of the materials, or any change in the plans?—I cannot answer that question.

18830. What do you believe?—I should rather wait to look at the documents; of course they will show.

18831. When will they be presented to Parliament?—They were begun in 1854, and the works are not yet concluded.

18832. The sum asked from Parliament, you say, will be exceeded by the sum expended?—So the engineer told me.

18833. To what extent?—I do not know.

18834. When will that excess be submitted to Parliament?—It will be on the winding up of the work next year.

18835. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Is the excess large?—I hope not; but I cannot state what it is.

18836. Mr. *Layard.*] The nation will have to pay it, will it not?—Yes; I do not think it is a large sum.

18837. Captain *Gladstone.*] Unless there had been a change in the plans, there would have been no increase in the price, if the work was done by contract?—I suppose there was either a change in the plan, or an addition to it.

18838. Mr. *Layard.*] Has there been any departure from the usual course in any inquiry into the conduct of the suborbinate officers of the department?—Yes.

18839. Will you state what that has been?—During the last month I had been very much at Woolwich, in consequence of the equipment of the Baltic Fleet, more especially the floating batteries, mortar vessels, and gun-boats, because the equipment for those vessels, more especially the mortar vessels, there

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there having been none fitted up for the last 45 years there, was new; they had to be equipped and stores to be got ready, and in my visits to the laboratory I found a state of things which, with my ideas of discipline, was quite incompatible with good order and the right discharge of their duty to the public between two persons standing in the relation of principal and assistant. I felt very uncomfortable about this, but after weighing it in my mind I felt it my duty to bring the thing before the Board, and I brought the thing before the Board. I stated in my communication to the Board that I had seen things which militated against the due exercise of the public service, and I felt it necessary to state that they were in such a position that steps ought to be taken to put an end to them, and I proposed that the question should be submitted to the Lieutenant-general in charge of the discipline of the department, to cause an inquiry to be made to see which of those officers was in the wrong. I did not venture an opinion upon it, and to suggest to the Lieutenant-general and the Board such a course as would put an end to a system so prejudicial. I found a great deal of hesitation on the part of some of the members of the Board as to what line should be taken, and I observed from what was said that there was an inclination to put the thing aside. I had strong feelings on this point, because matters had passed under my notice which assured me that in such a state of antagonism between two officers things must go wrong, and I then said, "Gentlemen, I will not delay any more;" and they proposed that this should be adjourned over till Monday. I said, "I do not ask for any crimination of one officer or another; I merely ask for an inquiry, and I think I have shown you sufficient cause for it; in my opinion, and if this Board chooses to flinch from doing its duty in this case, whenever this transaction is known, in the estimation of the public we shall stand discredited and disgraced." An adjournment was ordered till Monday; and on Monday, when we met, the clerk of the Ordnance said that he had taken the papers to the Secretary for War, who desired him to communicate to the Board that he adjourned its proceedings, and that he would take the proceedings into his own hands.

18840. What was the date of that?—It is within a month.

18841. Has any officer in consequence of what has occurred, and in consequence of the Minister for War having taken the inquiry into his own hands, been removed?—No; nothing has been done, but it led to another step, as I felt myself personally compromised in this matter, either that I had made an injudicious or an unfounded charge. I thought it right, as I concluded that something must have been stated to influence the Secretary for War to postpone the question, and I felt it my duty to write to him. My reason for doing this was, that the words which I had applied to the Board, the clerk of the Ordnance applied differently, that the individuals were discredited and disgraced. I then wrote to Lord Panmure, to state shortly what had passed, and to assure him that I did not apply those words in the way that would appear, from the communication made by the clerk of the Ordnance, that I had applied them, but that I applied them to the Board itself as flinching, in my opinion, from their duty, and that if they did do that, they would stand discredited and disgraced in the estimation of the public, and there I have left it.

18842. Was that letter answered?—No.

18843. *Chairman.*] No notice was taken of it?—No.

18844. Mr. *Layard.*] Has any step whatever been taken to your knowledge as to what passed at the Board?—No.

18845. Both of those officers are still at Woolwich, are they not?—Yes.

18846. In whose hands are the appointments, such as those to which the questions lately put refer?—Does the Honourable Member mean in the laboratory?

18847. Yes?—In the hands of the Lieutenant general, during the absence of the Master-general.

18848. And when the Master-general is here, they are in his hands, are they?—When the Master-general is here, they belong to the Master-general, and during his absence they belong to his representative, the Lieutenant-general.

18849. Has the Master-general, or his *locum tenens*, power to dismiss any officer who is not found competent?—Entirely so.

18850. During your connexion with the Board, have you ever known any instance of the Minister of War interfering with an appointment?—Never, till

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the present time; I have never known the Minister for War or Colonies to interfere in any way with the details of the Ordnance Department; nor do I see how it is possible that he could legally do so.

18851. If, through the incompetency or the misbehaviour of any person employed in the service, any detriment to the public service should ensue, the Board of Ordnance, or at least the Master-general of the Ordnance, would be responsible?—Yes.

18852. Not the Minister of War?—Certainly not.

18853. It is stated by the Duke of Newcastle, at the end of his evidence, in answer to the question, "Who was at the Board of Ordnance at that time; there was no Master-general?"—"No." "And no Surveyor-general, was there?"—"No, he was away." "The chief engineer was gone, was he not?"—"He went the very day of the prorogation of Parliament." "Who was there left to constitute the Board of Ordnance?"—"There was Sir Hew Ross (he was appointed temporarily), Sir Thomas Hastings, and Mr. Monsell; that was all." "Did you consider that Board, then, to be in a satisfactory state for the purpose of carrying on the business of such a Board?—Certainly not." Does that agree with your impression; are you of opinion that that was not a satisfactory state for the Board to be in?—I think that the Board was not equal to the work which was to be performed.

18854. Did you make any representation upon that subject?—I should premise that the duties of the Surveyor-general generally devolved upon me after Colonel Maule had left for the East, and after that I had conducted them for some time, two or three cases arose which implied the exercise of a judicial power, and where one had to go through evidences, and so forth, and to come to a decision as to individuals in that branch of the service; and there were more than usual of them at one time, and the responsibility thrown upon me, and the heaviness of the work, induced me to apply to Sir Hew Ross, and to the Clerk of the Ordnance (I was not personally in communication with the Duke of Newcastle) to appoint a third officer at the Board. I said that I felt that there was more to do than I could do well, and it cut me off from all those duties which were very important, attending frequently, as I ought to do, at Woolwich, at the Tower, at the outports, and at Birmingham. I made this statement repeatedly to both Sir Hew Ross and Mr. Monsell, and they said they had mentioned it to the Duke of Newcastle, but I heard nothing more of it. The thing went on, and at the close of the year I was really very much borne down by the weight of what I had to do; for, as I said before, I went down at eleven in the morning, and I rarely got away before half-past six, sometimes not till seven, and then I went back two days in the week, from nine to eleven, to keep the current business up.

18855. Did you make any written representations to the Duke?—No.

18856. In consequence of those representations to Sir Hew Ross and Mr. Monsell, did any change take place?—None. Then, towards the close of the year, about a month before I was taken ill, Lord Hardinge and Mr. Sidney Herbert came into my office on business; and after it was over, I happened the night before to have been very late at the office, and was extremely exhausted, and I said both to Lord Hardinge and to Mr. Sidney Herbert, "If you do not do something I must strike; I feel that I cannot stand this longer." Mr. Sidney Herbert and Lord Hardinge said it ought to be remedied; and Mr. Sidney Herbert said, "I have named the thing myself, and I have pointed out a person who should come here." Shortly after, about a fortnight or three weeks after that interview with Mr. Sidney Herbert and Lord Hardinge, Colonel Bruce was appointed; and I think about 10 days after he joined I was taken ill; and when I sent for my medical man, he said, "This is a case where you must abstain from doing anything for a certain number of days; it is an entire case of over-excitement of the nervous system."

18857. In what capacity was Colonel Bruce placed there?—Nominally as Surveyor-general, but he had no patent, and the duties of the Surveyor-general he discharged.

18858. When did that appointment take place?—About the end of December.

18859. Before Lord Panmure came into office?—Yes.

18860. Colonel Bruce was appointed by the late Government?—Yes.

18861. Has he his patent now?—No, he has no patent.

18862. Captain *Gladstone.*] He is the acting Surveyor-general, is he not?—Yes, but he has no patent.

18863. Mr. *Layard.*] Does he require a patent to perform his duties?—No, any intelligent officer may perform those duties without a patent, but then there are certain duties belonging to an officer having a patent, which cannot be performed by one who has not; virtually he is not the Surveyor-general.

18864. Has he the legal power, or the official power, of performing his duties till he gets his patent?—Certainly not, because any document that he may affix his name to, and which might become the subject of legal inquiry, would of course be vitiated by pleading that he is not the Surveyor-general of the Ordnance.

18865. To your knowledge, has any such case happened; has he affixed his name to any contract or any document, and has that document afterwards been disputed, in consequence of his not having a patent?—There is one case.

18866. Will you describe it to the Committee?—A contract was entered into for Aldershott, which in its preliminary stages was signed by Mr. Monsell and myself, and in the final completion of it, it was signed by Colonel Bruce, and until that period I did not know that Colonel Bruce could not legally sign a document; but the clerk came to me who had been employed in carrying out the details of that business, in great distress, saying that he was afraid he had got into a great scrape, because Mr. Monsell was desirous of rescinding the contract, which in its primary steps had been sanctioned by his initials and mine, and which had been finally perfected, as was supposed, by Colonel Bruce. He said, "Mr. Monsell has told me to be at ease; but I am extremely uncomfortable about it, because he said the contract is to be rescinded." I then said to him (the clerk), "I do not see how that could be." The next day, I think, he told me that he again saw Mr. Monsell on this subject, and it was one or two days that he spoke on the subject to me, and said, "I am afraid that I shall get into a scrape about this business, and I am sorry for it." He said, "I do not think it is possible, after Mr. Myers has taken the steps which he has done, that he will give up his contract;" and so the thing remained. I think the third day he told me that Mr. Monsell had sent for Mr. Myers, and he had voluntarily given up his contract.

18867. Then the contract was broken in consequence of Colonel Bruce not having his patent?—Yes; but I observed that afterwards there was, according to the statement of the clerk, an arrangement between the clerk of the Ordnance and the contractor, and that he abandoned the contract himself afterwards.

18868. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When you say "he," who do you mean?—The contractor gave up the contract.

18869. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you sanction the giving up of that contract?—No, I had nothing to do with it.

18870. You state that the contract was commenced by you and Mr. Monsell affixing your signatures or initials to it?—Yes, in that stage.

18871. As you commenced the contract, you intended it to be carried through, did you not?—No, I knew nothing of it officially. Mr. Monsell never spoke to me on the subject. Mr. Monsell never said to me, "I wish to abrogate this contract;" he never referred to my signature; he merely stated to the clerk that Colonel Bruce's signature was not a legal one, therefore he had power to break through the contract.

18872. The contract, in its first stages, was signed by you?—Yes, but till it was signed again in another part it was not a valid contract, and upon that ground it was that Mr. Monsell intended to put an end to that contract.

18873. What I want to know is this: did the contract require for its completion the signature of Colonel Bruce?—Of a third person; if I had signed the contract in the same part where Colonel Bruce did, it would have perfected the contract. Colonel Bruce's signature was supposed to be good till that time, or the clerk would not have asked him to affix his signature; he would have come to me or to Mr. Monsell.

18874. Was the fact of that contract having been broken officially communicated to you?—No.

18875. And it has never been?—No, I have never had a communication from the clerk of the Ordnance relative to that contract since.

18876. Therefore the breaking off of that contract falls entirely upon Mr.

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Monsell's shoulders?—Yes; but as I have stated, the arrangement was subsequently a voluntary one between the contractor and the clerk of the Ordnance.

18877. How do you know that?—From the same clerk who told me the other parts of the transaction.

18878. That is evidence that does not completely establish the fact; have you heard that from the contractor?—No, I have not.

18879. Have you heard it from Mr. Monsell?—No; he has never mentioned it to me.

18880. *Chairman.*] Have you seen the contract?—No.

18881. What was it for?—For some buildings at Aldershott.

18882. What building?—I think for the barracks, not for the huts.

18883. Will you state whether the authority of the Board was not requisite for the cancelling of the contract?—Yes.

18884. On the part of Mr. Monsell, had he authority from the Board to act as he did?—No.

18885. Then he acted upon his own authority?—I conclude so.

18886. Had he authority to cancel a contract which had been made by the Board?—I should say not.

18887. Mr. *Layard.*] Has Colonel Bruce, up to this time, received his patent?—No, I think not. I asked a few days ago, when the question, as to which I have spoken with reference to the two officers, was brought in another shape before the Board, and when it was likely to be brought to the vote, I asked the secretary whether Colonel Bruce had received his patent, because he was not at the Board. We had been waiting some time, and I said: "Gentlemen, we need not wait any longer; this is a case involving that which may be a subject of judicial consideration, therefore Colonel Bruce, if he cannot sign a contract, he cannot vote in any judicial question."

18888. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Can you state to the Committee whether that contract was broken by the desire of the contractor, or by the desire of Mr. Monsell?—Originally, as the case was stated to me by the clerk who carried out those details and obtained the various signatures, the contract was broken, or intended to be broken, by Mr. Monsell; at the same time it had not been legally perfected then. Two or three days afterwards the clerk told me that Mr. Monsell told him that he had sent for the contractor; and he said, "I do not think you will get Mr. Myers to consent," when Mr. Monsell said, "What would you say if I have got him to consent?"

18889. *Chairman.*] Was that contract entered into by the Board on one side and the contractor on the other?—Certainly.

18890. If this contract were cancelled by agreement between those parties, those two parties must have been present, acting?—Yes.

18891. Did Mr. Monsell represent the Board of Ordnance?—Certainly not.

18892. Therefore, so far as consent is concerned and the amicable arrangement upon that contract, that contract, legally considered, is not cancelled at all?—No.

18893. Mr. *Layard.*] Did Colonel Bruce on the occasion referred to, or on any other occasion, vote at the Board?—I do not think there has been any question in which there has been a vote; but he has done this thing. All the ordinary papers which do not involve discussion, are placed in one portfolio, and are not minuted, being papers of an ordinary description, and to those papers and to all the barrack papers, Colonel Bruce has affixed his signature; I have joined him in affixing mine also.

18894. I understand you to say, that a member of the Board of Ordnance exercises his duties in virtue of his patent?—Yes.

18895. And until a patent is given, he has no official position on the Board?—Clearly.

18896. Has Colonel Bruce signed any other contract?—He may have signed some before that question arose as to Aldershott, but since the period when it was known that his signature was not legal, all the documents requiring the signature of two members of the Board, have been signed either by Mr. Monsell and me, or, when Mr. Monsell was in the House of Commons, by Sir Hew Ross and myself.

18897. Supposing Mr. Monsell to have been authorised by the Board; if you

you can break a contract because it is not legally signed, cannot a contractor break it on the same ground?—Clearly.

18898. Then the public service is in a very dangerous condition, is it not, at this present moment?—I believe that contracts have not been signed by Colonel Bruce, because the moment it was known there was an end to the thing. I am not aware that there is any paper of importance which has been signed by Colonel Bruce likely to give rise to any legal questions.

18899. Colonel Bruce has been now four months at the Board of Ordnance, because he was appointed by the Government to the Board, at the end of December or the beginning of January, and up to this time he has not obtained his patent?—That is true.

18900. He has been sitting at the Board, exercising the functions of a member of that Board?—Many of them.

18901. Did he vote on the occasion which you have described?—No; that matter was withdrawn by the Clerk of the Ordnance, by the direction of the Secretary for War, and in the adjournment it did not come to a vote; and Sir Hew Ross, who was present in the chair, said, "Very well, I shall adjourn till Monday;" and on Monday coming, a communication was made that the Secretary of War had taken the matter into his own hands.

18902. Was Colonel Bruce on both occasions present?—Yes.

18903. Sir *J. Pakington*] What was the day on which this proceeding took place?—On Friday or Saturday.

18904. Mr. *Layard*.] Can you tell the Committee anything about the stoppage of that contract at Aldershott; did it suspend the works?—I think it was to do so; that is one of the things in regard to which I have been passed by. I can give the Honourable Member but little information about Aldershott; that business has been done in the room of the Clerk of the Ordnance, and not at the Board table.

18905. Do you know by whom that business has been done; can you state who has been at the bottom of this; who has been interfering in the duties of the Board of Ordnance, and taking upon himself to give those directions which ought to have been given by the Board?—I cannot answer that question for this reason, that a considerable portion of the business which in former times used to be conducted at the Board table, has been conducted in Mr. Monsell's private room; I do not know the details; I only know that when the contract for Aldershott was brought forward, it having been voted by Parliament, and different estimates having been prepared, we were pressed to push this forward, and I took the step of signing one of those Minutes, which I know was sustained by all legal formalities, and sent it, I believe, to the Clerk of the Ordnance, or he sent it to me; but with regard to all the subsequent steps, the plan and the estimates which are usually brought into the Board Room, I knew nothing of them.

18906. Look at your position, as I understand it; you are a member of a Board, consisting of three members (I put aside Colonel Bruce), yourself, Mr. Monsell, and Sir Hew Ross?—Yes.

18907. In any change of Government two of those members would go out of office, and you alone would remain of the old Board?—Yes.

18908. Three members of the Board sign a contract, and that contract is departed from in consequence of verbal communications from one of the members of that Board; that member who has made the verbal alteration, and another member of that Board, then leaves the Board in consequence of a change of Government, and you remain, having signed the original contract; in such a case as that are you not responsible for the consequences?—I am responsible for my own acts, not for those of others.

18909. If one member of the Board alters a contract without the consent of the Board, is he responsible?—He is answerable for that act, I think; suppose, at the moment, I were called to account for the alteration of this contract, my answer would be immediate (excepting that through the communications made to me by the clerk, who has been in charge of these papers), I have had no communication informing me that that contract had been altered.

18910. *Chairman*.] If you had sanctioned the alteration you would be answerable, would you not?—Yes.

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18911. If you did anything in consequence of the alteration, you would be answerable for no more than you had done?—I think not.

18912. Mr. *Layard.*] I understand you to say that the Board ought to sanction all alterations to make them legal or right; if therefore an alteration takes place without your knowledge, what is the consequence?—Then I am not answerable.

18913. In the case of a contract, suppose it is not completely fulfilled; during the time of its completion the Board changes; does the new Board take up the old contract?—Clearly; every act, I take it, which has been perfected by one Board is legal, and it is incumbent upon the Board coming in to fulfil that, because everything runs—the Board of Ordnance for the time being.

18914. *Chairman.*] In fact, the Board of Ordnance is immortal?—Yes.

18915. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you know who went down to Aldershott to construct the buildings?—No; having been placed in a situation not to have been consulted at all upon the subject, I did not go down, as I might have been in the mortifying position of interfering with things which other people might have been directed to do, and upon which I had no opinion to give.

18916. Who was the Surveyor-general of the Ordnance last year?—Colonel Maule was surveyor before.

18917. He went to the East?—Yes.

18918. On his departure who was named?—No one till Colonel Bruce.

18919. During the time of Colonel Maule's absence, until Colonel Bruce's appointment, no Surveyor-general was appointed?—No.

18920. Is it not the duty of the Surveyor-general to superintend the execution of the orders of the Board which relate to public buildings?—No, the execution belongs to the Inspector-general of Fortifications.

18921. What are the duties of the Surveyor-general?—The duties of the Surveyor-general have been changed of late years, and the substantial part of his duty has been consolidated with the Clerk of the Ordnance; he has now the entire direction of the whole Barrack Department; he has also the revision of the contracts; and he has a long list of duties which really I cannot recollect.

18922. Who performed those duties during the absence of the Surveyor-general?—I did the greater part of them, in addition to my own.

18923. Who was the chief engineer?—The Inspector-general of Fortifications, Sir John Burgoyne; during his absence his duties are performed by the Assistant Inspector-general of Fortifications, General Harding.

18924. Of course, he still holds his appointment?—Yes.

18925. Can you mention any other cases of interference besides those you have mentioned?—I do not now recollect any.

18926. Have you no other instance whatever in your recollection of the Board being interfered with in the manner you have described?—No; I before stated that a very considerable portion of the Board's business has been done on individual authority, but I cannot go to any other instances. If a thing be withdrawn from the Board, it is quite impossible that I may not know anything of it; I may know that it does not come to me.

18927. Has there been any other business of importance carried on through the Ordnance, which has not been brought officially to your knowledge?—That I cannot say at present; there is one thing—the question of contract for foundries at Woolwich has been carried on in a different way to that which I have described as the mode of contracting. An inspector of machinery has been sent to purchase large quantities of iron for the purposes of the foundry, without the usual system of contract being followed out, and that is a variation from the way of doing business.

18928. Why did that variation take place?—It was done by the Clerk of the Ordnance and myself.

18929. To what extent was that operation carried on, was it a very expensive one?—A considerable quantity of tons of iron must have been purchased, I think, for the foundry, and I should say, probably, there might be 500 tons or 2,000 tons.

18930. Has the whole of that been done without the Board being officially informed

informed of it?—I was not consulted about the purchase, but I sanctioned it on the statement put forward by the director of the Royal Laboratory.

18931. Still Colonel Bruce is not legally able to do that?—He does perform many duties which would not raise the legal question; it may be called an arrangement within the department; and as the Government have placed Colonel Bruce there, I take it that for all those things that do not require a legal signature his is good.

18932. Have you not seen on the minutes any record of the contract you have just mentioned?—No, it is not obtained by contract; the superintendent of machinery, under the orders either of Mr. Monsell, or Mr. Monsell and Colonel Bruce, or Sir Hew Ross or myself, has been sent to purchase this iron.

18933. Is that a portion of the regulations and laws of the Ordnance Office?—Our usual system is to go to contract for everything, and this is a deviation from that system, and though I have attended every Board since I recovered, I have heard no discussion.

18934. Have you ever asked for any explanation upon the subject?—No, I have not; there have been so many instances in which I have been placed in this situation, and seeing it announced that a change was to take place in the Board of Ordnance; seeing from time to time a semi-official notice in the "Observer;" there was one last Monday, for example, that the case was to be mentioned in Parliament next Monday, and a Bill was to be brought in; that has been going on for several months, and it was announced by the Secretary for War; this was to be done in the middle of the Session, and a gentleman in my position would not like to embroil himself in the matter.

18935. You have been many years in the Ordnance, have you not?—Nearly 10 years.

18936. With former Boards had you any of these difficulties?—Never one; since the time I have stated, I have never seen anything conducted with more regularity, and with more steadiness of purpose, than the business of the Ordnance till the change took place, which transferred us from the actual jurisdiction of the Master-general to be under the governance of the Secretary for War, through the instrumentality of the Clerk of the Ordnance.

18937. Did you ever make any representations to the Duke of Newcastle upon the subject?—No, I did not.

18938. Had the evil been so great during the time that he was in office as it has been since Lord Panmure has been in office?—Perhaps greater.

18939. Why did you make no representations then?—Positively it might have been better to have done so, but I was desirous, hearing that the Board was shortly to be extinguished, of going away without any collision, or contest of opinion; and when Lord Panmure came in, it occurred to me that we might linger on to the end of the Session; and I felt that it would be unpleasant to go to Lord Panmure and tell him precisely what this Committee have extracted from me.

18940. *Chairman.*] You never have gone to Lord Panmure?—No; it was my intention, but he has not acknowledged my letter; it would have been much more agreeable that I should have gone and stated to him this, than that I should have been obliged, on principles both due to this Committee and of moral obligation, to make the statement which I have made here.

18941. Mr. *Layard.*] How far have the Horse Guards to do with the Ordnance?—The Horse Guards are very much mixed up with the Ordnance; we are mixed up with almost all the departments of the state, being the great workshop of the nation and the executive department. The Horse Guards communicate with us as to the arming of the army; and the Commander-in-chief, of course, with regard to the proper arm, has full right to give his opinion; and when the new arm was formed, the Commander-in-chief had his representatives on the Committee, and conjointly with him, the Master-general and the Board.

18942. You stated that Lord Hardinge came to the Ordnance Office; did he give any orders in the Ordnance Office?—No, he has come to make various applications to hasten various things, and when they were points that he was able to explain, he has called in as he went down to the Horse Guards, but he has never exercised any authority over the Ordnance.

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18943. Are your communications with the Horse Guards the same as those with the Minister-of-War; are they carried on verbally now?—No; we carry on all our communications, or nearly all, in writing; and if a personal communication takes place, it is only to make clear a portion of those communications which are to be committed to writing.

18944. You have not received any orders from the Horse Guards verbally through Mr. Monsell?—No.

18945. Are they always in writing?—He has never conveyed any. Whenever the Horse Guards want anything, they write a letter, saying, we require such and such stores, and those things being almost all established by a Queen's warrant, no question arises.

18946. *Chairman.*] If anything had been purchased in consequence of this new system by the order of the Clerk of the Ordnance, and paid for afterwards by the Board, does not the Board thereby sanction the purchase?—Clearly.

18947. Is not the purchase then the purchase of the Board?—Clearly.

18948. Then does not the Board by that means sanction an irregular proceeding?—I admit that.

18949. Are not the Board therefore culpable in having sanctioned an irregularity?—I am sure that the Honourable Chairman would not think it necessary that I should record an opinion so decidedly against myself.

18950. The purchase is made by the Board, and it is irregularly made, and it is submitted to Parliament, and paid for by Parliament?—Yes; but though there may be an irregularity in the act, there is no misapplication, and no going beyond the vote which Parliament has given, probably, for example, in the case I have instanced; we have a vote for stores to that effect.

18951. You have given an instance of the enlargement of a building by the authority of the Clerk of the Ordnance; that is afterwards paid for by Parliament, and that increased payment made upon the authority of the Clerk of the Ordnance is sanctioned by the Board of Ordnance, because paid for by them, and afterwards submitted to Parliament as a regular expense?—I think I can show the Committee that it is quite impossible, that though that was an irregular act, we do not at all fall under that imputation, and for this reason, I think it very possible that the sum named here was intended to cover a larger factory, which I objected to, and that it is very probable (I do not say that it was absolutely so) that not more than the sum named here has been expended.

18952. That is only covered by the Secretary of State?—I believe since then, of course, it must have been included in the Estimates.

18953. I want to bring this to your notice, that the Board has sanctioned an irregular proceeding, and that has led to increased expense, which is paid for by Parliament, upon the understanding that the Board of Ordnance has sanctioned it?—Permit me to say, that I do not think that you will find the fact to be so. On the 18th of November 1854, the Duke sanctions 10,000 *l.* for the expense of a shell factory at Woolwich; that sum is taken in the estimates for the two years 1855-56. Now, if the factory, which is put up, does not cost more than 10,000 *l.*, then the Board of Ordnance, though they may have acted in an irregular manner, will have done nothing to bring them within a breach of the regulations under which we act; because my address to the members of the Board was this: I do not think that it ought to exist; there are many reasons why, in my opinion, it is wrong to put up a factory at Woolwich, and, therefore, when they said to me, "But will not you consent to put up a small model factory?" I perhaps wrongly, as a measure of peace, because it would have brought me into collision with the Secretary for War, said, "If you will make it the smallest thing, I will put my initials to it, and not send the letter to the Duke of Newcastle." My belief is that this 10,000 *l.* was intended to cover a larger factory; it is very probable that the one which is put up does not exceed the 10,000 *l.*; if it does not exceed the 10,000 *l.*, then the Board of Ordnance, *quoad* the financial part of the matter, would be entirely free from blame.

18954. The Board originally sanctioned a sum, say under 10,000 *l.*?—But they did not; they took 10,000 *l.*

18955. The Board originally sanctioned a building, which cost less than 10,000 *l.*?—It does not stand there upon record.

18956. Does

18956. Does not it stand so upon your own evidence?—No; I do not mean that.

18957. Then where is the irregularity?—The irregularity is very clear; but of that I am no judge.

18958. Did not the Board, first of all, sanction the erection of a certain building?—No, it was not so.

18959. With regard to the laboratory, did you not add two bays to it?—Yes; that was an irregular proceeding.

18960. Then how was the addition made, if there had not been some specification of the size of the building beforehand?—There was a specification.

18961. That sized building was sanctioned, and the erection of it by the Board?—

18962. And the addition was made without their sanction?—I have admitted from the beginning that it was an irregular proceeding as to the two bays, and I have not attempted to defend it. I further added, that I was quite aware that I had my own share of the blame to take in the question.

18963. I do not blame you; I am blaming the Board of Ordnance for sanctioning a proceeding which they knew to be irregular?—I do not defend it.

18964. Parliament has paid for something which the Board of Ordnance did not sanction, but by an irregularity?—I do not think that it is so, and it would be fair, upon that very question of the bays, that the Board of Ordnance might stand perfectly clear; for supposing Parliament to have sanctioned 20,000*l.*, and we had put up eight bays, and only spent 16,000*l.*, and, as in this case, we had previously stated, the bays were deemed useful, then I should not hesitate in sanctioning, as long as we were within the vote of Parliament, the putting up of the two bays, which would have come within a few hundred shillings of the mark, because we had a Parliamentary sanction to do that.

18965. You stated that this new system had arisen in consequence of a great deal of the power of the Master-general of the Ordnance having been assumed by the Minister-of-War?—It is an awkward thing to speak of the Minister-of-War.

18966. You stated that it had arisen as a matter of fact?—Yes. I have stated that we have acted under the order of the Minister for War.

18967. I have received a letter from Messrs. Hayter & Howell to this effect, "Sir,—We have felt it our duty to address a letter to the Committee;" have you that letter?—Yes, I have it here.

18968. Will you read it?—"Mark-lane, 4th May 1855. Sir,—With reference to the inquiries made by the Parliamentary Committee respecting the socks sent to Scutari, some of which it is alleged were of children's size, we feel assured you will pardon our reminding you that no portion of the clothing for hospital service was shipped by us. The whole of the stores packed and shipped by us, under the orders of the Honourable the Board of Ordnance, were forwarded to the Crimea. As the proceedings reported may give rise to an unfavourable impression to our prejudice, we shall feel obliged if you will take a suitable opportunity of offering this explanation to the Committee. We have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient servants, *Hayter & Howell.*" I wish to state, in reference to the socks, that articles for the army and the hospital were not only purchased in England, but they were purchased in Vienna, in Trieste, in Constantinople, and in Switzerland, under the authority of the Secretary for War; therefore it is very possible that some of those things may have been sent from those parts as well as from this country. It is quite possible that the small-sized socks which were found in the hospital at Scutari might have been sent from some of those places.

18969. *Chairman.*] All those goods are passed, are they not, by persons in the pay of the British Government?—Yes.

18970. Whoever passed them is responsible?—Quite so.

18971. Mr. *Layard.*] With regard to inventions, how are they brought to the notice of the Board of Ordnance?—The Board of Ordnance have really nothing to do with the question of inventions; that belongs to the Military Branch of the Ordnance, and is under the special direction of the Master-general. I speak now of the old constitution; that committee was composed of the heads of departments at Woolwich, and some of the superior officers; and to them the Master-general referred inventions, either for report or trial, as the case might be.

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18972. In the absence of the Master-general, whose duty has it been to look to that?—The Lieutenant-general.

18973. If a person sends a description of an invention to the Ordnance, to whom does it go?—If it comes to the Secretary of the Board, then it is passed to the office of the Lieutenant-general; if a person knows the proceedings, and goes to him, then it is sent to his chief clerk, as he has no secretary now; and then the Lieutenant-general sends the invention down to be examined and reported upon by the Committee; and when the trials have been made, a report is made by the Committee to the Lieutenant-general, and the thing is either approved or rejected, as the case may be. On this occasion I may say that the Board of Ordnance, antecedent to the adoption of that Committee, which has been placed on a more enlarged scale, was not in quite so helpless a position as they are stated to have been, because, on all questions relating to chemistry, we had till very lately the assistance of Mr. Faraday.

18974. Are inventions ever brought to the notice of the Board?—No; they belong to the Lieutenant-general entirely.

18975. Therefore it remains with the Lieutenant-general to decide whether they shall be sent or not to the Committee?—Yes.

18976. Who is there at the Board of Ordnance appointed to inspect inventions, or to ascertain whether inventions are of such a character as to authorise their being sent to the Committee?—The Lieutenant-general is the person.

18977. Therefore he may take upon himself to send an invention down for investigation or not, as he thinks fit?—Precisely.

18978. You know nothing about the inventions in the office?—Yes, I do; because frequently the Lieutenant-general refers to me, and they come, *pro formâ*, for certain things to the Board. I, having been interested in those objects, look over them, but then it is not a part of my duty.

18979. Do great delays take place in the Ordnance Office in returning answers to inventors?—The answers are sent from the Lieutenant-general's office now.

18980. Have any complaints been brought to the notice of the Board upon that subject?—Yes, there have been complaints; but I do not know that they are particularly well founded; but the committee meets twice a week; and the quantity of inventions really is something that is enormous; and some of them so ridiculous that they are not worth a minute's consideration.

18981. Then who is there to pronounce upon the fact of their being absurd or not; if an invention is absurd upon the face of it, I naturally understand that it is not referred to the committee; but who judges of that fact at the Ordnance?—The Lieutenant-general, I think, I may say, almost without exception, refers every invention to the select committee; he acts upon this principle: he says the committee are capable of judging; they have before them records of what has passed their view; they can reject at once that which is bad: and when such is the case they put upon it, "The committee have considered, and they see that the invention is not worthy of further consideration." But the committee under General Cator, the Director-general of artillery, generally give, I believe, a very patient and attentive consideration to those things which come before them.

Lunæ, 7° die Maii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	General Peel.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
Sir John Pakington.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Ellice.	Colonel Lindsay.
Lord Seymour.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., C. B., called in; and further Examined.

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18982. Lord *Seymour.*] THERE were some returns which I asked you to have the kindness to bring to-day; have you brought the return respecting the waterproof capes; the application?—The order to supply was on the 24th of November.

18983. That is the requisition, is it not?—Yes; that is from the Secretary-at-War. Perhaps you will permit me to send somebody up to ask for that paper; it ought to have been ready before I came down.

18984. With regard to the requisition for the hospital furniture, have you that?—This is an abstract. I understand that a return on a larger scale was forwarded in obedience to the suggestion of the Committee, conveyed through the Chairman, and I suppose it is here; for I am informed that that statement in detail has been furnished before; this gives merely the date and the outline.

18985. Were the dates furnished to us in the former return?—I believe so.

18986. I imagine this to be the return to which you allude (*showing a paper to the Witness*)?—No, I think not; it must be on a larger scale.

18987. This return has only been delivered this morning?—I wish to state that I was incorrect in saying that we had no return from the Cape on entrenchment tools; we have had one recently.

18988. Was that report from the Cape approving of the tools?—No; certainly not.

18989. Then, at the Cape, it seems that there has been some complaint as to tools?—Yes.

18990. Will you state the date of that complaint, and the nature of it; perhaps you have the complaint with you?—No, I have not the complaint here, but it is very much in the same tenor as the others; that the spades and pick-axes are of an indifferent quality, and applying for an improved supply.

18991. That was in what year?—This year; it arrived the other day, 2d May.

18992. Does that complaint, arriving in this country from the Cape, and complaining of the tools, apply to the tools supplied by the Board of Ordnance, or to the tools supplied by the colonels?—I cannot answer that question exactly, but I should think it must apply to both.

18993. You have not the letter with you?—I have not.

18994. You were asked the other day, at question 18769, "Will you state to the Committee whether the authority of the Board is ever used without the authority of the Board being expressly given?" To which your answer was, "I think there are instances of it." Then you gave some instances. You were then asked, at question 18772, "Can you give any other instance?" To which you answered, "I do not recollect any other." Are you satisfied that that is a correct answer?—I can state other instances, and not only as applying to Mr. Monsell, but to myself, if the case is put generally, and for this reason:

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since there have been only two members at the Board, it has sometimes happened that things urgently required were put forward on the signature of one Board officer; but I am not aware of any other exercise over questions involving the outlay of money in which more than one signature has not been attached. Again, it is clear that when I was the only Board officer for 15 or 16 weeks throughout the whole of the year, there must have been cases of that sort.

18995. Are the Committee to understand that you were the only Board officer during 15 or 16 weeks?—I think that for about eight or 10 weeks Mr. Monsell was absent, before Colonel Bruce's appointment.

18996. That was in the autumn of last year?—Yes.

18997. *Chairman.*] Was Sir Hew Ross absent also?—Sir Hew Ross was there, but his occupations in the military business of the department are such as to involve almost the whole of his time, and frequently when he has been occupied, and urgent things have pressed, ordinary things not involving principles have been put forward.

18998. Mr. *Ellice.*] You stated 15 or 16 weeks; will you have the goodness to state what weeks those were in the year, because it is very material?—The last five weeks were in the close of the year, about, I should think, December and the end of November; I cannot exactly state the other weeks without reference.

18999. Were they before that period or subsequently?—Before; in the autumn.

19000. About what month?—I should think somewhere about, probably, September and October.

19001. At the time the greatest pressure of business came upon you?—During the whole of last year there was an immense pressure of business.

19002. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated that much business went forward with only one signature?—When Sir Hew Ross and myself only were at the Board, it was necessary that things should sometimes be put forward; but the general rule is, that all things involving principles are to have the signature of two Board officers, and to many of these documents Sir Hew Ross's signature was affixed.

19003. I understood you to say that much business went forward with only one signature; did I understand you correctly?—Some business did.

19004. That, as I understand you, was an irregularity?—Yes, for certain papers; but I am not sure how many of those papers may have gone forward. In the pressure of business it is clear that some must have done so; I am not able to turn to a list and say this was done, and this was not done.

19005. You mean to state that some papers went forward with only one signature?—Yes; I think it is quite possible.

19006. Does one signature, that is, the signature of one member of the Board, carry with it the authority of the Board of Ordnance?—Not when it involves principles; there are certain papers which are called Board papers; those it is expected should have two signatures. With respect to papers which belong to us departmentally, those which I deal with as the principal Storekeeper and Comptroller of Stores, those which are dealt with in the immediate department of the Clerk of the Ordnance, and those which are not Barrack-board papers, by the Surveyor-general; I look upon it that those are all legitimate under one signature, because that has been the practice of the Board.

19007. Do you mean that one signature, for instance, by the Surveyor general of the Ordnance, would justify an outlay of money for the building of a new barrack?—No, certainly not; that would come under the designation of a Board paper.

19008. Wherever there is an outlay of money it is a Board paper?—Yes; the papers are placed in cases; one containing the papers which are called the "Board papers," which involve all the more important cases; then there is another description of papers from the Barrack department, called the "Barrack-board papers;" those papers involve principles, and they cannot be carried on departmentally. Many of the departmental papers are passed round, and a large portion of them have two signatures; but sometimes, when there is a pressing necessity, those departmental papers are put forward with one.

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19009. General *Peel.*] You mentioned two instances, that of the Laboratory and that of the Bays; are there many other instances?—Yes, there is another instance, which, I think, establishes that; sometimes questions have been dealt with which should not have been dealt with by one signature; indeed, I do not know that there was one to the particular case which I am going to mention. During the last year, unquestionably, the Board was pressed both by the Admiralty and by the Secretary-at-War to prepare war rockets. When Mr. Hale's rockets were drawing to a close, whose rockets had been under trial for some time, I spoke to the Clerk of the Ordnance as to the necessity of having another shed for preparing those rockets in; and I told him that Captain Collinson had estimated that the expense would be about 400 *l.* Mr. Monsell did not give me any answer on that occasion, but subsequently I learned that he had caused a ship to be brought round, that is to say, I had heard that she was coming round from Chatham for the purpose of receiving stores, which it was necessary to put out, to accommodate the workmen to be employed in these rockets. I then said, "Mr. Monsell, are you aware of the expense which such a measure will produce?" He said, "No." I said, "I can tell you that that expense will probably be towards 2,000 *l.*;" at which he seemed surprised; but nothing more passed between us, as I recollect. Shortly afterwards I heard that this ship, the "Talbot," was brought round to Woolwich, and that, having no mooring at the Arsenal, she was sent on to the dockyard, and was made fast to some of the ships there. I then saw that if this measure were carried out a very great and useless expense would be entailed upon the department, and I ordered the Superintendent of Ordnance Shipping, who is a naval officer, to make an estimate of the expense which that measure would entail on the Board. This is the official report from the Superintendent of Shipping, and perhaps it will give you the details better than I can give them from memory, if you will permit me to read it. "(Copy) No. 57 S-4128. The Superintendent of Ordnance Shipping to the Secretary to the Honourable Board. Reporting on the appropriation of Her Majesty's ship 'Talbot' as a store depôt for the Royal Arsenal. Shipping Office, Woolwich, April 3d, 1855. Sir,—With reference to your letter of the 19th ult., A-2168, desiring me to give any assistance in mooring Her Majesty's ship 'Talbot' on her arrival from Chatham, and subsequent instructions from the Comptroller of Stores to forward an estimate for the alterations and fitments required to render her efficient for a store depôt at Woolwich, I respectfully beg leave to state, for the information of the Honourable Board, that from their reply of the 30th January 1855, S-4036, to my report on this vessel, dated 29th January last (a copy of which is herewith transmitted), I understood that the 'Talbot,' from being too large to enter the canal, was rejected, and consequently no moorings were prepared." Now it was the original proposal to put the ship into the canal to receive powder, but she was too large to go in, and this transaction is a separate one: she was to remain in front of the Arsenal. "The 'Talbot' having arrived in the river, I have been assisted by a foreman of shipwrights from Her Majesty's Dockyard at Woolwich, in making a rough estimate for the alterations and fitments necessary, which would amount to the sum of 1,100 *l.*; the cost of the moorings, I have ascertained from the principal harbour master, would reach 650 *l.*; and a crew, consisting of a master, two seamen, and a boy, would incur an annual expense of 246 *l.* As it appears from the letter of the chief clerk of the Surveyor of the Navy, forwarded in my letter, No. 50, of the 20th ultimo, that a small vessel cannot be appropriated for this purpose by the Admiralty"—(that was the previous purpose of going into the canal)—"I would most respectfully suggest, for the consideration of the Honourable Board, the purchase of a vessel of greater length and less beam, that could be brought through the canal gates, and moored near the magazines, thereby saving the expense of such extensive alterations, moorings, and crew. Under these circumstances, I respectfully request the Honourable Board's further instructions on this subject." When I got this paper, the very next Board day I said to Mr. Monsell, "I have before told you what an expense this would be, that it would be a considerable expense; but you will see from the paper which I am going to read, that I did not overstate that expense." On hearing this read, Mr. Monsell took the paper from me (that is a copy), and he said, "Give me that paper; I will settle that; I will see Lord Panmure upon it." That is one

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of the transactions which appears to me to involve an expense without reference to the Board, for I knew nothing of it. Even after having given my opinion as a naval officer, the ship, against that opinion, was brought round, and I knew nothing of it till she arrived in the river.

19010. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was the expense actually incurred in that case?—No, it was not; except the expense of bringing the ship round.

19011. Do you mean that the subsequent expense, namely, the expense which is the subject of that estimate, was averted by your interference?—Exactly so; if I had not taken that step, in the common course of things, that measure would have been carried out.

19012. *Chairman.*] Not the common course of things, but the uncommon course of things?—I mean in the ordinary transaction of business, the ship having been ordered round for that purpose, proceedings would have been taken to carry it into effect. I said to Mr. Monsell, "You do not consider another thing; instead of saving anything by not laying out 400 *l.*, you will incur a very large cost in the hire of barges, in the embarkation of stores and transshipping them from those barges to the vessel, for she cannot lie alongside the wharf; then you will incur an additional expense in employing labourers to transship those stores again to other vessels to which they are to be taken."

19013. But are we to understand that, so far as the Clerk of the Ordnance was concerned, the order was given, and the transaction would have been carried out, had it not been for subsequent interference?—That is my belief.

19014. General *Peel.*] Was this reference to the Superintendent of Ordnance Shipping, a reference from the Board, or a reference from you as Storekeeper-general?—It was a reference from me; seeing the probable expense, I ordered an estimate to be made, for the purpose of dealing with it as I did, laying it before the Board, and preventing the transaction being carried out.

19015. Was the proposal to send the vessel there and to make her a store, a Board transaction?—No, I do not know how it was carried out; whether it was an application from Mr. Monsell or not; he told me, to the best of my belief, that he had made an application to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the subject, but I am not quite sure about that.

19016. Upon what authority was the vessel sent round; was it upon an order from the Board?—It was not upon an order from the Board; I never heard of her being ordered round.

19017. *Chairman.*] Until she came round?—Until she came round. I had heard of it in the previous conversation, when I endeavoured to stop it; but I conclude that the order to send her round was subsequent to my first conversation with Mr. Monsell.

19018. And in the ordinary and proper course of business, the order of the Board was required?—I think so, in such a transaction as that, because it involved, as you will perceive, considerable expense.

19019. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Are there any other instances which you have to state to the Committee?—There is another instance in reference to a question which I answered the other day. It may be remembered that I stated that I had applied for a court of inquiry on the state of the Laboratory. I had, and possibly have it now somewhere or other, a note to me, stating that an application had been made to the Secretary of the Board for a court of inquiry on the state of things in the Laboratory, which I inquired about; and it was stated to me by the Secretary that he had placed that letter in the hands of Mr. Monsell.

19020. *Chairman.*] By whom was that letter written?—I suppose I must name the party. That letter was written by Colonel Wilson, who is the director of the Royal Laboratory, applying for a court of inquiry into the existing state of things in the Laboratory. That letter, I understand, was addressed to the Secretary of the Board; I have not seen it; it was given by the Secretary of the Board to the Clerk of the Ordnance, and it has never been dealt with at the Board, to my knowledge, though I have attended every Board which has been held since.

19021. Are letters written to the Secretary supposed to be written to the Board?—Yes, he is the organ of communication to and from the Board.

19022. Sir *J. Pakington.*] That letter was never submitted to the Board, I understand

I understand you to say?—I have never seen it; and I asked the Secretary whether it had been submitted, and he told me that he had given it to Mr. Monsell.

19023. General *Peel.*] Who decides upon which are Board papers, and which are papers to be referred to the different departments?—The secretary selects the papers, places them in the cases, and either sends them before the Board, or sends the departmental papers to the rooms of the different Board officers; and if any Board officer has finished his departmental papers, which is sometimes the case with me, I send up and have the Board papers brought down to me, and when the hour is announced for the assembling of the Board, I take them up with me to the Board-room.

19024. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have had great experience at the Board of Ordnance; will you have the goodness to state to the Committee exactly what was the mode of conducting business, when the Board of Ordnance was complete, with the Master-general?—Perhaps the Committee will permit me to give a statement of something which was done by the Master-general himself before he left.

19025. When there was a Master-general, all papers which either passed from the Board to him, or were referred by him to the Board, came to him for his final decision?—Yes.

19026. And every order given by the Master-general and the Board was authorised by the Master-general?—Yes.

19027. So that, in fact, the whole of this disorganisation and difficulty at the Board of Ordnance has arisen from the want of a Master-general?—I do not think it would have happened if there had been a Master-general.

19028. No order was ever given by the Secretary, or by the Board itself, for anything of importance at the Ordnance, without its having been first referred to the Master-general and his having approved of it, or altered the recommendation of the Board, and, in fact, having given a direction that it should be carried into effect?—There was a considerable portion of the business transacted by the Board on which the Master-general put "I concur;" there were certain papers which did not go to him; the departmental papers and other papers of minor importance did not go to him.

19029. But in fact no order was given for the expenditure of money at the Board of Ordnance without the Master-general having sanctioned the order?—That is perfectly clear. I have no hesitation in answering explicitly the question which you have put, that it was so.

19030. Lord *Seymour.*] I have not been able to get the information which I wish to have; from the returns which we have before us, it appears that with regard to waterproof sheets and waterproof capes, none were received in store at the Tower till January 1855: had any provision been made during the summer or autumn of last year for the supply of those articles?—I believe that the first order for a supply of waterproof capes was sometime in November.

19031. And the waterproof sheeting in the same manner?—The order for the waterproof sheeting, I think, was a little before the order for the supply of capes.

19032. We have a return here from which it appears that 5,000 waterproof sheets were received at the Tower on the 22d January 1855?—Yes.

19033. Can you tell the Committee whether or not any had been sooner received, or any provision had been made for those articles earlier in the year?—My impression is that the provision for the waterproof capes and the sheeting took place early in November.

19034. When do you believe they were received at the Tower?—I have no doubt that that is the time.

19035. Referring to this return, do you think that the one which I have quoted was the first reception of waterproof sheeting at the Tower?—It is possible that the capes and waterproof sheeting may have been supplied earlier, because some of them were supplied through Messrs. Hayter & Howell.

19036. I wish to know when the Ordnance first had a requisition to supply these things, and when they did supply them?—I hope that that information will be down directly.

19037. Regarding the hospital furniture, for instance, the bedding, I, from these returns, cannot make out that any large number of beds were supplied for the hospitals until a late period in the year?—In March there was bedding: "Hospital marquees, 70."

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19038. I do not want to go to marquees, but I want to know what provision you made for the hospital at Scutari, and when you made it?—" Hospital provision and dresses, 2,665."

19039. When was that?—20th July. Then " Hospital beds," on the 29th of March, " 7,770."

19040. Was that for the hospital at Scutari?—I have the following paper: " Hospital stores; the original intention was to establish an hospital at Varna, and large supplies of medical and hospital stores were sent to that place in accordance with Dr. Smith's requisitions. When the army subsequently moved to the Crimea, it was determined to have the general hospital at Scutari, and the stores sent to Varna were to be removed from the latter to the former place. Great delay took place in effecting this in consequence of the transports being all required to convey the troops and their muniments of war to the Crimea. The wants of the hospital at Scutari seem to have been a secondary consideration, and much confusion took place in removing the medicines and stores from the one station to the other. Hence arose the difficulties in completing the equipment of the hospital at Scutari, and the want of stores at this place, which had been sent out in great abundance."

19041. When had any provision been made for the supply of hospital stores to Scutari?—From this paper it appears that provision was made early. I believed that the paper of which this is an abstract was in the hands of the Committee. The Chief Clerk told me just before I left, when I said that I had not seen it: " It has been already sent in." I can send for the original and show you that. On the 10th of April there are " 260 medicine chests, and canteens, 674." When I answered an Honourable Member's question, I understood, of course, that the expenditure of money involved a first principle; a beginning. I do not mean to say that in the intermediate time after a work had been decided upon, be it building or otherwise, the Board were not able to go on. I speak only as to sanctioning the commencement of works and so forth; after that step had been taken, then the Board were in a position to carry out that detail according to the funds which had been supplied by Parliament.

19042. Mr. *Ellice.*] Generally in the current course of business, the initiative in small matters of expense was taken by the Secretary or the Board, and it was sent up to the Master-general?—Yes, and in some cases where questions were referred to the Treasury, it is quite possible that money may have been dealt with according to the decision of the Treasury without the Master-general's sanction; but I am not aware that the Secretary can act on these, except on a Board's Minute.

19043. But would it not have gone back again to the Master-general for his sanction?—I will not say that it would always have done so, because the great tie, and in fact the great check against irregular expenditure, is not having the power to go beyond the Parliamentary vote, or to originate anything without the sanction of the Secretary of State conveyed to us through the Master-general.

19044. General *Peel.*] The substance of your former answer was, that matters upon the expenditure of money originated with the Board, and that they were always submitted by them to the Master-general; that was so?—Yes.

19045. Are there a great many instances in which matters were originated by the Board and submitted to the Master-general for his approval?—Yes.

19046. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Master-general is at the Board of Ordnance, and the first Lord of the Admiralty is at the Admiralty; the Master-general of the Ordnance does not sit at the Board; the First Lord of the Admiralty does sit at the Board; but with that exception their powers are the same?—Only that as to the power in their hands, practically the Master-general had the power without reference to our votes, of reversing our proceedings, which the First Lord of the Admiralty practically has not.

19047. *Chairman.*] Did you not say, on the first day, when you were examined, that the powers of the Master-general had been assumed by the Minister-at-War?—Exercised, I should, perhaps, say. I can give instances; I gave some instances the other day; I then stated that I did not recollect any other instances; but I was really very much wearied, and in reply to that question my answer was an incorrect one. I do recollect other instances; it has recently happened that the Storekeeper at the Tower has fallen into ill-health,

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health, and he has been absent altogether from his business about four months. The Treasury, adverting to his age, and one thing and another, called the attention of the Board to whether it was not time that he should retire. Now, he was so vigorous six months ago, that when there was a talk of his retiring, I stated that he would be a great loss; but on his coming back from his leave, he told me himself that he did not think he should be able to exercise his functions beneficially to the public, and he should be glad to retire. The moment I heard that that was the case, I put the papers forward, in the usual way, before the Board; those papers were approved of in the usual way, and testimony borne to his excellent character and long service, and it was sent to the Treasury. By some accident or other the thing was delayed, and feeling that it was wrong to keep a man in his position, after he had told me that he was incapable of discharging his duties properly, I went to the Treasury, and found out that, accidentally, some delay had taken place; but the papers were immediately put forward. When the papers reached the Board, they were placed in my hands, as announcing the retirement and the retiring salary assigned to Mr. Stacey. That being the case, I, considering that the Lieutenant-general stood in the place of the Master-general of the Ordnance, and that he had the right to appoint to those vacancies, waited upon him, and said: "As the Comptroller of Stores, it has been my custom with the Master-general to state my opinion in all principal appointments, and I am come to you, as I should have gone to Lord Raglan, if he had been here, to tell you, that it is important that these appointments should be made immediately, because there are great questions depending upon them; questions, I mean, of money. Of course, if the securities, in the event of a deficit in the stores, can show that the Board of Ordnance have not exercised due vigilance, their liability becomes a matter of question." Having had one or two instances where questions of that sort had arisen, I went, as I said before, to the Lieutenant-general, and told him, that it appeared to me that it was important for the public service that those appointments should be filled up; and I then stated that these gentlemen, last year, in a previous illness and absence of Mr. Stacey, had, for three months, discharged his duty very much to my satisfaction, during a great pressure of business, and that I took leave to recommend them strongly for promotion to the vacant offices of storekeeper and deputy storekeeper. Sir Hew Ross demurred a little; I said, "I have spoken to Lord Raglan relative to these gentlemen, seeing the probability of the retirement of Mr. Stacey, some time ago; and if you will send for the chief clerk, you may hear the view which he took upon it." Sir Hew Ross did take Mr. Ash's opinion, and it confirmed what I had said. I then, in Sir Hew Ross's presence, wrote down the following. (This is only the spirit of what I wrote.) "The deputy storekeeper, Mr. Hodgson, is a fit and proper person to fill the office of storekeeper; he, during a period of absence of Mr. Stacey, from illness," and so forth, "has given me ample proof of his fitness for the office; and as he has been for so many years in the department, he must know its details better than anybody else; he is a gentleman of unwearied perseverance, and I have no fault whatever to find with him; he has executed his duties entirely to my satisfaction; I recommend him strongly for promotion." I then said, speaking of Mr. King, the chief clerk, whom I recommended as deputy storekeeper, "He is a gentleman of very considerable ability, and has fulfilled his office also entirely to my satisfaction." Sir Hew Ross then said, "Under those circumstances, I can have no hesitation in filling up these appointments." He did fill them up; and I concluded that they would go forward immediately. Finding that they did not go forward, I asked the Secretary what had been done with the papers; he said that they had been given to Mr. Monsell; upon which I wrote again to Sir Hew Ross, and repeated in my letter what I had said, in stronger terms, and I concluded by saying that it was of great importance that those appointments should be made. Now, one of the reasons why it was important was this: it is probable that the intended changes in the department will give a new form to the office. I was desirous, before I went away, as I had recommended those gentlemen, to see them inducted into office, and to put, in fact, the machine going. I had confidence in them; but I felt that if they were kept in doubt and uncertainty as to their position, of course they could not be expected to execute their duties so comfortably or so efficiently; and another thing was, that if I were in a position to overlook them, it was probable

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probable that the matter would go forward more satisfactorily. The answer which I got upon that was, that there was reason to believe that the appointments had been suspended, and would not take place; and I have heard nothing more since on that subject.

19048. Mr. *Layard.*] Have the appointments taken place?—No.

19049. Has nobody been put into them at all?—No; the supercession of Mr. Stacey, I believe, will go up to-day, but nobody is appointed to take his place, and therefore the department will be vested in the hands of the deputy storekeeper and the chief clerk, the gentleman whom I recommended to succeed as deputy storekeeper.

19050. *Chairman.*] Does this clashing occur in consequence of the absence of the Master-general?—I have no doubt, myself, that if I had gone to Lord Raglan and stated to him what I did to Sir Hew Ross, he would immediately have filled up the appointments as Sir Hew Ross did, and of course no authority could have suspended them if he had made them.

19051. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you not state on Friday, that Sir Hew Ross in all respects had taken Lord Raglan's place?—I did.

19052. Had he not the same authority as Lord Raglan?—I believe so; according to his patent, entirely.

19053. Mr. *Ellice.*] Will you state to the Committee, according to your understanding, what were the powers of the Master-general with respect to appointments and promotions, and other arrangements of that description in the department of the Ordnance?—I believe that the Master-general, upon questions of promotion, was perfectly independent of everybody within or without the Board of Ordnance; the only thing that he was influenced by, was the consideration of who was most fit; and I can speak of all the Master-generals that I have served under from observation of their acts. I have observed that they aimed to take the fittest men to fill the offices; and I can add this, that a confidential report is made annually from every station under the Master-general, and that in almost every case where there was the promotion of a storekeeper, he sent for me and said, "I am thinking of promoting so-and-so; how does he stand in the department? He stands so-and-so in my confidential report."

19054. Do all the original appointments, both civil and military, in the department of the Ordnance, rest with the Master-general, or have any of the Board any patronage or power of appointment?—The Master-general had all the patronage of the department, excepting the patronage of the office of each Board officer that was vested in them by their patents.

19055. What was the patronage of each Board officer?—The appointment of the clerks of their own immediate departments.

19056. But all first appointments of officers to the engineers and the artillery rested entirely with the Master-general?—Entirely.

19057. The Master-general took the pleasure of the Crown upon those appointments?—Yes.

19058. Are the Committee to understand from you that Sir Hew Ross succeeded to all those powers?—I believe all; his patent is identical with that of the Master-general.

19059. *Chairman.*] So that Sir Hew Ross had by his patent the power to appoint those persons whom you have mentioned?—Decidedly.

19060. From your statement, instead of appointing them, he allowed Mr. Monsell to take the papers, and the persons have not been appointed?—I cannot say anything further as to the papers; I found, on inquiry, that they were in Mr. Monsell's hands; but I can state the reports I have heard upon the subject; I have stated all I know of my own knowledge.

19061. You know that the papers are in the hands of Mr. Monsell?—No, I believe they are gone elsewhere; that he has sent those papers elsewhere.

19062. You know that they are gone away from the Board?—Those were not sent to the Board.

19063. To the Lieutenant-general?—He put them in the hands of the Secretary for the usual execution. After the Master-general has decided upon a point, it is necessary that his orders should be carried out by an order from the Board.

19064. Was there such an order passed by the Board?—The papers were not brought before the Board; they were taken to Mr. Monsell.

19065. The

19065. The Lieutenant-general decided upon those papers, and he put them into the hands of the Secretary?—He decided to promote those gentlemen, as I understood him.

19066. From the hands of the Secretary they went to the Clerk of the Ordnance?—Yes.

19067. You have seen nothing more of them?—No.

19068. Therefore, they were interfered with so as not to come before the Board?—Yes; but there is one step not carried out. In the interim I wrote a second letter, expressive of the views which I entertained of the propriety of making those appointments; and one reason is obvious, that if those appointments are kept in an uncertain state for a certain number of weeks, it is clear that the liability of the securities will be lessened; and another thing is, that in this particular case, I was anxious to bring the question immediately before the Board, because from the immense quantity of stores in the Tower, and the immense press of business going on, I see it will be impossible to deal with this case as an ordinary case; and it will be necessary for the Board to consider it in conjunction with the Lieutenant-general, and to submit to him a mode of proceeding which will meet the special case. If we were to take the remain immediately, which, when the last remain was taken, required 200 men additional,—I do not say the exact number, but a large number,—and four months to count over and arrange the stores, the Committee will perceive at once that it will hardly be possible to do that, when really we are working from six in the morning till seven, and even till nine, at night, to get away the things ordered to be despatched.

19069. Do all these difficulties arise in consequence of the absence of the Master-general?—I do not think that anything of this sort would have arisen if he had been present.

19070. Captain *Gladstone.*] What was the date of the communication from the storekeeper, expressing his wish to retire?—It must be now about three weeks ago, or perhaps four, since he made his official application; and there was no delay on it, because the moment it came into the office, I put my own minute on it, and Mr. Monsell put one on it, expressive of the sense we entertained of Mr. Stacey's services, and it was sent forward with as little delay as possible to the Treasury. There was some little delay, and I went to get it rectified, as I have before stated.

19071. General *Peel.*] Was your recommendation to the Master-general of the persons to be promoted on a vacancy occurring in your office, as a matter of course, or was it out of the usual course of proceeding which takes place upon a vacancy occurring in any department of the Ordnance Office; supposing my chief clerk retires, do I recommend to the Master-general a person to fill his office, or was the application that you made an unusual one, or a private one?—No; in a Board officer's own office he would make his own appointments; he submits them for the approval of the Master-general.

19072. Was their recommendation for those promotions to go through the Board to the Master-general?—No; to the Master-general direct.

19073. Then he having approved of their recommendation, he submits it to the Board for their final approval, does he not?—To be carried out, not for approval, but merely to be carried out and to be recorded in the Board's minute.

19074. *Chairman.*] The Board are merely the executive officers of the Master-general?—In that case.

19075. General *Peel.*] After you had made those recommendations, and they had been approved by the Lieutenant-general, instead of coming back to the Board, they disappeared?—That is all I can say on the subject.

19076. Mr. *Layard.*] Will you give the other instances that you mention?—There is one instance; I do not know whether it comes immediately under the question now before the Committee; but, in my opinion, it is difficult to judge; if the Committee wish me to state it I will do so.

19077. You stated to the Committee, just now, that there were several instances in which the authority of the Board had been interfered with, and you have only given one?—Yes; I have given two now, and two or three the other day.

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19078. What was the nature of the other instance?—The other is an instance in which the Board have dealt with the question, in which another officer made a remonstrance, and finally it was carried out by the Board.

19079. *Chairman.*] Was that done by Mr. Monsell also?—Yes, it was.

19080. You had better state the case?—I am sure the Committee must see that it is an exceedingly unpleasant position in which I am placed, but I endeavour to state things honestly, and I will do it in the best way I can. A gentleman of very considerable distinction and ability was appointed to an office in the Ordnance; after he had joined that office, in several instances, or in two or three instances, he had manifested a very insubordinate turn of mind; so much so, that Mr. Monsell himself had spoken to me; he had also spoken to Sir Hew Ross, and requested him to send for him, I think, on two occasions, and to give him a severe reprimand, and to caution him on the impropriety of his conduct. Whilst Mr. Monsell was absent, at the close of the year, another complaint came relative to the conduct of this officer, and Sir Hew Ross sent for me on the occasion; he did not feel inclined to treat it solely on his own power, as the Lieutenant-general, in the absence of the Master-general, but he sent for me to assist him in forming his opinion upon the question; and I, taking into consideration what I had seen and known, of my own knowledge, though I appreciated this officer's ability, but seeing what I had of his conduct, being, as it was, subversive of discipline, and taking into consideration what Mr. Monsell had said to me, both when he was appointed and when those instances of insubordination occurred subsequently; after looking over the papers, I told Sir Hew Ross that I thought that a case was clearly made out of insubordination, and if a spirit of that sort existed in any part of the department it would be impossible that things could go on well. Sir Hew Ross then called upon General Cator, and other officers who were at Woolwich connected with those departments, and he talked the case over with them; and General Cator, who is the director-general of artillery, told me that he entirely concurred with the Lieutenant-general, but he lamented very much that an officer of such talent should be placed in a position which possibly might lead to the loss of his services. To which I replied, "General Cator, I have been a long time in command; and I made up my mind at an early period, when I was in the 'Excellent;' and I was constantly making the statement to the young men under me, that all the science in the world without a proper sense of discipline, was useless, and I would rather have an inferior man to carry on the duty than one who would embarrass it by interfering with the ordinary course of duty, by interrupting it, from the want of a right sense of discipline." We were outside then, whilst Sir Hew Ross was running over the papers, and he said, "I agree with you that it would be very undesirable to lose the services of the officer, but if we cannot have a regular transaction of business it would be better to lose his services." Sir Hew Ross afterwards sent for me again, and he then told me that he had made up his mind to write a severe reprimand to this officer for his conduct; and he did write a very severe one, and I annexed my initials to that reprimand. That reprimand was not to be given out in general orders; it was to be conveyed by General Cator, in the presence of one other officer, at the head of this gentleman's department. That was done, and finally the gentleman, whose conduct was called in question, received this reprimand, and there I conceive the thing ended. But when Mr. Monsell returned, he wrote a letter to the Board, calling upon the Board to rescind the decision to which they had come, and telling them that if they did not do so, he should place the papers in the hands of the Secretary for War. Sir Hew Ross then sent for me, and asked my opinion. I said I came to the conclusion that it was right to do what has been done, and nothing could by possibility (for I did not do it without thought) induce me to rescind the opinion I had given; and I think it still a just opinion. Possibly the reprimand was a severe one, but still I think there was great cause for it. Then the papers were taken from the office by Mr. Monsell and placed in the hands of the Secretary for War, and since that time the papers have not been returned, though they have not been asked for, nor has the decision been rescinded.

19081. General *Peel.*] Was this the usual course of attaching your signature to the reprimand of the Lieutenant-general, interfering as a member of the Board in any way with discipline?—In the instance of the officers of the

Manufacturing

Manufacturing department, they are in a double capacity, civil and military, and therefore the Board, I believe, are entitled to act in those cases.

19082. *Chairman.*] Is this transaction the same as the one that you mentioned during your last examination?—No.

19083. It is another transaction relating to the same person?—Yes, the beginning of the first transaction.

19084. Mr. *Layard.*] This was the first transaction?—This was the first.

19085. Have any appointments of late been made in the Ordnance department?—Yes.

19086. By whom have those appointments been made?—Any vacancies which have occurred in Mr. Monsell's office have been made by him and myself.

19087. *Chairman.*] Those have been departmental appointments?—Yes.

19088. Not coming under the Master-general or the Lieutenant-general?—No.

19089. Mr. *Layard.*] What appointments have been made in the Ordnance department; will you state what they were?—There have been several appointments made of clerks lately at the Tower, in consequence of the state in which the Tower was. I found that the business must get sadly into arrear, and I made various representations about it to get the establishment completed, but from one cause or other it has not been completed till recently. The system of appointing temporary clerks only had obtained in the office, and that was by direction from the Treasury; but when the war seemed likely to continue, I saw that it was impossible to carry on the duty effectively on such a system; and I made a representation, and I believe Mr. Monsell concurred in it, and carried it to the Treasury. At all events, a representation was made to the Treasury, and, after considerable delay the establishment at the Tower was revised; the old portion of the office was kept separate from the new portion of it, and the new portion was carried out on a scale decided upon when the separation of the principal storekeeper's duties at the Tower took place, and they were taken from him and transferred to the storekeeper at the Tower.

19090. Will you state what appointments have been made?—I was going immediately to show that those vacancies which were to cease as temporary clerks, and to be confirmed as permanent clerks of the Tower, were filled up a very short time ago by the Lieutenant-general.

19091. That was in the regular course of things, was it not?—Yes.

19092. Have any appointments been made out of the regular course?—No; but the Lieutenant-general told me, on my speaking to him upon the promotion of some clerk, that he could not appoint any permanent clerk; that his power of appointing to offices was suspended.

19093. By whom?—By the Secretary for War, I believe; so I understood him.

19094. Before that period, had the Master-general, or his *locum tenens*, the power of making those appointments?—Yes; the Master-general or the Lieutenant-general, till the present time, had the entire power of making those appointments.

19095. Mr. *Ellice.*] But only with the sanction of the Treasury, in case of the change in the establishment?—Yes.

19096. Mr. *Layard.*] By whom was that power vested in the Master-general?—By his patent, and by custom.

19097. Therefore the power of making appointments is vested in the Master-general of the Ordnance by the Crown?—Yes.

19098. Upon what authority, then, has that power been taken away from him, considering that he has a patent?—I cannot venture to answer that question.

19099. Has his patent been taken away or rescinded?—I believe not.

19100. Has any Act of Parliament been passed, or any Order in Council appeared upon the subject?—None that I know of.

19101. So far as you are aware, this has been a mere arbitrary proceeding on the part of the Secretary for War?—Merely by the Secretary for War.

19102. Can you mention any appointments or any promotions that have been made by the Secretary for War?—I do not think that any appointment has been made by him, so far as I understood from Sir Hew Ross, in reply to my question about the promotion of a clerk, I understood him to say, "I have no longer the power of making these appointments; I have had an intimation

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that my power is suspended;" and he then told me how it arose. He said, "I am sorry I cannot do this, but some little time ago Mr. Monsell wished me to promote a particular person; I found that I could not do it over the head of some other person, and a very deserving person;" and he said, showing me a letter, "If you read that, you will see the reason;" it was a letter from the private secretary of the Secretary for War.

19103. *Chairman.*] Who was the Secretary for War then?—Lord Panmure; that letter was from his private secretary, saying that during the present period of uncertainty in the office, only temporary appointments were to be made. I should add, that that applies to what I have now stated about Mr. Monsell's applying for the promotion of a clerk, which Sir Hew Ross could not concede to him; and he received, in consequence of that, the note which I have named.

19104. Mr. *Layard.*] You, like other members of the Board, exercise your duties under a patent, do you not?—Yes.

19105. Supposing any of those duties which you considered were incumbent upon you to fulfil were broken through by others, would you consider it your duty to remonstrate?—I think I should have seen the Secretary for War, and have asked for some explanation myself upon that subject.

19106. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Secretary of State has the power, has he not, of communicating the pleasure of the Crown to any inferior officer of the Government?—I conclude so. I raise no question as to the power of the Secretary for War to do anything that he may think right to do.

19107. When the Secretary of State communicates the pleasure of the Crown to the Board of Ordnance, that must be obeyed, must it not?—Clearly.

19108. Mr. *Layard.*] Was there any official communication made of the pleasure of the Crown to the Board of Ordnance?—I do not think that there was.

19109. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Secretary of State generally would communicate to the head of the department, would he not?—I conclude that that is the usual system.

19110. Then the communication was made by the Secretary of State to Sir Hew Ross, to desire that all the appointments for the present might be considered temporary?—Yes.

19111. Mr. *Layard.*] Was it a public or a private communication?—Through his secretary.

19112. Was it a verbal communication?—No; I saw the note.

19113. I understood you to infer that it was a private note?—Yes; but I suppose that such a note must be viewed as official under such circumstances.

19114. Was it a kind of note that would be placed on the records of the Board?—No; that does not at all happen in the office of the Board; that was done in the office of the Master-general; the note was to him; it was not an official note; it was a private note.

19115. Mr. *Ellice.*] That was the act of the Secretary for War, and not the act of Mr. Monsell?—No; I did not say that it was, and I never meant to imply that.

19116. Mr. Monsell, of course, is in no respect responsible for such an order as the Secretary of State chooses to send down to the Board of Ordnance, or to the Lieutenant-general?—No.

19117. General *Peel.*] Was not the suspension of the powers of the Master-general, in regard to appointments, in consequence of a proposed alteration in the department?—I believe so.

19118. Mr. *Ellice.*] You stated that Mr. Monsell had induced the Secretary-at-War to send down this order, in consequence of Mr. Monsell's not having made the promotion which had been recommended by you and the Board?—I did not mean to state that.

19119. That was not what you meant to say?—No.

19120. General *Peel.*] Will you explain how that was?—I meant to say this, for I am bound to say all that I know of the facts of the case, otherwise I should not have stated this; I stated this fact, that Mr. Monsell had made an application (I made no inference from it) to the Lieutenant-general for the promotion of a particular clerk, and Sir Hew Ross said that he could not make

that

that promotion, because he had reason for thinking that somebody else was better entitled to it, and he said to me, "Here is the reason why I cannot do anything more."

19121. Will you mention in that instance the name of the person?—I cannot do that; I do not know the name. I only speak to the fact of Sir Hew Ross having told me of it.

19122. You do not know that of your own knowledge?—No.

19123. Lord *Seymour*.] Did any requisition in regard to the huts for the troops in the Crimea come to the Board of Ordnance?—I do not think that that business was carried out quite with the accustomed regularity.

19124. Will you answer the question; did any requisition, in regard to the huts for the troops in the Crimea come to the Board of Ordnance?—Yes, certainly.

19125. It was read at the Board, was it?—No.

19126. Did you see it at the Board?—No.

19127. Was it brought before the Board?—No; but I was cognisant of it, and so was Mr. Monsell and General Hardinge.

19128. He was not one of the members of the Board?—No.

19129. But it must come to him through a member of the Board?—No; it might come from the officer immediately under him, who had to carry it out.

19130. I want to know whether, when the Secretary of State wished for those huts to be sent to the troops in the Crimea, he applied to the Board of Ordnance?—I believe he did; but this transaction was carried on not in the usual way. I do not think that we had a requisition in the first place, but Sir Frederick Smith, who had been employed at Beverloo in looking at the camp, was called upon by Lord Hardinge to give certain opinions upon those huts; Lord Hardinge told me this himself; then he placed Sir Frederick Smith, who was commanding engineer in the South-west district, and who had been at Beverloo, in communication with the Duke of Newcastle, as I understood him.

19131. You stated this, did you not, that whenever any expenditure was incurred under the Board of Ordnance, it must be by the sanction of the Board?—Yes.

19132. Was any expenditure incurred, or not, for the huts to be sent to the troops in the Crimea?—Certainly.

19133. Was that expenditure incurred under the authority of the Board of Ordnance?—It was finally paid for, but I did not see it; I was not present at all the steps of the transaction.

19134. Then the order was not given under the sanction of the Board of Ordnance?—No; because, as I stated before, there was some irregularity in it, and, as I understood the matter, Sir Frederick Smith was entrusted to make certain inquiries touching those huts; he communicated with Lord Hardinge, and he communicated with the Duke of Newcastle, and they decided on the line of action; then Sir Frederick Smith, I think, on that occasion should have gone to the Assistant Inspector-general, who would have brought the case before the Board.

19135. You stated that no expenditure could be incurred by one member of the Board, but that the order must be given by two members?—Yes.

19136. Then is it not the case that, in regard to the order for those huts for the Crimea, it was not given by two members?—I cannot speak decidedly as to that point. It was a transaction which passed in this way: a requisition did not come asking us to do so and so; but it was carried on between the War Department and Sir Frederick Smith, who had previously been in communication with Lord Hardinge; and finally the Board of Ordnance, on the whole question being brought before them, did approve of it before it was done.

19137. Did the Board of Ordnance have an estimate made under their superintendence?—No; the estimates were made by the contractors, and submitted, I think, by Sir Frederick Smith, through the Assistant Inspector-general of Fortifications, General Hardinge, and then adopted by the Board finally.

19138. Then, as I understand it, that also was an irregular mode of proceeding?—Yes, it was irregular in the beginning, but subsequently the irregularity was brought into the usual form by a proposal forwarded by, I think, Sir Frederick Smith, stating what those huts might be provided for; but that the

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whole business had been carried out in the War Department, and to a certain extent Colonel Tulloch, who commands the pensioners, had been mixed up with it.

19139. In what position was Sir Frederick Smith?—He is the Major-general commanding the engineers in the South-western district.

19140. You have alluded to Colonel Tulloch; what was his position?—He commands the pensioners.

19141. They had not come to the Board of Ordnance?—No.

19142. *Chairman.*] But the Board of Ordnance covered all the irregularity by subsequently approving of the proceeding?—Yes, when the transaction came in, in this irregular manner, there was nothing in it to prevent the Board of Ordnance sanctioning it, which may have been done by the War Department, and by persons employed by them, without being brought before the Board in the usual way, if they saw no reason to dissent from that which was proposed.

19143. In spite of the irregularity, they paid the bill?—Yes; it was only irregular in form.

19144. Lord *Seymour.*] Did the Board of Ordnance give its opinion upon the estimate in the first instance?—No, the business had proceeded a considerable way.

19145. Did the Board give an opinion upon those estimates?—As soon as they were brought before us we did so.

19146. Were the estimates brought before you before the work had been commenced?—I believe that many of the huts, at the time that this proposition was brought before the Board, were actually constructed.

19147. *Chairman.*] Were they built by contract?—Yes, by Messrs. Potter & Price, of Gloucester.

19148. Between whom was the contract entered into; who made it on the part of the Government?—I think it was carried out; but Sir Frederick Smith will be able to tell the Committee; Sir Frederick Smith was assisted in the business by Colonel Tulloch.

19149. The Board of Ordnance did not make the contract?—It is possible, after all the practical arrangements as to making the contract, that it was brought before them in a state which the Board did not disapprove of, and they adopted it.

19150. Then the work was begun before it was submitted to the Board of Ordnance; the work was begun upon a contract, and that contract was not made by the Board of Ordnance?—I am not able to say that it was not; the contract was not brought before us in the usual way of a tender, and I fancy that it was carried out under a pressing necessity by the direction of the Minister for War, and in the question the General commanding was also mixed up.

19151. You stated that the contract was carried out; I want to know whether the Ordnance afterwards approved of the contract which had been made by somebody else, and paid for work done under a contract in spite of any irregularity which preceded the making of it?—The irregularity was merely one of form, and before the Board of Ordnance gave their consent to adopt that which was proposed, they examined it, and they found that it was right that it should be done; at that moment the huts were urgently wanted, and ships were waiting at Southampton, or were to be there to receive them at a certain time.

19152. So that in fact the Board of Ordnance approved of the huts, of the price, and of the person to make them under the contract?—Yes, and I believe that in that instance, in consequence of something subsequently done to the huts to improve them, an increased price was added to the original contract.

19153. General *Peel.*] You stated in answer to question 18638, that when the Ordnance were in treaty with parties to supply the whole number of fur caps at 5*s.* 10*d.*, in the interim whilst that treaty was pending, the Secretary-at-War purchased fur caps at 6*s.* 8*d.*; can you state to the Committee whether the Secretary for War having made a contract to purchase them, the remainder of the transaction passed through the Ordnance, and if it did not appear in your name, and not that of the Board?—I think it is very likely, because the communications that I had verbally with the Secretary for War at that time were

were frequent. I happened to recollect distinctly that we were in treaty at one price, and on going down to the Secretary for War, his secretary told me that arrangements had been made to purchase the fur caps at 6*s.* 8*d.* I think it is quite probable that subsequently to the order the contract might have been carried out by my signature.

19154. You have stated in one part of your evidence that the papers respecting the appointment of the Storekeeper at the Tower was taken away by Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, and in another portion of your evidence I think you stated really that you did not know what had become of them?—No; I meant to say this, that I found, from the Secretary to the Ordnance, that he had given them to Mr. Monsell; I asked for them subsequently, and he could not say whether they were with Mr. Monsell, or whether they had been sent elsewhere.

19155. Were they not sent to Sir Hew Ross by his own desire, and submitted by him to the Secretary for War?—I stated before that I did not know how that was.

19156. Mr. *Layard.*] Where can the Committee obtain information as to the fuses?—Of General Cator, I think, the Director of Artillery.

19157. You are not acquainted with that part of the subject?—To a certain extent, I am.

19158. Were any reports sent from the army in the Crimea as to the fuses?—General Cator told me that he had had a report on that subject.

19159. Mr. *Ellice.*] The result of your evidence appears to be this, that it has been found as difficult to carry on successfully the administration of the affairs of the Board of Ordnance without a Master-general and a complete Board, as it would be to carry on the administration of the navy without a First Lord and a complete Board at the Admiralty?—I think so. I wish to read a letter from Colonel Bruce: "Ordnance Office, 7 May 1855. My dear Sir Thomas,—With reference to the contract for the erection of permanent barracks at Aldershot, which was mentioned in connection with my name, during the course of your examination on Friday last, permit me to correct an apparent misapprehension into which you have fallen respecting my part in that transaction, and which might lead to erroneous inferences on the part of the Committee. The execution of legal instruments, such as contracts, &c., forms, as you are aware, but a fractional part of the business of the Board, and I have abstained, in every instance, from becoming a party to them, lest their validity should afterwards be impugned on the ground of informality. In the particular case alluded to, the papers first came before me, while you were unfortunately suffering from severe indisposition; and a larger share than usual of the current business of the department devolved upon me. Mr. Myers' tender being much lower than the rest, had already been conditionally accepted by the Board, but before entering upon a final agreement, he had been called upon to produce satisfactory references in regard to his ability to fulfil the contract; these were submitted to me, and being of a most unexceptionable character, I did not hesitate, on consultation with the gentlemen at the head of the Contract branch, and knowing that the service was most urgent, to record my opinion, in a minute to that effect. Meanwhile, however, before the deed of contract was finally executed, although I believe it had received your signature, another and more economical scheme for the construction of these barracks had been suggested, involving a considerable modification in the original specification, and therefore, in the terms of the proposed contract, communications having already passed between Mr. Myers and the department, implying the acceptance of his offer, this change of plan might have caused some embarrassment, had it not been for his handsome conduct in at once consenting, at Mr. Monsell's instance, to meet the views of the Board in the matter. I state these particulars, not for the purpose of repudiating responsibility in connexion with this transaction, but in order that the facts may be clearly understood; and have only to observe, in conclusion, that the course pursued, although perhaps not strictly in conformity with the usual routine, will result, I believe, in effecting a large saving on behalf of the public. I remain, dear Sir, yours faithfully, *Thomas R. Bruce.*"

19160. *Chairman.*] Can you state how long Messrs. Hayter & Howell have been employed as shipping agents for the Government?—No, I do not know; I believe they have been agents for the shipping of stores which are sent to

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regiments abroad, for a long time; but I do not know whether that is connected with the Government or with the colonels of the regiments. I wish now to put in this paper, showing a "Memorandum on Reserve Camp Stores in Lord Raglan's Army."

19161. Lord *Seymour*.] Will you take that paper in your hand (*handing a Paper to the Witness*), and state whether that was the first application for warm clothing from the Minister of War?—Yes.

Vide Appendix.

19162. What is the date of that?—The 5th of July 1854.

19163. That does not give the quantity?—No; it is shown in the other papers which I put in.

19164. You were asked the other day whether there was any record of the proceedings as to the quashing of the contract with Messrs. Kynaston; was none found?—I put in, on that occasion, (if not, I will do so) a statement to that effect.

19165. Will you state the date when the waterproof capes were ordered?—The 17th of November 1854.

19166. That was the first order?—Yes.

19167. When were the warm socks ordered for the hospital at Scutari?—On the 13th and 27th of January 1854.

19168. Not till then?—No.

19169. You stated that you could give also the date of the report from the Cape upon the bad quality of the tools?—That was on the 28th of December 1854 and 5th of February 1855. These are the papers relating to the Minié muskets and their distribution.—(*The same were handed in*). This is a statement of the dates of the applications for tonnage to the Admiralty, and also a letter appointing the "Jura," for which we made no requisition.—(*The same were handed in.*) This is a paper showing the number of entrenching tools in store at Malta.—(*The same was handed in.*) This is a paper as to the state of the entrenching tools.—(*The same was handed in.*) Before I close my evidence I wish to state, that I regret very much that the application which I made for an audience with the Secretary for War was not complied with, because it would have been much more in unison with my feelings to have stated these things to the Secretary for War than to have had them extracted from me by this Committee; that was my object in applying for an audience. I will beg to hand in the following papers.—(*The same were handed in.*)

Vide Appendix.

Vide Appendix.

Vide Appendix.

Vide Appendix.

Vide Appendix.

William Monsell, Esq., a Member of The House; Examined.

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19170. *Chairman*.] YOU are the Clerk of the Ordnance, are you not?—Yes.

19171. When were you appointed?—Two years and five months ago; in the month of January.

19172. That was before the change took place in the office of the War Minister?—Yes.

19173. You acted under the War Minister when he was also Minister for the Colonies, did you not?—Yes.

19174. You are, I think, a co-ordinate member of the Board of Ordnance?—Yes.

19175. Having no more power than any other member of that Board?—No; except such power as may be involved in having the control of the finance of the Board.

19176. You have no more power of originating matters before the Board, or deciding upon them, than any other member?—Certainly not.

19177. You are the medium of communication between that Board and the Minister for War, are you not?—Yes; and perhaps I may add in answer to that question, that Sir Hew Ross was so also to a certain extent, during a part of last year, because there were meetings held weekly at the War Department, where the Secretary-at-War, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hew Ross, as representing the military portion of the Ordnance, and I as representing the civil portion of the Ordnance, used to attend. Latterly, there have not been any such meetings, and I have been the sole medium of communication with the Minister for War.

19178. The Committee have been informed that the Board of Ordnance is merely an executive Board, and that it does not suggest matters of itself; is that

that correct?—That is quite true, except so far as this goes: The Board of Ordnance have to consider how to execute cheaply, and therefore they originate very often modes of doing things. For instance, one may find that certain things would be more cheaply produced in one way than in another, and the Board of Ordnance thus originates modes of doing things; but it originates no order; all orders are given to it from some extraneous and superior authority.

19179. Amongst the duties of the Board of Ordnance, are making contracts for the supply of the goods which they require?—Yes.

19180. You have read the evidence that has been given by Sir Thomas Hastings, have you not?—I have read only that which he gave on Friday last.

19181. In that evidence he referred to an agreement with Mr. Kynaston?—Yes.

19182. He mentioned what he believed to have been an irregularity in the mode in which the contract was dealt with; have you any explanation to give the Committee upon that matter?—Yes; I have the papers here, and I will go through the several processes by which this contract was arranged. I may remark that the first suggestion with regard to the necessity of providing warm clothing was given to me by the Minister for War, I think, on the 21st of June. Upon that suggestion being communicated by me to the Board of Ordnance, certain inquiries were made with regard to the best mode of carrying out the order which it was anticipated would arrive; the order did arrive from the Secretary of State on the 5th of July, and upon that letter there was an order signed by Sir Thomas Hastings and myself: "Ordered, that the articles be provided, proposed by the civil officers of the Tower, in their reports of the 27th and 28th of June 1854, minus 50,000 socks, relative to which further instructions will be given." Upon, I think, the 11th of July, I find the following Minute, signed only by myself: "Before either flannel shirts, drawers, or stockings are purchased, let the patterns be submitted to Dr. Smith," head of the Medical department.

19183. Had you power to do that yourself?—I think, according to the ordinary practice of the Board, I had in anything of that sort. I do not know whether it will make the whole of my examination more clear to the minds of the Committee, if I just beg them to recollect that up to the time at which I felt it my duty to insist upon purchasing the muskets at Liege, at the beginning of November, all the members of the Board, Sir Hew Ross, Sir Thomas Hastings, and myself, had acted together in the most cordial manner possible; and under those circumstances, a liberty which perhaps might not have been taken under other circumstances, I think, was taken by one member of the Board as to the others.

19184. I was asking you whether that order, signed by yourself, was considered a Board order, or a departmental order?—It was certainly considered a Board order, and acted upon accordingly.

19185. According to the rule laid down by Sir Thomas Hastings, that was an irregular proceeding, as it had not the signatures of two members?—Yes; but I do not think it was a sort of order that would require two signatures, according to the ordinary practice of the Board; but it would perhaps be better to find this out from the Secretary. I think it was not irregular.

19186. What was the next step taken?—The next step was an order, signed only by Sir Thomas Hastings, on the 14th of July 1854: "The Director-general of the Army Medical department having suggested that the following articles should be submitted to a Board of medical officers, to be compared with others of a similar nature, with the view of judging of their applicability for winter use for the service of the army in Turkey; viz., a blue sea service serge frock, a pair of sea service knitten drawers, a blue Guernsey frock; and the Board anticipating some difficulty in obtaining patterns of these articles, ordered that an immediate application be made to the Lords of the Admiralty to cause this department to be furnished with patterns of these articles, if possible, by the messenger taking this communication, with the view to their being submitted to the committee appointed to decide on them this day." I do not consider that that was in the slightest degree irregular, though it was only signed by Sir Thomas Hastings. Then the next proceeding was, that Dr. Smith forwarded a report of the Board of medical officers assembled to consider this warm clothing, generally approving of it, but finding fault with some small portion of it; that was on the 15th of July. In the meantime very large

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quantities of clothing, chiefly from Scotland—an enormous quantity—from a very large number of houses, had arrived; we collected it together in the Board-room, I think, upon the 20th or the 21st of July, and we inspected it very carefully and very closely; and we decided then upon certain sealed patterns, which we thought well adapted at once to be used as winter clothing, and gave orders accordingly. In giving those orders we took care, as we were bound in justice to do, not to damnify Messrs. Kynaston; at the same time, we did very materially change the nature of many of the articles which he was to supply.

19187. On the 17th of July, was not there an agreement entered into with Mr. Kynaston?—No; I think the agreement entered into with him was with the civil officers at the Tower, in consequence of the order given by the Board on the 5th of July, and I rather think it was entered into before the 12th of July.

19188. Was not there, on the 17th of July, a note of yours, as Clerk of the Ordnance, stopping the agreement with Mr. Kynaston?—On the 15th July there was one, which I have here, drawn up in pencil, and dated the 17th July 1854: "Ordered, that the articles herein approved by the Army Medical department be adopted as patterns for governing the supply required for the service of the army in Turkey, and that they be sealed as such accordingly. Desire the civil officers at the Tower to afford the Board any suggestions that may occur to them, as the most advantageous application that may be made of the articles already provided by them, under the Board's order of the 5th instant, L–256, for this service." That is signed by Sir Hew Ross, and underneath it I find, signed by the chief clerk of the Contract department, "The above order postponed, by direction of Mr. Monsell, who considered our information regarding the patterns of this clothing, not sufficient to act on." The reason why I considered the information, so far as I recollect now, was not sufficient to act upon, was, because we had not an opportunity, at that time, of considering any patterns except those that were sent to us from the Tower.

19189. With regard to that interference with the contract, on your part, was that done by you as a member of the Board, or as the Board?—The way in which it was done by me was this: I refused to sign this order; I said I thought it had better be suspended: and Sir Hew Ross (not at the Board, but in his own room) very properly, I presume, signed this order, which was submitted by him to the Chief Clerk of the Contract Board. I thought it inexpedient that this order should proceed, and the Chief Clerk of the Contract branch, as is mentioned here, puts underneath this order: "The above order postponed by the direction of Mr. Monsell, who considered our information regarding the patterns of this clothing not sufficient to act on."

19190. Lord *Seymour*.] We have it in evidence that, on the 24th of July 1854, the Board repeated the order "to procure 90,000 Jersey frocks, and 100,000 pair of socks, to sealed samples sent therewith, and desired the civil officers to make the most advantageous terms with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons, with reference to the return of the articles not approved, which were contracted for upon the Board's order, 5th July 1854." That seems to show that there had been an actual contract on the 5th of July 1854?—The difference is not very material, and it is this, that the civil officers at the Tower, by order of the Board of the 5th of July, were desired to procure certain articles in a certain way; and accordingly they did take steps to procure them, and therefore they made a contract, and having done that with the authority of the Board, it was binding upon the Board.

19191. Therefore there was a contract actually made?—Yes.

19192. *Chairman*.] What was the date of that contract?—The date of the contract could be only found out from the civil officers at the Tower. The civil officers at the Tower, upon the 5th of July, were ordered to make a contract; but upon what day they made it, I do not know; but upon the 11th of July, hoping that they had not proceeded very far in it, or bought a great deal of clothing, I desired that the Director-general of the Medical department should be called in to inspect the clothing, and Sir Thomas Hastings, on the 14th of July, gave some other order tantamount to that. The inspection did take place of the clothing, and additional samples that were procured led us to adopt a different pattern from that which would have been procured if the order of the 5th of July had not been interfered with. I do not think

Mr.

Mr. Kynaston was in any way damnified by it, and I think that the army have a very much better article than they would have had if I had not taken the steps which I did take.

19193. In answer to Question 18589, Sir Thomas Hastings says, "I find, on reference to the papers, that the note of Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, for stopping the agreement with Mr. Kynaston, was dated on the 17th of July"?—Yes; that, as I have already shown, is not quite a correct statement, because the only method that I took to stop the order was this, though I did not sign it: "The above order postponed by direction of Mr. Monsell, who considered our information regarding the patterns of this clothing not sufficient to act on." One member of the Board signed the order, namely, Sir Hew Ross.

19194. You stated, did you not, that there was a contract before that entered into with Messrs. Kynaston?—Yes.

19195. And that contract was being fulfilled, was it not?—I rather think they were stopped, so far as they could be stopped, in executing that contract, when my order was given on the 11th of July to submit the matter to the Director of the Army and Navy Medical Department.

19196. What was done afterwards in consequence of the stoppage?—The result was, that we procured better articles than we should have procured if the contract had gone on without any interference, and I have here a letter from Messrs. Kynaston, dated the 27th of July, which probably will explain that. This is a letter to George Stacey, Esq., the Storekeeper at the Tower: "Sir,—In reply to your letter of this date, we are willing to supply 100,000 pairs of worsted socks, to weigh 3 ½ lbs. per dozen, at 10/4 per doz.. in lieu of those ordered on the 7th ult." They would provide a better article at a higher price, in lieu of an inferior article at a lower price. They go on to say, "Having, however, provided a large quantity of the latter sort for immediate delivery, we request you will receive a portion of our stock, say 10,000 pairs, at 8 ½ *d.* per pair. With reference to the 90,000 Jersey frocks ordered, we request you will receive the lambs' wool frocks delivered, say 14,880, all of which are of excellent quality, and well adapted for the service, subject to the approval of the receiving officers; the remaining 75,120 we undertake to deliver in conformity with the sealed pattern, and at the price stated; viz., 38 *s.* per dozen. The socks and Jersey frocks to be delivered one-third in one month, another third in two months, complete in three months, or earlier."

19197. Was your communication to the Board of Ordnance of the requisition from the Secretary of War made verbally, or in writing?—I rather think it was made verbally.

19198. Was that in accordance with the ordinary practice?—In that particular case I do not think that the question arises, because the Board of Ordnance did not act upon the order till they received, on the 5th of July, a regular official order from the Secretary of State.

19199. They acted upon a regular order?—Yes; the question will arise, but it did not arise in this particular case.

19200. The second case to which I will direct your attention is that of the Laboratory; the Committee have been informed that the Board of Ordnance decided to build a Laboratory, and that an alteration was made in the building by you; is that statement which has been made to the Committee a correct statement?—No; certainly that is not a correct statement of the facts of the case with regard to the two bays. In the month, I think, either of October or November last, I went down to Woolwich with Sir Charles Trevelyan; we went over all the establishments there, and the Director-general, I think, of the Laboratory, and other persons, came to us, and recommended most strongly to us the expediency of erecting additional machinery at Woolwich to make barrels; they thought that they had some cheap way of doing it.

19201. Lord *Seymour.*] Do you mean wooden barrels?—Wooden barrels. I desired that the question should be submitted to the Laboratory Committee, which is the proper tribunal to consider all those questions, and that a report should be made to the Board. Accordingly, the Laboratory Committee did assemble, and it made a report to the Board, and the Board decided, as I thought very properly indeed, that machinery for making barrels ought not to be erected. It appears that in some way or other they imagined that

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though they were desired to report as to the barrels, they were desired to go on at once with the bays; but I can speak with as much confidence as I can speak of anything in the world, that I never gave the order; I never desired them to go on with the bays, and certainly if they had done so on my mere verbal order, I think they would have been guilty of an irregularity. The Committee will understand distinctly that the making of those two bays, I believe, has been a very good thing; it has been very much wanted; therefore, there has been no loss of the public money. I am only expressing my own recollection that I had nothing to say to their being constructed.

19202. The building was originally made on contract, was it not?—Yes.

19203. That was passed in regular form by the Board, was it not?—Yes.

19204. And a deviation from that contract, if afterwards sanctioned by the Board, became a part of the contract?—There might have been a new contract for it, and I rather think that in this instance there was.

19205. Was that passed by the Board?—Yes; subsequently a contract was passed by the Board for the two bays.

19206. Who authorised the alteration at Woolwich?—I really cannot answer that question; it was ultimately authorised by the Board. There was a contract submitted to the Board, I rather think, in the month of January; at all events, at a time considerably subsequent to the time of which we are now speaking, that contract was sanctioned by the Board, and then they did give their sanction to the construction of those two bays. I am applying myself to the charge that has been made against me, that I, by word of mouth, on the occasion of that visit to Woolwich, did myself sanction the erection of those two bays. On that subject I beg to repeat that, so far as my memory serves me, I do not believe that I did anything of the sort.

19207. Then the alteration which was made, was made by the authorities at Woolwich, and without your order?—Certainly; under the misapprehension and under the belief that I had given an order which I did not give.

19208. Have you here the Board papers respecting this transaction?—I do not think I have.

19209. Would those papers show upon whose authority the alteration had been made?—No, I do not think they would, and I think so because I think that the clerks whom I desired to inquire into the matter would have mentioned it to me if there had been any statement of that sort which would have thrown any light upon the subject. I have here a report from Captain Collinson, the engineer officer who carried on the erection of the buildings at the Laboratory, and he states here the impression he was under with regard to the erection of those bays. "Among the other additions, 'two bays,' that is, two breadths of 20 feet each extending across the building, were added. The first authority for this addition was a verbal order, understood to have been given on an occasion last winter when the Secretary of the Treasury visited the works with the Clerk of the Ordnance. It was recommended by the Committee, and finally approved by the Board (B. O. 15 January 1855, C—3541), and when the work was in progress. The first intention of the addition, was to provide space to make powder barrels; but after the Board had decided against that proposition, the Committee recommended the addition, in consequence of the constantly increasing demands upon the Laboratory, which are so great, that the Committee have now given up the idea of placing the wood turnery and paper factory in the large general factory just finished (as was originally intended), and propose to place them in separate buildings altogether; which proposition is included in the Estimates for 1855-6. These two extra bays cost about 2,000*l.*, which has been partly charged against the Parliamentary vote for 1854-5, and partly against that for 1855-6. The bays are only just completed.

19210. Before that application they had begun to make it?—Yes, that is true; "The committee recommended an addition in consequence of the constantly increasing demands upon the Laboratory."

19211. That is to say, the committee, so far as their authority went, justified the proceeding?—Yes.

19212. In whom did it originate?—It is perfectly evident, from this paper, that Captain Collinson, or whoever the person was with whom I was in communication there, imagined that I had given authority to erect those two bays; but I most conscientiously state that I firmly believe that I did not order anything of the sort.

19213. Mr.

19213. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing those two bays were erected without authority, who would be the responsible person as to the payment of the bill?—I suppose the engineer.

19214. Not the contractor?—Whoever gave the order to the contractor would be responsible to the contractor.

19215. Then Captain Collinson would be responsible?—I presume so.

19216. *Chairman.*] When this irregularity was discovered, what did the Board do?—I have not got the Board papers here. I will send for them.

19217. Lord *Seymour.*] It seems that this work was done by contract?—Yes.

19218. Do you mean that a contract was entered into?—Yes; the first that we knew of it was on the 15th of January.

19219. A contract was entered into?—I presume so.

19220. Therefore there must have been a contract with some one?—Yes.

19221. And therefore it must have had one party to it representing the Ordnance?—It would appear so.

19222. When that irregularity was discovered by the Board of Ordnance, did not they have that contract brought before them?—I really cannot speak to that.

19223. Mr. *Layard.*] When was the fact first brought to your notice?—I rather think in the month of February last, on a visit to Woolwich. I was very much surprised on finding that they had been going on; and that is not inconsistent with the fact that this order was given on the 15th of January, as I was away at that time.

19224. Did you make any representation on the subject then?—No, I did not; but on the 15th of January I was not in London; whether the papers were sent down to me or not I do not know.

19225. *Chairman.*] Then it appears from your statement that a public work can be altered or can be proceeded with, on contract, without the knowledge of those facts coming to the Ordnance?—It would appear so, up to the 15th of January.

19226. Can you tax your memory to tell the Committee what steps the Board of Ordnance took, upon the discovery of that grave irregularity?—No; I was not in London myself; I was obliged to be absent a good deal during the months of December and January.

19227. General *Peel.*] Has this work been paid for yet?—Certainly it has.

19228. The bill for payment of it would pass through your office, instead of, as formerly, going to the Surveyor-general?—Yes.

19229. What are the steps first taken before a bill is paid; is not the first step to show the authority by which the work is performed?—Yes; and I presume that in this instance the authority would have been the order given on the 15th of January.

19230. That was an order afterwards given by the Board after the work was executed?—Yes, quite so. I presume that would have been the order upon which my office would have acted; there could have been no other order; but even supposing the case, that I had ordered the thing verbally, its being stated that I had ordered it verbally would be no justification in the Cash Account Office.

19231. Could any irregularity arise in consequence of the two offices being blended together?—No, I think not; I am quite sure that they would not act upon any verbal order; and so far as that question goes, whether I was correct in my impression, or whether the gentleman that imagined that I ordered the bays was correct, it would make no difference at all.

19232. The bill would only be paid upon the order of the Board at a subsequent date?—No.

19233. *Chairman.*] The bill came before the Board subsequently?—Yes.

19234. Then they became acquainted with all the irregularities, if irregularities they were?—Yes. General Cator recommended that the Board's authority for the erection of two additional bays may be given, and that Messrs. Hicks & Son's tender, amounting to 743 *l.*, be accepted; and this order is approved of by Sir Thomas Hastings.

19235. That is for expenditure also?—Yes.

19236. But Sir Thomas Hastings told the Committee that two signatures were

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were necessary; that has only one?—Yes, it has one. Here is a paper of the 10th of January: "Approved of by Sir Thomas Hastings, on the 15th January, to accept the tender of Messrs. Hicks & Son for work herein named;" which is also signed by Sir Thomas Hastings. Then there is this paper: "N. B. No answer from the Board to the letter of the President, dated 6th November 1854, concerning these two additional bays has been received, but as it was understood that the bays were to be erected, whether the barrel machinery was adopted or not, the work has been proceeded with." That is signed, I think, by Captain Collinson.

19237. That is upon the understanding that you had ordered it?—Quite so.

19238. That approval of expenditure by the Board was after the work had been executed?—Certainly; after it had been commenced; no doubt after the contract had been entered into, and after it was made certain that the work must be done.

19239. Who represented the Ordnance in that contract?—It appears to me from these papers that the contractor must have gone on, on the faith that the contract would be accepted.

19240. But there was a contract made, was there not?—There was a contract; I will read it to the Committee: "Specification and Estimate of Ironwork, &c. for two additional bays of roofing and ornamented cornice, &c. for the Royal Laboratory, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. Ironwork, &c. consisting of two lengths of six-inch pipes for drains, and two to build in piers; six pillars with base plates and bolts, and seven pairs of girders, the same as before, fitted timber and bolts; six ornamented pillars and nine pair of ornamented girders (from a new pattern), fitted timber, bolts, and colters; 15 cast-iron plain gutters, and two tees fitted with blank flanges and bolts; 140 feet of ornamented cornice and gutters, cast in parts six feet long, and fitted together with bolts and stays; 40 sets of tee wrought-iron rafters, same as before, two of the sets prepared for hips, all fitted together with necessary colters, bolts, and tie-rods; 40 pairs of castings for junctions, and bolts for them, and 28 cast-iron ornamented hanging mouldings; the whole delivered at the Royal Arsenal, and fixed up, would cost the sum of 743 *l.*, *Benj*^{n} *Hick & Son*, Woolwich."

19241. Lord *Seymour.*] Does that contract state the parties?—It is addressed, I see, to Captain Collinson, of the Royal Engineers, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich.

19242. That is upon the contract?—No; but I imagine that in this case Mr. Hick had gone on upon the belief that there would be a subsequent contract.

19243. So that the work was done without any understanding as to what would be paid for it; how was it that the undertaking to pay the money was made by somebody, and that the Board of Ordnance does not know by whom?—Afterwards the Board sanctioned all those proceedings, and took upon themselves the responsibility.

19244. They ought to have known every step that was taken; I ask you, who sanctioned that proceeding?—The only answer I can give is, that which I have already given, that undoubtedly the engineer officer who carried on that work believed that he had received my verbal authority for doing so; that is to say, that he made a distinction in his mind between the erection of the two bays, and the object for which the two bays were to be erected, namely, the barrel machinery; and he imagined, evidently, that though I did not sanction the one yet that I sanctioned the other, verbally. Now, it appears that the object for which it was first proposed to erect the two bays, and that everybody acknowledges, was not approved of by me or by the Board of Ordnance; but still the Royal Engineer officer there evidently believed that he had my verbal authority for constructing the two bays.

19245. Suppose all that, up to that point, to have occurred, then comes the agreement with the contractor to build?—Yes.

19246. That agreement must have been entered into with somebody who took upon themselves to represent the Board of Ordnance?—Undoubtedly, Captain Collinson.

19247. Is his signature to that paper?—The only thing that appears from these papers is, in the first instance, a tender from Mr. Hick, addressed to Captain Collinson; secondly, "The accompanying tender for ironwork for the completion of the factories is recommended for acceptance. *Alexander Tulloch*, Lieutenant-colonel,

Lieutenant-colonel, and president of the sub-committee, the 10th of January 1855;" then "T. B. Collinson;" those are the two names affixed to it.

19248. Recommended to whom?—Recommended, certainly, to the Board of Ordnance; it is all plain-sailing from this point; it is before this that the difficulty arises. Then this came to the Board, and they adopted that recommendation to sanction the execution of the contract; at least, when I say that, I should imagine from this paper that the work had been already commenced.

19249. So that no contract was entered into for work at all; and according to the statement of the person who did the work, he did it without any understanding as to what he was to charge for it?—No; in this tender the amount is stated, 743 *l.*

19250. That is no tender; it is an estimate?—Yes; but he would be bound by this. It was accepted ultimately, but it was not accepted at the time that the work was done.

19251. Everything was sanctioned afterwards by the Board of Ordnance?—Yes.

19252. I want to know whether that building was not undertaken and finished really without any understanding as to what it was to cost?—I should imagine not without an understanding as to what it was to cost, because I should conceive that Mr. Hicks would, of course, consider himself bound by his tender for his part of the work, which is for 743 *l.*; but as a matter of course, as the Committee will see that it is impossible for me to know anything about it, it would be better to examine Captain Collinson.

19253. You were not at the Board when it was sanctioned?—No, I was not in London.

19254. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You deny having given a verbal order for this work to be executed, do you not?—Distinctly. When I say deny it, it is my strong conviction that I did not give it, and I am very much confirmed in that, by the fact that a verbal order, if given at all, would undoubtedly have applied to the barrel-factory, as well as to the two bays.

19255. Did you ever give a verbal order for expenditure?—I should be very sorry to say that I never did, but I do not recall one to my mind at this moment.

19256. General *Peel.*] Was not this work of a peculiar nature, and was not the building of this work first of all almost confidential?—I do not think it was confidential.

19257. *Chairman.*] Is the making of wooden barrels a matter of confidence?—No; no part of the Laboratory was, I think, in any way confidential.

19258. With regard to the Foundry at Woolwich, I think there was a difference of opinion, was there not, about that; Sir Thomas Hastings thought it ought to be only of a small size, and was given to understand that it should be a model foundry?—Perhaps I may as well read the minute of the Board authorising the Foundry; in the month of May last, I was the only person at the Ordnance; Lord Raglan had gone, and Sir Hew Ross was not appointed, and Sir Thomas Hastings was in the country. I found that the state of our supply of shells was most lamentable, and, in point of fact, if any general action had taken place at the time, we should have been in the worst possible position. In the beginning of May, finding this, and finding that we were getting on very slowly in the manufacture of shells, I sent for Captain Boxer, and I told him exactly our position, and I said, "If there is anybody in the world who can get us out of these difficulties, I am sure you can;" and I asked him for his advice upon the matter. Upon that he engaged to me, within one month or five weeks, that if I would place at his disposal the sum of 7,000 *l.* to erect machinery, which would do all the work very rapidly for bouching shells and making fusees, which are the principal difficulties, and also that in a very short time he would save the whole of the expenditure of the 7,000 *l.*

19259. Lord *Seymour.*] Who was Captain Boxer?—He was second in command in the Royal Laboratory, and called the Fire-master. Accordingly I did take upon myself the responsibility as to the expenditure of this 7,000 *l.*

19260. *Chairman.*] How came you to sanction that expenditure; was it by a verbal order or by a written statement?—It was a written statement, drawn up immediately; in fact, a regular Board's order was drawn up giving this sanction.

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19261. You went to the Board and stated what you had done, and the Board sanctioned your proceedings by passing the order?—The Committee must understand that I was Master-general and Board at that time; there was nobody else there; and I rather believe that this order, though I wish, certainly, to claim the whole credit of having given it, for I think it is a very great one, was afterwards signed by Sir Thomas Hastings; but undoubtedly I did take upon myself the responsibility of giving that order, and the result of it was a saving, in one week, of 1,200 *l.* to the country, in the construction of fusees and the bouching of shells; and, in fact, at present, so far as those operations are concerned, we are entirely above the possibility of ever being run aground for them again. But that brings me to the point as to the Shell Foundry. I found, with regard to the operations of this factory, from Captain Boxer, that very frequently the machinery in his manufactory, of fusees, and the place for bouching shells, was idle, on account of his not being able to get a sufficient number of shells, and I also found that the supply of shells was not coming in in a satisfactory way. There were at that time three members at the Board, Sir Hew Ross, Sir Thomas Hastings, and myself. Sir Hew Ross entirely agreed with my view, and Sir Hew Ross and I accordingly proceeded to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, and requested his sanction, as Secretary of State, to the erection of this foundry. Sir Thomas Hastings differed widely from our views upon that matter, but, however, at length we drew up a minute, (I drew it up myself, I believe,) which was signed by all the three members of the Board.

19262. Lord *Seymour*.] As early as May you thought it expedient to erect a shell factory, did you not?—No; I thought it expedient then to erect a factory for making fusees, and the bouching of shells; but, as a complement to that, I thought it expedient, in the month of December, to erect a shell foundry.

19263. When you first thought it expedient to make a foundry for bouching shells, was that question brought under the consideration of the Board of Ordnance?—At that particular moment I was alone there.

19264. In May 1854 you were alone there?—Yes, at the beginning of May.

19265. *Chairman*.] How long were you alone?—I think I must have been alone (I cannot speak with perfect accuracy) for a fortnight or three weeks.

19266. When the Board consisted afterwards of more members than one, was the matter brought before them?—I believe so; I believe orders were given by the others then, as well as by myself.

19267. So that they sanctioned your expenditure, as made by Captain Boxer?—Yes.

19268. The expenditure of the 7,000 *l.*?—Yes.

19269. Have you got the minutes?—No.

19270. You can get them, can you not?—Yes.

19271. Lord *Seymour*.] Upon whose explanation, or upon whose statement to you, did you consider this measure for the bouching of shells to be necessary?—Upon the statement of Captain Boxer.

19272. That was early in May or June, was it not?—I think in the beginning of May 1854.

19273. Did you not, in going into that question with Captain Boxer, respecting the bouching of shells, then take into consideration the whole question of the shells?—I do not think we did at that time.

19274. Then Captain Boxer did not then bring before you that which you say was a most essential matter for the public economy, namely, a foundry for the shells themselves?—I do not think he did at that time; I think the great pressure at that time was not for the carcase of the shell, but it was for bouching it, and preparing fusees for it.

19275. How soon was the question of bouching the shells brought before any Board of Ordnance?—I do not know whether the Committee are aware that one member may constitute the Board of Ordnance.

19276. How soon was that subject brought under the consideration of two members of the Board?—I believe the very minute another member arrived in London.

19277. Have you no record of two members of the Board having approved of this factory for the bouching of shells?—Yes, I have the papers; and I believe

believe it will be found that there is no irregularity of that sort. I believe I am perfectly correct in stating, as the law of the case, that one Board officer does make a Board.

19278. Can that one member so constituting the Board perform all the functions of the Board?—No, I do not think he can; there are certain functions by Act of Parliament which are limited by Act of Parliament, and amongst those is the signing of contracts and the making of leases.

19279. And are not payments of money limited?—No, I think not.

19280. Nor the sanctioning of anything that costs money?—I rather think not.

19281. Sir Thomas Hastings has stated to-day, that for anything that leads to expenditure the signatures of two persons are required?—No, I think not; I do not know by what authority it does so.

19282. General *Peel.*] Were not the papers forwarded to the other members of the Board who were in the country?—Very possibly they may have been; I know that mine have been forwarded to me in the country.

19283. Your signature to the Board paper would make the second one?—Yes; but I have not looked at those papers yet.

19284. *Chairman.*] To constitute a Board, it is not required that they should act together?—No, I believe not.

19285. So that one member may be at Woolwich and another at York?—I suppose they must be at the Ordnance.

19286. You have been asked whether the papers could not have been sent to you?—Yes, and that is a very common practice; whenever I have been, as I have been lately obliged very often to be, away, I have had my papers sent to me, and I have transacted business at whatever place I was.

19287. Sir *J. Pakington.*] In any case, you state, do you not, that when this proposal was made by Captain Boxer, you were alone, and you took upon yourself the responsibility of alone giving that order?—I took upon myself the responsibility of assuring him that an order would be given; but whether I wrote an order to him at the moment or not, I do not know.

19288. You stated, did you not, that Captain Boxer's proposal was this, that you should place 7,000 *l.* at his disposal, and that he would do the work?—Yes.

19289. Did you take any measures before you sanctioned it, to satisfy yourself that the sum of 7,000 *l.* was a correct estimate for the work to be done?—No, I do not think I did; but that will probably appear from the papers I have sent for. I should think it most probable that I took up the thing simply on my opinion with regard to Captain Boxer, who, I believed to be one of the ablest men in this kingdom; and I said, "I have perfect confidence in you, and if you will assure me, and pledge your reputation, that you will produce certain results by spending 7,000 *l.*, I am perfectly willing to take the responsibility;" and that was the spirit of the matter.

19290. You at once placed 7,000 *l.* at his disposal?—Yes.

19291. Have any steps been taken by you to ascertain the accuracy of that estimate, and to ascertain in what manner that 7,000 *l.* was expended?—Undoubtedly; all the bills for all the construction for that factory have passed through the regular course.

19292. Have they passed, and been paid?—Yes.

19293. Was the accuracy of the estimate ever tested?—No, except by Captain Boxer's own certificate; in this particular case there was no building; we got hold of an old storehouse and cleared it out. There may probably have been some architect's work and engineer work; that of course would have been authenticated by the signature of the Royal Engineer who did the work, but everything as to the machinery, I imagine, was certified for by Captain Boxer only.

19294. The substance of your evidence is this, that that work was carried out upon the unsupported assurance of Captain Boxer that the 7,000 *l.* was required for it?—Certainly.

19295. *Chairman.*] It was ordered by yourself, was it not, and upon your own authority, without the sanction of any of your colleagues?—The sanction of my colleagues, as I have said, was given afterwards.

19296. According to your view of the powers of the Board, you had the

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power to sanction the whole of the proceedings yourself as a Board?—That would certainly be my view.

19297. There was no check, in reality, upon yourself but yourself?—No, I believe not.

19298. General *Peel.*] Would the Board have the power, do you consider, to sanction an outlay of money, such as 7,000 *l.*. without calling for an explanation of the manner in which it was laid out?—I think, in so very peculiar a case as this was, they would; and not only that, but it was their duty to do so. Supposing a regular Board had found a state of things such as I have described, I conceive, undoubtedly, that they would simply have been discharging their duty in taking the most immediate steps to remedy a very serious state of things, and I certainly in no degree shrink from the responsibility.

19299. Has there been any want of shells during the last 14 months, or any defect in the quality of them?—I think there has been no defect in the quality. I have heard that the quality has been excellent.

19300. Has there been any deficiency with regard to their number?—I imagine that there has. Only the other day there was a very pressing order came for shells, and if we had had the proper quantity of shells in store before that, those shells would have been all prepared and all bouched, and they would have had all fusees. As it is, through the means of that very machinery of Captain Boxer's, the bouching and preparing of them has taken a very short time indeed; but they would have been, I conceive, actually ready and actually in store if we had been in that position that I think we ought to have been, with regard to the supply of so important an article as shells.

19301. Are the Committee to understand that your authority to Captain Boxer was merely not to exceed 7,000 *l.*?—It was not to exceed 7,000 *l.*

19302. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was that 7,000 *l.* ever included in any estimate to Parliament?—It was not included in an estimate to Parliament, in which there was a vote only for 33,000 *l.* taken, I think, for the Laboratory last year. This shell factory was erected in the Royal Laboratory, and altogether there was expended 47,000 *l.* in last year, and a portion of that excess was made up of the 7,000 *l.* of which we are now speaking, but which received the Treasury sanction.

19303. Mr. *Layard.*] Captain Boxer's invention chiefly applied to fusees?—Also to shells; he was the inventor of the Diaphragm shell, one of the greatest improvements that has been made, I believe.

19304. You have had reports from the Crimea that the fusees were deficient, have you not?—None that Captain Boxer's were deficient; we have had reports of the other ones.

19305. Therefore Captain Boxer's presence at Woolwich tended to remedy, to a great extent, the deficiency of the fusees in the Crimea?—I consider that his presence there was most essential for that, and a great many other purposes.

19306. Captain *Gladstone.*] Was 7,000 *l.* the exact sum which was paid to Captain Boxer?—I am not quite certain; I think it was very near that.

19307. *Chairman.*] I do not mean the slightest imputation upon Captain Boxer, but I want to know what guarantee you had, that instead of spending the 7,000 *l.* he should only expend 3,000 *l.*?—I suppose, really, there would have been no guarantee, and I suppose if he had been a person capable of doing that, he might have done so.

19308. Mr. *Layard.*] Did you ever receive any reports from the Crimea as to Captain Boxer's fusees?—They would not come to me, but I believe a great many have been received, most favourable ones. I have seen private reports from officers of artillery, saying that they go with the accuracy of a clock. Then as to the foundry, I will read a minute of the Board, dated 18th December 1854: "The Secretary for War having sanctioned the establishment of a shell foundry in the Royal Laboratory, inform Captain Boxer and Mr. Anderson that they are to proceed with it at once. The object of this foundry is to try experiments as to the best mode of manufacturing shells to meet sudden emergencies, and to control the prices of the manufacturers. It is not its object, in any way, to supersede private manufacturers; it is intended to be a model establishment, in which the great manufacturers of this country can learn without delay, or the necessity of individual experiments, the best mode of overcoming the difficulties which now exist in adapting establishments and machinery to the production of shells. For these reasons it is to be constructed on a limited scale,

scale, and the cost is not to exceed 10,000 *l.* In the first instance, Captain Boxer and Mr. Anderson are to confine themselves to making the 8-inch and 32-pounder shells, diaphragm shells. Request Colonel Wilson's permission for Captain Boxer to apply himself to this order, and his co-operation in bringing the factory to maturity." Now, in regard to the question whether that minute has been fairly carried out, I have a letter addressed to me by Mr. Anderson, the Inspector of Machinery, one of the persons who were charged with the erection of this factory, of which I will read this extract to the Committee: "I have the honour to submit the following answer to the several questions. 1. Sir Thomas Hastings says, 'he found that the shell-foundry was being carried out on a much larger scale than that to which he had assented.' Answer: The dimensions of the foundry have not been altered from the original plan. In fact, that building had been planned out for another purpose by the committee before the shell-foundry was thought of. The space outside the foundry, which has been roofed over, would have been the same, whether for a large or smaller number of shells. The expense of this roofing amounts to 1,100 *l.* The minute of the Board confined the nature of the shells to be cast to five sorts, and the expense of the whole undertaking was not to exceed 10,000 *l.* These orders have been strictly adhered to, and, up to the present time, the sum expended, or contracted for, is only 7,121 *l.* 10 *s.* Had a shell-foundry been in operation at the commencement of the war an immense sum would have been saved to the country, and an abundant supply of shells insured against any emergency."

19309. Was not there an order of the Board for building a foundry of a particular size, and according to a particular specification?—No; there was an order given to Captain Boxer and to Mr. Anderson to construct a foundry for the purpose of making shells, which, I believe, was not to exceed a certain sum, namely, 10,000 *l.*; but I think that they were charged with the responsibility of providing the machinery, and making all the arrangements with regard to the foundry, very much in the same sort of way that Captain Boxer originally had been charged with regard to the manufactory for fusees, and making shells.

19310. I will read to you a question and answer which will show to you what evidence has been given: "You stated just now, with regard to the foundry, that the minutes had been altered? I did not mean to say that the minutes had been altered; I meant to say that the foundry had been made on a larger scale than the original minute, to which I affixed my signature, justified."—"Who was responsible for the work being carried out on a larger scale? That is one of the things which has been done more under the sanction of the Clerk of the Ordnance than is usual, and not by the Board."? —I do not think that that remark is at all justified by the facts. It appears to me that the simplest answer is exactly this, which is given here by the person who is best competent to give it, Mr. Anderson. I imagine Captain Boxer's name was affixed to it also, and I know that he entirely agrees with it.

19311. According to your view of the case, there has been no enlargement of the scale originally proposed?—No, I think there has been no inconsistency at all. I do not think that there is anything inconsistent between the scale on which the foundry is made, and the order of the Board. The limitation with regard to the quality of the shells to be made has been strictly adhered to; the persons constructing it were anxious that it should have been otherwise, and that they should have been allowed to make a larger number of sorts of shells; but in that particular, the minute of the Board has been strictly adhered to. As to the quantity of shells that can be made in one day, that I cannot speak upon; but the real limitation appears to be the sum of 10,000 *l.*

19312. At Question 18789, Sir Thomas Hastings is asked, "You state, do you not, that, in defiance of the Minute of the Board, an order was given to make this building larger than the Board had determined it should be. I will put it in this way: the building is larger than the Minute justified; that order was given by the Clerk of the Ordnance, was it not? I believe so; it was so reported to me by Captain Remson, the engineer; when I asked what authority there was for it, he said he had the authority of the Clerk of the Ordnance." Now that certainly argues an alteration, does it not?—I am not aware that there was any alteration at all; I do not believe that there was. I just recollect

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that there was, though I do not think that it was any alteration in the size of the building, but a very small bit, I think, of an old store in the establishment of the Inspector of Artillery, which is next to that of the Royal Laboratory, was added to the latter; this was done with Sir Thomas Hastings's full consent, approbation, and cognizance; permission was given by the Inspector of Artillery to remove a small building, erected upon his ground, and to make use of that space for the purpose of the shell foundry. I am not aware of any other enlargement.

19313. I will read you another question and answer, at 18743: "To whom was that [letter] addressed? To the Secretary for War's private secretary, and my personal communication. I received no answer to that letter; and, thinking it implied that there was little confidence in me, on the part of so high an officer of State, I felt it then necessary to write to Lord Panmure himself, and in that letter I enclosed a document which I had prepared for his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, pointing out my reasons for dissenting from the arrangements that my colleagues had arrived at. The letter was prepared for the Duke of Newcastle, but it was sent to Lord Panmure. When I prepared that letter for the Duke of Newcastle, of course I thought it right to show it to my colleagues; and I said, 'I differ from you in the views you take; they appear to me to be erroneous, and to entail expenses. I therefore put this letter into your hands, and if you still maintain that you ought to carry this measure out, which I dissent from entirely, then I shall send this letter to his Grace.' I had no immediate answer; but a day or two afterwards the resolution of having a foundry on a large scale was abandoned by my colleagues; and in the minute it was stated, instead of a large one, a small model foundry, to be useful in instructing people, should be put up. Subsequently, on visiting Woolwich, I found that this foundry was on a much larger scale than any model foundry ought to be; and on that I searched into the papers, knowing that certain papers had been passed over by me; and I found, from the report of the engineer, to whom that particular construction was entrusted, that the foundry was constructed on a scale to make 150 tons of shells in a week, I think, or a month; but, in his letter, he stated the position of that foundry as ill-calculated to make so large a quantity. Then when I found those papers, and perceived that the factory had been carried out very much as originally intended, I remonstrated against it, and I then wrote again to Lord Panmure." Is that a correct statement?—It appears to me not to be at all a correct statement; from this minute that I have read, it appears that the limitation is, that the cost of the foundry is not to exceed 10,000 *l.*

19314. Lord *Seymour*.] This answer that has been read to you refers to a conversation at the Board which Sir Thomas Hastings had with his colleagues; have you any recollection of such a conversation, after which the foundry on a larger scale was abandoned?—I have a recollection of a very great many conversations with Sir Thomas Hastings on the subject of the foundry, in the presence of Sir Hew Ross, he and I taking one view, and Sir Thomas Hastings taking the other; but the only compromise of any sort that was acceded to, by either Sir Hew Ross or myself, was the drawing up of this minute in the form in which it is drawn up; and I say further, it has been carried out according to the fair interpretation of this minute.

19315. Those conversations which have been mentioned by Sir Thomas Hastings may so far have taken place, that he objected at first to the size of the foundry?—Yes, he did.

19316. You came to some sort of compromise, did you not, as to the size of the foundry that should be built?—I rather question the noble Lord's word "compromise;" it must be remembered that, independently of the Secretary of State altogether, Sir Hew Ross and I were the majority upon the Board, and all that Sir Hew Ross and I did was for the purpose simply of conciliation, wishing to keep things as quiet as possible, and not to irritate the feelings of Sir Thomas Hastings. I consider that the only thing for the Committee to consider is, whether this foundry has been executed or not according to the directions given in this minute, which I hold in my hand. By this minute I consider that I am bound, and I have never sanctioned any departure from it. I do not consider that in anything that has been done there has been a departure from it; and I consider that the real limitation is the sum of 10,000 *l.*, as

I have

I have already read in Mr. Anderson's report, and that sum has not only not been exceeded, but as yet only about 7,000 *l.* or 8,000 *l.* has been spent.

19317. *Chairman.*] Did Captain Collinson report that the site was not adapted to make 150 tons a month, and has not a letter been received from him by the Board to the effect that it was not so adapted; did you not minute that paper on a Board day?—Captain Collinson did address such a paper to the Board, and I put a minute upon it, stating that his advice would have been more valuable if it had been given before the foundry had been built, instead of being given afterwards. Captain Collinson's minute was after the thing was done.

19318. Lord *Seymour.*] It appears from the evidence before this Committee that, on the 18th of November 1854, the Duke of Newcastle sanctioned 10,000 *l.* for the expense of a shell factory at Woolwich?—Yes.

19319. Did the first initiation of those proceedings commence in the Duke of Newcastle's office?—Yes, certainly.

19320. He first sanctioned the expenditure of 10,000 *l.* for a shell factory?—Yes, quite so.

19321. And that came to you?—Yes.

19322. Then are the Committee to understand that, having that order, you go to the Board of Ordnance?—Yes; Sir Hew Ross and I went to the Board of Ordnance.

19323. Did you then consult with Captain Collinson as to how this factory was to be built, and where it was to be placed?—Yes; I think we consulted both with Captain Collinson, Captain Boxer, and Mr. Anderson; and I certainly did not understand at the time that Captain Collinson had any objection as to the place where it was to be erected.

19324. You believe, so far as you can recollect, that at that time Captain Collinson did not disapprove of the site chosen?—I do not think he did.

19325. You having agreed upon the size of the foundry, had you no plan of the foundry brought before you, and before the Board of Ordnance, on a scale?—No; I do not think that we had any plan of the foundry; in the first instance we certainly had none; I rather think that Captain Collinson or Captain Boxer brought up drawings.

19326. If they brought drawings to the Board, those drawings must have been upon a scale?—Certainly; I am perfectly certain of this, that they accurately pointed out the precise spot of ground that the foundry was to cover; and I do say that there could have been no possibility of mistake.

19327. If a plan was brought, and a model upon any scale, it must have been easy for a member of the Board, Sir Thomas Hastings, or you, to have come to an understanding as to the size of the foundry?—Yes; but before what member of the Board, the drawings, if any were brought up, I really cannot state, whether it was Sir Thomas Hastings, or Sir Hew Ross, or whether I was alone; I do not believe that I was, but I am not certain.

19328. Is it not your usual course at the Board, when the plan of a building has been agreed upon, to have the signature of some member of the Board to show that that plan has been approved of?—It is, undoubtedly; but there is not the least doubt that the course that we pursued with regard to the erection of this foundry, was an entirely irregular one. The course that we pursued with regard to this foundry was as entirely irregular as the course that we pursued with regard to the erection of the first factory of Captain Boxer's, because it must be observed who was the person entrusted with the erection of this foundry. Captain Boxer was not the head of the Royal Laboratory; Colonel Wilson was, and neither Captain Boxer nor the inspector of machinery, Mr. Anderson, were the proper persons, according to official routine, to construct anything in the Royal Laboratory.

19329. Then it appears that you passed over the head of the department, and went to Captain Boxer?—Yes.

19330. Afterwards the Committee have been informed that some differences arose between two officers; was that between those two officers?—Yes.

19331. Was it not natural that when the Board of Ordnance, in dealing with a subordinate department, applied to the second, instead of to the first in command, that would create some jealousy and unpleasantness of feeling?—I think it was a choice of difficulties; I admit that; but I beg to add, that in the minute which I have read with regard to the factory, we put in these words: "Request

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"Request Colonel Wilson's permission for Captain Boxer to apply himself t this order, and his co-operation in bringing the factory to maturity."

19332. *Chairman.*] You have stated that it was a choice of difficulties; one was, creating this dissension between the parties; what was the other?—The other difficulty was one which I wish to mention, of course, as lightly as possible; but I will explain it in this way: I think that Captain Boxer was much more capable of planning or executing such works than Colonel Wilson; and I say that without any disrespect to Colonel Wilson, imagining him to be a very good officer, but I look upon Captain Boxer to be one of the most distinguished and eminent men in the country; and I should not, I confess, so far as my judgment goes, entrust the erection of any work, requiring skill, with the same satisfaction to Colonel Wilson that I should to Captain Boxer.

19333. Having directed Captain Boxer to proceed with this foundry, did he proceed by contract, or in what way?—He proceeded by contract with his portion of it, that is to say, Mr. Anderson and Captain Boxer were charged with the erection of the machinery jointly, and Captain Collinson was charged with the erection of the buildings. Captain Collinson pursued his own course. I rather think that he sent up a plan and estimate to the Board for the buildings. With regard to the machinery, Captain Boxer and Mr. Anderson were considered to be entirely charged with the purchase of that machinery, and they assumed to themselves the whole responsibility of erecting that machinery; the Board, undoubtedly, in sanctioning that course, in their case, did not pursue the regular course, but pursued a course which, I consider, for the strongest possible reasons, they were entirely justified in pursuing.

19334. At Question 18927, Sir Thomas Hastings stated, "The question of contract for foundries at Woolwich has been carried on in a different way to that which I have described as the mode of contracting. An inspector of machinery has been sent to purchase large quantities of iron for the purpose of the foundry, without the usual system of contract being followed out; and that is a variation from the way of doing business." In what way did you proceed in this building; first, with regard to the building, did Captain Collinson enter into a regular contract?—I believe he did enter into a regular contract; that is a matter that I can answer distinctly when I receive the contract.

19335. You do not recollect that contract being submitted to the Board?—Yes, I believe it was submitted to the Board; I am not certain about it.

19336. It is your opinion, after you had once agreed to the building, so far as the contract went, that it proceeded in a regular manner?—I believe that it did.

19337. Sir Thomas Hastings has stated that it was an irregular mode?—He may be quite right upon that subject. I believe that the contract for the building went on in a regular way, but that the machinery undoubtedly went on entirely in an irregular way. I believe that the building went on in a regular way.

19338. When you state that they proceeded, with regard to the machinery, in an irregular way, will you state in what that irregularity consisted?—They were entirely charged with the responsibility of procuring that machinery; they went down to the manufacturing districts to procure that machinery, and, among others, they went to Mr. Platt, of Oldham, and from him they ordered a considerable portion of that machinery.

19339. Was that done entirely on their responsibility, and not by means of correspondence with the Board of Ordnance?—It was done entirely upon their responsibility. They were given full latitude to do what they pleased, so long as they did not spend more than 10,000 *l.* That was the spirit of the arrangement.

19340. A part of the 10,000 *l.* was for the building?—Yes.

19341. Can you state what portion was for the building, and what portion was for the machinery?—I believe that by far the greater proportion was spent for the machinery.

19342. Then it appears that as late as February 1855 a letter was sent to the Ordnance, being, as it were, a covering authority for this work?—Yes, for a service undertaken without a regular official authority from the Secretary for War, namely, the Shell Foundry at Woolwich, at an expense of 10,000 *l.*

19343. Then the official authority did not come till February 1855?—The official

official authority did not come till February 1855, but the order in writing, that is to say, the order written either in my hand or Sir Hew Ross's, with the signature, "N," of the Duke of Newcastle's initial at the bottom of the document, did come at the time he gave the order. The same observation applies to a great many cases; I do not say to all; it did to this, but in all important cases, I think in most other cases a written order was given in that manner.

19344. Have you a paper initialed by the Duke of Newcastle, which would be a record in the office of his sanction having been given?—Quite so.

19345. General *Peel.*] Will you state whether this proceeding, which is allowed on all hands to have been very irregular, was not carried on with the sanction of two members of the Board, the third objecting strongly to it?—Undoubtedly, and I think that is the fair way to put it. I do not consider it is fair, because Sir Thomas Hastings signed the memorandum, which he did, probably, for the purposes of peace, that he should have the slightest responsibility.

19346. Can Sir Thomas Hastings' letter, as to the shell manufactory, be produced?—I presume he could have no objection to produce it.

19347. *Chairman.*] Have you no copy of it?—No.

19348. General *Peel.*] Would not the minutes on the Board's papers show whether the works had been carried out in the usual course under the commanding officer of Royal Engineers, or whether it was necessary to entrust them to Captain Boxer himself?—I think the Honourable Member is confounding two cases, the machinery and the building; in the case of the building, that was done by the Royal Engineers; and I have stated that I believe, though I am not certain, that it was done in the regular course.

19349. Would not the Board's papers show that?—Yes, no doubt of it.

19350. Lord *Seymour.*] It was stated by Sir Thomas Hastings, in answer to question 18839, "In my visits to the Laboratory, I found a state of things which, with my ideas of discipline, was quite incompatible with good order and the right discharge of their duty to the public between two persons standing in the relation of principal and assistant. I felt very uncomfortable about this; but after weighing it in my mind, I felt it my duty to bring the thing before the Board, and I brought the thing before the Board. I stated in my communication to the Board, that I had seen things which militated against the due exercise of the public service, and I felt it necessary to state that they were in such a position that steps ought to be taken to put an end to them; and I proposed that the question should be submitted to the Lieutenant-general in charge of the discipline of the department, to cause an inquiry to be made to see which of those officers was in the wrong. I did not venture an opinion upon it, and to suggest to the Lieutenant-general of the Board such a course as would put an end to a system so prejudicial. I found a great deal of hesitation on the part of some of the members of the Board as to what line should be taken, and I observed from what was said, that there was an inclination to put the thing aside. I had strong feelings on this point, because matters had passed under my notice which assured me that, in such a state of antagonism between two officers, things must go wrong; and I then said, 'Gentlemen, I will not delay any more;' and they proposed that this should be adjourned over till Monday. I said, 'I do not want any crimination of one officer or another; I merely ask for an inquiry; and I think I have shown you sufficient cause for it, in my opinion; and if this Board chooses to flinch from doing its duty in this case, whenever this transaction is known, in the estimation of the public, we shall stand discredited and disgraced.' An adjournment was ordered till Monday; and on Monday, when we met, the Clerk of the Ordnance said, that he had taken the papers to the Secretary for War, who desired him to communicate to the Board, that he adjourned its proceedings, and that he would take the proceedings into his own hands"?—The statement is substantially correct. There is no doubt he did make that statement before the Board. There is no doubt that I did proceed to the Secretary of State, and mentioned the circumstances to him; and there is no doubt that the Secretary of State informed me, that he would at once write a letter to Sir Hew Ross, desiring proceedings to be stayed, and saying, that he would take the matter into his own hands; and it so happened that that letter, through some inadvertence of the messenger, did not arrive at the Board before the meeting on Monday; and on Monday when the Board met, Sir Thomas Hastings having revived the subject, I spoke to

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Lieutenant-general Sir Hew Ross as to the letter, and I asked him whether he had received a letter, and when, he said he had not, I told him that a letter to that effect would be received by him, and therefore I considered it was better for him to act on the commands of the Secretary of State.

19351. When did this occur?—I do not recollect the date.

19352. Since Lord Panmure has been in office?—Yes; it was when he was ill; I suppose it may have been a fortnight or three weeks ago.

19353. *Chairman.*] Are the Committee to understand that the Secretary for War, on his own authority, interfered between two subordinate officers in a department of the Board of Ordnance?—Undoubtedly.

19354. Did you ever know, in your experience of the Ordnance, such a case before as that of a Secretary of State interfering in the Board of Ordnance, with the details of the discipline of that office?—The question would extend over a very short period, because, from the time the Secretary of State for War assumed the duties which he now discharges, undoubtedly from that time the position of the Ordnance has been a most anomalous one. The position of the Ordnance I look upon to be this: the Secretary for War is charged with the responsibility of the civil duties of the army; and the Master-general of the Ordnance, if he were at home, I conceive would have, in order to carry out that theory, to obey the commands which he received from the Secretary of State. From the month of May or June, therefore, the position in which we have been all placed, and which I have felt to be an uncomfortable one, was that of endeavouring to work out a new idea with an old organisation, and before that old organisation was changed; and that has led to very considerable difficulties indeed. I conceive that, in this instance, I shall be able to satisfy the Committee that, taking into account the responsibility of the Secretary of State, and taking into account also the fact, which is well known, that the whole of the departments of the army are going to be reorganised, and that the arrangements for that reorganisation have been in progress for a considerable time, and have been merely delayed by accidental circumstances; if the Secretary for War had not taken the step he took, (and of which I fully take the responsibility, for he took it upon my representations,) he would, in my opinion, have most grossly neglected his duty; and I think I can establish that fact to the satisfaction of the Committee.

19355. How was it that the position of the Secretary of War was altered by his being made alone Secretary for War, instead of being Secretary for War and the Colonies?—I conceive that it was not altered, because he really and practically was charged with the duty which he had before in theory, but had not exercised; I conceive that certain powers which had been in abeyance then came into life.

19356. Will you explain to the Committee the authority, or refer to the words of the Act of Parliament, which created that difference, and how it was that it was created?—I should conceive that the authority existed before; I should conceive that the Secretary for War had the authority before, but that the authority was latent and dormant before it was brought into action by the separate establishment of a Secretary of State for War.

19357. Mr. *Ellice.*] Was any official communication made to the Ordnance, that any alteration had been made, at the time of the appointment of the Secretary of State for War?—I am not aware that there was; I think it was by acts rather than words that it was manifested.

19358. There was no communication either to the Board of Ordnance or to Parliament upon the subject?—I think not.

19359. Lord *Seymour.*] The Duke of Newcastle was asked, at Question 14339, "Were those powers changed when the offices of the Minister for War and the Minister for the Colonies were separated?" and he stated, "No, there was no change made by that separation, beyond the fact, of course, that the Secretary for War being relieved from the duties attached to the Secretaryship of the Colonies, was enabled to devote his sole and undivided attention to the duties of war;" his Grace did not conceive that he had any more power than before to interfere in the details of management in any office?—Certainly not; that is exactly what I have said, that he had no more power, because I conceive that he had that power before, but that that power had been latent and dormant, and then it came into life.

19360. Upon this difference arising at your Board, respecting the question of

of discipline, you, the Clerk of the Ordnance, went with a paper to the Duke of Newcastle, as it were, asking him to interfere in the details of your office?—Undoubtedly; the Noble Lord has spoken of the Duke of Newcastle, which is quite correct, but I think he intended to say Lord Panmure. I did go to the Duke of Newcastle, and it is with my going to the Duke of Newcastle that I must beg the Committee to allow me to begin this question.

19361. Mr. *Ellice.*] The patent of the Master-general of the Ordnance remained during this time in full force, did it not?—Yes, but he was in the Crimea. I have already stated to the Committee my opinion of Captain Boxer's services, his great ability, and of his being really an artillery officer of the greatest distinction in scientific matters who has lived, probably, for the last 30 or 40 years. I was going to state the reasons which influenced me to proceed to the Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, in the first instance, and afterwards to proceed to Lord Panmure. The Committee will remember that Sir Thomas Hastings made two statements, one on a former day, as to the transaction with Lord Panmure, and the other with regard to a transaction with the Duke of Newcastle, which he made to-day. It is with the first question that I am now dealing. Captain Boxer being an officer of great distinction, and having, as I distinctly state (and I beg the Committee to investigate this matter most minutely), recently been guilty of acts which I consider it is an exaggeration to call acts of insubordination, and having discharged the very important duties he had done, and saved the country, as I believe it can be shown he did, by the expenditure of 7,000 *l.*, at least 40,000 *l.*, a-year, besides putting us in a good position to procure a supply of the articles wanted. Those circumstances, during my unavoidable absence from London in January last, took place with reference to him.

19362. Mr. *Layard.*] Is Captain Boxer in the navy?—No, in the artillery. A letter, upon the 17th of January, was addressed by Colonel Wilson to the Secretary of the Board of Ordnance in which he states, "Sir,—I have to request you will do me the honour of laying the accompanying correspondence before the Lieutenant-general and Board. In order to explain which I beg to state, that, on the 13th instant, Captain Boxer wrote to me, recommending that a man should be discharged for repeated loss of time. On the back of this note I made the following minute: 'No. 387, Charles Fairweather, to be brought before the Director to have his case investigated.' This man was, accordingly, brought before me, suspended, and a letter ordered to be prepared, recommending his dismissal to the consideration of the Lieutenant-general and Board, I this day received the accompanying letter from Captain Boxer, to which I also forward my reply, and both of which I beg to submit to the Lieutenant-general and Board. On the former letter I will refrain from making any remarks, except that, as Captain Boxer impugns the principle on which I have acted, and expressly states, that he considers that no appeal should be made from him, and that the power of taking on, promoting, and discharging men in the Royal Laboratory should rest with him, it is impossible that I can permit his letter to remain with merely an assertion of my own opinion on its subject, and it has become my imperative duty to lay this officer's views of the duties of his position before the Lieutenant-general and Board. I beg to add, that, to the best of my recollection, I have never refused to receive, or to recommend for promotion any man recommended by Captain Boxer, nor to investigate into any report made by him to me." That letter contained the following enclosure from Captain Boxer: "My dear Sir,—As the course you have thought it right to adopt, with regard to my recommendation for the discharge of Charles Fairweather from the department, involves a principle which, if pursued, will, I am confident, affect my usefulness in endeavouring to bring the Laboratory up to its proper standard as a manufacturing department, I have thought it my duty respectfully to bring this subject before you, and I trust you will believe my only motive for so doing is for the benefit of the public service. It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to point out the advantages which have been derived by the adoption of the system lately introduced into the department; this has only been accomplished by a vast amount of labour and anxiety on my part, and I may add, that had it not been from an impression among the men that my decision was final, it would have been useless for me to have attempted the reform. In all the manufactories in the kingdom, where a successful system is in operation, the word of the person who carries out the work is a law from which there is no appeal, and unless this be

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be the case in a Government establishment, no exertions of the superintendent will enable it to compete with such firms as you mentioned to me the othe day; that you thought it would satisfy the Board, if, when you recommended a man to be discharged, you were to state that you had investigated the case. I should indeed be much surprised if, after what has been already accomplished, the Board were not thoroughly satisfied with my discretion and ability, with reference to such matters. There is yet much, very much, to be done in the department, and my time and exertions will be wholly given up to accomplish the work; but my endeavours will be of little avail unless the Lieutenant-general and Board, as well as yourself, place every confidence in me, both with regard to the taking on and the discharging of men, as well as the promotion of those already employed. Believe me to be, my dear Sir, yours sincerely, *E. W. Boxer.*" I must remark, that when I have spoken about his savings, by means of the erection of new machinery, and the most important part of those savings arose from what he regards as the introduction of a new system, making the men work in a different way. This is Colonel Wilson's answer, dated the 17th January: "I have received your letter of this date. No man can be discharged from the Royal Laboratory, except by order of the Master-general and Board. When any man misconducts himself in such a manner as in my opinion to merit dismissal, it becomes my duty to report the circumstance to the Lieutenant-general and Board for their decision. I always have and always shall do everything in my power to support the authority due to you as Fire-master, and whenever you see fit to report any person with whom you may be dissatisfied, on receiving your report I shall give the case my most careful consideration; but I will not recommend any person to the Lieutenant-general and Board to be discharged, without previously having inquired into the case: nor will I delegate my duty of making that inquiry to any officer placed under my orders whilst I myself am present. Finally, the views which you entertain of your position of Fire-master, as shown in the whole tenor of your letter, are such, that in order that the authority and duties belonging to the appointment of Fire-master may be distinctly determined, I have forwarded this correspondence to the Lieutenant-general and Board of Ordnance. I am, my dear sir, yours truly, *J. A. Wilson.*—To Captain Boxer, Fire-master, Royal Laboratory."

19363. Lord *Seymour.*] When did this come before the Board of Ordnance? —This came on the 17th of January, and on the 20th of January, this minute, O–59, was made, I being away from London at the time: "The Lieutenant-general and Board have read the inclosed correspondence with the greatest regret and disappointment. It is only a few weeks since Captain Boxer, in the presence of the Lieutenant-general and Board, expressed himself in terms of the greatest regret for having been guilty of an act of insubordination towards his superior officer. He promised to apologise to Colonel Wilson for his conduct, and he did so, and he gave a most solemn assurance to the Lieutenant-general and Board that he would in future bear in mind the relative position of himself and the head of his department. The tone of Captain Boxer's letter, which has now been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant-general and Board, is one that they could have little expected from an officer in Her Majesty's service. It would appear to be dictated more in the spirit of a foreman of mechanics in a manufacturing establishment than in that of an officer holding the rank of Captain in the Royal Artillery, who might be supposed to have learned that his first duty is to respect those who are by his Sovereign's appointment placed in authority over him; and it is deserving remark, that whilst Captain Boxer resists that authority in his own person, he imperiously demands that he should be permitted to exercise a dictatorship over those under him. The Lieutenant-general and Board have to express their entire approval of the gentlemanlike forbearance of Colonel Wilson throughout these transactions. The course pursued by Captain Boxer cannot be tolerated in any establishment under Her Majesty's Government, and the Lieutenant-general and Board consider it necessary that he should at once acknowledge his error to the satisfaction of Colonel Wilson. They cannot again receive an assurance of his future intentions, but they warn him that a repetition of such disrespect will involve the necessity of his return to the ordinary duties of his regiment, that he may learn what is due to discipline and to the rules of Her Majesty's service. The Lieutenant-general and Board desire that Major-general Cator shall take an opportunity

opportunity of requesting the attendance of Colonel Chalmer, Colonel Tulloch, and Colonel Wilson, and in their presence to reprimand Captain Boxer; and Major-general Cator will report that the course prescribed has been pursued according to the spirit of this minute."

19364. That seems to refer to some former act of difference, if not of insubordination, that had arisen between them?—The word used is "insubordination."

19365. It shows, apparently, that there had been some former insubordination?—It states distinctly that there had been some former insubordination. I can only say as to that, that the occurrence referred to in this minute took place in my own presence, Sir Hew Ross and I being in the room; and I can assure the Committee now I forget what the occurrence was; it was a matter that appeared to me so small and insignificant.

19366. But that minute was agreed to by Sir Hew Ross, was it not?—Yes; and Sir Thomas Hastings.

19367. It cannot be supposed that it appeared small and insignificant to Sir Hew Ross, who spoke of it in such very strong terms?—Certainly not.

19368. What was the exact position of Colonel Wilson?—He was Director of the Royal Laboratory.

19369. Is there any printed regulation respecting the discharge of men from the Laboratory?—There are regulations.

19370. Is it, or not, a regulation, that no man can be discharged except by the Director?—No man can be discharged except by the Board; the question is with regard to the recommendation of the discharge.

19371. From whom should come that recommendation?—It must come from the Director; but, as I understand it, the custom had been for the Director to receive the recommendation of his executive officer upon those subjects, without making any inquiry; and Captain Boxer considered, in this instance, that unless that course continued to be pursued, he could not have that authority over the men which would enable him to carry out the great reforms which he was producing in that establishment.

19372. He claimed, did he not, to recommend persons for discharge, and that no inquiry should take place by the Director?—Quite so; that was the case.

19373. And the Board, by its Minute, seem to have confirmed the Director in his view of the subject?—Quite so; now the next point that we come to is this: when I heard of this occurrence, and when I saw clearly that a loss, which appeared to be irreparable, must almost ensue, namely, that Captain Boxer, with those imputations upon him as an officer and a gentleman, could not remain, I drew up, I think on the 30th of January, this memorandum, and submitted it to the Board: "I have carefully considered the letters of Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer, and the Minute in reference to them. Those letters were submitted to the Board, and that Minute was adopted, at a period when, from domestic circumstances, I was obliged to be absent from London. As I am reluctantly obliged to disagree with the views that have been adopted by my colleagues, and to disapprove of the censure on Captain Boxer, and still more of the language in which that censure is conveyed, I think it right to state the grounds upon which my dissent is founded. For this purpose, it is necessary to consider the services which Captain Boxer, by his great ability and knowledge, and by his remarkable energy, has rendered to the public. These services may be classed generally under the following heads: Firstly, in making most important improvements in warlike missiles; Secondly, in supplying the alarming deficiency which existed in certain sorts of these missiles at the breaking out of the present war; and Thirdly, in preparing these stores at a cost very far below that at which they had been hitherto manufactured or supplied. With regard to the first point: In 1849 repeated failures were found to take place in the practice with Shrapnel shells; those failures were so important, as not only to reduce the value of the missile very considerably, but to make it doubtful whether such projectiles could any longer be used with advantage in warfare. Captain Boxer proposed certain improvements to render the Shrapnel shell effective, which he considered would, if applied to common shells, increase their value. Upon experiments,

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it was found that although the improved fusee answered his expectations with regard to common shells, and was in itself a most valuable invention, the great defect then existing in Shrapnel shells was not overcome by it. To meet the difficulty, he proposed the separation of the bursting-powder from the bullet; but the new shell was not at once adopted. Trials, however, were made of it at that time; and in 1852, and when, in 1853, nearly 200 of his shells were tested in the severest manner, not a single failure occurred. Recent trials on the field have shown that these inventions, viz., the fusee, and the altered system of Shrapnel shells, must be considered as among the most valuable improvements that have been made of late years in the artillery department. Besides other improvements of a minor character, Captain Boxer has invented certain improvements in Congreve rockets, and the apparatus for firing them, the parachute-light and new mortar-fusee. One of these inventions was adopted in 1842, when he had been only three years in the service; and, as Fire-master, he is now engaged on others, which are likely to be of great importance. Directly after his success with the Diaphragm Shrapnel shells, he offered, officially, to render all the old Shrapnel shells then in store serviceable, by the application to them of his invention. Upon General Cator's appointment to the command of the artillery in the East, he found that it was impossible to obtain a sufficient number of Diaphragm shells for the army, and as he considered the old Shrapnel shells of comparative little value, he was, of course, most anxious to obtain such as could be depended upon. Captain Boxer was then engaged upon a most important work, at the Royal Military Academy, but feeling the urgency of the case, he undertook at once, not only to render the old Shrapnel shells serviceable, but also, (if he were given sufficient power) to prepare the quantity required in a very short time. This offer was accepted, and he prepared 10,000 shells in little more than a month. With reference to the second point, General Cator, before proceeding to the East, seeing how impossible it would be for the Laboratory to meet the demands which were then made, and which were likely to be made upon an increased scale, thought it absolutely necessary for the good of the service to recommend to the Master-general that Captain Boxer should be placed there in an official capacity. This recommendation was agreed to, and Captain Boxer was taken from the Academy, where he was acting as instructor of artillery, and in which position he had received great praise from the Lieutenant-general and Inspector (as may be seen from official letters in the Master-general's office), and placed in the Laboratory, as additional Fire-master. When Captain Boxer joined the above department it was in a most lamentable state of inefficiency with regard to the means at its disposal for supplying warlike stores upon a scale necessary for a time of war; and the cost for labour upon the most expensive articles was two, three, and even four times as much as it ought to have been. These defects had led the Master-general and Board to determine entirely to reconstruct the Laboratory; but the improvements they had ordered will not be brought into action for several months. In the month of April last I was, for a short time, the only officer at the Ordnance, and, from returns which I called for, I saw clearly that in the event of any large expenditure of shell in any military or naval operations, we should have been entirely unable to supply the wants of the service. I sent for Captain Boxer, and, pointing out to him the danger of our position, told him that some means must at once be found to improve it. He pledged himself to place the department, in five weeks, in a position to supply any number of shells that would be required, at an expenditure of about 8,000 *l.* He also pledged himself to effect such saving in the work performed as would, in six months, be sufficient to pay the whole cost of his proposed factory. His suggestions were at once adopted, and he was authorised to carry out his views by himself, on his own responsibility, and without being subject, either directly or indirectly, either in the construction or management of the proposed factory, to be interfered with by any other person. The annexed letter, forwarded to the Board by Colonel Wilson, in October last, clearly shows that Captain Boxer's expectations were more than realised; that the department was relieved of all danger of not being able to meet the demands upon it for shells; and that, in the present year, a sum of at least 40,000 *l.* has been saved to the public. It is almost unnecessary to observe that such great results could have been attained only by the union of great ability, great scientific knowledge,

knowledge, and great energy. It must be observed that the machinery procured for the temporary factory was, in most cases, only an extension of that already existing in the department, and was almost wholly of a similar nature, and if Captain Boxer had merely contented himself with the procuring and erecting of the same, and allowed the then method of manufacture to have been continued, not more than about one-third of the stores that are at present supplied could have been produced. He had therefore to reform, and not to create, an establishment; and when he explained to the different mechanics that they would be expected to do twice, and in some cases three times, the amount of work that they had been accustomed to perform, the answer was, "It is impossible; we thought when we came into a Government establishment we were not expected to exert ourselves." This increased amount of work was not only performed by these men, but at the present moment a still greater quantity is done by boys who have been since educated with the same mechanics, and who only receive one-fourth the pay of the mechanic. Many machines, also, of a peculiar nature had to be devised, in order to suit the new system, and great success has resulted from them; in fact upwards of 1,200 *l.* per week has been saved to the country in the work performed in a portion of the factory, by the success of Captain Boxer's exertions. In this undertaking Captain Boxer had to overcome peculiar difficulties; he had to deal with the prejudices of the masters and workmen. If they had refused to obey, a failure would have resulted with regard to the execution of work, which was even a more important point than the cost of the manufacture. It would have been altogether impossible for Captain Boxer to have succeeded in this reform unless he had had peculiar authority; unless the men had understood that no appeal was allowed from his decision, a complete failure would have resulted. Under these circumstances, it appears to me that Captain Boxer would have failed in his duty if he had not respectfully remonstrated against the adoption of any course which he thought likely to impair his authority with the men in his employment. I think his letter to Colonel Wilson a respectful one; and without expressing any opinion as to whether Colonel Wilson's or Captain Boxer's plan of dismissing incompetent men is the right one, I cannot think that Captain Boxer's mode of expressing his views ought to have given offence. My colleagues, however, were of a different opinion, and by their orders on the 24th January, after a meeting of the Machinery Committee, Captain Boxer, without any previous notice, or without having had any opportunity of saying one word in his own defence, received, in the presence of Colonel Chalmer, Colonel Wilson, and Lieutenant-colonel Tulloch, a most severe reprimand from the Lieutenant-general and Board, which was read to him by General Cator; a copy of this was asked for by Captain Boxer, but was refused; this reprimand was given simply for writing the letter dated January 16. Captain Boxer refused at the time to make any apology, but upon minute consideration he felt that as the Lieutenant-general had deemed it a breach of military discipline, it was his duty to bow to that decision, and offer the apology contained in the letter, dated 25th of January 1855. Such is, I believe, a fair statement of the whole case. Captain Boxer is the officer most distinguished for inventive skill and scientific knowledge that we have had for many years. In this present year he has saved the department from disgrace, and the country from imminent danger. In the year ending in May next, the period at which his factory is completed, he will have saved the public Exchequer not less than 40,000 *l.* The offence should indeed be a great one for which such a man ought to be visited with heavy censure; and without previous notice, without being allowed to reply to the charges made against him, not privately, but in the presence of several distinguished officers of his corps, should be told that his conduct was unbecoming of an officer, that it was dictated by the spirit of a foreman of mechanics, and that he had broken his word. I am far from denying that, in the excitement and hurry of business, Captain Boxer has in two instances that have been brought to my notice paid too little attention to the rules of official routine. I entirely concurred in the propriety of warning him to be more careful on this point. I was present at the time when this warning was given to him, and, together with Sir Hew Ross, was the party to whom he made the promises referred to in that passage of the Board's Minute where his truthfulness is impugned. I wish to state in the strongest manner my conviction that Captain Boxer's letter in no way was inconsistent

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with that promise. Under these circumstances, I earnestly request my colleagues to reconsider the whole matter, and to concur with me in withdrawing the Minute of censure. If this course is not concurred in, I request that the whole correspondence may be laid before the Minister-of-War." That gives an account of the way in which the matter came before the Minister-of-War.

Martis, 8° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., C. B., called in; and further Examined.

Captain Sir *T. Hastings*, R. N., C. B.

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19374. *Chairman.*] I THINK you wish to make some explanations to the Committee?—Yes; I stated that I had no recollection of having received an order from the War department, touching the huts.

19375. Lord *Seymour.*] Of what huts were you speaking?—The huts for the Crimea. Sir Frederick Smith says, and is there right, that we had that order, dated the 18th of November; and I have now a letter in my hand from Sir Frederick Smith, which will show that I am quite right as to the facts, that this transaction was irregular. When I say "irregular," I do not attach any evil importance to that word, but it was irregular. Sir Frederick Smith writes, "I have the honour to report, that on the 16th instant," that is the 16th of November 1854, "I received a communication from the General Commanding-in-chief, directing me to wait upon him in the course of the day, with the view to consider what would be the best description of hut to send out to the Crimea for the use of the army serving there, as shelter during the present winter. I submitted my views to Viscount Hardinge, who was pleased to approve of a project of a hut to contain 20 soldiers." Now, that is the first step; that shows that this had been going on, which is within my knowledge.

19376. Is that a report made to you?—Yes, to the Board; it is a letter from Sir Frederick Smith, with the annotations of the Inspector-general.

19377. Was that the first you heard of these huts?—Yes.

19378. Hearing from Sir Frederick Smith that he had been called upon by the Commander-in-chief to wait on him?—No, this is afterwards. Sir Frederick Smith was in communication with the Board. He wrote this letter, and the impression on my mind, as there was some difficulty about it, was, that the whole transaction commenced on the 16th, which it did, and this note of the Brigade Major of Sappers and Miners, Colonel Matson, will show how far that is borne out. "I beg to call the Board's attention to the 10th and 11th paragraphs of this report relative to the 300 huts prepared by Mr. Potter, which it appears have been ordered by the Secretary-at-War through Sir F. Smith and Colonel Tulloch." Now those facts were on my mind when I gave my evidence, and I had not referred to this paper. "The construction of these huts is imperfect, but under the pressure of the moment there appears to be no alternative but to take them; and I strongly recommend that a sufficiency of felt be sent out to preserve all these huts." Now, in my mind, the whole of this transaction, as narrated here, is one connected fact, and I speak of it as an irregular proceeding; but Sir Frederick Smith is quite right. Before the official business commenced, this letter had been written by the Secretary for War, authorising the measure on the 18th of November, and before Sir Frederick Smith

Smith went down to Portsmouth, the whole of that order was carried out in the irregular manner which this minute of Colonel Matson's points out; and finally, the Board gave their authority on the 20th of November to the whole of the proceedings.

19379. *Chairman.*] The irregularity commenced before that order from the Secretary of State, and it was sanctioned by the Secretary of State?—Yes.

19380. Have you any further explanation to give?—I have no further explanation on that matter to give. I beg leave to explain, as to Question 18927, relative to the iron. I was asked, "Has there been any other business of importance carried on through the Ordnance which has not been brought officially to your knowledge." I was wrong upon that point, but not as to the facts of the case. I took up this evidence this morning to correct it, and had got as far as this, when I perceived my error. I say, "The question of contract for foundries at Woolwich has been carried on in a different way to that which I have described as the mode of contracting. An inspector of machinery has been sent to purchase large quantities of iron for the purposes of the foundry, without the usual system of contract being followed out, and that is a variation from the way of doing business;" that is quite true. I was then asked, "Why did that variation take place?" and I said, "It was not done by the Board." Now what I would explain upon that point is, that the whole preliminary discussion relative to this question did not pass under my view. The facts came to me subsequently in a minute prepared and attached to a letter from the director-general of the laboratory. On referring to the papers I find that that is the fact, and that I affixed my initials to that proceeding. Being called upon to state whether I knew of any irregular proceedings, of course I was bound to state that such a proceeding was irregular.

19381. Lord *Seymour.*] But you sanctioned it so far as putting your initials to it?—Yes.

19382. *Chairman.*] That seems to have been the regular course (if I may call anything regular which applies to the Ordnance); the regular course was to have an irregularity, and that that was to be sanctioned by the Board?—I had not entered into this case previously to its coming before me in the shape of a minute; but on looking over the papers I conclude that Mr. Monsell had weighed and considered well with Mr. Anderson, the superintendent of machinery, that there would be a saving on adopting that line of conduct, and I believe that there will be a saving; but I regret to have affixed my initials to that minute, because, on reflection, I am bound to say that I think that if such a plan be carried out generally, of individual purchases under the sanction of the Board, it would lead to evil consequences, because you have not the same control over the question which you would have under a contract.

19383. Mr. *Layard.*] You have stated that you placed your initials to that document; may I ask you whether it is your habit to put your initials to documents without reading them, or knowing their contents?—No; I did read that, but not having been mixed up with the transaction, the facts, which I suppose is frequently the case, have escaped me; at least the affixing of my initials escaped me; but the facts of the proceeding touching the foundry, and the general principle upon which iron should be purchased, had not been brought before me.

19384. But having sanctioned it by your initials, do you still consider the proceeding irregular?—I must admit it. It was on being asked whether I knew of any irregular proceeding that I named it.

19385. Why did not you remonstrate at the time?—At the time I did not remonstrate because this proceeding of the erection of the foundry had been sanctioned by the Secretary for War. I saw upon the face of the minute that reasons were assigned for considering that the purchase of iron would be more cheaply carried out, and I, of course, felt that Mr. Monsell himself would not enter upon anything which was incorrect. Such an idea never entered my mind, and I felt that the person employed was a man capable of judging of the work which he was set about.

19386. Up to the time at which you mentioned that occurrence to the Committee, you had never made any remonstrance or representation?—I had not; and I have no hesitation in stating, that whatever special advantages may be gained by employing intelligent and clever persons to purchase, no system can

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be so safe as one carried out by contract, because, in the case of a contract, every step of it is followed, and if you take a considerable number of individuals, it is quite possible that you may find one who will not go so straight, without guidance, as with it.

19387. *Chairman.*] Have you any further explanation to give?—Nothing further.

William Monsell, Esq., a Member of The House, further Examined.

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19388. *Chairman.*] YOU were in the midst of an explanation, yesterday, when the Committee rose; will you continue it?—I am rather anxious to explain one or two things, with reference to the evidence of yesterday.

19389. Can you state the question to which the explanation applies?—The two bays at the Laboratory; it will be in the recollection of the Committee that I was asked many questions, yesterday, with regard to the erection of two bays at the Royal Laboratory, the proceeding with which I had no recollection of having sanctioned, and on the other hand, Captain Collinson, an officer of the Royal Engineers, considered that I had done so. I have received from Captain Collinson this morning, a memorandum, which I will read to the Committee: "After the recommendation of the Laboratory Committee to build the two bays, I got a tender from Mr. Hick, of Bolton, for the iron work, 743 *l.*;" the Committee will recollect that I produced that tender yesterday; "and it was not until that tender had been approved by the Board that the iron-work was put up; Mr. Hick having a conditional order from me to prepare the iron work, which would be available for other purposes, if not required for the two bays. The bricklayers' and carpenters' work was done by a schedule of prices, previously authorised by the Board, and was not done till after the iron-work." Therefore, really and practically, as regarded, at all events, the greater part of this work, whichever may be right in our recollection, Captain Collinson or myself, it was not done until there was an order of the Board given for it.

19390. Mr. *Layard.*] Were no minutes made of those various orders?—Undoubtedly there were.

19391. How is it, then, that Sir Thomas Hastings and yourself should be ignorant of the circumstance?—I explained yesterday why I was ignorant of the circumstance; I was away from the Board upon the 15th of January, and therefore had no cognisance of that particular minute.

19392. But did you not state that minutes were sent to you when you were absent?—They generally were, but at that particular time there were special reasons which render it probable that they were not.

19393. General *Peel.*] The schedule of prices, approved of by the Board, did not apply to that particular work, but was a general schedule of prices approved beforehand?—Yes, a triennial contract.

19394. Therefore the approval by the Board of that schedule of prices did not at all apply to that particular work?—No. The statement is this: the whole work cost somewhere about 2,000 *l.* Captain Collinson states the facts of the case, with regard to 743 *l.* out of that 2,000 *l.* With regard to the remainder, he says, "The bricklayers' and carpenters' work was done by a schedule of prices, previously authorised by the Board, and was not done till after the iron-work;" therefore the work was not done until after the sanction of the Board.

19395. There was a sanction of the Board to that schedule of prices?—Exactly so: the work was sanctioned upon the 15th of January; therefore, according to that memorandum of Captain Collinson, that particular portion of the work was not done until after the 15th of January.

19396. Mr. *Layard.*] When was that memorandum given to you by Captain Collinson?—Within this last half-hour.

19397. Have you referred to the minutes since your examination yesterday?—No.

19398. Have you referred to them as showing the sanction of that particular work?—That sanction was brought before the Committee yesterday. The point made by the Committee was this, that the work was done before a formal sanction was given; that it was done upon verbal orders given by me. I stated that I had no recollection of having given those verbal orders, and that I did not

not believe I had even given them; but now Captain Collinson states to me, that the work was not done until the sanction of the Board was given.

19399. Surely the minutes of the Board, by comparing dates, would give that fact, without Captain Collinson's private memorandum?—No; because it was sanctioned, if the work was done irregularly, before there were any minutes of the Board, in order to authorise its being done.

19400. Surely the minutes of the Board would supply that same information, if it were entered?—No, I think not, for this reason: let us suppose that a work was commenced irregularly, without sanction, in the month of November, and suppose that that work was completed by the 15th of January, and suppose, then, that the work, having been executed, the sanction of the Board was given; that is to say, that the Board sanctioned the payment of the money on account of that work having been done, unless the Board wrote a reprimand to the officer who had done so irregular a thing, it would not appear at all upon the minutes of the Board.

19401. If the work were done before the order, that is an irregularity?—Quite so.

19402. And that would appear by the fact of the Board referring back to the work, and saying that they paid for work done on such and such a day of November?—Yes; if the Board did notice the irregularity in their minute, but not otherwise.

19403. Then, upon the very face of the order, the irregularity would appear, without any reference to the irregularity, by name, on the part of the Board?—Yes; under the circumstances mentioned in my last answer. However, I stated yesterday, which I beg to state again, that it is a matter of which, of course, I have no personal cognisance; and, therefore, if the Committee have any difficulty about it, I wish they would examine Captain Collinson.

19404. Lord *Seymour*.] Does Captain Collinson, in his letter to you, state that he had an order to proceed with the work, from the Board, before any commencement of the proceeding was taken?—I will read exactly what he does state, "After the recommendation of the Laboratory Committee to build the two bays"——

19405. Mr. *Ellice*.] What was the date of that?—He does not give it. "After the recommendation of the Laboratory Committee to build the two bays, I got a tender from Mr. Hick, of Bolton, for the iron work, 743 *l.*; and it was not until that tender had been approved by the Board that the iron-work was put up." And then he goes on to say, "Mr. Hick, having a conditional order from me to prepare the iron-work, which would be available for other purposes, if not required for the two bays."

19406. Then I understand that upon some ground or other Captain Collinson gave what he calls a conditional order?—Quite so.

19407. As to that conditional order, it is a question whether or not you gave an order?—Yes.

19408. Captain Collinson thinks you did, and your impression is different?—Yes; and I have consulted three other gentlemen, Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was with me, and two other gentlemen, who were present on the spot, and they all of them confirmed my opinion.

19409. What you have, as I understand, in support of it is, that you never recollect giving a verbal order on any other occasion?—That I never recollect giving verbal orders which were not immediately followed up by written orders.

19410. General *Peel*.] At Question 19250 you were asked, "That is no tender; it is an estimate?" To which you replied, "Yes; but he would be bound by this. It was accepted ultimately, but it was not accepted at the time that the work was done." The next question is, "Everything was sanctioned afterwards by the Board of Ordnance?—Yes"?—Quite so.

19411. It would appear by that, that the work was done before the sanction of the Board?—It would appear that my impression yesterday was that the work was so done; and I find that that was erroneous, and I want to correct that evidence. Then with regard to another matter, namely, the erection of a factory by Captain Boxer, by which so much money was saved, I think I led the Committee to imagine that I had actually sanctioned him to spend 7,000 *l.* upon my own authority, without any sanction of the Board. It is difficult, of course, to recollect things at such a distance of time very accurately, but I have

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now the papers, and I did myself injustice in that particular; I find I was incorrect in the date; it was not the beginning of May, it was the end of April. On the 25th of April I wrote this minute, "Inform Captain Boxer that he is requested at once to proceed to the north, to make inquiries about Laboratory machinery, and that he is authorised to take Mr. Davidson to accompany him;" that minute is signed by myself.

19412. *Chairman.*] And only by you?—Only by me.

19413. That being another instance of expense sanctioned by one name?—Yes, so far as regards the expense of going down to the north. Then, I think, the Honourable Chairman asked me if Captain Boxer had chosen to make away with the 7,000 *l.*, could he have done so; I find that upon the 2d of May there was an official letter written to the Director of the Royal Laboratory to this effect: "With reference to the suggestions contained in the report of Captain Boxer, additional fire-master of the Royal Laboratory, submitted to the Board by you, I am directed to acquaint you that the Board approve of the same, and have desired immediate orders to be given for the purchase of the machinery there recommended. I am to signify the Board's request that you will place Captain Boxer in charge of the erection of the machinery; and when it is erected, in charge of its management, as well as of the manufacture of Congreve rockets." Lieutenant-colonel Tylden, the other fire-master, was desired to do something else.

19414. Mr. *Ellice.*] By whom is that signed?—The Secretary of the Board, Mr. Wood. Before I came away from the Ordnance Office, they had not been able to find the minute upon which that letter was written; therefore whether the minute was signed only by myself or also by Sir Thomas Hastings I do not know, but I shall be able to mention that to the Committee.

19415. Mr. *Layard.*] How are these minutes kept; is there any order, or regularity, or system?—Yes, they are kept with very great regularity; it is a very extraordinary thing to me, that the minute was not found within one half-hour.

19416. *Chairman.*] Have you a minute book, or are they upon loose sheets of paper?—All except minutes of very great importance are upon loose sheets of paper. There was a Committee appointed to inquire into the way the business was done at the Ordnance somewhere about a year ago, and they recommended that no minutes excepting those embodying principles should be entered in the minute book.

19417. Mr. *Layard.*] Then are you quite certain that that letter was written in consequence of a minute?—It states so; there is no doubt about it; the only question is, who signed that minute.

19418. How do you account for not finding the minute?—I cannot account for it at all; it ought to have been forthcoming, of course, at the moment.

19419. Are those minutes bound up in any way, and classified according to date?—No; they are classified I fancy according to an alphabetical arrangement, and also according to time.

19420. Surely there would be no difficulty, by referring to the date, in finding the minute?—One would have thought so; but it must have been taken away for some other purpose.

19421. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What is the course of proceeding when the Board comes to any decision requiring a minute; when is the minute made?—In ordinary instances, the minute is written in pencil by the Secretary.

19422. On the instant?—After he has read over the papers; he brings it then to the Board officer who is particularly charged with the matter to which it refers. If he approves of that minute he then puts his initials to it; it then proceeds in regular course; it is either taken to and signed by the other Board officers, or in many cases the minute is brought in to the Board when the Board is assembled, and it passes round to the different members of the Board.

19423. You say, when it is taken to the officer of the Board, "if he approves of it;" whom do you mean by the officer of the Board?—One of the Board officers whose special business it is to attend to the particular matter.

19424. Do you mean a member of the Board?—Yes.

19425. If he does not approve of it, what happens then?—He alters it.

19426. In any case, in some shape it is passed?—Decidedly.

19427. Then what becomes of it; is it transcribed into any regular book, or put in such a shape as to be capable of reference at any future time?—Yes, by what

what I have always found a very accurate system of registering; there is a registering room where these things are entered.

19428–9. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do not you consider a transaction of this description, where you determined upon a new establishment to be formed, and a particular officer to take charge of it, to be of sufficient importance to be registered according to the arrangement lately made of registering papers in the office?—There is no doubt it was registered, but not put into the book. I do not know whether they have referred to the minute book. I wished to get the paper, and of course I imagined there would be no difficulty in getting the paper; however, up to this time, it has not appeared. But I think the Right Honourable Gentleman will see that it is not a matter of very great importance whether it is found or not; because I have in my hand a minute, signed by Sir Thomas Hastings upon the 11th of May, showing that he entirely concurred with me in the arrangement which was made with regard to the establishment of this factory, and directing in certain ways assistance to be given by all the heads of departments to Captain Boxer in proceeding with it. That is signed both by Sir Thomas Hastings and by myself.

19430. *Chairman.*] Have you any further explanation to make?—I should wish to state further that, by placing at the disposal of Captain Boxer this 7,000 *l.*, it was not to be understood as issuing money, but only authorising, him to purchase machinery to that extent, and the bills for the several purchases were all passed into orders of payment under the strict forms of office, each bill having a certificate of delivery, and the Board's order authorising each payment. Captain Boxer was authorised so to act under the Board's order of the 2d of May 1854.

19431. Sir *J. Pakington.*] In whose writing is that memorandum which you have just read?—That is written by my chief clerk, Mr. Smith, who is the head of the Cash Account Office, and therefore peculiarly charged with these matters.

19432. I understood you yesterday that that 7,000 *l.* was to be in part devoted to the erection of works for the construction of sheds?—No, that is another matter; this was erected in an old storehouse.

19433. The 7,000 *l.* was entirely for machinery?—Almost entirely. There was the clearing out of the old storehouse, whatever expense that might be. I suppose that was done by the ordinary labourers at Woolwich.

19434. All the bills for that machinery were brought to account in a regular way?—In a perfectly regular way.

19435. By whom were they checked and passed?—They were checked in the Cash Account Office, as all other bills are, but they were certified, certainly, by Captain Boxer. Whether they were certified also by the Director of the Royal Laboratory, I do not know.

19436. Captain Boxer is the person who had made the offer to spend the money?—Yes.

19437. And to whom you had trusted the expenditure of the money?—Quite so.

19438. Therefore any check or passing of the accounts by Captain Boxer would amount to very little. By whom else were they passed or checked. Was there any audit of those bills, in any way?—I suppose the Right Honourable Gentleman's question applies not to the course which was pursued when the bills arrived in the Ordnance Office, but to the course which was pursued before they arrived in the Ordnance Office?

19439. My question has this object: I wished to know whether, in any way whatever, the public had proper security for that money having been properly expended; what guarantee was there for the proper and judicious expenditure of that 7,000 *l.*?—I imagine that, in every instance, there were tenders for the machinery which Captain Boxer ordered, from the persons of whom he ordered it, and that before the money was paid he certified. I stated before, that I did not know whether Colonel Wilson also certified, but certainly Captain Boxer certified that the machinery had been duly and properly erected. Then the Right Honourable Gentleman will also recollect that the machinery was all there; anybody could see what was got for the money.

19440. You say you imagine that that course was taken?—I have no doubt

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that the course I have described was taken, except as to the signature of Colonel Wilson. Whether Colonel Wilson signed it or not I do not know.

19441. Were any steps taken in any way subsequently to ascertain that the goods bought for that money were worth the money, and that the public had the full advantage of the expenditure?—That would depend upon who certified the bills sent in; they were certainly certified by Captain Boxer. Whether they were certified also by Colonel Wilson, I do not know.

19442. Mr. *Layard.*] Is there an auditor in the Ordnance Office?—There is an auditor, who I think attends there every day, from the Paymaster's Office, but every bill which passes into the Ordnance Office is most carefully and minutely scrutinised in the Cash Account Office.

19443. Therefore I suppose the bills which Captain Boxer incurred for this machinery were passed in the ordinary way through the office?—There is no doubt about that point; the question put, I think, was what course was pursued before they arrived at the Ordnance Office.

19444. I suppose it would have been detected in the office if there had been any irregularity?—If there had been any formal irregularity it would have been detected, but if Captain Boxer had sanctioned an expenditure of 1,000*l.* where he ought only to have sanctioned an expenditure of 500*l.*, unless the bill was signed by another person besides him, of course it could not have been found out.

19445. Was it necessary that Colonel Wilson should sign the bills as well as Captain Boxer?—In all ordinary circumstances it undoubtedly would be necessary, but in this particular case Captain Boxer was specially and personally charged with this particular work; and I wish to explain to the Committee, that whatever may be the case with regard to the initiation of the work, almost immediately after the work was commenced, there was the sanction of the Board to what was done.

19446. Then Captain Boxer might have sanctioned any expenditure of his own accord, without the sanction of Colonel Wilson, in your opinion?—Yes; in my opinion he certainly might.

19447. Captain *Gladstone.*] Up to a certain amount?—Yes, to the extent of 7,000*l.*, but all bills would, before payment, undergo an examination according to rule, by the cash accountant.

19448. Mr. *Drummond.*] Did I understand you rightly, to say that there is a general contract at certain prices entered into with individuals over a period of three years for all the works done by the Board?—Yes; a schedule of prices.

19449. Instead of having a contract for every particular work which is done, is the work contracted for according to that schedule?—Not always; sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not. In this particular instance the work, being machinery, of course there would by possibility be no schedule of prices which would apply to it at all.

19450. When the work is completed, is it not all measured, and do you not pay according to the measurement?—Yes, when it is done by the schedule of prices, and that is certified by the engineer officer.

19451. The schedule of prices had nothing at all to do with this machinery work?—Nothing in the world.

19452. Sir *J. Pakington.*] I think you stated yesterday that your orders to Captain Boxer were verbal; that your authority to Captain Boxer for this expenditure was a verbal authority?—I think I have clearly shown that I was perfectly wrong in stating anything of the kind, for I have already read the first minute which was written, authorising Captain Boxer to proceed to the North: "Inform Captain Boxer that he is requested at once to proceed to the North, to make inquiries about laboratory machinery, and that he is authorised to take Mr. Davidson to accompany him." Therefore, in no single instance, with regard to this matter, were the orders verbal.

19453. General *Peel.*] The first step taken upon the arrival of those accounts in the Cash Account Office, would be to show the authority upon which the work was performed?—Quite so.

19454. Lord *Seymour.*] You read yesterday to the Committee a long memorandum, dated the 20th of January?—Yes.

19455. That memorandum referred to a question which had arisen between Captain Boxer and Colonel Wilson?—Yes.

19456. Those two persons were officers in the artillery, were they not?—They

They were officers in the artillery, in the civil appointments of Director of the Royal Laboratory and Fireman.

19457. All questions relating to officers in the artillery, and the discipline of the regiment, come properly under the consideration of the Lieutenant-general?—Undoubtedly.

19458. The Lieutenant-general had upon this occasion pronounced an opinion, in which he had condemned the conduct of Captain Boxer to his superior officer, Colonel Wilson?—Certainly.

19459. Then I understand that you interfered in the case, taking a different view, and, as it were, taking the part of Captain Boxer?—Certainly.

19460. And to support your view, you transferred the question from the consideration of the Board of Ordnance to that of the Minister of War?—Certainly. I may state that the Minister of War was the principal person to whom I transferred it; but I considered myself at the Board of Ordnance to have two masters, one the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the other the Minister of War. I communicated, also, with him upon the subject, and explained the whole matter to him; he, of course, was very much interested with regard to the mode in which the money voted by Parliament and to be expended on manufactories at Woolwich was to be dealt with.

19461. In one of the letters which you have read, Captain Boxer states, that he cannot be answerable for the due management of his establishment, unless, with regard to all the men under him, his decision is final?—Yes.

19462. Would not the same rule apply in that case to Colonel Wilson; and, if that be so, ought not the same power to be given to Colonel Wilson, that with regard to all persons under him his decision should be final?—I must beg the noble Lord to remember, that in my memorandum I distinctly stated, that I expressed no opinion upon that subject. I have an opinion, and am quite ready to express it now; but in my remonstrance against the course pursued by the Board of Ordnance with reference to Captain Boxer, I expressed no opinion as to whether he was right or wrong in his view, in the letter which he addressed to Colonel Wilson.

19463. Would not the same rule apply to Colonel Wilson; and, if that be so, ought not the same power to be given to Colonel Wilson, that with regard to all persons under him his decision should be final?—I presume that the noble Lord imagines that Captain Boxer wanted to get rid of the authority of the Board; Colonel Wilson was, undoubtedly, supreme already. I do not understand the meaning of the question.

19464. In one of the letters which you have read, Captain Boxer states that he cannot be answerable for the due management of his establishment, unless, with regard to all the men under him, his decision is final. Would not the same rule apply, in that case, to Colonel Wilson; and if that be so, ought not the same power to be given to Colonel Wilson that, with regard to all persons under him, his decision should be final?—Undoubtedly, as to all persons that he was actually employing; but the Noble Lord must understand that in the laboratory, Captain Boxer is charged with one particular part of the duty, and Colonel Wilson takes another part of the duty. Of course I never meant to put forward so absurd an opinion as that Captain Boxer should in any way interfere with the men that Colonel Wilson was actually employing.

19465. Mr. *Layard.*] But in this case, Colonel Wilson himself could not discharge the man?—No, except that the recommendation was made to the Board, which the Board always act upon, and therefore practically it comes to the same thing.

19466. Lord *Seymour.*] If the discipline of the office is to be kept up, ought not the decision of the Board of Ordnance, in regard to the due subordination of the persons under it, to be also final?—Yes, unless there be a court of appeal in the Minister for War.

19467. What constituted, or what made you think that the Minister for War was constituted a court of appeal, as to questions of discipline in the department?—Because I conceive that the Minister for War is responsible to the public for the due discharge of the duties of all the civil departments of the army.

19468. Therefore you supposed that, in any department which was connected with the management of the war, in all the details of that department, the Minister for War might interfere, and overrule the department itself?—I should imagine that he might do so; but I think it would be very unwise for him to

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do so, except in a very grave case; and the whole question, as it appears to me, with regard to this particular matter, was this: was it really a question worthy of his interference? I believe that it was, because I believe that it involved the whole question as to whether the laboratory was to be carried on upon the principles of a regiment, or upon the principles of a manufactory.

19469. You wished first of all to overrule, as I understand, the decision of the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance?—Yes; decidedly.

19470. You wished next to overrule the decision of Colonel Wilson?—No; I did not wish to overrule the decision of Colonel Wilson on this particular subject, as to the particular way of dismissing men. I distinctly stated in my minute, that I expressed no opinion upon that matter; but I saw clearly, that unless that minute were withdrawn, which had been addressed by the Board to Captain Boxer, Captain Boxer could not remain in the establishment. I considered that that would be a great public loss. I therefore did what probably was an irregular action. I referred those matters to the Minister for War, and I beg the Committee to allow me to explain when it was that I referred them to the Minister for War. I suggested in my minute, that they should be referred to him; but I resigned office very soon afterwards, and at the time when I was actually out of office, I took this step. I was most anxious that the Minister for War should be entirely cognisant of the facts, because I thought that the public would suffer a severe loss, if they lost the services of Captain Boxer.

19471. Did you, or did you not, think that Captain Boxer should have some power with regard to the men under him?—Yes.

19472. But in your memorandum to the authorities, you did not state that you thought so?—Certainly not.

19473. Therefore you did not put them in possession of your opinions upon that subject?—No.

19474. But that was the whole question?—No; the whole question was whether it was right or not that so insulting a letter should be written to a gentleman in Captain Boxer's position, as to render it utterly impossible for him, having the feelings of a gentleman and a man of honour, to remain in a position, in which, for the benefit of the public service, I considered it distinctly essential that he should remain.

19475. Captain Boxer's letter states that unless he had this authority, and his decision was final, it would be useless for him to attempt the reform of that factory?—Yes; therefore, he would not have been able to do nearly so much as he did without that power, and as I am informed by Captain Boxer, up to the moment when this question arose, Colonel Wilson had always allowed him that power. This was a deviation from the course of proceeding by Colonel Wilson in this particular case.

19476. In the memorandum it is stated that Captain Boxer pledged himself to effect a saving in the work: "His suggestions were at once adopted, and he was authorised to carry out his views on his own responsibility, and without being subject, either directly or indirectly, to be interfered with by any other person"?—Quite so.

19477. That was for the construction of the factory?—That was with reference to the factory about which we have heard so much.

19478. It was with regard to getting the materials also?—Decidedly not. He had also the most distinct understanding that until that factory was set at work, and was actually, what I may call, in movement, Captain Boxer was to have the whole authority and management of it.

19479. Have the Board of Ordnance gone to this length; have they given to Captain Boxer the whole management of the department under him?—No; that particular factory which he erected himself is a very small portion indeed of the laboratory.

19480. He had the management of one particular factory?—Yes.

19481. But he wished to interfere with men not in that factory?—No; these were men in that very same factory.

19482. Had he the entire authority in that factory?—Whether the exact time for which that authority was to last was defined or not, I do not know; but the spirit of the understanding was this, that he undertook to produce a very great saving, if he was given undivided authority, in purchasing machinery, and

setting

setting that machinery to work; whether the time necessary for doing that was six months or 12 months, of course I cannot answer.

19483. In the management of the department, had he or not the authority which he claimed to exercise? — Yes; I think he certainly had in that factory.

19484. Colonel Wilson thought he had not?—With regard to the dismissal of the labourers.

19485. Is not that a question of authority within the factory?—I should think so; that would make the case still stronger in favour of Captain Boxer; that had not occurred to me; I do not know how the rule which the Board laid down would apply to that.

19486. You have not considered that point?—No.

19487. Nor the Board of Ordnance?—I think not.

19488. Therefore, all this confusion appears to have arisen from the Board not having properly defined the authority of officers under them?—Yes; I think it would have been very much better if they had done so; and, in a more distinct and definite manner, given an absolute power and control to Captain Boxer, not only over the men during the time of their employment, but also as to taking men into employment, or dismissing them from employment, in that particular factory.

18489. General *Peel.*] Your letter to the Board, objecting to the decision to which they had come, was transmitted, by the Board, to Colonel Wilson, was it not?—Yes; and he wrote an answer to it, which I have here; Colonel Wilson wrote an answer, and Captain Boxer wrote a reply; I will put them both in, if you please. (*The Witness delivered in the same.*)

Vide Appendix.

19490. Mr. *Layard.*] Is it the custom of the Board to give such reprimands?—I never heard of anything of the sort in my life; I never heard of any officer, or any gentleman, receiving such a reprimand from any Board, or anybody else; and I have never known the Board of Ordnance give a reprimand of that description to any human being.

19491. Was not it rather going out of the way to cast a reflection upon a man who appears to have been as well behaved as anybody else. The minute states, "The letter would appear to be dictated more in the spirit of a foreman of mechanics;" is that the way in which the Board generally exercise their authority?—No; and I may say that it appears to me that the spirit in which the factory should be carried on should be the spirit of a foreman of mechanics; but it was intended as an insult.

19492. That was an unnecessary reflection, you think?—I think it was intended as an insult.

19493. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What was the result of your memorandum?—The result of my memorandum was this: in the first instance, I rather think that the Board adopted this minute, which I will now read: "The Lieutenant-general and Board having learned from Mr. Monsell, and from some of Captain Boxer's personal friends, that in their estimation the terms of the censure conveyed in the minute of the Lieutenant-general and Board, dated 20th January 1855, are liable to be misconstrued into an accusation against Captain Boxer's personal character, and Mr. Monsell having urged his opinion that this prejudice to Captain Boxer must continue while the original minute of the 20th January remains officially recorded, and that the assurance in the minute of the Lieutenant-general and Board of the 30th, on Captain Boxer's letter to the Lieutenant-general of the 29th January, that no such reflection on his personal character was intended, does not remove the possibility of such an imputation: under these circumstances, the Lieutenant-general and Board are prepared to substitute the following minute for that of the 20th of January, which is cancelled: The Lieutenant-general and Board have read the enclosed correspondence with regret. It is only a few weeks since Captain Boxer, in the presence of the Lieutenant-general and Board, expressed himself in terms of the greatest regret for having been guilty of an act of insubordination towards his superior officer. He promised to apologise to Colonel Wilson for his conduct, and he did so; and he gave an assurance to the Lieutenant-general and Board that he would in future bear in mind the relative position of himself and the head of his department. The arrangements complained of by Captain Boxer are those laid down in the printed orders of the Master-general and Board. By them no man can be discharged from any of the de-

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partments of the Arsenal but by the recommendation of the head of it to the Master-general and Board. Colonel Wilson acted in obedience to this order, and the Lieutenant-general and Board see no reason for Captain Boxer to have proposed an alteration of the rules on the present occasion, more particularly as, after examination, Colonel Wilson recommended that the man sent up by Captain Boxer for discharge should be dismissed, which was done. The Lieutenant-general and Board desire that Major-general Cator shall take an early opportunity of requesting the attendance of Colonel Chalmer, Colonel Tulloh, and Colonel Wilson, and in their presence read this minute to Captain Boxer." Then General Cator says that he has read it.

19494. As far as I followed it, that minute is, in substance, the same as the former one, is it not?—It is totally different in tone.

19495. It is not so strong in language, but is it not substantially the same?—I think the one would not compel a gentleman to remove himself from his position, and I think the other would.

19496. *Chairman.*] In consequence of your suggestion, that last minute was written?—Yes; and I was asked whether I would be satisfied with it.

19497. Were there any means used to induce the Board to adopt that minute, and cancel their former one; was it told to them that that was the opinion of the Minister for War, or how did you succeed with the Board in inducing them to do that thing?—I should imagine that they did not wish that the papers should be sent to the Minister for War; when the proposition was made to me not to send the thing to the Minister for War if that minute was adopted, I consulted with Lord Panmure upon the subject; and Lord Panmure said, "I should wish you still to send the papers."

19498. And did you send them?—Yes.

19499. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was the Lieutenant-general a party to that second minute which you have just read?—Yes.

19500. Mr. *Layard.*] Who wrote the first minute?—I believe it was written by Sir Hew Ross.

19501. Who was present at the Board when it was written?—I was out of town; Sir Hew Ross and Sir Thomas Hastings, I believe.

19502. Did they both sign the minute?—Yes; they both signed the first minute, and the second also.

19503. It was written, you believe, by Sir Hew Ross?—I have heard so; I have no knowledge of it.

19504. General *Peel.*] But it was only the circumstance of those two parties, Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer, being employed in the civil department, that authorised the interference of the Board at all?—Undoubtedly.

19505. If it had been merely a military matter, Sir Hew Ross could have written his minute, and would not have had to send it to the Board at all?—Certainly.

19506. Has it been the practice of the Master-general to issue minutes with regard to the civil conduct of the Board, without ever appealing to the Board upon the subject?—I cannot answer that question.

19507. No instance ever came under your knowledge?—I do not remember one, at all events.

19508. Is it not the fact, that Captain Boxer is the immediate assistant of the director in the Royal Laboratory, and has no independent position whatever?—I consider that he is the second in command; I presume that he has no independent position.

19509. Mr. *Layard.*] How long has Colonel Wilson been at the head of the Laboratory?—I should think he must have been the head of the Laboratory for three years; Captain Boxer had been in the Laboratory only for a short time; he was introduced there specially for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the war.

19510. *Chairman.*] Is there any explanation which you desire to make about the cholera belts?—I find it stated by Sir Thomas Hastings, at No. 18635, "Then again in some instances, the Clerk of the Ordnance ordered some cholera belts out of the usual course." I find this memorandum of the 24th of November, written by me, "I propose to order 80,000 cholera belts, 50,000 yards of macintosh," some other things, signed by me and approved by the Duke of Newcastle. I then find that the order for procuring these cholera belts is signed, not by me, but by Sir Thomas Hastings alone. The Committee,

of course, will understand distinctly that I am not making the least accusation against Sir Thomas Hastings, for signing minutes separately, but I merely mention the fact.

19511. Lord *Seymour*.] Were those the first cholera belts which were ordered?—That I cannot state.

19512. If you say that the cholera belts were ordered in the usual course, and you only refer to one instance, unless those were the only ones ordered, how do we know that what you are now stating applies to what Sir Thomas Hastings stated; it may be another case?—I do not think myself that there were any others before this time; I will find that out.

19513. You think there were no cholera belts ordered till November?—That is my impression, but I may be wrong about it; as bearing upon exactly the same subject, and therefore germane to it, I may as well state that with regard to a very large number of things in the way of warm clothing and other comforts for the troops in the East, which were purchased without any official authority from the Minister for War, I find that a vast number of these orders are signed only by Sir Thomas Hastings; whether so many are so signed by him as by me, I do not know; at all events it shows that the practice was for one Board officer to sign them. In the month of November, and in the month of January, I have had a list made in the Secretary's Office of the number of orders signed by one Board officer only, and I think it runs something in this way: Sir Thomas Hastings, 250; Mr. Monsell, 60; Sir Hew Ross, 30; that, I think, is something about the proportion. I find now that 40,000 cholera belts were ordered on the 14th of March 1854; the order for them is signed by Sir Thomas Hastings.

19514. Mr. *Drummond*.] It has been stated that in July last you were required to purchase warm clothing; who is the officer or clerk whose duty it was to write for tenders?—Mr. Hanby.

19515. Do you happen to know to whom he was going to supply at that time?—I rather presume that he wrote the order to the storekeeper at the Tower to make the purchase from Messrs. Kynaston, upon which I gave some evidence yesterday.

19516. Did you not tell him to write to some contractors at Hawick?—I do not think I told him to write to the contractors at Hawick. I communicated with a vast number of people at Hawick, and I think also with Dumfries and different places in Scotland, and got them to send in an enormous quantity of clothing; and that is the clothing which I described to the Committee yesterday as having been seen by Dr. Smith, and from which he made his selection of patterns, which we afterwards adopted.

19517. The greater part of that was lost in the "Prince," I think?—Yes, I believe so. I may add, that I think tonnage was applied for its shipment somewhere about the 7th of August, and it was not shipped till about the 18th of October.

19518. Was not application, when you ascertained that loss, made to Mr. Almond, the contractor, in St. James's-street, to supply that deficiency?—I think not to Mr. Almond; I forget the name of the person; there was a great contractor in London, who came to Sir Thomas Hastings and me, and who, I think, in three days, actually supplied the whole loss on board the "Prince."

19519. He was going to apply to Leicester, was not he?—Yes, I rather think he was, and I think that he procured the things at Leicester.

19520. When he went down to Leicester, did he not find out that all that had been pretended to be sent from Hawick had, in fact, been bought at Leicester, and sent straight from Leicester to London, and had never been at Hawick at all?—He stated so distinctly; but I afterwards made inquiries of people who knew something about Hawick, who told me that nothing more absurd ever entered into the mind of man; Hawick is a very large depôt for those commodities.

19521. But Mr. Almond never told you that?—I do not think it was Mr. Almond; but another great London contractor, who supplied the goods to replace those lost in the "Prince," told me so distinctly, and that nothing could be more absurd than endeavouring to buy direct from the manufacturers themselves; that everybody ought to proceed by means of the great London contractors, an opinion from which I entirely differed.

19522. At all events, you did not get that intelligence from Mr. Almond?—I think

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I think not, I am not certain; I got the intelligence from whoever the person was who supplied us with the goods to replace those that were lost in the "Prince."

19523. Mr. *Layard.*] With respect to packing, can you tell me by whom Messrs. Hayter & Howell were appointed?—No; I know that they were appointed by a Board's Order somewhere about the 25th November last.

19524. Was it formerly the custom to have packers?—No; but the officers at the Tower represented that it was utterly impossible for them to meet the enormous pressure which there was upon them. Hayter & Howell did not pack at the Tower, they had their own separate establishment; they were doing in their establishment what the officers at the Tower were doing in the Tower.

19525. Where was that establishment?—Somewhere in the City; I do not know where.

19526. Why were Messrs. Hayter & Howell selected?—I cannot answer that question; I know nothing about it.

19527. Who is Mr. Hayter?—Mr. Hayter, I believe, is a brother of Mr. Hayter, the Secretary to the Treasury; but I think it is only fair to add, that his firm has been employed for a very long time by the War Office, and for a very long time in packing for colonels of regiments; I believe they were the natural persons to select.

19528. Have any inconveniences been found, in consequence of having packers to pack goods which were sent to them from other places?—No, I have never heard of any; I think that Messrs. Hayter & Howell have discharged their duties most admirably. Mr. Howell is a person with whom I have been brought a good deal into communication, and I never saw a more intelligent man.

19529. Has it ever been represented to you, that things were sent to them and left for a long time exposed to the rain without being packed?—Never. I do not say it did not happen.

19530. How was the packing done formerly?—It was all done at the Tower.

19531. Did not the contractors pack their own goods?—The Tower is not in my department, therefore I cannot answer that question positively, without reference to Sir Thomas Hastings.

19532. Can you state whether Colonel Bruce has as yet received his patent?—He has not.

19533. When was Colonel Bruce appointed?—I think Colonel Bruce was appointed about the 18th of January.

19534. Is he an artillery officer?—No; he is an officer in the Guards.

19535. By whom was he appointed?—By the Duke of Newcastle; but I understand that at the time when he was appointed, the Duke of Newcastle informed him that he proposed to make considerable changes in the Ordnance, and that, therefore, he was not to consider his appointment as a permanent one.

19536. In your opinion, could he legally exercise the duties of his office without a patent?—I think there can be no doubt upon that point; at least, I will give my reason for thinking that there can be no doubt upon it: The Solicitor to the Ordnance expressed distinctly his opinion that Colonel Bruce's signature to a tender was binding upon the Board of Ordnance.

19537. Then is it the case, as has been stated by Sir Thomas Hastings, that a contract which had been signed by Colonel Bruce was afterwards vitiated by you because his signature was not valid?—Most distinctly not.

19538. Will you state how that occurred?—Yes; in the first instance I had better state, in the most explicit manner, that the contract with Mr. Myers, which is the contract to which the Honourable Gentleman alludes, has never been vitiated. The facts of the case are simply these: it was proposed to erect permanent barracks at Aldershott, upon a certain plan; it was decided, afterwards, to alter that plan, and to erect them in a different manner. Mr. Myers's contract was not a lump sum for erecting a certain work, but it was made upon the triennial schedule of prices, about which we have been speaking, and it stated the per-centage below those schedule prices at which he would do the work which it was appointed to him to do. He agreed to do the work at 21 per cent. below those schedule prices; there were a great number of contractors, and his amount was the lowest. On the day when I brought forward the

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the Ordnance Estimates in Parliament, I, in answer to the Noble Lord, the Member for Totnes, stated, that the barracks which were going to be erected at Aldershott would cost only 25 *l.* per man. I made that statement upon the authority of a written statement which I had received from the office of the Inspector-general of Fortifications. Lord Panmure made a similar statement in the House of Lords. To my horror, the day, I think, after I had moved the Estimates, when I went up to the Ordnance Office, I found that the statement which had been put into my hands, and which I, of course, had been perfectly justified in considering accurate, as I received it from the proper authority, had been entirely inaccurate, and that, according to the mode proposed for the erection of those buildings, they would cost infinitely more. I immediately went to Lord Panmure, and said, "I must go down at once to the House of Commons; I must tell them that I have made them an erroneous statement, and I must devise some way or other to put this 250,000 *l.* at their disposal again, in order that they may, upon the new showing of the case, having granted the money upon the statement which I previously made to them, if they please, reject it." Lord Panmure told me, before I did that, to make some inquiries with regard to the matter, and see whether it would not be possible to carry out the work upon a different plan, and in a mode which would be consistent with the statement which we had made. I went back and made inquiries upon that subject. It so happened, that just at that moment, we had had a committee sitting upon the subject, composed of very intelligent men, who had made inquiries from many of the principal builders in the country, as to the best mode of erecting barracks; and I found that I was enabled to arrange with Mr. Myers that a really good and solid barrack, which should last for 60 or 70 years, should be constructed for the price at which we had pledged ourselves to the House of Commons to construct it. Mr. Myers did not make the slightest difficulty with regard to the alteration of the plan; he never ceased for a moment to be charged with the execution of the work, and I believe it is proceeding at this very instant at Aldershott.

19539. Are these barracks which are now being constructed, exactly the same as those which you announced to The House were to be constructed?—No; they are perfectly different.

19540. You asked the House of Commons for supplies for a certain house, and now you are using those supplies for another house?—No; what I asked the House of Commons was, to give me 250,000 *l.* to build barracks for 10,000 men, at the rate of 25 *l.* a head, and I am going most religiously to discharge the obligation which I then contracted.

19541. Are these new houses as good as what you first contemplated, in your opinion?—In my opinion they will be as serviceable for this generation, and probably for the next, as the buildings which it was proposed to erect; they will not certainly last so long; but in my opinion a barrack which lasts 60 or 70 years, lasts quite long enough.

19542. When you made the statement to The House, did you state what time these barracks were to last; what their nature was?—No; my statement was simply to the effect which I have now described.

19543. But you used the word "permanent" barracks in the estimate, did you not?—Most distinctly I did.

19544. Do you consider those now to be erected permanent barracks?—Certainly.

19545. Were any representations made to you that huts or barracks could be constructed at a cheaper rate than even 25 *l.* a man?—No representation was made to me, that permanent barracks could be constructed at a lower rate; at least I do not recollect any; such a number of representations came in from inventors, that a person would be rather rash to say he had never received one, but I never recollect receiving one.

19546. Going back to the case of Colonel Bruce, is it not the fact, as stated by Sir Thomas Hastings, that after that case of the contract he did not attend and vote at your Board?—He certainly did attend; he has always attended and voted.

19547. He did not sign contracts?—That I am not able to answer.

19548. Was any doubt entertained at all at the Board of his power to enter into contracts, on account of not having a patent?—I think that the actual signing the legal contract would be a different thing from accepting a tender.

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Accepting a tender is binding upon the Board, but then there is the legal proceeding afterwards of signing a regular formal document. Now that document must be signed, according to the Act of Parliament, by two of the principal officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance. I do not consider that Colonel Bruce would come under the description in the Act of Parliament, therefore I do not think that he could sign one of those formal documents.

19549. Why would not he come under the description in the Act of Parliament. Because he had not his patent, or because he was not one of the principal officers?—It is a legal question which I cannot answer. I do not know whether his not having his patent prevents him from coming under the description in the Act of Parliament.

19550. *Chairman.*] You stated that he did not come under that description. Why did you think that he did not come under that description?—Simply because he has not his patent. I wish to guard myself from being supposed to express a decided opinion upon that subject.

19551. Mr. *Layard.*] Would there have been any objection to giving him his patent, although for a limited period?—I do not think there would have been the slightest objection.

19552. Is there any expense attending the patent?—Yes.

19553. *Chairman.*] He would have been put to that?—Yes.

19554. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you know what the expense is?—I think it is 75 *l.*, as well as I recollect.

19555. And is it the custom in the public service that the officer shall pay for his own patent?—I can only speak for myself, that I had the pleasure of paying for mine.

19556. *Chairman.*] Colonel Bruce had his appointment conferred upon him, with the understanding that it might be a temporary appointment?—Quite so.

19557. And therefore the incurring of expense would have been incurring expense for an appointment that might not have lasted above a few months?—Exactly so.

19558. And that, I suppose, was the reason why the patent was not taken out?—I presume so.

19559. Mr. *Layard.*] You were in the Ordnance when the war broke out, I think?—Yes.

19560. Was the Ordnance at that time in a state to meet any urgent demands which might be made upon it?—Certainly not.

19561. To what do you attribute that want of proper fitness?—There was undoubtedly not a sufficient quantity of stores and not sufficient means of procuring them; that applies to such articles as I have described in my evidence, fuses and other warlike stores, and altogether I think we were in a state of very considerable difficulty. It seems to me that it was absolutely necessary to use very extraordinary means to overcome those difficulties. If we had not done so, I believe we should have been in a very much worse state than we have been in.

19562. To what do you attribute that deficiency?—I attribute the deficiency almost entirely, in fact I attribute it altogether, to the very small amount of all sorts of warlike stores that we had in our hands at the time the war began.

19563. General *Peel.*] And was not it attributable to Parliament not having voted the money for the purpose?—Yes, if the money was asked for in Parliament; it was attributable, I should think, as much to Government as to Parliament.

19564. Mr. *Layard.*] Had Parliament ever refused to grant money?—I never heard of its refusing a single halfpenny.

19565. Then is it fair to throw upon Parliament the state of the Ordnance?—No, I think Government is quite as much responsible as Parliament.

19566. By your account, the Board does not seem to have worked very harmoniously together; when did that state of things commence?—The Board worked perfectly harmoniously together until the beginning of the month of November. At that time certain strong differences of opinion arose between Sir Thomas Hastings on the one hand and Sir Hew Ross and myself on the other. Sir Hew Ross and I worked most perfectly harmoniously together until this unfortunate difference arose with regard to Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer; and I should wish to state, in the strongest possible manner, my opinion that even in that difference, though I thought Sir Hew Ross certainly took

took a very wrong view, at the same time I think he took a view which was very natural to him, as an old military man, and I do not find the least fault with him for having done so.

19567. When were you first informed that there would be any change in the Ordnance?—I have known for the last year that changes were impending in the Ordnance, but I do not think that there was any definite plan for a change before the month of February last. In the month of February, I understand that Government had considered and nearly decided upon a plan for a change: and I think that that, perhaps, will explain a good deal of the difficulties which have arisen since. Really, we were in a sort of moribund state; it was almost impossible to know exactly what course to pursue with regard to any question, when one believed that the whole constitution and the whole organisation would be changed from week to week.

19568. But that was only a belief on your mind, and on the minds of those who were with you at the Board?—I do not know whether it was the belief of those who were with me at the Board; it was my strong belief, from circumstances that I was aware of.

19569. Did that impression interfere with the public service?—Yes; I think it did.

19570. Do you think it was advisable, that at such a moment there should be such a state of things as you have described in the Ordnance department?—No; I think certainly not.

19571. Sir Thomas Hastings has spoken a good deal of the change which took place in the way of conducting business in the Ordnance, after the separation of the Colonies from the War department; is that the case; was there such a difference?—Undoubtedly. Whether the difference arose at the precise moment when the change took place, I am not prepared to say; I think not; but undoubtedly a very considerable difference did take place.

19572. Was the change which took place in the War department specially notified to the Ordnance?—I am not aware that it was.

19573. Did the separation confer any new powers upon the Minister for War, which he had not before exercised as Minister for the Colonies?—Undoubtedly not; there was no new patent, and no Act of Parliament.

19574. But I understood Sir Thomas Hastings to say, that from the time when the separation took place, the Minister for War assumed powers which he had not previously exercised with respect to the Ordnance?—Undoubtedly; because those powers existed before in the Secretary of State, but he did not use them.

19575. Were you absent during the months of November and December, as has been stated to the Committee?—No, I was most constantly in London, during both the months of November and December. When I found myself obliged to be absent for any time, I thought it my duty to tender my resignation to the Duke of Newcastle. The Duke of Newcastle kindly said, that he considered it of importance to the public service that I should remain, and I did so.

19576. Can you state how many of the principal officers of the department were absent at one time?—At what time?

19577. At any particular time?—There have been times, as I have already described, when there was only one principal officer.

19578. Take the time when there were the fewest members of the department; to what was it reduced?—The office was reduced at one time to only one. I myself have been there alone, as described in the question with regard to the machinery and Captain Boxer. During the month of November, I rather think there were generally three of the Board officers in town; I was myself living within 2 ½ hours of town, and used to come up three or four times a week.

19579. *Chairman.*] Which of the officers were permanently absent; was not the Master-general?—Yes.

19580. Was not there also another officer high in command, namely, Colonel Maule?—Colonel Maule was killed.

19581. But was he not permanently absent?—No, he had resigned before went away.

19582. Then Colonel Boyle?—I think Colonel Boyle resigned also before he went.

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19583. Was that the Surveyor-general?—No, Colonel Boyle was secretary to the Master-general.

19584. What was Colonel Maule?—Surveyor-general.

19585. Was his place filled up?—No.

19586. Mr. *Layard.*] You say that you have lately become the sole organ of communication between the Ordnance Department and the Minister for War; how was that effected?—Simply because the meetings which I described, yesterday, which used to take place at the office of the Minister for War, have not taken place lately; when they took place Sir Hew Ross and I generally used to attend them; since that, Lord Panmure's wishes to the Board of Ordnance, when they have not been expressed officially (of course they have generally been expressed in official letters), have been expressed through me.

19587. Sir Thomas Hastings stated that almost everything was carried on by verbal communication?—There were an immense number of official letters.

19588. Were you also in intimate communication with the Horse Guards?—Sometimes I was; I very frequently saw Lord Hardinge; not exclusively; I think I was about in the same way the exclusive medium of communication with the War Minister as Sir Thomas Hastings was with the Admiralty.

19589. Who was generally the medium of communication with the Horse Guards?—I do not think that there are many unofficial communications with the Horse Guards; there are some; not any very great number. Generally, the communications with the Horse Guards are by official letters.

19590. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Duke of Newcastle states in his evidence, that in August his difficulties were very much increased by the inadequacy of the staff at the Ordnance. He states that he represented that the staff of the Ordnance was extremely unsatisfactory; and in another answer he says, "I was dissatisfied with the organisation of the Ordnance Department;" do you concur in opinion with the Duke of Newcastle in respect to that state of the department?—I concur most fully in it, and most frequently stated it.

19591. Accordingly, are you of opinion that the breaking out of the war was exactly the period at which the office of Master-general should have been left vacant, and the Board of Ordnance left in the state described by the Duke of Newcastle?—No, I think not; but at the same time the Right honourable Gentleman will, I think, at once clearly see that the existence of a Master-general, and of a Secretary of State for War, with the powers which it is understood that Secretary of State is to exercise, is perfectly incompatible; it is impossible that there can be both.

19592. In what respect were the powers of the Secretary of State for War different from the powers which the Secretary of State for the Colonies and for War had previously to the separation?—I presume that there is no legal change; but I consider that there is a very great change indeed in this respect, as I have already stated three or four times, that the powers which were before latent and undeveloped have become active and developed.

19593. How were those powers applied in the administration of the Board of Ordnance; did the Secretary of State take upon himself the duties of the Master-general?—No, I do not think he did. I think that the chief interference on the part of the Secretary of State was in deciding what was to be done, not as to the mode of doing things. In some particular cases which we have already referred to, undoubtedly he interfered beyond that; but I am speaking now generally. I think generally his interference was merely in the way of giving orders to an executive Board.

19594. But if a war had taken place, the Secretary of State, whether he was both Secretary of State for the Colonies and for War, or Secretary of State for War alone, would have given his orders to the Master-general and the department of the Ordnance, as had been the case in former wars?—Yes, I presume so.

19595. Therefore, the office of the Master-general being vacant, and the whole Board of Ordnance thrown into a state of disorganisation on that account, was the same hinderance to the public service as if there had been no change in the department of the Secretary of State?—I am afraid it was, to a considerable extent. I wish distinctly to state, that, up to the month of November, at all events, and, I think, I should go lower down than that, I do not think there was any harm done; but, I think, after that there was.

19596. You

19596. You state, in that memorandum relative to Captain Boxer and Colonel Wilson, that, for a short time in April, you were the only officer at the Board of Ordnance?—Quite so.

19597. Do you think that that was a fit state of things, the month of April being the peculiar month in which the war equipments were required for the army?—I do not consider that it was at all a fit state; but I certainly am prepared to maintain that the public service did not suffer any injury by it. I may be quite wrong; but I am of opinion that the public service did not suffer an injury; that is to say, that we did execute all the orders given to us promptly.

19598. *Chairman.*] Not "we," that "I" did?—The Honourable gentleman must see that I am pressed to answer these questions; I do not want to make any statement with regard to myself, of course.

19599. Mr. *Ellice.*] Does that answer refer to the civil or to the military duties of the Board of Ordnance?—I merely speak as to the civil duties. If the Right honourable Gentleman has imagined that I have stated, that, in any way, the military duties of the Board of Ordnance have not been discharged in the best possible way, he has misunderstood me. I think nothing can be better than the way in which the whole of the military arrangements of the Ordnance was carried on; there was never a single instance when whatever was required was not ready before the ship was ready for it; I think Sir Hew Ross discharged those duties in a manner most creditable to himself.

19600. When Sir Hew Ross is asked whether he has the same powers as the Master-general, he says, "No; the Master-general was supreme over the Board; I do not possess that power; I am only a member of the Board?"—Exactly so.

19601. Do you think that all these difficulties and embarrassments and dissensions at the Board of Ordnance could have occurred if there had been a Master-general?—No; I have stated already, in answer to the honourable gentleman the Member for Aylesbury, that these dissensions did not break out until the month of November, and therefore it was with reference to that statement that I made the other statement which I have just now made, that I do not think the public service suffered any great injury from the absence of the Master-general until the month of November.

19602. Therefore, in fact, although you consider that the state of things was extremely unsatisfactory at the period of the breaking out of the war, and that the disorganisation of this great department was injurious to the public interests, it accidentally happened that the public interests did not suffer?—Up to that particular time; but then the right honourable gentleman must please to recollect this, that it imposed a very large additional amount of labour indeed upon the persons who were at that period in the department, and I most frequently represented to the Government, the great importance of appointing a person to supply the place of Colonel Maule; therefore I do not think there is anything inconsistent in the statements.

19603. When you personally found yourself unable to attend to these duties, which fell very heavily upon you in consequence of the state of the Board of Ordnance, and tendered your resignation to the Government, did it appear to you that your absence from your post would be in the least manner prejudicial to the public service?—Yes; in fact, I tendered my resignation in a stronger way than that.

19604. You pressed it, in fact, upon the Government?—I put it strongly.

19605. General *Peel.*] You stated that, up to the month of November, no difficulties occurred in the working of the Board of Ordnance?—I think not.

19606. Lord Raglan was absent from what month?—I think he was absent from the beginning of April.

16607. It therefore was not the absence of the Master-general that had interfered with the working of the Board of Ordnance up to November?—No.

19608. Was not it from the interference of the Secretary for War, and not knowing to what extent that interference was to take place, that the difficulties arose between the members of the Board of Ordnance?—In my opinion, if the Secretary for War had not interfered as he did in the way of giving those constant orders, verbal orders and orders on scraps of paper, however irregular they

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they may be, the army would have been in an infinitely worse state than it was in, on account of the want of clothing and necessaries.

19609. I am now speaking as to carrying on harmoniously the duties of the Board of Ordnance amongst themselves?—If the Honourable and gallant Member will be so good as to ask me a question with regard to any specific case, I will give him my opinion upon it.

19610. To what do you attribute the first disruption of the harmony?—I attribute it to the fact that Sir Hew Ross and I (we both of us agreed entirely upon the matter) considered it a matter absolutely essential to the public service that we should extend the sphere in which we were purchasing small arms, and that we should send and endeavour to get as many as we could at Liege; that was the first point. The second point was one upon which we have had great discussion, namely, as to the foundry.

19611. Colonel *Lindsay*.] You have stated in your evidence that the Ordnance were short of military stores; that they were in an unsatisfactory state?—Yes, distinctly I have.

19612. Was the period to which you allude the time when the war broke out?—Yes.

19613. When did you first give orders, or when did the department first give orders, to increase the military stores consequent upon the war?—They undoubtedly worked as hard as they could from the month of February; but I imagine that even in the anticipation of the war they set to work beforehand; but then they had a great deal of lee-way to make up.

19614. Are you acquainted generally with what military stores there were in the possession of the Ordnance at the time the war broke out?—I have a return here, which I brought down in consequence of a question with regard to the amount of shell; at least, the three different sorts of shell. I think that, as to small arms, we were in an unsatisfactory state.

19615. Mr. *Layard*.] Have the Board of Ordnance been in communication continually with Lord Raglan during his absence?—No, I think not.

19616. You have not referred to him for decision upon any point?—No. Sir Hew Ross may have asked him a few questions probably upon some mere military points. I really do not know. I have not communicated with him, except privately.

19617. You have not depended upon Lord Raglan's decision for any acts of the Board?—Distinctly not.

19618. Colonel *Lindsay*.] The object of my question is this: you have stated generally that you were in an unsatisfactory state at the commencement of the war; I wish to know whether large orders were given by the Ordnance for the increase of military stores, in anticipation of the war breaking out, namely, for instance, at the time when Russia and Turkey declared war?—I think considerable preparations were made; but I could not, without looking and getting returns for the Honourable Gentleman, answer that question in a very satisfactory way.

19619. Speaking generally, is it your opinion, as a member of the Board of Ordnance, that you did order a large quantity of stores in anticipation of the war breaking out in March?—Yes; I think that there were increased exertions to procure stores, but not at all to the same extent that there were afterwards.

19620. In 1853, had you taken large estimates for the supply of a considerable increase of military stores?—Yes, undoubtedly.

19621. General *Peel*.] Were not the fleets for the Baltic and the Black Sea fitted out at a very short notice from the stores of the Ordnance?—In a wonderfully short time, and it was done in a very great measure by the admirable working of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich, which prepared the carriages and everything connected with the arrangements which they had to do with in a most remarkable manner, and with the most wonderful rapidity.

19622. Lord *Seymour*.] You have stated that you think there was a very scanty supply of stores; are you of opinion, or not, that during the six or eight years before this war, more money had been voted by Parliament, and spent for the supply of stores to the Ordnance, than had ever been voted before during a time of peace?—I am not aware of that fact.

19623. You are not aware of the enormous amount which had been voted by

by Parliament, compared with former years; for works in the Laboratory, for instance?—Will the Noble Lord state whether he applies his question to the last 2 ½ years?

19624. To within the last six years?—With regard to the first 3¼ of those years, of course, I cannot speak; I can only speak with regard to the last 2¼ years. Undoubtedly, during the time that I have been in office, a very great deal has been done for the Laboratory in the way of erecting new machinery, and increasing its productive powers; and Parliament has given very liberal sums for that purpose.

19625. You are not aware, for instance, that whereas in 1815 the charge for wages in the Laboratory was 5,000 *l.* a year; in 1849–50, and following years, it had grown to 16,000 *l.* a year?—No doubt it is so, if the Noble Lord states it.

19626. When you were called upon to provide for the probability of war, did you not look into the state of the stores in the Ordnance department?—Undoubtedly; we looked very much indeed into the state of the stores; and, as I say, with regard to many very important stores, particularly with regard to fuses and bouching shells, we found our state a very unsatisfactory one.

19627. Then the large expenditure which had been granted by Parliament had not availed for the purpose of making the stores satisfactory?—Certainly not.

19628. For instance, in 1848–49 I find 502,000 *l.*, that is above half-a-million of money voted, for stores in that one year; during a time of peace there could be no such expenditure of stores as that?—The universal complaint, certainly, which I have heard at the Ordnance, in matters of which I am not personally cognisant was, that their stores had been so run down that they, without very great exertions, were not prepared to meet the demands of the war.

19629. I find that they were preparing ball cartridge each year above six millions; preparing that quantity during a time of peace would have made some store for a time of war?—I do not see the use of those ball cartridges for the Miniés, because the Miniés had not been introduced till afterwards, and in that particular, of course, very great exertions were necessary.

19630. Captain *Gladstone.*] Can you state in what other description of stores you were deficient?—I have stated shell, and I rather think shot; I will take the case even of those very gun carriages of which I have been speaking; the quantity of them that had to be provided was very large, and the rapidity with which they had to be provided was very great indeed; the thing was done, because the Royal Carriage department was in the most perfect order possible; there was machinery there of the most admirable description for carrying on every sort of work, and consequently they were enabled to provide, in the most rapid manner, the stores which they had to supply.

19631. Were those gun carriages of the new description?—That I cannot answer; they were of the description approved of by the Board of Admiralty.

19632. Can you name any other stores which were deficient?—It appears to me that, with regard to almost every description of store, with regard even to gunpowder, there was not at all that quantity which there ought to have been at the commencement of a war; consequently we had to make very great exertions in order to put ourselves in a better position, and I think now in that position we certainly are.

19633. *Chairman.*] Was it not said, or if not said, insinuated, that you had persuaded Lord Panmure to deprive Sir Hew Ross of the power of appointing clerks, because he (Sir Hew) had declined to promote a person on the recommendation of yourself?—That was the statement which I understood to be made; it was made yesterday, in my hearing, by Sir Thomas Hastings; I have not the paper here now.

19634. Have you any explanation to make of that?—No explanation in the world; I have to give the most unequivocal, decided, and distinct contradiction which can by possibility be given to it; it is utterly groundless; there is not the slightest foundation even for the imagination of it.

19635. I want to direct your attention to the Crimean huts: when did the Ordnance first receive any order respecting those huts?—I am afraid I have not the memorandum upon the subject. Does the Honourable Gentlemen wish to have a very accurate account, or only about the time?

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19636. About the time will do?—I think they were ordered either at the end of the month of November, or the beginning of the month of December; and I recollect that they were got up in a very short time indeed.

19637. What steps did the Ordnance take upon that order being sent from the War Minister?—I have the following memorandum: "The order for the construction of the huts for 20,000 men is dated War Department, 18th November 1854, and was received by the Ordnance on the 20th; on the same day the Board referred the subject to the Inspector-general of Fortifications, and applied to the Admiralty for tonnage, to the extent of 4,000 tons; 2,000 tons to be taken up at Southampton, and 2,000 tons at Portsmouth. On the same day the Inspector-general of Fortifications transmitted his reply, with a letter from Sir Frederick Smith, who stated that on the 16th he had received a communication from the General Commanding-in-chief to wait upon him, to consider what would be the best description of hut to send out to the Crimea. The project of a hut to contain 20 soldiers was approved of; but he was directed by Lord Hardinge to place himself in communication with Colonel Tulloh, of the War Office, a member of the committee on Aldershott buildings; with him he found Mr. Potter (of the firm of Price & Potter, of Gloucester; who had proposed for the hut in question a structure of wood, on the principle of those supplied to Australian emigrants; 300 of these huts were on the 17th November ordered by the Secretary-at-War, through Sir Frederick Smith and Colonel Tulloh."

19638. Lord *Seymour*.] They were ordered before the order came to the Ordnance?—No doubt.

19639. Then in this case the Secretary-at-War ordered them?—Yes, so it appears.

19640. He ordered 300 huts without any communication with the Ordnance?—Yes; and he communicated immediately afterwards to the Ordnance that he had done so.

19641. *Chairman*.] Then the memorandum is incorrect at its commencement; I asked you when you first heard of it, and your answer to me was, on the 20th?—Quite so; this part of the memorandum is something about what the Secretary-at-War did before he communicated with the Ordnance; here is the letter; the Secretary-at-War, as I understand, gave the order for the huts; the Secretary for War gave the order to the Ordnance.

19642. Lord *Seymour*.] The Secretary-at-War gave the order for 300 huts?—Yes.

19643. *Chairman*.] On the 17th of November?—Yes; and the Secretary for War then wrote on the 18th of November.

19644. You got it on the 20th?—Yes; "The objection submitted to the Board to Mr. Potter's system of construction, by Sir Frederick Smith, was in the roof planks being laid vertically instead of horizontally, the latter system being considered a greater security against leakage; and in the timber used by Messrs. Price & Potter being American yellow pine and spruce, instead of yellow Baltic timber. The Board, however, considering the urgency of the case, accepted Messrs. Price & Potter's tender for the 300 huts, and stipulated that in the 200 remaining huts to be constructed by them, the roof boards should be laid horizontally. A tender from Mr. Camwell, for 500 huts, was at the same time accepted, making in all 1,000 huts, equal to 20,000 men; no delay can be said to have occurred, as the whole was settled in one day; the tender of Messrs. Price was at 27 *l.* per hut, to be delivered at Gloucester; the tender of Mr. Camwell was at 34 *l.* per hut, to be delivered on board ship at Southampton or Portsmouth, the difference of carriage from Gloucester to Portsmouth or Southampton, and the inferiority of the timber used by Messrs. Potter for the construction of the first 300 huts. On the 20th of November, tenders were accepted; on the 3d of December the first vessel, the 'Norman,' sailed from Southampton with 80 huts on board; on the 4th of December, the 'Cumberland' followed with 80 huts; on the 6th, the 'Metropolitan,' with 93; on the 7th, the 'Hetton,' with 80 huts; on the 8th, the 'Cosmopolitan,' with 80; on the 9th, the 'John Bowes,' with 80; on the 10th, the 'William Hutt,' with 104; on the 12th, the 'Sir J. Easthope,' with 70; on the 14th, the 'Allaster,' with 90. Thus by the 14th of December, or in 25 days from the time the order was given by the War Department, contracts had been entered

entered into, the huts had been constructed, and not less than 757 sailed for the Crimea, with a proper proportion of stores."

19645. There is a reference there to the difference of the material employed. By the second contract was it undertaken to make the huts of Baltic timber?—I am not prepared to answer that.

19646. The memorandum says that the difference in the price was occasioned by one set being engaged to be embarked and made of a superior timber to those made by Messrs. Potter?—Quite so.

19647. Of what timber were those superior huts made?—I think Sir Frederick Smith will be able to answer that question.

19648. Lord *Seymour*.] In obtaining those huts was there a contract made by the Ordnance? Sir Frederick Smith objected to the first plan; afterwards was there a contract?—"Accepted Messrs. Price & Potter's tender." Practically there was a contract.

19649. Who accepted it?—The Board of Ordnance.

19650. When did they accept it?—On the 20th of November.

19651. That communication only came on the 18th?—Yes.

19652. On the 20th they accepted the tender?—Yes. The communication was written on the 18th, but only received on the 20th; therefore they accepted the tender, as it appears from this, the very day on which the sanction from the Minister of War came.

19653. They sent to Mr. Potter on the very day that they got his tender, for how many huts?—I think that Sir Frederick Smith will better explain that. I presume that we were made cognisant of the order that had been given to him on the 17th.

19654. What had the Board done in regard to that?—They entered into a contract on the 20th of November.

19655. Were you in town then?—I cannot speak as to the particular day. I rather think I was.

19656. Have you any record of the price at which you accepted that tender?—Yes; it is stated, two prices.

19657. What was the price accepted?—From Messrs. Price 27 *l.* per hut, to be delivered at Gloucester; and the tender of Mr. Camwell was at 34 *l.* per hut, to be delivered on board ship at Southampton or Portsmouth.

19658. Who is Mr. Camwell?—He was either at Southampton or Portsmouth.

19659. Those huts were of the same size, were they not?—Yes, I believe they were.

19660. With respect to the Minié rifles, Sir Thomas Hastings has stated that he objected strongly to an application being sent to Liege. I ask you whether you concurred in his view, or whether you agreed in opinion with the Secretary for War, as to that application being made to Liege?—Both Sir Hew Ross and I were most strongly of opinion that it was of the greatest possible importance to send to Liege.

19661. Then in that respect, Sir Hew Ross and yourself differed from Sir Thomas Hastings entirely?—Yes; Sir Hew Ross and I never differed on any subject except the question regarding Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer, so far as I recollect.

19662. This question was put to Sir Thomas Hastings by the Honourable Member for Aylesbury: "You stated to the Committee just now, that there were several instances in which the authority of the Board had been interfered with, and you have only given one?" and he answered, "Yes, I have given two now;" and in answer to Question 19102, "Can you mention any appointments or any promotions that have been made by the Secretary for War?" he stated, "I do not think that any appointment has been made by him, so far as I understand from Sir Hew Ross; in reply to my question about the promotion of a clerk, I understood him to say, 'I have no longer the power of making these appointments; I have had an intimation that my power is suspended;' and he then told me how it arose; he said, 'I am sorry I cannot do this, but some little time ago Mr. Monsell wished me to promote a particular person; I found that I could not do it over the head of some person, and a very deserving person;' and he said, showing me a letter, 'If you read that, you will see the reason;' it was a letter from the private secretary of the Secretary for War." Upon that it was asked, "Who was the Secretary for War then?" and he

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answered, "Lord Panmure; that letter was from his private secretary, saying that during the present period of uncertainty in the office, only temporary appointments were to be made. I should add, that that applies to what I have now stated about Mr. Monsell's applying for the promotion of a clerk, which Sir Hew Ross could not concede to him, and he received, in consequence of that, the note which I have named"?—Quite so.

19663. Do you differ from what has been stated there by Sir Thomas Hastings?—Yes. I state most distinctly that Sir Hew Ross never received any letter from Lord Panmure with regard to any appointment, or from his private secretary, on account of his having refused to promote a clerk whom I had recommended.

19664. What he states is this: "Some little time ago," Sir Hew Ross stated, "Mr. Monsell wished me to promote a particular person; I found that I could not do it over the head of some person, and a very deserving person; and he said, showing me a letter, 'If you read that, you will see the reason;' it was a letter from the private secretary of the Secretary for War;" how can you know what private letter Sir Hew Ross has seen?—The point which I was anxious to be asked a question upon was this: it appeared to me, I hope I am mistaken, that Sir Thomas Hastings wished to convey this impression to the Committee, that I, in consequence of Sir Hew Ross's not having done a certain thing, which I asked him to do, had got Lord Panmure to write a private letter, to prohibit him, Sir Hew Ross, from making any appointment at the Ordnance.

19665. *Chairman.*] No; I think you have made a mistake; what Sir Thomas Hastings intended to say was, that an application had been made to Sir Hew Ross to promote a person, and he said he could not do it, because he had received this letter from the Secretary for War?—That is very different indeed.

19666. Then there is Question 18927 on the 4th of May 1855: "Has there been any other business of importance carried on through the Ordnance which has not been brought officially to your knowledge?" and his answer is, "That I cannot say at present; there is one thing, the question of contract for foundries at Woolwich has been carried on in a different way to that which I have described as the mode of contracting. An inspector of machinery has been sent to purchase large quantities of iron for the purposes of the foundry, without the usual system of contract being followed out, and that is a variation from the way of doing business." Are the facts there stated accurately stated?—Certainly not. I find here a minute in my handwriting to the following effect: "Direct Mr. Anderson," the Inspector of Machinery, "to make inquiry with regard to the price at which different stores used in the manufacturing departments at Woolwich are procured, and to suggest any alterations in that mode which may appear to him to be cheaper. Desire a list of the present prices of all such articles to be furnished to Mr. Anderson. Desire Mr. Abel to pursue a similar course with regard to all chemical ingredients used in the Arsenal. Request him further to send weekly reports of the articles he examines and tests in the different departments." That was signed both by Sir Thomas Hastings and by myself. I find that the order to purchase the iron was signed by Sir Thomas Hastings as well as by myself. That is so far as to the question between me and Sir Thomas Hastings. As to the further question about the irregularity: it is not the regular way to purchase anything except by contract; but in these instances I think we were perfectly justified in doing it, and that we exercised a wise discretion in making the purchase as we did make it. By a paper that I have in my hand, it appears that the saving which will result from our having pursued that course is very great indeed. I find this: "An order was given to purchase 2,000 tons of pig iron of certain sorts, the contract price for which is an average of 125 *s.*; for the same iron by the new system, 98 *s.* 6 *d.* Likewise, also, in coal, of which about 40 tons is consumed daily in the Arsenal, a saving of 4 *s.* per ton has been effected."

19667. Lord *Seymour.*] Do you conclude from that, that it would be proper to abandon the system of contract?—Decidedly not. I think the exception of deviating from the system of contract, is one which ought to be most carefully guarded; it ought only to be done under very peculiar circumstances; and although I may think that the public, by purveyors, might be supplied more cheaply, I think it would be very inexpedient for any public department to subject

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subject themselves, or the Government of the country, to imputations which, no doubt, would result from an entire abandonment, or even from any very great abandonment of the system of contract.

19668. *Chairman.*] So that, as far as the statement of Sir Thomas Hastings is concerned, he made the statement accurately, in saying that it was irregular? —Perfectly so.

19669. Captain *Gladstone.*] You stated that no differences took place at the Board of Ordnance before November. Did you not receive a communication from Sir Thomas Hastings, to the effect that he had no difference with you till a later period, until the difference that occurred in connexion with Captain Boxer? —I received a letter from him to that effect. The simple statement is this, that feeling very uncomfortable at there being these dissensions, I wrote a letter to Sir Thomas Hastings, very earnestly appealing to him to put them aside, and he wrote me a kind answer in return; but unfortunately, these differences about Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer revived them; that is the whole statement of the case.

Major-General Sir *J. M. Frederick Smith*, K. H., R. E., called in; and Examined.

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19670. *Chairman.*] WHAT position do you occupy?—At the present moment I am Commanding Engineer of the South-West and Sussex district.

19671. You wish to make some explanation to the Committee, in consequence of some misconception which you fancy might arise from the evidence given by Mr. Potter?—I do.

19672. What explanation is it that you wish to give?—I am desirous of showing that, on the part of the Ordnance, and on the part of the officers acting under the Ordnance, there was no unnecessary delay in procuring or sending the huts to the Crimea.

19673. Where did you get your first instructions from?—My first instructions were to wait upon the Commander-in-chief, in a letter from Colonel Tulloch, which I will read: "War Office, Wednesday, 15th of November. My dear Sir Frederick,—I have just left Lord Hardinge, who has requested me to write to you, to meet me to-morrow at two o'clock, here, on the subject of the huts for the Crimea; and I hope to have the proposed contractor also, when everything can be settled, as there is great pressure. I hope it will be convenient for you to come, for your assistance is much needed. Yours very truly, *Alexander Tulloch.*—I think we must have the houses all of wood, as the cost of any inferior materials would be so much for freight." On the receipt of that letter, being then in the double position of Commanding Engineer and commanding the troops in the whole of the South-western and Sussex District, I considered myself under the direct orders of the Commander-in-chief, as well as under the Master-general of the Ordnance. I therefore attended, first of all, at Lord Hardinge's office, at the hour appointed; and he said, "I wish you, and the Secretary at War wishes you, to confer with Colonel Tulloch, who is taking some steps towards procuring huts to be sent to the Crimea." I proceeded to the office of Colonel Tulloch, where I met a gentleman of the name of Potter, whom Colonel Tulloch represented to be a person well skilled in the construction of huts of a temporary character, of easy transport, and suited to the purposes of the army in the Crimea. I begged to see a plan of the huts, and I at once discovered it to have certain defects; first of all, it was of too slight a structure to bear the rough usage which it was likely to meet with on the hills near Sebastopol; and in the next place of a bad proportion, of a proportion that would have given no passage between the men's beds; besides which the hut was too short, consequently involving an extra price, and a great number of cross partitions; because the longer a hut is made, provided that the length does not become inconvenient to the troops, so far as regards their comfort, the better it must be, in point of economy, because cross partitions are saved.

19674. Lord *Seymour.*] What was the date of your visit to Colonel Tulloch? —The 16th of November.

19675. On that day you had an interview with Colonel Tulloch and Mr. Potter?—Yes. Having explained to Mr. Potter the defects of his construction, he said, "I am myself not a practical man. I am a timber merchant, but I

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will go down to Gloucester and will get a revised plan prepared by my practical man, and bring it up to-morrow, if that will suit your convenience." I assented. I then saw the Secretary-at-War, and I stated what had passed; that I had been called up by Lord Hardinge and had met Mr. Potter at Colonel Tulloch's office, and I wished to know in what position I was to stand; because I said, "As an Ordnance officer I am very ready to give my advice, but I can take no step except under the direct order of my own Board." That I explained most clearly to Mr. Sidney Herbert. I was not quite satisfied with even that, but I went to Colonel Mundy, to whom I understood Colonel Tulloch intended to write. Colonel Mundy was the Secretary to the Duke of Newcastle. I did not see Colonel Mundy; he was, I believe, attending the Duke of Newcastle, who was at a Council, but I came up on the following day. I then told Colonel Mundy what had passed, and I said, "Remember distinctly that whilst I have been most happy to give my opinion, I must be instructed by the Board in any further step that I may take." Colonel Tulloch was very anxious that no time should be lost in sending the huts out. I said, "I believe it is a very pressing service;" but I added, "Remember, I am an Ordnance officer, and I must act under my own Board." It has been inferred that I passed by the Board, but I went that very day to the Inspector-general of Fortifications, when I saw the Assistant Adjutant-general, Colonel Matson, and I related to him what had passed; and I said, "I received this instruction, or this communication has passed, and I wish you to understand that I shall take no steps but by the order of the Board." I guarded myself against any impropriety in form.

19676. Did you not give, on the 17th, any verbal order to Mr. Potter?—Distinctly not, and I have evidence to prove that.

19677. If Mr. Potter has stated to this Committee, at Question 15452, that on the 17th he saw Sir Frederick Smith with Colonel Tulloch and one or two clerks of the Ordnance, and a very long discussion took place for many hours, is that true?—The discussion lasted perhaps for an hour upon the subject of the construction of the huts.

19678. "I wrote out an estimate, both as to the time and the price, but nothing was settled; there seemed to be some difficulty in taking any responsibility, or giving a positive order, although I was then acting on a verbal order which I received from Sir Frederick Smith"?—Which he did not receive from Sir Frederick Smith, and I have evidence to prove it; I guarded myself particularly against that.

19679. He goes on to say, "The next day, the 18th, an inspector was sent by Sir Frederick Smith to Gloucester"?—Yes, that was on the 18th.

19680. The day after you had seen him, at any rate, you sent an inspector down to Gloucester?—Yes, for the purpose of ascertaining the description of hut I had not seen, and was not likely to see, and that I might be able to give, if called upon, a correct report as to its nature.

19681. Mr. Potter stated that Mr. Fabian came down, and that he objected to the materials, yellow pine and spruce, which was a lighter wood than the Christiana deals, which he said was always used by the Board of Ordnance?—Mr. Fabian did object to the material, and to the form of construction.

19682. First he objected to the materials?—Yes.

19683. Did you agree with him in that objection?—Clearly and distinctly.

19684. You thought that the kind of wood was bad?—Yes, I think so.

19685. You admit that it was a lighter wood?—Yes, but it was unsuitable for the purpose.

19686. Was the wood which you desired to have, that which is called in the market Christiana deals?—No, Baltic timber and deal; I think the word Christiana was not mentioned at all.

19687. Having objected to this wood you wished for Baltic wood; was the wood that you wished to have plentiful in the market?—Yes I think so; abundant.

19688. Was it afterwards procured?—For 900 huts.

19689. *Chairman.*] Are you able to distinguish between the one wood and the other?—Certainly, between Baltic and American pine.

19690. You are able to tell whether a hut is made of Baltic timber or American pine?—Certainly.

19691. You are quite prepared to say that those huts which have been sent out as being made of Baltic timber, were really made of Baltic timber?—I have not

not the slightest doubt of it; I beg to say that at the inspection of those huts, every hut, and every piece of every hut, consisting of about 300 pieces, was not one piece of it put on board at Portsmouth without being examined by an officer of engineers, a clerk of the works, a foreman of works, and the sapper in charge of them; I believe every piece of wood that was imperfect was discarded, and there was not a single piece put on board there that was not of Baltic timber.

19692. If anybody has stated that those huts were composed of wood not coming from the Baltic, and that you were entirely deceived in the material of which they were composed, you say that they were wrong?—I believe that is perfectly untrue.

19693. Sir *J. Pakington.*] It has been stated to this Committee that the object of giving protection to the troops would have been better answered if canvas had been sent out for doubling the thickness of the tents, and planking to floor them, instead of sending out those heavy and costly huts; what is your opinion as to that suggestion?—I believe that double canvas would have answered the purpose; in point of fact, I entertain the opinion that single canvas would have answered for the purposes of the Crimea at that time; I think the months of January and February are worse than November and December, and the world at large did not believe the siege would last over the month of December.

19694. Looking to what was the only protection during the months of December and January, is it your opinion that double canvas would have answered, combined with planks for flooring?—I am inclined to think that it would.

19695. Would it not have been much more easily procured; more rapidly procured, and much more easy to put up?—Canvas would have been much more easily transported; I believe more easily procured; and unquestionably much more easily put up.

19696. As the huts were constructed do you think that they were well calculated to afford the covering that the soldiers required in winter?—I think that when they were covered with felt they were impervious to the wet.

19697. Did their erection require skilled labour?—None; and to illustrate that, I may mention that, being at that time in command of the troops at Portsmouth, I instructed the whole of the men of the rifles going out in putting up the huts; they had one day to learn their lesson; but putting them up requires no skilled labour.

19698. Supposing the army had been in possession of proper means of transport, were those huts, in the shape in which they were sent out, easy of conveyance, do you think?—Certainly, those made at Portsmouth were, which were not put up in packages; but the huts made at Gloucester, which were easier of transport by railway, required three or four men to move each package. It is much better, where you employ soldiers, that one man should have his load, than that three, or four, or six should have to carry a load.

19699. Was there any professional examination of those huts?—Mr. Fabian examined every hut at Gloucester. First of all, with him, was Captain Kean, of the Royal Engineers, for three or four days. Captain Kean then came to Southampton to receive the huts, having, as his assistant, a practical foreman of works; a gentleman of the name of Whittle. Captain Kean was sent overland to the Crimea, so that he might arrive before the first vessel, and Mr. Fabian was transferred from Gloucester to Southampton, where he inspected, with the sappers and miners, every part of each hut, and they passed them all; and at Portsmouth the same thing was done. There were three captains of engineers employed there, and there was never one piece of a hut put on board without that inspection.

19700. Were stoves sent out with the huts?—Yes, a stove with each; they were supplied by Sir Thomas Hastings, I think.

19701. You stated, did you not, that felt was sent out to cover the huts?—Yes.

19702. Who supplied that?—It was supplied through the Surveyor of the Inspector-general's department.

19703. Was there any unnecessary delay in shipping the huts when they arrived?—I think that every ship that came alongside found the huts ready for her; there was no one instance of a day's delay, that I know of.

19704. Captain *Gladstone.*] As the huts were for a temporary purpose, what was the reason that the Baltic timber was recommended, when it was much more

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more expensive and heavier?—I should never use American pine for outside work.

19705. But the huts were only for a temporary purpose?—They have not been very temporary.

19706. Mr. *Layard.*] When were the huts first put up in the Crimea?—I think the first vessel was about 16 days going out; they were all screw vessels.

19707. About what time was it?—I think the first vessel left on the 3d of December.

19708. From what has been stated in the public press, a considerable lapse of time took place before they were moved to the front?—I am not able to speak, of my own knowledge, of that.

19709. Do you think that the expense of procuring those huts was equal to the accommodation that they would afford to the troops, considering the late period at which they were sent out?—The accommodation is very perfect.

19710. As a military man, do you think that, after a certain time of the year, the huts would not become much more unhealthy than tents?—I think that they are sufficiently ventilated; it is a question of ventilation; they are cooler in summer, and warmer in winter, than a single tent, though a double tent might be very serviceable; I know that it has been so considered by other officers; I should be quite satisfied to be under a double tent.

19711. What was your opinion of the advisability of sending out those huts?—The Minister of War, the Secretary at War, and the Commander-in-chief having decided upon them, it would be presumptuous in me to give an opinion; but I would not have sent out wooden huts, but canvas coverings.

19712. General *Peel.*] You were not consulted, as an engineer, as to the practicability of supplying the army in the field with those huts?—Not at all.

19713. Captain *Gladstone.*] How long would huts constructed of North American timber have lasted?—They would have lasted, I suppose, a season without splitting or decaying.

19714. If covered with felt as the others were?—It is quite right that the Committee should understand that when the huts were first designed and approved, it was not contemplated to put felt upon them at all; I never gave an opinion as to that.

19715. How long do you think that huts constructed of American timber, particularly spruce, would have lasted?—They are not articles of great durability.

19716. Would they have lasted two or three years?—They might have lasted for a year or two.

19717. Then why was the wood which made so great a difference in the price as between 27 *l.* and 34 *l.* chosen, it being also heavier?—Those are not the figures. The huts approved were to be 28 *l.* 10 *s.*, besides the carriage from Gloucester to Southampton, and dock dues.

19718. At any rate the Baltic timber was dearer and heavier?—Yes, dearer; the weight of the two huts was as nearly as possible the same.

19719. Do you think that that difference of expense was justified by the object?—Had it been for my own purposes I would have used the better timber.

19720. But for a temporary purpose, can you give any reason why the more expensive timber was used?—I never should have used an inferior article for a military purpose; I think that they are more liable to be split and to be knocked to pieces; the other is tougher wood, and less liable to receive injury.

19721. *Chairman.*] The American yellow pine is a particularly lasting wood; spruce particularly so?—I should not object to it for inside work, but I do not like it for outside work.

19722. Is there so great a difference between Baltic timber and the American yellow pine, in respect of durability, as would make the one so much superior to the other?—Perhaps not; but the whole were not yellow pine in Mr. Potter's huts. I should like very much that the Committee should have a better opinion than mine on the subject; upon a matter of this kind, though a very old officer of engineer, I always consult more practical men, who are in our department brought up as carpenters, and who rise to the position of foremen and

and clerks of works, and under their advice I recommended a decidedly better article.

19723. Their opinion may be of value as to the durability or non-durability, but surely their opinion is not one to guide you as to the propriety of having wood which would last one, or two, or three years?—I hope the Committee will let me state that I merely give an opinion; other gentlemen in this room may entertain a different opinion to me, but my opinion was not the opinion that decided the question; my opinion was given to the inspector-general of fortifications, who, advised by his surveyor, decided the question.

19724. You were asked upon what you grounded your preference for the Baltic timber?—Because I think that the one is very durable, and the other, I think, is not.

19725. But the durability is shown not to be a necessity in the thing required?—It was not put to me in that shape; my opinion was asked as to the description of hut to be sent out, and I said Baltic timber in preference to any other.

19726. Being sent out for a particular purpose, you did not suppose that they were going to remain in the Crimea as long as the siege of Troy lasted, viz., 10 years?—What ulterior purposes the Government might have it was not for me to judge of.

19727. Can you speak of the durability of American spruce?—I have less information upon that than as to Baltic timber.

19728. You like the higher price?—I should like the better article.

19729. Lord *Seymour*.] If Mr. Potter has stated that he was required to make them of Christiana deals, is that correct or not?—I think that nothing upon the subject of Christiana deals ever passed with him.

19730. If he stated that he was required to make them of that material, and that he refused, that is an error?—He stated that he had got the articles in a great degree prepared, I believe, when he was in Colonel Tulloch's room; 200 or 300 huts were made.

19731. Was he, or not, required to use Christiana deals?—Certainly not.

19732. Are you aware whether or not Mr. Potter had been accustomed, or his firm had been accustomed, to make houses for emigrants, to a great extent?—He said that he had.

19733. When you sent Mr. Fabian down, was not an inquiry made upon that point?—Mr. Fabian made an inquiry; and he reported that he believed he had, but not to the extent that I was led to suppose when I saw Mr. Potter.

19734. Since those huts have been sent out, have you seen any report from the officers upon them?—None whatever.

19735. You have not heard whether they approve most of the form recommended by Mr. Potter, or the form made at Portsmouth?—I have not heard anything about it.

19736. Mr. Potter stated that on the 26th of November Sir Frederick Smith telegraphed to detain the huts till further orders, and there was a delay occasioned then; do you remember that?—I remember that perfectly well.

19737. He says that on the 29th of November, and up to the 6th and 7th of December, a good deal of telegraphing took place on the subject of those huts?—Yes.

19738. Then the form of them was not finally settled, it appears, till the 7th of December. It is stated: "It was not till the 7th of December that the question as to the form of roof was finally settled"?—The fact was, that I recommended, very strongly, a horizontal covering. Mr. Potter was disposed to use, and, in fact, had prepared, the timber for a vertical roof. The Board accepted his tender for the vertical roof planking, at 27 *l.*, and he said he would require 1 *l.* 10 *s.* more to make the boards suited for being placed horizontally. All my professional men recommended, very much, the horizontal roof, and I preferred it myself, for a reason which I can give the Committee; and it appeared that Mr. Potter, knowing my wish to have it horizontal, had actually proceeded to make them with a horizontal roof without the Board's sanction, for the Board had accepted Contract B. for 27 *l.*, and not Contract C. for 28 *l.* 10 *s.*; but Colonel Tulloch, who was very much mixed up in this, and I think very much out of his position, had a conversation with Mr. Potter, and said: "You may depend upon it you are to make the 28 *l.* 10 *s.* huts; you had better go on;" but as I had the Board of Ordnance to look to,

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and to get the bills paid, I was put in that position that the authority of Colonel Tulloch would not bear me out in it, and I required to get the Board's sanction for the 28 *l.* 10 *s.* hut before I could order it, and that caused a delay, for Mr. Potter was then in France. Then I communicated with his firm, and Messrs. Price & Potter said, "We are told, by Mr. Potter, that we are to make a more expensive hut, and we shall expect the Board to pay for it, and if not, we will not send them." Just about that time I had notice that vessels were coming to Southampton, and it was not desirable that they should be kept, as there would be a question of demurrage, both upon the railway and the docks, for those vessels. I wrote to Mr. Potter, and I said: "You had better send the things, and I will consult the Board about it; if there should be demurrage you will have to pay it." They said: "We will not pay any demurrage; we will have 28 *l.* 10 *s.*, and no difference in our price, in any shape."

19739. General *Peel.*] It was stated by the Rev. Mr. Osborne, in answer to Question 9060, at page 475, "I want to put before the Committee the position in which the staff of engineers, and, in short, every authority in the hospital, were placed, by that sort of indefinite commission that seems to have been given to Lord Redcliffe." He then goes on to say, "And they then set to work to repair a large new ward, to take one side of the barrack not yet occupied, to put down flooring, and prepare it for occupation. The engineer, whom, I must say, I always thought a most active young gentleman, of the name of Gordon, came one morning and told me that 60 Turks (I think as many as that, a large mass of them carpenters), had struck, and refused to work unless they were told who was to pay them. We were all most anxious to get this ward finished; the smell had got most offensive, and we were obliged to move the cholera patients out of the old ward as they were so bad, and the men were dying one after the other, and it was our object to get a new ward finished. Miss Nightingale at once offered to become responsible for all sums of money necessary. I said to Mr. Gordon, that must not be, and that I would infinitely rather be answerable myself. I was afraid lest she should get into any trouble for interfering in a thing of the sort; and I said, 'I will be answerable to you for the money on Saturday next, if it is wanted, to any amount that you may require for this work; I only hope it will reach Lord Redcliffe's ears that I am answerable, and there will be no difficulty then.' That was perfectly true; for within two days the men were set to work, and Lord Redcliffe desired them to apply for the money to him." Now, if the engineer officer was performing the work under proper authority, could he be dependent upon any private source for executing it; could he not secure to the workmen payment for their services?—I think, in the case of engineers employed under a public department, they would have no difficulty, if properly authorised to do the work, in getting the payment made by the Commissariat.

19740. *Chairman.*] Have you any further explanation to make?—No.

19741. Lord *Seymour.*] Was not it proposed by Mr. Potter, when he sent the huts, to send also a box of tools with them to put them up?—Yes, and they were so sent.

19742. Did he propose to put into that box an exact plan of the hut from which a person could judge how to put it up?—He did. A plan of the Portsmouth hut was sent with every hut nailed upon the door of the hut; and I sent plans of Mr. Potter's huts with each cargo.

19743. So that the persons out there could put them up?—Yes, they were so sent.

19744. *Chairman.*] The Committee have been informed that there were huts sent out without nails?—I assure the Committee that with every cargo everything belonging to that cargo went out complete; the sapper employed to put them up was responsible for them; it was quite impossible that anything of the kind could have happened. I can recollect this, that there were bills of lading of every hut, signed by the officer who superintended, and by the storekeeper of the department also, and every possible means was taken to prevent it. I am certain that it did not happen.

19745. If it did happen, it did not happen in consequence of what occurred in England?—Certainly not. I do not believe that that was the fact.

19746. The Committee have been told that there were huts sent from other parts of the world; for instance, Trieste?—Yes.

19747. Are you in a position to say that it did not occur with regard to those

those huts?—I imagine that something of the kind did occur with some huts, but whether they were Trieste huts, or from Constantinople, I cannot tell; certainly not with those that were sent out from this country, that I am quite sure of.

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19748. Captain *Gladstone.*] Were not wooden pegs used in some of the huts?—No; all nails.

19749. *Chairman.*] (To Mr. *Monsell.*) Have you any explanation to make to the Committee?—Yes. This morning, in my evidence with regard to the factory erected by Captain Boxer, I stated that the minute of the Board was not to be found. What I ought to have stated was, that the original paper on which the minute was founded, was not to be found. The minute of the Board is recorded in the records of the Board, and I now hold it in my hand, and with the permission of the Committee, I will hand it in.

[*The same was delivered in, and is as follows:*]

EXTRACT from BOARD'S MINUTES, dated 2 May 1854.

Present:—The Clerk of the Ordnance.

Purchase of machinery, for the Royal Laboratory. Ordered, Captain Boxer to take charge of the erection of it, as well as of the manufacture of Congreve's rockets.

Wrote Do. Laboratory, 2 May 1854.

(True extract.)

(signed) *J. Wood*, Secretary.

Office of Ordnance, 8 May 1855.

Mercurii, 9° die Maii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Bramston.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable *Sidney Herbert*, a Member of the House; Examined.

Right Hon. *S Herbert*, M. P.

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19750. *Chairman.*] YOU were Secretary-at-War, were you not, at the breaking out of the war?—I was.

19751. You were a member also of Lord Aberdeen's Government?—Yes.

19752. You continued Secretary-at-War after the breaking up of the Government, and until you left office?—No; in Lord Palmerston's Government I became Secretary of State for the Colonies.

19753. Upon the breaking up of Lord Aberdeen's Government, you retired from the position of Secretary-at-War?—Yes.

19754. Did your being a Cabinet Minister affect your position as Secretary-at-War?—Technically not; I had been in the same position as far back as 1845 and 1846, in Sir Robert Peel's Government. At that time the Secretary of Stateship for the Colonies and for War not being divided, of course the Secretary-at-War exercised more authority over the military departments than he did subsequently, and the effect of the change was to diminish the powers of the Secretary-at-War.

19755. Not so much to diminish his power as to diminish the exercise of his power over the army?—Yes; to diminish the exercise of his power, which was not warranted strictly by the financial position of the Secretary-at-War,

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and which, in the course of years, had been growing in the absence of any other civil control.

19756. What are the precise duties of the Secretary-at-War?—The Secretary-at-War is strictly a financial officer; he exercises a control and check over all expenditure, and no alteration, even in matters of promotion or discipline, which necessitates any increased expense, can be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief without his sanction. He has other civil duties, such as giving protection to the subject in cases of enlistment, and minute duties of that description; but he properly has no executive duties except those which of late years he has acquired by his having originated certain improvements and reforms in the army; and, being the originator, he has, I apprehend, kept them in his own hands to see them effectually carried out. I take such cases as the organisation of the pensioners, and the establishment of regimental schools and normal schools at Chelsea, where the masters for the different regiments are trained; these remained in the hands of the Secretary-at-War.

19757. Mr. *Ellice.*] You had the preparation of the Mutiny Bill, had you not?—Yes, and the Estimates.

19758. And you gave advice as to any alterations which you thought might be required in the provisions of that Bill?—Yes.

19759. *Chairman.*] The Mutiny Bill is a conglomeration; it is added to, but nothing is taken from it?—It is generally very slightly added to; there are verbal alterations in it, but no alteration of importance.

19760. Mr. *Ellice.*] And also there has been a restriction introduced into the Mutiny Bill upon the exercise of military power as to punishment?—Yes.

19761. *Chairman.*] What were your relations with the Commander-in-Chief?—The relations of the Secretary-at-War with the Commander-in-Chief are really that of control or check upon the expenditure of the army.

19762. He has nothing to do with promotion?—He has nothing to do with promotion, except such a promotion be made as entails additional expense; then it would have to be submitted to him; and in the same way, any alteration in the system of promotion must be sanctioned by the Secretary-at-War, if it involves additional expense; but so long as an officer is promoted to an existing vacancy in an existing establishment, the Secretary-at-War has nothing to do with it.

19763. Mr. *Layard.*] You speak in the present tense; are the Committee to understand that that was the state of things in existence when there was a Secretary-at-War?—At present, the Secretaryship-at-War is not abolished, but it is held simultaneously with the Secretaryship of State by Lord Panmure; it is necessary to maintain it, because in many Acts of Parliament duties are imposed upon the Secretary-at-War which, unless all those Acts are repealed, could not be performed at all; and therefore it is necessary to maintain the office.

19764. *Chairman.*] The officer really now exists, but he is at the same time Secretary of State for War?—Yes, and Secretary-at-War together.

19765. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Secretary-at-War had also the appointment of all the paymasters, had he not?—Yes.

19766. The paymasters are the persons, except those in the Commissariat department, who have the control of the financial arrangements of the military force?—Yes.

19767. *Chairman.*] What are the relations existing between the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary-at-War?—The Secretary of State has the complete control over all the Military departments; but the Secretaryship-at-War is merely in its origin, I take it, a delegation from the Treasury of the financial business of the army which is too complicated and minute to be controlled by the Treasury, and the Secretary-at-War would exercise the same control so long as the offices were held by different persons as he did before, but he could exercise no control over the Secretary of State, because the Secretary of State's order would ride over anything. But if any extravagant expenditure was incurred by the order of the Secretary of State, it would be the duty of the Secretary-at-War to appeal to the Treasury to decide between them.

19768. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Treasury has still a control over all the expenditure by the Secretary-at-War?—Just so.

19769. *Chairman.*]

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19769. *Chairman.*] Not as Secretary-at-War, but as a member of the Cabinet, I presume, you discussed, did you not, the question of the policy of the war?—Yes; just as any other member of the Government might do.

19770. Can you state to the Committee at what time it was contemplated to begin the expedition to the Crimea?—I might be wrong about the date, speaking from memory; but the dates were quite correctly given, according to my belief, by the Duke of Newcastle.

19771. The order was given to the Horse Guards first on the 29th of June, was it not?—Does the Honourable Chairman mean the order for the preparation of the expedition, the troops being then at Varna?

19772. Yes?—It was given by the Duke of Newcastle directly to Lord Raglan.

19773. Was there any contemplation before that time that the expedition would have to be undertaken?—Yes.

19774. What steps were taken to prepare for the expedition?—Lord Raglan's original instructions, which are before the Committee, contemplated, first, the defence of Gallipoli, and, secondly, if there should be any advance short of that, the defence of the line of the Balkan; but he received instruction to make inquiries in every practicable manner as to the nature of the defences, and the amount of Russian force in the Crimea, with a view, if possible, to an attack upon Sebastopol.

19775. What steps were taken in consequence of that determination to attack Sebastopol to prepare the army for that proceeding?—An additional force was sent out under Sir George Cathcart subsequently to the arrival of the troops at Varna, and preparations were made, I believe, in which Admiral Boxer took a considerable part, in providing means for carrying the expedition across the Black Sea.

19776. Admiral Boxer was appointed by the Admiralty to his office?—Exactly so.

19777. Was any arrangement made to prepare the troops for any long stay in the Crimea; was it contemplated that it was to be merely a *coup de main*, or a campaign?—I think the expectation was that it would be a *coup de main*.

19778. All the preparations were made upon that expectation, were they not?—Apparently so; I judge as much from the circumstance that I have read, as from anything else, that the troops went from Varna to the Crimea in very light order, and that many of their stores were left at Varna at the time of their departure.

19779. I am speaking to you now as a member of the Cabinet, not as the Secretary-at-War?—Yes.

19780. As a member of the Cabinet, had you anything to do with the preparation of the army for transporting themselves from one part of the country to another?—The Secretary-at-War never had any authority over the Commissariat, and I cannot speak to any proceedings done by that department.

19781. It is a matter of importance to ascertain exactly the part of the proceedings over which you had control, and that part over which you had not control; that, as I deem, is a matter of importance?—I may state to the Committee that at the time the division took place between the duties of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, I, having a strong opinion that that measure was necessary, and that a considerable change would ultimately be necessary in the constitution of the military departments, offered to Lord Aberdeen, just at that time, to retire from my office, which I saw must ultimately be absorbed, or be, what I should have preferred to see, converted into a subordinate office, but an office exercising financial control, not only over the Horse Guards, but over all the military establishments, and I proposed then to retire, or, with a view to facilitate the change, to give the advantage of what little experience I had acquired from having held office before, and to remain as long as my services could be made available in the transaction of business. Subsequently, I undertook, with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, to do a good deal, which properly was not the business of my office to do; but I did it as his assistant, by delegation from him.

19782. Amongst that class of duties, was the preparation of the hospital at Scutari one?—No. I had no authority over the Medical department, any more than over the Horse Guards, except as a financial officer. Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the department, would naturally draw out, for any expedition, a

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programme of how many surgeons, and what staff of medical men, he intended to employ, and what stores were necessary for the purpose.

19783. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would he state that in the first instance to the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes; and if he approved of it, it would then come to the Secretary-at-War, for his concurrence in the expenditure involved.

19784. Dr. Andrew Smith was then, for all purposes, except with relation to finance, under the direct authority of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes.

19785. Sir *J. Pakington.*] As a member of the Cabinet, can you inform the Committee whether, at the time the despatch was sent by the War Minister to Lord Raglan, on the 29th of June, ordering the expedition to the Crimea, it was then contemplated by the Government that the orders would be carried into effect?—The expedition sailed later than we expected.

19786. How soon did you, then, contemplate that it would be carried into effect?—At the distance of 3,000 miles it was almost impossible to state, for it must depend upon local circumstances with which we could not be acquainted, and, as it turned out, a good deal upon the health of the army.

19787. However, it was contemplated a good deal earlier than it occurred?—Yes.

19788. General *Peel.*] What was the nature of the authority which you held, as Secretary-at-War, over the Medical Board?—It was purely financial. I could control the expenditure, but I had no power to originate.

19789. When did you first interfere with regard to the medical preparations?—When Dr. Andrew Smith first drew out his plan of the number of persons to be employed, and the amount of stores to be sent out, he spoke to me on it, and I went into the subject with him, and at that time I urged his extending the plan as far as it could be done with the existing staff of surgeons that we had at our command; but the first point which came very directly under my cognisance was a disputed question between Dr. Smith and Dr. Guthrie with respect to the appointment of additional staff surgeons, or additional regimental surgeons, and after hearing the discussion between the two rival authorities, I referred the question personally to Lord Raglan before he left England, and he decided in favour of having additional assistant regimental surgeons.

19790. The question between the two rival authorities which you referred to Lord Raglan was decided by him?—Yes, with some hesitation; but I think I have stated elsewhere the objections which Dr. Andrew Smith had to that, which were, that the staff would be weakened, and that where one regiment happened to suffer very much in an engagement, the increased number of regimental surgeons would be found still insufficient, whereas in another regiment three or four men would be wasted, the regiment not having been in action. That was got over by my recommending that he should make the staff as large as he had intended when the regimental surgeons were to be fewer.

19791. A third regimental assistant surgeon was therefore added?—Yes.

19792. How has that plan worked?—I believe it would have been better to have adopted the original plan. Where an army is moving in the field I have no doubt that an additional regimental surgeon is the best; but where an army is stationary, as it is in the Crimea, and where the bulk of the hospitals are not regimental, but general ones, a large staff is most efficient.

19793. Mr. *Ellice.*] That was Dr. Andrew Smith's recommendation, was it not?—Yes.

19794. General *Peel.*] Did Dr. Andrew Smith submit his other proposals to you?—Yes.

19795. Did you curtail them?—No; on the contrary, I urged him from the first to have as extensive an establishment as we could produce for the purpose.

19796. When was your attention first called to the medical preparations made in the East?—Not until after the battle of the Alma, when the account came of the failure of the hospital at Scutari; it must have been in October.

19797. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How had the hospital then failed?—The business of establishing hospitals lies, of course, with the chief medical officer of the expedition, he being subordinate to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in the field; Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general, would be the person to recommend what should be the stations for general hospitals; and when the army left Varna, he left orders that the stores, medical comforts, and medicines, and so on, should be sent down from Varna to Constantinople. Whether from deficiency of transport,

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or from a misunderstanding of the order, I cannot say, but practically that was not done; and when the first importations of sick and wounded came to Scutari, there was a great want of many of the most necessary hospital stores. I believe great exertions were made afterwards to induce the admiral upon the station to send for those stores from Varna; and upon one occasion that I recollect, though this is mere hearsay evidence, a vessel that was sent up to Varna to bring those stores, met a merchant vessel in a foundering state, and, instead of going on, and letting the merchant vessel go to the bottom, having taken out the crew, they towed it back to Constantinople, and lost so many additional days.

19798. Whose duty was it to appropriate the hospitals?—That would be entirely a question for the decision of the Inspector-general of hospitals out there, at the head of the medical staff.

19799. What means did you take when you heard of the deficiencies?—I think, as has been stated by the Duke of Newcastle, a telegraphic message was sent to Lord Stratford, begging him to ascertain what was the truth as to the state of things, and to assist them in every way in his power; we wrote likewise, and I kept up, I may say, a correspondence of some length with the principal medical officer, and the purveyor there, urging upon them, in every possible way, to exert themselves, and to purchase upon the spot what was attainable, and to let us know as immediately as they could what their present wants were, and what they would be.

19800. Mr. *Ellice.*] Will you state first what measures were taken by the Government to establish a general hospital before the sailing of the expedition?—Dr. Andrew Smith, I believe, has put before the Committee returns of the stores of medicines sent out; the selection of the places where the general hospitals should be established, and those stores used, was, of course, left to those in command of the expedition to exercise their discretion; and first of all, I believe, before they went to Varna they took possession of the general hospital at Scutari, and afterwards of a large Turkish barrack, which was converted into an hospital.

19801. Were those hospitals taken possession of in consequence of any order from Dr. Andrew Smith?—No; I should imagine it was a general order to select the best sites and positions for general hospitals, according as the exigencies of the campaign might demand.

19802. He had no power to issue any order, except through the Commander-in-Chief?—None.

19803. What orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief which came to your knowledge in consequence of the advice of Dr. Andrew Smith?—The orders to Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general, would have proceeded from the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition.

19804. Then I cannot collect from you, upon whose direct authority orders were given for the preparation and establishment of the first general hospital at Scutari?—I should think upon the authority of Lord Raglan. I apprehend that the Medical department would provide for the men, and settle the way in which those men should be placed and distributed; the places at which the stores should be placed would be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition.

19805. The Duke of Newcastle has stated, that instructions were given to Mr. Calvert, our consul, to look out for fit situations in which general hospitals could be established?—Yes.

19806. Those orders were given by the Duke of Newcastle, through the Foreign Office, were they not?—Yes, I presume so.

19807. But you are not aware what report was made by Mr. Calvert, or by Lord Raglan, or by the military authorities in the East, with respect to the possibility of obtaining sufficient hospital room?—I should imagine (I speak now without authority) that both those officers, that is, Dr. Hall and Lord Raglan, had been in communication with Mr. Calvert, either personally or by letter, and that they took advantage of his local knowledge to guide them in the selection of places where the general hospitals should be established.

19808. You are not acquainted with the details of the arrangements before the application was made to you after the battle of the Alma?—No.

19809. Did Mr. Guthrie ever deliver to you a copy of the paper which he delivered to the Commander-in-Chief, recommending, previously to the sailing of the expedition, that general hospitals should be provided before the arrival

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of the troops, at the rate of 600 men per division, to be increased afterwards to 1,200 men when the troops went into action?—I have a copy of that recommendation of Mr. Guthrie, but he gave it to me a very considerable time afterwards. I was not aware of its existence at the time, but in conversation with him, he mentioned it, and I asked him to give me a copy, which he did.

19810. But, in fact, you knew nothing of these arrangements till the period which you have stated, namely, after the battle of the Alma?—No.

19811. Lord *Seymour*.] You stated, did you not, to the House of Commons, that before the expedition sailed Dr. Andrew Smith collected together the purveyors of hospitals who had had experience in previous wars, and that they met at his house?—Yes.

19812. And that they there drew up a report as to the proper amount of stores to be sent out?—Exactly so.

19813. Did they, in drawing up that report, consider merely what was to accompany the army, or did they draw it up as they should have done, in two classes, namely, what was to be provided for the army in the field, and what was necessary for the general hospital?—I think not; but it does not follow necessarily that the general hospital is not to be with the army in the field; very often the general hospitals follow the army within a certain distance; when the whole of the operations of an army have been moved to a certain distance, the general hospitals have frequently moved with it; when the army has moved to any great distance, the communications would be so long and impeded, that you could not send patients back to the hospital.

19814. General *Peel*.] Did the action of the War Office, by attracting attention to forms, and imposing the necessity for economy, militate against the efficiency of the hospitals?—No, and I took great pains that it should not. I wrote to Dr. Menzies, who was then at the head of the medical establishment, to Mr. Wreford, the purveyor, and to Major Sillery, who was the commandant, and I urged upon them most strongly that all forms should be simplified, and that every effort should be made to purchase what was to be got on the spot, stating, as strongly as I could, that though the checking of expenditure was the most essential of their duties in peace, yet that in war questions of pounds shillings and pence could not be put in competition with human life, and that every effort must be made, at any cost, to provide the hospital supplies.

19815. Were those remonstrances in writing?—Yes, they were.

19816. Have you copies of them?—Yes, I have. I must state, in reading these letters, which I am anxious to do, partly in my own justification, that they are but samples out of a great many. I wrote them at the time when it was very difficult to get any satisfactory evidence as to what was the truth with regard to what was going on, for there were statements made by the press extremely condemnatory of the conduct of the officers of the hospital, and denouncing, in strong terms, the great deficiencies said to exist, and detailing the consequent sufferings of the men. On the other hand, we received, and I believe they have been put in evidence, letters from the medical officers there, Dr. Menzies and others, contradicting those statements in very strong terms, the fact being, I believe, that there was plenty stated which would bear contradiction, and plenty uncontradicted to condemn the system then going on: but I wrote, of course, without having been then able to weigh the counter evidence backwards and forwards; therefore, in reading what I wrote at the time, I may be doing injustice to persons who subsequently I found were oppressed by great difficulties, and who were, though unsuccessfully then, doing their best.

19817. Mr. *Ellice*.] Before that will you state to the Committee whether there was a regular report from the commandant or the officer commanding at Scutari to the military authorities, either in this country or to Lord Raglan, of which Lord Raglan had sent copies home, with respect to the state of those hospitals?—Yes; Lord Raglan sent Dr. Hall down to inspect the hospitals, and Dr. Hall went back giving a very flourishing account of the state of them, and that report was sent home to us.

19818. What was the date of it?—I do not recollect; but it was put in by Dr. Andrew Smith.

19819. Was Dr. Hall sent down soon after the battle of the Alma?—Very soon after the battle of the Alma.

19820. Had you then his report before you, or had Dr. Andrew Smith his report then before him, before you wrote those letters which you mentioned?—I think so. This is a letter to Mr. Wreford, and I read it because it will answer a question that was put to me by General Peel.

19821. Mr. Wreford was an officer immediately under the Secretary-at-War?—Yes: "War Office, 11 December 1854. Dear Sir,—I hope that efforts are being made to get Scutari into a proper state. I want to have you prepared with room accommodation and stores for a fresh influx of sick and wounded from the Crimea, which may arrive at any moment." Previously to that, a Commission was sent out, consisting of Mr. Maxwell, Dr. Cumming, and others: "Have additional beds been procured? (I understand they can be made up at Constantinople in any number.) Are additional sheds and store-rooms preparing?" This refers to previous letters, desiring that those things should be done: "Have you devised short and expeditious forms for issuing stores? All these, I apprehend, are wanted; but you must understand that we here, at home, cannot know or judge of what is wanted. You are on the spot; and the medical authorities under whose orders you are placed" (I was anxious to state that to Mr. Wreford, as Dr. Andrew Smith had raised some doubt upon that point), "and yourself, must co-operate to devise the best way of meeting difficulties and deficiencies. Recollect that your business is to promote efficiency. No cost can be put in competition with the safety and comfort of the sick. Lord Stratford has an unlimited power as to money; and the authorities of the hospital have an unlimited authority to procure all that is necessary. If additional buildings are wanted, and they must be wanted, let them be run up at once. Constantinople is a wooden city; there can be no difficulty in getting carpenters or timber. I hear that Miss Nightingale has started a washing establishment outside the hospital. She has done quite right. Let everything be supplied to it that is necessary. She will be the best judge of that, and of the number of persons to be employed. The expense must be borne by the public. I must repeat what I have said before, and what I cannot too strongly impress on you, your first duty is to take care that nothing is wanted in the hospital. The mere checking of expenditure is all very well in peace; in war it is secondary to the first and great object, of efficiency at all price. If you want more assistance, apply to the commandant for temporary assistance, and, if necessary, he will authorise it."

19822. Was that sent directly to Mr. Wreford, or through the commandant?—I sent it directly; but these are not strictly official letters.

19823. Is it not your opinion that all communications to the medical officers in the hospital, of whatever rank or station, should have been made through the military commandant in charge, and who had complete authority over those hospitals?—Yes; but it must be recollected that the whole of the Scutari establishments were strictly and technically under Lord Raglan; and in writing to them, as I have done constantly, urging greater exertions, I was doing that which was not technically my duty, and which I really had no authority to do; but I did it from knowing the individuals, and wishing to urge them to exertion by every means that I could.

19824. But the intermediate authority between Lord Raglan and the establishments at Scutari was the commandant at Scutari?—Yes.

19825. Is it not your opinion that all communications of this description should have been made through the commandant who had command of the whole of the establishment?—I think every official communication should, certainly, but these were not official communications.

19826. That letter which was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to desire him to afford any assistance in his power to the hospitals, was not sent through the commandant?—No.

19827. In short, instead of there having been one supreme authority, who was responsible for the management of those hospitals, and for the care of the sick and wounded in them, and having under his direction all the medical establishments, separate instructions were sent by different departments of the Government, to separate persons, to interfere in their administration?—No; I apprehend that general instructions were given by Lord Raglan to Major Sillery. The letter which I wrote, and which I have quoted, the one to Mr. Wreford, an officer directly under my control, as being a War Office officer, and the letters

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which were written to Major Sillery himself, were all letters not of a strictly official character; and I found it was easier to write those urgent remonstrances to them in letters of that description than to put upon record an official letter, open to the sight of all the subordinates.

19828. Did it not occur to you to recommend, when you heard that there was so large a number of sick and wounded at Scutari, that a superior officer, of high military authority and energy, should be appointed at once to become responsible for the charge and care of those hospitals?—Yes; and in consequence I recommended to the Duke of Newcastle to make such an appointment, and an officer was selected here. In the interval Lord Raglan had come to the same conclusion, and had sent Lord William Paulet down to act as commandant at Scutari.

19829. Lord William Paulet was appointed only, I think, in the beginning of December?—I think so.

19830. So that the great pressure upon those hospitals, and the great calamities that occurred in them, took place while they were under the command of Major Sillery?—Just so; and whom Lord Raglan had previously appointed, considering him to be a fit person to hold the appointment, and who was very indefatigable in the discharge of his duties.

19831. It has been stated by Mr. Stafford, a Member of Parliament, who visited those hospitals, and who has given evidence here of the miserable state in which they were, that when he applied to Major Sillery to take measures to remedy the evils and difficulties which occurred there, Major Sillery stated that he was an officer without fortune, and with a large family, and that he shrunk from giving any orders which might subject him to pecuniary responsibility; do you think it was a fit thing that the hospital should have been left under his command?—I have no hesitation in saying that I do not think so; his military rank was not sufficient. Apparently Lord Raglan thought so too, since he sent another officer.

19832. A great part of the difficulties that occurred before you interfered in this matter, in consequence of hearing that statement, must have arisen from there not having been an efficient military officer, both to maintain discipline, and to receive reports as to the daily state of those hospitals?—My belief is, from all that I have heard since, that Major Sillery was a man who worked very indefatigably in his department according to his own light; but I do not think that he was a man of that rank in the army and of that weight which he ought to have had, to be at the head of an establishment of such a gigantic character.

19833. But Major Sillery could have had no staff sufficient for an adequate inspection of those hospitals. When there were from 3,000 to 5,000 people in the hospitals, it would require that there should be a large staff attached to the commanding officer, to inspect them daily, and report upon their condition?—Certainly.

19834. Therefore the administration was deficient in that respect also?—Certainly.

19835. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Had he any staff?—He had a few clerks and a secretary, I believe.

19836. Had he that?—I do not know what his staff had been, but Lord William Paulet, when he came afterwards, applied for an additional staff, and Lord Hardinge sent it out to him.

19837. To what extent?—He sent out several; seven or eight, or nine or ten.

19838. *Chairman.*] Who was answerable for Major Sillery's appointment?—He was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition.

19839. So that the Commander-in-Chief of the expedition is really responsible for the efficiency of Major Sillery?—Yes, as for any officer under his command.

19840. Lord *Seymour.*] I find you writing, on the 11th of December, to Mr. Wreford, to impress upon him that his "first duty is to take care that nothing is wanted in the hospital; the mere checking of expenditure is all very well in peace, but in war it is secondary to the first and great object of efficiency at all price"?—Yes.

19841. You wrote that under the impression that he was paying too much attention

attention to the checking of expenditure, and that he was not doing efficiently his duty?—That was what had been represented to me.

19842. You were not aware, then, that, so far from his having been checking the expenditure, he had kept no account of his stores since the end of August?—No; I think it was another gentleman who had been storekeeper.

19843. You will find that neither Mr. Ward nor Mr. Wreford knew anything of the stores that were at Scutari. It was so stated by Mr. Maxwell, in answer to question 13048, that when he spoke to Mr. Wreford upon it, "Curiously enough, as it seemed to me, Mr. Wreford appeared to fill a very anomalous position, for when I called upon Mr. Wreford to give me some account, as a purveyor, he declared to me that he was not a purveyor;" you were writing to him supposing him to be one, were you not?—Yes, certainly; and I cannot account for that.

19844. You thought that it was on account of the forms required that those people did not get their medicines properly?—It was stated that the number of signatures required to a requisition was so great that it produced considerable delay.

19845. Then with regard to the apothecary, who, at least, if he did not give medicines, ought to have kept accounts, it is stated, at Question 12979, Mr. Maxwell stated, "I do not understand much about book-keeping, but, upon examining those books, I found that there had not been an entry made in either of them from the 24th of September to the 28th of November"?—I have since heard of that.

19846. Therefore there was no check as regards the accounts?—Certainly not, if the check was not exercised.

19847. So that, in fact, while, on the one hand, the public were not getting the advantage of a check, on the other hand the poor soldiers got no advantage from the medicines, or medical stores?—Yes; but it was not the fault of the system; the system gave a check, but it was gross dereliction of duty on the part of an individual.

19848. It appears that the commandant was not fit for his duty, that the purveyor was not performing his duty, and the apothecary was not doing his duty?—I was not aware of that statement as to the purveyor, who is a man of great regularity of habits, and who, I should have thought, would have been perfect master of all those details; I received no complaint upon that head against Mr. Wreford. The next letter that I would read is one written to Major Sillery, of the same date: "War Office, 11 December 1854. Dear Sir,—I have been for some time, in consequence of letters which I have seen, and reports which I have received, very anxious and very much dissatisfied as to the state of the hospital at Scutari. I believe that every effort has been made by the medical men, and I hear that you have been indefatigable in the conduct of the immediate business of your department. But there has been evidently a want of co-operation between departments, and a fear of responsibility, or a timidity, arising from an entire misconception of the wishes of the Government. No expense has been spared at home, and immense stores are sent out, but they are not forthcoming; some are at Varna, and, for some inexplicable reason, they are not brought down to Scutari. When stores are in the hospital, they are not issued without forms so cumbrous as to make the issue unavailing, through delay. The purveyor's staff is said to be insufficient." After hearing that, I sent out a large additional number of clerks; in the meanwhile the purveyor wrote, on the 10th of December, to say that the staff was insufficient: "The Commissariat staff is said to be insufficient; your own staff is said to be insufficient; the interpreters are said to be insufficient; more store-room is wanted; temporary buildings are wanted. The object of the Government is, that the hospital should be made thoroughly sufficient for its purposes. That every comfort should be given to the sick. We authorised Lord Stratford to incur and sanction any expense to procure what is necessary; but nothing is asked of him. If things are wanted, they must be got. You are away from England, and a letter takes a month to get an answer; no reference home, therefore, is possible when time presses. If the stores are at Varna, and you can get others at Constantinople, they must be got. If you want more interpreters, you should get them; we cannot find them here, but you can find them at Constantinople. As commandant of the hospital, it is your duty to see that no department in it is wanting. There is a story going

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abroad here, which however can scarcely be true, that the fourth side of the barrack square is wanted, but that the Turks have not been asked for it, or told that we must have it, or another; that sheds and store-rooms were about to be built, but were counterordered by you because the Turks will not pay for them. I do not care whether the Turks pay or not, provided it is done. The hospital is crowded in a manner dangerous to health; temporary buildings should immediately be run up. Lord Stratford has full powers to advance any sum of money required. The object you should have in view is to create perfect efficiency; checking expenditure is a secondary consideration. No cost can be put for one moment in competition with the comfort and safety of the sick and wounded. I trust, therefore, you will not only act upon this yourself, but enforce the same energy upon others. If your staff is insufficient, and you can augment it on the spot, do so, and report it." I do not mean a military staff by that, but interpreters, and persons of that description. "I shall approve of your proceeding. If other departments require strengthening, and you are satisfied of it, and can get the additional strength on the spot, do so; but, above all, be ready for a fresh influx of wounded. If buildings are wanted, lose no time in applying to Lord Stratford. If sheds are wanted, or store-rooms, let them be at once constructed. If the landing-place or pier wants repair or extension, let it be done. Let everything be efficient. I apprehend that Constantinople is deficient neither in wood nor carpenters, and that sheds, bed-tressels, and anything of that description, can be got there without difficulty. I hear that Miss Nightingale has started a washing establishment outside the hospital; I am very glad to hear it. The expenses, of course, will be provided by the Government. I can only again urge in conclusion that every effort may be made, every necessary expenditure incurred, and every co-operation between departments insisted upon, in order that the hospital shall afford to all the sick or wounded that may be sent to it every accommodation and comfort which can be procured for them."

19849. General *Peel.*] Was the receipt of this letter ever acknowledged?—I got from all those officers assurances that no effort should be spared to remedy those deficiencies.

19850. Mr. *Ellice.*] Why was it necessary to direct the commandant to apply to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe for money for this service?—The circumstances of the case were peculiar, and I think, upon the whole, they may be taken to have justified the proceeding. It was evident that those men were afraid of their responsibility; they were in a strange country, with which they were themselves personally unacquainted, and they were dealing with a nation of peculiar habits. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was a man who eminently possessed the power of obtaining for them buildings, or supplies of other things, through the intervention of the Turkish Government, and had the power of obtaining them with a facility which no one else could possess. We thought, likewise, that a man of such energy and decision of character would have been very useful in visiting the hospitals, and insisting upon more being done than they had the courage themselves to undertake upon their own responsibility.

19851. I can understand that Lord Stratford's assistance would have been very useful; but with respect to money, surely the regular proceeding of the departments of the Government would have been to direct the commandant to apply to the Commissary-general, Mr. Smith, who has already stated to this Committee that he had told the commandant that he was at his orders, to supply him with any money that might be required?—Just so; and they had full power to do that.

19852. Then why mix up another authority with respect to the furnishing of the money necessary for that service?—I think it was the feeling of the Duke of Newcastle that the fear of responsibility in those subordinate officers was so great, that it would be impossible to get them to draw money, and apply it, unless the intervention of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe took place.

19853. If a complaint has been made of the division of authority, and of unnecessary confusion in the military administration, by placing it in several independent hands, it was very inexpedient to increase that evil by bringing Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and mixing him up with the administration as to supplying money for that service?—It was not a divided authority, nor the introduction of two authorities, so much as the introduction of two sources for the supply of money. It gave them a second banker; nor did any confusion ensue,

ensue, for though the authorities never drew on Lord Stratford, yet do doubt his interference quickened their action, for they subsequently incurred all the necessary expenditure; drawing, as was quite regular, on the Commissariat.

19854. Was not one authority amply sufficient; the Commissary-general had power to draw all the monies required for the military service of the expedition?—It was ample, if they had chosen to have availed themselves of it.

19855. *Chairman.*] When did you first hear a complaint of the hospitals at Scutari?—I think it was in November; it is difficult to fix the precise time.

19856. Was not it soon after the battle of the Alma?—Soon after the news of the battle of the Alma had arrived in England.

19857. Why was it so late before you sent those instructions to the officers at Scutari?—I had written an earlier letter to the officer at Scutari. I have here a letter, dated the 29th of November. If the Committee wish, I will look back among my letters; but I have taken those two, simply because they embraced the main points; they are mostly all of the same character.

19858. General *Peel.*] You commenced writing letters much earlier than the ones you have read?—Yes.

19859. Sir *J. Pakington.*] As a matter of strict form, I wish to know whether you, as the Secretary-at-War, were the proper person to write a letter of that kind to the military commandant of the hospitals?—No, certainly not.

19860. Who ought to have written such a letter as that?—All official communications with the commandant ought strictly to have gone from Lord Raglan, and no one else.

19861. Under those circumstances, why was it that you, as Secretary-at-War, not being the proper person to write such a letter as that, did write that letter?—I was in office, and responsible, like every other member of the Government, for everything that was going on; I was very much dissatisfied with the state of things, and I did not think it was a moment to be stickling upon mere questions of official form; I thought that my interference by letters would have the effect of pushing the service on more rapidly.

19862. It was written under a general anxiety for the promotion of the service?—Yes.

19863. Would it have been strictly more correct if the letter had gone from the Minister for War, instead of from you?—That would be the case, I think, with regard to Major Sillery; but as to Mr. Wreford, it was more natural that I should write to him, he being a financial officer under the department of the War Office.

19864. Supposing Major Sillery to have disregarded the orders which you so conveyed to him, you not being strictly the right person to convey them, could he have been punished for disobedience?—No; they were extra-official communications.

19865. General *Peel.*] Had you proper authority to sanction any extra expense?—Yes; I was the proper authority to sanction any extra expense, and it was important that I should know who were afraid of the responsibility, as the Secretary-at-War was the person, who, if he disapproved of their conduct, would have to call them to account for it; but I entirely approved of their incurring that expense.

19866. Mr. *Layard.*] Of course you are acquainted with the history of the Peninsular War?—I have read it.

19867. Are you aware of what the Duke of Wellington did after he arrived in the Peninsula as to the Commissariat, and the various branches of the Military departments, and the way in which he opened a communication with America, and all parts of the world, to supply his Commissariat?—Yes.

19868. I ask you this question, because you have just stated, that the person who ought to have written that letter, or ought to have given instructions which were contained in that letter, should have been Lord Raglan?—Yes.

19869. Such being the case, and Lord Raglan never having given such instructions, was not the conduct of Lord Raglan ever taken into consideration by the Cabinet, and no remonstrance made to him upon that subject?—You must consider the peculiar position of Lord Raglan in the Crimea; in the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington had the whole of his army immediately under his hand, or within three seas; but here the operations were being conducted in the Crimea, in Russia, and the general hospitals were in another

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country, in Turkey, and they became naturally very much dissevered from Lord Raglan; but Lord Raglan did that which was right and natural in his case to do; he sent Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general, to inquire into the state of the hospitals, and he came back, and said that they were in a state perfectly satisfactory; under those circumstances, Lord Raglan naturally would not have written any letter of remonstrance with regard to deficiencies of which he was not aware.

19870. You say that operations were carried on in different countries; that is to a certain extent true; but do you know how many hours it would have taken to communicate between Balaklava and Scutari?—Not many.

19871. Would it have taken a longer time to communicate between Balaklava and the Crimea, than it would have taken to communicate between the army under the Duke of Wellington and his hospitals, which you have described as being very often 100 miles distant from the scene of his operations?—I have not so described them.

19872. In that letter of yours there is scarcely a single department which you do not condemn; in fact, there is a general condemnation of almost everything?—No, I beg pardon; I guarded myself, before I read the letter, by saying that I was writing then upon insufficient information; it was impossible to wait to know whether those things were accurately stated; but there was a danger that they might be true, and it was necessary to interfere at once, and make the most urgent remonstrances to the persons who it was supposed had neglected their duty; but after that, a good deal of counter evidence arrived, and perhaps I should have written the letters differently worded, had I been then in possession of the facts which came to me afterwards.

19873. What information have you since received which inclined you to change your mind generally as to the subject upon which that letter touches?—It was extremely difficult, at a distance of 3,000 miles, to come to any sound conclusion as to the truth or falsehood of many of the statements made. If there was one thing at one time of which I was more satisfied than another, it was that there was a deficiency of lint; we had sent an enormous quantity, and we subsequently sent out a great deal more, and Miss Nightingale wrote back, and complained of the quantities coming out; she said they were smothered with it, and they did not know what to do with it. I afterwards saw a letter in a newspaper purporting to be from Miss Nightingale, asking for an increased store of lint; this astonished me exceedingly, and I wrote to her about it, and she said that the letter had been inserted without her authority or cognizance; I do not believe that any one was to blame, but that it was a misunderstanding on the part of Mr. M'Donald, entirely unintentional on his part, the result of a conversation with her, he having a list in which he had inserted this lint, the purchase of which was to be applied for by him, imagining that there was a deficiency; Miss Nightingale wrote to me by return of post, and said, "There never has been, from the first to the last, any deficiency of lint, except for half an hour, and that through the mistake of the orderly sent to the store for it."

19874. That applies to a simple detail; you stated that there was a deficiency of a staff of interpreters, and, in fact, the enumeration included almost every department connected with Scutari?—Yes, as reported to me.

19875. Does the evidence which has been submitted to you, taken before this Committee, confirm the impression generally which you then had?—As regards numbers, yes; I think that all those departments were underhanded; we had great difficulty in knowing what to do; they made no complaint; they did not ask for any accession; we asked them whether it was true that they wanted those things, and begged them to give us early intimation of what their wants were; in the meanwhile I sent out an additional number of persons. I sent out a considerable number of clerks from the city to Mr. Wreford, and subsequently he wrote, and said he did want them, but my clerks crossed his requisition for additional assistance.

19876. To a certain extent, you founded the opinion that you formed upon information which may be called official, as it was sent to you from persons officially connected with the hospitals at Scutari?—I got a great deal from non-official sources, but some from official sources. I received letters from Mr. Sydney Osborne.

19877. When the Cabinet sent out Lord Raglan, it was with the understanding, was it not, that he should have the entire management of the operations in the East?—Yes.

19878. You gave him complete control over the army in all its departments?—Yes.

19879. The Cabinet exercised no control over him?—No; the Commander-in-Chief in the field ought always to have plenary powers.

19880. Do you suppose that the same official communications that were made by you were also made to Lord Raglan?—I think not.

19881. Why not?—Because, as I said before, perhaps the word official might mislead you; but I had a great deal of information about the hospitals from a person whose opinion I would rather have upon such a subject than any person I know, namely, Miss Nightingale; she was certainly in an official position, but she would not be communicating with Lord Raglan.

19882. I cannot understand how a person could be sent out in a *quasi* official position who was not immediately under Lord Raglan, who had the command of the forces there?—Yes, but Miss Nightingale, at the head of the establishment of nurses, was not likely to be in correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief; she corresponded with me at my request, to inform me of all those details, she being a very intimate friend.

19883. Surely the person who ought to have been most anxious was Lord Raglan, whose army depended almost entirely upon the condition of the hospitals at Scutari?—Yes; but who had reason to believe that all was going on well.

19884. *Chairman.*] The official information that Lord Raglan received gave a very flourishing condition of those hospitals, did it not?—I imagine that all the information which he had was perfectly satisfactory to him, which was the information given by the Inspector-general of Hospitals, in whose statement he of course placed confidence.

19885. Mr. *Layard.*] He was an interested person, was he not, he being at the head of the hospital establishments there?—Just as the general of a division is an interested person in giving an account of a battle that he has fought, or a general of a brigade in giving an account of his brigade.

19886. On your receiving information which induced you to write that letter, did not the Cabinet write a letter, if not in the same words, at least in the same spirit, to Lord Raglan, who was the responsible person?—I think that the Duke of Newcastle, who had a very large correspondence with Lord Raglan, wrote to him, stating the dissatisfaction that was felt here at the reports which had come home from Scutari, and the steps that had been taken to remedy them.

19887. *Chairman.*] Did the Ministry, or the Administration, take any steps respecting the proceeding of Dr. Hall, who conveyed to Lord Raglan so incorrect a statement concerning the hospitals at Scutari?—No; Dr. Hall's statement was founded upon what he had himself seen. He was there a very short time; but I apprehend that people have looked upon the state of things at Scutari with very different eyes; I have received throughout extremely contradictory evidence from Scutari. Officers who were there even quite at the beginning, wrote and said that they had never seen an army hospital more effective; there have been great improvements of late years in hospitals, especially civil hospitals. I think originally too much was expected; at the same time I am bound to say that I think that too little was done; but men who have been accustomed to see hospitals in the field, would not be so much shocked at discomforts and deficiencies as civilians would be, who had never seen an hospital established in war.

19888. Mr. *Layard.*] When you were in office was any person of consequence in the East recalled, and officially reprimanded or punished in any manner whatsoever?—Dr. Menzies was withdrawn.

19889. From ill health, was it not?—He was withdrawn; ill health would be a sufficient ground to recall any gentleman so responsibly situated.

19890. Do you think it is fair to the public service that when a man has shown great incompetency, or has misconducted himself, that you should give him any opportunity of escaping from the punishment which he deserves by removing him on the specious plea of ill health?—That depends upon what the nature of the incompetency is. I believe Dr. Menzies to be (I have heard so) a medical man of very considerable skill as a surgeon, and very zealous and attentive to his duty, but he had not the gift of organization.

19891. In that letter you say, in writing to Major Sillery, that you can make some

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some allowances for the state of things, because he was in a strange country with which he was in no way acquainted; would it not have been possible to send out anybody who was acquainted with it?—I cannot speak to that.

19892. Were not there men in England, General Chesney and others, who had spent many years in Turkey, and were perfectly acquainted with the country?—It is possible.

19893. The Government never thought it necessary to look out for any one of the kind?—Yes, they did.

19894. Did they find anybody?—Yes; we found an officer; but he was not sent out, because Lord Raglan in the interim had appointed Lord William Paulet.

19895 But he was not acquainted with the country?—Not previously to the campaign.

19896. *Chairman.*] That was very late, was it not?—In December.

19897. In a speech in the House of Commons you used this phrase: "There have been all manner of forms to be gone through before stores could be issued to the medical officers. Every account I get says this: the medical men, in their vocation, are beyond all praise, especially those at the head of the establishment; they work night and day; their tenderness to the sick, their humanity, their zeal, their energy, are mentioned by every one, friend and foe. But the deficiency is this, that, with plenty of stores, no one seemed to know where to lay their hands upon them; with plenty of materials at their disposal, the forms were so cumbrous, that they never could be produced with that rapidity which was necessary for the purposes of a military hospital." Is that your opinion now with regard to the heads of the department?—Speaking of them as heads of the establishment, a duty which, in my opinion, ought never to have been imposed upon them, for I confess that I differ very much from Dr. Andrew Smith as to the proper constitution of such an hospital, I think it is true that, as medical men, they exerted themselves most zealously; but, as originators of a great establishment, they broke down.

19898. You say "originators" of a great establishment; do not you think that the word "governors" of a great establishment is the proper expression?—No; you have to create it before you can govern it.

19899. Was not it created to their hands?—No; I think that the army medical system is defective in that respect; I think too much is put of a non-medical nature upon medical men.

19900. Major Sillery was not a medical man?—No. I am speaking of medical men, who were all admitted to be very attentive and zealous in their duties, that is, their medical duties.

19901. When you found out that Major Sillery was totally inefficient, because that is the phrase I use about the matter, did you, upon that, immediately proceed to find a substitute?—I think that as soon as we were satisfied that he was not the man to undertake so vast a task, the Duke of Newcastle wrote to Lord Raglan, saying that he should send a general officer out.

19902. At what date was that conclusion come to?—I could fill that up afterwards.

19903. I wish to know how soon you came to that conclusion after you had heard of the facts?—I do not think I can give it you now; I will fill it up.

19904. Mr. *Drummond.*] Reference has been made to the Peninsular war, and the state of things at that time; is it not true that you sent out a far greater proportionate number of medical men with this army than ever was sent with any army before?—I believe so: as compared with the "Moniteur de l'Armée," giving an account of the number in the French army, I find that the proportion of the medical staff in our army was considerably larger than theirs.

19905. *Chairman.*] Is it not true that the hospitals at Scutari broke down in a disgraceful manner?—I think in November and December it was in a state very little creditable.

19906. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated just now that you received here more accurate and more full accounts of the Scutari hospitals than Lord Raglan did; were not periodical reports sent to Lord Raglan of the state of the hospitals?—I should apprehend so.

19907. It is quite clear, I apprehend, that they ought to have been sent to him?

him?—Yes; I should think that the medical men at the head of those hospitals sent periodical reports to their chief, Dr. Hall.

19908. If any such reports had been neglected, would it not have been Lord Raglan's duty to call for them?—Yes.

19909. Therefore ought not he then to have been as well informed of the state of those hospitals as you were at home?—No, I think not, because reports would have come from Dr. Menzies, who considered that the hospital was as good as it could be made under the circumstances. I got mine from extra-official sources; I was in correspondence with Mr. Osborne.

19910. Do you think that Lord Raglan's reports would be limited to one channel?—Yes.

19911. You stated just now that the Commander-in-Chief of the army in the field ought to have plenary powers?—Yes.

19912. In this instance did the Government confer upon Lord Raglan plenary powers in all respects?—I believe so.

19913. Captain *Gladstone.*] If you relied upon the information that you received from the medical officers in Scutari, you would have had a very imperfect idea of the state of the hospitals?—Very imperfect. I hold in my hand a letter of an earlier date, the 29th of November, to Mr. Wreford; it is merely a letter begging him not to be stickling at forms, but to facilitate in every way the rapid and easy transaction of business. I thought the forms were very cumbrous, and I found that they did alter them. Requisitions used to be signed by two medical men; and I have seen about 300 that have been sent home, dated at different periods in January, and they are all signed by one medical man only.

19914. General *Peel.*] Are the Committee to understand from you that the forms have been simplified?—They have been simplified to that extent. The complaint was that a requisition would not be obeyed, unless it had more than one signature.

19915. Lord *Seymour.*] In that hospital?—Yes; I think that the whole of that statement has been a good deal exaggerated. A requisition is necessary, and in civil life you never would send, except by a requisition, to an apothecary even, for a dose of physic; still more is a requisition necessary for general stores.

19916. There must be some requisition?—Yes; not only for the sake of the public, as to the issue of stores, but for the security of the patients for whom the stores are supplied.

19917. It seems, from a Return that has been given to the Committee, that the instructions to the purveyor were not written till the 14th of November?—That is the new instructions.

19918. But until he got those instructions, the department was not in a proper position, we have been told by Dr. Andrew Smith?—He, I think, is in error upon that subject. Dr. Hall sent some instructions from the Crimea to Scutari, I think, at an earlier date than this. I sent out altered instructions, placing the purveyor entirely under the authority of the medical men; it was never understood by me that he was not under the authority of the medical men; but the question was raised by Dr. Andrew Smith, who states in his evidence, I think inaccurately, that in the instructions, as he drew them, and sent them to the War Office by some person or other, a sentence was erased which put the purveyor under the authority of the medical officer; that, I think, is not so, for the sentence still exists in the purveyor's instructions. The facts were these: I believe that a misapprehension arose in this way: Dr. Andrew Smith sent me, by my desire, a draft of the instructions, as he would propose them, and I submitted them to Mr. Kirby, the Chief Examiner in the War Office, at the head of the accountants' branch, and I asked him to look them through carefully, and to give me his opinion how he thought they should be altered, if they required alteration, and he, I apprehend, in his draft, omitted that sentence as being, in his opinion, inexpedient; and I sent back (I speak from memory only) the instructions so altered to Dr. Andrew Smith, for his observations upon the proposed alterations by Mr. Kirby. He then defended his instructions as they were originally drawn; and I thought Dr. Andrew Smith was right; and the instructions were drawn putting the purveyor entirely under the authority of the medical officer.

19919. Then, as the Committee understand, the purveyor was not put under the

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the medical officer till the 14th of November?—I do not think that is correct; the purveyor always acted under the orders of the medical authority.

19920. Do you think that if a medical officer made that his excuse, it is not a good excuse?—No; another thing there was which I must say, in defence of the purveyor, the medical officers did not give him sufficient notice of the things they required. A change was proposed in the hospital, which I believe was assented to by the authorities there, that certain things should be appropriated to every bed, without any further requisition, and that these should be supplied for every man that came in. Certain things were to be supplied; but if the list was never given to Mr. Wreford by the medical man, he could not supply them.

19921. Then Dr. Menzies stated that the proceedings of the Government here placed him in an anomalous position, because they had sent out an officer who, though he did not actually take charge, yet in some degree superseded Dr. Menzies. Did you agree with His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, or were you a party to the sending out of that Commission, of which Dr. Cumming was one?—Yes.

19922. Does it appear to you that that was justly stated by Dr. Menzies, and that his authority was very much interfered with by the arrival of Dr. Cumming?—No, I think not; we thought that if Dr. Cumming, at the same time that he was acting as a Commissioner, was likewise to take charge of the hospital, his position would then have become very anomalous, for he would be inquiring into the state of an hospital of which he had himself the management. We desired him to go out, and carry out the duties he was instructed to carry out as a Commissioner, and we, thinking that the Commission would have closed more rapidly than it did, desired him not to take charge of the hospital till his Commission had reported.

19923. You did not get the report of that Commission while you were in office?—No, it came since; one of the members of it was drowned, and there were delays.

19924. With regard to any immediate improvement of the hospital, a commission was much too slow a process?—As it turned out, it was a slow process; but instructions were given to the Commission, on the one hand, and to Lord William Paulet on the other, that they should report to him from time to time the various improvements that they intended to suggest, and that he should carry them out.

19925. Does it not appear to you that the best course would have been to have appointed another commandant, and to have given him authority over the whole hospital at once?—No, I do not think so, and for this reason: there were great changes to be made in the system of working the hospital there, and I do not think that a commandant would have been able to do that. I think that a man going out with instructions from home was more likely to suggest the manner of putting things into a good shape than a military commandant.

19926. *Chairman.*] That Commission had no executive power; it had only the power to suggest?—Yes.

19927. It could do nothing?—No; but there was authority given to Lord William Paulet to adopt their recommendations.

19928. So that the Commission and Lord William Paulet, you think, had sufficient power to do anything that was necessary?—I think so.

19929. Mr. *Ellice.*] Then there must have been evidently, according to your representation, a complete conflict between the authorities; according to your military organization, the commanding officer of the forces is also commanding officer of the hospitals, wherever they are stationed?—Yes, he is.

19930. Then if you send out separate instructions, with separate authority, to a person who is to act independently of him, there must be immediately that conflict of authority, and nobody is responsible?—The Committee must recollect the peculiarity to which I referred before, namely, the separation of the establishments in Turkey from the army in the field. When those accounts came to us, time was important; but if we had written to Lord Raglan, and desired him, though in the Crimea, to send back to Constantinople such and such instructions, great delay would have taken place.

19931. Suppose you had taken a shorter step, and have appointed from this country, under the authority of the Commander-in-chief, a competent general officer,

officer, giving him authority to draw money from the Commissariat, and to procure everything you had instructed Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to procure; you would then have had some one man responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the management of the hospitals, and to the public for the calamities that ensued?—Certainly; and that is the course that has been since pursued; take, for example, the case of the hospital at Smyrna.

19932. Why was it not pursued in the first instance, that being according to all military rule, military practice, and military experience?—It was. Lord William Paulet, the commander at Scutari, is responsible for everything under his command.

19933. But he was only appointed after the mischief had taken place?—After it had commenced.

19934. After it had taken place; if Lord Hardinge had been instructed by the Secretary of State to look into the difficulties of Lord Raglan's position, and to send out a competent head, say a general officer, with all the powers you had intrusted to various parties, we should have had some one person responsible for all the calamities which ensued?—That implies the cutting off from Lord Raglan the command of all that portion of the army that was in Turkey.

19935. Not at all cutting off the command, but informing Lord Raglan that a general officer, whom he probably could not spare from his army, had been appointed, subject to his orders?—He could and did spare one from his army; for when the Government was going to take that course, he sent Lord William Paulet.

19936. But he sent him after Major Sillery had been there for two months?—In December; but Major Sillery was the responsible officer till Lord William Paulet came out.

19937. *Chairman.*] What induced Lord Raglan to send Lord William Paulet?—I think he must have been satisfied that the command was one of far greater magnitude than Major Sillery could administer.

19938. It was not from hearing that Major Sillery was incompetent?—Major Sillery was originally placed by Lord Raglan there, when there was merely an hospital; afterwards it became a great command, and then, finding that Major Sillery's military rank was not equal to it, Lord Raglan sent Lord William Paulet.

19939. Mr. *Layard.*] What command had Lord William Paulet held in the Crimea?—He was on the staff, I think.

19940. *Chairman.*] The Duke of Newcastle's instructions to Lord William Paulet are dated January the 5th?—Yes.

19941. That was long after a great part of the mischief had occurred?—Yes, and after much had been remedied.

19942. Was not it the duty of Lord Raglan to have discovered the miseries that were being suffered at Scutari?—I think Lord Raglan himself entirely depended upon the reports sent to him by official persons at Scutari; what those were, I cannot say. Those I have seen were of a nature to satisfy him.

19943. You found them out before then, did you not?—Yes, but as I said before, from non-official sources principally.

19944. Were not those non-official sources as well open to Lord Raglan as to you?—I think not.

19945. Mr. *Layard.*] Was Lord William Paulet a brigadier-general in the Crimea on the staff?—No.

19946. He was made a brigadier-general after he went to Scutari?—Yes, where he had a command.

19947. Colonel *Lindsay.*] Had he not commanded a regiment with very great ability?—I believe nobody stood higher than he did as a regimental line officer.

19948. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you generally appoint an officer of that rank to command 5,000 men; are colonels made brigadiers for the occasion?—I should be very glad to see colonels made brigadiers in much more important commands.

19949. Was he an officer of sufficient rank to command the number of men who were then at Scutari, with military detachments passing backwards and forwards?—Yes, I think so.

19950. Would you appoint a brigadier-general to command 5,000 men in the field?—Yes, if he was a good man.

19951. General *Peel.*] Does there still exist any deficiency in the hospitals?—The state of the hospitals is very much improved. I have no official knowledge

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of it, but I have letters sent to me by different persons who have been in the hospitals. I have one dated as far back as the beginning of February, from a civil surgeon, who said that he did not see much distinction between the hospitals at Scutari and some of the great London hospitals.

19952. Was there any deficiency in lint or port wine?—I believe not in lint, or port wine.

19953. *Chairman.*] Do you speak of your own knowledge that there was no deficiency of port wine?—No; it was certainly stated by Dr. Cumming and others that there was no deficiency in port wine.

19954. It has been stated that a great deal was sent out, and it has been stated to the Committee that port wine was wanting, and supplied by the "Times" fund?—There was a moment when they were within half a day's supply; but there was some on board ship, which was subsequently obtained. The "Times" Commissioner, I believe, contributed very liberally when there was that expected deficiency. I speak of what I have heard.

19955. General *Peel.*] What were the means taken to procure the port wine?—I would say as to the amount sent out, that the shipments were enormous, but the consumption was likewise enormous; I think it was stated in one of the medical reports, that it amounted to two pipes in three days. The consumption was therefore immense, and I believe that there is very great medical doubt now whether stimulants of all kinds were not used too freely.

19956. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When you stated those figures, do you suppose that that quantity of wine was consumed by sick men?—You will find complaints occasionally in every hospital, even in the best London hospitals, that the nurses, and particularly the night nurses, consume a large portion of the stimulants meant for the patients.

19957. You have spoken of the quantity of port wine sent out; is it within your knowledge what that quantity really was?—I cannot state it from memory; there is a return before the Committee.

19958. A statement has been laid before the Committee, to the effect that the quantity of wine sent out was no less than between 16,000 and 17,000 dozens; do you suppose that that is an exaggerated statement?—I think not; the consumption must have been that. If there is any doubt about the amount of port wine, I beg to suggest to the Honourable Chairman, that if he were to call for Mr. Howell, he would give information upon that point.

19959. Have you any reason to doubt that the quantity of wine that was ordered and intended to be sent out, really was sent out from this country?—No; I have heard it stated by a gentleman, a friend of mine, who thought that he had some clue; but as I have not heard from him since, I suppose it is not the case.

19960. General *Peel.*] Did Dr. Andrew Smith ever complain of the system on which things were supplied?—Yes.

19961. What arrangements did you settle?—I altered the arrangements altogether; it used to be got by the Admiralty for the Medical Board, and they got it by open tender. I believe it is not a good system with wine, and I secured the services of a gentleman, a broker, who had had great experience in things of that kind, and we put him upon a salary. The gentleman's name was Bridgett. He had acted for mercantile houses and for the East India Company, and he has executed our orders very much to the satisfaction of the Government, and I believe that the wine he has bought has been of very good quality. Do the Committee wish to have any other letters put in on the subject of the hospitals?

19962. *Chairman.*] Any thing that you desire to hand in the Committee will be very glad to receive?—I have a copy of a letter to Lord William Paulet, calling his attention to the different points.

19963. General *Peel.*] What is the date of it?—Subsequently to the Duke of Newcastle's instructions having gone out; it was more a commentary upon them; it is dated the 18th January 1855.—[*The same was delivered in.*]

Vide Appendix.

19964. Mr. *Ellice.*] Those reports that were made by the Inspector-general, Dr. Hall, when he was sent down by Lord Raglan to Scutari, were sent home, as well as to Lord Raglan, were they not?—He sent them home, I think, to Dr. Andrew Smith.

19965. Therefore Dr. Andrew Smith and the Medical department here had every reason, as far as official information was concerned, to rely upon the statement of Dr. Hall?—They had.

19966. And

19966. And any other information that reached them, conveying a different representation of the state of the hospitals, came to them either from private sources or officially?—Yes; I would read one letter written at an earlier date than the others, and at a time when I had received less evidence of the state of things there. It is a letter to Dr. Cumming, dated the 29th of November: "I am very glad to have received by yesterday's mail a very improved account of the hospitals at Scutari. I have seen a letter from Miss Nightingale speaking in high terms of the medical men; indeed all do justice to their exertions; but they had a task put upon them beyond any strength, and the confusion of the transport service at a moment of great pressure, no doubt, added much to their difficulties, by leaving them without any certainty of regular supplies. Between Commandant and transport service, Commissariat, Purveyor, &c., I suspect there is much unnecessary official form; all this, however, you will have to go into, and, I hope, set right. The authorities of the hospital have been attacked without consideration for their difficulties, and have, no doubt, been inclined to refuse assistance, thinking its offer conveyed an imputation. The French, I am told, are wiser, and accept for their hospitals everything which is offered to them. The first object should be, to make the hospital as good, and the people in it as comfortable, as it is possible to do; that is the only real answer to unfounded attacks, and it is sure to extinguish them at last; I am full of hope now for the future. We send out another batch of nurses (46) from Marseilles on the 6th; this will complete Miss Nightingale's staff to the full strength, I suppose, which she can manage; I hope she will be successful. I am very glad to hear that the medical authorities have received her so well. You will, I think, have seen enough of her now to know that she is thoroughly equal to her task. Pray recollect in your demands upon us here, whether for more men, more comforts, or more necessaries, that there is no question of pounds, shillings and pence in such matters, but that whatever can be got, must be got."

19967. *Chairman.*] At Question 9543, Dr. Andrew Smith was asked, "Do you think it convenient for a public establishment like the hospitals at Scutari, to be assisted by private contributions, and to have the authority divided by various persons assisting to manage such hospitals?" and he says, "Decidedly not; the very reverse." Then at Question 9549, he is asked, "In fact you do not know exactly in what position Miss Nightingale was when she arrived in the hospital at Scutari?—In conversation at my office, I understood that she was simply to take charge of the nurses, and make them do nurses' duty; but whether she got any instructions in addition to what I heard in conversation, I cannot say, but I believe she did." Had Miss Nightingale a divided authority?—She had no authority whatever in the hospital, except as superintendent of the nurses, over those placed under her control; she received official instructions from me, a copy of which I think I sent to Dr. Menzies; she had no other instructions than these; she had been accustomed to hospital work, and she thoroughly understood the necessity of subordination to the medical authorities; she has written to me, denying that she has ever issued anything, or administered anything, except upon a medical requisition duly signed; she had no authority whatever which could interfere with that of any one else.

19968. At Question 10370, with regard to some order to Mr. Wreford, it was asked, "Was it in writing, or verbally, that you complained to Mr. Wreford?—I think verbally; I sent for him on this occasion, and pointed out to him the state that the meat was in." And then, at Question 10371, "That was in December?—Yes; and his explanation to me, or the explanation of the other purveyor, Mr. Stuart, was, that the kitchen had been occupied by Miss Nightingale a great deal, so that the hospital cooks had not an opportunity of cooking the patients' dinners properly." Is that statement correct?—Perhaps the Committee will allow me to read a letter, written by Mr. Bracebridge, at Miss Nightingale's desire, to Mr. Bonham Carter, which he has put in my hands, in answer to the statement: "Scutari, April 16th, 1855. Dear Carter,—In the evidence of Dr. Menzies, as given in 'Times,' 28th of March, he states, that Mr. Wreford and Mr. Stuart, purveyor and deputy-purveyor, explained bad cookery in the barrack hospital kitchen, by saying that, 'the kitchen was occupied by Miss Nightingale; she was preparing soups and arrowroot for the sick.' Mr. Stuart has denied all knowledge of this explanation; it remains, therefore,

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therefore, between Dr. Menzies and Mr. Wreford, who will be in England before this letter: may I ask you to refer to them? This piece of evidence is a gross libel on Miss Nightingale; for she never had anything to do with the kitchen in question, directly or indirectly, or ever sent any orders there; nor has any arrowroot, or other extra diet, been prepared by her order anywhere else than in the two kitchens in her own quarters; these are at the opposite end of the barracks from the general 'cook-house,' or kitchen referred to. Again, in Dr. Andrew Smith's evidence, given in 'The Times,' of 27 March, he states, that, 'a divided authority is most unfortunate, and I think many of the imputations which have been made have arisen from it,' (in reply to, 'Do you think persons so benevolent as Miss N. should have a divided authority in hospitals with the medical men?'); whereas Miss Nightingale has most implicitly followed her instructions in acting only under the directions of the medical men; nor has she given nor allowed her sisters or nurses to give, as his reply infers, anything away without the requisition of a medical man. [*See* Miss Nightingale's evidence before the Commissioners, as quoted by Mr. Maxwell from their Report.] You will admit that it is an obvious duty on my part to defend Miss Nightingale against such an uncalled-for slander. I will not make any remarks on the motives which must have prompted an attack on a lady zealously exerting herself in the performance of her duty."

19969. Did Miss Nightingale attend the officers as well as the men?—I believe that some remarks must have been made on Miss Nightingale, stating that she refused to give her assistance to the officers, and, for the sake of more popularity, wishing to devote herself to the men; but I am glad to be able to state, that in so doing Miss Nightingale acted strictly in accordance with the injunction that I gave her. I advised her strongly herself not to do so, and with regard to the ladies engaged with her, not to allow them to attend upon the officers, or else there would be imputations and scandal soon abroad, and the officers having means of their own, were able to get attendance to a far greater degree than the men could. I cannot put it in myself, because it is an official document; but if the Committee wish to see the instructions to Miss Nightingale, I have no doubt that the Government would give them.

19970. Lord *Seymour*.] It was stated by Mr. Osborne, with regard to the cooking at the hospital, that the system upon which the meat was brought up into the wards (and then divided, and then taken back to be cooked, and then brought again back to the wards), caused a great delay, and that many deaths he believed resulted from the irregularity with which the poor creatures were fed; was that ever brought to your notice in the course of the autumn?—No; not at that time.

19971. Was not that a point which the medical officers reporting continually upon the state of the hospitals should have noticed?—Certainly they ought on an occasion of that kind, if they found the system defective, to have altered it and improved it.

19972. Then the medical officer of the establishment, who neither corrects the thing there, nor writes home even any account of it, but leaves Dr. Andrew Smith here, supposing that everything was going on well, is greatly to blame?—I think he is; I think he should have kept the chief medical officer of his department better informed as to those points.

19973. General *Peel*.] You established an hospital at Smyrna, did you not?—Yes, I did.

19974. It was not intended to be permanent there?—No; when the first hospital at Smyrna was established, it was established upon a representation made by some persons acquainted with the locality that the climate was better for the curing of wounds and diseases generally than that of Constantinople, and we sent some medical men, I think, to Smyrna, together with a Commissariat officer, to make inquiries as to the possibility and expediency of establishing a hospital there, and they sent home reports with regard to the health of the place, which appeared to me to be of a very doubtful character; but at the moment it was necessary to have a roof somewhere under which additional hospital room could be created, and that existed at Smyrna. The doubt as to the health of Smyrna does not refer, I believe, to the winter months, but to the time that the health might be affected, and fevers set in, which would be when the hot weather began. My intention was, as to the hospital at Smyrna (and that of the Duke of Newcastle, because all those things

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things were rather for his decision than mine), that after a certain period, during which the patients could be received in a large barrack, which the Turkish Government offered, inquiries should be made as to where there was the best site to build temporary wooden hospitals for the reception of the whole establishment elsewhere, and an hospital might then be built, and be ready before the hot weather set in. I had an interview here with Professor Laurie, of Glasgow, who produced some evidence showing that a larger per-centage of cases of fever are cured in wooden buildings than in stone buildings, and he brought drawings of the hospitals which had been in use in Glasgow for about ten years. I left it all in that train at the War Office two or three days before I left.

19975. Mr. *Layard.*] Who first suggested Smyrna to the Government?—I think two or three gentlemen suggested it who were acquainted with the locality.

19976. Persons well acquainted with Smyrna?—Yes; and we likewise made inquiry here in the city amongst merchants engaged at Smyrna, and the evidence was very contradictory with regard to the health of Smyrna.

19977. Did not you think that the fact of it being contradictory implied that there was considerable doubt as to its being healthy?—Yes; that is why I did not sanction its being established as a permanent hospital, but to take patients in till wooden hospitals could be built. We doubted between three sites for the permanent hospital; one was Rhodes, which, I believe, is the healthiest place in the Mediterranean, but too distant; Prince's Island, in the Sea of Marmora; but the place I should have preferred would have been Sinope.

19978. With regard to the wooden hospitals which were to be sent out, were they to be raised at Smyrna?—No.

19979. Where then?—Either at Rhodes, Prince's Island, or Sinope.

19980. Have they been raised?—I believe not. I think that Lord Panmure took a different view of the subject; but I have no official knowledge upon the subject as to what site was ultimately decided on by our Government; it was left for decision upon the examination of those different localities.

19981. When you sent to Smyrna, it was surely so late in the year, that you must have anticipated that the warm weather would set in before anything could be done?—No; it was already a convalescent hospital; there was a nucleus of an hospital there.

19982. When?—I think persons were sent to Smyrna as early as December.

19983. When does the warm weather begin there?—I cannot say of my own knowledge.

19984. Are you aware that fever has already broken out in the hospital, and that they have been obliged to remove their patients from the lower wards?—Yes; but I have seen a letter from Dr. Meyer, stating that the hospital has improved in health very much, and the fever diminished in its malignity.

19985. Did I not in the House warn you of the probable result of establishing the hospital at Smyrna?—I think you did; and I entirely agreed with you upon the subject; it was merely a temporary site for the hospital; I never contemplated its being made a permanent station.

19986. General *Peel.*] How is that hospital constituted?—It is constituted in a peculiar way; it is entirely manned by civilians; it is not a military hospital in one sense, but the hospital is an army hospital so far as the patients are concerned; there is a Colonel-commandant at the head of it, but all the medical men are civilians. I obtained them through the intervention of three very eminent medical men in London, Mr. Bowman, Mr. Moncrieff Arnott, and Mr. Grainger; they selected those gentlemen for me, and they went out to Smyrna a little before I left office.

19987. What rate of pay do those civil surgeons receive?—They are paid very considerably more than the army surgeons.

19988. Do you think it just to the army surgeons that the civil surgeons should be paid so much more than they are?—Yes, I do; the nature of their service is quite different; the army surgeon goes into the profession for life, and he has the prospect of pay for the rest of his days, and a pension on his superannuation, after a certain period. The civil surgeon is possibly taken from a good practice; and unless you give a large salary, you will only get an inferior man; the moment the war is completed, you turn them adrift, and

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they have no longer any claim upon you, no half-pay, and, in point of fact, their position is not nearly so assured a one as the others.

19989. It is because it was a temporary arrangement that you conceive they are entitled to more pay than the army surgeons?—Yes.

19990 Why did you select civil surgeons, instead of army surgeons; was it in consequence of the failure of the military surgeons?—Yes; the army surgeons were completely exhausted; I have had a good deal of difficulty as to the establishment of this hospital, and as to the best manner of introducing civil assistants into the army; I had a difference of opinion with Dr. Andrew Smith upon that subject. Dr. Andrew Smith, I think, stated in his evidence that I had taken the Smyrna hospital entirely out of his hands; and I think some gentleman asked him this question, "Whether he was not consulted, as the head of the Army Medical Board?" And he said, "No; that he had come to me, and said, that, under the circumstances, he considered that he was relieved from all responsibility, and that I told him it was so." I will state what the circumstances were. I have no recollection of Dr. Andrew Smith having come to me; but as he states that, of course, I have no doubt that it was so; the answer I gave him was exactly the answer I should have given to such a question at the commencement of the difficulties at Scutari; great sickness prevailing, and being very short of medical men, we took, by Dr. Andrew Smith's advice, civilians in, with acting commissions, as assistant surgeons, and that went on for some time. I then suggested to Dr. Andrew Smith that the pay of the acting men should be increased to a larger sum than that of the permanent army surgeons, to which he assented. Then, finding that at last we had exhausted all that class of practitioners whom we could get on those terms, I proposed to carry it higher, and take in civil surgeons to act as surgeons, and even as high as deputy inspectors of hospitals. Dr. Andrew Smith differed very much from me on that subject; but, in the end, I was so satisfied that I was right about it, that I carried out the system of a purely civil hospital, manned entirely by civilians. I thought it a better plan than to mix them; there would be less clashing of interests than there would be if they had an army surgeon and a civil one acting under military inspection.

19991. Who is at the head of the medical department?—Dr. Meyer, a man who had the charge of some large establishments in Norfolk Island at one time. He is a man of great ability and talent for organization; then I got from Lord Hardinge, Colonel Storks, as commandant; the system is working admirably. I have seen a letter from a gentleman who went from Scutari to examine it, who says that if those two men had been at the head of Scutari when it was first established, you would not have heard one word about the hospitals.

19992. Mr. *Layard*.] Why were they not?—We did not know of their existence at the time. Might I just state what passed between Dr. Andrew Smith and me as to the appointment of civil surgeons?

19993. *Chairman*.] Yes?—I mention this because Dr. Andrew Smith rather implied that I had taken the matter out of his hands; my reason for so doing was, that as he differed from me, and very honestly, upon professional grounds, as to the policy of the measure, I thought it would not be wise to entrust to him the organization of a scheme which he thought radically defective in itself. I was told by civil surgeons, who undertook the selection of gentlemen to go out, that they would not act if they were put under the Army Medical Board; I had written as early as January 19th upon the subject to Dr. Andrew Smith, and I said, "The country is now drained of the men who can be got as acting assistant surgeons. If you go on with this system, you will get only some inexperienced boys, to whom it is impossible to trust the lives of our soldiers; already there is complaint on this head; we must now look higher; you know the opinions I have pressed upon you on this subject, from which you have, on professional grounds, differed. When you expressed that difference, there was still the possibility of acting on the army system, aided by the introduction of civilians in the lower ranks: this is exhausted. We must now introduce civilians of higher rank, and give not only acting surgeoncies, but acting deputy inspectorships. I would send out to take charge of Smyrna a complete staff of civilians, with a gradation of acting ranks; I do not wish to exclude a simultaneous extension of the army system, if it can be extended. You have still men at home whom you can send out, I believe; Taylor, at Woolwich, and

men

men of that class. I wish to learn your views on this without loss of time, as we must act with promptitude." I wrote him a second letter upon the same subject, urging him to appoint an assistant to himself, after the loss of Dr. Spence, and urging also the necessity of immediately organizing a complete hospital corps, in lieu of the existing orderlies.

19994. Mr. *Layard.*] Was not a communication made to you concerning Mr. Arnott, a well-known medical man?—Yes.

19995. Was not some attempt made to obtain his services?—Yes.

19996. On what grounds did the communication with him break down?—It was a personal communication with Mr. Arnott; he occupies a very high position in London, and I could not offer him terms which probably would have made it worth his while to leave the country.

19997. What was the offer to Mr. Arnott?—I do not recollect at this moment.

19998. But it was such that he could not entertain it?—I did not say that. It did not succeed, though at one time I hoped it would.

19999. You stated that on the 12th of December medical rank had been given to many gentlemen to induce them to enter the army?—Yes.

20000. Was that the case?—Yes.

20001. What was the medical rank?—That of acting assistant surgeon. Then I proposed to give them a higher rank at Smyrna, and they are paid at a rate much higher than the highest ranks in the army.

20002. Did not these surgeons with whom you communicated in London consider that they could not, with any regard to their own position, go out there with the simple rank of assistant surgeons?—That is the case, and that, I believe, is why I pressed upon Dr. Smith to give a higher rank, and bring in men of greater standing.

20003. Mr. *Ellice.*] Dr. Andrew Smith has stated to this Committee that he wrote an official letter to the Commander-in-Chief before the expedition went out, to recommend that a certain number of transports should be prepared for the sick and wounded, and that also hulks might be prepared for hospitals in the event of it being found difficult to find accommodation on shore; was that letter communicated to you by the Commander-in-Chief?—No, I do not recollect that; I know that orders were sent by Sir James Graham in the autumn to have ships fitted up.

20004. You are not aware that any communication was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to the Duke of Newcastle, or to the Admiralty?—No, I am not; it may have been.

20005. Mr. *Layard.*] Were any reports ever communicated to you from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the subject of the hospitals?—I think I saw some letter which he wrote.

20006. Not officially communicated?—No.

20007. Would it not have been possible to have appointed a person connected with the Embassy to look after the hospitals, and then to have communicated with the Embassy?—It is quite true that the appointment of the Ambassador himself was irregular, and it was only justified by the circumstances at the moment, and the position he holds, and the influence he exercises; but I would not carry it further.

20008. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did not you think that adding to the complication of its administration in any way was a serious evil in itself?—I think any complication is an evil, and it is only on occasions of emergency that you are justified in departing from the ordinary rule: this, I think, was one.

20009. General *Peel.*] Did you take any part in providing clothing for the army?—Yes, I did; I assisted, to the best of my power.

20010. Will you describe what was sent out?—We sent out at first sheepskin coats and waistcoats, lined with cheap furs, rabbit-skins and others.

20011. Lord *Seymour.*] That was not till late in the autumn?—The "Prince" took the woollen clothing; that was the first.

20012. The Committee have here a letter from Dr. Smith, recommending, early in the summer, that warm clothing should be provided immediately, or before the autumn came, for the troops in the East?—Light clothing.

20013. Flannel clothing?—Yes.

20014. Was that brought to your notice?—No; I was not at the time aware of his having written the letter; but Lord Hardinge did not think his recommendation

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mendation a good one; he proposed, I think, that they should wear a light serge blouse, instead of a coat; but Lord Hardinge thought that in that climate, where, I believe, the peasantry dress thickly and warmly, there was great risk in exposing them in very thin clothing; for though there is great heat in the day, there is a great degree of cold at night; but upon the strength of that letter, Lord Hardinge sent out clothing of different sorts, the patterns of which he will be able to describe to the Committee exactly.

20015. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is it the duty of the Commander-in-Chief, under later arrangements, to provide clothing?—He did not provide the clothing; he selected the pattern.

20016. General *Peel.*] Do you believe that the boots sent out were too small?—No; there were some evidently too small; it was stated by Sir Thomas Hastings that they were ammunition boots. The boots sent out by the Ordnance were, I believe, large; and I say it with some confidence, because I was constantly at the Ordnance urging and hastening those proceedings; I had always the pattern of everything to be sent out sent to me. There were some long boots for the cavalry, coming up over the thigh, and some boots coming to the knee for the infantry; and I am convinced they were large enough, for I tested it in this way: I sent down my compliments to the officer of the guard and requested him to send me up one of the stoutest men he had, he being a grenadier, and I made him try the boots on; and I imagine if a guardsman of considerable size and height could be comfortable and easy in them, they would be quite large enough, even with two or three pairs of stockings, for a small man.

20017. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What do you mean by ammunition boots?—It is a technical term; but they are boots either supplied as part of that which formerly the colonels used to supply, or that which the men buy as necessaries themselves; additional pairs, which are supplied generally through the regimental agents; those were probably too small, because they were of the ordinary size, and being thoroughly wet, and the men's feet swollen, I have no doubt they shrunk; those were the regimental supply.

20018. General *Peel.*] Was all the clothing obtained in England?—No; a great deal of the clothing was bought in Austria; the sheepskin coats and things of that description. There was also a considerable quantity of woollens bought in Switzerland, through the intervention of Mr. Christie, our Minister there; and a peculiar kind of shoe, which has been well spoken of—a shoe with a very thick wooden sole, with the upper part made of leather, and lined with felt; they were sent out to Marseilles to Mr. Turnbull, our consul, and shipped there.

20019. Did you receive any complaints from the Crimea on the subject of the clothing?—None; I received a great many letters from the Adjutant-general Estcourt, speaking in terms very complimentary to me, and which I do not therefore repeat, of the efforts that had been made, the liberality with which they had been treated, and of the amount of supplies sent out.

20020. Did those orders emanate from you, or from the War department?—They emanated from the War department. What I did was this: wishing to relieve the Duke of Newcastle of some of those details, I took a good deal of trouble with respect to getting those different articles of clothing; but whatever was done, I made a minute of it for his signature, so that the order went from him to the Ordnance.

20021. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you think that details of this description should be left to the Secretary of State?—I think the Secretary of State should give general directions; but where, for example, it was decided to supply, say 100,000 pairs of socks, and 50,000 Jerseys, and so on, as has been done, these would go by the order of the Secretary of State to the Ordnance to procure those articles of clothing.

20022. But the Secretary of State would surely give his directions either to the Board of Ordnance or to the Secretary-at-War; and of whichever department it was the duty to provide the clothing, they were provided without himself entering into the details?—Certainly, and that is what I say he did; he merely gave a general order to the Ordnance to procure a certain quantity of clothing.

20023. Would the Secretary for War even define the quantity; should not that be left to a subordinate department in communication with the military authorities?

authorities?—That was done in communication with the military authorities and with the Ordnance, because the custom of the Duke of Newcastle was to have periodical meetings, twice a week, to meet the heads of the military department and myself to discuss those points.

20024. Surely the Secretary of State for War should not enter into details as to the quantity of socks that may be necessary; he should give an order, of course, having an understanding with the inferior authority, if he should give the order, that the inferior authority should provide that quantity, and for which the inferior authority ought to be responsible?—Just so; they gave their advice that a certain quantity would be required, and a minute was made upon it, and a letter was sent, being a covering order to the Ordnance to purchase such and such things to the amount so agreed upon.

20025. Lord *Seymour*.] With regard to this clothing that was supplied from England, from Trieste, from Vienna, and from Switzerland, I wish to know whether an account of these would come under the Secretary-at-War, or whether it would come under any other department?—It would come under the Ordnance ultimately; the Secretary-at-War would have nothing to do with it.

20026. That would come under the Ordnance?—Yes.

20027. What officers had the Ordnance to make those purchases, and to be responsible to them?—They had none; the time pressed; it was an urgent service, and there was an advantage in getting them in Austria and Vienna, for they could be sent by Trieste faster than they could be sent from England by Gibraltar, therefore it was thought better to buy those sheepskin coats there, especially as it is a country in which they can be most easily got.

20028. Then, in regard to all those purchases, we were at the mercy entirely of the persons who were ordered to purchase them?—You were at the mercy of the British Consul, or of some similar authority, being a responsible officer serving under the Government.

20029. General *Peel*.] Although those will be paid for by the Ordnance, you cannot make the Ordnance responsible either for the quality, number, or size?—Certainly not; you had that risk to encounter in consequence of the difficulties in which we were placed.

20030. Did you alter the mode of providing the annual regimental clothing?—Yes; it was altered last year. The clothing formerly supplied by the colonels, at a fixed allowance, much larger than that which the clothing cost, and leaving a profit to the colonels, was abolished.

20031. If the colonels were deprived of the privilege of clothing the regiments, how comes it that they are still supplied by them?—That arises in this way. The colonels made contracts for a year or more in the infantry, and in the cavalry I think it was two years. And until those contracts are expired, the troops will be supplied under the arrangements made by the colonels previously to the abolition of that privilege; it has not yet therefore come fully into operation, and will not so long as those contracts are in existence. When the change was made, I had some doubts as to how the supply should be regulated in future; my intention was to give to every regiment a fixed allowance to cover the exact cost of the clothing, as is done in the Life Guards and the Blues, getting the best clothing they can for the money. My object in that was not to overtask the Ordnance more than could be helped; but subsequently I left it open, not being decided about it. I found that while the wear and tear is very rapid in war, the number of suits to be worn cannot be foreseen, and you ought to have it in store; and it would be necessary ultimately to go to the Ordnance or to a Clothing Board, to perform the whole duty.

20032. What did you intend to substitute for clothing by the colonels?—Originally we fixed an allowance, and the colonel in the meanwhile received compensation for the profit he had lost.

20033. Mr. *Ellice*.] Did you make an additional allowance for any variation in the market?—Yes.

20034. General *Peel*.] Did the colonels make an unbue profit at the expense of the men?—I do not believe they did. I believe this happened, that a colonel, when he got his regiment, went to one of the old established clothing houses, which have a very large business, and the colonel said to the clothier, "I do not wish to make money by this; my object is that the regiment should be well clothed; therefore give them the best of everything;" and I think the

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clothiers were benefited most by that arrangement, for they charged a very sufficient price.

20035. Upon what evidence do you suppose that that speech was made?—Because many of the officers told me that they made it.

20036. General *Peel.*] Will there be a great saving under the new method?—Yes, some, but not so much as people suppose; but still, some saving. If the plan, which is now an experiment, should be carried out, I think there may be a considerable saving effected by the introduction into the prisons (where we are now obliged to maintain a great many persons almost in idleness) of sewing machines, and there making up large quantities of clothing with them. I believe they could make trousers, which is straight sewing, for the whole army.

20037. Have you taken any measures to ascertain at what price clothing can be made?—Yes; I have had several suits made to ascertain that, and I have satisfied myself that for the price hitherto paid a much better article can be given to the soldier than he has before worn.

20038. *Chairman.*] Sir Thomas Hastings states that you ordered clothing, and that the two departments were battling against one another in the market; was that so?—I do not think it is a correct statement. The case, I think, to which he alludes was this, probably: we ordered, as has been stated, a large quantity of woollen clothing for the troops, and generally, when reinforcements were sent out, we desired them, as they went out at a very short notice, to take their clothing with them, and to buy upon the spot, wherever they might be, in Dublin, or in Cork, their Jerseys, flannels, and socks, and to take them with them. I do not think that is competing in the same market, for the great market was the English market. But supposing that we paid 1 *s.* or 1 *s.* 6 *d.* more for things got in that way, I think, that upon 1,000 men, 50 *l.* were well laid out in securing that the regiment going out had its clothing with it; and in case of a great alteration of temperature during the voyage, the men could wear it, and when they arrived at Balaklava, they would have their woollens in their knapsacks, instead of the bales being made into stepping stones in the mud.

20039. Sir Thomas Hastings stated that you ordered fur caps at 6*s.* 8*d.*, while he was buying them at 5*s.* 10*d.*?—I think that is an entire misconception of the facts. I have refreshed my memory upon that subject, and I went to a gentleman who was present at the time, my private secretary, and asked him his recollection, which tallied with my own. A gentleman named Oliphant came, hearing that a contract had been made for a certain number of fur caps, and said that he had the means of putting his hand upon a very large number of seal skins, and he proposed to convert them into caps, and deliver them to the Government. I find that what took place is, that I acquainted Mr. Oliphant that I had no power to enter into contracts, but I gave him a note of introduction to Sir Thomas Hastings, and he went to Sir Thomas Hastings, and I have got here an Ordnance paper, requesting him to tender for caps; therefore I assume that so far from two departments bidding against each other in one market, no department was bidding except the Ordnance. I merely gave a letter of introduction to Sir Thomas Hastings, but possibly, and I think very properly, with a strong recommendation that when such an offer was made of this very large quantity of a scarce article, it should be at once accepted.

20040. You bought no caps at 6*s.* 8*d.*?—No.

20041. He stated that you desired him to send no goods except by steamers; was that so?—No, that must be an error; I was directly opposed to that; and I pressed Dr. Andrew Smith very much to establish a stream of sailing vessels, so that when once his supply was ahead by steamers, he should have a constant stream of sailing vessels that would arrive with the same regularity, although at a less speed, and that steamers should be released for the other services. I think now that our exclusive use of steam rather delayed than hastened our operations; for the steamers were all exhausted, and the goods waited till a steamer could be got; and when it was got, great repairs were required very often; and if the goods had been sent in a sailing vessel at the first moment that they were ready, I believe they would have reached Constantinople as soon as they did ultimately by steam.

20042. Captain *Gladstone.*] A large number of sailing vessels were employed, were they not?—Yes, a great many; but more might have been employed, and I think

I think it would have been better to have reserved the steamers for taking men, and for the most urgent services.

20043. Lord *Seymour*.] At Question 18578, Sir Thomas Hastings said, "My belief is that steam-vessels were not to be had; and we had an order from the Secretary for War not to send any articles destined for the Crimea in sailing vessels." That, you say, is a mistake?—I had no authority in the matter; I could have given him no instructions.

20044. You are not aware whether the Duke of Newcastle gave him such an instruction?—No.

20045. It is possible that that may apply to the Duke of Newcastle?—It may be so, or it may apply to some particular service that was to be executed.

20046. There was also a proposal of Dr. Andrew Smith for an ambulance corps?—Yes; he recommended that a corps should be formed of native bearers; and Captain Brett, of the Indian service, who was acquainted with the East, and who spoke the Eastern languages, went out for the purpose; but an objection was made to that. I think that the military authorities there disliked having a corps of natives mixed up with them, and they would not trust them; ultimately, I believe, for some reason which I cannot give, the scheme was abandoned, and Captain Brett came home.

20047. Mr. *Ellice*.] No arrangements were made for regular orderlies for the hospital?—No, not at first. Dr. Andrew Smith's opinion was a very just one, that a permanent establishment was the proper thing; but there again some difficulties arose; the military authorities, and very justly I have no doubt, disliked to have many civilians attached to an army in the field; but they were unwilling to spare their efficient men out of the ranks when the army was so small; afterwards we endeavoured to rectify that by enlisting men for the purpose, but it is very difficult to do, for you have no analogous service in civil life from which to draw; and I have no doubt that for some time it will work ill.

20048. Subsequently it has been found that foreigners, Turks, who have been employed in the hospitals, have answered the purpose very well?—I am not aware of that; they have been employing convalescent soldiers; but the evil of that is, that as soon as a man has learnt his business, he is well enough to go back to his regiment, and goes away; we have established by a warrant, which I could obtain from the War Office, with a regular gradation of pay, wardmasters and orderlies, and a complete establishment of male nurses of different ranks.

20049. And the service is now carried on on that principle, is it not?—Yes, so far as we have yet been able to get men.

20050. Mr. *Layard*.] Who are those orderlies?—A good many of them have been taken from the soldiers, not pensioners. The pensioners were tried, and, to a great extent, they failed; they were men taken generally under the age, I think all under the age of 50, most of them under the age of 45, and some younger than 35. There was, I believe, a great deal of drunkenness among them on their first arrival, and it was thought better not to carry that on; then some soldiers were taken, men who would have a claim to pensions in a few years, over whom there was more hold.

20051. They are now strictly military, and not civil?—Ultimately they will all be military; but a good many civilians are acting with them temporarily.

20052. Still it is a military department?—Yes.

20053. Captain *Gladstone*.] Have they been civilians who have been sent out from this country?—I think both military and civilians.

20054. *Chairman*.] How long has the purveying system been in operation?—For some years; it arose from there being detections of very great frauds in the hospitals; not great in amount, but a very great number of small frauds constantly going on, when the sergeants were employed by the medical men to purchase. Then the system was established which put an end to that.

20055. Mr. *Ellice*.] That system, which existed during the last war, was put an end to during the peace?—Yes, for the purpose of economy.

20056. And when we had no occasion for it, there being only one general hospital?—That is true; but I believe we lost by frauds more than we gained by the economy.

20057. Now the establishment is reformed?—Yes.

20058. *Chairman*.] Do you agree with Dr. Andrew Smith, that the medical officers ought to have more power?—No; I think, upon the whole, it would be a far

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a far better system to put the purveyor upon a footing to have more power and authority, and to make him responsible for the completeness of the hospital as to its *materiel*, and that the surgeon should not be disturbed from his medical duties by having to organize in any way, and that he should be strictly a surgeon, an operator or prescriber, and nothing else.

20059. Are you aware that it was stated to this Committee by Dr. Menzies and other medical authorities, that it was considered by them in the hospital at Scutari what the duties of the purveyors were, and they had insisted that the purveyors not only had to supply all that was wanted as to medical comforts, and other things, but it was their duty to see to the repairs, and to the cleansing of the hospital?—The cleansing, certainly.

20060. And the washing of the hospital?—Yes, so it is; but under the authority always of the medical officer.

20061. And the commanding officer?—Yes; ultimately the commanding officer has the authority over the whole.

20062. Colonel *Lindsay*.] Would you not consider the purveyor as a sort of quartermaster and surveyor?—Yes, I should think so.

20063. Mr. *Ellice*.] And a commissary as well as a quartermaster?—Yes, within the hospital. In the French hospitals it is carried to the other extreme. A person, who has studied the French hospitals very much, says, that a good deal of mischief arises in their hospitals from the *officier d'ordonnance* being made completely supreme, and the surgeons being made entirely secondary and subservient to him.

20064. *Chairman*.] Will you state what has been the result of the system which has been introduced of female nurses?—Upon this occasion it has been very good; but there are great difficulties attending it, and I do not think that in army hospitals it will become a permanent system. The Committee are aware that the civil hospitals in this country are very deficient as to that; you cannot get paid professional nurses, in whom you can place very great confidence. At Scutari they are perhaps in equal proportion paid nurses and ladies; the professional nurses have the advantage of long experience, and the others have the advantage of steadiness of conduct and zeal.

20065. Mr. *Ellice*.] It was found very difficult at the commencement of this war, in consequence of the complete reduction of our military establishment, there being no general hospital organization, except that at Chatham, to find the different instruments for carrying into effect good hospital arrangements?—I think so; it pervaded all the establishments; they had not the experience for acting upon any very great scale.

20066. We had no medical officers, in fact, who had any experience of the necessary discipline of general hospitals?—No, not upon any scale.

20067. *Chairman*.] It has been discussed whether the patients in hospital get 9 *d*. worth of comforts per diem in return for the stoppage?—I think it is not worth discussing, because the stoppage is not 9 *d*.; there is no hospital stoppage abroad, in the field; at home there is a stoppage of 9 *d*. or 10 *d*.; the stoppage of the soldier for his rations is only 4½ *d*. at home and 3½ *d*. abroad. I ought to say this, that in the December Session, a question was asked me as to the stoppage, and I gave the answer which I have now given; but, from the fact of the question being put, I conceived that there might have been an error at Scutari; and I wrote out to inquire, and I found that the paymaster there, in ignorance of his instructions, had been exacting hospital stoppage abroad, in war, such as is exacted at home, in peace. I then desired him to refund to the men all the stoppages that they had unduly paid; and I desired, before I left the War Office, the most efficient paymaster that could be found to be sent out, to supersede the gentleman who had committed those errors.

20068. Lord *Seymour*.] In regard to the bringing home of invalids, it was stated to this Committee, by Sir Thomas Hastings, that considerable inconvenience and expense arose in bringing home the invalids; for instance, that a vessel arrived at Portsmouth, whereas the invalids were to be sent to Chatham; was that subject brought to your notice?—No.

20069. The great inconvenience that arose in consequence of having to land them at Portsmouth, and then sending them by rail to Chatham, was never brought to your notice?—No.

20070. Mr. *Layard*.] Supposing a private should be separated from his knapsack, and that the knapsack, with the kit, should be lost, has the private soldier

soldier to pay for the value of the knapsack and the other articles?—That would depend entirely upon the circumstances. Claims for any losses in the field are sent home after having been sat upon by a Board of competent persons out there, and then those claims come to the War Office, and they are entertained and paid; but if the things were lost through carelessness, there would be no compensation.

20071. You are aware that a number of regiments lost their knapsacks almost entirely, and never got them back again?—They were stated to be in some vessel.

20072. It is stated in a letter that a soldier of the 95th Regiment, who is in England, had lost his knapsack, and that his pay has been stopped to make up for it; is not that very hard?—That would be hard, if the knapsack was lost in the execution of a service, and unjust.

20073. Though unjust, it is according to military regulations?—I should say not.

20074. Mr. *Ellice.*] If that was brought to the cognizance of the Secretary for War, he would remedy it, would he not?—Yes.

20075. Lord *Seymour.*] It was stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan that much of the difficulty in regard to supplying the troops, and as to vouchers for supplying the troops from the Commissariat, arose from the stoppages of the soldiers; that they were obliged to have the signature of the paymaster, and that the stoppage on the one side must correspond with the ration allowed on the other?—Yes, so I see it stated.

20076. Was it ever considered whether it would have been possible to have obviated that, by giving the ration, and allowing a small payment at once, instead of drawing the stoppage?—At present the soldier is paid short so much, 3½*d.*, and given the ration instead; but it would simplify the thing very much.

20077. Why, when the army is in the field, could not that have been adopted, which would very much simplify the accounts of the Commissariat?—I am not competent to speak upon that.

20078. Captain *Gladstone.*] In the navy there is no stoppage, is there?—No; but a man buys his clothes in the navy; the men know what the stoppage is very well; they know exactly what the net profit is to themselves; but the change that was made in the amount of the stoppage, and the mode of issuing the rations, has been very much in favour of the soldier.

20079. Were you in London during the recess?—Yes, I was. I can state what my attendance was during the recess. I think, since the declaration of war, there have been only two weeks that I have been absent up to the time that I left office—only two whole weeks, during some part of which I was not in London. After the prorogation I was away a whole week at the meeting of a Scientific Society, over which I presided; and I was away for a whole week in September; but my practice was to go into the country for the Sunday invariably, and for the Saturday or Monday, when possible, but the rest of the week I think I was always, with the exception of those two weeks, in London.

20080. Mr. *Layard.*] Were you during that time in constant communication with the Duke of Newcastle?—Yes.

20081. And with all your colleagues?—Not with all, but with several of them.

20082. Were you in the habit of receiving official letters from the East, directed to you as the head of the department?—No.

20083. Were no communications made to you from the East?—If letters came officially to me, as Secretary-at-War, I got them.

20084. Did you send those letters to your colleagues?—They were not on subjects that would interest them. They were merely on financial details, purely of a departmental nature.

20085. You received no information at all which, in your opinion, it was necessary to communicate to them?—No; but I saw all the communications that the Duke of Newcastle received.

20086. You received no communications which you thought necessary to communicate?—None.

20087. Were you in constant communication with those of your colleagues that were absent?—No; but I should have been, if there had been any necessity for it.

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20088. You think that there was no necessity?—Nothing occurred in my department that made it necessary; mine is entirely a financial department.

20089. During that time you were rather more than the mere Secretary-at-War?—I was a volunteer; I was assisting the Duke of Newcastle, and so far mine was an anomalous position. I believe I may say, that all my colleagues were within reach of the telegraph, and could have been got together in 24 hours.

20090. They were not got together in 24 hours?—No, there was no occasion.

20091. After the landing in the Crimea, the battle of the Alma took place?—Yes; all the preparations had been made before they left town, and we were waiting for news of the result.

20092. Were your colleagues waiting for two months?—I forget when Parliament was prorogued; I think it was in August.

20093. General *Peel.*] What authority had you over the militia?—I had the same authority over the militia that I had over the army, and that is a financial authority; and as there was much regulation to be made in organizing a new force, and as all regulations more or less affect pay, of course a great deal of it came under me.

20094. Had you any power to embody regiments, or to select regiments for embodiment?—No; it was entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State; I only recommended regiments for embodiment to Lord Palmerston.

20095. Did you ever have any authority delegated by Lord Palmerston to embody any during his absence?—Yes, on one occasion; for this reason, that at the commencement of November or the end of October, I had been getting together information as to the best mode of recruiting the army, and I came to the conclusion that we should act with greater probability of success through the medium of the militia, than in any other way; and I wrote a memorandum, and circulated it among the members of the Government immediately concerned; that memorandum was dated the 6th of November; I had been some days before getting up the facts contained in it; and the views which I put forward having been adopted by the Government, when Lord Palmerston went to Paris for a few days, in November, I asked him, with the view of carrying out this resolution, whether he would authorise the Home Office to call upon the regiments that I might specify; and I used that authority by calling upon and embodying a good number of regiments.

20096. Have you any objection to read that memorandum which you wrote upon the subject?—No; but I may state in reading it that I asked Lord Palmerston's opinion whether it was a memorandum that ought to be read, and he is of opinion that it ought, as specifying what the Government had intended to do. The object was this; I stated what had been the losses in the campaign at that time, and what would be the number necessary to keep up the army to its then state; I then showed what had been obtained from the militia regiments in an embodied state, and how few had been contributed by them when not in an embodied state; we could not get any number, except we first got them from the militia; the military spirit being once awakened, they would come in bodies, which they would not do from their homes.

20097. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The memorandums that you made were written early in November, were they not?—Yes, the 6th of November; the others were the 23d and 27th; and these latter gave an account of what had been the result at that time.

20098. Is it your opinion, that if the militia had been embodied at the commencement of the year, when war was declared, that there would have been greater facilities for recruiting the army than existed at that time?—There is nothing more difficult than to form an opinion as to the number of men that may be procured at any given time; raising the bounty, which is the natural way, would be entirely without effect if you did it at an improper moment; you might raise the bounty immensely during harvest, and you would lose the whole effect of it; the men would not come, and then, as the act of raising the bounty operates more with them even than the standard amount of it, you would have lost the whole value of that increase. After the battle of the Alma there was a great willingness to recruit; when that had subsided to a certain extent, the bounty was suddenly raised, and the bounty now is double the usual bounty, and higher, for limited service, than it was in 1815.

20099. Mr. *Layard.*] Did not the accounts that came from the East, of the neglect

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neglect to which the soldiers were subjected, do more to prevent enlistment than an increase of bounty did to encourage it?—I think it was a very great discouragement, and did a very great deal of harm. I can state here the result of what we were doing, in a letter which I wrote to Lord Palmerston, which I have his permission to read, stating what I had done in his absence. It is dated November the 30th, and it contemplates all that has been since done with regard to the reserve at Malta and as to Aldershot: "I must render an account of my stewardship, which I have exercised by your permission during your absence. In accordance with the memorandum which you read before you left London, all the militia regiments who trained a decent battalion at their last training have been embodied; there are one or two exceptions, which I will explain. The embodied regiments are now 61 in number. The small Welsh counties I have omitted for the present, as not possessing battalions which would yield us much harvest; but I am not sure that they too might not come out. The London, and one or two of the Middlesex and Surrey regiments remain for your decision. I doubt whether Colonel North's regiment would be of much value in billets, and we have no barracks for them; when we have any vacant, I would move them in. I have thus left for your decision all the doubtful cases. I have written a circular to the colonels, explaining why it is impossible to barrack them (as a general rule), and acquainting them that, in order to alleviate the burthen of billeting to the publicans, the nightly payment will be increased from ½*d.* per man to 1½*d.* I am told that the publicans will be quite satisfied with this increase. I have ordered from the Ordnance great-coats and knapsacks for all the force embodied, and the colonels undertake to procure the new clothing: there are many advantages in this. The Irish Government have consulted me as to at once embodying seven regiments in Ireland, and enrolling and embodying simultaneously; work is now slack, and the men willing to come, but they will not come if not at once taken on pay, and retained, else their masters turn them off for enrolling, and they get nothing in lieu. The seven regiments are those which are thought to be most likely to give men to the line, having local connexion with popular Irish regiments in the service. I mentioned the matter at the Cabinet to-day, and they agreed with me that these regiments should be at once embodied; and I have written to Sir John Young accordingly. The Cabinet also agreed to a plan, worked out between Newcastle, Hardinge, and myself, for augmenting the army. We proposed to add four more companies to the 44 regiments serving in the East; and placing those four companies in reserve at Malta and Gibraltar, with stores of all kind, ammunition, &c. Recruits will then first join the depôt in England, get all the preliminary drill, and when perfect in that, they will go to Malta to join the reserve; there they will get their finishing Minié practice, and be within reach of Lord Raglan's steamers whenever he chooses to put his hand upon them. As they will go out from here, therefore, without any pressing hurry, they can go in sailing transports, and thus release steamers for urgent work. Among other advantages, this plan will secure a sufficient reserve near at hand to feed our army efficiently. If the eight companies were in depôt in England together, they would be 2d battalions, and would soon be sent out to join the 1st, and the regiment would be without a reserve to feed it. We propose to create two new Rifle battalions. To attract men from the militia, we are to offer a captaincy, lieutenancy, and an ensigncy for 200 men. Then we hope to get for the augmentation one company of officers and two companies of men. We can form the battalion of Rifles in the same way. This would, if the plan works, give us from the militia 132 officers and 8,800 men; besides, say, 1,000 men and 15 officers for the Rifle battalions. The whole augmentation to the army would be about 20,000 men, of whom I hope to get half from the militia. The first draw from the militia has answered very well. The recruiting from the non-militia sources also continues at the rate of 1,000 a week; but I think much of that will turn out to be militia likewise. I am in hopes we may barrack some of these new regiments before long in iron houses, and encamp them at Aldershot in the summer."

20100. *Chairman.*] Has not the system of rationing the army been changed during the last year?—Yes; by the former regulation the amount of the stoppage oscillated with the price of food, the soldier paying what the ration cost up to the price of 6*d.*, and the Government paying the excess, if any; that was a very

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a very bad system; for a man quartered in Ireland, where provisions were much cheaper, was paying less for his ration, and consequently getting a larger pay than a man quartered in London, who was doing the same service; and the change made was to put them on a permanent fixed stoppage of 3½*d.* abroad, and 4½*d.* at home.

20101. Has the soldier or the public gained by that?—Certainly the soldier has gained, because the price has been very high, and I doubt whether there will be, on an average, sufficiently low prices to cover the cost of it.

20101*. What is the ration in the Crimea?—The ration at home is three quarters of a pound of meat and a pound of biscuit; the ration abroad is generally a pound of meat to compensate for the bad quality, and a pound of biscuit; the ration in the Crimea, however, is a pound and a half of meat, and a pound of biscuit; and I think, besides, rice, and also coffee. The vegetables were at first charged to the soldier in the Crimea, but were subsequently, by my desire, issued gratuitously to the men, on the ground that whatever ration was necessary for health, ought to be issued at the public expense.

20102. What is the stoppage for the officers?—It used to be 3*s.* a day in the hospital; it was lowered the other day to 1*s.*

20103. Mr. *Layard.*] Is there any accommodation in England for officers who come home wounded?—No, I believe not.

20104. There is such accommodation for the officers of the navy, is there not?—Yes, at Haslar. I think it would be a very good thing to establish that accommodation; they receive gratuities for their wounds.

20105. Captain *Gladstone.*] Dr. Smith recommended that, did he not?—I do not know.

20106. Colonel *Lindsay.*] With regard to Militia regiments, for instance, Colonel North's regiment, you stated that that would not be efficient if they were embodied; was not that in consequence of their being in billets to the east of London?—Yes; it was not that the regiment was bad, but the locality was bad, in the Tower Hamlets.

20107. Mr. *Layard.*] Had you anything to do with the foreign legion?—Nothing.

20108. You do not know the terms of the German contract at all?—No, I have not heard of it; all that I know is this, that when this foreign legion was in contemplation, I got some gentlemen acquainted with the language, good German scholars, and speaking other languages, and brought them into the War Office to make themselves masters of the paymaster's duties.

20109. With regard to the nationalities that were to be employed, the question was not brought before you?—Except as a member of the Government.

20110. Can you state to the Committee upon what grounds the foreign legion was to be limited to Germans and Swiss?—Merely because they were the countries from which we had the hope of getting the greater number, and it was better not to mix them.

20111. Were not offers made to the Government to raise men from Spain and other countries?—I do not think that any definite offer was made.

20112. Were any offers made?—I think not; there may have been since I left office.

20113. If any such offers were made to the Duke of Newcastle, or other members of the Government, they were not placed, to your knowledge, before the Cabinet?—No, I think not; there were some offers mentioned at the Cabinet; and I have no doubt many persons made offers who were quite unable to carry them out.

20114. It was stated the other day at a meeting, and here also, that an offer of 10,000 Spaniards was made to the Government?—Yes, by an English gentleman.

20115. Writing on behalf of a Spaniard?—Yes, from Paris.

20116. And was that offer brought to your notice?—No.

20117. General *Peel.*] If such an offer had been made, the Government could not have availed themselves of it without an Act of Parliament?—No.

20118. *Chairman.*] This was after the Act of Parliament had passed?—I do not know.

20119. Mr. *Layard.*] Did he submit any plan with regard to the organization of Turkish troops in English pay?—I was cognizant of a plan.

20120. The

20120. The Duke of Newcastle submitted a plan of that kind, did he not?—Yes, and it is in action, I believe.

20121. *Chairman.*] Who appointed Messrs. Hayter & Howell?—I did.

20122. Why?—I appointed Messrs. Hayter & Howell because they are a commercial house very well known, and Mr. Howell, one of the partners, with whom I have been in constant communication, is one of the most intelligent men I know. I thought they would carry on the Government business very effectually.

20123. Is Mr. Hayter a brother to the Secretary of the Treasury?—I believe he is.

20124. Mr. *Ellice.*] It is a house of very old standing in the city, is it not?—I was going to explain the way in which I became acquainted with that firm. They were packers for the colonels, and when I took from the colonels their business, I looked out for packers, and hearing from all hands the highest testimony to the ability and zeal, and the way in which Messrs. Hayter & Howell did their duties, I took them, together with the business, which the colonels gave up; but they have been army packers, I believe, since the year 1755, which was sometime, I apprehend, before the Secretary of the Treasury was born.

20125. Were they called Hayter & Howell then?—I am not sure.

20126. Mr. *Ellice.*] They are great army clothiers, and you have had recourse to them for very many years to pack (generally speaking) all the army clothing that was sent abroad?—Exactly so.

20127. They inspected the army clothing, did they not?—Yes, and they did everything most efficiently. I have every reason to be satisfied with the work they have done for the War department; I believe they have likewise packed for the Ordnance since that. Messrs. Hayter & Howell conducted the whole business of the transmission of free gifts made during the winter to the army and to the hospitals.

20128. Mr. *Ellice.*] I believe they have packed for the Government from time immemorial, what have been called Indian presents sent to Canada?—Yes; they sent 809 packages to Scutari, of free gifts, 433 to the Crimea, and likewise transmitted large packages out to the officers, by the facilities which we gave them for that purpose.

20129. *Chairman.*] I ask you this question, because I find it in the papers put into my hands by you: you say that Mr. Hayter is a brother of the Secretary of the Treasury; was that the reason why they received the appointment they have received?—I am not sure that at the time the appointment was made I knew at all that Mr. Hayter was brother to the Secretary of the Treasury; but certainly my motive in making this appointment was solely on public grounds, and I am satisfied that the result has justified the appointment.

20130. Mr. *Layard.*] In what relation did your department stand with the Horse Guards?—My department was purely financial, with the exception of this, that the Secretary of War names the regimental schoolmasters, and overlooks the whole system of education; he names the chaplains, and he names the officers of pensioners, for the system of embodied pensioners.

20131. Were you in the habit of being in continual communication with Lord Hardinge?—Yes.

20132. Do you know whether he was consulted by the Cabinet as to what was taking place in the East?—Yes, certainly.

20133. Did they act upon any reports from Lord Hardinge?—Yes; he drew up schemes for the organisation of the army, which were placed in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle, and which were acted upon.

20134. For the organisation of the army, not for operations?—No, not for operations: but he drew up very able papers on the organisation of the army.

20135. When you had reason to believe that the state of things in the East, or rather at Scutari, were such as you have described in that letter which you have read to this Committee, did you not then communicate, or make a representation, to Lord Hardinge upon the subject?—I spoke to him on the subject, of course, frequently.

20136. Were any representations made to him formally on the subject of the hospital at Scutari?—I do not know what representations the Duke of Newcastle made to him; I had no authority over Lord Hardinge.

20137. Being a member of the Cabinet, and being aware of the state of things

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things which you have described, was not it natural to you to represent to Lord Hardinge that somebody was not doing his duty in the East?—Yes.

20138. Was that representation made?—Yes; and I think Lord Hardinge agreed with me; but the difficulty that we had was, at that hour, to know the right man.

20139. In your opinion, and in Lord Hardinge's opinion, so far as you knew it, who was that somebody that was to be blamed?—Even now I should hesitate in fixing it upon any one individual.

20140. *Chairman.*] Do you think it was more than one?—I think now that there is a general opinion entertained by the public that the system is very much to blame, and that an alteration of the system would remove all the evil. I do not believe that the difference between one system and another is nearly so great as between one man and another. If you have good men, they will work a bad system, but the best system will not work well with inferior men; but the men must know their business, and have experience in it. I apprehend that at the commencement of these operations, owing to the long peace, nobody had seen any operations conducted on a large scale. I think they were frightened at the responsibility, and the expression used by Dr. Andrew Smith, as regards his own case, I dare say will apply to many others; he said it took him five months before he could believe that he could spend as much money as he required.

20141. Do you think that the system in 1853 was worse than the system in 1800?—I have no means of comparing them; it was 10 years before I was born.

20142. Mr. *Layard.*] In your opinion, during the period of 50 years has the system gone down or improved?—The system is entirely different.

20143. Is it a better or a worse system?—Better for some purposes, and worse for others; it is better for the purposes for which in peace you look, which is the simplification of the finance of the army, and a check upon the expenditure. I cannot speak of what the system was in 1800; but no doubt the system, as it has been worked now, has not been expansive enough for war.

20144. There have been Indian campaigns, have there not?—Yes.

20145. Where did the Duke of Wellington acquire his experience originally?—In India.

20146. Had he a worse system to deal with in India than the system that Lord Raglan had to deal with in the Crimea?—Originally I think he had.

20147. His experience was obtained from India, was it not?—Yes; but I do not believe that the Commissariat was very good, even when he left it.

20148. Still his experience was gained in India?—Yes.

20149. Do you think that the battles in which he was engaged in India were greater than those which have taken place in India during the last 20 years?—Those are questions of opinion; what I have stated is, that I think we are in error in putting the blame so much upon the system; I think it results more from the men who have had to work the system having had no previous experience of the duties they had to perform.

20150. *Chairman.*] You have stated that a bad system with good men may be better than a good system with inferior men; supposing you had a bad system and bad men, what would you do?—In that case you must try and reform your system; experience will show you who are the men who are capable of working it for you.

20151. This war has continued above a year; has experience shown us who was incompetent?—That is a matter upon which I ought not to be called upon to give of opinion.

20152. Lord *Seymour.*] The Duke of Newcastle has stated to this Committee that he was dissatisfied with the department that superintended the supply of the army; were you satisfied with the department over which you presided, namely, the War Office, having regard to its duties?—Yes; I must say that I am bound in gratitude to the men in that office to state that I believe it to be the best constituted office under the Crown. The clerks worked with the greatest possible zeal. I made great demands upon their time, and I lengthened the office hours, but they never murmured or objected, but worked with the greatest possible zeal; and I must say that no man was ever served by his subordinates better than I was; some of them are quite first-rate men as public servants.

20153. What

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20153. What is the system of that office?—There is a very great difference in the system from that of other offices. The person who originated its efficiency was Mr. Sullivan, the Deputy Secretary-at-War, who brought it up to a very high pitch. But in that office all the promotions go by merit, not by seniority, though that rule has been occasionally departed from by some Secretaries-at-War, just enough to disturb it a little; yet it has been, upon the whole, sufficiently maintained to be the rule of the office, and I have always adhered to it most rigidly.

20154. How do you ascertain merit in this office; is it by the examination of the seniors?—I require from the heads of the departments a recommendation in writing of the men that they think best in each class, and the reasons on which their recommendations are founded; I then discuss the matter with them, with the assistance of the Deputy Secretary-at-War; sometimes the discussion may modify matters, but I take from them their opinion, and I believe it is very honestly given. The working of it has been this: it does not give satisfaction generally in the office itself. There is a constant strain upon everybody; and when promotions were made, I used to look forward with dread to a promotion, because I was assailed with remonstrances and objections from persons who are passed over; but the public service has gained, for the result has been that you have got the ablest men in the War Office at the top, men in the flower of their age; and those under them, feeling that the men who are directing them are their superiors, obey them willingly. Latterly I introduced clerks at the bottom, by means of examination; I got accountants from mercantile houses as temporary clerks, and when any one had distinguished himself, and was obviously, from the report, the best, I gave him a vacant clerkship on the establishment; when that was not the case, I put a certain number to compete with a certain number of nominations of my own, and I sent for the master of the school at Chelsea to examine them, and report to me the order in which they stood, and according to that they came into the office.

20155. Mr. *Layard.*] That applies solely to the Secretary-at-War's office?—Yes.

20156. General *Peel.*] Do you suppose that the Duke of Newcastle's opinion, as to the other departments, was an opinion with respect to the clerks of the departments?—No, he could not know, nor do I think he meant that.

20157. *Chairman.*] Did you concur with the Duke of Newcastle in the opinion which he expressed, that of dissatisfaction with the organisation of the departments which superintended the supply of the army?—I think the view I took was this, that the authority of the Secretary of State was paramount, and admitted to be so; but from the independence of the different departments, they had not that intercommunication amongst themselves which enabled them, as they were then constituted, to carry out properly any operation which depended upon the combination of all, or any of them.

20158. Did you find, practically, that the separation which took place of the Secretaryship of War from the Secretaryship of the Colonies led to any practical good, so far as the preparation for war was concerned?—Very great; I think it would have been impossible to have carried it on at all without it. It required the undivided attention of one man, and the Duke of Newcastle laboured morning, noon, and night, and it would have been utterly impossible to have gone on with the Colonial administration.

20159. That small change that was made having done good, did you make any proposal to the Government as to any further change?—Yes; first I proposed to the Duke of Newcastle, who assented to it, with a view to correct the evil which I have spoken of, namely, the ignorance of each department of what was being done by the others to promote a particular service, that there should be periodical meetings at the War department, consisting of the heads of the Military departments and myself, so that whatever orders were given should be given to each in the presence of all; and that if there was any objection to make, it should then be made, and if any alteration was to be made, it should then be made. That was approved of, and it worked, I think, satisfactorily, so much so, that, subsequently, the Government came to the conclusion that it would be well to give to those meetings a more formal character; and it was proposed that there should be either a Minute of the Treasury, or an Order in Council fixing those meetings, and putting necessary limitations upon the

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powers of the Military Board, for a Military Board it would have been in some senses.

20160. The Committee are to understand that the organisation of the departments was not satisfactory, and therefore you recommended those periodical meetings?—I recommended those periodical meetings, and I had got certain things ready in my own office, with a view to the ultimate reorganisation of all those departments; for example, the War Office is, I think, quite ready to take the whole of the financial business of the Ordnance Corps, that is, of the artillery and engineers, which, in my opinion (and I believe that the Government coincided with me in that), should be transferred from the Ordnance to the Commander-in-Chief, confining the Ordnance to the supply of the *matériel* of the army, and putting the authority over the whole *personnel* in one man, namely, in the Commander-in-Chief.

20161. Was that Order in Council issued?—No; the plan was, I think, agreed to; and I drew up a minute for the Duke of Newcastle, which he requested me to do, as I had given a great deal of attention to the subject; but, in the interval, a motion was made in the House of Commons, which terminated in the disruption of that Government.

20162. Would there have been power enough in an Order in Council to have effected the whole object of constituting this sort of Military Board, with the Secretary for War at the head of it?—I think there would; because the Board, as I intended it, was not to have any executive functions as a Board; the Secretary of State was to be the sole power, and the others were to meet to advise him, and to receive his orders, in his presence, but not to have any power of voting, or any authority as a Board. They would have been merely a deliberative Board of advice, meeting together to receive the instructions of the Secretary of State, whose authority would be paramount.

20163. Such a system as that might have been adopted even when Parliament was not sitting in August or September last?—No, clearly not; everything that we were doing was tentative, and it was very important, in dealing with questions of this kind, not to make too great or too sudden a disturbance. Even the change that was effected, of making the Secretary of State, which he was technically before, one supreme authority, did, to a certain degree, disturb the routine of some of the offices. I think there is evidence of that before the Committee. The Civil Service are acquainted very well with their own particular method, and it is like a Russian horn-band, where each man plays one note, and it is played with perfect harmony; but if you take one man from his note, the whole thing is thrown out of tune. So in the Civil Service; after men have been running in one track for many years, a small disturbance deranges the method of the department very much; and it would not have been prudent to remodel the whole without some experience to guide you as to what you were to do.

20164. Then your change, as proposed by you, would eventually have led to the abolition of the office of Secretary-at-War?—No, not necessarily. The change which I proposed was this, that the Board should consist of the Secretary of State, and that he should be assisted and advised by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Master-general of the Ordnance, if there was one, which I left rather as an open question.

20164*. But the Master-general is in the Crimea?—Yes, and the Lieutenant-general would have attended in his place; the Commissary-general also would attend to represent the Commissariat, if thought necessary, and the Secretary-at-War. I contemplate the preservation of the Secretaryship-at-War, because I think that an independent financial authority is a very wholesome check upon the whole expenditure of the army; he might have then had placed under him the finance of the two Ordnance corps, the Artillery and Engineers, which I proposed to transfer to the Commander-in-Chief; he would have to move the Estimates, not only for the Army, but for the Ordnance corps; and he would have to move likewise the Estimates for the Commissariat, so that the House of Commons would have got at one view the gross expenses of the army, with the exception of the Ordnance, which would remain purely as a great manufacturing establishment, without any military duties whatever, and I thought they should be under some separate head.

20165. Did you submit that in writing to the Cabinet?—I have this draft minute which I wrote, but it is not official.

20166. Lord

20166. Lord *Seymour.*] When did you write that minute?—It was written I think early in January 1855.

20167. That resulted, did it not, from your experience of the practical working of that Board?—Yes.

20168. Could you have brought the War department into something resembling the organisation of the Admiralty, consisting of the chief and the other Lords, who take their official parts?—Yes, preserving carefully the autocracy of the Secretary of State; practically the first Lord of the Admiralty is autocratic over the Board, and I think that, in the case of Lord Spencer, he desired a signature to be affixed to a paper, and if it was not to be affixed, a new Board was to be formed, and forthwith the paper was duly signed.

20169. It would have been something of the same kind that you would have established?—Yes, something of the same kind.

20170. Mr. *Ellice.*] You would not necessarily have made the Secretary of State a member of that Board; you would have made him the supreme authority, to whom the Board could have referred all questions, while he could submit questions to them?—No; I think that where there is a Board, the President of the Board should always be there.

20171. But would it not be a great consumption of the time of the Secretary of State to be present at the Board when they were discussing matters in detail with regard to military expenditure?—No; I did not mean that the members of that Board should there conduct the whole business of their own departments; all that I proposed was this, that the Secretary of State should summon them, in order to give him advice upon any points which he wished, and receive his orders upon them; and in order to guard against the possibility of their transacting ordinary business there, I proposed that if in any one of the departments there was any question that they wished to reserve for the decision of the Board, it should be sent previously to the Secretary of State, so that he should decide upon what should be the agenda for the Board, and either adopt it or reserve it for private discussion as he thought right; the persons of whom it would have consisted, would have been the Commander-in-Chief, who governs the army, the Master-general of the Ordnance to arm and equip the army, the Secretary-at-War to control the finance of the army, and to move the Estimates, and the Commissary-general, if it was thought necessary, to feed the army.

20172. Do you think, with these opinions, that it was prudent, just at the time the war broke out, to render the machinery in the different departments less efficient than it had been during peace?—In what respect?

20173. Do you think it was advisable, just at the moment when the war broke out, to attempt to carry on the administration without a Master-general, or a Surveyor at the Board of Ordnance?—The case of the Master-general was a peculiar one. The question was, which inconvenience we should undergo, it being thought that Lord Raglan was a man eminently qualified to undertake the particular service in hand. If we had thought it necessary to retain him as Master-general, we should have lost his services abroad. On the other hand, in his absence, there was an officer of great experience with regard to the *personnel* of the Ordnance, namely, Sir Hew Ross, who had been Adjutant-general of Artillery for some time, and who could perfectly discharge his functions.

20174. But Sir Hew Ross had not all the authority of the Master-general. Sir Hew Ross stated to the Committee that the Master-general was paramount, and that he could either act upon the recommendation, or reverse the recommendation of the Board, but that Sir Hew Ross, being a member of the Board, only had a voice as that member, and could not supersede the authority of the Board?—But I see Sir Thomas Hastings states that, according to his patent, he had all the authority of the Master-general.

20175. But Sir Hew Ross himself, who executed the duties in the absence of Lord Raglan, has stated that he had not that authority, and, owing to the want of it, great difficulty did occur subsequently, from dissension between the members of the Board?—I was not aware that he had made that statement; I should have thought that the Lieutenant-general, in the absence of the Master-general, had his full authority.

20176. But even supposing the Lieutenant-general, in the absence of the

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Master-general, had his authority, do not you think that the Master-general of the Ordnance, having always been an important member of the Administration, and having been always a Privy Councillor, the office should have been maintained in its full power and authority at such a moment?—That is, that some other person than Sir Hew Ross ought to have been selected to fill that situation?

20177. Some person either of higher rank or of higher authority, and having the rank of a Privy Councillor, should have been chosen?—That is entirely a question between men.

20178. The Master-general of the Ordnance takes the pleasure of the Crown upon all appointments, does he not?—Yes, as the Commander-in-Chief does.

20179. Then he has all the patronage of that department?—Yes.

20180. Do not you think that that should have been vested in rather a higher officer than in the hands of an officer who is only a member of the Board?—In some respects, yes; but I think there was an advantage in having an artillery officer at the head of that establishment.

20181. Lord Raglan was not an artillery officer, was he?—No; that has not been the constitution of the Board generally.

20182. Yet you state that he was a very efficient officer?—Yes, a very good man of business.

20183. Mr. *Layard.*] Was any proposal made to you in the beginning of the year for making a wooden tram-road from Balaklava to the camp?—No, not that I remember; any proposal of that kind would have gone to the Duke of Newcastle.

20184. With regard to Sir John Scott Lilly's improvements, he has written to me about them; were they entertained by the department?—He called upon me with a note of introduction from Mr. Hume, and he showed me the plans, and their adaptation of the rifles to a peculiar use, which struck me as being very simple and ingenious; but of course I have no competence to give an opinion upon that subject, as I told him; but as I was struck with the plans, I gave him a letter of introduction to the authorities at the Ordnance, and they entered, through the means of the Committee at Woolwich, into the examination of this plan, but, I believe, they decided against it.

Jovis, 10° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Sir John Pakington.	Captain Gladstone.

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Joseph Wood, Esq., called in; and Examined.

J. Wood, Esq.

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20185. Lord *Seymour.*] YOU are Secretary to the Board of Ordnance?—I am.

20186. How long have you been in that situation?—I have been Secretary about 18 months.

20187. Before that, what situation did you hold?—Chief Clerk.

20188. Had you been Chief Clerk for many years?—No; I was Chief Clerk about four years; I have been many years in the service.

20189. How many years have you been in the service of the Ordnance?—Fifty-one.

20190. You

20190. You were made Secretary, you say, 18 months ago?—Yes.

20191. Upon what occasion?—Upon the retirement of Mr. Butler.

20192. Therefore, having been so long in the Ordnance, you are conversant with the forms and the practice of the Board and of the department?—Yes.

20193. You were in the office formerly, when there was both a Master-general and a Lieutenant-general?—Yes.

20194. The Lieutenant-general used then to be a member of the Board, I believe?—He was.

20195. When was the office of Lieutenant-general abolished?—I think about 1831.

20196. Then you had no Lieutenant-general again till last year?—I will not be sure that I am accurate as to the date which I have mentioned, but the Lieutenant-generalship was abolished somewhere about that time, and we had no Lieutenant-general until last year.

20197. Then the Master-general was absent, and the Lieutenant-general was appointed in his place, as we understand?—The Lieutenant-generalship was re-appointed.

20198. Then you did not consider that it superseded the office of Master-general?—No.

20199. Were there, in fact, any communications made to the Master-general upon the business of the Ordnance while he was absent abroad?—Not by the Board to the Master-general as Master-general.

20200. Then, in that respect, the Lieutenant-general performed all his duties?—The Lieutenant-general performed his duties; there is a particular warrant under which the Lieutenant-general acts.

20201. The warrant which came before the House of Commons in the Report of 1828?—It is a warrant of George the Second, which provided expressly for the performance of the duties of the Master-general by the Lieutenant-general, when the Master-general was absent.

20202. Was there any inconvenience as regards the daily working of the office from the absence of the Master-general and the substitution of the Lieutenant-general?—I am not aware that there was any in the current business of the office.

20203. The Master-general discharged the military duties of the office?—Yes.

20204. Had you, as Secretary, anything to do with that portion of the duties of the office?—No.

20205. You merely had to do with what came before the Board?—Yes.

20206. With regard to the Board of Ordnance, was it in the power of one member of the Board to perform all the duties of the Board?—No, not according to the instructions.

20207. Legally, I wish to know how that is; are you aware of that: could he perform the duties or could he not?—Yes, when no other members of the Board were present.

20208. He had full authority?—Yes; it has been the practice always, if only one member of the Board was present, that that member transacted all the business which would come before the Board.

20209. Did you yourself bring the business before the Board as Secretary?—Such letters as are received as Secretary.

20210. All letters directed to you as Secretary to the Board of Ordnance you brought before the Board of Ordnance?—Yes.

20211. Did you prepare any minutes upon those, or did you merely submit them to the Board?—It was according to circumstances. If they were matters in the current course of business, I should put minutes upon them, and submit them in that state to the Board's consideration. If they were matters of graver importance, I should submit them in a portfolio to the Board's own consideration and decision.

20212. You keep a record of all the business done at the Board?—The minutes, in consequence of a recent examination of the office by a committee, have been changed somewhat in that respect. Formerly very copious minutes used to be kept, but now they are only records of principal transactions, and transactions involving a principle.

20213. During the time the Master-general was in this country, who was not present at the Board, were these records or these minutes sent to him, that he might know what the Board was doing?—Yes.

 20214. Invariably?

20214. Invariably?—Yes; the record of the Board's minutes was submitted to the Master-general.

20215. So that, in fact, the Master-general, although he was not present at the Board, yet was made cognizant of all the proceedings of the Board?—Of the principal subjects.

20216. And he could, of his own authority, if he pleased, reverse the decisions of the Board, could he not?—Yes, that was in the Master-general's power.

20217. When the Lieutenant-general took the place for some purposes of the Master-general, were, in the same way, all minutes sent to him if he was not present at the Board?—No, they were not; the Lieutenant-general is a member of the Board.

20218. Then he has not that superintending authority which the Master-general has?—He has the same superintending authority which the Master-general had or has upon all military subjects.

20219. But not upon subjects connected with the Board?—No.

20220. He cannot, of his own authority, reverse the decisions of the Board?—No.

20221. He is merely a member of the Board?—A member of the Board.

20222. Therefore the authority which in the Master-general was sole and complete, was a divided authority in the Lieutenant-general, as regards the business of the Board?—Yes.

20223. Will you state how these different minutes upon business were kept: supposing, for instance, an application for stores was sent to the Board of Ordnance, to whom would that come; would it come to you naturally?—Not in all cases.

20224. It might come to you, or it might not; is that so?—It would depend upon the party from whom it came. If a demand for stores, or a requisition came from any one not in the Ordnance Department, it would be addressed to the Secretary to the Board, and consequently it would be opened by me, and it would be brought by me before the Board, or referred to the Store Account Office, to which it would probably relate. Demands, of course, from the Ordnance stations go direct to the Store Account Office, where they are examined, and they then come to the Board.

20225. Supposing, for instance, that the Minister for War desired to send out clothing to the Crimea, he might send a requisition to the Comptroller of the Stores, to the Clerk of the Ordnance, or to the Secretary of the Ordnance?—He might use, of course, his own pleasure.

20226. What was the course?—The usual course is for letters from the War Department to be addressed to the Secretary to the Board.

20227. Was that the case during the whole of the last year; were the letters invariably addressed to you?—I believe all letters were invariably addressed to me.

20228. But the moving authority, so to call it, did not come in the first instance to you, as I understand?—Not in all cases.

20229. Did it sometimes come to the Clerk of the Ordnance?—Yes, I believe so.

20230. When it came, how was it brought before the Board, in that case, when it did not come to you?—Frequently the authority of the Secretary for War did not appear; but directions were given by one or other of the Board officers to me to do so and so, which, of course, I did.

20231. Were those directions given to you at the Board?—Not always at the Board.

20232. Were you always present at the Board?—Yes.

20233. In fact, has there ever been a Board when the Secretary was not present?—No, unless he was absent from the office.

20234. But then he would have a substitute?—Yes.

20235. You were, as a matter of course, present at the Board of Ordnance, I understand; then you brought one class of letters, and presented them to the Board?—Yes.

20236. Other letters were brought by members of the Board; was that so?—It might be that letters were so brought; but it was scarcely ever the case, because letters, I believe, in almost all cases came through the regular channel to the Secretary.

20237. But documents of this sort were brought by members of the Board?—Yes.

20238. Did that often occur?—Many times.

20239. Whose business was it to keep at the Board a record of all the transactions of the Board?—Nothing was carried out, that I am aware of, upon directions from the Secretary for War, or any other authority, without an order from some member of the Board, which order became a minute; it might not always be in the usual formal state, but still there were directions to do so and so.

20240. When such directions were given, was a short record of it entered in a book?—I cannot say that that was always the case.

20241. Were the more important ones entered in a book?—Yes, what might be considered more important subjects.

20242. Who judged of what was important, and what was not?—In a great measure myself, or those acting under me, who had probably to carry out these papers.

20243. Suppose, for instance, a new foundry was wanted at Woolwich, would that be considered a matter of sufficient importance for a record to be kept of it in a book, if it was brought before the Board?—I should say yes.

20244. With regard to a shell foundry which we have heard of, which was established, I think, in the autumn of last year, was that business brought before the Board?—I cannot say from recollection exactly what shape it took; I believe that there was an order upon that subject, but I cannot from recollection say; I can get the papers.

20245. Were you not in the room the other day when Mr. Monsell gave his evidence?—No; I was not.

20246. You have not seen, perhaps, the evidence upon that subject?—I have not.

20247. Were you here when Sir Thomas Hastings was examined?—I was here during a part of the time that Sir Thomas Hastings was examined, but I have not read the evidence.

20248. Then you cannot now say what was the proceeding in regard to that foundry?—No, I cannot from memory; I could easily refer to the papers and give the Committee every information.

20249. You cannot say when you first heard of it yourself?—No.

20250. *Chairman.*] Then you cannot say whether the action of the Board commenced after the building of the foundry, or before?—I do not know exactly when the building of the foundry did begin, nor do I recollect exactly the date of the Board's minute; I shall be very happy to refer to those papers.

20251. Without stating actually the date, you can state that matter of fact, whether the action of the Board commenced before or after the building of the foundry?—I presume before.

20252. It ought to have been before?—Certainly, according to course.

20253. Then if the foundry were begun to be built before the action of the Board began, there was an irregularity?—Certainly.

20254. Lord *Seymour.*] After the proceedings of the Board were over, as I understand, these matters were not brought separately again under the consideration of the Lieutenant-general?—No; not as a matter of course.

20255. Therefore, if he was not present at the Board, he might not be cognisant of what the Board was doing?—Certainly.

20256. The Master-general was never left in that state of ignorance, as I understand; he might always become cognisant?—Yes.

20257. He had an opportunity of having brought before him all the business of the Board?—Except the common form business of the Board.

20258. *Chairman.*] But the Master-general could not be made cognisant of proceedings which the Board knew nothing about?—No; unless personally communicated to him by any one.

20259. Therefore, as far as the Board was concerned, if any building was commenced before the action of the Board commenced, it would be begun without the knowledge of the Master-general?—Without any official knowledge.

20260. Without any official knowledge through the Board?—Yes.

20261. Mr. *Ellice.*] But could any such proceeding have been commenced while there was a Master-general in this country, without some communication

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having been previously made to the Master-general upon the subject?—Yes, it is possible that it might.

20262. Do you know of any instance in which that has taken place?—No.

20263. General *Peel.*] Are not the minutes of the Board always attached to or written on the paper referring to the case?—Yes, the actual minute of the Board is put upon the paper. The minute upon which we act is the order given upon the paper, and which is signed by a member or members of the Board; that is the positive minute. The minutes generally to which I have alluded are the records of the Board's minutes.

20264. Therefore the Lieutenant-general, or any member of the Board, might be absent from the Board on the occasion of a minute being given, but he would have an opportunity of seeing what had taken place by referring to the papers?—Decidedly; and very frequently a minute which has not been signed by a particular Board officer in the first instance, comes before him with a subsequent paper on which there is another minute on the same business.

20265. Is it not an evident irregularity, on the part of the Board, to accept a tender for any portion of a work which has not been already approved of by the Board?—That would be a very peculiar case.

20266. I hold a letter in my hand, addressed by Captain Collinson to Sir Thomas Hastings, dated Woolwich, the 8th May 1855: "I was at Enfield last night, and therefore did not get your note till this minute. I certainly understood, when Mr. Monsell and Sir Charles Trevelyan were here, that they both gave a verbal authority for the two extra bays. I felt the more certain about it, because I myself was individually opposed to increasing the building, but when pressed by the Committee to go on, I got a tender from Hick, dated December 6th, for the ironwork, which was approved by the Board, January 15th." Therefore the Board appear to have approved of the tender before they had even approved of the work. "The Board's approval to the remaining expense of the bays did not come till some time after (24th March). But I took the approval of Hick's tender as an approval of the whole"?—It must have come before the Board, I apprehend, as a tender for an approved service.

20267. Lord *Seymour.*] When a new work was to be undertaken, in the first place, I suppose there was a decision of the Board with regard to it?—That is the ordinary course.

20268. Then I imagine they called upon some officer of the department to prepare plans?—Yes.

20269. Then the plans were submitted to the Board?—That is the usual course.

20270. Was some signature put showing the Board's approval?—That again is the usual course; there is a minute upon the paper approving of it, signed by one or more members of the Board.

20271. On the plan?—On the letter which transmits the plan, or some document in connexion with the plan. I scarcely ever knew a plan submitted without some document, stating what the plan was for; therefore the order would be put usually upon the document which accompanied the plan.

20272. But is the plan itself so signed that it may be afterwards known?—The plan is identified as being connected with a certain paper.

20273. How is it so identified?—By the register number of the letter, being marked also on the plan as an enclosure.

20274. In regard to this foundry, can you not remember whether any plan was submitted to the Board?—No; I do not remember that.

20275. *Chairman.*] After these separate pieces are amalgamated and signed by members of the Board, is any record of the proceeding made in a separate book?—The order is registered.

20276. In a book?—Yes; in the register of the papers and documents of the office. Every paper that comes into the office is registered; the date of its receipt, the date of the minute upon it, and what is done upon it, are recorded in what is called the register.

20277. Is that book kept by you?—It is kept in my office.

20278. Are you responsible for its accuracy?—It comes under my general responsibility as Secretary; it is kept by the clerks in that particular branch.

20279. Are

20279. Are the proceedings of the former Board read at the succeeding Board, and approved?—That would be quite impracticable.

20280. Then how do we know that the record of the transactions is a correct record?—The transaction itself is really the record; the other is a note, only a register of the transaction.

20281. But you might record a transaction which never occurred; how do we know that that has not been done?—I could not record in the register a paper which never came forward to be registered.

20282. Why not?—Of course anyone could forge.

20283. I am not making any imputation; I am now asking what checks exist to prevent irregularity, and I want to know what guarantee is taken to prevent the irregularity of that record?—I do not, perhaps, take the question properly; but I should say, I do not see that any irregularity could exist in such a case. First of all, there must be the paper to be recorded; that paper would be marked immediately with the day when it came into the office; and it would also have upon it the date of its minute; and, therefore, in the book which I am speaking of, it would be merely the entry of it in a certain form, the same as any letter would be copied or entered in any other book.

20284. Supposing, for example, that a work had been undertaken by the authority of some member of the Board, without first being submitted to the Board, and that, afterwards, the Board's authority was asked for the erection of that work, there an irregularity would have occurred; how would it appear to be irregular upon the face of your proceedings?—Do you mean, supposing that order was subsequently given, but ante-dated?

20285. No, I do not suppose any ante-dating at all; I am supposing the work to be undertaken on the 1st January, and, on the 1st February, to be authorised by the Board; I want to know how that irregularity, which is an irregularity according to your own statement, would appear upon your record?—We should not know it.

20286. Then what is the value of your record?—Our record would be of that which actually took place, namely, the order of the Board; but the commencement of that building would not be known within the office of the Secretary to the Board; it is a thing which would take place at a distance, and we should have no knowledge of it.

20287. So that your record simply makes everything regular in appearance?—No; our record would be correct as to the date of the order; but if you could show that a building was begun without an order, and that the order for it was of a subsequent date, then the irregularity would appear, because the order would bear date on a certain day, and you would prove that the building was begun on a previous day.

20288. Then you call upon me to do something extraneous to the record; I want a record of the irregularity, as well as of your own proceedings?—The irregularity could not be recorded until the irregularity was brought before the Board.

20289. Is it not brought before the Board when the Board is asked to sanction a proceeding which has been undertaken without its authority?—Yes.

20290. Ought not that to appear upon your minutes?—If it comes in that shape.

20291. Would it not come in that shape if it came subsequently to the erection of the building?—That would depend upon whether it appeared in the application for the authority that the building had been commenced.

20292. So then, again, I say your record does not record an irregularity which is not pointed out by the person committing the irregularity?—Because it is not known.

20293. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have had very long experience at the Board of Ordnance; you have been there during Sir James Kemp's administration, during Lord Hardinge's, during the Duke of Wellington's, during Lord Anglesea's, and lately during Lord Raglan's; have you ever known such a thing as a public building being commenced under the direction of the Board of Ordnance without the Master-general having been previously acquainted with it?—I cannot say that I do recollect any such instance.

20294. General *Peel.*] You never record any minute which is not written on the paper referring to the transaction, and signed by the Board?—No.

20295. That record is comparatively useless in comparison with the papers themselves, which would show every transaction; the papers themselves would show any irregularity?—The register to which I have referred, as an index of the papers.

20296. *Chairman.*] Then do you send the register or the papers to the Master-general?—The papers, when the Master-general's directions are required.

20297. Lord *Seymour.*] Is there a record kept of the number of Board meetings in the year?—Yes; the record of the minutes states the day, and who were present.

20298. In the course of last autumn, for instance, there would be a record of all the meetings during the whole of the autumn, and of who were present at such meetings?—I believe so; but the minutes have been very much changed in form of late; they have been considered merely as an index, merely as a memorandum, rather than the record they used to be; formerly they were set out at very great length; but there has been quite a new system pursued.

20299. Supposing there was only one member present, did he practically transact the business at all as a Board; did he come into the Board-room to transact it, or did he do it in his own room?—Sometimes one way, sometimes another.

20300. He did it either way; did you go to his room?—Yes.

20301. And he became a Board there?—Precisely so.

20302. At other times he came to the Board-room to constitute a Board?—Yes.

20303. You and this single member only being present?—If it were in his own room.

20304. And in the Board-room occasionally?—Occasionally so; but the business, when there was one member only present, was transacted in the manner most convenient to him; it was done in his room for his convenience, the papers being taken to him instead of his going to the Board-room.

20305. Would that have been considered a Board at all; would it have been put down in this record as one of the Board meetings?—Yes, it being substantially the same, merely being transacted in one room instead of in another.

20306. When there was anything to be done at the Board, did you read to the Board the business in hand?—No.

20307. I believe that is not the custom at the Ordnance?—No.

20308. Is there any discussion at the Board upon the business?—That is as the case may be.

20309. The papers are divided and handed to different members of the Board, are they not?—Yes.

20310. And different members turn down the corner of the paper and write their minute upon it?—Yes.

20311. That is the form, I believe?—Yes.

20312. And those are what you call the real minutes?—Yes.

20313. Then when a paper is marked, you keep a record of that note?—Yes.

20314. The minute having been written at the corner of the paper turned down, if another member of the Board differs, does he write the different view which he takes upon the same paper, or what course is pursued?—That is occasionally done. The reason for differing from the minute has been occasionally put on the papers; but it has been more common for the Board officer to state to his colleague his objections to what is proposed, and the thing is discussed.

20315. General *Peel.*] Is not the usual way of doing business this: there are certain Board papers which are referred to different members of the Board?—Yes.

20316. There are certain Board papers which are mere matters of course, which are submitted to the Master-general, and there are certain Board papers which are for consideration?—Exactly so.

20317. Those are placed by themselves, and submitted to the members of the Board who may happen to be present, and the minutes are put upon them?—Yes.

20318. *Chairman.*] Is everything determined by majority at the Board?—Yes.

20319. Supposing there are two members only at the Board, and they differ, what occurs then?—Then the paper would be reserved for the decision of the other member of the Board.

20320. Sir *J. Pakington.*] I understand you to say that a record is kept of the minutes upon the corners of their papers, turned down. Why should any such record be kept; are not the minutes themselves kept?—They used to be recorded at very great length; that was considered by a committee as useless; andnow there is merely a brief memorandum. It is more in the form of a catalogue *raisonnée.*

20321. The minutes themselves are, in fact, the record of what they contain, are they not?—Yes.

20322. General *Peel.*] When did that alteration take place?—I think it was in 1853.

20323. The Board's minutes are attached to the papers; there is sometimes an immense body of papers, and the record is a mere extract of the minutes?—Exactly so; a mere memorandum of them.

20324. *Chairman.*] Have you known many Boards composed simply of a single member?—Yes.

20325. You say things are carried by a majority; there is no minority there?—No; but when there is only one member of the Board present, it is considered that the acts of that member are the acts of the Board.

20326. Does he determine upon what you call important matters?—If they are pressing.

20327. Who determines the pressing nature of the importance?—The officer himself; he must judge from the subject.

20328. So that, in reality, in spite of the rule, a single member is the Board?—On certain occasions.

20329. And his single responsibility is taken as the responsibility of the Board?—Certainly.

20330. General *Peel.*] You state that one member of the Board, in the absence of any other member, transacts Board business?—Yes.

20331. But there is certain business, such as signing leases and signing contracts, which legally require the signature of two members of the Board?—They must be deferred till another day.

20332. When you speak of one member of the Board doing any pressing business, is it such as a requisition which would require immediate attention?—If a requisition came for stores for the war, or anything of that sort, it would be brought forward immediately; it would not wait for a second Board officer.

20333. Lord *Seymour.*] You say contracts must be signed by two members; supposing only one member is in town, he can sign the contract and then send it down to another member in the country, I suppose?—Yes.

20334. Is that ever done?—I do not remember the case of a formal contract ever being sent out of the office to be signed by any member of the Board, because it is witnessed by the Secretary or somebody in the Board-room; therefore a contract would not be sent down to be executed by a Board officer, because we could not get that verifying signature.

20335. How do you proceed in the case of a contract when only one member is in town?—I speak of a regular written contract subsequent to an order for accepting a tender.

20336. Then a regular written contract must wait till there are two members in town, as I understand?—The preparation of a regular written contract sometimes takes a week or more after the actual acceptance of the tender; the contract has to be drawn by the solicitor.

20337. *Chairman.*] But is not the acceptance of the tender the real contract?—Yes.

20338. Then your proposition, that a contract must be signed by two members, is an illusory proposition, because the acceptance can be signed by one?—It is so.

20339. Therefore, a contract can be signed by one member of the Board?—Yes, in that acceptation of the word "contract."

20340. Lord *Seymour.*] After a tender had been accepted by one member of the Board, could it be, in common justice to the person giving it, departed from?—I do not think it could.

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20341. It would be binding upon the Board of Ordnance, unless there was some proof of fraud or something of that kind in it?—I apprehend that that tender having been accepted by a Board officer, and my having communicated to the parties, as the Secretary to the Board, the acceptance of that tender, it would be binding upon the Board.

20342. Therefore, in fact, a very large contract may be entered into by one Board officer?—Yes.

20343. General *Peel.*] Supposing that one member of the Board had accepted a tender, and it was afterwards refused by the Board, would he be personally responsible, or would the Board of Ordnance be responsible?—I consider that the Board of Ordnance would be responsible; but that is a legal question which I cannot answer.

Vice-Admiral *James W. D. Dundas*, C.B., called in; and Examined.

Vice-Admiral *J. W. D. Dundas*, C. B.

20344. *Chairman.*] I THINK you were in command of the Mediterranean Fleet when the war broke out?—I was.

20345. To what station were you first ordered in consequence of that breach of the peace?—I was ordered by Colonel Rose first to come to Vourla near Smyrna; I sent the letter on to England, and the order from England was that I was to remain at Malta. Three days after the order to go to Vourla reached Malta, another order came from Colonel Rose, begging that I would remain where I was. Afterwards I was sent up to Besika Bay by Lord Stratford, who wrote to me, and there was also an order from England.

20346. At what date was that?—The 8th of June.

20347. How long did you stay there?—Till the 30th of October.

20348. Where did you go from thence?—To the Bosphorus.

20349. Captain *Gladstone.*] This was in 1853?—Yes; I sailed from Malta on the 8th of June 1853; I sailed for Constantinople on the 30th of October 1853.

20350. *Chairman.*] From Constantinople you went to Varna, I think?—No; to Sinope. I was in the Bosphorus in 1854, and on the 3d of January I sailed for Sinope.

20351. Mr. *Drummond.*] When you were in Besika Bay, did you not receive some fresh orders?—I was under the orders of the ambassador.

20352. Did you consider it likely at that time that you would be employed hostilely against the Russian fleet?—I thought I should.

20353. War was not declared?—No, not until the year after that.

20354. You thought at that time that it was likely?—Yes.

20355. Did the Admiralty give you a statement of the strength of the fleet against which you were going?—A very rough statement; I was possessed of a list, but a very old one, not a recent one.

20356. Did you know its strength better when you moved into the Black Sea?—Not a bit.

20357. Did you apply to the ambassador at Constantinople to know if he had any information about it?—Yes.

20358. What did he say?—He sent me much such another list as I had.

20359. As you had from the Admiralty?—Yes.

20360. Has he not a large establishment of secretaries, and paid and unpaid attachés and interpreters, and consuls and vice-consuls, and all sorts of people from whom you might get information?—We had no consul or vice-consul at Sebastopol; we had consuls all over the Black Sea.

20361. What steps did you take yourself to procure information respecting the strength of the Russian fleet?—The first three weeks I inquired at the Consulate at the Dardanelles; I sent up to inquire at Constantinople, but finding that failed, and that nobody knew anything about Sebastopol, I then wrote some letters.

20362. *Chairman.*] To whom were those letters directed?—The one in my hand is addressed to Lord Stratford.

20363. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What is the date of it?—The 11th of July 1853, before I sailed for the Bosphorus; then I wrote to Captain Drummond.

20364. *Chairman.*] Did you get any answer to the letter to Lord Stratford?—I got an answer from Captain Drummond; it was tantamount to it.

20365. Sir

20365. Sir *J. Pakington.*] But you got no answer from Lord Stratford to that letter?—No; Captain Drummond was employed by me very near the ambassador's house upon business.

20366. Mr. *Drummond.*] After having received no answer from the ambassador to the letter requiring information, you then sent Captain Drummond again to him, to endeavour still to get this information?—Yes; and I have an answer from Captain Drummond.

20367. Did Captain Drummond state to you the answer which he received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe?—Yes.

20368. What was it?—That there was some doubt about the passport, and he referred the gentleman to me; and he came back in 10 days.

20369. It has been stated in evidence before this Committee, in answer to a question which I believe I put to the Duke of Newcastle, Question 15261, "Did Admiral Dundas take any steps to acquaint himself with the force in Sebastopol, either the fleet, or the defences which protected that fleet?—The 'Retribution,' as is well known, went in with a message at one time into Sebastopol, and by that means obtained a very clever sketch of the place, so far as it could be seen from the deck of the 'Retribution;' that was the only step that he took, that I am aware of." Is that answer correct or not?—No, it is not.

20370. It is correct as far as the Duke was concerned, but not as far as you are concerned?—As far as I am concerned, I took more steps.

20371. Will you state in general terms what they were?—I sent my interpreter, a Maltese gentleman, to Constantinople.

20372. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When was that?—On the 18th of July 1853, requesting Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Captain Drummond, that they would, if possible, forward him on to Odessa and Sebastopol; but difficulties arose about the passport, and he returned to me at Besika; and I then pointed out to Sir James Graham the great necessity of obtaining information; that was on the 1st of September 1853, and during my stay at Constantinople, in November and December 1853, I endeavoured to collect intelligence relative to the Crimea, Circassia, and so forth, from persons of all nations and all classes, but with little success; and I attribute the failure to the systematic vigilance and precaution of the Russian Government, and the hostility of the Greeks.

20373. Lord *Seymour.*] During 1853, you had obtained very little information?—Hardly any; of Sebastopol, none.

20373*. Did you obtain any information as to the fleet?—Not any.

20374. *Chairman.*] Were you hindered in so obtaining information by any backwardness on the part of our authorities during 1853?—Yes; I think there was a backwardness.

20375. Lord *Seymour.*] You think that during the year 1853, the English authorities impeded your obtaining information?—No; I think that the English authorities were excessively slow in getting information, when you remember that, in Russia, you can get anything for money.

20376. You stated, did you not, that they were prevented first by the vigilance of the Russian Government, and next by the hostility of the Greeks?—Yes, that is my information; the people at Constantinople, whom I sent for into my ship, I found were all either shut out from Sebastopol or unwilling.

20377. There were great difficulties in obtaining information?—I think that if travellers had been sent up to the Crimea they might have got in somehow, and that you might have got information in 1853.

20378. *Chairman.*] Were you prevented, or in any way impeded, in obtaining that information by the conduct of our authorities abroad?—Yes, I think that if they had sent my interpreter on, they would have obtained that information.

20379. Captain *Gladstone.*] Your recommendation was not adopted?—No; Captain Drummond wrote me an answer.

20380. *Chairman.*] Who were the authorities who ought to have sent your interpreter on?—The ambassador.

29381. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did they or not assign reasons for not carrying out your object?—Certainly; Captain Drummond wrote to say that the ambassador saw reasons why he should not go. I was under the ambassador's orders.

20382. Mr. *Ellice.*] What were the reasons that Captain Drummond stated?—The answer was, that difficulties had arisen about the passport, and he returned to me.

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20383. *Chairman.*] Was the difficulty about the passport the only difficulty; was any objection raised to the character of the person whom you proposed?—Certainly the contrary; he was a first-rate character; this man had been offered a post under the Russians.

20384. Mr. *Ellice.*] That is your opinion; did the ambassador state any objection to him?—No, no objection; the objection was about the passport.

20385. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The alleged reason was about the passport?—Yes.

20386. Mr. *Drummond.*] Did any other public servant, any consul, offer to procure information?—I never applied to them. My master, my commanding officer, was the ambassador till the war broke out; after that, I was my own master.

20387. Was not a complete plan of the fortifications of Sebastopol offered to be procured?—I do not think it was.

20388. To whom was Mr. Yeams's offer made?—His information was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who sent it to me.

20389. What was the information that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe gave to you, that Mr. Yeams had sent to him?—The only information that I ever heard from Mr. Yeams came through the ambassador at Constantinople.

20390. *Chairman.*] What was that information?—This letter is to Lord Stratford, informing him that the French and English merchants were to quit the spot on March the 17th, 1854; and he ends his letter by saying, "it is confirmed to me that works have been constructed at Sebastopol for defence on its land side." Lord Stratford's letter to me is dated the 23d; Mr. Yeams's letter to Lord Stratford is the 17th of March, about 10 days before the war broke out.

20391. Mr. *Drummond.*] Did he not offer to procure a complete plan of the fortifications of Sebastopol?—I never heard of it.

20392. Lord *Seymour.*] Did this letter of Mr. Yeams's tell you the amount of the Russian fleet more correctly than you had known it before?—Not a bit.

20393. Did it tell you the nature of the fortifications of Sebastopol better than you knew them before?—No, except that they were arming on the land side. "It is confirmed to me that works have been constructed at Sebastopol, for the defence, on its land side."

20394. Mr. *Drummond.*] Did your orders direct you to act in concert only with the French Admiral?—I was directed to act according to the orders of the ambassador till the war broke out.

20395. Might you have moved your fleet, independently of the French fleet?—No, I could not move my fleet before the war broke out without the leave of the ambassador.

20396. After the war broke out, could you have moved your fleet?—I was then joined to the French Admiral, who was my senior.

20397. You could not move your fleet without the permission of your senior commanding officer?—It was always done by concurrence.

20398. You stated that before the war broke out, you were under the English Minister; was the French Admiral also under his ambassador?—Yes, he was.

20399. After the war broke out, who was he under?—He was under the orders of his own Government.

20400. Not under the military authorities in anyway?—Yes. The rule of the service as I understand is this, that in case the French General and Admiral disagree, the French General's order is paramount; then the Marshal St. Arnaud.

20401. General *Peel.*] You stated that the impediment thrown in your way by the ambassador, in procuring information, arose from not granting a passport to the person whom you proposed to send?—Yes, I did say impediment. I said that I sent up those men to the Minister under whose orders I was, and he did not choose to send him on; Captain Drummond wrote to say, the reason why he was not sent out had, he believed, something to do with his passport.

20402. Was there any difficulty in granting passports to other persons, or did it apply solely to this person?—I do not know; I was 100 miles from Constantinople, at Besika Bay; those events took place at Constantinople.

20403. Might

20403. Might it not have arisen from some objection to granting passports to anybody?—Yes.

20404. Mr. *Ellice.*] Will you state to the Committee a little more clearly under whose especial directions you were acting in the East; you state that you were acting first of all under the directions of the ambassador, and then when the French Admiral came, he being your senior, you were obliged to act in concert with him, and with his consent?—Yes.

20405. After the arrival of the French Admiral, and you were so obliged to act in concert with him, did you consider yourself then still under any responsibility to your ambassador?—Decidedly.

20406. Then you could not have moved the fleet or have taken any step without the concurrent authority of the ambassador and the French Admiral?—The ambassador was the person that I looked to; if I had had orders from him to move the fleet, I should have gone to the French Admiral and told him.

20407. You still remained under the direction of the ambassador?—Entirely.

20408. General *Peel.*] If the commander of the French fleet had ordered you to move, should you have gone to the ambassador?—Yes; he was my superior officer.

20409. Captain *Gladstone.*] You would not have moved the fleet without the authority of the ambassador?—Certainly not.

20410. *Chairman.*] Could you have moved without the French fleet moving?—I should not have moved without telling the French Admiral.

20411. Supposing you did tell him, and he said he would not move, would you have moved then?—If I had had the ambassador's orders I would have moved.

20412. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Supposing the French Admiral had communicated to you a desire on his part to move, should you have moved with him without the orders of the ambassador?—No; the English Minister was my admiral.

20413. *Chairman.*] That was after the war, as well as before?—No; when the war broke out I was my own master.

20414. When the war broke out you were your own master?—Yes.

20415. You could have moved the English fleet without consulting anybody?—Certainly; but I should have gone to the French Admiral, and told him what I was going to do, as I did do at Odessa.

20416. When did the fleet arrive at Varna?—The fleet arrived at Varna on the 20th of May 1854.

20417. You did not proceed to the Crimea till the beginning of September?—We did not lie there all the time; we went to sea afterwards. I had nothing to do with the enterprise; I was to blockade Sebastopol; I knew nothing of the army coming till it arrived at Varna. I was to take care of Sebastopol, and protect the Euxine; that was my duty.

20418. Do you mean by that, that you were to blockade the Russian ports?—Yes.

20419. Were all the ports blockaded?—Not to merchantmen; to men-of-war they were blockaded.

20420. Did not the enemy's fleet come out of Sebastopol?—Very often; two or three of them.

20421. Did not one Russian steamer come to the Bosphorus?—I never heard of her coming to the Bosphorus; one of them came on the coast of Anatolia, and I am only surprised that more did not come; if they had been an enterprising enemy they would have come out.

20422. In spite of your blockade?—Certainly; you cannot blockade a port so close as that; it is impossible.

20423. When did you first hear that the army was going from Varna to the Crimea?—About the end of July it was determined on.

20424. When that determination was communicated to you, did you prepare the fleet for the embarking and disembarking of the army?—A great delay took place before that; several conferences took place.

20425. Did you, upon hearing that the army was to proceed to the Crimea, make any preparations by getting boats ready for the embarkation and disembarkation of the troops?—Yes.

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20426. Did you receive any orders with respect to that expedition?—I received orders to assist the expedition as much as I could.

20427. Did you receive any orders to prepare boats for the embarkation of the troops?—I received no orders; I ordered it myself.

20428. Then you did prepare boats for the embarkation of the army?—Yes.

20429. And for the disembarkation of it?—Certainly.

20430. How many men had you the means of transporting from Varna to the Crimea?—Of English troops about between 25,000 and 30,000 men altogether.

20431. Had you the means at your command to transport a larger number than that; or about what number?—Every ship was crowded with troops, except seven sail of the line that we had arranged with the French Admiral should be kept free in case the Russian fleet came out; those seven were my own ships, but the French agreed to have four or five more; but they had not transport enough, and they were obliged to crowd their men-of-war with troops, and when the landing took place, I kept outside on the flank, and sent boats in; the French Admiral was obliged to go in; and when the troops landed he came out again.

20432. So that you could not have carried, without encumbering your ships, more troops than you did carry?—No. I might have carried 500 or 600 men on board the ship; but if the Russian fleet had come out, we must have had some ships to protect the convoy.

20433. Was there at your command any means of conveying more horses from Varna to the Crimea?—None.

20434. In your opinion, the want of transport, when the army arrived at the Crimea, was a thing of necessity; you could not have brought more horses from Varna to the Crimea?—No; the only way in which they could be taken was on board of those seven men-of-war; and I leave the Committee to suppose what state they would have been in, if they had been so employed.

20435. Captain *Gladstone.*] Admiral Boxer had a great deal to do with the arrangement of the transports, had he not?—Yes, at first, Admiral Boxer and Lord De Ros had.

20436. Had you reason to be satisfied with the arrangements which Admiral Boxer made?—We found out that it was necessary to make a little change; and the consequence was that I sent Admiral Boxer to Constantinople. Lord De Ros went home, and I then appointed Sir Edmund Lyons to go to Constantinople to purchase boats, and prepare for the embarkation of the army. Admiral Boxer was first intended to be there; but it was necessary to send an admiral to remain at Constantinople, and prepare for their arrival.

20437. Were you satisfied with his arrangements, so far as he had control?—Yes.

20438. *Chairman.*] At what date were you ready to embark the army?—Immediately; there was nothing to prevent us being ready at the end of July. The cholera broke out on board the fleet on the 10th of August.

20439. Were you not ready then, or were you ready then?—The cholera broke out a week or 10 days before; it broke out on the 10th of August; in 10 days, or before that, we embarked the whole army.

20440. Had you a sufficient number of boats?—Certainly we had; I sent Sir Edmund Lyons to get four or five small steam-boats.

20441. Had they come up at the time?—Not all of them.

20442. So that you were not prepared in 10 days after?—We were ready to embark the army without those steam-vessels.

20443. What did you send him down to buy those steamers for?—To buy four or five steam-tugs; and as they were bought they came up.

20444. What were they to do?—To take the troops from the ships to the shore.

20445. Then you were not prepared to go on your expedition to the Crimea till the arrival of those steam-tugs?—We might have gone without them.

20446. You were not prepared for all operations of the campaign?—I think what detained us mostly was the cholera; we were ready before the troops were.

20447. Did Sir Edmund Lyons buy two steam-tugs on his own responsibility?—I ordered him to buy four or five steam-tugs, to take the troops from the ships to the shore of the Crimea.

20448. Captain

20448. Captain *Gladstone.*] Were they of a light draught of water?—Yes.

20449. *Chairman.*] It has been stated that there were orders given to you to protect the Crimea against the importation of troops by Perekop?—Yes.

20450. That order was not carried out, and for what reason?—You cannot approach the shore.

20451. Lord *Seymour.*] A despatch was read to this Committee, at Question 14422, by the Duke of Newcastle, in which he states, with regard to the Crimea, "Important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught, which would prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azof;" was your attention at an early period called to that subject?—Perfectly.

20452. Having heard from the Government at home that it was considered desirable that the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea, through the Sea of Azof, should be prevented, you considered, of course, whether or not it was possible to prevent it?—Yes; and it was not possible.

20453. Even if you had had vessels of light draught of water, you could not have done it?—Without troops to take possession of Kertch, you could not have done it.

20454. You must have landed at Kertch, which is a military position?—Yes. I should like to state my reason for wishing to read the letter which I hold in my hand. The Duke of Newcastle, in his evidence, says that my information was erroneous. I wish to prove that my information was not erroneous, and that the information sent by his Grace to Lord Raglan, before the embarkation, was erroneous.

20455. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The Duke of Newcastle was asked, at Question 15263, "You do not recollect seeing in any of those despatches," that is referring to despatches to you, "any account of any steps which he had taken, or had urged to be taken, to acquaint himself with those facts"? The Duke's answer is this, "I do not say that he did not urge any to be taken. I certainly do not think he stated that he had taken any. I recollect his stating in his despatch what he believed to be (or in a private letter, I forget which) the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea at that time, which certainly was extremely inaccurate". First of all, was that a despatch, or only a private letter?—A private letter to Lord Raglan, dated May the 10th, 1854, before Lord Raglan thought of ever coming into the Black Sea.

20456. Will you read the letter?—Yes. I was then on a cruise off Sebastopol. "Sebastopol is a second Gibraltar. We see many new works erecting, and from prisoners learn that the landside is equally being strengthened. An encampment is seen, of large size, close to the south of the town; and we are told that 120,000 men are in the Crimea, 30,000 of whom are in Sebastopol. The ships, 14 or 16 sail of the line, have their sails bent. I expected, when we attacked Odessa, that the Russians would have come out and drawn us off from protecting the steamers, but, I fear, now we are doomed to a long blockade. I hope your Lordship has better information respecting Russian matters than I have now been able to get. I enclose a copy of a confidential letter I felt obliged to write to Sir James Graham. It is said that Russians are easily bought and bribed; if so, our diplomatic agents have been very remiss. The Turks, I find, know nothing." With the permission of the Committee, I will read a letter addressed to Sir James Graham.

20457. *Chairman.*] Have you got Sir James Graham's leave to read that letter?—No, I have not.

20458. Did you ask leave of the Government?—No. I am now contradicting the Duke of Newcastle. I want to prove that his information is wrong.

20459. Lord *Seymour.*] That is a public despatch which you propose to read?—No; all my correspondence with the First Lord is confidential.

20460. You have not inquired of any Member of the present Government whether or not you are at liberty to use this confidential letter?—I do not think that the present Government has anything to do with it; this is a letter to Sir James Graham from me.

20461. Do you think that because you were in command of the fleet, if you wrote a private letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the letter is your property to do as you please with it?—Yes, for this reason: I find one of the late Government saying that I sent him wrong information, and to prove that I did send him right information, I wish to read this letter.

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20462. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The Duke of Newcastle, in the answer to which I have referred, stated that the letter which you have just read gave inaccurate information; how do you substantiate, now, the allegation which you have made that the information which you have just read was accurate?—The information which the Duke of Newcastle sends himself to Lord Raglan gives more men in Sebastopol than I did.

20463. *Chairman.*] That does not prove that you gave the right number, because you might both be wrong?—The Duke says this, that I had sent him erroneous information, or information by a balloon, or some nonsense.

20464. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Have you reason to believe that the information which you have read was accurate?—Yes, because the man who told me was a very respectable German, who had no reason for telling me an untruth, and who said that in the Crimea there were 120,000 men. The Duke of Newcastle's letter to Lord Raglan says this. On the 4th of April 1854, the Duke says, "Consul Yeams states there are 45,000 men in the Crimea; that was in April." I do not suppose that the Russians were idle from April till September, but that they strengthened their army very much. In another letter Mr. Yeams says, "they are going on with the fortifications on the land-side."

20465. The letter which you have just read, stating this large Russian force, was on the 10th of May?—Yes.

20466. *Chairman.*] Then, the Duke of Newcastle says that about that time there were about 45,000 men?—In March or April he says so; a month before.

20467. And you say that there are 120,000?—Yes.

20468. What reason had you to believe that your information was correct?—Because my information was from one or two people; one in particular, a German, a man of great respectability, who said that troops had been pouring into the Crimea, with Cossacks, and that 30,000 of them were at Sebastopol; I think that was not so inaccurate.

20469. Mr. *Drummond.*] You stated that you were first called upon to co-operate with the army going to the Crimea in May; I want to know whether you were consulted by our military authorities as to the sufficiency of the force to undertake that expedition?—Yes, I gave my opinion.

20470. Were you asked if you could take Sebastopol with the fleet?—Yes.

20471. What was your answer?—That I could not take Sebastopol.

20472. Were you obliged to make any particular disposition of the fleet in consequence of the situation of the army in the Crimea?—I have answered that.

20473. Mr. *Ellice.*] After having given your opinion that it was impossible to take Sebastopol with the fleets, was your opinion asked subsequently by the English authorities with respect to the expedition to the Crimea by the army?—Certainly.

20474. Was that before or subsequently to the expedition being determined upon?—Before. I should say our troops were at Varna, and in the vicinity of Varna. The Turks had not advanced.

20475. Then, the expedition having been determined upon, you were consulted with respect to the measure of transporting the army from Varna to the Crimea?—I was not consulted; I ordered it.

20476. You ordered preparations to be made, but of course you were consulted by the military authorities with respect to the nature of those preparations?—Yes. Does the Honourable Member refer to the place of landing?

20477. No; but the preparations for embarking the troops?—Yes, I have said that already.

20478. The preparations were found amply sufficient for the purpose; you had abundance of means for transporting the army which afterwards went to the Crimea?—No; the British ships were.

20479. The means of transport were sufficient for the British army?—Yes.

20480. Were they sufficient to embark both the troops and such animals or means of transport as Lord Raglan considered necessary for the equipment of the army?—I believe so; many horses were left behind; bât horses.

20481. Were those horses left behind in consequence of the want of means of transport?—Most certainly.

20482. Did

20482. Did you ever offer to Lord Raglan to take the troops on board men-of-war, so that greater means might have been employed for the transport of animals?—The division of ships that had no troops on board was with Lord Raglan's perfect knowledge; the horses that were embarked could not have gone with the men-of-war, and there were very few transports that could take horses in to enable the men to go on board men-of-war.

20483. There were not means sufficient if you had not sufficient horse transports?—I believe there were 2,000 or 3,000 horses left at Varna, and what are called horses for baggage.

20484. Then you had not sufficient means to transport them?—None.

20485. Could you have obtained ample means?—No, not a ship.

20486. It has been stated, that the French were enabled to transport a greater number of horses, and a greater amount of the means of transport, than the English military authorities?—Certainly not.

20487. Did not a large proportion of the French troops go in the French men-of-war?—Certainly.

20488. A larger proportion than went in our ships of war?—I must explain that by saying that the arrangement was, that of the French fleet there should be seven sail of the line kept clear, in case the Russian fleet came out; but at the eleventh hour it was found that they had not transports to carry the troops, and they were obliged to embark them on board those ships, 1,000 men on board some, and one had 2,000, and the consequence was that the only ships clear were the seven English ships.

20489. The reason you have just now given, was the reason why more French troops went in French ships of war than English troops in English ships of war?—Yes. I ought to state another thing, that the French men-of-war were nearly double the number that we had; they had about 15 sail of the line, and I had eight sail of the line, and two steam line-of-battle ships.

20490. On the whole, it was impossible for you to have transported more baggage animals, with the number of troops that you were bound to take on board, than you did?—If I had known that the troops could land without being disturbed by the enemy, or if no ships had come out, I could have carried the troops in the seven sail of the line.

20491. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, you transported as many animals and as much baggage as you could conveniently transport with the number of troops that went?—Certainly.

20492. General *Peel.*] It might be implied that the French took over more horses than the English; while, on the contrary, they took no cavalry at all?—I never said that; the French cavalry were all left behind.

20493. Captain *Gladstone.*] The number of French infantry was less than that of the English, was it not?—No; the French infantry were more than the English; the French had no cavalry.

20494. The number of French troops in the Crimea was not so great as the number of the English?—Yes; they landed more men at the time, but not cavalry.

20495. *Chairman.*] When were you first apprized of the necessity of procuring transports for the army going from Varna to the Crimea?—I had nothing to do with the transports; they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie.

20496. When were you first apprized of the necessity of procuring transports for the army going from Varna to the Crimea?—I was never ordered to find transports; Lord Raglan had the arrangement of the transports.

20497. Surely you transported the army across?—Yes; but I had no orders to hire transports; it was the part of the army to do that; and if there had been 50 ships lying in the Bosphorus, I could not have hired one.

20498. When the army was prepared to be taken to the Crimea, could the proper authorities have obtained more transports than were obtained?—I was not at Constantinople, but I understand not; they could not have obtained more.

20499. Not in the Black Sea?—There was not a ship in the Bosphorus; there might have been a few Sardinian vessels, but no large vessels for troops.

20500. Was not part of the French army transported in ships of the country?—No, very few; they are very small vessels in the Black Sea.

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20501. The Committee have been misinformed when they have been told that a large number of small vessels transported the French troops?—They were very small vessels, Piedmontese, French, and Sardinian, and that was out of the Black Sea; they were hired in France.

20502. Still there were a large number of those small vessels?—Yes.

20503. Could vessels of that sort have been procured by the English authorities, provided they had taken precautions to do it?—If the English authorities had known that there was to have been an invasion of the Crimea, and they had had three or four months to hire them, they might have done it; in a month or six weeks, it was impossible.

20504. I am now talking of the English authorities; they knew before that they were going to invade the Crimea, did they not?—I do not know that they did.

20505. Surely the Ministry did?—Their letters were dated July; and we sailed in September. I do not think that they could have known it.

20506. Supposing the Ministry, or the English authorities, had determined some months beforehand upon the Crimean Expedition, could they, by foresight, have obtained greater means of transport?—I do not know what transport they had in England, but I suppose so.

20507. Could not they, from the Mediterranean, have obtained a large mass of small transports?—I should doubt very much if they could do it in six weeks; but if they had had six months before they invaded the Crimea, they could have done it.

20508. General *Peel.*] Was it possible, between the raising of the siege of Silistria and embarking for the Crimea, to have engaged more transports?—I do not think they could.

20509. *Chairman.*] If, on the 11th of April, the determination had been come to to proceed to the Crimea, was there then time, from the 11th of April to the middle of September, to have procured ample transport for the transport of the army?—I cannot answer that question, because it was not determined in April. If you had determined in April to land our troops in the Crimea, you could have done so; I said that before.

20510. Lord *Seymour.*] Could you have conveyed the army from Constantinople to the Crimea as easily as it was conveyed afterwards from Varna to the Crimea?—Certainly not.

20511. It could not have been conveyed from Constantinople to the Crimea?—No; many of our transports, with horses in them, were only stowed with three days' water, and some of them not three days' coal.

20512. Then the Committee are to understand that, if it had been desired at once to make an expedition from Constantinople to the Crimea, it could not have been made in the way in which it was made from Varna?—You must have watered at Varna, or at Baltschik.

20513. But touching at Varna, it might have been done?—Watering at Varna, or watering at Baltschik, you might have done it.

20514. If the army had been required with the fleet to make a demonstration off Varna, and then to proceed to the Crimea, they might have done so?—They might have gone in for water and for coals.

20515. If that had been ordered, would you have had sufficient means to land the troops when you arrived at the Crimea?—If at first, instead of going to Varna, the troops had gone at once to the Crimea, we could not have done what we did; we owe very much to those boats which Sir Edmund Lyons bought at Constantinople for landing our people.

20516. Early in the year you had not a sufficient number of boats for landing the troops?—If we had landed them in boats, we should have covered the boats with our guns; we should have then lost a great number of men.

20517. Captain *Gladstone.*] You did not require those large boats at Varna?—No; when the troops arrived at Varna they came to a friend's country, and they were landed regiment after regiment; but when they embarked again for the Crimea, they were embarked in those boats as fast as they came up. They were used by Lord George Paulett, who embarked the troops.

20518. Mr. *Drummond.*] Was the decision to go to the Crimea from Varna taken by the Commanders, or was it in consequence of orders from home?—I do not know; my opinion was that they were ordered from home.

20519. Sir *J. Pakington.*] After you had landed the army in the Crimea would there have been any difficulty in sending the ships back to Varna to fetch the horses and the baggage?—There were many that went back immediately.

20520. Were all the horses fetched?—No; our ships went back to Varna and to Bourgas to fetch the French cavalry over.

20521. *Chairman.*] The question was this: could we have sent the vessels and have brought over the transport animals that were left behind, and the baggage?—If we had sent them, we could not have brought over the French cavalry.

20522. How many ships brought them over?—A dozen.

20523. Sir *J. Pakington.*] How many had you in the Crimea; 500?—No; never more than 125 (English), men-of-war and all.

20524. If you had 125, and only sent 12 for the French cavalry, why not send some of the others back for the horses?—Our transports had artillery and stores on board, and they had no room; you could not send them immediately.

20525. When they were landed they might have been sent?—Where were they to land; they were not landed for a fortnight or three weeks or more; how could you land them on an open beach, under the fire of the enemy?

20526. *Chairman.*] Did you ever land in the Crimea?—Once or twice I went ashore.

20527. Were you in Balaklava?—Yes, in June or July, before the expedition. Admiral Bruat and I went to reconnoitre it.

20528. Did you enter the harbour of Balaklava?—No, I was never in Balaklava; my station was at Sebastopol, with my fleet. I sent my second in command to command at Balaklava, and another experienced officer in command to Eupatoria.

20529. Were you in continual communication with Lord Raglan?—Constantly.

20530. Mr. *Drummond.*] Were you obliged to make any particular disposition of the fleet in consequence of the situation of the army in the Crimea?—Certainly.

20531. *Chairman.*] What disposition did you make?—All the sailing ships were off Sebastopol; all the screw ships were near Balaklava; we had also a squadron at Eupatoria, and another at Odessa.

20532. Mr. *Drummond.*] Was it contemplated that they would be obliged, when they first went, to winter in the Crimea?—No; everybody supposed that they would be in Sebastopol in a week.

20533. Were you told that apprehensions were entertained that the army would re-embark, and were not the ships detained there under that impression?—We were very often told that. I had no orders about it; we kept the ships all ready, but Lord Raglan did not mention it to me.

20534. Did not he strongly protest against passing the winter in the Crimea to you?—No; I do not know that he did.

20535. *Chairman.*] Did you never have any personal communication with Lord Raglan after the embarkation of the troops in the Crimea?—Yes; I saw him in December. I had letters every day.

20536. Had you no communication with him till December?—I constantly heard from him. I went to him in December; there were no meetings of the Admirals and Generals as we had at Varna.

20537. Did you ever see him after the army disembarked?—Yes, in December. I rode up to him to the camp.

20538. But before then, did you see him in the Crimea?—No; early in December I went to him in the camp.

20539. Can you state whether the steam-vessels of the fleet had sufficient coal at all times?—No, certainly not; sometimes they had very little coal.

20540. Was anybody to blame for that?—No; the elements were to blame.

20541. I suppose no care could have provided coal?—No care whatever. On the whole, I think we were extremely well off. I took care to keep the steam-boats to tow the line-of-battle ships into action well supplied.

20542. Captain *Gladstone.*] You stated that you were in Balaklava Harbour in December?—No; I went in on the French side.

20543. Were you in the harbour of Balaklava at any time?—No. I left Balaklava entirely to the screws; my fleet was off Sebastopol, and there I remained.

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20544. Were any representations ever made to you of the state of the harbour, and of the imperfect manner in which the ships were moored?—Never; no public report. I left it entirely to Sir Edmund Lyons, who was at Balaklava Harbour. In the month of October, Sir Edmund Lyons wrote to me, to beg to be recalled from Balaklava, and I desired him to stay a little longer. The action off the batteries took place on the 17th of October; he joined a few days before, and he afterwards went to Balaklava; and either he or Captain Dacres was always in the harbour.

20545. It has been stated in evidence that the harbour of Balaklava would have held more vessels than were in it, and that if they had been in the harbour before the bad weather came on, many of them, the "Prince," and others, would not have been lost?—The only complaint I had of the harbour was, that it was a great deal too small; but as to mooring vessels, I never heard a word.

20546. Can you give any opinion as to whether more vessels might with safety have been moored in the harbour before the gale on the 14th?—The officers who had charge of the harbour were most excellent, and I think they had quite vessels enough in.

20547. Are you aware that Captain Dacres received messages from Sir Colin Campbell, warning him to be ready to clear the harbour?—Yes; I had a letter to that purport from Captain Dacres.

20548. *Chairman.*] I think, before the 14th of September, or the 10th, there were no storms in the Euxine?—There is seldom a week without a gale of wind.

20549. Were there many gales during October?—Yes, a good number.

20550. Were there any during September?—There was a breeze of wind, too, after the troops landed.

20551. Would that have prevented you bringing coal?—The wind at Sebastopol is not the same as down at the Bosphorus; there is a strong current running into the Bosphorus, and a northerly wind; and what vessel could have gone against that, unless she was towed by a steamer?

20552. In the month of September Captain Dacres stated that he had no coal; he was asked, "You stated that you went to Yalta early in September?—Yes. At that time what coals had you on board?—I think we had 14 tons; I am not certain; I had very little; there were no coals there at all." I ask you whether, by precaution, you could have got coals for those vessels?—Coals were ordered up; but when the wind blows constantly from the north, colliers cannot get up as they do in the Thames.

20553. Could you not have had a steam-tug in the Bosphorus?—A dozen would not do.

20554. Captain *Gladstone.*] Had you anything to do with the supply of coals?—Yes; every day or two coal arrived. I had no complaint to make about the want of coals, because the ship that Captain Dacres commanded could sail as well as any other.

20555. *Chairman.*] Why were there not coals?—Providence was the cause of there not being coals.

20556. Could foresight have provided coals?—It was not for want of foresight, I can tell you.

20557. Had you one steam-tug at Constantinople?—I had two small ones, but that will not drag a vessel out to sea; it will drag it five or six miles from land; but that steam-tug does not take much coal.

20558. They provided coal afterwards at Balaklava, did they not?—A very good supply, because the wind came round to the southward.

20559. Does the wind blow from the southward in the winter?—Very often; the gale in November was from the southward; the wind is seldom four hours together the same in that country.

20560. Then did not that occur in October?—Yes; and one vessel was lost.

20561. Was there more southerly wind in November and in October?—I cannot tell you that. The reason was that Providence would not allow the vessels to come up with a fair wind; and when there was none, they could not beat up 280 miles.

20562. Lord *Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that you did not consider yourself responsible for the transport service?—Not at all.

20563. Admiral Boxer was not under you?—Yes, he was.

20564. Was

20564. Was Admiral Boxer under you?—Yes.

20565. If you had been dissatisfied with him, had you the power to dismiss him?—No.

20566. But you would have had to represent his conduct to the Admiralty at home?—I should have mentioned it to Lord Raglan before I did so.

20567. Was anything brought under your notice as to Admiral Boxer that you did mention to Lord Raglan?—Nothing of the kind.

20568. You heard no complaint of him?—Many in the newspapers; never officially.

20569. Therefore, you did not bring him to the notice of Lord Raglan?—The last time I saw him, I spoke of Admiral Boxer, knowing him to be a most intelligent and useful man—not the most polished man, I allow. I did mention it to Lord Raglan, that I had heard a great many stories, but none officially.

20570. Did you appoint the naval officer who had the command in the harbour of Balaklava?—Yes, I did.

20571. Those different officers that we have heard were successively in command were appointed by you?—Yes.

20572. If you had been dissatisfied with the state of the harbour, could you have removed those officers?—Certainly.

20573. Was no complaint made to you as to the state of that harbour?—The complaint was, that it was a great deal too small. The transport service was not under the jurisdiction of the naval officers; no complaint was made to me of the state of the harbour.

20574. Nor of its being badly administered by the naval authorities there?—They had nothing to do with the shore, only with the water. I think that the officers that I sent there were very superior men, Sir Edmund Lyons, Captain Dacres, and Captain Heath.

20575. Were they ever directed by any one to provide ships, and to have them fitted up as hospitals?—I had a private letter from Sir James Graham after the battle of the Alma, desiring me to provide an hospital ship.

20576. Had you had any communication previously from the ambassador, or from Lord Raglan, upon that subject?—No.

20577. The battle of the Alma took place on the 20th of September, did it not?—Yes. This is a letter which, I think, will explain to the Committee the whole. It is an account of the battle of the Alma, written by my surgeon the day after the battle of the Alma, describing what wounded they had, and how they were sent down:—"According to your request, I have drawn up the following statement of what I recollect of the battle of the Alma, in reference to the wounded of that battle. Immediately the enemy retreated, you sent Commander Glyn to Lord Raglan, with offers of assistance, &c. He returned late at night. He stated to me, when he came into the ward-room, after making his report to you, that the number of wounded not amounting, according to the opinion at head quarters, to more than 300 or 400, no medical assistance from the fleet would be required on shore, but that Lord Raglan had made a requisition at his (Glyn's) suggestion, that medical officers might be ordered into the boats, to be sent to the beach in the morning, to convey the wounded to the transports. You granted me permission to land the following morning to see the wounded, for my own instruction and experience. I had no expectation, after Captain Glyn's report, that I could be of any assistance, but I was soon undeceived. The first field hospital I came upon was a small house at the entrance of the village. There were several wounded officers inside, and a great number (some 50 or 60 wounded men) outside. I found only one medical officer in charge, and him without instruments or surgical appliances. He was the assistant-surgeon of one of the regiments in advance, and his panniers were with the regiment. He had been suddenly ordered away from his regiment to this hospital. He stated also, that having made his destitute state known, he had just received orders to dress his wounded roughly, and send them off to the transports to be operated upon there. I went now in search of the Director-general, and found him at the general field hospital. I introduced myself, and offered any amount of medical assistance from the fleet. He declined medical assistance; but on my stating what I had just seen and ascertained at one of his field hospitals, he consented to receive about 25 medical officers from the fleet, to be employed in taking charge of batches of wounded from the field hospitals to the transports. I next

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inquired into his means of transport for his wounded from the field hospitals to the beach. He was in that respect, he said, very badly off. I then took upon myself to offer all the stretchers in the fleet, and men to carry them; offers which were readily accepted. I now made the best of my way back to the beach: the captain on duty took down in writing my report, and sent it off to you; and as soon as possible, all the medical officers that could be spared, 500 stretchers, and 1,000 seamen and marines were landed. I returned myself to the field of battle, ascertained the positions of the different field hospitals, and was back, at the entrance of the village, in time to direct the different parties with the stretchers to the several field hospitals; and by the middle of the day some little organization had been given to this impromptu ambulance corps of seamen and marines. The transports for the reception and conveyance to Scutari of the wounded were told off by the Superintendent of Transports. On his application, and at great prospective risk to the fleet, you sent some of your own medical officers into them, and who remained in them until the wounded were landed at Scutari. Indeed one of the transports sent to Scutari with the wounded, of this their first battle in the Crimea, had not a single army medical officer on board; they were all medical men from the fleet."

20578. Lord *Seymour*.] It is stated in that letter that certain transports were told off for the purpose of conveying the wounded?—Yes.

20579. Do you know whether or not those transports were properly fitted up for the purpose?—Certainly not.

20580. Whose duty was it to have fitted them up properly?—Whoever thought that there would be 1,500 or 2,000 men wounded? You could stow 300 or 400 men, with beds, on board those transports, but no one suspected that there were 1,500 men wounded, and 1,500 sick patients.

20581. Do you mean that when invading the Crimea, knowing as you did the large amount of force in the Crimea, it was not expected that there would be any large number of wounded, or more than 300 or 400?—Quite the contrary. It was not my business to fit them out.

20582. Was there any consideration given to the fitting up of vessels to carry the wounded to Scutari?—If you fit up a vessel previously for wounded men, you of course withdraw vessels for the troops to be embarked in, and we were pretty well pinched for ships; but I went on board one day to see a ship, and she was in the most perfectly clean order that I ever saw, considering how many men were on board; but though large ships could have taken on board 300 or 400 sick, when they conveyed persons to the amount of 600 or 800, it was different.

20583. Having found this difficulty, as to the first battle, in the conveyance of the wounded to Scutari, was any provision made, in anticipation of other battles, for the conveyance of the sick and wounded to Scutari?—As to fitting up the vessels in the Crimea, that was out of the question; and as to another battle, two-thirds of the people supposed that they would be in Sebastopol in two or three days.

20584. Then, when the vessels were in Balaklava, it would have been impossible, with all the appliances of that fleet, to have made a vessel fit for the conveyance of the sick and wounded?—Yes; the fleet was 12 leagues off.

20585. Could you not have sent them to have fitted-up transports for the conveyance of the wounded?—When we landed seamen, we landed shipwrights as far as they went; they were sent down to fit the ships out; I believe Captain Christie did fit them out as he could. In the Crimea there was nothing to fit them up with.

20586. Captain *Gladstone*.] Did Lord Raglan make any requisition to you to fit-up ships?—No; he had the power without me.

20587. Sir *J. Pakington*.] Did you receive any orders to provide a hospital till after the news of the battle of the Alma had reached England?—The orders were not orders; they were orders to call my attention to it, and I did so.

20588. Do you state that orders were not issued to you till after the news of the battle of the Alma had reached England?—I am not sure; I cannot tell; an order came from Sir James Graham, or a letter.

20589. Of what date?—I cannot tell that; it was after the battle of the Alma.

20590. Lord

20590. Lord *Seymour.*] Have you not got the letter?—No, I have not; but it was after the battle of the Alma.

20591. General *Peel.*] As the English army took over no means of transport, must they not always have depended upon the fleet?—Yes; but the fleet were a long way off.

20592. I mean transport; must they not have always depended upon the fleet for transport?—If Captain Christie had had the smallest idea that there were 3,000 men to carry down to Scutari, which there were, he would have selected more transports; and if he had taken more transports, those transports contained baggage and stores and provisions for the army; we had no separate transports fitted for the sick.

20593. Mr. *Ellice.*] You received no orders from home to prepare transports for the sick and wounded, neither from the Secretary of State, nor from the First Lord of the Admiralty, or any other authority; and no requisition was ever made to you by the military authorities in the Crimea to prepare such transport?—No.

20594. Lord *Seymour.*] Never?—Never.

20595. Captain *Gladstone.*] Lord Raglan never made any requisition to you to prepare hospital transports?—The transports were all under his Lordship's orders: all that he had to do was to send for Captain Christie, and say, as he always did, what he wanted.

20596. But did you give facilities, and send carpenters to the ships?—I gave every facility to them, though they were not under my orders; when the transports wanted anything, I gave it.

20597. You received no such application?—No.

20598. Sir *J. Hanmer.*] Did those ships that were sunk by the Russians in the mouth of the harbour at Sebastopol very materially strengthen the defences against the sea attack?—Not the fleet; the fleet never could have gone into Sebastopol unless the army had had possession of one side.

20599. Captain *Gladstone.*] You stated that Admiral Boxer was under your command; would it have been his duty, if he had not transports at his disposal at Constantinople for the service of the troops and the Commissariat department, to have represented that to you?—He would have hired transports directly for everything that he wanted.

20600. Would that have been his duty, to have represented his want of transports to you?—Yes; or to Lord Raglan.

20601. Would it have been his duty to report that want to you?—To Lord Raglan, and also to me.

20602. Did you receive any such representation from him, saying that he had not sufficient transport at his disposal?—No; I do not think I did.

20603. *Chairman.*] Did you ever receive orders from the Admiralty respecting the blockade of the Euxine?—Yes, very often.

20604. Did those orders complain that the blockade was not complete?—No; they never complained of it.

20605. Lord *Seymour.*] Was your fleet adequately equipped in point of stores when you were in the Black Sea?—Perfectly.

20606. Was it well equipped?—Yes.

20607. Did you consider it well manned?—Excellently.

20608. Was there any complaint as to the number of surgeons, or had you the full complement of surgeons on board?—Yes. We had the assistants a little short; we had surgeons on board.

20609. What assistants were short?—I think we were one or two short.

20610. Were your crews amply supplied with provisions?—Not with fresh meat; we could not get it.

20611. In what way did you proceed to supply your fleet with fresh meat?—I had a man at Sinope. The man did get us some beef, but it was more like carrion than anything else. I was obliged to give a pound and a half a man, and I thought that the beef and flour that we had on board ship was better than bad fresh meat. Latterly, he said, he could not get it. I believe, since I have been gone, they have entered into some contract at Trebizond. All the time that we were there, we always thought it likely that we could get possession of Sebastopol, and that there were ample provisions there, and our ships were employed in bringing troops backwards and forwards.

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20612. When off Varna there was a great deal of sickness amongst the crews, was there not?—Yes.

20613. Was that to be attributed to the want of fresh provisions?—No; not at all.

20614. Had you then plenty of fresh provisions?—Yes, very good; a difficulty arose when we got to sea; the season was bad for carrying bullocks.

20615. *Chairman.*] Were you bound only to eat beef; could you not eat mutton?—We had mutton, but it was perfect carrion; we had mutton from Eupatoria brought in by the Tartars, some 20,000 sheep, and we sent them to the army. I begged Lord Raglan to send a Commissary to Eupatoria to pick up those sheep, which he did, but they were very lean: the Russians had driven in the Tartars, and the grass-land was all in the possession of the enemy; those poor things were starving on the beach, and in that condition we killed 5,000 or 6,000.

20616. Did you try to procure fresh meat from the southern shore?—From Sinope; they are very small bullocks.

20617. Captain *Gladstone.*] Then it was not on account of the want of means of transporting them that you were not supplied?—Yes; both the want of meat and of transport; of course, coals are very expensive there, 6*l.* or 10*l.* a ton; and sending a vessel down to Sinope, and back again, for bullocks that you could hardly eat, was very expensive.

20618. Mr. *Drummond.*] Will you explain this a little more minutely, because it has been stated in documents of considerable importance, that the whole of the misfortunes that have happened in the Crimea might have been avoided if the troops had been landed at Kertch; you have stated already that that could not have been done?—No; I could not attack Kertch without a force; I offered to do it with 3,000 men, but they could not spare them.

20619. Mr. *Ellice.*] You could not get the men?—No; what ships could do, we could do; we had no marines on board.

20620. Were not the soundings very shallow at Kaffa?—No, very good; there is a very good anchorage there, and a very good bay.

20621. It has been stated that the harbour at Balaklava was in a very filthy state; but the evidence is very contradictory; if it is true at all, it was not the fault of Captain Christie?—The place is a ditch; there were a great number of vessels coming in after the gale of November, and from the report of Captain Dacres there was a great deal of lumber and stuff in the harbour.

20622. Captain Christie was not to blame?—No; he had the control of the transports, and his orders were not to keep too many transports in the harbour, but merely what he wanted to discharge their cargoes.

20623. Therefore all the censures that have been levelled against Captain Christie are totally unjust and false?—Yes. I have not read one-half of what has been said against him, or against myself; but he was a good steady officer, and a very quiet man; perhaps he had not enough of the devil in him; but he worked very hard.

20624. Captain *Gladstone.*] Had you reason to find fault with Captain Christie in the discharge of his duties?—No; he was a most amiable man; he had a very difficult card to play; he commanded the transport service, and they are not under naval laws; they are rather a set of wild fellows, and they do as they like. I have no complaint to make of him.

20625. Lord *Seymour.*] A large naval force was landed to assist in the siege, was it not?—A few days after the army landed, 1,200 seamen and 2,000 marines were sent from the fleet to assist on shore. When the Russian fleet was sunk, and there was no chance of getting at them, I proposed to Lord Raglan to send those men on shore.

20626. When they were on shore, were they under your own officers?—The blue jackets were; the marines latterly were under Lord Raglan.

20627. Did you find their discipline interfered with by being sent on shore?—We sent picked men on shore; therefore they behaved well. The marines at first were under Sir Edmund Lyons at Balaklava; but I found that they would be rather under the army: I sent word to Lord Raglan, and he then added them to the strength of the army where they now are. There is one thing I should

should mention about the Crimean force—I speak of that, to show that my informer was really a very good man; he was from Ragusa, and not at all attached to the Russian service; he said plainly there was a large force in the Crimea; and I thought it my duty to write and tell Lord Raglan, as I considered that we might be going to the Crimea; there was then a doubt whether we should or not go.

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Veneris, 11° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	General Peel.
Captain Gladstone.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

General Viscount *Hardinge*, G. C. B., attending by permission of the House of Lords, Examined.

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20628. *Chairman.*] YOU are the Commander-in-Chief of the army, are you not?—Yes.

20629. You have been Master-general of the Ordnance?—Yes, I have.

20630. You have been Secretary-at-War?—Yes.

20631. And you have seen, as everybody knows, great service in the field?—Yes.

20632. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have, therefore, more knowledge of our military system than any other living authority. The Committee have had, from Mr. Sidney Herbert, a statement of the duties of the Secretary-at-War, and they will not trouble you upon that subject; will you be so good as to state to the Committee what were the duties of the Master-general of the Board of Ordnance?—The Master-general of the Ordnance has charge of all the military duties of the Artillery and Engineers' departments, and with him, generally, originates all military questions. The Board have the greater portion of the financial considerations of the department to deal with, and with them, generally, but not exclusively, all financial subjects originate.

20633. When they originate with the Board, are they sent up to the Master-general for his decision?—Yes.

20634. Could any work be undertaken, or any new expenditure entered upon, without the sanction of the Master-general?—It ought not to be so.

20635. The Master-general has complete power, either to concur in, or to reverse any decision of the Board upon any subject?—Certainly.

20636. While the Master-general is at the Board, no difference of opinion at the Board could produce any injury to the public service, inasmuch as the Master-general's sole authority would decide that difference?—Exactly so.

20637. The Lieutenant-general, when he is appointed to act in the absence of the Master-general, is only a member of the Board?—No.

20638. He has not, therefore, the superior authority which the Master-general of the Board would have, either in reversing the opinions of the Board, or acting upon his own sole opinion and authority?—I should think not; but I must observe, that a Lieutenant-general of the Board has not existed for several years, and it is only in the absence lately of the Master-general that recourse has been had to the appointment of a Lieutenant-general, who formerly used to act in the absence of the Master-general, but only to the extent that you have described.

20639. The Lieutenant-general being a member of the Board has no superior

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superior authority to the Board, and could not reverse a decision of the Board?—Certainly not.

20640. General *Peel.*] It has been stated by Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, in the course of his evidence, that the Ordnance stores were insufficient when the war broke out; was that the case?—What description of Ordnance stores does the Honourable Member allude to?

20641. He said generally; guns for instance?—I should say that my first act, when coming into the office of the Master-general, in March 1852, was to look to the state of our Artillery, in case of war, or even for defence; and I found that the number of guns prepared for the field and for the field batteries were, for Great Britain, between 40 and 50 only that we could have done any service with, and they were of the date of the battle of Waterloo. I also found in Ireland a small number, and there were altogether about 50 pieces of field artillery. I then proposed to the Government of that day, Lord Derby's, in a very long memorandum, my reasons for considering that to be a dangerous state of the Artillery; and I recommended to Lord Derby's Government that 300 guns and two ammunition waggons to each, making 600 ammunition waggons, should be immediately prepared; the Government assented to that proposal, but it was voted by the succeeding Government.

20642. Do you know the number of guns and ammunition waggons as well?—The number of guns for the field were, of 6-pounders and 9-pounders, 300 guns; two ammunition waggons are the usual proportion for the field for each gun; and there were 600 ammunition waggons. I beg to say, that at this moment we have in the Crimea 78 guns as field batteries, horsed and manned in perfect order, which could not have been the case if we had kept the establishment upon what it was when I came into office.

20643. *Chairman.*] What is the calibre of those guns?—There are a few 6-pounders to keep up with the cavalry; but the greater part are 9-pounders, with the exception of two batteries, I think, which are of 18 or 24, and one of 32-pounders.

20644. General *Peel.*] Shells were one of the principal Ordnance stores that were supposed to be deficient; can you tell at all what was the state of that supply?—I do not think they were deficient, because we had Sir Thomas Hastings, who had the charge of both the ammunition for the Army and the Navy, and knowing that if war broke out, the Navy would require an immense quantity of naval stores. We look naturally to that, and I believe there was a very large proportion prepared, the naval portion of the Ordnance is very large, I should say it is nearly three-fifths of the whole; but no difficulty, I believe, was experienced in the course of last spring, when the fleet went to the Baltic and the other to the Black Sea, in having a sufficient supply of naval as well as military ammunition. Also we had to send, suddenly, a number of heavy guns to Sebastopol; and there are three complete trains, siege guns and ammunition.

20645. There was hardly ever an instance of such a demand upon the Store department as was made to supply the Baltic fleet and for the other large armaments?—No; and I am bound to say, in favour of that department, that I regard with admiration the way in which the military work of that department is performed: the gunners are well trained and drilled; their horses are good, and the Artillery is admired by the French; everything regarding the military portion of that department, is as well done as could possibly be expected.

20646. Were the military arrangements good in sending out the Artillery, and have the Artillery maintained their reputation?—It is reported of them, on every side, that nothing could be more admirable than our Artillery in the field: bold and dashing, keeping up with the cavalry, and rather surpassing it in speed, and the field batteries always performing their duty with the greatest energy.

20647. Evidence has been given as to irregularity in the meetings, and in giving orders at the Board of Ordnance. In your opinion, could such irregularities have taken place under the ordinary working of the Board?—I should say not if the Master-general were present, or if it were a time of peace; but this being a time of war, we met so frequently in the Duke of Newcastle's room, sometimes twice a week, generally once, with the heads of departments; the Duke, being exceedingly pressed, the mails going out twice a week when the

the hour arrived, or a mail was coming in, we were obliged to take down in notes what he decided should be done, and then to carry it into effect without the loss of a day, and subsequently to give him a memorandum for official signature, that it might be recorded as a fact that his orders had been strictly obeyed.

20648 You stated, in answer to a question of the Right honourable Member for Coventry, that any proposal originating with the Board must be submitted to the Master-general for his approval; on the other hand, supposing a proposal originated with the Master-general, which proposal incurred expenditure, would he not equally be obliged to obtain the sanction of the Board?—I should say so; in anything relative to finance, he seldom would go alone.

20649. *Chairman.*] Supposing the Board opposes the Master-general, and the Master-general chooses to pursue his own view, could he do so?—If he were disposed to be very vigorous, and to display it, he might, under his patent, I think, do it; but if he was prudent, he would carry his Board with him, or yield to them.

20650. General *Peel.*] With regard to Minié rifles, is the army in the Crimea provided with Minié rifles, and the troops now on their way out, or will they be provided when they arrive?—I rather think that the whole of the army in the Crimea are already provided with Minié rifles; but they consist of two calibres, being the rifle of 1851 and the rifle of 1853; the one is smaller than the other, and a more perfect rifle than the other. I presume rather more than half the army are still armed with the rifle of 1851, and the remainder are armed with the Minié rifle of 1853.

20651. In the spring of 1854, what steps were taken to supply the force sent out with the small bore rifle?—There was a large purchase made under the Duke of Newcastle, amounting first to 20,000, and afterwards to 20,000 more, at Liege; there were, I think, 20,000 ordered in the United States, and a very large contract was made with the people of Birmingham.

20651*. What steps are taken to ensure that the reinforcements sent out to the different regiments are armed with the same description of rifle as the regiments which they are about to join?—When the expedition was about to embark, in the early part of last year, it appeared to me that it was very desirable that as many regiments as could be supplied with the Minié rifle of 1851, should take out that rifle; but for the want of target practice, as to which there is great difficulty in this free country, I thought it prudent, as well as Lord Raglan, that the troops should take out the smooth bore, and that we should then send out Minié rifles, at the same time, as many as we had; and when they arrived at Malta and at Scutari, the practice with those rifles took place; and it was determined, when the troops afterwards took the field, that as many men as could be armed with the rifle of 1851 should receive it, and the remainder continue to receive the smooth bore. Therefore there were two different arms with two different kinds of ammunition. Then, subsequently, the Minié rifle of 1853 (having exhausted all that remained of the Minié rifle of 1851) were sent out to the Crimea and were issued to the divisions; but if there are any troops still unsupplied with the Minié rifle of 1853, they will shortly receive it; generally speaking, 4,000 Minié rifles of 1853 are received every month; and by this time, I should hope, every man of that army is now supplied, even the last three regiments that have gone out.

20652. Going out from this country with the old musket, they would change it for the new arm, previously to going to the Crimea?—Yes; for instance, a detachment going out, if the regiment in the Crimea has the Minié rifle, it would, notwithstanding that, take out some smooth bores; and when it got out there, it would be armed with the same arm as its own regiment.

20653. If that precaution was not taken, a detachment might arrive with a different rifle and different ammunition from the regiment to which it belonged?—Exactly so.

20654. *Chairman.*] Can it be true, as we have heard, that lately a detachment of the Guards went out with the old musket?—Certainly; it went out, because we had here no Minié rifles of 1853 to supply them with. All the Minié rifles are sent to Balaklava, where they can be properly distributed to those regiments to whom we can give them; and they must be given by regiments, for it would be very inconvenient in a regiment to have two kinds of ammunition. We may have now two or three kinds with divisions, or with

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brigades; but in the same regiment it would be very inexpedient to have two or three different kinds of ammunition.

20655. They merely took out muskets, and exchanged them at Balaklava?—Yes; then the smooth bores are handed over to the Turks, so that by that plan they are carried out. At the same time it would not be safe, not knowing whether the regiment might be in the Crimea, or elsewhere, if they did not take out arms. By this mode every regiment is sure of getting its proper arm.

20656. Lord *Seymour*.] Can you state whether, in 1852, when you were Master-general of the Ordnance, the amount of the military stores generally under the Ordnance, was or was not sufficient in proportion to the number of the army?—I should think they were, but not of field guns.

20657. You limit your answer to field guns?—No; I think guns for the defences of the batteries lately erected for the last five or six years; they were inefficient. The guns were too small for modern practice against line of battle ships; the gun carriages and platforms, as well as the ammunition, were not in due proportion.

20658. This country has been for many years expending considerable sums of money in substituting larger guns in the fortresses abroad, instead of the old guns?—Yes; that has been going on annually, and I was not surprised to find that there should be a deficiency; the new system, involving the abolition of the old pattern guns, because they were too small, naturally caused a very heavy demand to be made for a larger description of gun, and consequently it could not be done in one year, nor in two, or three; it was a work of time.

20659. With regard to the Artillery force, this country has been for some time, year by year, somewhat increasing the Artillery force, has it not?—Yes.

20660. The sappers and miners have been increased of late years, have they not?—Yes.

20661. Can you refer to any period, during the long peace that has occurred, in which this country was so amply provided, with regard to its military power, as it was just at the breaking out of this war?—I should say that with regard to stores it was probably better, just at the breaking out of this war, than it had been for the previous 30 years.

20662. With regard to its Artillery, was it not so?—Artillery-men as well as Artillery.

20663. Also with regard to its sappers and miners?—Yes.

20664. With regard to its naval force, it was far better prepared than it had been for the last 30 years?—I think so; I should say that from 1845, from that period in Sir Robert Peel's administration, when there was some apprehension of a rupture, that succeeding Administrations did, as regards the Artillery, each make efforts to improve that branch of the service.

20665. With regard to the Minié rifle, the first pattern that was adopted was that of 1851?—Yes.

20666. When you came to the Ordnance, on considering the subject of the rifle, you made some alteration in the pattern, did you not?—I made a proposal to the Duke of Wellington that I thought the rifle carried too large a ball, instead of carrying an ounce ball, which the Duke was partial to, it carried about an ounce and a quarter ball; and therefore instead of the soldier carrying 60 rounds, he could only carry 42 rounds of that ball, which was not so safe as 0 rounds; also the small-bore rifle is, upon the whole, a better weapon.

20667. You think the improved rifle is a very much better one?—Yes. Some very strong opinions have been given upon that in a Committee of which the noble Lord was a member.

20668. A change in the form of the arm necessarily interferes with the rapidity of providing a supply?—Yes.

20669. Therefore as we have so lately changed the pattern, it was not to be expected that we could, in the course of a few months, have sufficient store for all the requirements of the country?—We were in such a state of transition as to arms that it was very difficult to know what arrangements to make; one of them was this: we had made a large number of smooth-bore; it was money likely to be thrown away, as the Duke of Wellington had made up his mind that that rifle should be adopted, namely, the Minié, in which opinion I entirely concurred, as I believe now every officer does. In the Russian trenches, at this time, the enemy it is said retire more rapidly when they are attacked by regiments

regiments armed with the Minié rifle than when attacked by those armed with the smooth bore. The sound is distinguished immediately; and if they are attacked by troops armed with the Minié they are not so steady at their posts or resist with so much energy as when they are attacked by the smooth bore.

20670. All the information which you have received has satisfied you as to the excellence of the pattern of the rifle which was adopted in 1853?—Yes; I think that is the best of the two, but my own opinion is, that we are in a state of great transition as to fire-arms; that is another element of difficulty, in considering what we ought to make now. I have seen within a few days a rifle that loads at the breach instead of at the muzzle, and it seems to fire more accurately, and with greater ease, than any other that I have seen.

20671. *Chairman.*] Whose invention is that?—Mr. Prince's.

20672. Lord *Seymour.*] You referred to the purchase of rifles made by order of the Duke of Newcastle at Liege, and others purchased in America?—Yes.

20673. Are you sure whether any of those from Liege have been received?—I fancy not.

20674. Sir Thomas Hastings has stated to this Committee, that he objected to the application to Liege for the Minié rifles?—I think I have heard that he did so; not being at the Board of Ordnance at present, I do not know those facts.

20675. That having been stated, are you of opinion, looking to the want of them in this country, and at the same time looking at the importance of maintaining in this country the manufacture of those rifles, that it was a wise application to make to Liege for additional arms?—I should say that our wants were so great, that the Duke of Newcastle was justified in providing for them as early as possible; on the one hand, applying to Liege and letting them set up a large manufactory for the Minié rifle upon our pattern, was certainly encouraging them at the expense of the people of Birmingham; but on the other hand, there were at that time Russian parties entering into the Liege market, and ready to make terms with them, and if the Duke of Newcastle had not been before them, and agreed to take a certain number, they would have obtained them; therefore I presume that the Russians have been delayed in obtaining the Minié rifles, which they would have obtained at Liege but for the Duke of Newcastle. The measures which were adopted were of a twofold character, that of getting rifles for ourselves and also of excluding the Russians.

20676. Did the Duke consult you before he sent for them?—He spoke to me upon it.

20677. You thought it a prudent measure, did you not?—Yes.

20678. Have you heard what was stated by Sir Thomas Hastings as the consequence of that; he says, in answer to Question 18693: "I have been obliged to break a promise which I had made to the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, that 2,000 rifled carbines should be completed, because the men employed in that service, making the carbines, were withdrawn to go to Belgium and America." Had you any notion that our order to Belgium and to America had had the effect of withdrawing some of the best workmen from this country to go to complete the order?—I never heard that statement before, but it may be so; many of those things are mere statements proceeding from the Birmingham workmen, and are not always to be relied upon as they bring them forward.

20679. This proceeds from Sir Thomas Hastings?—How does he know that fact?

20680. He says, with regard to the weapon, "I should add, that in consequence of withdrawing our better hands for Belgium, I have been obliged to break a promise which I had made to the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, that 2,000 rifled carbines should be completed, because the men employed in that service, making the carbines, were withdrawn." He stated that to the Committee from his official knowledge?—I have no doubt that whatever Sir Thomas Hastings states he states upon very good data.

20681. As Master-general of the Ordnance, were the Artillery officers who were employed at Woolwich considered to be under your authority?—Entirely so, unless they were employed on any particular duty, when their acts would not come under my supervision.

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20682. For instance, if a man is employed at the head of the Laboratory, is he under your military authority?—Certainly, at any moment.

20683. Those who are under him again are also still retained under military authority, are they not?—If they are soldiers they are, but if they are workmen they are not.

20684. Any officers also employed at the Laboratory are under the military authority, are they not, of the Master-general of the Ordnance?—Yes.

20685. Mr. *Ellice.*] The other branches of the manufactures of the Board of Ordnance were also in a good state at the time of the breaking out of the war; a waggon corps had been laid down, had it not?—The gun carriage department; that department was under a very able officer, the late Colonel Colquhoun; he was making a very large supply for the Navy, as well as for the army; we required, in the year 1853, 600 ammunition waggons to be made, besides the carriages of 300 guns.

20686. My question had reference to the waggon corps that existed during the previous war?—That was not under the Ordnance.

20687. Lord *Seymour.*] Was it not the duty of the Surveyor-general of the Ordnance to consider especially the barracks?—Yes; he had the general duty of superintending all military buildings that were connected with the Army, as well as with the Artillery. The Artillery barracks and the Army barracks being united in one, so far as use can be made of them.

20688. If any great alteration was contemplated in the barrack arrangements of this country, that would be a question which would be brought very much under the examination of the Surveyor-general of the Ordnance?—I cannot say that; the Surveyor-general may or may not be a military man. If he is a military man, he may take more interest in military buildings than a civil one would; but the Surveyor-general is, generally speaking, the surveyor of everything; formerly he had all the auditing of the accounts. That is all changed; therefore I could not so well speak of the Surveyor-general's duties, as at the time that I was Master-general; when I was Clerk of the Ordnance it was very different; he was the auditor of accounts.

20689. Do you think that the Surveyor-general, having to consider questions relating to all military buildings, should have been a military man?—I think there is a great advantage in having the Surveyor-general a military man; I think, if I may give another opinion, that the principal storekeeper ought to be a naval man, because the transactions with the navy are so numerous and so important, that I may say three-fifths of the whole duty are naval, upon the question of military stores.

20690. *Chairman.*] Do you think that any mischief to the public service would arise from the absence of the Surveyor-general?—I should say not so much personally, because he has no particular personal duties attached to him; he has chief clerks under him, who if he was sick could perform his duty; he is not like the Inspector of Fortifications, when buildings are going on he ought to inspect the works in progress; but the Surveyor-general has no duties that a senior clerk might not in his accidental absence be able to perform for him.

20691. Lord *Seymour.*] You have had great experience, not only of the military, but of the civil departments of the country; did you consider, when you were at the Board of Ordnance, that the arrangements of that Board were satisfactory, and that it was a department well adapted for the public service?—We had made very great alterations at that time. Under the Duke of Wellington, I was Clerk of the Ordnance for four years, and we had reduced the expenditure largely, and I think we had simplified the working of the department. But it has since then been very much reduced; the Board officers and other parties have been very much reduced, and great credit is due to those under whom those reductions were subsequently made.

20692. Did that department work satisfactorily when you were there?—I think that it did work satisfactorily as a department; the Ordnance Department is most difficult to manage well, because in almost every other department, take the Secretary-at-War, the Commander-in-Chief, or any other officer, he is an officer of administration; he administers certain matters; and as soon as the necessary letters are written, the transaction is almost at an end. The Ordnance Department is a department not only of administration, but

but a department of great execution; its duties are executive; and with regard to a duty that is to be executed, years may go on, and it may not be completed for eight or ten years, and it may be a work of great importance. It is a department of excessive labour, and great responsibility; I should say, having filled three offices, including that of Secretary-at-War, it is a more responsible department than any of that class, as the preparation for the Navy and the preparation for the Army depends upon it; it is one of the most important departments, and should be carefully dealt with.

20693. *Chairman.*] The first conclusion that one would come to, therefore, is that the men appointed to that office ought to be men of first-rate ability?—Yes.

20694. And to be present at their posts?—That depends upon the necessity of the service; if the service is one of emergency, and you take away that very able man, Lord Raglan, for other purposes, he cannot be there.

20695. In time of war, is the absence of the Master-general a public disservice?—I should say that the department would not go on as well in his absence as in his presence.

20696. Lord *Seymour.*] You were at the Ordnance in 1828, were you not?—No, I was Clerk of the Ordnance in 1827; I went to the War Office in 1828.

20697. You were Clerk of the Ordnance in 1827, when the Duke of Wellington was at the Ordnance?—He left, I think, in 1827; I was Clerk of the Ordnance in 1823, 1824, and 1825; I think he left in 1826.

20698. You were there for some time, were you not, while he was Master-general?—Certainly.

20699. At that time the Ordnance was considered one of the best, if not quite the model department of the Government?—So it is stated in the report.

20700. It was while you were there that it had the Duke of Wellington for its head?—Yes.

20701. Since then, you went back to the Ordnance in 1852; did you find the Ordnance worked in any way more inefficiently then than it had been when you were there before?—No; I did not find it worked more inefficiently, but I think that the desire to reduce the expenditure had been carried so far that almost universally the clerks were overworked. By the amalgamation of departments, when it extended so far as to throw too many heads of business into clerks' hands, instead of obtaining by that means unity and simplicity, you get into very great confusion.

20702. Did you practically find, when you came back in 1852, with your former recollections of the office, that it had been so altered by amalgamation and consolidation under different heads of departments, that the whole working was weakened?—I cannot say that I had time, during the short time, six or seven months, that I was there, to make many observations of that nature; but I should say that it was in very good order, and that the different departments certainly did their work well. I think it is an improvement that the clerks have been brought from the Tower to Pall Mall, and are at the same place; it saves time and trouble, and, upon the whole, the alterations that have been made have worked, I should say, well. At the same time, I repeat that I think the clerks are overtaxed; they really have hardly bare time for recreation, and I think that the popular desire to make reductions of the expenditure has been carried too far in that department, especially as regards the lower order of clerks.

20703. General *Peel.*] When you returned to the office in 1852, had not the duties of the office been considerably increased?—Very greatly; steam has greatly increased them; the armament of vessels, and new inventions in military machines.

20704. Sir John Burgoyne, in a portion of a letter published in the Appendix, has expressed this opinion, that "The employment of masses of civilians, for work or other purposes, with an army, is most inconvenient and objectionable. There was some excuse for applying it as an expedient on this particular occasion, from the inadequacy of our army to meet those necessary demands; but an additional number of troops even for these services of labour, would be far preferable, and a very large number of sappers would be of peculiar utility for the many services they could render, while they, or any description of troops, would add to the strength in the field against the enemy whenever requisite." Is it your

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opinion that the increase of such a body of men as the sappers and miners would be preferable to the employment of civilians with the army?—I have no doubt of that. They can do two things instead of one; they can fight as well as work, while the latter cannot.

20705. *Chairman.*] Can you make a sapper in a short time?—I think you can make him in less time than is supposed. Sir Charles Pasley's evidence upon that, when he was at Chatham, and some subsequent evidence, is very strong: a soldier taken in at 18 or 20 is taught a smattering of geometry, and he learns it very well; and you could do upon the English and Irish survey with a man paid 2*s.* 6*d.* a day the same work that in the Civil Engineers would probably cost a guinea a day for the same class of man.

20706. That observation applies, does it not, to the use of civilians in the Crimea?—If the observation applies to the Crimea alone, I should say that it is a great advantage when you want work to be done, and you are short of soldiers, to get what assistance you can; you cannot be deterred by any inconvenience that may result. At this moment, there has been some anxiety as to what is going on there with respect to the employment of civilians; it is hardly to be expected that a Grenadier Guardsman, who is ready to face any danger, will be satisfied to be receiving about 6*d.* a day and his rations, sleeping in the trenches, and being very hard worked, when another man, call him either a land transport man, or an orderly in an hospital, or a navvy, or an Armenian scavenger for the camp, will receive 2*s.* 6*d.*; that would try the patience of our men if you pay the others so much higher than the soldier is paid, when his duty and his whole demeanour is of a very much higher quality.

20707. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Do you think it important to the efficiency of the Ordnance office that there should be an Artillery officer on the Board at all times?—I cannot say that I am very much of that opinion. It is a small portion of the army, and it is found that an Artillery officer has strong prejudices in regard to his department; it was tried in Lord Mulgrave's time. I do not like to mention names, but the bent of the officer was to bring forward and favour Ordnance friends. I should say that it would do no harm upon the whole, but I do not see any very great importance in it.

20708. General *Peel.*] A knowledge of Artillery would be of no use in doing the service of the Board?—Certainly not.

20709. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Has it not been the general practice to place an Artillery officer on the Board?—Never. I never recollect one.

20710. Notwithstanding the extent to which the duties of that office are connected with the Artillery, your Lordship does not think that there should be an Artillery officer upon it?—No. I think that a naval officer ought to be on the Board. I think that a landsman would have very great difficulty in carrying on the large preparations and arrangements for naval operations.

20711-12. *Chairman.*] You would use, would you not, the knowledge of an Artillery officer rather as a witness than as a judge; you stated, I think, that you thought that an Artillery officer should not be on the Board?—I did not say that; but I do not see the advantage of it.

20713. Will you state the disadvantage that would arise from his being at the Board?—There are partialities.

20714. As they have got to judge about Artillery matters, ought they not to get Artillery officers as witnesses to give them information upon them?—I do not think that a judgment upon Artillery rests with the Board, or comes before them; it is more of a financial kind.

20715. Mr. *Ellice.*] Will you state the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the army?—The duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the army are chiefly these: maintaining the discipline of the army, and providing that it shall be kept in a proper state of discipline at all times, and in good order.

20716. He has the appointment to all military stations and staff situations, has he not?—He has the recommendation; he has to select and recommend, but other people appoint. For instance, he recommends to the Secretaries of State at Home and in the Colonies, what officers he thinks are fit for vacant appointments, and they decide whether they will accept his recommendation or not.

20717. He has the first appointment to the army, and all subsequent promotions in the army are made upon his recommendation or nomination, are they not?—They are, subject to the Queen's authority.

20718. He takes the pleasure of the Crown upon those appointments, but you are subject to no other control?—Yes.

20719. He has the same power of appointment to the staff, save and accept when a general officer is selected for the command abroad, or any officer of great importance?—It is subject to different modes of action when it comes to be applied. When the army went out this last year, in 1854, I gave the brigade majors the appointment of all their staff; I gave the officers commanding brigades all the appointments of brigade majors, and to the general officers of every description the appointment of their own aides-de-camp, and if it is a command that requires the assistance of a military secretary, the general officer also appoints him; it is the invariable rule; the personal staff are always appointed by their own generals.

20720. It was your duty to appoint those officers, according to your discretion, and you gave the nomination to the superior officers that you have stated?—Yes; taking care that service and rank, and various other qualifications, were inherent in the person appointed.

20721. Still, the power of appointment was solely in yourself?—Certainly.

20722. You have also the appointment of all the regimental medical officers, subject, of course, to the recommendation of the Medical Board?—I think in the course of the last two years-and-a-half I have looked over the list, which I was bound to do, but I have never had the appointment. The Director-general of the Medical Department selects the officers, and he submits them to me, and if I see no objection to them I let the War-Office know of it, but if I think that there is any objection to any of them, I point it out to the Secretary-at-War, that he may, in conjunction with me, take such steps as he thinks necessary, either to confirm the appointment, or to state on financial grounds, or others, what we think ought to be done; it is not distinctly my appointment.

20723. No appointments could take place, without your nomination, upon the recommendation of the Medical Board?—No; I know everything that passes of that description; but there are many appointments which involve financial considerations, and every one of those is laid before the Secretary-at-War before I confirm it.

20724. Except with regard to financial arrangements, the Secretary-at-War has no power of appointing medical officers to the army?—No; nor do I ever put in a single name.

20725. With respect to staff appointments, as they have become vacant, have you filled up those appointments, or do you leave them to the commanding officer on the spot in the Crimea?—I leave them entirely with Lord Raglan; and the reason that I do so is, that I think a general officer, placed in his difficult position, ought to have every means that can be afforded him of strengthening himself by appointing those whom he thinks most fit, and rewarding and encouraging those who are most meritorious.

20726. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief extend, beyond his duty at home, to all the colonies and possessions of Her Majesty abroad?—Yes.

20727. You correspond directly with the commanding officers in those colonies, even while there is a civil government?—Yes.

20728. All the vacancies that take place in the foreign service in those colonies, either among officers of regiments or in the staff, are filled up by you?—With very few exceptions.

20729. It is the same with respect to the Queen's troops in India, is it not?—Yes.

20730. When a commanding officer is appointed to the command of an expedition, such as that lately sent out under Lord Raglan to the Crimea, he receives his appointment, does he not, under a letter of service?—He does.

20731. By whom is that letter of service signed?—It is signed by me, as the Commander-in-chief.

20732. As soon as the Commander-in-chief takes the command of that force abroad, he is then subject, with respect to the movements of the army, to the direction of the Secretary of State, and only corresponds with you upon strictly military details?—Entirely so; I had better read to the Committee the beginning of a letter to Lord Raglan, which is the same as that which was sent to Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1809, and also by the Duke of York to the Duke of

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Wellington, when he took the command of the English army at the battle of Waterloo. It runs thus: "Horse Guards, 5th April 1854. My Lord,—Her Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint your Lordship to the command of a detachment of Her army to be employed upon a particular service, I have to desire that you will be pleased to take the earliest opportunity to assume the command of this force, and carry into effect such instructions as your Lordship may receive from Her Majesty's Ministers."

20733. In what respect do you exercise the functions which you have described as belonging to the Commander-in-chief under the control of the civil Government of the country?—I have at different periods (we have had a very responsible duty when the country has been disturbed) had intimate communications with the Secretary of State for the Home Department; I wait upon him myself, or the Adjutant-general, or Military Secretary, waits upon him for his orders; frequently those orders might appear to be irregular, because they are given verbally, as I was describing upon the subject of the Ordnance Department, by the War Department, and the post must go out without delay, or a telegraph must send down orders to send the troops, as fast as the occasion may require, to the disturbed districts. I cannot exemplify it better than by referring to that which took place in April 1848, when there was a Chartist meeting, and an attempt to march through this town; that was an occasion when the Commander-in-chief exercised a very great responsibility with the civil departments of the country, especially with the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

20734. I mean more peculiarly with respect to the administration of the patronage and the power of appointment in the Commander-in-chief; in what respect is he subject to the civil authorities of the country?—In this way: if I appointed an officer to be commander at Portsmouth, I cannot do that unless I write to the Secretary of State and say that I propose, if he concurs, to appoint So-and-so to be the officer in command at Portsmouth, and if he does not object, the appointment takes place; if he does, I appoint another man; I must carry his concurrence with me.

20735. It is the same with respect to appointments in the colonies; you take the pleasure of the Secretary of State for the Colonies?—Yes.

20736. The Duke of Newcastle has stated that the relations between the Horse Guards and the Secretary of State are not very satisfactory, and that the demarcation between the Minister of War and the Commander-in-chief is inconveniently indefinite; can you give the Committee your opinion upon that subject?—I must say that during the whole course of my transacting business with the Duke of Newcastle, I am not aware, since the war broke out, of any portion of the duties between us having been personally unsatisfactory, nor do I know to what he alludes in pointing out that he thinks it has been unsatisfactory.

20737. I do not think that any part of his evidence went to the fact that the relations between the two offices were personally unsatisfactory, but he states that the general demarcation between the limits of the power of the Commander-in-chief and the power of the Secretary of State was, as he describes it, inconveniently indefinite?—I am not aware of what other limit he can desire, because the real fact is, that the Secretary of State for War has unlimited power over the Horse Guards; and if I were to recommend to him an officer to go to the Crimea, and he thought, for any reason, that he was not a person fit for the office, on making his objections to me I should, of course, take them into consideration, and if he persisted in his views I should at once give way, and recommend another, or request him, upon a list that I should give of the best men that I could find, to make his own selection.

20738. So that if those demarcations are inconveniently indefinite, it must be for want of the Secretary of State expressing his pleasure with respect to the service to the Commander-in-Chief?—Exactly; I think that the Secretary for War has every power to enable him to make any appointment that he pleases; and when, in one part of the Duke of Newcastle's evidence, he says that he thinks he ought to have the power of submitting the names of the persons to be appointed to the Queen, I cannot see what advantage would accrue to him from having that power, because it does not effect the object which he has in view, which is to appoint the best person. He being a political

political officer, serving in the Cabinet, it is of no value to him that the army should know whether it is the Duke of Newcastle or Lord Panmure who makes appointments; but to the Commander-in-chief of the day, who is a professional officer, I consider it of importance to him that he should keep up that kind of connexion between him and the Crown, that the officers may know that the appointments, in a certain degree, proceed upon the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief; and the Commander-in-chief having to exercise at times very severe acts of discipline towards those who may infringe the rules of the service, it is desirable, on every account, that the Commander-in-chief should have the submission of the appointments to the Queen, as it has always been done during the last 100 or 200 years.

20739. In fact, if, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, an inexpedient appointment of any description was insisted upon by the Commander-in-chief, it must have been because the Secretary of State did not express Her Majesty's pleasure that such an appointment should not take place?—I presume that was so; but I cannot be sure that it was.

20740. The fact is, that you would make no appointment, and give no promotion, which the Secretary of State made an objection to?—Certainly not.

20741. *Chairman.*] The power of the Secretary of State overrides that of the Commander-in-chief?—Entirely so.

20742. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have also the distribution of military rewards and pensions, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary-at-War, or prescribed by Act of Parliament?—I have.

20743. In the same way, does the distribution of those military rewards, in which there is any discretion exercised, come under the review of the Government of the country, if they should think fit to bring them under review?—Certainly.

20744. When the Government determine upon sending a military force out of the country, in the letter of service, what instructions do you give to the Commander-in-chief of that force?—They are very technical: they are, that he will report to me upon matters of discipline; that the Quartermaster-general will send to me a copy of the demands that he makes, and details of that kind, which are not very important; but it is very important, I think, that the Commander-in-chief at home, and the Commander of the Forces abroad, should clearly obey that part of the instructions of the letter of service, that he will receive Her Majesty's instructions; because I consider that very great inconvenience would result if the Commander-in-chief at home was to correspond with him freely upon military operations, in the event of his taking a different view from the Secretary of State and the Cabinet of the day, who are responsible for his operations. It would be extremely wrong, I conceive, on the part of the Commander-in-chief, if he entertained different opinions from Her Majesty's Government, to give those opinions to the Commander of the Forces abroad; they might clash very inconveniently; and I should think it a very improper mode of proceeding to allow of such interferences between the Government and the Commander-in-chief of the Forces carrying out those operations, by a third person.

20745. If the Commander-in-chief in this country held a different opinion, with respect to the operations, from that of the Commander-in-chief of the Forces abroad, it would be his duty to communicate it to the Secretary of State, and allow him to exercise his own discretion upon it?—Clearly so; and when I thought the landing proposed in the Crimea was a great deal too close to Sebastopol, and that it was safer to go higher up, I gave my opinion to the Duke of Newcastle upon this point, but I did not write them to Lord Raglan.

20746. *Chairman.*] Supposing the views of the Commander-in-chief respecting the war differ from those of the official persons forming the Cabinet, what occurs then?—He has given his opinion honestly, and if the Cabinet do not choose to take it, it is not his fault; but those opinions given by me are in my professional character, and confidential, generally. Of course I have seen the instructions given by the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan; and if I had thought that any part of those instructions to Lord Raglan were capable of improvement, I should certainly have made them.

20747. Suppose the view of the Commander-in-chief differs from the view taken by the Administration as to the operations of the war, and the operations

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are carried on in opposition to his view, is he responsible at all for that?—Not at all.

20748. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What opportunity have you, as Commander-in-chief, of expressing your opinions to the members of the Government?—By constant intercourse with the Secretary for War, and with other Cabinet Ministers.

20749. Does that intercourse turn upon your being consulted by the Administration; or, as Commander-in-chief, do you feel it your duty to offer opinions upon current events?—I should feel it to be my duty to speak to the Secretary for War, and inform him what my impressions were. I should not carry it to the extent of withdrawing from the office of Commander-in-chief because I am expressly instructed, by Her Majesty in the Letter of Service, not to have anything to say to the operations.

20750. In the event of any circumstances in the progress and conduct of the war coming to your knowledge, of which you did not approve, or which you thought dangerous to the interests of the country, you should feel it your duty to express that opinion to the Minister for War?—Yes; I should certainly state that to him.

20751. During the progress of the present war, have the despatches received by the War Minister from the General Commanding been regularly shown to you as Commander-in-Chief?—There may have been instances in which they were not shown to me, but I should say that, particularly during later periods, they have been constantly shown to me.

20752. Are you aware of any important despatches that have not been seen by you?—No.

20753. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Commander-in-chief is responsible, is he not, for the organisation and outfit of any force that is sent abroad?—Yes, he is.

20754. He is responsible for its composition, for the proportions of the different branches of the service, the infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery, and the staff?—He is.

20755. He is responsible also with respect to advising the proper means of transport for the army, and for the medical arrangements for the army, and for the accoutrements of the infantry and the cavalry?—He is not responsible for the land transport; the land transport has never existed as a separate department in this country, and therefore such a department does not exist, or did not till lately. When the Commander of the Forces goes out and takes the command of the army, it is, I believe, usual for the Commissariat department to furnish the transport, and that is generally done by hiring animals in the country, or purchasing them, and applying their best efforts to obtain transport; but the Commander-in-chief at home knows nothing of those transactions; it is the Commander of the Forces abroad who makes his arrangements with the Commissary-general. It would be impossible, 3,000 miles off, to send animals from England to Balaklava in the number there required; it would not only be a great expense, but it would be perfectly impossible; it should be done by the Commissary-general and other officers who may be sent out to purchase animals by the Commander of the Forces.

20756. I did not mean responsible for the execution of the means which it might be necessary to take to secure the transports, but he would be responsible for advising that those means should be prepared by the departments of the Commissariat?—I could not do more with the Commissariat than what the Treasury say to the Commissary-general, "Provide, as usual, the transport that is required." I could do no more, because we never have had a transport corps.

20757. When you were desired to organise this force, you conceived it no part of your duty to advise that proper means of transport should be secured?—How could I do more than say, "You will do what has been done by the Duke of Wellington and others." We are an insular power, therefore we cannot march to the point of operations, and under these circumstances, nothing is so weak and so bad for military operations as that upon which Lord Raglan is concerned, that of having to make a long sea voyage. The strongest army is always the army that has merely to move across a frontier to the place of operations: such an army is always in health. Under these circumstances, we have, at the outset, always to undertake a very great difficulty. I have no doubt, that in the American war, the great difficulty we had to contend with against

against our countrymen there, was the distance: they had everything on the spot and we had to send everything from England.

20758. When an army is organised, some advice must be given with respect to provision for every branch of the service connected with the army?—That advice is contained in the instructions from the Treasury to the Commissariat officers; Lord Raglan knew that, and it would have been a work of supererogation, or something very like a weak interference in me, to be sending orders to him when he knows that I cannot interfere or assist him in providing transport.

20759. In France the military authorities have control over the department whose duty it is to provide transport?—Their service is entirely different from ours.

20760. Will you state, very shortly, what are the duties of the chief officers, not the general officers, but the other staff officers appointed to a force of the description in the Crimea, such as the Quartermaster-general and the Adjutant-general?—The Adjutant-general has the charge of the discipline of the camp, and the Quartermaster-general has the charge of the movements of the camp.

20761. *Chairman.*] Would that include transport?—Both would give their orders to the Commissariat to provide what is necessary; the Quartermaster-general has the larger proportion of those duties, being for the movements in the field; he would merely apply to the Commissary-general, under our system, for what he wanted.

20762. Supposing you wanted to move the army, say 10 miles, whose duty would it be to provide the baggage animals for that operation?—The Commissary-general's.

20763. He would have the duty of providing them; who would have the duty of apportioning the numbers?—The Commander of the Forces would, on a paper being laid before him, apportion them to the different departments; so much for ammunition purposes, so much for regimental purposes, and so much for medical purposes; he would dole them out as he could, but the Commissary-general would lay those plans before the Commander-in-Chief, who would have to decide; his orders having been given to the Commissary-general, he would do his best to provide what was required.

20764. Mr. *Ellice.*] When the army takes the field, there is then no division of authority; the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for everything, and has absolute power over everything?—I think in every way; and it is a wise policy always to let the Commander of the Forces, he who is at the head of the army, to be as independent as you can, and to give him every possible authority.

20765. No person of any description, belonging to the staff, can exercise any independent authority, or in any way place any obstacle in the way of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief?—Certainly not.

20766. How many troops were first ordered upon this expedition?—Ten thousand.

20767. How soon after the outfit of the 10,000 were other requisitions made upon you by the Government to organise a further military force?—I have before me a paper that I believe has been given to the Honourable Chairman, dated Horse Guards, 8th February 1855, and it is printed in the Appendix. The first division, that is, of the Guards, embarked on the 22d of February 1854, for Malta, and the 93d regiment also about the same date; between February and May they embarked.

20768. Ten thousand men?—Yes.

20769. When was it determined to make an augmentation to that force?—I should say it took place very shortly afterwards; we knew that there would be 10,000 more required, making 20,000 infantry, and, with the artillery and cavalry force in four divisions, there would be 25,000.

20770. That was the force that was originally intended to be sent out to the East?—That was to be our contribution, or at least our force, and upon that assumption I made my arrangements for the organisation of the reserves for that force.

20771. When that force was sent to the East, you also organised reserves to maintain it in a state of efficiency up to that number?—Yes.

20772. That was, during the last year, the state in which it was considered necessary to maintain our military force in the East?—Certainly. I can show that the first reserve under Sir George Cathcart, composed of seven battalions

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and 6,000 men, were ready in September, and they had arrived at Varna at that time, and in my opinion, instead of remaining as a reserve nearer home, they did right in immediately joining the army, and aiding Lord Raglan at the battle of the Alma with that additional force. Of course we all agree that it is much better, when you are going on an expedition of that kind to have 6,000 more men than to leave them at Varna; because, though people do talk of the propriety of having a reserve, it is always found in practice to be very desirable to fight as many men as you can upon a given point. The Duke of Wellington, as is well known, in his first campaign, in the operations at Assaye, detached Colonel Stevenson, leaving himself with only 5,000 men, and Colonel Stevenson with 6,000, and the Duke fought the battle of Assaye with half his force, but he never repeated that experiment. In his subsequent career he always brought up to fight the largest force on the most important point: therefore, the Duke of Newcastle was right in bringing the reserve under Sir George Cathcart to bear upon the expedition in the Crimea. I think that the second reserve was sent after the battle of Inkermann, and consisted of 11 battalions and 6,500 men. Then there were drafts sent up to the end of December, amounting to 9,008 men, making 21,508, being as nearly as possible equal to the force I had originally provided; so that, notwithstanding the great loss by deaths at Varna and Balaklava, up to the end of December the force that I had provided equalled the force sent out originally. So far as the number of the line went, including artillery, they would be rather stronger; in fact, we had at the end of the year a few hundred men more than what I had assumed would be the force, 25,000, in the Crimea.

20773. It has been stated that many of the men that have been sent out latterly in detachments, or as a reserve, have been very young recruits and perfectly inefficient for duties in the field; has that been so?—That has been so in a great degree, and unavoidably so, the peace establishment having been very low indeed; so that after we made the first effort to send out 25,000, we could do nothing more than to send out young recruits. We made our men pretty perfect in drill in the course of sixty days, and when we had to send them out, instead of being composed of bone and muscle, they were almost gristle; in fact, they were too young. We have sent out no men under 19, and that is a restriction on the power of sending out men. The peace establishment was so low when the war broke out, that we were obliged to raise men as fast as we could; and the great difference between the state of our men in 1808, when the Duke of Wellington went to the Peninsula first, and when we went to the Crimea, is simply this: that in 1808 we had had previously, for six or seven years, a very large force, an army of second battalions, and the militia prepared to resist invasion, and all those soldiers were in the highest state of discipline; they were men of 25 and 30 and 35, and we drew upon them. There you had a fine race of soldiers, on whom, in case of hard work or sickness, you could rely; a reserve of 130,000 trained soldiers; but when we came to send, in October, November, and December, to pass the winter in the Crimea, our raw recruits, and we had no others, it was impossible to expect that they could stand the inclemency of the climate and the hard work in the trenches in the same manner as a similar number of soldiers would have done in 1808.

20774. Before you sent those recruits had you exhausted all our garrisons abroad, so as to bring into action every disposable seasoned soldier, who might have been replaced by those recruits?—We had not; the Duke of Newcastle, in my opinion, acted very wisely in bringing home nine or ten battalions from the nearest colonies, who were old soldiers; those were some of those that we applied as reserves. I think ten battalions came home, and as fast as they came home I put them into the best order I could, and sent them out instantly to the Crimea. A regiment from the Cape and a battalion of rifles went out a very short time after its return, and a number of regiments that went out were filled with recruits; and it was not to be wondered at, when you consider the materials of which they were composed, namely, raw boys, without any previous practice, or stamina, to undertake the fatigues of war and the climate, so that they were found unequal to it.

20775. Were there not two transports sent out to the Cape to bring back two regiments which failed?—There has been a great deal of misapprehension on the subject. The instructions to the Civil Governor of the Cape, and to the Commander of the Forces there, were that they were not to allow the garrison

garrison at the Cape to go below a number named; and when the order was made by the Duke of Newcastle to send home those regiments, they found that there would be in the Cape a deficiency of upwards of 500 men, and the consequence was that the civil governor, and the military commander, both concurred in saying that they could not send home the troops. We knew that the deficiency would fall within the number laid down by the Duke of Newcastle and the Government, and we did not send any order similar to that of the Duke of Newcastle; but we did not oppose his order, and that was the result; the civil governor and the military governor, concurring in that particular point of their duty, did not obey the Duke of Newcastle's order, in which I believe they were right.

20776. This must have been one of the cases to which the Duke of Newcastle adverted in his evidence, when he stated that there might be some difficulty in the demarcation between the military and civil authorities?—I saw the Lieutenant-governor when he came home; he called upon me, being the son of a military man, and I asked him the question, and he said, "The absence of your order could not have influenced us; we acted upon the principle that at that time the state of the Cape was not such as to enable us to send home the forces; we were limited, and obliged to keep the force there;" and whether any letter had gone from me or not, it would have had not the slightest influence on the result.

20777. The civil and military governors at the Cape did not consider themselves obliged to obey the subsequent order of the Government, because they had an order to maintain a certain garrison?—It was by the same authority.

20778. Did not the subsequent authority supersede the first order?—No; the officer feeling that it was a matter of discretion with him, with regard to the order given previously to prevent any disaster there, thought it likely that there might have been some mistake in the Duke of Newcastle's letter from home. The civil and military authorities were of opinion that it was impossible to maintain order at the Cape, if anything happened; that is, if he weakened himself to that extent.

20779. The fact was, that two transports were sent to bring home those two regiments, with absolute orders from the Government to the authorities there, but those vessels of transport were sent back empty?—Not so; they brought home a considerable number of soldiers that were invalided, I believe; the expense was not so great; but I have always maintained in the House of Lords that no blame whatever attached to the Horse Guards in this transaction, and the civil governor proved that no order from me would have altered his decision.

20780. *Chairman.*] Was not this the state of facts; that the Duke of Newcastle had previously given orders, or the Colonial Governor, that the garrison at the Cape of Good Hope should not be less than 5,000 men?—Yes.

20781. Afterwards, wanting troops in the Crimea, they determined to withdraw a proportion of the troops from the Cape; and in order that that might be done two things were required; first, his order, and then yours?—No, my order is not necessary in any case, but it frequently goes, because there are other minor details connected with it; but his order is supreme, and it supersedes any that I might give, or any deficiency in not giving it.

20782. Are the Committee to understand, that the Duke of Newcastle's order, as Secretary of State, was paramount without the assistance of your order?—Entirely so.

20583. And that anybody who disobeyed it did it upon his own responsibility, and not yours?—Yes.

20784. Therefore the non-sending home of the troops was the fault, if fault there were, of the persons in authority at the Cape, not of the Horse Guards?—Certainly. My letter enters into small details, but the order from the Secretary of State is paramount over me. The civil and military governors agreeing in the necessity of retaining the troops specified, and it being a moment of some anxiety at the Cape, of course they would not send them home.

20785. Sir *J. Pakington.*] As to the inconvenience of which you before spoke, having been obliged to send out young men and boys, would not that difficulty have been obviated, and in some degree prevented, by the earlier embodiment and training of the militia?—No; I should think you might have

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got your volunteers a little earlier. I cannot say that it would have made any material difference.

20786. Supposing, the war being so probable, that the militia had been embodied at an earlier period, in the spring of last year, would there not, in all probability, have been a supply of seasoned and trained soldiers, to a considerable extent ready, when any such supply was required?—The Honourable Member's question assumes that the militia should be trained and made seasoned soldiers. That, I am sorry to say, is not the case. They are thoughtless boys who come in, and not men of 25; they are generally boys from 18 to 20; the numbers at that age are very large in proportion to those who are past 21 and 22.

20787. Are you speaking now of the ages of those who come from the militia?—Yes.

20788. But the ages vary?—Yes, they do; but we do not get from the militia at the present time (they have been embodied only for a short time) that description of soldier to which I alluded, and who had been embodied for seven or eight years previously to the troops going to the Peninsula; he was a very valuable description of man, not only very highly drilled, but of a certain age. Now the men that we get from the militia, and it will be always the case while you defer bringing the militia together, or until a war breaks out, are raw inexperienced boys.

20789. Would there not have been this difference, that you would have had a body of men having had at least a training for several months to which you might have turned, instead of sending out recruits altogether fresh and undisciplined?—We have never sent out troops untrained; they were all well trained; in two months we train a soldier very well; we did so in the Peninsula, and have done so since; in 60 days we can make a very good soldier; give us a good stout man, and let us have him for 60 days to train him, and he will be as good a soldier as you can have.

20790. *Chairman.*] Would you have obtained good stout men before you raised the bounty?—We did do that twice.

20791. But would you have got good stout men until you raised the bounty more?—There is a very great difficulty in that; we find the more you raise the bounty the greater the desertions; they make a trade of it. Since the last bounty has been raised it has very much increased desertion.

20792. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is the average age of those who enter the militia more than the average of those who enlist in the army?—I think they are nearly the same; the thoughtless boy enlists; the grown-up man of 25 will not, or seldom; it is the same in each case; the numbers of recruits, I think, are nearly alike up to the end of the year, between those enlisted from the militia and the general recruiting.

20793. General *Peel.*] Was not it necessary, in order to make up the 25,000 that were sent out in 1854, to make use of every trained soldier that was in the country?—It was; and it has been stated in some of the papers that the 63d regiment, which went to the Crimea 1,000 strong, was composed of very young boys, and that that state of things was caused by a great number of volunteers having been taken from them previously, which made them so much weakened; but upon an examination into the case, it appeared that, out of 1,000 men, in the whole course of last year, only 20 men had volunteered into the line.

20794. Having made use of all those trained soldiers, it was necessary to rely upon the recruits that might be obtained, as reinforcements for the army?—Yes.

20795. Mr. *Ellice.*] You have stated the means which you took to equip and organise this force, had you made proportionate arrangements with the Board of Ordnance and the artillery corps, to send out the proportionate amount of force which was required from them?—Lord Raglan, the Duke of Newcastle, and myself, when they first went out, settled the number of artillery which we thought should go with the infantry, and as the infantry began to be increased by Sir George Cathcart's Division, and other regiments, the proportion of artillery was necessarily increased; that was chiefly done by communication with Sir Hew Ross; he sent out the number required. And I must say that, in the whole course of my experience, I never saw anything more admirably managed than the military part of that arrangement. They arrived in very good order, and they have lived throughout the winter, and the horses have lived

lived in greater numbers than any other portion of the force. I think more care has been bestowed upon the horses by the officers and soldiers; and nothing can exceed the military arrangements of the Ordnance Department.

20796. The whole equipment of the force as it went out, in every other respect, was in your opinion admirably sufficient and efficient?—I consider that we have improved in the last 40 years, and since the late war was over, and our system has been copied by every great military power in Europe; and at this time, I should say, the artillery service of Great Britain is equal, if not superior, to any other.

20797. With respect to accoutrements, military stores, and everything that was necessary, you consider that ample provision was made?—Certainly.

20798. With respect to the medical arrangements of the army, what arrangements were made beyond the military arrangements for general hospitals, in anticipation, for the service of the army?—I, having no power to communicate with our ambassador or consuls, and having nothing to do with the medical department in a time of war, out of Great Britain, that is an arrangement that has always been made in case of war, by the Secretary of State for the War Department, and therefore all those arrangements were made by him; I have no option; I cannot spend a pound, and these would have been made by the Secretary-at-War as well as by the Secretary of State for War.

20799. Then the Committee are to understand you that the duty of providing general hospitals, beyond the arrangements for separate regiments, is a duty which devolves upon the other authorities concerned in the administration of the War Department, and not upon the Commander-in-Chief?—Entirely so.

20800. One of the great complaints which has been made, and from which great misery and suffering have followed, has been the want of sufficient means of transport for the sick and wounded, from the different scenes of action to the places where the hospitals were established; Dr. Andrew Smith has stated that, so early as the 10th of May, he, holding that it was his duty to correspond directly with the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject, wrote a long letter, giving detailed advice as to the necessary preparations for those hospital arrangements, to the Military Secretary, recommending that vessels should be properly prepared for the transport of the sick and wounded; that floating hospitals should be looked forward to as more likely to conduce to the convalescence of the invalids, than hospitals on shore; and he absolves himself from all responsibility as to those preparations, by stating that he made that communication to the Commander-in-Chief?—Probably the paper, in official routine, at the time came to me, but it was transferred to the War Department; I have no authority to correspond with our consuls or ambassadors or admirals; I can merely give instructions as to regimental surgeons; if he wanted to take away or add to them, he would apply to me, but I have nothing to do when a war breaks out as to the arrangements that are made.

20801. Do you remember to which department the Military Secretary sent that letter of Dr. Smith's?—It was so early to consider, in April or May, where the hospitals should be sent to, when the destination of the army was scarcely known; it was sent, I presume, to the War Department, and by them considered in its turn. But Dr. Andrew Smith was told very early, by the Duke of Newcastle, that he was to apply to him on all these matters. Direct communications in May, I think, passed between the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith; they constantly went to Dr. Andrew Smith; they scarcely ever came to me.

20802. Dr. Andrew Smith states that he had no authority whatever to correspond with any other department, except the department of the Commander-in-Chief; that he made his official communications to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commander-in-Chief submitted them to the department which was to carry into execution such measures as the Commander-in-Chief might order?—The order was sent, of course, to the War Department, in the same way that when Dr. Smith wants tonnage for any medicines, he sends his requisition for tonnage through me, to send on to the Admiralty, and then it is answered.

20803. You have no doubt that that communication, which was an official one, made by the chief of the Medical department to the Military Secretary, was transmitted by him to the Secretary for War?—I cannot say how that transaction took place; I know that in the case of Dr. Brett, an Indian officer, he applied to me by requisition, and I said I should forward his requisition to the

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the proper authorities; Dr. Brett went out on our combined recommendation, to make arrangements to carry the wounded in a kind of slung cot. He went out to the Crimea; and the next thing that I heard of it was, that it had failed; the Armenians would not carry them; and Dr. Brett returned home. That was treated exactly in the same manner as the other; it was sent to the War Department, Dr. Andrew Smith knowing that I had no power to employ Dr. Brett, or any other person.

20804. When the Committee examined Dr. Andrew Smith with respect to his responsibilities upon the subject, he absolved himself by saying that he had made this official communication, and his duty ended with that?—I should have thought that the Commander-in-Chief could not decide where hulks or hospitals should be placed; that must be a matter of communication between the Secretary for War and the Admiral upon the station, or the Ambassador.

20805. The Duke of Newcastle has stated that he instructed Mr. Calvert, the consul-general, to look out for the best sites and the best buildings that he could obtain at Gallipoli, and that when Sir George Brown subsequently arrived there he made arrangements with Mr. Calvert for taking the Turkish Hospital; that was done, was it not, under the orders of Lord Raglan, who was then commanding the forces, and did not depend upon any order from the Commander-in-Chief at home?—Certainly not; from the moment they landed at Malta, or left these shores, and Lord Raglan, it was under his complete control, and that of the War Minister of this country; I had no power to interfere; that is part of my instructions. I not only do not communicate with him, but I give no order for the movement of the troops; nor would it be proper that I should.

20806. Dr. Andrew Smith stated that having sent out proper medical officers to the Danube and to the Black Sea to obtain for him all the information that could be obtained with respect to the climate and diseases of the country, and the probable wants of the troops if they were obliged to pass the winter in the East; in consequence of the information received he wrote another letter to the Military Secretary, recommending that warm clothing should be provided immediately for the troops; do you recollect such a letter?—I do.

20807. Do you know what was done with it?—It was answered. That was a case in which I could interfere, because it was fully before me. The suggestion is, that, in his opinion, the mode of dressing the troops for the summer was defective, and that the other mode which he suggested should be adopted. I therefore took the whole case into consideration. But I find that there is a letter of Dr. Smith's, at page 696 of the Appendix, dated the 2d of April 1854, in which he recommends, "That the red coat, more especially the red coat tightly buttoned to the body, should be discontinued during the hot weather of summer. That a loose garment of lighter material, for instance, one somewhat resembling the blouse used in France, or the smock-frock in England, should be substituted for it." Then, "That the head-dress at present worn by both infantry and cavalry soldiers should be laid aside during the hot season." Now, taking those three recommendations, it was impossible, as any military man must know, that you could dispense with the red coat because it was hot; in the summer season the nights are extremely cold, and the troops would perish, if, after great exertions on a hot day, they could not lie down and be warmly clad; where there is a great deal of dew, they ought to have warm clothing to sleep in; and the consequence was, that I had previously decided that the blouse, as he calls it, the common frock, which the soldiers have in going on board ship, called a sea-frock, should be adopted, as it always is on those occasions, a loose frock, with loose arms, made of fine canvas; it is very cool, and if the troops chose to march in it in the day time, they can carry the coat upon their backs. The consequence was, that we had already made this arrangement before Dr. Andrew Smith wrote this letter, and ordered that every man in the expedition should have this frock, and go out in it to Malta, and he had the frock. Then there is another rule of the service, that every man shall have a light serge pair of pantaloons, instead of the linen duck. A light serge pair of blue is very much better adapted for marching in than the lighter linen, which chafes a man; and, therefore, serge has been universally adopted, even in the West Indies, as being better than the white pantaloons. Then he "That the head-dress at present worn by both infantry and cavalry soldiers says, should

should be laid aside during the hot season, and a substitute furnished, not so calculated as black felt, bearskin, and such like materials, to accumulate heat." I took the precaution, from my experience in India, to have every soldier's hat covered with white linen before he went out, both infantry and cavalry. That meets the third objection. The fourth was, "That the leathern stock should be discontinued, so long as the troops are employed in the field." I altered the stock. I concurred with Dr. Andrew Smith, that the stock was bad for the men; and a light stock has been prepared, and a black handkerchief, which the soldier puts round his neck; and when he is in a great perspiration, instead of it falling into his breast, it is absorbed by the handkerchief.

20808. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You stated that you ordered that the head dress of the soldier should have a white cover similar to those used in India?—Yes.

20809. Was that actually done?—Yes, I saw them.

20810. Did they wear them in the East?—Yes. The fifth was, "That each man should be in possession of one or two flannel shirts or waistcoats." (*A stock, handkerchief, and pair of trowsers, were exhibited to the Committee.*)

20811. Have those articles of dress ever been used?—Constantly.

20812. Are the serge trowsers made of the same material as the light blue which the Line wear in England?—The same; that is the light pair; the pepper and salt are a thicker pair for winter. Now, I will read my letter in reply to Dr. Andrew Smith's letter, which does not appear in the Appendix.

20813. Mr. *Ellice.*] To whom was that letter sent?—The reply is to Dr. Andrew Smith, the Director-general, in reply to his letter of the 13th of April. "I have submitted to the General Commanding-in-Chief your letter of the 28th ult., with its enclosure from Dr. Dumbreck, dated from Widdin, in Bulgaria, and his Lordship had previously had under his consideration your letter of the 13th ult., to which you again refer. Viscount Hardinge observes, that in your letter of the 13th ult., although adverting to the extremes both of heat and cold to which it may be expected that the troops will be exposed in Turkey, your suggestions mainly relate to the heat; and with a view to the comfort of the soldier, you recommend that the red coat should be discontinued during the summer, and a loose garment of lighter material substituted for it. Lord Hardinge is fully sensible of the advantage which it would be to the soldier, if he could be provided with clothing adapted to meet both the extremes of heat and cold; but he desires me to observe, that this advantage could only be fully obtained, particularly in a climate where the days are intensely hot and the nights cold, by giving him two dresses, and it would be impossible that he could himself carry this extra weight, with the addition of a blanket or great coat, nor could such an addition be admitted to the wheel carriages or other means of transport accompanying the army, as would be required for the conveyance of this extra clothing for the troops. The great and important desideratum is to lighten the weight which the soldier carries, and to this his Lordship's attention has been for some time directed, and as he hopes, with some effect; but while aware that a lighter garment would conduce to the comfort of a soldier under a burning sun, he must observe, that the troops perform their marches in India wearing their usual uniforms, and the heat there is at least as great as is likely to be experienced in Turkey. Dr. Dumbreck, on the other hand, adverts to the necessity of our troops having better and warmer clothing on entering upon a campaign, and he lays great stress upon the importance of a large supply of bedding. No doubt a full and sufficient supply of every article of this description for the hospitals should be forwarded and made applicable for their use. This his Lordship hopes has already either arrived at or is on its way to Constantinople, but he begs to be informed to what extent bedding has been sent out for general hospitals. It is however impossible to carry with an army engaged in operations in the field, bedding for the soldiers in the ranks." That was a recommendation which went so far as bedding, and it would be quite impossible to carry on the operations of the army if so encumbered; we had barely transport enough for the ammunition. "With reference to the observation in your letter of the 28th ult., as to the necessity of timely measures being resorted to with a view to protect the troops against inclement weather, Lord Hardinge desires me to state, that a supply which he hopes will be found sufficient, of blankets and of field equipments of every kind, has been already forwarded to Turkey; but in determining a question of such importance as

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that of changing the dress of the troops employed in the field in that country, it is essential to proceed only on accurate information after the subject has been well considered on the spot; his Lordship therefore requests that Dr. Dumbreck may be instructed, on his return to Constantinople, to lay before General Lord Raglan the result of his observations, and such practical suggestions as he may desire to offer, with a view to protect, as far as possible, the troops from the effects of the climate. The opinion which Dr. Dumbreck may have been enabled to form will doubtless receive from Lord Raglan every consideration, and aided to, as he will be, by officers who will then have acquired some experience of the country. The General Commanding-in-Chief will then be able to act with confidence on any report which may be made to him by his Lordship in all those matters which require his interference. In others, to which reference is made in your letter, such as wearing the leather stock, Lord Hardinge quite concurs that the leather stock is objectionable, and ought to be changed just in the same manner that white covers, similar to those worn by our soldiers in India, have been adopted; but to make any general changes in the clothing of the army at 3,000 miles distance, at the very moment of entering upon a campaign, is absolutely impracticable. The Commander of the Forces in the country will give such orders as he may deem expedient with respect to any particular points in which he considers a change may be desirable." The question of shirts, cotton drawers, and woollen drawers, has been a mooted question for the last 20 years in the army, particularly amongst the medical officers. I therefore on the 22d of January in the present year wrote thus: "A difference of opinion having existed among medical men as to the beneficial effect to the wearers of a general and constant use of flannel, the General Commanding-in-Chief has desired me to request you to favour him with your opinion as to the expediency of issuing to soldiers flannel in lieu of cotton shirts. This question more especially relates to the troops serving in the Crimea, the climate of which country is very changeable, to the extremes of wet, heat, and cold." Then Dr. Andrew Smith says, on the 23d January: "Every soldier serving in the Crimea should have two cotton shirts, and he should have, in addition to these, two flannel shirts." The Adjutant-general replies to that on the 24th of January. He acknowledges the receipt of Dr. Andrew Smith's letter, and says, "The point is, that whereas soldiers can only carry two shirts; your opinion is required whether, considering the vicissitudes of climate to which the soldier is exposed in every part of the world, those shirts should be of flannel or cotton; both cannot be allowed." He cannot carry them. Dr. Andrew Smith then says, having strongly urged the woollen and cotton in the letter that is in the Appendix, "I have now the honour to submit for the consideration of the General Commanding-in-chief, that if both kinds of the articles in question cannot be allowed to the soldier, cotton shirts are to be preferred to flannel." So that in the recommendation that the Committee have in the Appendix, it is that flannel shirts and flannel drawers are of great importance to the army at that time, April 1854; and there is this difference, that he, now 1855, prefers cotton to flannel. When the question is put, that is the way he decides it. I believe Dr. Andrew Smith to be an excellent medical officer, and most anxious to carry on the service with consideration, and well; but, I think, when he wrote those letters, he had not had an opportunity of considering them fully, not being a military man. If the troops were able to carry four shirts without inconvenience, it would be adopted; the soldier would stagger under all the additional weight that he proposed; he therefore takes with him the canvass frock, which is very light, and when he moves about he throws off his coat. He drills in his blouse, and he marches in his red coat, or puts the lighter one on, and carries the red coat on his knapsack. Those articles, as I have said before, were supplied to the troops before Dr. Andrew Smith's letter was written, and they were actually in the hands of the troops at Malta and Scutari. Further than that, this year the Guards have sent home for the same frock as that which I have shown to the Committee. It has not been necessary to send them generally out to the army, because Lord Panmure has ordered from Vienna about 50,000 suits of light clothing for the summer; and therefore those troops that did not have them sent from England, will receive them at Balaklava.

20814. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Was no supply of woollen stockings and flannel drawers sent to the troops at the commencement of this last winter in compliance

pliance with that recommendation of Dr. Andrew Smith?—They had worsted stockings even in the summer, and before he wrote the letter probably those things were in the hands of the troops every one of them; and the regulation is, that when a man embarks the sea-frock must be a part of his necessaries.

20815. Captain *Gladstone.*] Many of them had not their knapsacks?—Yes, when they moved from this country.

20816. Mr. *Lindsay.*] Was not the issue of the frock a part of the sea equipment of the soldier?—Yes. We had, after repeated experience in going to the West Indies and to India, adopted the same precaution in going to the Crimea. Then we were met by the Director-general, asking us to throw aside the red coat which is worn in the West Indies, and which is warm at night, particularly in the field; it was quite impossible to do that, because we could not carry the weight that he gave the soldiers to carry.

20817. That frock is issued to every soldier who leaves this country, is not it?—Yes.

20818. General *Peel.*] The answer which you read to Dr. Andrew Smith's letter proceeded from your office, because the subject to which his letter referred was in your department?—Yes, it was upon the clothing of the troops, and the regulations now existing; he finds fault with the regulation, and I maintain it.

20819. The other letter of Dr. Smith's, with reference to the situation of the hospitals and transports, was forwarded from your office to the Secretary-at-War?—Yes, quite so. That belonged to the local authorities upon the spot; I had nothing to do with it.

20820. *Chairman.*] Was the letter forwarded from the Military Secretary's Office to the War Office?—I cannot be sure.

20821. It is dated May the 11th, and it suggests how the transport of the sick, and the hospitals, ought to be carried out. The Duke of Newcastle is asked, at Question 14818, "Would the suggestion of Dr. Andrew Smith, if it had been attended to, have precluded the possibility of those evils arising to our soldiers?" and he says, "Yes, I think, to a great extent; but it is right to say, that such suggestions were certainly not made to me by Dr. Andrew Smith at anything like so early a period"?—But the arrangements about the floating hulks or hospitals would be between the navy and Lord Raglan, if it was advisable; the medical officers on the spot would have made them. All this correspondence of mine with Dr. Andrew Smith, every bit of the communication about the hulks, I have no doubt, was sent to Lord Raglan.

20822. I will direct your attention to the letter of the 11th of May, at Question 8271?—A suggestion made on the 11th of May, before the Army was in operation, would not have had very great weight with me as to what was necessary to be done. The destination of the troops was hardly known; but no doubt those letters which we received were communicated to the local authorities; they were either sent to the War Department or to Lord Raglan. There are a great number of this description; on which I state that this letter will be sent to Lord Raglan. Dr. Dumbreck was on his way to Lord Raglan at the time, and his opinions were written on his way from Vienna to Constantinople, therefore this report was made to Dr. Smith, on which Dr. Smith made his suggestions to me; abstracts were sent to me, and sent on to Lord Raglan, as I state here: "The opinions which Dr. Dumbreck may have been enabled to form will doubtless receive from Lord Raglan every consideration, and aided too as it will be by officers who will then have acquired some experience of the country. The General Commanding-in-chief will then be able to act with confidence on any report which may be made to him by his Lordship in all those matters which require his interference. In others, to which reference is made in your letter, such as wearing the leather stock, Lord Hardinge quite concurs that the leather stock is objectionable, and ought to be changed."

20823. *Chairman.*] What became of that letter of the 11th of May: you state that it must have been sent either to Lord Raglan or to the Secretary of State?—Our invariable practice, when we have nothing to say to it, is to send it to those who have.

20824. The Duke of Newcastle said that he did not see it?—That may be so; but I could not have done anything with it.

20825. This is the Duke's answer: he says, "Yes, I think to a great extent; but it is right to say that such suggestions were certainly not made to me by

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Dr. Andrew Smith at anything like so early a period. I do not say they were not made to the Admiralty, or to somebody else, which Dr. Andrew Smith may be confounding; but one that was made at certainly a much earlier period was this, namely, that he considered (it arose, I think, after the complaints at Varna) it was very desirable that the medical department should have some vessels allotted specifically to themselves, for the conveyance of the stores of all kinds from England." That letter of the 11th of May refers to the transport and the hospitals, and that letter is to the Military Secretary?—Yes. It was his duty to send that letter on to the Minister for War, and send it on to Lord Raglan; but I have no doubt that Dr. Andrew Smith, being in constant communication with the Duke of Newcastle after May, when he had been desired to be in constant communication with the Duke of Newcastle on all those matters which did not come within the usual communications made to the Commander-in-Chief, he might have spoken to the Duke, or if he did not he must have had a very short memory. If the matter of the floating hospitals was of so much importance, it was his duty to have said, "I have recommended this matter to be taken up in my letter, and I wish to know whether it has been done;" and if he thought the matter a very important one, he should have repeated it. But he never resorted to me in any way.

20826. Was it Dr. Andrew Smith's duty to write that letter to the Military Secretary upon that subject?—Yes, perhaps it was at the time; in a time of peace it was quite impossible for him to be very precise in his communications between the Horse Guards and the War Department, and until he was told distinctly by the Duke of Newcastle that his communications were to be with him. I frequently met Dr. Andrew Smith after these transactions in communication with the Duke of Newcastle at his house, where we all met together. Dr. Andrew Smith was at an early day in complete communication with the Duke of Newcastle.

20827. Therefore it was not your duty to see that hospital arrangements were provided?—Not in the slightest way. I could not have said where they were to be placed; that should have been arranged between the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan, and the Admiral upon the station.

20828. Mr. *Ellice.*] Although you have stated that your duties with respect to the army ended with its equipment, so far as the particular force placed under the Commander-in-Chief for a distant expedition is concerned, will you be kind enough to state your opinion to the Committee how a military hospital should be organised and conducted?—I have seen a good number of them; the interior arrangements must vary according to the size of the rooms; but there is no doubt, in my opinion, that a military hospital ought to have a military chief at its head, to control the discipline of the establishment, and not the professional mode of doing the business; it is his business to interfere if there are any nuisances; he ought to take care that they are abated; the police is in the hands of the military officer.

20829. It would be the duty of himself, or his staff, to inspect the state of the hospitals, and to have daily reports made of their state, and give such orders to them as he might think necessary for the comfort of the persons in them?—Decidedly.

20830. Do you consider that it was a fit state of things that the military hospitals, for there were several at Scutari, in which there were 5,000 patients, should be left under the command of a major of the army?—I am obliged to admit, that I think the command ought to have been entrusted to a man of higher rank and greater influence; in all probability he was appointed when it was small, and having performed his duty well at that period, he was continued by Lord Raglan.

20831. Probably the exigencies of the service might have prevented Lord Raglan from detaching from his army any efficient officer whose services he required; but if he was not able to appoint a military officer of higher authority than Major Sillery, ought it not to have occurred to the authorities at home to send out a general officer for the command of the hospitals?—It did occur to the authorities at home.

20832. When?—I cannot exactly say, but I fancy it was about the month of November; it did occur to them, and another person was on the point of going out, when it appeared that Lord Raglan had himself sent Lord William Paulet, and I believe and hope that he has given universal satisfaction by the efficiency of his measures.

20833. Do not you think that all interference with the military authority in the management of the hospital would be rather prejudicial than favourable to its good government?—I should say, acting here, that it must be very difficult indeed for the Duke of Newcastle or others to give exact instructions for the management of the hospitals. That would rather belong to the authorities there; in the Crimea.

20834. Are you of opinion that it would have been better to have entrusted the whole superintendence and government of that hospital and the whole duties and responsibilities connected with it to one authority, than to have introduced various authorities in the management of it?—Undoubtedly.

29835. If it had been found necessary, in consequence of the great pressure, and of the emergency of the moment, to empower any persons to provide additional means or to institute any inquiry, it would have been expedient to have executed those measures through the officer in command, and upon his responsibility, than by independent persons?—I certainly think it would have been as effective, and probably more so, had it gone through the officer commanding, that is Lord Raglan. I should say so, because I hold the very high principle, that when an officer is in the field, he should have the full confidence of his Government, and at the same time full powers.

20836. The Duke of Newcastle stated to this Committee that he gave his instructions directly to Lord William Paulet. Do not you think that those instructions would have proceeded better from Lord Raglan; or if he was supposed to be at too great a distance from the immediate locality of the hospitals, from the Commander-in-Chief at home?—I must assume that the Duke of Newcastle acted upon the presumption that by so doing he would save time, and that men's lives could be saved; but I have no doubt a copy of those instructions went to Lord Raglan, that ought to have been done.

20837. The Duke of Newcastle also states that a separate commission was sent out, composed of two medical men and a barrister, to inquire into the state of the hospitals; would not that also have been much better entrusted (if they were to institute any changes in those hospitals) to the military commandant who was responsible for the management of the hospitals?—He not only wanted to improve the state of things, which was known to be bad, but he wished to have from impartial persons the true state of things. If it was merely for the improvement of the hospitals he should have sent to Lord Raglan, but if he wanted an impartial opinion as to what had been the causes of the misfortunes that occurred, I think he was right in sending them from here.

20838. *Chairman.*] Was not the hospital at Scutari a matter entirely under Lord Raglan's command?—It was under Lord Raglan's command, I admit; but at the same the reports made to him did not give such a true account of the extent of the misfortunes as, perhaps, ought to have been given.

20839. That is to say, Lord Raglan received untrue reports?—I did not say that; that may not have been the case. I think that Lord Raglan did not receive at an early period sufficient information of the extent of the distress; he did not know that the case was so bad.

20840. The Committee have been informed that Lord Raglan sent down Dr. Hall to make inquiries into that matter, and that Dr. Hall was to report, and that he did report upon the state of the hospitals at Scutari?—Yes; and what was the effect of that report?

20841. It was to the effect that everything was in capital order?—Then you cannot blame Lord Raglan.

20842. No; but I blame Dr. Hall?—Just so.

20843. Was no inquiry made into the conduct of Dr. Hall for giving that incorrect report?—I am not aware of it.

20844. Whose duty was it to call Dr. Hall to account?—I should say that it was Lord Raglan's, but the Honourable Chairman is asking for opinions upon points upon which I really think it is scarcely fair to express an opinion.

20845. I am asking you for your information as to the mode of proceeding in the army, and upon whom the responsibility would fall, that is the great desire of this Committee?—If Dr. Hall made a report, which was not justified by the state of the hospitals, and that report went to Lord Raglan, the Honourable Chairman is too keen not to know that the blame attaches to the person who made the untrue report.

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20846. Has any inquiry been made into the conduct of Dr. Hall?—I am not aware of it.

20847. Mr. *Ellice.*] Dr. Andrew Smith stated that that report of Dr. Hall was also transmitted to this country?—I did not see it in the transactions as to the hospitals, but I was early absolved from all interference; I gave none, and if I had given any, I should only have done mischief.

20848. I asked you for your opinion as to the responsibility of persons, and the expediency of appointing fit persons to superintend military hospitals?—My opinion is that it ought to be a military man.

20849. *Chairman.*] Mr. Sidney Herbert, when he was examined, stated that he wrote to the persons in command of the hospitals at Scutari, he being the Secretary-at-War, will you give to the Committee your opinion as to the benefit to the public service that arose from such interference on his part, in writing to the commandant of the hospital at Scutari; was not the hospital at Scutari under the immediate command of Lord Raglan?—I think he was quite right; and I think that his motive was excellent. He had interfered in securing Miss Nightingale's services, and those of other ladies, being very anxious to relieve the soldiers from their existing sufferings; I know he would not hesitate for one moment to do what he thought was beneficial.

20850. You think that his mode of interference was beneficial to the public service?—Yes; he was a Cabinet Minister in daily communication with the Duke of Newcastle, and he was attempting to relieve him from a very heavy weight of business. We all went to the Duke of Newcastle, and what he did was, I think, justifiable and useful to the public service. Not only was the motive right, but the effect was good; and I think that those attempts on the part of Mr. Sidney Herbert, to relieve the sufferings in the hospital, were not only praiseworthy, but I think they were useful.

20851. The hospital, you state, was only under Lord Raglan's command?—Yes.

20852. Was not it his duty to see to the state of the hospital?—But an officer in the field, a long distance from the place, in the state in which the lines at Balaklava were, could not be absent from his post for a moment.

20853. But he could have made inquiries in a much shorter time than we could?—Yes; but his suspicions of anything going wrong had been corrected by Dr. Hall's report; one hardly sees why he should have sent another person down.

20854. But the newspapers, and the same means that were open to you for exploring into the mischief, were open to Lord Raglan?—I suspect that we heard earlier from the newspapers than Lord Raglan did; it came here first, and then went back to the camp.

20855. General *Peel.*] Ought the soldier to pay for stoppages when he does not receive food?—That is a military question; it is frequently done without any financial intention; a soldier may be detached, and not receive his ration. If, therefore, there was to be a running account kept, by putting it down, so that he should be released from the stoppage, you would have a very extraordinary state of accounts. When the soldier is not well supplied, the soldier ought not to pay for his ration. If a division, during a week, only receive rations for four days, the men ought to be absolved from it. After the battle of Talavera, I can state a fact, showing the justice of the Duke of Wellington: I was going from Lord Beresford's camp on the frontier with letters for the Duke, and as I passed through our lines, our men were murmuring. I never heard more violent language or more discontent expressed, and even from the mouths of the officers, as to the distresses to which they were all exposed; they had nothing but a few handfuls of wheat for the rations, they were starving, and the discontent was very general. I went to the Duke of Wellington, and having given him the message from Lord Beresford, he observed, "Are the men in a very bad state?" "Yes," I replied, "and the men are very violent and discontented in the camp." He said, "I will put that right in five minutes;" and he sat down and wrote an order to this effect: "Whereas, the troops have not received their rations for the last week, I therefore order that the troops shall receive their full pay and no stoppage when they get into quarters." Upon which there was universal approbation of the justice of the Commander-in-chief, and they looked forward to the happy time they were to spend in quarters. That order is in Colonel Gurwood's despatches.

20856. *Chairman.*] Did the Government consult with you as to the military operations?

operations?—When the Duke of Newcastle wished to speak upon that subject, I went to him. I had the most free communication with him, and I think that our communications were satisfactory on both sides.

20857. Did you draw up any general report of your opinions as to the Crimean expedition?—No; I should be sorry to have done so. Lord Raglan's position is a very difficult one, not being his own master as to his operations, but acting with an ally, he is obliged to take their opinion as well as act his own. I know that the administration here were in rapid communication with the Council of War at Paris, it would have been perfectly useless in me to have given my own impressions, having free access to the Duke of Newcastle.

20858. Were the despatches of the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan shown to you?—Yes.

20859. Did you make suggestions and remarks upon them?—Yes, whenever I thought they were required.

20860. When the army was at Varna, and about to proceed to the Crimea, you, knowing the situation of the army, did you consider it in a condition to go to the Crimea?—I think they were right in going there, because any change is useful. When the minds of the soldiers have been at all depressed by disease, and by remaining long without exercise, on one spot, nothing is more calculated to put them into good order than the step that was taken.

20861. Do you think that, materially, they were in a condition to go?—Yes, I think so, they had lost a considerable number of men at Varna, and that stopped immediately they were in movement.

20862. Were you, by the Government, made acquainted with the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and the great neglect of the sick and wounded in the East?—I heard of it.

20863. Did you ever address Lord Raglan on the subject?—I had no direct communication with him upon any matter but those relating to any improprieties in the army discipline, and courts martial appointments or promotions. I never corresponded with any general officer in the Crimea, for the reasons stated in the letter of service; neither with Sir De Lacy Evans, nor any one. I thought it would be inconvenient to Lord Raglan and myself.

20864. General *Peel.*] Although your Lordship differed in opinion from Dr. Andrew Smith, as to the question of clothing, do not you consider that he was most actively employed, and most anxious to perform his duties?—I have a very high opinion of him. I think him a very honourable and conscientious man, and he performed his duties, so far as I have been able to form an opinion, with very great precision, and a great desire to do what was right, and he is a very faithful and good public servant.

20865. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Were you consulted about the huts sent out for the troops in the winter?—Yes.

20866. Did you approve of the course that was taken with regard to the huts?—Certainly.

20867. Had you any hope, from the time at which they were sent out, that they would be erected so as to afford shelter in the winter?—The period was late for sending them out; but I think, even if they could have got them up with ease at the time when they arrived, they would have been very valuable; and they have been very valuable as it is.

20868. Was a suggestion made to you that the same purpose might have been answered more expeditiously and cheaply by sending out double covering for the tents, and planking for the floors?—It was not my particular duty; but I spoke to Major-general Sir Frederick Smith on that subject, who was employed by me to go to Beverloo and see the camp there, and with a view to Aldershott, where we were about to erect huts for the militia; and he came back, and upon talking to me upon the subject, I said that I thought, considering that our tents had been blown down by the storm of the 14th of November, something more substantial would be required, and certainly something heavier; for unless a tent is very carefully pegged down, it is very difficult in a hurricane to keep it on its legs. He proposed huts, and I concurred in the propriety of their being sent out.

20869. Lord *Seymour.*] Were huts suggested to you in the first instance?—Yes.

20870. And the propriety of sending them out?—I rather think that on hearing of the effects of the storm I wrote to him, and desired him to call

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upon me. When he came, I said it appeared advisable that something that would resist those storms should be put up, and as he had seen those huts at Beverloo, I begged to have his opinion upon the matter. He gave me a favourable opinion upon them, and I mentioned it to Mr. Sidney Herbert and the Duke of Newcastle, but I believe he had previously considered the question of the huts.

20871. Were you aware, at the time that you considered the expediency of sending out huts, of the state of the road between Balaklava and the camp?—I cannot say that I was at that time, but I subsequently knew what had been done to assist in the making of that road. My son came home, on sick leave; he had been employed at that time in looking at the road at Balaklava; and he said that, on his report to General Airey and Lord Raglan, 500 Turks were put upon it by Lord Raglan, and three engineer officers, and that they worked for some days, trying to make an improvement in the road; but the difficulty was so great, and those Turks were so unaccustomed to the work, that they made very little progress, and at the end of that period, upon the advice of the engineer officers, and the little progress made, the plan was given up as hopeless. I must say, at the same time, that I believe, about that time, General Airey could not attend to it himself. It is not very well known, but I know it, that he was from about the 16th of November till the 18th or 20th of December, a cripple, in bed; he had not been able to move out, from an attack of very severe rheumatism; he was blind, and could not read; he was obliged to have everything read to him and written for him, and he was suffering from dysentery. Most people in his state would have come to England, but being a man of very considerable spirit and nerve, he determined to remain with Lord Raglan; and about the 18th or 20th of December, he got up, and was able to crawl about on crutches.

20872. Being in that condition, was it not right that another person should be appointed to perform his duty?—There was an officer next to him who did as much of his out-door business as he could.

20873. Some one else was appointed to perform the duties?—No; the next in succession, Colonel Gordon, transacted the orders of his chief. He was sufficiently able to express what his wishes were, and Colonel Gordon remained at head-quarters, living with Lord Raglan, and transacted the business for him.

20874. When Commissary-general Filder reported to the Quartermaster-general that the road was becoming impracticable for wheeled carriages, and very difficult of passage even for animals with packages on them, for bât animals, whose duty was it to see to that?—Certainly that of the Quartermaster-general's department. At what period was Commissary-general Filder's communication made?

20875. On the 13th of November Commissary-general Filder reported to the Commissary-general his alarm as to the state of the road?—Taking my dates, Colonel Airey being very ill, and confined to his bed, from the 16th of November till the 18th of December, it shows that his incapacity had a great deal to say to the state of things, that it might have been remedied earlier.

20876. When the Quartermaster-general was unable to attend to his duties, was not it the duty of some one else to attend to this matter, namely, the state of this road?—It was the duty of some one else; and it was undertaken by some one else; by the three engineer officers, and 500 Turks; but they could not succeed.

20877. It appears by a statement which we have here, at Question 13933, that Lord Raglan called upon Commissary-general Filder to supply means of transport, not only for the supply of the army for huts and timber, but for buffalo robes, besides the ammunition, fascines, gabions, camp equipage, and all the Quartermaster-general's stores; was that a supply of transport that was naturally required from the Commissariat Department?—All transport arrangements that is not for Artillery horses are required from the Commissary-general.

20878. If a sudden pressure arises, and whereas the Commissariat has only before been supplying food for the army, and they are suddenly called upon to supply huts for all the army, and timber, buffalo robes, and other articles, how do you suppose that such a pressing necessity is to be met?—That is one misfortune of having a large army depending upon sea communication; it was also

also the misfortune of the army that the roads were in such a bad state, and the climate and soil so peculiar.

20879. Have you considered whether, under such circumstances, with this great pressure upon it, the Commissariat was to blame in that respect?—I can hardly think they were, because it seems to have been almost beyond human efforts to have got things right; certainly the Commissariat animals had at that time of the campaign, by death and losses, been reduced very low; and I can only say, giving one example from India, when we crossed the Sutlej to Lahore, that we had for 20,000 British and Sepoy troops 120,000 camp followers, and, including cavalry and artillery, about 50,000 animals.

20880. The proportion of animals to men, in India, is much larger than in Europe, is it not?—Yes; much larger, and the country is an open country.

20881. I understood from your former answer to a question that was put to you, that as the Commander-in-chief, you were responsible for the outfit of the army, with respect to the Quartermaster-general's stores, before the army started from this country?—Certainly.

20882. Did you then go over with the Quartermaster-general, and consider with him the amount of stores that would be necessary for the supply of the army?—We have a regulation of the service as to how many are required, according to the number sent out; we sent a large number on board the vessel with each detachment of soldiers; for 500 or 1,000 men, the proportion of camp equipage, and everything that they required, everything they want when they encamp, is sent with them. That is what I have constantly insisted upon; it used not to be so; it was sent out *en gros*; here it is sent out for each detachment, and if they landed on an island they would have wherewithal to be covered. That has been carried through in every instance, except in some cases after the troops were embarked, and the tonnage for the tents for the number of men would have occupied so much space in the vessel that they could not without inconvenience be put on board; those are accidents, but the rule is such as I have stated. Besides that, there was for the army at large a store of Quartermaster-general's articles sent to form a depôt in the Crimea, so that nothing should be wanted during the campaign.

20883. Are the Committee to understand, as regards the setting out of this army, that it set out under greater advantages than armies that had formerly left these shores?—Yes; I recollect that when we landed, previously to the battle of Vimeira, we had not a tent, nor had we one till 1813, four years after the Duke of Wellington took the command.

20884. Not only did you send the requisite quantity, but you also established a depôt?—Yes, to meet all casualties.

20885. It has been stated to this Committee that no separate storekeeper was appointed, who was to have the charge of those Quartermaster-general's stores?—None was appointed, and I think that was a great difficulty.

20886. Was that question considered before the Army started?—It was considered, I believe, but I must say upon that subject we had a difference of opinion. It had been the rule in the Peninsular war to have the stores handed over to the Commissariat, and under those circumstances that rule was pursued. My own opinion would have been to have had a storekeeper for each different department, one for medicine, and so on.

20887. Do you remember when the system was altered of placing all the stores under the Commissariat, instead of having a separate storekeeper?—I do not know when it was altered; it was always under the Commissariat.

20888. Was it so in the Peninsula and in Belgium?—Yes; I believe at one time at Lisbon we had a storekeeper's department, and that storekeeper's department was a separate department even in England, in Tooley-street; Mr. Stace was one of the principal persons, but afterwards it was given up, at the latter end of the Peninsular war, and the Commissary-general having to keep up a communication with the Army, from Lisbon to the frontier, he was the sole storekeeper, as well as Commissary. I think it a bad arrangement. I think it is laying too much upon one department.

20889. It has been stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan, that under this arrangement, though the Commissary-general might convey the stores in his department, yet, that as those stores were issued the Quartermaster-general would not be kept aware of the state in which his stores were?—No issue can be

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be made to the troops of Quartermaster-general's stores but by an order from the Quartermaster-general, and he knowing originally what was in the Commissary's hands could immediately get an account without any difficulty, I should think.

20890. Who kept an account of these stores?—Both ought to have done so.

20891. If, for instance, we have been told that a great proportion of cavalry horses died from the want of such things as nose-bags, so that the corn was thrown on the ground, with whom would the fault of such a want as that lie?—I should blame the cavalry officers themselves who did not in time provide for it; generally speaking, when a cavalry force goes out two nose-bags are provided to each horse, but there were a great many things occurred from losses; when that part of the year had come on, and the cavalry could not be fed without difficulty, I think it was a great misfortune that they did not bring the cavalry force close to the ships, from whence forage could be obtained, and feed them as close as possible to the place where the ship was containing the forage; but instead of that a great many were kept at a distance; that was owing to the enemy being in the neighbourhood.

20892. It was desirable, if possible, that the cavalry should have been kept at Balaklava, instead of at a distance on the heights?—Yes, if military reasons would have admitted of it, which, I believe, they did not.

20893. It has been stated that those combined causes, and the difficulties existing between the Commissary and the Quartermaster-general, gave rise to numerous complaints respecting the issue of stores, although the fault in most cases, particularly as regards the Quartermaster-general's stores, lay with the parties making them, owing to their not having been furnished with orders, signed according to the forms prescribed, not by the Commissariat, but by the military authorities, for the protection of the army. It appears from that, that there were certain forms required for the issue of those Quartermaster-general's stores, upon the receipt of which the Commissariat issued them?—Yes, I believe so.

20894. Do you believe that those forms are badly arranged, and that they might have been so shaped as to prevent the difficulties that arose?—In case any inconvenience was felt, it was competent to the Quartermaster-general to simplify them.

20895. He had full power to alter the forms?—Yes.

20896. No blame, then, is to be attached to the forms used in this country?—Certainly not; it is competent to the Commander-in-chief to do away with the forms if he likes, but he cannot protect the public interest.

20897. The Committee have heard of the forms inconveniencing the army; have you heard, as regards the issue of provision, that the forms were so drawn up by the Commissariat, as to be inconvenient with regard to feeding the troops?—They ought not to have been so.

20898. Have you any reason to believe that they were so?—I should say not.

20899. It has been stated to the Committee, with regard to drawing the rations, that it would much simplify the mode, if instead of the stoppage for the ration, a smaller amount of pay was given to the soldier, and if his ration was given him while he was in the field, instead of making the stoppage?—I think it comes to the same thing. He would not be entitled to the fund that General Peel pointed out. In case he did not receive his ration, he should be paid for it; that ought to be the natural consequence, refund of pay.

20900. The Committee have been told that there are necessarily two accounts, one for the issue of the rations, and the other to check the stoppage; if the thing had been simplified we should have done away with one of those forms?—I should say that the best way would be to simplify the form.

20901. You believe that it requires simplification?—No; it is stated that the form is an impediment.

20902. There are two forms, one of which has to be signed by the paymaster as to the stoppage, and another to be signed for the receipt of the ration?—I should have called together Commissary-general Filder, the Quartermaster-general, and the Paymaster of one or two of the regiments, and have discussed the matter with them, and have decided how the form should be drawn

drawn up, and at once, by a general order, altered it. If it was a real impediment; it could have been remedied by the power of the Commander-in-Chief.

20903. Upon the arrival of troops invalided at home, it has been stated that considerable inconvenience has arisen from the depôt being at Chatham, the troops arriving at Portsmouth having to be conveyed to Chatham; that many of the large steamers cannot convey them up to Chatham, and they have either to be sent by railway, or to be re-shipped in a small vessel, and to be sent round?—That is the case. And that only shows the poverty-stricken way in which our public departments have proceeded from time immemorial. There has been but one or two general hospitals for the army for the last hundred years; the one at Chatham is the only one that I know of, except a small one at Dublin. There is no general hospital either at Portsmouth or Plymouth; there will be one, I hope, shortly at Portsmouth; but all those places where ships can come in ought to be provided with places for invalids. Chatham is the only place, and formerly it was not inconvenient, because the ships were not of the immense burden that they now are; it was not inconvenient then to go to Chatham, now it is; and the sooner the Government establish an hospital at Portsmouth the better. Dr. Hall, finding there was such a large number, immediately took the resolution, and I think it was very wise, to send the invalids home, as affording the best chance of their recovery; and that only points out more strongly the necessity for hospitals.

20904. You think it is desirable to establish good military general hospitals at the outports?—Yes.

20905. Mr. *Ellice.*] The chief deficiencies in the hospital arrangements have been principally owing to our whole organisation having been that of regimental hospitals, arising from the division of our forces?—Yes; the whole system of the British army has been on the regimental system; we have never been allowed to go beyond that.

20906. The hospital at Chatham was a very small establishment, was it not?—Very.

20907. Lord *Seymour.*] Sir John Burgoyne gave it as his opinion that it would be most desirable that there should be an additional body of very light cavalry formed for service in the field?—It is very easy for States that have large armies to have various descriptions of troops of the same class, such as cavalry. Those we cannot afford to have here, as we have the advantage of having the finest race of horses, which can carry the heaviest weights, and probably the largest men, and it is important to use those advantages. We have powerful men and large horses; and if you are to have a small body of cavalry, it is better to have that which can probably beat any other cavalry in the field than to have a few Cossacks. You may rely upon it that the weight of a man and horse will always tell in a charge. At the same time, there are objections that the men are too heavy, though a good deal of that—perhaps some portion—may be attributable to carrying things that they ought not to carry; but, on the whole, I think that the British cavalry is as fine as any in the world. Lord Anglesey and Lord Londonderry were very fond of being Hussars; but the Hussars abroad have not the means of getting powerful horses, and they get upon those small horses. They do very well for outposts, but they never charge in line; they always charge in detached small bodies; and I think it would be a great mistake, for the sake of having troops at outposts, to be changing that which we know to be very valuable. Our heavy dragoons in the Peninsular war bore down every one of the opposing troops; the light cavalry did not do that at Waterloo; they did not oppose their opponents with so much vigour as if they had been mounted on stronger horses; they were over-weighted; they had small blood horses; but the heavy cavalry and the Life Guards were more serviceable than the light cavalry, as always will be the case. I may say with regard to the light cavalry, that we have reduced the men; the heavy cavalry were formerly 5 feet 10 inches, and 5 feet 7 inches was the lowest. Since October 1854, I took upon myself to recommend to Her Majesty that the heavy cavalry should be, at the lowest, 5 feet 5 ½ inches; whereas before it was 5 feet 7 inches, and the highest to be 5 feet 9 inches; so that we take one inch off the tallest man, and go down lower by one inch and a half. I should be sorry to see the heavy cavalry men of smaller stature; I think it would be very prejudicial to the service.

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20908. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Have you altered the light cavalry?—Yes; I have reduced them from five feet nine and a half to five feet eight; and in India I reduced the Horse Artillery, so that no man should be above five feet eight; the horse artillery being light, it was not necessary to have larger men riding upon the horses and distressing them; there, there is no personal conflict; the horses have not to charge; therefore it is very unnecessary to have a heavy soldier riding upon a horse; the tallest in the heavy line cavalry is five feet nine, and the shortest man five feet five and a half. In the light cavalry the tallest man is five feet eight, and the shortest five feet five and a half; consequently, every man in a light regiment is within two and a half inches of the same height; this restriction greatly augments the difficulty of enlisting him. Arrangements are now being made as to the clothing; under the quadrennial system of clothing, in the course of a year's field service the Hussar's clothing was all to pieces, and if the public had not given him gratuitously another dress, he would have been in rags; now we have the dress for one year, the same as the infantry; every cavalry soldier will have his new dress, which is not so costly and much looser than he had before; and that is to be annually given to him for the future.

20909. Some statements have been made with regard to the valise which is carried by the cavalry soldier, that it was too large and heavy?—I believe that to be the case; then he has a cloak which looks very well, but when at the outposts the first thing he does is to throw off his cloak, when he sees a Cossack, in order to be ready for an encounter. That is very inconvenient, and we therefore decided to have a great coat rather longer than that of the infantry, over which the accoutrements of the cavalry soldier will be placed; he will be kept warm, and able to defend himself, which he cannot do in a cloak.

20910. You think that not only may the man be reduced in size with advantage, but the weight that he carries on the horse may also be reduced?—I think so; those are questions which we are entering into with great accuracy.

20911. Colonel *Lindsay.*] You stated, did you not, that it is your opinion that the military stores should be separated from the Commissariat?—Yes; by a storekeeper.

20912. Was it not the case that in the campaign of 1815, and subsequently in France, there was a Storekeeper-general to the army?—There was a partial arrangement made, but when Paris was occupied, those things were not much thought of. The truth is, that our army is equal to anything that any army in Europe can perform; our regimental system is most perfect; but we do want those arrangements which the armies of other powers have. A great portion of the French improvements have been introduced since the occupation of Algeria, and it is the constancy of the war that has led to them. We are in fact the police at home, abroad, and especially in the manufacturing districts.

20913. You do not remember what effect the fact of there being a Storekeeper-general in the army had upon the general arrangements?—I do not.

20914. Mr. *Ellice.*] With regard to the comparative merits of the huts and double tents, would not the planking of a double tent give you an additional means of securing that tent against a storm?—If you had sent out flooring of plank with it, it might have answered.

Henry Mapleton, Esq., M. D., called in; and Examined.

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20915. Mr. *Layard.*] I BELIEVE you accompanied the expedition to the East, in the capacity of Lord Raglan's private physician?—As staff surgeon.

20916. Did you leave England with his Lordship?—Not with his Lordship, but with some of his personal staff.

20917. Where did you join Lord Raglan?—At Scutari.

20918. You were at Scutari during the time the English troops were there?—Yes.

20919. Had you then any opportunity of seeing the hospital at Scutari?—Soon after I got there I saw the hospital.

20920. When did you see the hospital?—Some time early in May.

20921. At that time what was the condition of that hospital?—That hospital was partly in occupation by the Turks, and it was being got ready for the reception

reception of the English; that was the hospital at Scutari, the general hospital afterwards.

20922. Up to what time did you remain at Constantinople?—Somewhere about the 20th of June I left for Varna.

20923. In what condition was the hospital up to the 20th of May; had it been prepared for the British sick and wounded?—It was in the course of preparation; there was some Turkish bedding in it, but no English, to the best of my belief.

20924. Were there any English patients in the hospital then?—Yes.

20925. In what condition were they?—I should say they were comfortable; being a small number, there was sufficient for their wants.

20926. I believe you returned before the expedition went to the Crimea?—At the time the expedition went to the Crimea I was on board ship, and I came down to the Scutari barrack.

20927. In what condition did you find the hospital then?—I was too ill to go to see the hospital then; I was put into a barrack-room, where I was confined to my bed.

20928. Did you not visit the hospital then?—No, I did not.

20929. At the time you visited the hospital, in the month of May, was tht hospital at that time in a fit condition to receive the sick and wounded?—No as regards the privies and drains, certainly not.

20930. In what state did you find the privies?—In a very bad state.

20931. At that time they were in a very bad state?—Yes.

20932. Have you seen the evidence given before this Committee, with regard to the privies?—Yes.

20933. Were they in anything like the state described when you saw the hospital?—Some of the barrack privies were much in the state, at that time, as described by Mr. Stafford, I think.

20934. Was the hospital at the same time used as a place for putting provisions in?—Not the hospital, but underneath the barracks, that is to say, under the lower floor of the barracks, was the Commissariat store, and in that Commissariat store these privies came down through, or rather through the walls, and the soil had escaped into the store in one place.

20935. Were there provisions in the store then?—Yes.

20936. Did you ever make any representation upon that state of things to anybody?—Yes; I brought the principal medical officer of the army to see himself the state of those drains.

20937. Who was that?—Dr. Burrell.

20938. Was anything done, upon this representation, to put that state of things in order?—He represented it to the engineer, and to other authorities; but having shown him the nuisance, I left it with him, to do what he judged proper.

20939. Was there then any military commandant at Scutari?—I believe not at that time.

20940. Who had the actual charge of this hospital?—It was not an hospital; it was a barrack; in these barracks were certain regiments; there was no particular commandant in these barracks then; each regiment was under its own commanding officer, I believe.

20941. Were those barracks afterwards turned into an hospital?—Yes.

20942. Was anything done to remedy the state of things you have described?—I do not think radically then.

20943. It appears that the privies remained in this state till they were remedied subsequently?—I do not believe that they are remedied now radically, from what I have heard, as it would have been unsafe to do so whilst occupied by troops.

20944. Who was then in the chief command of the troops?—Lord Raglan.

20945. Who had the charge of the Commissariat stores?—I do not recollect the Commissariat officer's name.

20946. From Constantinople you went to Varna?—Yes.

20947. When at Varna had you an opportunity of seeing the state of the army?—I saw detachments; at times I went amongst the men.

20948. At that time what was the condition of the troops?—I consider that the troops at that time were sickly, and they were "using up," if I may so express it.

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20949. With regard to their food, how was that?—Bad, in my opinion.

20950. Was the bread bad?—Very bad, I consider it.

20951. Did you make any representations upon the subject?—I did.

20952. To whom?—To Lord Raglan, and he instantly (and he has often done so, without my representation) sent for me to make inquiries, and he even tasted the bread, and he desired me to use all the means I could to give him the best intelligence on the subject, so that he might alter it.

20953. In what way was the bread bad?—It was more or less sour always; it was badly baked, and it was not pure wheat.

20954. Was the bread so sour and bad as to be likely to cause bowel complaints?—Most decidedly.

20955. Would you attribute in any degree the cholera which broke out, or the aggravation of the disease, to the bread?—I cannot attribute the cholera to the use of the bread, but the use of bad bread will predispose a person to bowel complaints, and that will, where cholera is going on, in some cases fall into cholera.

20956. Did you represent the state of the bread to Commissary-general Filder?—I made a representation to Lord Raglan, and he sent for Commissary-general Filder, and in his presence Lord Raglan tasted the ration bread; Mr. Commissary-general Filder differed as to its quality. On this subject there was a great difference of opinion even amongst the officers of the army. I found that many of them liked the bread, and even medical officers did not consider it unfit. But any bread that is sour, more or less, will conduce to bowel complaints, and therefore is bad as food.

20957. Notwithstanding those representations, did Commissary-general Filder continue to supply that bread?—I believe he spoke to the contractor on the subject. But I may say that by the contract system which is carried out, you cannot insure a good supply of bread in Turkey; it is morally impossible. There is only one way by which you can get good bread, and that is by sending out the flour and bakers from this country.

20958. Did you see the French bread?—Yes; it was much better, but still it was sour.

20959. How was that bread obtained?—By the French bakers; they ground their own flour.

20960. They did not do it by contract?—No.

20961. Had we the means of baking bread?—We had no means at that time; we could not have done it; it would have been necessary to have had ovens, bakers, and yeast.

20962. With regard to the meat, was that good?—The meat was not good; it is difficult to get good meat in Turkey. The contract is for beef or mutton. The contractors give the troops goats instead of sheep often, and which is very difficult for the Commissariat to prevent. I may mention, that the animals are killed and handed over to the divisions after they are killed; that is to say, they are skinned, and when once served out it is difficult to detect whether it is goat or sheep.

20963. With regard to the clothing of the troops, did it appear at that time that their clothing was not well adapted to the climate?—I think it was. I do not think that in a climate of that sort they should have tight clothing, but such as they ordinarily wear in England. I heard what Lord Hardinge said, and I perfectly agree with him, with the exception of the stock; I think the soldiers cannot have a better neck dress than the stock, if not too stiff, too tight, or too high. I have served in the hottest climates, and I never saw any ill effects from it.

20964. With regard to the stock generally worn by the troops, does that correspond with the description of stock you would give?—Just so, with this exception, that it requires not to be too tight or too high; you can hang a man with a silk hankerchief as well as choke him with a stock.

20965. Is the present stock too high or too tight?—No; but that depends upon what care is taken to fit the men; a careless officer will give a man too tight a stock, but if he is a good officer the men will not have cause to complain.

20966. Why do you consider the stock the best thing for the neck?—It is cool, does not absorb the perspiration, and if a man in a hot climate were to have a neckcloth on by day, and at night nothing, he would get swelled glands probably.

20967. With

20967. With regard to the site chosen for the encampment of the troops, did you ever make any representation as to its unhealthiness?—That was the province of the principal medical officer.

20968. Was anything done on that subject?—I do not know.

20969. Do you consider that the place where the troops were encamped was a healthy one?—I did not visit the camp at Devna.

20970. At that time was any provision made for moving the sick and wounded in hospital ships?—Not that I am aware of.

20971. Did you ever make any representation upon that subject?—I did make a representation upon that subject.

20972. To what effect?—It was to the effect, that the sick should be brought to England; that no hospital should be established at Smyrna, or neighbouring place; as my opinion was, that men prostrated with disease or wounds would die there, and that the best chance to save them would be to bring them home for cure.

20973. Do you mean to say that you recommended a regular line of ships to be moving backwards and forwards with the sick and wounded?—I recommended that every man likely to be ill long should be brought direct to England, and on no account be left in the East.

20974. Have you had much practice in moving sick and wounded?—A good deal.

20975. Have you been lately employed by the Government here in fitting up hospital ships?—Yes.

20976. Was that suggestion of yours carried out to any extent?—I think not sufficiently.

20977. Do you think if it had been, that there would have been a considerable saving of life?—I am sure of it.

20978. What was the nature of your suggestion?—I was obliged to leave Turkey; I got a sort of paralysis, and when my head allowed me, on coming to England, I found that representations on certain subjects from the East were not exactly what I thought they should be myself; that was a matter of opinion. I then wrote a confidential communication to the Deputy Secretary-at-War, to be laid before the Minister for War, embodying my opinions in as strong language to him as the subject required.

20979. At what time was that?—It was at the beginning of February.

20980. Sir *J. Pakington.*] On what subject?—On hospital ships, and various subjects connected with the health and other things of that army. I may observe, that I ought to have done this through the head of my department; it was out of place my having sent a direct communication to the Government.

20981. Mr. *Layard.*] And you made no earlier representation than this?—None earlier.

20982. Not as to the hospital ships?—No.

20983. At that time it was almost too late to make representations, was it not?—I do not think it is too late now; I think and believe that every sick man should be brought fromTurkey.

20984. Upon what do you found that opinion?—I found that opinion upon this: I have served in hot climates; I was obliged to return from Turkey. An officer who falls very sick is obliged to return to England, therefore, I conceive, that the men should be allowed to do the same.

20985. You are not in favour of the establishment of an hospital at Smyrna, or elsewhere?—Most decidedly not.

20986. Do you think the climate unfavourable?—I consider the climate objectionable on these grounds; the heat is very great, and I conceive that no man who has had a serious illness, or is worn down by wounds, will recover in so enervating a climate as those places are for certain months in the year.

20987. Is Smyrna a healthy place?—No, on account of the heat.

20988. Do you know the hospital there?—Yes.

20989. Is that in a healthy place?—I do not think it is, also on account of heat.

20990. In what state were the tents when the troops were at Varna?—They were very bad; that is to say, the tent itself was a bad description of tent; I do not know that the tent itself was bad, as to quality, but the description of tent was bad.

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20991. In what respect?—The tent is a mere sheet of canvas; I conceive that they should have been all double roofed; and that no man, in a hot climate, can live in a tent of that sort long.

20992. You think, both for heat and rain, that a double-roofed tent is advantageous?—It is actually necessary.

20993. Did you ever make any representation upon that subject?—Yes.

20994. When?—With the other representations.

20995. Have you got any copy of those suggestions of yours?—It was a confidential communication to the Government; I have no objection, as far as I am concerned, to its being produced.

20996. You have had some experience of tent life?—Yes.

20997. And that experience has been in hot climates?—Yes.

20998. Then you have had rain to deal with?—Yes, I have had rain, wind, heat, in the hottest station in the world, which is Upper Scinde, where I was with Sir Charles Napier.

20999. Had you then double-roofed tents?—Yes.

21000. Was that description of tent a sufficient protection for you?—Even that was not sufficient; but for those tents the men would have died; any man who lived in a single tent would have died, in my opinion.

21001. You think some such tent as was used in Upper Scinde would have been much more beneficial to the army than those they had with them?—Yes, I do.

21002. Have any such tents been ordered or sent out?—I do not know.

21003. With regard to the drills of the army, do you think that they were proper?—Lord Raglan put a stop to the system of long drills which was creeping in; he instantly put a stop to them.

21004. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When was that?—At the commencement, at Scutari.

21005. Mr. *Layard.*] Were his Lordship's orders carried out?—I believe at times they were not; that is to say, certain officers, who had never served in those climates, did not believe in the necessity for such stringent orders, and they were apt to use their own discretion as to the time of day, when the sun was hot or when it was not.

21006. Do you think that mode of treating the soldiers was the cause of a good deal of ill-health in the army?—I should not like to say it was the cause, because it was stopped; bad tents, the great heats, and the sour bread tended to produce disease, or, rather, to predispose to disease, and the "using up" I described.

21007. Then you do not think that the army altogether was in a satisfactory state at the time you left it?—I do not.

21008. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What was the state of the health of the army at the time when you were with it in Bulgaria?—So far as the per-centage goes, I do not know that there was a great amount of sickness; but you would meet a tall stout fellow who had been very strong two months before, and if you asked him why he looked so thin, he could not tell. Was he ill? No, he was not; he was weak, though he was not in the hospital.

21009. Do you mean to convey the impression, that there was a considerable portion of the army in a weak debilitated state, though not actually on the sick list?—Yes.

21010. In point of health, do you think that the army was then in such a condition that it would have been able, if necessary, to advance towards the Danube?—I do not think so; that is to say, there would have been greater sickness.

21011. Do you think that the army was in such a condition that it was able with efficiency to undertake any active operations?—If the Honourable Member means operations by land, I can hardly answer that question; my experience went to seeing detachments of guards; I mean different guards attached to head quarters, and to meeting a number of soldiers in the streets, and to now and then riding amongst the regiments.

21012. You had no official military position in the army?—None whatever, excepting staff surgeon at head quarters.

21013. Were there at that time a considerable number of men actually away

or sick in the hospital?—I do not know that there was a very great per-centage, even at that time.

21014. Where were the hospitals at that time; were they regimental hospitals?—Yes, and a general hospital at Varna.

21015. Was it your opinion that those hospitals were well regulated, and such as they ought to have been?—I had little experience of those hospitals; I went merely once or twice to them.

21016. *Chairman.*] Did you make any representations to the commanding officer upon the subject of the long drills?—I did; not to Lord Raglan himself.

21017. Did you make any representations to any other officer?—I made representations to the Adjutant-general of the army on the subject; I mentioned the subject to him.

21018. Sir *J. Pakington.*] In your position, it could only have been a private conversation?—It would amount to little more than that.

21019. Lord *Seymour.*] What was your exact position?—Merely a staff surgeon attached to Lord Raglan's head-quarters.

21020. As a staff surgeon, it became your duty to point out to general officers——?—Not to general officers; it rested with the principal medical officer of the army; but in daily intercourse, I took it upon myself to give my opinion, when his Lordship consulted me, which his constant anxiety for the health of the men induced him to do on a great many subjects.

21021. You say you spoke to the Adjutant-general about the effect of a long drill?—Just so.

21022. How was your suggestion received?—With every possible kindness, and an order was issued on the subject.

21023. General *Peel.*] You stated that the bread was bad that was served out to the troops; what is the course pursued when bread is bad that has been delivered by contract?—The practice is this: there is a contract system in the army; and in England, if the bread is bad, a Board of officers condemn it, and the colonel of a regiment sends into the town and buys the best he can get at the expense of the contractor. In Turkey a batch of bread comes up a distance of perhaps 20 or 30 miles from the bakehouse, and it is bad; the soldiers hardly ever complain, but the officers will see it, and say it is bad. But if you do not take it, you cannot send into a town and buy good: therefore you are obliged to take the bad, or have none at all.

21024. Was any Board held upon the bread?—Often.

21025. You stated, did you not, that there was a difference of opinion even among the medical officers and others as to this bread?—Just so.

21026. You returned home in October, did you not?—Yes.

21027. Lord *Seymour.*] Major-general Bentinck was asked whether the bread was good at Varna, and he said, "It was very fair indeed; it was brown, or of a dark colour, not the description of bread that the soldiers had been accustomed to eat in England, but it was very good bread; the officers and men did not object to it"?—I differ from Major-general Bentinck. I do not wish to convey any censure upon the Commissariat; and to show the difficulty of getting good bread in Turkey, Commissary-general Filder went to the store one day, and unknown to the contractor, sent a small bag of wheat to Lord Raglan, and he said, "My Lord, I send you what I consider very good wheat." Lord Raglan handed it to me, and said, "What do you think of that?" I said, "It looks to me good, and we will, if you please, consult your Lordship's baker upon the subject." I took the bag of wheat in the presence of Colonel Ligondé, the French officer attached to our head-quarters, and I said, "We will go to this baker, and ask his opinion." I then showed him the wheat, and he said, "That is not clean; there is wheat there, but there are bird seeds, and other matters in it." I said, "That will not do; we must pick out those grains." I picked them out, and I think they amounted to one-fifth of the whole. There was barley, rye, and a black sort of seed,—showing the difficulty that the Commissariat laboured under. I then consulted a Turkish gentleman of fortune in that place, and he told me that the Turkish farmers farmed so; that you could not get clean wheat. For that climate, the wheat ought to be kiln-dried and ground in this country, and yeast used to prevent the bread becoming sour.

21028. Lord *Seymour.*] Much of the French bread was better, was it not?—Yes, but still sour.

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21029. Did they use the same wheat?—I cannot tell you, but I think not; I think they had the flour sent out from France.

21030. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is there not a great deal of wheat imported into Turkey from England?—Yes.

21031. Is not that good wheat?—I do not know in what state it is when it is sold in this country, whether it is cleaned or not.

Lunæ, 14° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Drummond.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Bramston.
Lord Seymour.	General Peel.
Colonel Lindsay.	Captain Gladstone.
Sir John Pakington.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable Sir *James Graham*, Bart., a Member of the House; Examined.

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21032. *Chairman.*] YOU were First Lord of the Admiralty at the breaking out of the war with Russia, and you remained in that position until you left the Ministry of Lord Palmerston?—I was first Lord of the Admiralty from the commencement of the war, and transacted the business of the Admiralty until the 25th of March.

21033. Will you describe the relations between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Minister for War?—All the details of the naval service are transacted by the Board of Admiralty without reference to any other department; but when it is the Queen's pleasure that any particular movement of the fleet, or of any portion of the fleet shall take place, that pleasure is communicated to the Board officially by a Secretary of State.

21034. When you were First Lord of the Admiralty did you consider yourself subject to the supervision and control of the War Minister in your administration of our naval armament?—Not at all.

21035. It was wholly fitted out, was it not, and controlled by your authority?—Entirely by the Board, over which I presided.

21036. Is the First Lord of the Admiralty a co-ordinate part of the Board of Admiralty, or is he, like the Master-general of the Ordnance, a superior officer, with power to overrule the decisions of the Board?—He has no power whatever to overrule the Board's decisions; when he is present at the Board he presides. The practice is, that when documents are read, the First Lord presiding, gives his opinion with reference to the answer to be given. The Secretary sits where I am now sitting, and the First Lord sits where the Honourable Chairman is sitting, and he gives his opinion as to the answers which he thinks ought to be recorded; if all the other members are silent the Secretary notes down that answer, but any member who dissents from the opinion given by the First Lord has an opportunity of stating it; that at least is the mode in which I have always transacted the business.

21037. Then the First Lord of the Admiralty is not like the Master-general of the Ordnance, a person sitting with the Board as a council, but he is sitting as a co-ordinate member of that Board?—He is an integral part of the Board under the patent, and has no power apart from the Board.

21038. Supposing there were a majority of the Board against his opinion, would that majority govern?—With the permission of the Committee, I will state the advice which I received from a most distinguished First Lord of the Admiralty when I first went there. Earl Spencer presided at that Board during the early part of the French war, when such great distinction and success attended

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attended our naval arms. Objections are urged against a Board that it limits responsibility; he told me that, in his opinion, practically, he had never found the Board of Admiralty interfere with the large discretionary power of the First Lord. He mentioned an instance to me which had occurred to himself when presiding upon a matter of great importance, where his opinion, as a layman, came into collision with the naval feeling of the majority of his Board with regard, I think, to Lord Bridport striking his flag on a particular occasion; the decision of the Cabinet was, that he should strike his flag; and Lord Spencer told me this himself, that at a meeting of the Board he proposed that by telegraph an order should be sent to Lord Bridport to strike his flag; the Senior Naval Lord on his right objected, and the Second Naval Lord on his left objected; at that time it was necessary that an order should be signed by three members of the Board, I think there were seven present; of the two next Lords, when it came to them to give their opinion, the third demurred. Lord Spencer said: "This order must be signed by two of you, and if it be not signed I shall immediately dissolve the Board and go to Mr. Pitt, and the patent will be revoked." The order was signed, and Lord Bridport struck his flag. Lord Spencer told me that, in his opinion, that was a mode in which the First Lord exercised his power duly at the Board of Admiralty.

21039. Does not that bear out what Mr. Bentham said, that a Board is a screen?—I can form no opinion upon that speculation; practically I have always found, having presided over two Boards, no formidable difference of opinion on the part of the Board; if the power be exercised both with firmness and with forbearance and temper, I have always found on the part of the members the most earnest desire and willingness to concur. I have never had any difficulty, and so far from a screen, I have found it to be a council, without which I do not think any layman could advantageously administer the affairs of the navy.

21040. With regard to the transport service, did you receive requisitions from the War Minister as to the amount of transport needed, or did he state the number of troops to be moved, and leave to your determination the number of ships required?—Until the Transport Board was established, and until some changes had been introduced towards the close of Lord Aberdeen's Government, when the Secretary of State for the Colonies ceased to be also the Secretary of State for War, the Board of Admiralty was altogether passive with regard to army requisitions; they came in from seven different quarters, and I will enumerate them: occasionally from the Secretary of State himself; with regard to the embarkation of the men, frequently from the Horse Guards, after consultation with the Secretary of State; and from the Board of Ordnance with regard to the embarkation of artillerymen and engineers; those are three of the sources; then from the Treasury with respect to the Commissariat, making the fourth; and from the Secretary-at-War with respect to the supply of medicines, making the fifth, and then a double requisition from the Ordnance, sometimes with respect to ammunition and sometimes with respect to stores. Thus there were flowing into the Admiralty from time to time, without any previous notice, requisitions to a large amount from those different sources, and the Admiralty had to provide as best they could without previous notice for the supplies required from those seven sources.

21041. Lord *Seymour*.] Do you think it a convenient system that those different sources should be able to apply for transport to the Admiralty?—I found that the inconvenience was such, that I represented strongly my opinion that it was absolutely necessary that those various requisitions should be brought to a common centre, and I suggested that that centre should be the Secretary of State for the War department; that day by day those requisitions should be fiated by him and adopted, and when so adopted, that they should be given to the Chairman of the Transport Board, whose duty it would be to call daily; his first duty at the commencement of each day should be to call at the office of the Secretary of State, and having received those requisitions, to come to the Admiralty and see the Naval Lord superintending the Transport Board, for the purpose of obtaining his opinion as to the mode in which those requisitions should be met, and then proceed to his own Board to carry those requisitions into effect. That was the arrangement I suggested before I left office, as the one which I thought would give both promptitude and order to those various requisitions.

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21042. Was that system adopted before you left office?—Not altogether; the concentration of the requisitions had commenced; the first commencement of the concentration was, the bringing of the Commissariat under the Secretary of State; that took place, I think, about the month of November; the requisitions from the Treasury ceased at that time, and the requisitions from the Horse Guards, I think, ceased also, and they came direct from the Secretary of State, while the requisitions from the Ordnance remained as they were, coming in from the Board of Ordnance. I think the medical requisitions came from the Secretary-at-War until Mr. Sidney Herbert ceased to be the Secretary-at-War, when I was only for a short time at the Admiralty; I am not quite sure what arrangement took place as to the medical demands after the resignation of Mr. Herbert.

21043. As First Lord of the Admiralty, you were answerable, were you not, for the transport system?—Having mentioned to the Committee all the powers which I had been taught to believe it was the duty of the First Lord to exercise, I hold that the First Lord of the Admiralty is responsible for everything in the naval department.

21044. When the expedition was first contemplated, will you state whether you had any steam transports or any sailing transports available, and to what amount?—We had, I think, three ships of war, iron and steam, capable of carrying about 2,000 men, and they were under a pennant, subject to martial law; no other ships belonging to the Crown were immediately available for the conveyance of troops.

21045. Then you had to advertise for transports for the whole service?—As the requisitions came in according to the established usage, advertisements were sent out to meet the requirements, and transports were taken up in competition in the open market.

21046. Were you applied to generally for steam transport?—It was the opinion of the Government that every effort should be made, with a view to dispatch, to employ steam as largely as possible. I quite concurred in that opinion, and did my utmost to supply steam transports; but the demand arose so rapidly, and the supply was so limited, that I was of opinion that it would be impossible to persevere in the use of steam only; and I was of opinion that heavy articles, not of immediate urgency, might have been with great advantage placed on board sailing vessels, and that there should have been a continuous flow of sailing vessels from this country to the seat of war.

21047. With regard to the transports leaving this country, you and the Board of Admiralty were responsible; but who was responsible for the transports in the Black Sea and the Bosphorus?—The naval Commander-in-chief.

21048. He was responsible for both the transport service, whether that transport service was in the Black Sea or in the Bosphorus?—Certainly, in the Black Sea, and generally throughout his command; the power of the naval Commander-in-chief over the transports, according to the Queen's Regulations, apart from all special orders with regard to particular service, extended, and most wisely extended, to the whole of the transports; they are all placed under his control, so that when there is a combined military and naval operation, he, concerting with the military Commander-in-chief, may move the transports throughout the whole sphere of his command.

21049. *Chairman.*] The sphere of Admiral Dundas's command was the Mediterranean, was it not, as well as the Black Sea?—Everything within the Gut of Gibraltar.

21050. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated to this Committee that Admiral Boxer was specially sent to superintend, and to be responsible for the transport service?—He was sent specially to superintend the transport service within the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, but subject always to the controlling power of Admiral Dundas.

21051. *Chairman.*] Did Admiral Boxer's power extend over the Black Sea?—No; it was limited within the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, subject to Admiral Dundas. He could not act, in the first instance, without reference to Admiral Dundas, excepting within those limits; within those limits he might act separately, reporting to Admiral Dundas.

21052. Who was in command of the transport service in the Black Sea?—Captain Christie, who was also subject to the same control.

21053. Lord

21053. Lord *Seymour*.] You appointed Admiral Boxer, did you not?—Yes, I did.

21054. Will you state what reasons induced you to appoint Admiral Boxer?—Admiral Boxer was first made known to me in the year 1830, 25 years ago, by Sir Thomas Hardy, who was remarkable for many things, and for nothing so much as for his knowledge and just appreciation of naval character, and he represented Captain Boxer to me at that time as one of the best seamen that he knew; and I recollected this character of Captain Boxer upon my return to the Admiralty. Captain Boxer, at Acre, had more than justified the opinion of Sir Thomas Hardy; he was the officer employed to mark the stations for the line-of-battle ships that bombarded Acre, which he did under a heavy fire; he himself commanded a ship, and greatly distinguished himself on that occasion; he then, after that operation, went to the Saint Lawrence, and was harbour-master at Quebec, and he had more experience with respect to the embarkation and disembarkation of troops than any other officer that I know. I looked through the list, and endeavoured to select the man that I thought the fittest. No application was ever made to me in favour of Admiral Boxer, and I selected him, and very much surprised him by giving him the appointment.

21055. Admiral Boxer was told, was he not, in his instructions that he would be under the command of Admiral Dundas?—Before I answer that question, will the Committee allow me to state that I am about, with their permission, to read to them several public documents. I did not think myself at liberty to read any of them without first having an interview with Lord Palmerston, the first adviser of Her Majesty, the documents not being mine, but belonging to the public; therefore everything that I am now about to read I have submitted to Lord Palmerston, and I have had Lord Palmerston's permission to use them, subject to the willingness of the Committee to receive them.

21056. *Chairman*.] The Committee will be very happy to receive them?—Then I will proceed to answer the question by reading a short extract of the appointment of Admiral Boxer. I will read an extract from his instructions.

21057. Can you put in those instructions?—Yes; I can put them in if the Committee please. This is dated the 8th of March 1854: "To follow such orders as you may receive from time to time from us, or from Vice-Admiral Dundas, the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea and Mediterranean." Then the Minute of the 8th of April is, "Rear-Admiral Boxer to hoist his flag for special service with the fleet under Vice-Admiral Dundas." The Minute of the 13th of April is, "Rear-Admiral Boxer to keep up a constant correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas, the Commander-in-chief, and to follow his directions." Then by the Minute of the 22d of May, "Admiral Boxer's command is limited from the entrance of the Dardanelles to the eastern entrance of the Bosphorus, in the Black Sea." *Vide* Appendix.

21058. Lord *Seymour*.] It appears from these instructions that Admiral Boxer was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Dundas?—Yes, without limitation in the first instance; and then the last Minute of May gives him power, apart from Admiral Dundas, within the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, for the purpose of preventing loss of time within those limits, subject always to his reporting to his Commander-in-chief; but the orders of the Commander-in-chief would be of course supreme even within those limits.

21059. Are the Committee right in supposing that the Admiralty looked to Admiral Dundas as the person who was responsible for the whole transport service in the Black Sea?—Most clearly, subject to the limitations which I have mentioned; and I should like to read, upon that point, a letter which was addressed to Admiral Boxer, on the 29th of May 1854. Upon his first arrival he stated that it was his intention to superintend the movement of the troops and their embarkation, and the place of their disembarkation; and the answer of the Admiralty to his letter is this: "Sir,—With reference to your letter of the 15th instant, No. 7, stating your intention of superintending the movements of the troops on their embarkation at Constantinople, and at the place of debarkation, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that so far as relates to the embarkation of troops within the Bosphorus, their Lordships approve of such superintendence on your part, but all movements outside the Bosphorus are only to be undertaken under the orders of the

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the Commander-in-chief of the Black Sea squadron. I am, &c., *W. A. B. Hamilton.*"

21060. Are the Committee to understand that Admiral Dundas had equal command again over the harbour of Balaklava, and over the transports in that harbour?—Certainly.

21061. He was held by the Admiralty responsible also for that harbour?—Everything within the Black Sea was under his immediate control and superintendence.

21062. Who appointed Captain Christie?—I appointed him.

21063. Will you state why Captain Christie was selected for the command of the transports at Balaklava?—I selected Captain Christie on these grounds: I asked Captain Milne, the officer who, with great ability and zeal, had under me managed the transport service, who, he thought, upon the great occasion of so large an armament, was a fit officer to be entrusted with the supreme controul, and immediate power over the transports, subject always to the superintendence of the naval Commander-in-chief; and Captain Milne recommended to me Captain Christie; Captain Christie was only known to me by his naval reputation; he had been a lieutenant in the "Tartar" frigate under Sir George Collier, when Commodore on the coast of Africa. I had the greatest possible respect for the memory of Sir George Collier; I considered him an admirable officer, and I knew that Captain Christie was a lieutenant for whom he had the greatest regard; he was altogether unknown to me except from that naval reputation, and on the recommendation of Captain Milne I appointed him. The Committee have already before them, in the Appendix to their Report, page 728, the instructions given to Captain Christie, which were as full and as guarded as we could make them.

21064. Mr. *Ellice.*] Captain Christie had no authority or command in the port of Balaklava beyond his superintendence of the transport service there?—He had no power within the harbour of Balaklava at all, because there was always a naval officer as harbour-master there, who (he not having his pennant flying) was his superior officer.

21065. Therefore Captain Christie was in no respect responsible for the state of that harbour, which has been represented to have been in the utmost confusion and disorder?—Not in the slightest degree; he was in no way responsible for it.

21066. Is it consistent with your knowledge that Captain Christie generally was on board ship, outside the harbour of Balaklava?—I believe almost invariably.

21067. Was he on board the "Melbourne" transport at the time of the gale of the 14th of November, when so many ships were lost?—I believe he was.

21068. It has been stated that that ship was mainly saved through his exertions, the masts having been cut away and the ship having been got safely out of the gale; are you aware of that circumstance?—All that I have ever heard of the conduct of Captain Christie leads me to think well of his exertions, excepting in two particulars, in which, perhaps, he may have erred. One was with reference to allowing the "Prince" to remain too close in shore off Balaklava, she not having entered the harbour of Balaklava, and at a single anchor, which led to the misfortune of her loss in the violent storm of the 14th. And there was another transaction in which he made an error, with reference to the ordering one transport that had been sent for Turkish troops from Varna to come to Balaklava, instead of to Eupatoria. He made those two mistakes, and for those two mistakes the Admiralty ordered him to be tried by a court martial; and, I believe, as a broken-hearted man, he has not lived to be tried.

21069. Are you aware that Captain Christie sent his lieutenant to the senior naval officer in Balaklava three times to represent that the "Prince" was not in a state of safety from the condition of her cables, and to entreat that room might be made in the harbour to place her in safety?—I believe that that was so; but, on the other hand, the Committee must bear in mind what was the state of Balaklava Harbour at that moment; it was very shortly after the attack of the Russians on the 26th. This Committee has been told most truly that Balaklava is more a ditch than a harbour, and quite incapable of containing the immense number of ships which were waiting to discharge their cargoes

cargoes there, and there only. I must state to the Committee that after that attack on the 26th or 27th of October, Lord Raglan had thought it necessary to take precautions to reimbark some stores, and to order the harbour to be cleared.

21070. If these were the circumstances of the case, and Captain Christie did all in his power to prevent the loss of the "Prince," by pressing one officer in command of the harbour to receive her in the harbour, Captain Christie would be, in no respect, responsible for the loss of that vessel?—The admission, or the refusal of admission, of the "Prince," into the harbour of Balaklava, rested with the senior naval officer commanding in the harbour, and not with Captain Christie, outside the harbour.

21071. Captain Christie was subject, then, so far, to the orders of the naval officer commanding in the harbour, that he could not have insisted upon that vessel being received into the harbour without the consent of the officer commanding in it?—No, he had no power whatever; the senior naval officer in the harbour was supreme.

21072. *Chairman.*] He had power, had he not, to command the "Prince" to go out to sea?—Certainly he might have done so, but I believe that the wind for some days before the fatal catastrophe blew so strong, and there was such a swell with an indraught, that it would have been a difficult operation; she was a very long ship, and not easily managed or controlled, and it would not have been easy to have brought her head round to the wind, and have got her out to sea in the teeth of such a gale as had blown for some days previously.

21073. Was not her head to the wind?—I think not.

21074. Was she not at anchor?—Yes, at single anchor.

21075. Then must she not have been with her head to the wind?—She must have been.

21076. Mr. *Layard.*] Did not the "Agamemnon" get out the night before?—I believe so; she did, certainly.

21077. Did she not make signals that the vessels might go out?—I am not aware of that.

21078. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did not that indiscretion of allowing the "Prince" to remain at single anchor so near the shore, which was then a lee-shore, apply to other vessels besides the "Prince"?—The "Resolute," I think, was lost.

21079. Did not the indiscretion of allowing vessels to remain at anchor so near to a lee-shore, apply to several vessels besides the "Prince"?—Yes; and this is the real subject-matter of the trial of Captain Christie before the court-martial; it is the very subject upon which he is about to be tried if he be still alive; it is with reference to those transports outside the harbour, under the command of Captain Christie, that the Admiralty has ordered him to be tried, whether he exercised a right discretion with respect to the ships generally, in keeping them outside and at anchor under such circumstances.

21080. Captain Christie, as I understand you, had always the power of sending the transports out of the harbour if he thought it necessary?—No, not out of the harbour; and he had no power to order any movement within the harbour of Balaklava.

21081. Captain *Gladstone.*] He would apply to the commanding officer in the harbour?—Certainly; and by an order which was imperative upon him, and upon the Admiral, no movement of the transports could take place without the previous concurrence of Lord Raglan.

21082. Mr. *Layard.*] Supposing a transport had been required to be sent down for fresh provisions, could not Captain Christie have ordered her out of the harbour?—Not without a previous application to the officer commanding in the harbour, and it could not take place without the knowledge and concurrence of Lord Raglan.

21083. Captain *Gladstone.*] It was stated by Admiral Dundas, on Friday, that Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority with Admiral Boxer over the transports; will you state to what extent that is true?—Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority with the naval Commander-in-chief, Admiral Dundas, and the order was imperative that there should be no movement of any transports without the knowledge of Admiral Dundas and Lord Raglan, and with respect to their combined operations, the Committee will see that that was indispensably necessary.

21084. *Chairman.*] Do you mean only in the harbour of Balaklava, or in

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the Black Sea generally?—I mean detaching them on any branch of the service.

21085. Mr. *Ellice.*] But suppose Admiral Dundas to be off Sebastopol and Lord Raglan to see fit, from some particular necessity, to give an order as to the transports in Balaklava Harbour without consulting Admiral Dundas, that order would be carried out, would it not, by the officer commanding the transport there?—The naval officer commanding the transports at Balaklava, in the case put, would exercise the supreme naval power on his own responsibility, and instead of referring it to Admiral Dundas, he would simply report that he had so done.

21086. That must be the course of the service, both in the harbour of Balaklava and at the Bosphorus?—Everywhere.

21087. So that the Admiral would not necessarily be responsible for the movement of every particular transport under his general orders, as the Admiral commanding in the Black Sea?—If the transports were all around the flag, and within his purview, he would exercise the power; but if they are detached, and not within his view, then the first naval officer exercising, on behalf of the Admiral, his power, would on his responsibility give the order, reporting to the Admiral.

21088. Each officer would be responsible for his own orders in that case, would he not?—Certainly.

21089. Mr. *Layard.*] In the instructions there is this sentence; "You will control the movements of all steam vessels and transports which are under your orders;" what does that mean?—I think it will be found that it is subject always to the control of the Commander-in-chief.

21090. No; it says, "You will control the movements of all steam vessels and transports which are under your orders, and you will afford such assistance to the naval Commander-in-chief, or Rear-Admiral Superintendent at Malta, as may be necessary for the conveyance of stores or provisions when it does not in any manner interfere with military movements." That gives him, does it not, control over the movements of all steam vessels?—The Queen's regulations are express, and apart from that special order there are general orders in the Queen's service which place the officer commanding the transports under the command of the senior naval officer, with a pennant flying, and being present.

21091. Was Admiral Dundas in Balaklava Harbour?—No.

21092. What distance was he from it?—He was off Sebastopol.

21093. Was he ever in Balaklava Harbour?—I do not know.

21094. General *Peel.*] It is in evidence that certain transports were placed under the orders of the Commissary-general, and that being so placed they would not be subject to the orders of the naval commanding officer?—There is in Captain Christie's instructions a passage about the Commissariat, I think.

21095. Lord *Seymour.*] There were at different times different naval officers in command of the harbour at Balaklava?—Before the 16th of October, and the attack on the forts of the 17th of October, indeed from the time that the army sat down before Sebastopol, Sir Edmund Lyons commanded himself in the harbour of Balaklava; and when he joined the fleet on the evening before the attack on the forts, he delegated that command to Captain Dacres, and when he, Captain Dacres, from ill-health returned to England, it was transferred to Captain Heath, and Captain Heath was assisted by Commander Powell, and it remained under the orders of Captain Heath and Commander Powell till Admiral Boxer went up from the Bosphorus; and I am bound to say, a discretion having been exercised in the selection of those naval officers, I believe that without any interruption of time, Balaklava Harbour has been under the direction and control of naval officers who will bear comparison for ability and character with any officers in the service, and I have mentioned their names.

21096. Were those appointments made out there by the Admiral?—They were made by Admiral Dundas.

21097. Had you received any complaints of Admiral Boxer before you removed him from the Bosphorus to Balaklava?—I had not received official complaints, but I had reason to think that the operations at Constantinople generally had swollen into such magnitude and importance that they had assumed a character different to that which I contemplated when I made the selection of

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Admiral Boxer, and I thought it might be for the good of the service to move Admiral Boxer up to Balaklava; that a captain no longer should exercise command there, but that an admiral should be appointed, and I thought that under the immediate eye of the Commander-in-chief Admiral Boxer would do the duty of Balaklava Harbour particularly well; and under the circumstances I removed Admiral Boxer. Will the Committee indulge me by allowing me to do what I think but an act of justice to Admiral Boxer? I have said that I was responsible generally for the conduct of the naval operations. Some censure has been cast upon Admiral Boxer, and I have three letters from him of different dates, which, if the Committee will permit me, I think it is right and fair to him that I should read, because there is a requisition in September which I did not give effect to, acting within the Board of Admiralty; but looking back I am bound to say that I was sorry that I did not, for I think it contains a suggestion which would have assisted him if it had been adopted, but it was not adopted, I being responsible for the delay. I think it only fair to Admiral Boxer that I should read this letter; this is dated, "'Banshee,' Constantinople, 10 May 1854. Sir,—Having acquainted you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in my letter of the 2d instant, that I considered it absolutely necessary a storekeeper should be appointed here. The various duties of my office, which must daily increase, viz., the necessary correspondence between the Admiral Superintendent at Malta and Commander-in-chief in the Black Sea, consequent on the arrival of supplies for the fleet, and despatching the same, which occasionally requires my presence, independent of the important duties which must devolve upon me in the presence of the head-quarters of the army, which is encamped and quartered at Scutari; all these movements afloat will necessarily come under my superintendence. Having also received directions from the Commander-in-chief, on my visit to him off Sebastopol, to put myself in communication with Lord Raglan, for that purpose I have, in consequence, called upon Mr. Mowbray, the acting storekeeper, to furnish me, for the information of their Lordships, with a detailed statement of the duties he has had to perform since his appointment to that office, which I herewith enclose. It appears to me so clear and conclusive, that I feel convinced their Lordships will at once see the importance of his appointment being confirmed, with the necessary assistance to carry on his duties effectually; and my appointment being made similar to that of Rear-Admiral Stewart's, at Malta, it being quite impossible that I can act in any other capacity but that of Admiral Superintendent of the whole naval establishment at this place. And should their Lordships approve of the suggestions made in my former letter with respect to the store depôt, which have met with the approbation of the Commander-in-chief, and who at once gave me directions to employ one or two transports for that service, I shall then be enabled in a short time to bring this establishment into good working order, thereby causing a great saving to the public, as well as carrying it on expeditiously." I hold in my hand the original despatch, and here is a minute of the Board made upon reading it, which, as I told the Committee, was the mode in which the business was conducted. "See separate minute for Admiral Boxer's appointment as Superintendent in the Bosphorus." That is the one which I read appointing him, which gives effect to the wish described here, that he should have within the Dardanelles and in the Bosphorus the power of an Admiral Superintendent, similar to the power of the Admiral at Malta. The next was, "Approve of Mr. Mowbray being appointed as Acting Storekeeper, to be borne on the books of the 'Britannia,' with 1st rate's pay; approve of temporary employment of two transports," which was what he had suggested, "taking care that they are those chartered, and to retain them if required for troop service. I have omitted reading what he suggested about flat-bottomed boats, but I will now read it: he says, "Rear-Admiral Stewart has informed me that he will send Her Majesty's ship 'Cyclops' immediately to the Dardanelles, to assist in towing any transports, and two flat-bottomed boats for their use; and I beg to inform their Lordships that I consider it of great importance that 'flat-bottomed boats' should be sent out as soon as possible for the transports that may be required, as they are very deficient in boats for the purpose of embarkation and disembarkation, which may in the future movements of the army be required to be performed with great safety and expedition." Then the minute of the Admiralty upon that is, "Inform the Admiral that eight flat-bottomed

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boats have been sent with the transports, and that others will be sent. With reference to the steam transports, he is at present to apply to the Turkish Government for one or more, as may be required." His letter goes on to state, "Rear-Admiral Stewart has also requested me to send down all the disposable 'steam freight ships' here for the purpose of towing any transports that may be still on passage, or to send them to England, if necessary, to assist in bringing up the rest of the army. In consequence of which I have, with the principal agent of transports, communicated with Lord Raglan as to the number that may be required to be kept here. He has decided that three (3) paddle-wheel steamers for towing six (6) artillery transports, and steam freight ships for the conveyance of a sufficient force corresponding, in the event of its being necessary to move forward an expedition in the Black Sea. All the rest will, in compliance with his request, be sent back to him." In the main, effect was given to these requisitions. Now this is the letter as to which I take some blame to myself, as I have already expressed, and it is dated the 8th of September: "Sir,—The departure of the expedition for the Crimea" (the whole of the military force had then gone up to Varna), "affords me leisure to represent to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the very great want of a receiving ship at Constantinople, for invalids and supernumeraries, with an experienced master, surgeon, a sergeant's guard of marines, three good warrant officers, and a small gang of artificers and mechanics. In all large repairs, docking, &c., I receive every assistance from the Turkish authorities; yet from an inspection of the cash vouchers of the naval storekeeper, their Lordships will perceive the quantity of work required to be executed by hired artificers, who are slow, generally inefficient, and most expensive. Had I a small body of English workmen at my disposal, under proper supervision, great delay and expense might be avoided; no extra outlay would be caused by a compliance with my request, as the 'Canterbury' transport, now appropriated as a provision and store depôt, could be dispensed with and sent home, and the service conducted with economy and regularity; I therefore submit the same for their Lordships' consideration.—I have, &c." The minute upon that was, "Inform the Admiral that the service being temporary, the Board are not prepared to send out a receiving ship, with its establishment." Now, looking back, I certainly regret that immediate steps were not taken in conformity with the requisition of the Admiral.

21098. *Chairman.*] The "service being temporary," means, I presume, that you expected the expedition to the Crimea to be successful immediately before Sebastopol, and to return?—No; it was not so contemplated at that time, to the best of my recollection; I was present at the Board when that minute was made, and what was considered "temporary" was, that the force having gone to the Black Sea, there was no probability, within the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, of any such extent of duty to be performed as Admiral Boxer appeared to contemplate; the service would be within the Black Sea, and not within the limits of his command; but I say that I regret that that requisition was not met at the time. However, circumstances very speedily arose which led me to re-consider that answer, and I did give orders for the preparation of a receiving ship.

21099. Sir *J. Pakington.*] When was that?—It must have been in the month of October, because I hold in my hand a letter of the 20th of November from Admiral Boxer. I have asked for all the requisitions from the Admiralty, on the part of Admiral Boxer, for further assistance, and I am now going to read a letter of the 20th of November from him: "'Canterbury,' Constantinople, 20th November 1854. Sir,—The Turkish authorities having, at my request (conveyed through Her Majesty's Ambassador), placed at my disposal a large range of buildings at the Seraglio Point, known as Constantine's Palace, as a depôt for naval stores and provisions, I beg to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that I shall, as soon as possible, make some necessary alterations and additions, and then clear the 'Canterbury' transport, and send her to England to be discharged. 2. Having constant demands on me to repair ships of war and transports, to embark and land invalids and troops, and other services too numerous to mention, and being almost entirely without resources of any kind, I consider the present moment, as the late lamentable loss of ships in the Crimea will throw all the necessary repairs upon me, a fitting opportunity to respectfully recall their Lordships' earnest

earnest attention to my letter, No. 68, of the 8th September last, requesting that a receiving ship might be placed under my orders. The lapse of more than two months has confirmed my opinion of the necessity of such an economical mode of conducting the public service. 3. A vessel like the 'Apollo,' commanded by an efficient master, to act as master attendant, would answer the purpose remarkably well. In addition to her crew and body of artificers, she would also receive the reserve supply of ammunition, and allow of the 'Coronella,' the present powder depôt, being sent to England. 4. At the present moment, the fitting up of the transports 'Talavera' and 'Sultana,' for the conveyance of military invalids to England, is delayed by the want of artificers, and great expense necessarily incurred. 5. I trust their Lordships will do me the justice to believe that I am solely actuated by a desire for the public welfare in repeating the above application. I have, &c." Upon which there is a minute, "Immediate. Inform the Admiral that the 'Melampus' is under orders for a depôt ship." In the interval, between the 8th of September and the receipt of this letter, I had re-considered the requisition, as I found the urgency of the service increasing. I then ordered the "Melampus" to be got ready; and the "Melampus" sailed very shortly after that letter.

21100. Captain *Gladstone.*] Supposing Vice-Admiral Dundas had not been satisfied with the manner in which Admiral Boxer conducted the Admiralty service, had he any authority to supersede him?—That question had not arisen at the time; but if the Committee will proceed to the examination in order of dates, I shall be able to show them that I gave the largest power to the Commander-in-chief to deal with all the officers, Admirals not excepted, under his orders.

21101. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated that the general arrangement of the transport service was very defective, and that there was great delay in the transports when they were sent to the Crimea, that they lost time there, and that they also lost time at the Bosphorus; was that brought to the notice of the Admiralty?—Not officially, certainly, by any naval or military authority.

21102. Have you formed the opinion, from further experience, that the arrangements in that respect were defective, and that time was lost, and inconvenience to the public service occasioned, in the management of the transport service?—I am not aware of any defect in the arrangement of the transports within the Black Sea.

21103. When the transports were sent from England, for instance, it has been stated that they ought to have gone out to Balaklava, and returned rapidly to this country, by which a stream of communication would have been kept up?—Upon that point I have the strongest opinion that it would have been quite impossible, to any very great extent, to have sent back steamers from the Black Sea with prudence.

21104. Is that opinion formed on military grounds?—It is a combined view, both on military grounds and also of the inexpediency of detaching vessels when so large an army is in motion, and when the basis of the military operations is not on shore but afloat, thereby weakening the basis of the whole operations which depended upon the naval means of transport, both with regard to the British army and their allies; and if I were to illustrate that position, I would recall to the recollection of the Committee the immense operation which has been recently performed by a large power of locomotion, when Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons have moved 45,000 Turks from Bulgaria to Eupatoria, in the space of about three weeks, and if they had had no redundant power of steam that operation would have been impossible.

21105. It has been stated that a good deal of time was lost here in fitting out the transports?—I have seen a calculation made that a million has been lost to the public in the transport service; that calculation is based upon two assumptions, both of which are erroneous. The first is, that on this side the transports, when taken up, can be fitted up more expeditiously than we had found it, with the utmost exertion, possible to do. The period allowed after chartering is ten days, but with every exertion ten days has generally been found insufficient for fitting them up. The calculation assumes that the fitting may take place in four days, ten days, in fact, being insufficient generally, for it will average from a fortnight to three weeks. That is the assumption on this side. Then the other is the assumption with which we have been just dealing, that the sole necessity of the service is landing the stores and landing the men, and

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that operation performed that the ships may immediately return. I have stated already, very shortly, my view of the great inexpediency of any such return, and if I were permitted to illustrate that still further, I would just ask the Committee to consider what was the decision of the great master of the art of war, in circumstances similar, but much more advantageous to this country, than those with which we have had to deal. The Duke of Wellington, occupying the lines at Torres Vedras, had the river Tagus in his rear, and the great city of Lisbon for his storehouse, and yet the Duke of Wellington never thought it safe not to have the means in the Tagus of embarking every man within the lines at Torres Vedras. Will the Committee just contrast that with the position of Lord Raglan: instead of the river Tagus he had the creek of Balaklava, and instead of the city of Lisbon with its storehouses, he had a naked shore without a building and without a storehouse, and of necessity a very large portion of the transports had to be used in lieu of the storehouses as continuous receptacles of stores.

21106. *Chairman.*] Was not the Duke of Wellington at the head of a retreating army; not an offensive one?—He was at the head of an army occupying a position which he considered impregnable, and though he thought so, he held the precaution to be wise, of having the means at his disposal of embarking his whole army.

21107. But he had retreated into those lines; he had not advanced in opposition to the French army?—But he held a position quite as strong as that which Lord Raglan now holds, with the advantages which I have mentioned, which are wanting to Lord Raglan.

21108. Sir *J. Pakington.*] And there was this further broad difference, that the Duke of Wellington was in a friendly country instead of an enemy's country?—Yes.

21109. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to loading the transports, it has been stated to the Committee that there was a bad system adopted in loading the transports, and that it was not under proper and efficient regulation?—Upon that head I really have nothing to add to the evidence of Captain Milne, which I have read. I should beg to recall to the recollection of the Committee, that as relates to the naval practice, with reference to their own stores, our established rule of loading and delivering is, I may say, perfect, and never fails; if the Committee will turn to the answer of Captain Milne to Question 16804, they will there find what is the mode established for the navy, and what is the result. He says, "Every 14 days, and if the Commissariat Department in London were to receive a return the same as this every 14 days, or every month, giving what they have in store, and what they have received since the last return, and what is on the sea, and on the way to Constantinople, they would be able to tell exactly what we can, namely, every article that we have in store at Constantinople," upon its landing.

21110. There has been a report of a Commission laid before the Committee which you have probably seen, in which it is recommended that a cargo book should be in all cases used?—In December last, discovering the imperfections of the system in operation as to the Ordnance stores, we did suggest that a cargo book should be introduced, and I believe it has been introduced with good effect. I may go on to point out to the Committee that it must be recollected, that quite without any experience from the past, we have had to take up packets and passenger steamers, the masters of which have not been accustomed to cargo, and who had been accustomed to carry only passengers; under the old system of sailing vessels, the masters performed the duties of supercargo, and looked to the loading of the ship, and placing every article within it, and were responsible for the delivery; generally speaking, the duty was performed satisfactorily; but the masters of these steam vessels have had to perform duties with which they were not before acquainted; and some difficulties have arisen; and before I left the Admiralty I was disposed to entertain an opinion with respect to those steamers, that it would be necessary to employ a supercargo.

21111. With regard to the Commissariat service, were any vessels appropriated for Commissariat purposes from the first sailing of the expedition?—I think, if the Committee will look to Captain Christie's instructions, they contemplate an appropriation; and, with the permission of the Committee, I will read a letter from Sir Edmund Lyons, bearing upon this very question, dated the 17th of March, Royal Albert, off Sevastopol. "Sir,—With reference to your letter,

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letter, No. 214, of the 22d ultimo, expressing the desire of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the various steam vessels sent to the Crimea with stores shall be unloaded and return to England with the least possible delay, I have the honour to inclose a list * of all that have arrived at Balaklava up to this time. Secondly, their Lordships will observe that, as fast as those which first arrived were cleared, they were required by Lord Raglan for the Commissariat service of his army (he having the power of taking them up), and that they have rendered good, I may say indispensable service. Their services will still be required, but those which I have marked with a cross, amounting to 20, shall be ordered to England directly they can be cleared (I beg the Committee to observe these words), an object which has engaged my serious attention, and in which considerable progress is now making, since Lord Raglan has sanctioned the appropriation of huts and store houses for the reception of their cargoes. I am," &c., there being no place of deposit until the surplus huts were used as store-houses.

* *See* Appendix.

21112. Then the Committee are to understand that the Admiralty here appropriated a certain number of vessels to the Commissariat, and that Lord Raglan took other vessels for that purpose?—He mentions, in the letter I have just given in, a very large number in addition to those that have been appropriated by Lord Raglan for the Commissariat service, from time to time.

21113. It was stated to this Committee that all the transports that were at Varna, at the time of the expedition, were taken for the purposes of the troops, and that there were not sufficient to take over either the animals for the ambulances, or many of the animals for the purposes of the Commissariat; and that great difficulties arose, both as regards the wounded, and as regards the supply of the army, from that defect: can you state to the Committee how it happened that there were not a sufficient number for these necessary purposes?—There were present off Varna only the number of transports which had conveyed from England the entire army, the entire cavalry, and the entire force of the artillery, such as then constituted the British force; and there had been also at that time an additional appropriation of a portion of them to the Commissariat service; and there were at the immediate disposal of the admiral and generals who decided upon undertaking that expedition, the limited amount of transports then at Varna; but it was found sufficient to move a portion of the British cavalry; and, if I mistake not, the English force was alone in possession of means of transport for the cavalry.

21114. *Chairman.*] The question I think had a different meaning; there was a deficiency of land transport when the army landed in the Crimea, and the reason of that deficiency was, because there was a deficiency of sea transport to bring the animals over from Varna to the Crimea; upon whom did the duty devolve to apportion the amount of sea transport to the number of animals which they had to transport?—The force of the naval transports was limited on the spot in the manner I have mentioned; there was only that amount of transport which had conveyed from England the infantry, the cavalry, and the artillery; the horses were for both the artillery and cavalry, therefore the amount at their disposal was limited; the power of distributing that limited amount was in the hands of Lord Raglan and the Admiral.

21115. When the army was in Bulgaria, they acquired a large amount of horses and animals that rendered necessary a large amount of transport to convey them to the Crimea. The expedition to the Crimea was contemplated some time beforehand, and I want to know whether being contemplated some time beforehand, a sufficient amount of transport to convey the troops and their horses to the Crimea could not have been acquired during that time?—The base of the operation was changed after the Russian army retreated from Silistria. The decision to change the base of operations was taken quickly and promptly. I have no doubt that the preparations for the means of land transport had been made with a view to operations on the continent of Europe, in Bulgaria, on the line of the Danube, but the change of the base of operations was attended with the inconvenience which the Honourable Chairman has pointed out.

21116. Still the difficulty arises, why were not sufficient transports provided, for there was plenty of time to provide them, for the Russian army had retreated from Silistria some time in June, and we did not leave Bulgaria till the end of August; why, between those periods, were not transports provided

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sufficient to carry the land transport belonging to the army?—I have already said that the supply there was limited to the number of vessels present; if I were asked whether the transport supply here was not unlimited, I must say that an opinion did prevail that you might call for a steam transport exactly as you would call a cab off the stand. You could not have got steam transport capable of carrying 2,000 or 3,000 men without difficulty; horses, it was not possible. The Committee can hardly conceive what the difficulty was, but if they reflect they will see what it must have been; in the course of a year we have moved somewhere about 60,000 British soldiers to a distance of 3,000 miles from this country; we have moved 6,000 horses to that distance; we have moved somewhere about 25,000 or 30,000 French troops from Marseilles to the Crimea, and simultaneously with this very difficulty of supplying the means of transport to the Black Sea, we moved 12,000 French to the Baltic; in the course of last year we moved, principally by steam, somewhere about 150,000 men, including the amount I mentioned before of 45,000 Turks; altogether somewhere about 150,000 men; and the larger portion of them to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country; simultaneously with that we have fed not only the navy, but the army, and a portion of our allies. I think that Captain Milne has given the Committee the amount that we are sending now every month from this country, namely, 1,250,000 lbs. of biscuit, 50,000 gallons of rum, 2,500 tons of salt meat and sugar, and there is to be added to that a perpetual flow of somewhere about 10,000 tons of coal to a distance of 3,000 miles.

21117. The operations were, no doubt, stupendous, but could not transports have been found in sufficient number to have carried all the land transport for the army to the Crimea if the attention of the authorities had been directed to that point?—To be found here or there?

21118. I do not say where they were to be found; but could not we have found transports sufficient to be sent thither in time to take the land transport required for the army to the Crimea?—I must say, in answer, that I exerted myself to the utmost, with the ablest assistants that a man ever possessed, and that I had exhausted the means of transport.

21119. General *Peel.*] Was any requisition made to the Admiralty to supply additional transport to convey the means of land transport for the army to the Crimea?—No.

21120. *Chairman.*] Supposing such requisition had been made, was it in the power of the Admiralty to have accomplished it?—Not at that time, certainly.

21121. Not from any part of the earth?—Not between the end of June and the time when the army moved from Varna to the Crimea.

21122. Mr. *Layard.*] But the Government knew how many men were to be transported from Varna to the Crimea?—The order was that the base should be changed.

21123. Did not the Government know how many men were to be transported to the Crimea?—Of course they knew the strength of their own army.

21124. Had they made no calculation in England as to the necessary amount of land transport to accompany that army?—It was left to the discretion of the general; it was not an imperative order, though a strong wish was expressed that if he thought it possible he should go; of course his discretion must have been guided by the means at his disposal, with reference to the object to be attained; and the general decided to go with such means as he had.

21125. *Chairman.*] Leaving his land transport behind him?—I am not aware that he did so, not the whole of it; I imagine that he took what he thought sufficient.

21126. Lord *Seymour.*] Dr. Andrew Smith has stated to this Committee, indeed has laid before this Committee a letter which he wrote in the course of the summer to the military secretary of the Commander-in-chief, stating the great importance of having some vessels prepared, some as hospitals, and some for the conveyance of the sick and wounded; was that letter sent on to the Admiralty?—No, I am not aware of receiving any such letter.

21126.* Was the question of ship hospitals brought to the consideration of the Admiralty?—Yes; not officially or formally, but discussions took place between me and the military authorities upon the subject of floating hospitals; and

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and I, with naval experience and advice, was very much opposed to floating hospitals; and the very first step taken by Admiral Dundas, I am not quite sure whether by orders or on his own responsibility—but it was highly approved when the war became inevitable—was to hire a building at Therapia for a naval hospital, with the view of having the sick and wounded of the navy, not on board ship but on shore, for all our naval experience leads us to think that where it is possible to put the sick and wounded men on shore it is highly inexpedient to keep them on board ship. Admiral Dundas hired a hospital at Therapia, and, I think, the Committee probably will have heard of the state of that hospital. While other hospitals have not been in a good condition that one has been well provided, and there has been no hospital in England better ordered than the naval hospital at Therapia. So, also, last year in the Baltic, I was most anxious, instead of having a floating hospital, to have obtained a hospital either in Denmark or in Sweden, but the Danish and Swedish Governments thought it inconsistent with their neutrality to give us that facility, and in our distress we were forced to send a ship there fitted as a hospital, with very great regret. Generally, I gave my advice against floating hospitals, but still the urgency of the service, and the numbers of the sick became greater, and two floating hospitals were established in the Bosphorus, one a Turkish line-of-battle ship, and the other a transport. I do not believe that the experience of those floating hospitals has shaken the soundness of the opinion that floating hospitals are inferior to hospitals on shore.

21127. As the base of operations was now removed from Varna to the Crimea, it became obvious, or at least probable, that the wounded would have to be removed by sea from Balaklava to Constantinople or its neighbourhood. What provisions was made for the transport of those sick and wounded?—With the permission of the Committee I will read to them a despatch upon that subject to Admiral Dundas, dated Admiralty, 28th of December 1854. "Sir,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you copies of a letter from the Foreign Office, and of its enclosures, containing representations of the deficiency of the accommodation on board the two hospital ships at Constantinople" (these are the ships that I mentioned, the Turkish line-of-battle ship and another), "appropriated for the reception of the sick and wounded of the British army in the Crimea, and of the defective arrangements for the conveyance of the wounded from the Crimea in transports, in consequence of which the suffering of the patients is greatly increased; and with reference to the latter representation, my Lords desire me to call your attention to that part of Sir James Graham's letter to you on the 25th of October last, a copy of which I also enclose, in which he invites your consideration to the question of fitting one or two steam transports specially for this service." That was a private letter, and I should not have felt myself at liberty to use it, had it not, by this letter of the 28th, been made a public document, and I will now read to the Committee a private letter of the 25th October.

21128. *Chairman.*] You state that you would not have felt yourself at liberty to use it if it had not been made a public document by the despatch of the 28th, but is not any private document relating to public matters public?—I conceive not; I conceive that no person has a right to use a private letter without the consent of the writer, whether that gentleman be in office or out of it.

21129. Is not that a private letter of your own?—The letter of the 25th of October was a private letter, written by me to Admiral Dundas, but I should not have used that letter, had it not been made public by the despatch which I have just read.

21130. Not if it related to public matters?—Certainly not; I should not consider myself at liberty, with reference to the conduct of Admirals with whom I corresponded, on an occasion like this, to make use of my private correspondence.

21131. Mr. *Layard.*] Is it advisable that instructions of any kind should be sent in private letters?—I do not think that the public service could be conducted without it; I think there is a freedom of communication in private letters, where the head of the department communicates with those conducting at a distance the public business under his directions, which would be entirely destroyed if that confidence were not mutually and strictly maintained;

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and my view is that the public gain greatly by the maintenance of that confidence.

21132. That merely relates to treating of public matters; but when instructions are given in a private letter upon which an officer may act, surely that letter becomes a public letter?—I conceive not until it assumes a public shape, such as I gave to this letter of the 25th of October, which, if the Committee will allow me, I will read.

21133. I do not see the distinction which you draw between a public and a private letter?—I am sorry that I cannot explain it more clearly.

21134. Lord *Seymour*.] Will you have the goodness to read that letter?—This is from Mr. Hammond to the Secretary for the Admiralty, dated December the 26th 1854: "Sir,—I am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to transmit to you, for the information of the Board of Admiralty, a copy of a despatch from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, inclosing copies of his correspondence with Admiral Boxer, respecting deficient accommodation on board the hospital ships for the sick and wounded of the British army. I am," &c.

21135. Mr. *Layard*.] Is that a public letter?—Yes; sent by Mr. Hammond to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

21136. *Chairman*.] You have not read the private letter from yourself?—No. Then Lord Stratford de Redcliffe incloses this letter to Admiral Boxer: "British Embassy, 1 December 1854. Sir,—An impression pretty generally prevails that our sick and wounded, on board the Turkish hulk and the 'Bombay,' have neither beds nor quilts to lie down on at night; it is asserted that a similar deficiency sometimes, if not often, exists on board the transports employed in bringing down the sick and wounded. As I cannot conceal these reports from Her Majesty's Government if they remain uncontradicted, I shall feel extremely obliged by any information which you may think proper to afford me on this subject. I have," &c. That is Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's letter to Admiral Boxer, and Admiral Boxer answers it December the 9th: "My Lord,—In reply to your letter of the 1st instant, relative to the want of beds on board the 'Bombay' and Turkish hospital ships for the military invalids, I have the honour to state, that both these ships were appropriated for convalescents; and hammocks and blankets were provided for them. The sick on board of those ships are not under my jurisdiction. I have," &c. Now, the last inclosure is my private letter to Admiral Dundas, of the 25th of October, to which, officially, the Board of Admiralty calls his attention on the 28th of December, I having made it public, and the Committee will observe the date; it is immediately after our receiving an account of the battle of Alma, the day before the action at Balaklava, and this letter must have been received within a few days of the battle of Inkermann. "My dear Admiral,—Distressing accounts, probably exaggerated, of the sufferings of the sick and wounded after the battle of Alma, on their passage to Constantinople, have produced a painful impression in England. It was necessary to embark them from an open beach; on shore there was no hospital or cover; the preparations had all been made on the Varna side, when the base of operations was suddenly changed, and every available ship had been fully occupied in the conveyance of troops. In such circumstances it is no matter of surprise, though it is to be regretted, that the sick and wounded were put on board ships imperfectly prepared for this service; that the crowding was great, the ventilation insufficient, and the suffering extreme. In truth, a ship is always a bad hospital; the motion of the sea is a great aggravation of distress and pain, and the worst hospital ashore is preferable to the best sick-bay afloat. If Sebastopol falls into our hands, I conclude that both naval and military hospitals will be established for the sick and wounded in suitable buildings which will be found there; but if the operations outside be prolonged, and it be necessary again to send large numbers of wounded to Constantinople, I will thank you to have one or two of the large steam transports fitted up for this service without delay, first conferring with Lord Raglan, and arranging that naval and military medical officers shall be consulted as to the necessary fittings. I am willing, however, to hope that the fall of Sebastopol, and that your firm hold of the southern portion of the Crimea, will supersede the necessity of these hospital transports; but, in case of an unexpected emergency, it is better that the preparation should be made. I am," &c.

21137. Mr. *Layard*.] Why were not those instructions sent in a public letter?—I did not think it necessary at that time so to do.

21138. Could Admiral Dundas in explanation of the fact of his not having made those preparations, shield himself under the fact of its being a private letter?—I should think he might have done so; but it is highly improbable that an officer of his high honour would do so.

21139. Then what is the distinction between a public and a private letter?—The greatest. One may be used by the Government without any reservation, and the other cannot, as I think, be so used.

21140. *Chairman.*] You stated just now that you made it a public letter?—Yes.

21141. On your own authority?—There is a power always on the part of the First Lord of the Admiralty of converting a private communication into a public one, informing the officer that he has so done.

21142. Do not you perceive that you put the officer under a disadvantage, because you have the power to render that public which you began by making private, thus involving him, if he is to be involved, in a difficulty?—That is the invariable practice, an approved system; and is the mode of conducting the business with officers on foreign service.

21143. The letter contained instructions which he was to follow, and which it was his duty to follow in obeying you as the head of the Admiralty. If he had thought fit not to follow them, could you have made him responsible for his non-obedience of his orders?—I have always the power of recalling him, and ordering him to strike his flag.

21144. For not obeying a private letter?—Yes; if I think that an order so conveyed ought to have been attended to, though in a private letter, and that he has neglected his duty. I am responsible, while at the head of the Admiralty, for his remaining in command, and I have the power to order him to strike his flag.

21145. Sir *J. Pakington.*] In the event of any public inquiry such as this, if public orders are conveyed in private letters, and those private letters are to be considered as strictly secret, might not the object of such an inquiry be entirely defeated?—The Committee will excuse me if I do not argue that question. I can only say that I adhere to the practice and to the opinion that there is the broadest distinction in any inquiry between what are public despatches and private letters.

21146. Even when private letters convey public orders?—Yes; the order is not complete as relates to the sanction of the public authorities till it has been communicated to the Admiralty.

21147. *Chairman.*] I again ask, if the person to whom such letter is written is responsible for his obedience to it; for if he be responsible for his disobedience or obedience to it, there is no difference between that letter and a public one?—I cannot carry the argument further.

21148. Mr. *Layard.*] Are those letters copied and registered in the Admiralty, the same as public letters?—No.

21149. Then they remain the private property of the person who writes them?—Certainly.

21150. Then suppose you leave the Admiralty, and that by any casualty that letter is lost or burnt, and that the person to whom the orders are sent in that private letter has obeyed, and the responsibility falls upon him; how can you prove that those orders were given to him?—It is not equivalent to an Admiralty order, and it cannot be pleaded as an Admiralty order.

21151. You give that order in a private letter, which remains your property, and which you take away when you leave the Admiralty; and you throw upon the person to whom that order is given, the responsibility of obeying it; at the same time there is no record in the office of his having received the order which he does obey?—It is a limited responsibility, and it remains limited until it be confirmed by a public order.

21152. If the person to whom it is sent should disobey it, you cannot dismiss him, can you?—Yes; I can recall him from his command.

21153. *Chairman.*] It is the rule, as to a private letter, that the person to whom it is written has not the power to use it without the consent of the person writing it?—Yes.

21154. Then if the officer to whom a letter is written wanted to use it in his own defence, he could not do it without your consent?—No; the writer exercising

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exercising his own discretion; it being his property he may make it public if he thinks fit, which is the discretion that I did exercise; it is unequal; the writer is the proprietor of the letter, and has full power over it, but the person who receives it has only a limited power over it.

21155. Therefore he cannot use it in his own defence?—Not without the consent of the writer.

21156. General *Peel.*] Had not Lord Raglan a concurrent power with Admiral Dundas as to the use of the transports which were there?—He had the supreme power; he had a veto over the movement of the transports.

21157. Then how could Admiral Dundas comply with your order, without imparting it to Lord Raglan?—The letter provides for that; it says, "I will thank you to have one or two of the large steam transports fitted for this service without delay, first conferring with Lord Raglan, and arranging that naval and military medical officers shall be consulted as to the necessary fittings."

21158. Lord *Seymour.*] From the evidence which you have given, it would appear that you do not concur with the evidence given by Dr. Andrew Smith. I will read to you what he stated at Question 8271: "Experience at Walcheren, at Hong Kong, and at other places, has proved that disease which would not yield to treatment on shore, readily succumbed almost the moment the sufferer was placed on board a ship, not half a mile distant from the spot where no favourable results could be obtained; and further, that convalescence, which was stationary on shore, advanced rapidly under like circumstances. These facts indicate the preparations which ought to be made, provided it be not possible to secure what would be much more advantageous, namely, hospital accommodation on some healthy island in the Black Sea, or in the Grecian Archipelago." I understand from you that that letter was never submitted to the Admiralty?—I never saw it.

21159. Was that question brought before them in any official shape, namely, the importance of establishing a naval hospital-ship at the Bosphorus as soon as the expedition to the Crimea was commenced?—I speak from recollection, I am not aware of any such official communication having been made to the Admiralty; but I do recollect discussions as to the superiority of a floating hospital as contrasted with a hospital on shore, and I had then the benefit of the advice of Sir William Burnett, the Director-general of the Medical Branch of the Navy, one of the oldest officers in the service, who was present at the battle of the Nile and Trafalgar, and who has the largest experience as to wounded men, and he certainly prefers a hospital on shore; and effect was given to that opinion in this very case, for in preference to having a floating hospital in the Bosphorus, we hired a hospital at Therapia.

21160. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is it not possible that a small number of invalids on board ship might rapidly regain their health, but that they might not do so when the ship was crowded?—Gangrene appears when a ship is crowded; ventilation is very difficult, and erysipelas often spreads with frightful rapidity. The contact is so close, that there is every possible disadvantage in a floating hospital.

21161. Lord *Seymour.*] Great complaint has been made as to the means of landing the sick, for want of proper boats, at Scutari; who was responsible for the supply of those boats for such a purpose?—I conceive the officer commanding in the Bosphorus, subject always to the communications which he should make to the Commander-in-chief. I conceive the Commander-in-chief to have the largest power both for supply and ordering, and if the Committee will permit me to add one remark, this had been enforced upon Admiral Dundas from an early period, and I should like to read to the Committee the instructions upon this very point, of exercising control. A letter was written on the 29th of November, and it was written before the account of the storm off Balaklava arrived in England. The storm took place on the 14th; Admiral Dundas writes on the 17th of November, informing us of it; that letter was not received at the Admiralty till the 2d of December. The letter which I will read is dated the 29th of November, and we were not then cognisant of the storm: "Sir,—I am commanded, by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to acquaint you that the period of the year having now arrived at which the difficulties of navigation in the Black Sea may be expected to increase, and it being of the utmost importance that attention should be given to the means by which

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which the support of Her Majesty's ships and the regular transport of supplies, for the use of the allied armies in the Crimea, can be best insured, and casualties averted during the winter, my Lords are of opinion that the capabilities of the several anchorages to which ships of war and transports can most conveniently resort, should be carefully considered, and that no time should be lost in concerting proper arrangements to ensure the safety of the allied fleets, and the regular supply of the armies, as well as the means of embarkation in case of necessity. In the several reports received by their Lordships relative to the operations of the fleets during the last winter, it was more than once asserted that only two secure ports existed in the Black Sea, namely, the Bosphorus and the harbour of Sebastopol. In the present posture of affairs it must be doubtful when free access to the harbour of Sebastopol will be obtained; the bays in the neighbourhood of Cape Khersonese being exposed to the prevailing northerly winds can afford no such certain means of communication with the armies on shore as will be necessary, and the harbour of Balaklava appears to be too limited in extent to afford more than the shelter required for a given number of transports when in the act of unloading; next to these may be mentioned the anchorages at Eupatoria and in the Bay of Theodosia, but both are too distant to afford ready support, or the means of prompt communication with the allied armies; neither of them can be regarded as protected from all winds, or secure from the molestations of the enemy; the bays of Bourghas and of Sinope are both distant, and to leeward, but present some advantages which may deserve attention. It seems not improbable that the most certain means of communication with the allied armies may be by the frequent and regular despatch of powerful steam-vessels direct from the Bosphorus for Balaklava, with orders to return immediately when unloaded, or when freighted with return cargoes. My Lords therefore direct that, upon full consideration of the whole subject, and after communication with Vice-Admiral Hamelin, you will report fully your opinion of the relative advantages of the several anchorages which may be used to facilitate the necessary operations of the fleet; and you are to state at the earliest possible period the arrangements intended to be adopted by you with the ships and transports now under your orders, in order that proper instructions may be given to all vessels to be hereafter despatched from this country, and that their Lordships may have full information of the positions in which vessels of every class will be most probably collected. Your arrangements upon this subject should likewise be carefully explained from time to time to Lord Raglan. I am, &c." Then on the 18th of December this further letter was written with reference to the one which I have just read. "Admiralty, 18th December 1854. Sir, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that although their Lordships have received no official details from you, they have reason to believe that great delay and confusion have occurred both at Balaklava and Constantinople in the disembarkation of the baggage of the army, and of stores most urgently required for the comfort, and even the wants, both of the officers and men. Their Lordships are aware that the most pressing necessity has been to forward the reinforcements and ammunition to the seat of war with the utmost possible expedition; and that stores, much wanted at Constantinople, have been forwarded to Varna and to the Crimea, because the ships containing them could not be detained or unloaded. Again at Balaklava, the smallness of the harbour, the apprehensions of an attack, the insufficient accommodation for landing, and the entire absence of storehouses on shore, have caused unavoidable delay in clearing the transports of their cargoes, and it may have been necessary to send them away suddenly for fresh troops before it was possible to unload them. Their Lordships have already directed an inquiry into the causes which led to the loss of the "Prince" six days after her arrival at Balaklava, and after the landing of the troops conveyed in her, when she still lay in an open roadstead outside the harbour, with her whole cargo on board, which cargo contained the means of meeting some of the greatest wants of the army, encamped within a few miles of the ship. The loss of the "Resolute," in the same roadstead, on the same occasion, freighted with the ammunition most necessary for the siege, is another illustration of the same defective arrangements. Medical stores, shipped for Constantinople, and much required in the hospitals there, have, as it is alleged, been sent on to Varna, and have not until lately reached their

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destination, while the baggage of the officers, which was left at Varna when the army moved to the Crimea, after the lapse of two months, had not been delivered to the regiments in front of Sebastopol, thereby inflicting on the officers extreme and most painful privations. Great allowances must be made on all sides for the peculiar difficulties in which adverse circumstances have placed both the fleet and the army, but past experience may serve to prevent the recurrence of such defective arrangements, and to suggest proper precautions for the future. My Lords desire that the whole subject be carefully and immediately considered by yourself, in concert with Lord Raglan, more especially with reference to the steps to be adopted for keeping up the supplies of provisions and stores from Constantinople, and the establishment of a regular communication by steam vessels, as directed in their Lordship's letter of the 8th November, No. 706; and orders are to be framed on the spot, and issued for the guidance of the Port Admiral at Constantinople, and of the senior naval officer at Balaklava, on whom the command of the transports and of the arrangements within the harbour devolve, in conformity with the established rules of the service. Rear-Admiral Boxer has been ordered to proceed to Balaklava, there to take the command, under your immediate control and direction, and to keep up the most ready and constant communication between the army, the fleet, and the Commissariat. The Rear-Admiral has been directed to shift his flag from the "Harpy" to the "Diamond," or any steam vessel well adapted for the duties in Balaklava Harbour, and around Sebastopol. Rear-Admiral Stopford is now at Constantinople, and my Lords have directed him to remain there for the present, with his flag in one of the sailing line-of-battle ships not ordered home; and to him should be confided all the duties hitherto discharged by Admiral Boxer, and any additional duties which, with reference to these instructions, you may think fit to impose on him. The Rear-Admiral being entrusted with the command at Constantinople, is to keep up a constant and confidential communication with the British Ambassador, and through his Excellency obtain the co-operation and assistance of the Turkish Government in the various naval services which will be brought under his supervision and control. It is, moreover, particularly incumbent on the naval officer charged with the command in the Bosphorus to act in strict concert with the military authorities there, to whom power is delegated by Lord Raglan; so that past omissions may be supplied, and inconveniences may be avoided for the furtherance of the army, medical, and commissariat services, and for better securing the disembarkation and prompt distribution of army stores consigned to the various British departments of the army at Constantinople. Their Lordships must necessarily leave many details to your direction; but they desire that the substance of these instructions be carried into immediate execution, and that you will hasten to inform their Lordships what are the arrangements which you may have made. You will request Lord Raglan to appoint some officer to be associated with Rear-Admiral Boxer" (that is, at Balaklava), "for the purpose of pointing out what is most required by the army, and of rendering every assistance in landing and placing the stores in safety, in a convenient position. The necessary corresponding instructions have been given to Rear-Admirals Boxer and Stopford. I am, &c." This letter reached Admiral Dundas about the time that he transferred the command to Sir Edmund Lyons. I am not aware that any answer has been received at the Admiralty; but very detailed instructions with regard to the harbour at Balaklava were issued by Admiral Boxer, I should presume in pursuance of this instruction. They are before the Admiralty; they are excellent, and have produced the best effect.

21162. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Did that despatch reach Admiral Dundas before he resigned the command, or not?—I am not quite sure; it is dated the 18th of December.

21163. *Chairman.*] At Question 20495, I put this question: "When were you first apprised of the necessity of procuring transports for the army going from Varna to the Crimea?—I had nothing to do with the transports; they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie." "When were you first apprised of the necessity of procuring transports for the army going from Varna to the Crimea?—I was never ordered to find transports; Lord Raglan had the arrangement of the transports." Is that your idea?—No.

21164. "Surely

21164. "Surely you transported the army across?—Yes, but I had no orders to hire transports; it was the part of the army to do that, and if there had been 50 ships lying in the Bosphorus, I could not have hired one"?—That is not my view of the duty of the admiral, or of the power of the admiral. I have already stated that I conceive that the naval Commander-in-chief, in concert with the military Commander-in-chief, has complete power over the transports, and upon an emergency, on their responsibility, may hire and take up anything that can be procured.

21165. General *Peel.*] The military Commander-in-chief would not take up transports without communicating with the Admiral?—No, it is a combined service and a joint authority, and can be only conducted by concert and perfect harmony.

21166. *Chairman.*] You were asked by the Noble Lord whether you had any information respecting complaints made of the management, by Admiral Boxer, of the transport service, and you stated that you had received no formal complaint?—Yes.

21167. Had you heard any informal complaints?—I had only seen what had appeared in the daily prints; I had no official information as to any defect in the conduct of the duties of that service, within the Bosphorus, by Admiral Boxer, and I have never yet seen any.

21168. If this Committee have been told that there was a vessel sent from Balaklava for horses, called the "Jason," and that she was detained many weeks in the Bosphorus by Admiral Boxer, very much to the detriment of the public service; you had no complaint of that circumstance?—I cannot bring any complaint to my recollection with respect to the conduct of the duties by Admiral Boxer; no official complaint whatever.

21169. It was in consequence of the opinion you entertained before, of the high character of Admiral Boxer, that you transferred him from the Bosphorus to Balaklava?—Yes; I thought, as I have already expressed, that for the limited duty which I sent him to discharge, when I first appointed him, he was well suited; but the magnitude of that command swelled with events, and I thought that there were particular portions of it for which he was not so well qualified as another officer whom it was in my power to employ; I did think him particularly well qualified to restore order at Balaklava, under the direction of the Commander-in-chief; and I moved him up upon that view of his merits and qualifications.

21170. Of the complaints made in the newspapers, which were informal, you took no notice?—I have read the letter of the 18th of December, in which I begin by saying: "Although their Lordships have received no official details from you, they have reason to believe that great delay and confusion have occurred, both at Balaklava and Constantinople." That is the notice that I took of it.

21171. Mr. *Layard.*] No reflections have been made, either in this Committee or elsewhere, upon the character either of Admiral Boxer or Captain Christie; what has been stated about those officers merely points to their being incapable to perform the duties imposed upon them?—The faults of Captain Christie, if he is alive, are about to be investigated by the most competent tribunal, and the merits of Admiral Boxer will be better displayed by his services at Balaklava. It is very important, and I should like to exhaust what has been written upon this point. I have read to the Committee the two letters of the 29th of November and the 18th of December. I would now like to read a letter of the 20th of December. This is a public despatch from the Board of Admiralty. I have not read any private letter except that of the 25th of October, which was made public. All the other documents that I am using are public despatches, which I read to the Committee, with the consent of Lord Palmerston, the first adviser of the Crown. "Sir,—With reference to the appointment of Rear-Admiral the Honourable Montague Stopford to fulfill the duties heretofore performed by Rear-Admiral Boxer at Constantinople, and to the removal of the latter officer to Balaklava, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that as the charge of the Heraclea coal mines will now devolve on Real-Admiral Stopford, you are to take care that this service is perfectly provided for. My Lords further desire that you will exercise a general superintendence and maintain a general responsibility over the

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the whole of the duties devolving upon the several flag officers under your orders. I am, &c."

21172. *Chairman.*] To whom was that directed?—To the Commander-in-chief in the Black Sea.

21173. Was that Admiral Dundas?—Yes; he was the Commander-in-chief in the Black Sea, so far as we were aware at that time. Then, on the 28th of December, the Secretary of the Admiralty writes, "Sir,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you a copy of a letter from Mr. Hammond, with copies of its enclosures, and with reference to the representation of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, relative to the facilities to be afforded in the conveyance of ammunition and provisions to the Turkish troops to be detached from the army of Omer Pacha for service in the Crimea, I am to signify their Lordships' direction to you, to render every assistance that the means at your disposal will admit, to further, with the least possible delay, the object in question. I am further to call your particular attention to the grave error committed by Captain Christie, in sending certain Turkish troops to Balaklava, instead of to Eupatoria direct, adverted to by Lord Raglan in his despatch of the 8th instant, transmitted herewith; and with reference to the general conduct of the transport service in the Black Sea, my Lords wish to be furnished, as speedily as circumstances will permit, with your opinion and report as to the manner in which this duty has been discharged by Captain Christie, and as to the perfect competency of that officer to carry out the intentions of the Government, and his capability of fulfilling the duties devolvingup on an officer holding so important a post. I am, &c." And there is one more letter of the 3d of January, addressed, I think, to Sir Edmund Lyons. "Sir,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you copies of a despatch, and of its enclosures, from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, requesting that Rear-Admiral Boxer would afford assistance in the transmission of Turkish troops and munitions of war from Varna to the Crimea, together with a copy of their Lordships' reply to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I am to acquaint you that my Lords consider you, as Commander-in-chief, responsible for carrying out such requirements, bearing in mind that in all the arrangements to be made for the transport and landing of such a force you should communicate fully with the Commander-in-chief of the army, in order to an entire and complete co-operation with his views. I am, &c." There is one other passage which I should like to read to the Committee, but it is an extract from a secret and confidential despatch, of which I cannot read the whole. It is addressed to Sir Edmund Lyons, and is upon the question of responsibility when the command was transferred to him. The whole despatch is secret and confidential, and I cannot produce it before the Committee; but there is an extract relating to the principal responsibility of the naval Commander-in-chief, which, if the Committee think fit to hear, I should like to read. I have asked Lord Palmerston whether I am at liberty to read that extract or not, and he has said that I might, subject to the willingness of the Committee to receive the extract. I cannot read the whole despatch.

21174. *Chairman.*] The Committee will be glad to hear it?—"For the adequate performance of the duties of the commands, both at Balaklava and at Constantinople, their Lordships regard you as responsible. You are invested with supreme authority, you have ample means at your disposal, and in the just exercise of your power you may rely on the support of their Lordships; but the safety of the army and the honour of the nation are at stake, and each officer in his respective station must do his duty under you with corresponding energy, activity, and zeal." That was on the 4th of January, on the transfer of the command to Sir Edmund Lyons, and power was given to him summarily to deal with any officer whom he thought negligent in his duty.

21175. But he had not greater power over the transport service than Admiral Dundas had had?—Certainly not; but it recalled to his recollection the principle, the particular principle, which is, I think, necessary to be remembered by Commanders-in-chief, as to their large authority on the one hand, and the weight of their responsibility on the other.

21176. Mr. *Layard.*] In your opinion, had Admiral Dundas had the same powers that you gave to Sir Edmund Lyons by that despatch?—Most certainly.

21177. Could

21177. Could Admiral Dundas have suspended either Admiral Boxer or Captain Christie if he had thought proper?—It would have been a strong measure, but I think, beyond all doubt, he had the power.

21178. Sir *J. Hanmer.*] With reference to the private letter, has Admiral Dundas applied to you for permission to use any private letters of yours in explanation before this Committee?—No; no such application whatever has been made.

21179. *Chairman.*] In his examination before this Committee Admiral Dundas was asked, "Was Admiral Boxer under you? Yes.—If you had been dissatisfied with him, had you the power to dismiss him? No.—But you would have had to represent his conduct to the Admiralty at home? I should have mentioned it to Lord Raglan before I did so"?—With reference to the question regarding the insufficiency of the means of transport of the sick and wounded from Balaklava to the Bosphorus with comfort, I should wish the Committee to bear in mind a melancholy fact, but one almost unexampled, that out of an army so limited in number as the British army was, 13,800 men had been removed sick or wounded between the 30th of September and the 17th of February, a number for which it was hardly possible for any foresight to have provided.

21180. Lord *Seymour.*] With regard to the conveyance of warm clothing, it has been stated by Sir Thomas Hastings that as early as the 7th of August the Board of Ordnance applied to the Admiralty for the means of transport for the warm clothing, but that they did not obtain that transport till the 16th of October?—I had an explanation on this matter from Captain Milne, and I have, together with him, myself inspected all the original requisitions from the Board of Ordnance, and therefore I have verified the accuracy of what I am about to state to the Committee on this subject.

21181. At Question 18278, Sir Thomas Hastings was asked: "Is it customary, on the part of the Board of Ordnance, when there is any pressing necessity, to remark in that application that it is urgent?" And I ask you the same question, whether the applications that were made from the Board of Ordnance were stated to be urgent?—I have seen all the original requisitions, and verified them myself, and there is not one marked "immediate" or "urgent," with respect to warm clothing, within the time specified. I will now read the requisitions as they came in to us.

21182. Captain *Gladstone.*] Was any one of them marked "warm clothing"?—Not one; the Admiralty had no notice that those requisitions referred to clothing.

21183. Did the first requisition of the 7th of August state when the clothing would be ready?—I will read to the Committee the requisition; "7th August, 100 tons light Ordnance stores, to be ready in about a fortnight"; no mention was made that it was warm clothing, and there was no mark of "immediate," or "urgent," upon the requisition. "12th August, 10 tons light stores, 7 ½ of which is ammunition"; there is no "immediate" on it. "14th August, 96 tons light stores, 50 of which is ammunition"; nothing ever stated about clothing, or any notation of "immediate." "25th August, 200 tons light stores, in addition to the requisitions of the 7th, 12th, and 14th August"; note, in addition, "200 tons in about a fortnight"; there is no mention of clothing. "2d September, 200 light stores, in addition to 300 tons, 7th and 25th August"; there was not one word about "urgency." Not one word was ever said to the Admiralty that those requisitions were for warm clothing, nor was one marked "urgent," or "immediate"; had it been so, the Admiralty had particular facilities throughout the month of September for sending them out. We had the following vessels loading for Varna, during the month of September, while those requisitions were taking place; and I will read to the Committee, with the dates, the shipping with cargoes which were unmixed, but with which clothing might have been very easily mixed. The "London" sailed on the 3d of September with beef and pork, &c. The "Supply" sailed on the 4th of September with shot, shell, and ammunition. The "Vifriedo" sailed on the 21st of September with beef, pork, biscuits, &c. The "Briton" sailed on the 22d of September with beef, pork, biscuits, &c. The "Faith" sailed on the 28th of September with beef, pork, and rum; and the "Lion" sailed on the 13th of October with a similar cargo. A steamer, certainly not a very eligible one, was declined on the 18th of August, because there was no urgency in the requisitions. Had the Admiralty been told that the requisitions of the

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Ordnance were pressing, this vessel would have been chartered. The stores shipping by these vessels could have been left out had the Board of Ordnance expressed any urgency for these light stores to be sent out. The first requisition was not to be ready until about the 22d of August, and as those stores were accumulating, it required a large vessel to convey them. Now, the "Prince," a very large steamer belonging to the Crown, was on the point of returning from the Baltic, and her arrival was expected early in September, and there being no note as to "urgency," it was thought that this accumulation of Ordnance stores might be embarked in her. She came from the Baltic on the 11th of September, and she was at once appropriated for the Ordnance service. She did not reach the river till the 16th of September, and she was to have sailed on the 4th of October, but owing to the large amount of Ordnance stores to be shipped, 1,287 tons, and besides that the embarkation of the 46th Regiment, it was the 16th of October before she sailed. Now she had on board all these articles of clothing, namely, 35,700 pairs of woollen socks, 53,000 woollen frocks, 17,000 woollen drawers, 2,500 watch coats, 16,100 blankets, and 3,700 rugs. I was about to say, what is a matter of opinion, that if the "Prince" had never been lost, and if those valuable goods had been delivered, we should not have heard of the urgency of the "warm clothing" requisition during the months of August and September.

21184. Captain *Gladstone.*] What was the date of the first requisition that the Admiralty received, to find tonnage, from the Board of Ordnance?—The 18th of October; that was the first requisition when we heard of warm clothing, and it was in these terms: "Light stores (warm clothing), 300 tons"; and I beg the Committee to observe that in this requisition, for the first time, warm clothing was mentioned and "urgency." The note was received at the Admiralty on the 18th, and it was shipped in the "Jura" on the 22d, within four days. To make the return complete, I will put in the date of the requisition, the date of departure, and particulars of tonnage, also when shipped, and all the subsequent Ordnance requisitions.

Vide Appendix.

21185. Lord *Seymour.*] It has been stated to the Committee that the Secretary-at-War had desired that articles destined for the Crimea should not be sent in sailing vessels, but to be sent in steamers; will you inform the Committee whether or not any such communication was made to the Admiralty?—I have already stated that no written communication took place with the Admiralty upon this subject of steam only, or a combination of steam and sailing vessels. There was a discussion between me and my colleagues; they naturally pressed for steam, not knowing the difficulty of obtaining it; I contended for the prudence of mixing steam and sailing vessels in the then state of the market.

21186. Captain *Gladstone.*] Then the fact was that some steamers did sail after the 7th of August and before the 16th of October, which might have taken out warm clothing?—The vessels I have mentioned were sailing vessels, carrying out provisions such as I have mentioned, but there was a steamer which we rejected, and which, if we had known of the urgency, we should have taken up.

21187. Lord *Seymour.*] I believe you were at the Admiralty in former years, and abolished the old Transport Board, did you not?—Yes, I did.

21188. Then you came to the Admiralty in a time of war, and found it working without a Transport Board, and you eventually re-established the Transport Board. Will you state to the Committee whether you found that the abolition of the Transport Board had led to any inconvenience to the public service?—In a time of peace, promptitude, despatch of business, concentration of authority and responsibility, and every advantage, flowed from the abolition of the Transport Board; and it was with the very utmost reluctance that I gave my consent, even during the emergency of war, for a short period, to reconstituting the Transport Board. I do not know whether the Committee will choose to hear my opinion upon that point, but the reasons which led me to it are reasons which ought to have weight in the reconstruction of or alteration of the construction of any great department, in my humble judgment.

21189. Did you find that the management under Captain Milne was not efficient?—It was far from that; and if Captain Milne could have been spared to devote his attention exclusively to the transport service, I think it would have

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have been more efficiently conducted than by any Board. I must make one reservation, that, with implicit reliance on the spotless honour of Captain Milne, it is a great trust to have the power, amidst extraordinary temptations, of spending five millions, year by year, without the intervention of any second person; but, saving that question of pecuniary responsibility, as relates to the efficiency of the service, the work would have been better done by him without a Board than by any Board that could be constructed. Now that opens the way to the great nicety of combined considerations in reconstruction; for to have spared Captain Milne from the general service of the Admiralty, for the exclusive management of the transport service, would have been impossible; it would have been necessary to come to Parliament for an additional Lord of the Admiralty. Now with my experience of that Board, I have said that the harmony which always existed there, and the cordial co-operation, have tended greatly to the efficiency of the service, and rendered the transaction of public business easy, and even agreeable; but as you multiply the members of the Board, you greatly, and to a degree that you can hardly calculate, increase the difficulties of cordial co-operation and good understanding. A layman presiding at the Board of Admiralty has to consult four naval authorities, and if he had to consult five, I am quite sure it would shake his authority and increase his difficulty infinitely; and though I think the Board of Admiralty has worked well and does work well, yet there are evils inherent in Boards, and the difficulties are immensely increased by adding to the number of members. Upon the whole, I, having to decide between reconstructing the Transport Board for the limited period of the war, or making an addition to the Board of Admiralty itself, preferred the reconstruction of the Transport Board to asking Parliament to appoint an additional naval Lord of the Admiralty. Those are the views I took, which my colleagues wholly adopted.

21190. You made in former years some other alterations in the organisation of the departments of the Admiralty; did you find the Admiralty departments during this war, with two large fleets to be prepared, effective for that purpose? —I have said that the whole responsibility rests with me; if faults have been committed the faults are mine; if there be any merit the merit is with those who served under me. I do not think it is possible under any reconstruction that I can contemplate, that the public will be served more efficiently, more zealously, or more successfully, than under the co-operation which I have received, first from the Board, next from the Secretaries of the Board, and next from heads of the different departments. Sir Baldwin Walker I consider a man of first-rate abilities; he was my constant adviser and friend. Mr. Bromley, the Accountant-general, is a most accomplished public servant, and a first-rate accountant. Mr. Dundas and Mr. Grant, both in their respective departments, have done admirably. Sir William Burnett, the head of the medical department, has now retired, but a more efficient servant never was in a public office, and I certainly should say that any hopes of improvement by reconstruction and altering the composition of the Admiralty were vain; the head of it has every responsibility, and has as much power as can be conceded, or ought to be conceded to any man; the help he receives is most efficient; and the conduct of every man and every clerk since the commencement of the war, I cannot make an exception, has been zealous and exemplary in every respect.

21191. Your mention of Sir William Burnett calls to my mind a statement that was made by Admiral Dundas as to assistant surgeons, that there were not a sufficient number of assistant surgeons?—I have a note from Captain Richards, who is the superintending Lord of the medical branch, upon that subject, dated yesterday. I asked whether it were true that there were any vacancies in the establishment of the medical officers on board the Black Sea fleet, and this is his answer: "It appears (as far as can be ascertained) that the ships in the Black Sea were not short of their establishment of medical officers in the month of April 1854; in fact, an additional surgeon (for Therapia hospital), and an additional assistant surgeon, were borne on the books of the 'Britannia' flag ship at that time. Moreover, it further appears, by a return prepared for Parliament, in the Medical department, that in the month of July 1854, the Black Sea fleet was not short of its establishment of medical officers; and, in the course of August, September, and October 1854, upwards of 20 medical officers were sent out to the Black Sea, for service with the

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seamen employed on shore, at the hospitals, and to meet any special wants or exigencies of the service." Therefore, so far from being deficient, 20 extra medical men were sent, and they have contributed considerable assistance to the army on shore.

21192. It has been stated by the Duke of Newcastle, that with a view to the efficiency of the military operations, he conceived it desirable that the whole of the transport service, and the Transport Board, should be under the directions of the Minister of War; what is your opinion upon that subject?—I conceive that any such arrangement would have led to the greatest possible confusion. The service afloat is strictly naval; it is so intermingled with the regulations of the Queen's service, with the habit of officers commanding transports to be commanded by the superior naval officer, the chain of responsibility connecting the humblest officer of the transport service with the Commander-in-chief on a foreign station, and then, again, that Commander-in-chief with the Commander-in-chief of the army on shore, that it forms, altogether, one united link of responsibility, connected with order, which would be broken and dissolved by any such arrangement as was contemplated by placing the transport service under the Secretary of State for the War Department.

21193. Was that subject, when you were in office, ever brought to your notice by the Minister-of-War?—He stated the opinion to me, but not formally, and I stated the opinion on the other side, which I have given to the Committee.

21194. It was stated in the House of Commons that the strict blockade of the Black Sea had been ordered; will you state to the Committee whether or not such a strict blockade had been ordered?—In the strongest possible manner it had been called to the attention of the naval Commander-in-chief, and if I should not weary the Committee, I should like to read a series of despatches on the subject of the blockade; Lord Palmerston has no objection to my reading what I am about to read. This is dated the 25th of October.

21195. Mr. *Layard.*] Is that the first?—No, there are others. I was going to show the regret of the Admiralty that the blockade had not taken place earlier.

21196. Will you state when the first despatch was sent?—On the 5th of April, war being declared on the 29th of March. The Admiral is ordered to use the largest discretionary powers in blockading the Russian ports in the Black Sea, he taking care to specify the ports blockaded. That was on the 5th of April 1854. On the 29th of May, reports from the Advocate-general were transmitted to Admiral Dundas, with orders to furnish without delay precise information of the blockades actually established.

21197. Did he furnish that information?—I have already stated in Parliament that a scheme of blockade was prepared by Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin, which contemplated the stoppage at the Bosphorus of the entrance of trading vessels into the Black Sea, which was sent to England and to Paris by the respective Ambassadors, and was negatived by the two Governments as inconsistent with the law of nations, and that led to a considerable loss of time.

21198. Was that done in pursuance of those instructions?—Yes; then came the expedition to Varna, and from Varna to the Crimea, which occupied the whole of the available force; and that will bring me pretty nearly to the period when we expressed regret that the blockade had not been established. The letter of the 25th of October is the first expressing regret that it had not been done: "Sir,—I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to express to you the regret of their Lordships that the blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea has never yet been generally and rigorously established. The plan proposed by Admiral Hamelin and yourself of stopping the trade to and from the Russian ports at the entrance of the Bosphorus was inadmissible under the law of nations, and was consequently rejected. The failure of this plan rendered still more imperative the immediate adoption of the accustomed mode of blockade, by the presence of a sufficient force at the entrance of the principal harbours and estuaries belonging to the enemy, by the proclamation of each blockade in due form, and by its rigid enforcement by adequate naval means. With the exception of the mouths of the Danube, no such blockade in the Black Sea has as yet been established. Odessa is open; Kertch is open;

open; the whole coast from Sebastopol to the entrance of the Sea of Azof has remained unmolested and unwatched by the cruisers of the allies. The preparation of the means of transport for the allied army from Varna to the Crimea, the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, and co-operation with the army in the siege of Sebastopol, are reasons why these measures of blockade and of watching the enemy's ports may have been necessarily suspended or interrupted. But your attention is now specially called to this subject. You must concert your measures with the French Admiral immediately; and their Lordships desire that a strict blockade of all the enemy's principal ports in the Black Sea be forthwith established. I am, &c." Then the next letter that I would wish to read is dated the 3d of November.

21199. Did you receive any reply to this despatch to Admiral Dundas?—The time of this was very near the surrender of his command; and he did not receive it till about the end of November; there are some replies.

21200. During the months of September and October did Admiral Dundas give you any information on the subject of the blockade?—No; this letter admits the reasons why the blockade during those months was impossible.

21201. Did you not ask for information upon that subject, and was it given?—The first letter expressing regret that no blockade had been generally and rigorously established, was dated on the 25th of October, which I have just read.

21202. Did not the Government express surprise that no information was given to it on the subject?—I have read the first letter, in which regret is expressed.

21203. *Chairman.*] Beginning from September, or the latter end of August, when the army went from Varna to the Crimea, and while the naval forces were employed in that transport, there seems to have been a good reason why there should have been no blockade during those months; but in the months previously to that, when there was nothing to be done, there was no blockade?—It was all suspended on account of the plan which was under consideration, namely, the plan that Admiral Hamelin and Admiral Dundas had framed, which would have been quite effectual, but which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the French Ambassador thought inadmissible, and time was lost by reference home, and the result of the reference was the rejection of the scheme, and in the meantime nothing was done.

21204. That brings it down to the end of August?—That brings it down to the time of the whole concentration of the naval force, with a view of changing the basis of operations.

21205. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Are the Committee to understand that the expression of regret in that despatch was not intended to convey any censure upon the Admiral?—Quite so; it admits the validity of the reasons, but it regrets the fact that a blockade had not been instituted, and it ends with the desire that a strict blockade shall forthwith be established.

21206. Mr. *Layard.*] When was that received by Admiral Dundas?—I cannot tell; it was written on the 25th of October.

21207. Previously to Admiral Dundas having quitted the station, had he established any blockade?—No.

21208. During what time was it that that Russian steamer came out of the harbour of Sebastopol and appeared on the Turkish coast, and committed some act of aggression there?—The question of a steamer having so appeared is not clearly established; it may have taken place, but I am not satisfied that it did take place.

21209. *Chairman.*] Admiral Dundas said that she did come out?—Then of course that is the best authority; if he says so, no doubt it was so.

21210. Lord *Seymour.*] You have referred to the scheme of blockade which was disapproved by the diplomatic authorities at Constantinople?—They thought that they should refer it to their respective Governments.

21211. Had they not power themselves to reject it?—I think not; I think it would have been a strong measure; it came from the two Admirals with their concurrence in this scheme, and the Ambassadors thought it expedient to refer it to their respective Governments.

21212. Mr. *Layard.*] Did that prevent them, if they did not blockade the Bosphorus, from keeping up some kind of blockade on the coast of Turkey, or the Crimea?—They did not take that responsibility upon themselves.

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21213. Yet they were authorised to adopt a blockade?—The Committee will feel, I think, that they are trenching on delicate ground; it was necessary to proceed in concert with our ally in this matter. On November the 3d, the Admiralty writes to Admiral Dundas, "Sir,—With reference to former instructions relative to the necessity of establishing effective blockades of ports in the Russian dominions within the Black Sea, I am commanded to transmit to you a copy of a letter which my Lords have this day received from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informing them that instructions, similar to those which were forwarded to you on the 25th ultimo, will be communicated to Admiral Hamelin. I am therefore to signify their Lordships' desire that you lose no time in concerting measures with that officer, in order that effective blockades may be legally established, and proper notices given with respect to the coast, and all the rivers and ports from the mouths of the Danube inclusive, round by Odessa, and the Bay of Kherson, to the Gulf of Perekop, and along the north-west coast of the Crimea to Cape Tarkhan. Similar blockades should be established of the Gulf of Kertch, and thereby of all the ports and territories of Russia, within the Sea of Azof, and from thence of all the coast of Circassia, now occupied by Russian forces; and should the naval force at the disposal of yourself and of Admiral Hamelin admit of it, you are to take further steps to blockade such ports, and such portions of the south-west and south-east coasts of the Crimea as you may deem necessary, and especially the Port of Theodosia and the Bay of Kaffa. You are to observe that in the execution of these orders the first steps to be taken will be to station sufficient naval force upon the several parts of the coast intended to be included in the blockade, and that such blockade can take legal effect only from the dates at which such forces may be properly stationed; and I am further to direct your particular attention to the necessity of transmitting, by the earliest opportunities, the necessary notifications of blockades actually established in the forms forwarded to you in my circular letter of the 12th of August last. I am, &c." The precise form, drawn by the Queen's Advocate, was transmitted on the 12th of August.

21214. Did not you state in the House of Commons, in the early part of last year, that a blockade was in existence?—I had every reason to think, that in pursuance of these orders it had been instituted.

21215. Was not it announced in the "Gazette," to the effect that the blockade had existed?—I cannot charge my memory with that; my belief was, that when that first order was transmitted, on the 5th of April, to use the largest discretionary powers in blockading the Russian ports of the Black Sea, those ports would have been blockaded, and that instead of the plan of instituting a blockade at the mouth of the Bosphorus, which failed, the ordinary mode, and the effective mode, of blockade would have been instituted, and I answered the question under that belief.

21216. Did not merchants connected with the Levant trade make a representation to you that they had abandoned their trade in consequence of the announcement that the blockade existed, and that their trade was ruined, while that of the Greeks continued?—I will read to the Committee a despatch upon that subject. This is number 889, dated the 25th of December 1854:—"Sir, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you the accompanying letter from Lord Clarendon, dated the 21st instant, with its enclosures, from Count Walewski and from the Queen's Advocate, on the subject of the dealings of the Greek merchants at Leghorn with Russia, and in calling your especial attention to the transactions referred to in these documents, and to the proofs afforded by them of the consequences arising from the want of a rigid blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea, my Lords desire once more to revert to the various instructions addressed to you on this subject, as enumerated in the annexed précis; and they earnestly hope that no time will be lost, and no exertion spared, to render such blockade effective. In the execution of this service the attention of the officers under your orders should be directed to the necessity for the most rigid scrutiny of the papers and characters of vessels trading in the Black Sea. I am, &c."

21217. Surely that infers on the part of yourself and the Government that the blockade had not been carried out, although stringent orders had been given that effect?—Certainly.

21218. And also that it depended upon Admiral Dundas, and not upon our allies,

allies, that that blockade should be carried out?—No, it must have been a joint operation.

21219. That letter, to a certain extent, in my mind conveys a reprimand upon Admiral Dundas; does it not do so?—No; it expresses great regret, and points out the evil to the public service from the blockade not being instituted; again I say, that it must have been a conjoint operation.

21220. If that blockade depended upon the conjoint operation of our allies, surely it did not need that despatch to Admiral Dundas?—The Board of Admiralty thought it right under the circumstances to write that despatch, and I do not regret its being written.

21221. That despatch leads me to believe that you thought Admiral Dundas was personally to blame because the blockade was not carried out?—That was not my view, nor my intention.

21222. Did not certain British merchants make a representation to the Government, that in consequence of the announcement of the blockade they had suspended their trade with the East?—No doubt the delay of the blockade was attended with very great inconvenience to the mercantile interests, and with great evil, I think, to the operations of the war. The difficulty was very great; the naval force was occupied in the movement of the troops to a very large extent, the French bringing up reinforcements, a matter of paramount importance, and the English moving the Turkish army, first assisting in bringing it to Varna, and latterly assisting in bringing it from Varna to Eupatoria; therefore the calls upon the naval service were very great for all their disposable means of carrying those orders into execution; and, certainly I am not prepared to blame Admiral Dundas, though I very much regret that means should have been wanting, and that the urgency of the other demands on the spot prevented the blockade.

21223. I can understand that the reasons which you had given might have prevented an effectual blockade, but my question is this, whether those considerations ought not to have been thought of before notice was given which led British merchants to suspend their trade and incur very grievous loss?—I cannot answer that.

21224. Did not they make representations to the Government that the notice which had been given of the blockade was not carried out?—Certainly, the fact is so; that the notice had been given, and that the service was not executed.

21225. The Greek merchants, I suppose, had some means of knowing that the blockade would not be carried out, for they did not suspend their trade also?—The Honourable Member is probably better informed than I am upon that question.

21226. Did you not read a despatch stating that Greek merchants were carrying on their trade?—It states this, that Lord Clarendon wrote on the 21st, sending "enclosures from Count Walewski and from the Queen's Advocate on the subject of the dealings of the Greek merchants, at Leghorn, with Russia, and in calling your especial attention to the transactions referred to in these documents, and to the proofs afforded by them of the consequences arising from the want of a rigid blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea, my Lords desire once more to revert to the various instructions addressed to you on this subject, as enumerated in the annexed précis."

21227. *Chairman.*] Has the blockade been completed during this year?—If the Committee will allow me, they will see that its commencement was fixed for the first day of February; they will see this by the correspondence that I will read.

21228. Mr. *Layard.*] You stated that the mouths of the Danube were blockaded?—They were at one time, but that blockade has been raised.

21229. Has there ever been, strictly speaking, any Russian trade in the Danube?—Munitions of war, it was believed, were conveyed from Odessa by the Danube to the Principalities.

21230. Did not that blockade interfere with the export of grain from the provinces of, or shore of Wallachia and Moldavia?—With regard to any export trade from the Danube while the Russians occupied the Lieti and the coast of Bessarabia, the river trade is altogether in their power; they can stop it, or permit it as they think fit.

21231. But they did not stop it?—They have done so latterly.

21232. Did they then?—It was with the view of allowing that trade to take

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place, if the Russians would permit it, that the blockade was raised. The next paper is dated 1st January 1855. "Sir,—Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 12th ultimo, No. 664, with its enclosures, relative to the intended blockade of certain Russian ports in the Black Sea on the 1st of February next, I am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that whilst they regret that it should have been thought necessary to postpone the commencement of the said blockade after the repeated instructions which have been sent on that subject, my Lords trust that this delay will at least afford time to amend the form of notice, especially as regards the ports of Eupatoria and Balaklava, in accordance with the recommendations of the Queen's Advocate, already transmitted. I am, &c."

21233. Can you establish a blockade without giving notice of it in the Gazette?—Yes.

21234. Is that blockade valid unless it is notified?—Yes, the blockade is good *de facto*. My understanding of it is, that a blockade *de facto* is valid, and may be enforced upon all ships coming close in contact with the line of ships blockading, but that notice does not affect ships at a distance. A blockade notified in the Gazette does affect ships at a distance from the line blockading bound to the port blockaded.

21235. Surely any blockade requires due notice, does it not?—No, it requires notice to the ship captured.

21236. Lord *Seymour*.] The Duke of Newcastle was asked this question: "Do you believe that the reasons why that blockade was not enforced arose from political, and not merely naval circumstances?" and his answer was, "Entirely political circumstances." Is that your belief?—I have already explained to the Committee that the difficulty for a very long period, from the 9th of April until the movement from Varna to Balaklava, arose from the plan which was abortive as a blockade, and no substitute for that abortive measure was adopted on the spot. Then after about two months, naval operations between Varna and the Crimea occupied the whole force that could have been employed in that duty. After that period, the difficulties I have already mentioned arose from the employment of the steamers of war of our ally and of Great Britain, in other services which on the spot were considered of paramount importance.

21237. I ask you whether any ships of light draught were sent out to assist operations in shallow water?—Yes; six steamers, the whole of light draught, were sent out in the course of the autumn of last year, and power was given to Captain Grey, at Gibraltar, and to Admiral Stewart, at Malta, and generally to Admiral Dundas, to purchase and fit any vessels of light draught suitable for that particular service.

21238. Could he have found vessels at Constantinople for such a purpose?—Yes, they might have been fitted. I think they did buy three or four steamers at Constantinople suitable for that purpose, and besides that, vessels might have been fitted. I think perhaps it is not expedient to go into that question; but I think they might have been fitted in the East for that service.

21239. It has been stated, that when this expedition for the Crimea was sent out, the Government had received no accurate information with regard to the force there, or the nature of the defences; does your opinion coincide with that statement?—Instead of an opinion I will give you a fact. In the last week in July I saw a Crimean authority, who, of course must be nameless, and who had left the Crimea in the month of June. I saw him at the Admiralty, and I myself examined him, and an officer of the Admiralty was in attendance on me, and took down his statement in writing; it was most circumstantial and full, giving a complete account of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was estimated by him at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which were cavalry, 40,000 of which constituted the garrison of Sebastopol, and the remaining 30,000 dispersed throughout the Crimea. I sent that information to Admiral Dundas, on the 29th of July. I directed a copy to be sent to Lord Raglan, and it must have been received by Admiral Dundas before the expedition sailed from Varna. The person I have alluded to was an Englishman, and a most intelligent man; and I had at the time the utmost reliance on his statement; and subsequent events have proved that his estimate of the force at that time, such as, I believe, we encountered at the period of the battle of Alma,

Alma, was accurate, within a few thousand men; and, more than that, the individual himself followed the information which I sent, and had a personal communication with Lord Raglan. I hope the Committee will not press me further; but I state this distinctly, I have looked back to the copy of the written statement; and I have conferred with the officer of the Admiralty who took down the statement, and I have verified the date.

21240. General *Peel.*] You consider with the Duke of Newcastle, that the information obtained by Admiral Dundas, as to the number of the troops, which he sets at 130,000 Russians, was erroneous?—I consider that the difficulty was immense of obtaining any information in the East; the only information Government has obtained has been here; all the information on which any reliance could be safely placed has been transmitted from hence, such as this particular information, which at the time I relied upon; my deep conviction was, that it was accurate, and subsequent experience and knowledge confirm me in its accuracy. It was received by the officers commanding the army and the navy before the expedition left Varna; and immediately on the declaration of war, I sent an engineer who was employed in one of the Queen's ships on the home station, who had been engineer in a packet-boat plying between Sebastopol and another port in the Black Sea for four years, and who knew the harbour of Sebastopol just as well as the Commander of the Ryde Steam Packet knows Spithead; I sent that engineer to Admiral Dundas in the early part of last year at the breaking out of the war; and again, in the autumn, with reference to the Danube, I sent the engineer who had been employed by the Russian Government, an Englishman, and employed particularly in the Sulina passage, and who knew every shoal, and every battery, and every impediment between Reni, Ismael, and Sulina.

21241. Lord *Seymour.*] Respecting your absence from London during the course of the summer of last year, were you absent after the declaration of war?—A short time. I accepted office on the 1st of January 1853, and until I left it in March of the present year, I was not at my own country residence six days during the whole of that time. During the last summer I went on naval business of urgency to Portsmouth and to Plymouth. I was never absent from London, I believe, with one exception, upon the arrival of the mail from the East; I did go to wait on Her Majesty at Balmoral, in pursuance of an order that I received, and on both those occasions I passed my own home, both going and returning, without visiting it

21242. It has been stated to this Committee that the Ordnance Office was in a very inefficient state during the summer and autumn for the supply of the large demands upon them; from your experience do you consider that the organisation of the Ordnance Department is suited for military operations?—I am growing an old man. I remember the Finance Committee of 1828. I have a very strong opinion that Boards are instruments that are highly efficient or inefficient very much in proportion to the capacity of those who are placed at the head of them. The Board of Ordnance of 1828 came under the review of the Finance Committee, and at that time it was considered a perfect model of a Government establishment, and no bad judges formed that opinion; and the Right honourable Member for Coventry will bear me out, Mr. Alexander Baring, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Huskisson, and Mr. Herries, all sat in judgment upon that establishment. It was then fresh from the hands of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Henry Hardinge, and as conducted by them it was held up as a perfect model, and I believe under their efficient management nothing could be more effective or better than the Board of Ordnance. Again, I say, that I do not think that it is the composition or construction of a particular department, which renders it efficient, so much as the hands which wield it.

21243. *Chairman.*] Then if the head of a department is 3,000 miles off, you do not think that the department will work well?—Certainly not; no department has fair play when its permanent head, that is, permanent so far as our political institutions will allow, is removed from it.

21244. General *Peel.*] Was there any deficiency in the naval stores depending upon the Ordnance?—None; on the contrary, a gigantic effort was made in a short time to arm an immense fleet with the heaviest ordnance, and notwithstanding the unexpected demand on that Board for army services, for two or three siege trains in succession, the largest demand for heavy cannon that in the

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history of this country was ever made, we were never stopped a day in our naval armament for the want of a supply.

21245. Mr. *Layard.*] Can you state at what time the army was ready to embark at Varna, so far as the preparations were concerned, to take them on board the fleet?—Admiral Dundas declared (I speak from memory) that the navy was ready some time, I should say a week, at least, before the army was ready.

21246. That is to say, about the very end of August?—Yes.

21247. Were any representations made to you that proper boats had not been provided for embarking and disembarking the troops?—On the contrary, Sir Edmund Lyons had been sent to Constantinople to prepare boats, and an officer, whose praise I cannot exaggerate, Admiral Stewart, at Malta, who not only executed everything, but who always foresaw everything that would be wanted, did make extraordinary exertions to supply boats; and I believe that the combined efforts of Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Stewart made up for any deficiencies with respect to the boats in the home supply.

21248. Did not Sir Edmund Lyons go down to Constantinople, to hasten those boats?—Yes.

21249. Did not great delay take place with regard to them?—No; the whole were ready before the army was ready; notwithstanding the difficulty, whatever it was, it was considered that the efforts of the two officers whom I have named, Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Stewart, compensated for any deficiency in the home supply. It was not anticipated that that particular movement would take place when the transports left England, but such was their success, and such their exertions, that the whole was complete before the army was ready; and there is not, I believe, in military history, an example of so successful a landing, or so rapid a one.

21250. Then, in the opinion of the Government, or of yourself, the fleet could not have been ready earlier to take the army on board?—Not earlier than it was.

21251. That was at the end of August?—Yes.

21252. Are the Committee to understand you to say that the Government consequently did not anticipate that the army would embark for the Crimea until that period?—The Government sent the army to Varna for the purpose of disembarkation there, not pressed by an enemy, and the means were ample; but the great operation of disembarking a large army, probably in the presence of an active and powerful enemy, required preparations of a different kind, and those preparations were made by Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Stewart in the East, with a promptitude and success which are beyond all praise.

21253. Then those preparations could not have been made at an earlier period than the end of August, or the beginning of September?—Of course, if instead of sending the army to Varna it had been determined to send the army to the Crimea at once, those preparations might have taken place much earlier.

21254. The Government did not anticipate sending the army to the Crimea earlier than the beginning of September?—The order was given on the 29th of June, the Duke of Newcastle read that order, and it was contingent upon the approbation of Lord Raglan with reference to the means which he could command, and among the means to be provided were the boats in question.

21255. Then are the Committee to understand you to state, that the delay which took place in Bulgaria from the raising of the siege of Silistria, which determined of course the position of the Russians in Turkey, to the departure of the army from Varna, depended upon Lord Raglan?—I conceive that from the great misfortune of the cholera breaking out and making such ravages, that the health of both the French and English armies was shaken most seriously, and the difficulty of movement was rendered insuperable by that circumstance.

21256. But these were unforeseen events; the question is this, whether the army was in a condition to be transported from Bulgaria to the Crimea at the time of the raising of the siege of Silistria?—The order that was given has been, I think, read before the Committee.

21257. Do you state that you think that the fleet could not have been in a condition to move that army, whatever preparations might have been made before the time when the army was embarked, that is to say, the beginning of September?—

September?—Yes; I should think that the fleet was ready the third week in August.

21258. That was two months after the time which was decided upon in England for the expedition to take place?—The order was given on the 29th of June.

21259. You do not think that it could have left Varna earlier?—I have no doubt that every exertion was made, and I am satisfied that it is impossible for more zealous officers to have used greater exertion than those that I have mentioned.

21260. The question is this, whether the Government at home anticipated that that fleet would have been as late as the beginning of September before sailing with the army to the Crimea?—The Government gave the order contingent upon the adoption of it by Lord Raglan, with reference to the means at his disposal.

21261. Had the Government accurate knowledge of the means at his disposal?—Of course they had a knowledge of the number of transports, and they had a knowledge that there were 10 sail of the line, with all the appliances of such a fleet, and a very large number of steamers of war, with a great power of boats; but there was, from the nature of the operation, a want of flat-bottomed boats, which could not be sent from England, and which it was necessary to supply in the East.

21262. There was not the means, in fact, of disembarking and embarking that army?—I should say the reverse of that. There were the means in the fleet, but there were not the means that were considered the most eligible and the best. Recollect: one very serious difficulty in the operation, the most difficult, perhaps, in war, namely, the service of disembarking in the presence of a brave enemy drawn up to resist the landing; and the peculiar nature of the boats for that service, rendered some preparation in the East necessary, or rather it was deemed to be necessary.

21263. A great part of the sufferings of the army, and to a certain extent the failure of the expedition, has been attributed to the late time of the year when that expedition took place. I wish to understand whether the Government at home, and you at the head of the Admiralty, believed that the army could have been embarked at the period at which you gave orders for it to be sent out to the Crimea?—Yes. I have the strongest opinion that the order was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time, and the information which I sent stated distinctly that the weather in September and October was almost invariably fine and healthy in the Crimea, and that storms did not ordinarily take place till November. Certainly my opinion was, and is, that the end of August and the month of September, and October, were the right months for that operation.

21264. You did not think that the expedition was undertaken at too late a period?—Certainly not.

21265. Captain *Gladstone.*] Mr. Commissary Smith has stated in his evidence, that he made repeated applications to Admiral Boxer for a steamer to tow vessels containing provisions to Balaklava, and also for sailing vessels, and that he was unable to obtain any assistance from him; did the Admiralty receive any applications from Admiral Boxer or Lord Raglan for more steam vessels or sailing vessels for that service?—In justice to Admiral Boxer, I have read to the Committee the only requisitions or complaints that he has made to the Board of Admiralty.

21266. Mr. *Layard.*] Did Admiral Dundas receive every assistance from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in the prosecution of the public service?—I am not aware that the Ambassador failed in his duty in rendering every assistance in his power.

21267. There was no difference between Admiral Dundas and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to your knowledge, in consequence of which the public service was interfered with?—If the question implies that the public service was damnified by the nature of the communications between the Ambassador and the Admiral, I cannot put my finger upon any real detriment that was sustained.

21268. *Chairman.*] Was there a difference of opinion between the two?—I have no doubt that there was.

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21269. Did that come officially to your knowledge?—As a member of the Administration, I should say "Yes;" but as First Lord of the Admiralty I I should say "No."

21270. Did that difference of opinion lead to any delay of the public service?—I cannot say that I know of any particular instance in which the public service has been impeded.

21271. Mr. *Layard.*] Did Admiral Dundas complain that he had not received instructions or information which was destined for him, and which he ought to have received, to have enabled him to act?—I think there was one complaint of that kind, that information which he thought ought to have been communicated to him was not communicated; I think there was one instance of that kind, but I cannot say that my recollection of the investigation of that case led me to the conclusion that the public service was damnified by the absence of that communication.

21272. You do not think that the state of things which existed at Constantinople between the Admiral and the Ambassador in any way interfered with the public service?—I cannot think that any misunderstanding in a great crisis of public affairs between such important functionaries as the Ambassador and the Admiral commanding the fleet, could fail to produce some bad effects upon the public service. I am quite sure that any such difference is deeply to be regretted, and always to be avoided, and that opinion was expressed by Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and by me to Admiral Dundas; but if I am asked, as it was put, whether officially I can say that the nature of the relations between those two functionaries really inflicted injury on the public service, I cannot say that I know the precise case which would justify the assertion.

21273. Did the Turkish Admiral propose to take the Turkish fleet to the Circassian coast, to your knowledge?—Before the affair at Sinope?

21274. No, I think after that, immediately?—I know that the Turkish Admiral, before the affair of Sinope, insisted on going into the Black Sea in spite of the remonstrances of the French and English Admirals.

21275. Afterwards, did not the Turks propose to effect a landing, or to blockade the coast of Circassia?—Yes, I believe they did, and after the experience at Sinope, it was considered a most dangerous operation for them to go alone.

21276. Who prevented them going?—I believe the common sense of all the authorities, other than the Turkish.

21277. Did you receive any information as to the road which the Russians had recently constructed into the Crimea, between the Putrid Sea and Perekop?—Yes.

21278. At what time did you receive that information?—I think in the month of January this year, or of December 1854.

21279. Previous to that time, had you no knowledge of the existence of those roads?—Not of the road 40 miles to the east of Perekop; that was unknown here, and unknown at Constantinople, and unknown throughout the army and navy, both French and English.

21280. The informant who gave you information upon the Crimea, was not acquainted with the existence of that road?—He did not specify it.

21281. Did he lead you to believe that there was no mode of communication between the Crimea and Southern Russia, except by Perekop and the other known road?—No; my belief is that the principal supplies, if not of men, certainly of ammunition and provisions, had come the other way.

21282. Which way?—By the Sea of Azof.

21283. Was no attempt made to blockade the Sea of Azof?—It was impossible to carry on any naval operations there without passing the Strait of Kertch.

21284. No vessels were supplied of a sufficiently light draught to pass it?—On the contrary, vessels were provided; but there are batteries which command the passage; and the passage is blocked up by sunken vessels, as it is at Sebastopol.

Martis, 15° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Drummond.
Sir John Pakington.	Captain Gladstone.
Colonel Lindsay.	

JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable the *Earl of Aberdeen*, K. G., attending by permission of The House of Lords, Examined.

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21285. *Chairman.*] YOUR Lordship was at the head of the Administration at the breaking out of the Russian war?—Yes.

21286. You continued at the head of that Administration until you left office, did you not?—Certainly.

21287. Mr. *Layard.*] Will your Lordship be good enough to state to the Committee when the Government first made preparations, under the conviction that a war was imminent with Russia?—I should think about three months before the declaration of war preparations were made in contemplation of that event; it had been more or less apprehended, but of course there was a difference of opinion as to the probability of the occurrence of the war; but I think about three months before the declaration of war active preparations were made.

21288. In what month was the declaration of war made?—About the 29th of March.

21289. Had preparations commenced in January?—Yes.

21290. To what extent did those preparations go; did they extend to putting our army upon an effective footing?—Certainly. I think on the 9th of February a large force was sent to Malta with the view of being forwarded to Turkey in case a declaration of war should take place, but that was more than a month before war was declared.

21291. Previously to that period, up to the month of January, the Government was still under the impression that hostilities would not ensue?—As I said before, upon that subject there was a difference of opinion; perhaps I was more sanguine than any other Member of the Government in the hope of preserving peace, but of course that was a matter of opinion.

21292. During the previous year no steps had been taken either to obtain information with regard to the country in which the war would be likely to take place, or upon other subjects connected with hostilities?—Yes; information had, for a considerable time, been endeavoured to be procured, but it was very difficult to procure any correct information of the state of the Russian forces, and various matters that it was desirable to obtain a knowledge of. We found very great difficulty in acquiring that in the East, and I should state that the most correct information that we obtained was obtained in this country.

21293. Are the Committee to understand you to say that before January no actual preparations, whether with regard to the Commissariat or other departments of the public service, had been made in anticipation of the war?—I think not in actual contemplation of the war.

21294. After the declaration of war, were all matters connected with the war, and with the army that was sent to the East, submitted to the Cabinet?—All matters of importance. Of course the departments having the manage-

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ment of the war, did not submit the details of all their measures to the Cabinet, but any decision of importance was always brought before the Cabinet.

21295. Then the Cabinet was consulted, of course, upon all matters which related to operations of importance connected with the Eastern expedition?—With respect to any important operation, certainly.

21296. Were Cabinet Councils continually summoned until the time that Parliament was prorogued?—Yes.

21297. It has been stated to the Committee, that from near to the time of the prorogation of Parliament till late in the autumn, there were no Cabinet Councils held?—I think from the prorogation of Parliament, about the middle of August, until about the middle of October, no Cabinet Council was held.

21298. Therefore a period of two months elapsed?—Yes.

21299. At that time were all the Members of the Cabinet present in London?—No; at the prorogation of Parliament the various Members of the Government were dispersed in different directions, very few remained in London.

21300. Which Members of the Cabinet remained in London?—The Duke of Newcastle was constantly in London; I remained till the end of September, having the year before not left London for a single day. I went for a week home, and another week I was in attendance on Her Majesty, with that exception I was in London all the time, and other Members were very frequently in London. Mr. Sidney Herbert was very frequently, almost constantly, in London, but the greater part of the Cabinet were dispersed.

21301. During that period the expedition sailed, did it not, from Varna to the Crimea, the landing took place, the battle of the Alma was fought, and the siege commenced?—Yes; the instructions for the expedition had been, I think, sent at the end of June, and much greater delay occurred than was anticipated in the sailing of the expedition, but it was during that time.

21302. I think I am correct in what I have just stated in the way of a query, that those operations did take place during that period?—Undoubtedly.

21303. Did your Lordship not think it necessary during that period, to submit any questions to the Cabinet?—I am not sure that the precise nature of those meetings of the Cabinet is perfectly understood; I apprehend that it is no part of the duty of the Government to hold those meetings at any stated times, but only according to the necessities of the public service. It is true that during the meeting of Parliament, I desired that Cabinets should be summoned every Saturday, but this was for the progress of legislation in Parliament, and the current business of the week, and did not render difficult the meetings of the Cabinet on other days when the public service required it, which accordingly was the case. Any Minister may summon a Cabinet whenever he pleases, and for any object, either connected with his own department, or for anything else. But instead of sending at once and ordering a messenger to summon the Cabinet, it has been usual to mention it to the First Minister, who then naturally orders the Cabinet to meet.

21304. Would your Lordship be of opinion, that in a case of great emergency a Cabinet should be summoned?—Certainly; when the Cabinet dispersed at the end of the Session, it was with the full understanding that a Cabinet might be summoned at the shortest notice, and had any occasion required it, it would have been summoned, and they would have assembled in less than 48 hours.

21305. Would it not, in your Lordship's opinion, be more important to have the Cabinet during the period that Parliament was not sitting, in case of public events of great importance, than during the time that Parliament was sitting?—It would depend upon the events that required it; it is not merely the importance of an event that requires a Cabinet to assemble; it is when there is some subject to discuss, and some determination to arrive at.

21306. When the army landed in the Crimea, the Government were under the impression, were they not, that Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a *coup de main*?—That was the general belief.

21307. It was during the period of the absence of the Members of the Cabinet that the army came round to the south of Sebastopol, and it was found that the place was too strong to be taken in the way that had been contemplated?—Yes.

21308. Was not that an event which would have required a meeting of the Cabinet to discuss what measures should be taken?—I do not know that any fresh

fresh instructions could have been given to the generals in consequence; the Minister for War was in London, and if he had felt any difficulty with regard to any decision that he might have wished to arrive at, he would of course have summoned the Cabinet at once.

21309. Did not the circumstance of the fortress being found to be much stronger than was anticipated, and the fact of our army being compelled to lay a regular siege to it, alter completely the complexion of the expedition to the Crimea?—No, I do not think that in the least.

21310. Supposing it had been anticipated that Sebastopol would have sustained a long siege, would the Government at that period still have thought that the expedition was not too late in the year?—As I have already said, the instructions directing the expedition were sent in the end of June, and we had no reason to suppose that they would not have been carried into execution earlier than they were. At the same time, I think that when the expedition did sail it was in very sufficient time.

21311. It sailed in the beginning of September, did it not?—Yes.

21312. Then the Government did not think that too late for the expedition to be undertaken?—Not so as to stop it; because the generals had perfect discretion, if they thought fit, not to undertake it at an unreasonable time.

21313. When instructions were sent out at the end of June was the Government under the impression that the expedition would take place earlier than it did?—I think so, certainly.

21314. To what do you attribute that?—There are a great many causes.

21315. Was it on account of the want of any preparations on the part of the Government?—I should say, certainly not. I believe that there were some deficiencies; the boats were not quite sufficient, and there was some delay on that account; but that was not the principal cause of the delay, I believe.

21316. Were any proposals made to you by Lord John Russell, or any other Member of the Cabinet, for the consolidation of the offices as early as last year?—No. I had a good deal of discussion with Lord John Russell, and with other Members of the Cabinet, on the subject of the consolidation of the offices; but it was thought, and it was the opinion of Lord John Russell himself, that it was not a fit time to carry it into effect.

21317. He at that time opposed the consolidation of the offices, did he not?—No, he did not oppose it; on the contrary, he recommended it; but, after a great deal of discussion and consideration, he came to the conclusion that it was not desirable at that time.

21318. Are you aware upon what grounds it was decided that it was not a favourable moment for the consolidation of the offices?—I apprehend, from the risk of undertaking a change at a time of war, and that it might lead to inconvenience in the management of those offices, and produce an effect injurious to the public service, that was not contemplated, though the object itself was desirable.

21319. Will you state the time at which this determination was come to, that it was not desirable then to consolidate the offices?—A correspondence took place between Lord John Russell and me, a portion of which he read to the House of Commons, and also the Duke of Newcastle referred to it in the House of Lords; and, therefore, although a private correspondence, I have no objection to refer to it, nor that the Committee should see the whole of it; but, at the conclusion of that correspondence, after Lord John Russell had recommended the consolidation (I think it was about the end of November), he came to the conclusion that it was not desirable to carry it into effect.

21320. Lord *Seymour*.] Early in the year 1854, a motion was made in the House of Commons, by the late Mr. Hume, for the consolidation of the offices?—Yes.

21321. Lord John Russell stated, did he not, on the part of the Government, that the Government objected, at that time, to enter upon the subject of consolidation?—Upon any extensive consolidation.

21322. Did they not, upon a further pressure, though they would not make a consolidation, agree to associate with the Secretary for the Colonies a military secretary, to assist him; do you remember that that was done, or that it was said to be done?—No, I do not remember that.

21323. Do you know whether any Military Under Secretary was appointed to assist the Duke of Newcastle in his office?—I think not at that time.

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21324. Sir *J. Pakington.*] Does not your Lordship remember the appointment of Colonel Munday, as an additional Under Secretary in the Colonial Office, before the separation of the two Secretaryships of State?—No; I think it was in the month of June when the separation of the offices took place.

21325. Lord *Seymour.*] You must recollect that in former wars there was attached to Lord Bathurst a Military Under Secretary to assist him, Colonel Bunbury?—Yes.

21326. With reference to that appointment, it was suggested to the Government when they objected to consolidate the offices, that at least they could give the Secretary for War and the Colonies, the advantage of a Military Under Secretary?—That may have been so; I do not recollect the time.

21327. If a Military Under Secretary was appointed, it was done by the Duke of Newcastle himself, without reference to you?—I now recollect the Duke mentioning the appointment to me.

21328. Mr. *Layard.*] Your Lordship stated just now that you had the remainder of that correspondence, which you would submit to the Committee; does that affect the question of the consolidation of the offices?—Yes; the object of that correspondence was to propose that the Duke of Newcastle should be removed from the office of Minister for War.

21329. He held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, and at the same time of War, at the commencement of your Lordship's administration?—He did.

21330. Was the Duke of Newcastle made cognisant of that correspondence?—Yes; and every Member of the Cabinet was.

21331. An impression prevails that Lord John Russell objected to the retention of the office of Secretary for War by the Duke of Newcastle; was such the case?—Quite so. As to discussions in the Cabinet, when 12 persons meet together of course there is a difference in opinion as to the mode of carrying on difficult operations; but I do not feel at all bound to state the difference of opinion of individuals upon the conduct of those matters. That correspondence stands upon a different footing, because Lord John Russell, with my consent, used it as he thought proper in the House of Commons, and the Duke of Newcastle did the same; and therefore I do not feel that there is any secrecy necessary about it; but that correspondence was confined entirely to the proposal of Lord John Russell to remove the Duke of Newcastle from the office of Secretary for War.

21332. Mr. *Layard.*] This Committee has been appointed to inquire into the conduct of the departments which have had to supply the wants of the army before Sebastopol; a great deal of blame has been thrown by witnesses that have been examined, and I think by the public, amongst other departments, upon the Board of Ordnance, therefore I think it is a fair question to ask your Lordship whether any suggestions were made at an early period of last year as to the consolidation of those offices?—No, I think not.

21333. Such being the case, I think that your Lordship might justly submit to the Committee any correspondence which took place upon that subject?—I do not think that there is any objection to the production of the correspondence upon that subject. Although the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle to the War Office was approved by Lord John Russell, and by the whole Cabinet, I think, early in November, to my great surprise, Lord John Russell wrote to me to propose that the Duke of Newcastle should be removed; he was not satisfied with the conduct of the war by the Duke of Newcastle, and he proposed that he should be removed from that office.

21334. At what period was that?—The beginning of November.

21335. Before that time, had Lord John Russell made any objection?—Not a syllable.

21336. *Chairman.*] Has your Lordship any objection to produce such parts of the correspondence as have not already become public?—I can have none at all.

21337. Your Lordship is rather desirous, are you not, that it should be given in?—No, I cannot say that; it is disagreeable, considering that it is a personal discussion, objecting to a colleague. I have not said a word about it in Parliament. Lord John Russell has said what he thought right to say.

21338. Mr. *Layard.*] Do you think that that which took place in consequence of the correspondence to which you have alluded, or any difference which

which occurred between Lord John Russell and yourself, or other Members of the Cabinet, has led to any part of the misfortunes which have occurred, or that it has embarrassed the hands of the Government in providing for the army?—Not the least.

21339. General *Peel.*] Did your Lordship say that no objection was made on the part of Lord John Russell to the Duke of Newcastle holding the situation of Secretary for War, till November?—None whatever.

21340. Mr. *Layard.*] As parts of this correspondence are before the public, and have made a considerable impression as to the conduct of the war, I think it is only fair to the public, and fair to your Lordship also, that the whole of the correspondence should be brought forward?—The whole is a personal subject. It is entirely whether the Duke of Newcastle should be removed or should remain; but I have no objection.

21341. That very case of personality very much affects our inquiry; we are to inquire whether the persons who had the charge of departments, were fit and competent persons to discharge the duties that were imposed upon them? —That correspondence will disclose my reasons for retaining the Duke of Newcastle where he was, and not agreeing to the proposal of Lord John Russell to remove him.

21342. Did not Lord John Russell state in the House, that he had left your Lordship's Government on account of the horrible and heart-rending accounts from the East, and that to a certain amount he attributed those accounts to the want of a proper management of the war?—I think that that would be a very erroneous inference to draw.

21343. Still it was an inference which the public naturally drew from his Lordship's speech, was it not?—I can only say this, that when the Honourable Chairman of this Committee gave notice of his motion, Lord John Russell wrote to me to say that he could not oppose that motion, and as it inculpated or affected the conduct of some of his colleagues, he thought it his duty to resign his office, and that was the first that I heard of it, to my great surprise; I had had no information that that course was likely to be pursued.

21344. General *Peel.*] Did that correspondence take place before November? —The correspondence to which I allude, about removing the Duke of Newcastle from his office, began early in November, and ended, I think, at the end of November, or the beginning of December; there were several letters.

21345. Previously to that Lord John Russell made no objection whatever to the Duke of Newcastle?—Not the least.

21346. Mr. *Layard.*] Will your Lordship be so good as to furnish the Committee with the correspondence?—If the Committee please, I will do so; but it is a subject which I should have been glad should have ended with the explanations in Parliament; I have no reason in the world to refuse it.

The *Chairman* stated that it was the wish of the Committee that his Lordship should hand in the correspondence.

21347. Mr. *Layard.*] At the conclusion of the correspondence between you and Lord John Russell, was his proposition, or any proposition of the same kind, submitted to the Cabinet?—No; I should say, by way of explanation of that correspondence, that it ends with a declaration from Lord John Russell that he must submit the subject to the Cabinet. As I did not agree to his proposal of dismissing the Duke of Newcastle, or removing him from his office, it ended by Lord John Russell's saying that he should submit it to the Cabinet; but he never did submit it to the Cabinet; he changed his mind, and it never was mentioned to the Cabinet.

21348. Your Lordship was under the impression that Lord John Russell had altered his opinions upon that subject?—Undoubtedly.

21349. You were not aware that such was not the case, until he made that statement in the House of Commons?—Not until the notice of the motion to which I have referred.

21350. Did Lord John Russell never recommend to you afterwards, either publicly or privately, the consolidation of the offices?—The consolidation of the offices was a different question altogether, but I do not recollect that he did.

21351. Both with regard to the Duke of Newcastle, and the consolidation of the offices, you were under the impression that Lord John Russell had altered his original opinion?—Yes, so far as to time undoubtedly; we all thought that

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the consolidation of the offices would be desirable, but it was a question of time entirely.

21352. Had Her Majesty's Government obtained as much information as could have been obtained under the circumstances, of the numbers of the enemy in the Crimea, the condition of Sebastopol, and information upon other subjects connected with the expedition to the Crimea?—We obtained very different information leading to very different conclusions, and it was not easy to ascertain the respective degree of credit that we ought to give to the different informations which we received. On the whole I think that the most correct information that we received, was received in this country from a gentleman who had recently been in the Crimea, and that information turned out to be pretty correct as to the amount of the force of the enemy, and the state of the country, and the defences.

21353. In your Lordship's opinion, as much information was obtained as was necessary to authorise the expedition?—That was the opinion I believe of the military authorities.

21354. Captain *Gladstone.*] Can you state how long that individual was in the Crimea who gave the information that was most relied upon?—Many years; I do not know how many.

21355. Sir *J. Pakington.*] The purport of that information was, that the numerical force of the Russians in the Crimea, amounted to about 70,000 men?—Altogether.

21356. Forty thousand in Sebastopol and 30,000 dispersed about the country?—Yes.

21357. Mr. *Layard.*] The condition of the army in the East, after the month of November, was brought to the notice of the Cabinet, was not it?—It was, but very late. I believe that a great deal of difficulty existed before we had any official notice of it; we heard of it from the public papers and private sources before we had any official information of it.

21358. In your Lordship's opinion, should the Cabinet have been furnished with that information?—Certainly; I apprehend that anything that required remedy from this country ought to have been communicated to the Cabinet.

21359. To whom do you attribute the neglect in not having furnished that information to the Cabinet?—The authorities on the spot, of course, must be the persons whose duty it was to complain of anything that was amiss, and to endeavour to remedy any evils that existed from home.

21360. Can you state about what period the Cabinet was informed officially of the state of things in the East?—It was very gradually; at first, from not receiving official information, the private accounts and the reports in the newspapers were more or less discredited; but they became confirmed by degrees, and we arrived at the knowledge of the real state of the army.

21361. *Chairman.*] Has the public before it all the information which the Government received from Lord Raglan respecting the state of the army?—I really do not know; I do not recollect exactly what has been published; of course the Duke of Newcastle would know that.

21362. Mr. *Layard.*] Still, until a late period, the Government of the country, that is the Cabinet, was not made acquainted with the real state of things in the East?—Certainly we were in ignorance, longer than I think we ought to have been, of the real state of matters in the East.

21363. *Chairman.*] Did you not obtain your chief information through the newspapers?—We obtained a great deal, certainly.

21364. Captain *Gladstone.*] Is your Lordship aware whether the individual from whom you received the information on which you relied had been in Sebastopol itself shortly before he gave that information?—I think so. I did not see this gentleman myself; but I know that the Duke of Newcastle and Sir James Graham examined him very minutely, and obtained from him all the information that he had to give.

21365. Lord *Seymour.*] You considered it desirable in the spring of last year to separate the offices of War and the Colonies?—That was determined upon in the beginning of June; in the end of May I may say.

21366. That was in order that the Duke of Newcastle might give his whole time and energy to the consideration of the details of the war?—Undoubtedly.

21367. Did

21367. Did you consider that in making that separation the arrangement was complete, or that it was only an initiatory step to further changes that were to follow?—I thought that it was sufficient at the time, but certainly only, as the Noble Lord says, initiatory to other changes that were to follow.

21368. The Duke of Newcastle has stated to the Committee, at Question 14339, that the making of that separation led to no further change than that he was enabled to devote his sole and undivided attention to the duties of the war; did not that bring other offices more under him than they had been before, when he was Secretary for War and the Colonies?—No, there was no result of that kind. I believe that the Duke of Newcastle had full authority over all the other offices before.

21369. As First Lord of the Treasury and Chief Minister of the Crown, you considered yourself responsible, did you not, for the appointment of the heads of all the departments?—Yes, certainly.

21370. You found the Ordnance under Lord Raglan when you came into office, did you not?—Yes.

21371. Lord Raglan was a person who had had great experience of official administration, and had been for some time in the management of the Ordnance Office?—Yes.

21372. When you appointed him as Commander-in-chief of the Forces, did it not occur to you that so important a department as the Ordnance should have another Master-general appointed?—Undoubtedly it did occur to me, but the office of Lieutenant-general had been abolished some years before, and it was thought that by reviving that office, and having a Lieutenant-general possessing all the authority of the Master-general, it was not necessary to displace Lord Raglan and to appoint another Master-general.

21373. *Chairman.*] Is your Lordship quite accurate in saying that the Lieutenant-general had all the authority of the Master-general?—It is a question that I am unable to decide; there may be a difference of opinion, but I can only say, that it was so understood decidedly.

21374. Lord *Seymour.*] You appointed Sir Hew Ross as the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, did you not?—Yes.

21375. Had Sir Hew Ross ever been accustomed to the administration of a large department?—He had a high official appointment connected with the military service. I do not know whether he had had the experience that the noble Lord mentions.

21376. The Ordnance is a department which has to administer and regulate the supplies for the army?—Yes.

21377. It is therefore in time of war a most important department?—Yes.

21378. Had Sir Hew Ross ever been at the head of a department which had any large duties to perform?—I do not know that he had. I should say that my knowledge of the military qualifications of Sir Hew Ross was very slight; it was principally through Lord Raglan. I believe that he was brought before the Duke of Newcastle as a proper person to fill the office. I imagine that it was Lord Raglan's recommendation that induced the Government to appoint Sir Hew Ross.

21379. But the natural course would have been to have appointed another Master-general of the Ordnance?—Undoubtedly it would.

21380. *Chairman.*] Are not the duties of the Ordnance during war greater than they are during a time of peace?—Of course, I take it for granted that they must be.

21381. During a time of peace it was considered requisite, was it not, to have a Master-general at the head of the Ordnance department?—There has been, for some time, a project which, I believe, is now about to be carried into effect, to abolish the office of Master-general altogether, and that has been more or less kept in view.

21382. Does your Lordship consider that the commencement of a war is the best time for such an operation?—There is a great deal to be said, I think, against doing it at such a time.

21383. As for the efficient supply of the army, an efficient Board of Ordnance was required, was it a wise course to pursue to send the head of that department 3,000 miles off?—It would not have been so, only a provision was made, by the appointment of a Lieutenant-general, and Lord Raglan's services were required urgently at a distance.

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21384. What beneficial object was obtained by retaining Lord Raglan in the office of Master-general?—None.

21385. General *Peel.*] Was not Sir Hew Ross the Adjutant-general of artillery, before he was appointed to the situation of Lieutenant-general to the Ordnance?—Yes.

21386. Did not the appointment of a Lieutenant-general, instead of appointing a new Master-general, leave it more open to remodel the office than if a Master-general had been appointed?—Perhaps it might.

21387. *Chairman.*] Could you not have appointed a Master-general, with the understanding that the office was to be remodelled?—Every appointment may be made subject to such an understanding.

21388. Is it not very common?—Perfectly common; but I did not know that the decision had been arrived at so completely to abolish the office of Master-general as to render that necessary.

21389. Lord *Seymour.*] The Duke of Newcastle has stated to this Committee, in answer to Question 15163, and the following questions, that while this expedition was in contemplation by the Government, he had reason to be dissatisfied with respect to the management of several of the departments: did he ever state to you that he was so dissatisfied with the great departments for the supplying of the army?—The difficulties of the Duke of Newcastle were very great, and he may, in general terms, have expressed his dissatisfaction; but he made no representation to me upon any particular subject, or in any particular quarter; otherwise I was perfectly ready to do whatever was competent to me to do, to assist him to remove his objections.

21390. Then the Committee may understand that he did not represent to you that he was dissatisfied, for instance, with the organisation of the Ordnance department?—In general terms, undoubtedly, he has stated that, as others have done too; and I believe, generally speaking, there has been an impression that the organisation of the Ordnance department required change; but there was no specific complaint made to me.

21391. The Duke of Newcastle stated that he considered the organisation of the medical department defective?—That also, in the same way, he has expressed; but no representation was ever made to me upon the subject of the medical department requiring my interference. The Committee will understand that I had no personal interference with those departments at all, except when a reference was made to me to correct some special grievance.

21392. If the Duke of Newcastle had thought it necessary to remodel any of those departments, or to change their organisation, he would naturally have come to you?—With regard to anything that he could not do by his own authority.

21393. For instance, such a department as the Ordnance, he would not have meddled with it without coming to you?—Clearly; the Cabinet must have decided that. I could not have decided it any more than he.

21394. This dissatisfaction on the part of the Duke of Newcastle appears from his statement to have existed in his mind in the month of August last year?—I dare say it had.

21395. At that time you were in town, were you not?—Yes.

21396. But the Cabinet were not generally in town?—No.

21397. He would therefore, if he desired any reconstruction of this department, have applied to your Lordship?—Yes.

21398. He did not bring it before you in any way that impressed upon your mind that there was a great necessity for some reconsideration of the state of those departments?—Clearly, if the Duke of Newcastle, at the end of August or in September, had come to me and said, "I cannot go on longer with the Board of Ordnance existing as it does, and it must be changed," then I should have summoned a Cabinet to consider it.

21399. The Duke of Newcastle had no official house at that time, had he?—The Duke of Newcastle inhabited my official residence; all his business was transacted at the Treasury.

21400. Then the clerks that he could collect around him were placed there to assist him; or had he any clerks?—Yes. The Duke of Newcastle declined to take the active charge of the Commissariat until it could be placed under the same roof with himself, and therefore although he had full authority to give directions as he pleased, it was still nominally under the charge of Sir Charles

Charles Trevelyan until the Duke removed to the present War Office; then the Commissariat clerks and all were removed with him.

21401. During the summer, and early in the autumn, he lived officially in your Lordship's house?—Yes.

21402. He went there to transact business, but he had no rooms for his clerks?—Very insufficient. I did also furnish rooms for his clerks. Two or three came with him from the Colonial Office, and his secretaries also, and they were accommodated in the Treasury; but of course it was inconvenient.

21403. Was the want of a house the only reason why the Commissariat was not transferred to him till so late a period as the 22d of December?—The only reason; but at the same time, though it was not actually transferred in all its details to his management, he gave directions, as he thought proper, to the Commissariat while it was still at the Treasury.

21404. Therefore he gave directions under this system without taking upon himself the responsibility, till it could be brought under him?—Yes.

21405. Therefore there was a divided responsibility?—It remained as it was under Sir Charles Trevelyan.

21406. With the interference occasionally of the Duke of Newcastle?—Yes.

21407. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Duke of Newcastle says that he thought that the organisation of the Commissariat department being under the Treasury was unsatisfactory, and that all the departments for the supply of the army were, in his opinion, at that time in an unsatisfactory state; did the Duke of Newcastle make any specific representation to you upon those very grave subjects which would have induced you to think that the whole question should be brought under the consideration of the Cabinet?—No, certainly not. The Commissariat, independently of that opinion of the Duke of Newcastle, was transferred from the Treasury to the War Minister, I think almost as soon as the separation of the Colonies and War Office took place.

21408. You will perceive that this is an expression of general dissatisfaction with the whole system of the military administration, and at a most important crisis, and just before the expedition to the Crimea was ordered. No specific representation was made to your Lordship upon that subject, which induced you to consider it necessary to submit it to the consideration of your Cabinet?—No; except the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Office; and I confess for one that, though it was very strongly felt in general to be necessary, I had some doubt myself about the wisdom of that step, in consequence of a very strong opinion expressed by the Duke of Wellington to the contrary, who had very strongly advised that the Commissariat should never be separated from the Treasury.

21409. Lord *Seymour.*] Had the Duke of Wellington recorded that opinion in any official manner?—I have seen it in a minute written by the Duke of Wellington shortly before his death.

21410. Was not his reason for giving that opinion this, that the Commissariat being under the Treasury, the Commander of the Forces abroad was enabled more easily to obtain ample supplies of money for his army?—That may have operated with him, but this opinion was given in a time of peace.

21411. But of course the Commissariat is of small consequence in peace, compared to what it is in war?—Clearly.

21412. In the management of the Commissariat, it is of great importance, is it not, that the money accounts should be kept under the control of the Treasury?—Yes.

21413. One danger of placing the Commissariat under the Secretary-at-War, was, that that perfect control which the Treasury exercised would be somewhat weakened?—It might have been so.

21414. Do not you think that it has been somewhat weakened since it has been found necessary to allow so many persons, consuls and others, in different parts of the world, to draw directly upon this country for money?—That was my apprehension at the time of the separation; but the opinion which prevailed was so decidedly in favour of it, that I did not persevere in my opposition.

21415. In making the change, what precaution was taken to prevent the chance of this evil arising?—The Commissariat being an office of account, Sir Charles Trevelyan no doubt settled all that with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but so far as I was concerned, I had no concern with the finance of the office.

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21416. As First Lord of the Treasury, you considered that a question so much of detail as not to require your opinion?—I apprehend that the First Lord of the Treasury never has any concern whatever with such a matter.

21417. Do you consider it desirable that the Secretary-at-War should be a Cabinet Minister?—I do not think it is indispensable that it should be so, but at the same time, on this present occasion, I thought it very desirable that it should be so.

21418. You consider that it is desirable that the office should be maintained as a means of controlling the expenditure of the army?—Undoubtedly; that I apprehend to be the main object of the office, and its chief duty.

21419. Do you consider it essential to maintain that office as a separate office, and not to merge it in that of the Secretary of War?—That would be my feeling, certainly.

21420. Mr. *Drummond.*] Your Lordship has been asked respecting a person who gave information with regard to the Crimea in this country, and I think you stated that he was not examined by you, but that he was examined by Sir James Graham and the Duke of Newcastle?—Yes.

21421. Does your Lordship remember that in that information, the individual stated that he had only been for one day in Sebastopol, and that that was as long ago as the year 1846?—I do not recollect that. My attention was principally directed to the force of the enemy, and the defences of the place.

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SKETCH of MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS for a Force of 12 Regiments of Infantry, 4 Batteries of Artillery, &c. &c., in all perhaps 12,000 Men, based on the experience of the War in the Peninsula. Appendix, No. 1.

[This Sketch was sent by Mr. Guthrie to the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary-at-War, Lord Hardinge, Lord Raglan, Dr. Smith. A copy was given to Sir G. Brown, and Sir De Lacy Evans, then supposed to be Commanders of two Divisions, or 12,000 men.]

1. ONE surgeon and three assistants to accompany each regiment; one assistant-surgeon to accompany each battery of artillery, and one regimental surgeon to every four batteries. Regimental officers.

It is advisable that these officers should always, if possible, remain with their respective corps, except the surgeon of artillery, and go into action with them, when they may take as much care of themselves as they can. At a siege, one assistant-surgeon accompanies each relief into the trenches, and is exposed like any other person.

2. One staff surgeon should be attached to each division, to superintend and regulate its proceedings. Staff surgeon with a division.

He also accompanies the troops into action, but avoids musquetry fire, cannon shot, if he can; for, once an officer loses his regiment at the commencement of an action, it has happened that he could not find it again until it was over, not even if he should be a staff officer.

3. The medical conveyance for an army in the field should be, as far as possible, independent of the commissariat, although receiving assistance from that service on every occasion in which it can be afforded. Medical conveyance independent.

4. The first principle of a medical military movement in the field is, that wherever a gun can go, an hospital cart should be able to follow and keep up with it.

5. An hospital cart should be on two wheels, with shafts and outrigger for two horses, capable of being taken off the springs, and put on again easily; it should have a light permanent cover, and side curtains. It ought to be able to hold a cot slung high. A seat for two persons in front, covering a waterproof box for surgical stores. There should be a similar, but narrower, seat behind for two persons, affixed to the doors, and everything belonging to the cart should match, as near as possible, similar articles, such as wheels, &c. in the artillery. Two horses and two men to be permanently attached to it, and it should carry eight spare horse-shoes. Nature of an hospital cart.

6. One of these spring carts should be attached to each regiment of cavalry or infantry, and to each battery of artillery not serving with a brigade. One cart to each regiment.

One should be specially attached to the horse artillery, and capable of accompanying them everywhere.

7. A quartermaster and two non-commissioned officers, old hospital sergeants, if possible, should be attached to every 12 carts, the whole being under the orders of the staff surgeon of the division, six of the 12 being in reserve. All the carts should be numbered. The six attached to regiments should carry nothing but the box aforesaid of surgical and medical stores; a tent and six bearers, with poles and slings. It should follow the regiment into action at a convenient distance, near enough, on any movement taking place, to pick up the wounded. Disposition of hospital carts.

The six reserved carts should carry in addition, two hard-pressed packages of 10 sets of bedding, each set consisting of one rug, two blankets, three sheets and one paillasse case; these carts are to be with the staff surgeon, and as near as possible to the scene of action, without incurring much risk.

Appendix, No. 1.

8. There would thus be 24 carts for two divisions, and 12 more and a forage waggon should be attached to the head quarters of the army; in all 37.

The forge waggon should have two blacksmiths and a cutler, a handy man at all hardware work.

What they should carry.

These carts are intended to replace any defective ones with the divisions, or for particular services. One half should carry the same stores as before mentioned, with the addition of five caoutchouc bed cases ready for inflation by air; the other six should carry, instead of the bedding, such articles constituting the materials for a field hospital (well packed), as may be immediately required: the Inspector-general taking care that every cart shall be provided with the best means for carrying water, whether by barrels or skins, &c., as the country will afford; the want of water having often given rise to the greatest sufferings after a battle.

Water especially required.

Number of horses and men.

9. Thirty-seven two-horse carts will require 90 horses for them, and the non-commissioned officers. The men required for each cart may walk when the cart is required for the wounded; and as servants for the medical staff officers should be furnished from this corps, 150 men in all will be required, although none perhaps need be fully efficient for service in the field.

These carts, &c. should be under the direction of the Inspector-general of the Medical Department for their duties, and under the commanding officer of the artillery for their discipline and payment. The great store of materials for general hospitals should be carried on bullock cars, at a sufficient distance in the rear of the army.

Carriage of general stores.

Regimental conveyance for sick, &c.

10. Each regiment should have two bullock cars for the purposes of the sick only; they should be hired, say at Constantinople, from persons, if possible, who will supply 12 for each division, with one superintendent, to be paid for at Constantinople at a fixed price, stipulated rations being granted to each driver and his two bullocks; the Commissariat to be at liberty to kill a lame or disabled beast, and to pay for it at a fixed price; the contractor to furnish another beast from the country at a fixed price, or the pay to be stopped as long as the cart is found unserviceable. This will prevent the irregular pressing found so prejudicial in the Peninsula.

Return conveyance.

11. The return conveyance, of whatever kind, belonging to the Commissariat of each brigade or division, should always carry sick to the rear, so as to leave the hospital conveyance as effective as possible in the field.

Regimental surgeon's horse for stores.

12. Every regimental surgeon should find a horse, mule, or camel out of his allowance, like captains of companies, or as their case may be; and two panniers should be furnished by Government for each beast, made of wickerwork, covered by bull-hide with the hair on, and having an additional covering or lining made of some waterproof material. A Portuguese field officer's tent should be above and between the panniers, the whole being covered by a painted waterdeck, or other waterproof material, firmly girded on by a rope. The animal thus loaded should never be sent to the rear with the baggage when preparing for action, but should always march in front of the last section of the regiment, if not with the commanding officer at the head of the regiment.

13. Each staff surgeon, and each surgeon unattached (absurdly called second-class), should have an animal and packsaddle found once by the Commissariat; panniers and stores should be furnished by the medical department, together with a tent; a man to take care of the animal should be supplied from the hospital conveyance corps, as above indicated.

Sick on landing.

14. Supposing 12,000 infantry to land at Constantinople, there will be some sick, or men unable to march, dependent principally on the time they may be kept on board ship, and on the discipline observed, particularly as to ventilation by night.

Hospital at Constantinople.

15. A building should be obtained for an hospital a mile at least out of the town near which the troops land, airy, roomy, capable of containing 600 sick; it should be walled in, if possible, with a field or garden behind.

Bedding, less the straw, and all other hospital stores, should go out by the same ships for at least 1,500 men. One staff surgeon and one or two of the best assistant staff surgeons should be allotted to this hospital, with a purveyor or clerk, and two or three hospital serjeants or stewards, if procurable, from the pensioners attached to the hospital conveyance corps.

This hospital should not only receive all sick on landing, but all that are left on the advance of the army, and all that return from it as it proceeds.

It should be so augmented from time to time as always to be ready to admit 200 more, whatever be the number present. It may be the depôt for the apothecaries, and for all other stores. If the force sent should ultimately amount to 25,000 men, this establishment must be greatly increased.

Military commandant.

16. There should be a military officer attached to take charge of the convalescents, and to repress any great irregularities; if this officer should not act cordially in concert with the principal medical officer, they should both be removed.

Duties of Deputy Inspector-general.

17. One Deputy Inspector-general of the Medical Department should remain, it is presumed, in Constantinople, with one staff-assistant surgeon and one clerk.

This officer ought to superintend the landing of troops, and the departure of invalids, apportion their supplies, regulate the hospital, and approve the contracts to be made for it.

He

He should correspond with the Inspector-general at head-quarters, and have a separate correspondence on every point relative to the station with the Director-general of the Army Medical Department at home, copies of which should be sent to the Inspector-general at head-quarters. He provides attendance for all sick officers arriving from the army, and reports them when fit for duty. He should be an officer of inspectorial rank, as he will have business to transact with the Turkish and other foreign authorities, perhaps even with the Ambassador. The quantity of writing will require a clerk, more particularly as the accounts of the expenditure of the hospitals should be made out weekly, and submitted to him every Monday morning.

The army moving.

18. The army being prepared to move, the Inspector-general goes with the head-quarters. He is almost entirely a pen-and-ink man, and will require two clerks for 24,000 men, as his correspondence will be unbounded, his returns complicated, his attention wanting in every direction; for the General commanding should never be troubled about the sick or wounded unnecessarily. A staff surgeon, or surgeon unattached, will be required for the sick at head-quarters.

Deputy Inspector in the field.

19. The second Deputy Inspector should accompany any division detached from the army, and should be in the field in the event of a battle. In a retreat he should accompany the General commanding the rear-guard, and should, with the staff surgeon of his division, be the last man to leave the bivouac at daylight, except perhaps the Brigadier or General commanding. The whole of the reserve carts should be with him, together with an assistant staff surgeon, and such others as may be disposable.

Staff surgeons to each division.

20. A staff surgeon should be attached to each division of the army. He ought to be selected by the General, but should not consider himself permanent. He should form a part of the General's family, and it may be advisable to make an allowance for him, as for an aide-de-camp. On this officer mainly depends the efficiency of a division; he should be a young and vigorous person, equal to anything, and when he does no longer possess the confidence of the General, he should be removed. (His duties are not here stated.)

Good water an essential after a battle.

21. When a battle has been fought the wounded should be, if possible, collected in tents, or in villages, or in a town; the essential thing in all being good water.

The Deputy-general should take charge of the whole. The Inspector-general may remain a few days if the loss has been severe, to approve or to censure. The whole of the unemployed medical staff should be brought up. All the regimental assistant surgeons should be called in, and the hospital establishment of each regiment, viz., the sergeant, nurse, and orderlies, should accompany them, the surgeon alone remaining with the regiment.

One surgeon with a brigade if the loss have been great.

22. The staff surgeon of the division should remain with the wounded as long as he can be spared from the division, and if the loss should have been great, one surgeon only should remain with each brigade. The surgeons of artillery should join the general hospital, and the assistant surgeons attached to batteries also, if wanted.

23. The wounded of each brigade and division should be, as far as possible, placed together under the assistant surgeons and hospital establishment of each regiment. The hospital establishments should remain until they can be dispensed with. Regimental surgeons are, in fact, the men for work on such occasions; they understand their business, obey orders, and have an *esprit de corps* that carries them through everything. They never give in, under a staff surgeon who knows his duties, and sets the example of doing them.

24. Medical men are not to be computed according to the force employed, but according to the loss likely to be sustained in the first battle. If a force of 12,000 men should have 1,500 wounded, including officers, they would require (Toulouse being taken as an example, and there is no other so good) 52 surgeons, besides four apothecaries or dispensers.

Medical staff enumerated.

The whole force of doctors being,

Inspector-general	1
Deputy Inspectors	2
Staff Surgeons	8
Assistant Staff Surgeons	10
Regimental Surgeons	12
Assistant Surgeons	36
Artillery Surgeons, four batteries	5
TOTAL	74

Exclusive of four apothecaries, or dipensers of medicine.

Deduct,		
Inspector-general	1	
Regimental Surgeons	12	Always in the field.
Artillery Surgeons	4	
Deputy Inspector	1	At Constantinople.
Staff Surgeon	1	
Assistant Surgeons	2	
Absent or sick of the whole medical department	3	
TOTAL	24	

Appendix, No. 1.

If 24 be deducted from 74, it will leave 50, being two less than the number required at Toulouse for the first week, to take a proper and scientific care of 1,359 wounded men, and 12 less than were present on the second week.

25. If a second battle should take place within a few days, there would be only 12 regimental surgeons to depend upon, and if the loss were only half of that which occurred at the first battle, all scientific treatment would be at an end.

State after a second battle.

The proposed medical staff is, then, insufficient for the duty if two battles are fought within a week; yet, in the south of France three large hospitals were established in less than four weeks, viz. at Tarbes, Orthez, Toulouse, besides some smaller ones. If, in addition to this, any of the diseases common to the country should be superadded, and it is much to be feared they will, the medical officers will be totally unequal to the duties, a consideration of the utmost importance.

If the diseases of the country should prevail.

26. If the reports of the Inspector-general of the Medical Department in May or June next should appear to indicate such an evil, 20 assistant surgeons might be allowed with advantage to volunteer from the regiments at home, some four or five of whom should find themselves promoted to unattached or second class surgeoncies on their arrival at Constantinople, unknown to themselves.

The General commanding should have authority to call for all the medical men who can be spared from Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar; the navy may be able, under such circumstances, to take charge of the hospital at Constantinople.

Medical officers should be under 30 years of age.

27. The Inspector-general may be of any age, provided he is not subject to the back ache, the gout, chronic cough, or other inconvenient derangements.

All others will do their duty better if under 30 years of age.

After six campaigns, a larger share of practical labour than anyone else, and perhaps, with one exception, of more responsible administrative duties, I was, at the termination of the war in the Peninsula, 28 years of age. What I could do then, anybody else can do now.

If an addition be made to the original force.

28. If an addition of 12,000 men be made to the original 12,000 now sent, one Deputy Inspector-general, eight staff surgeons of both classes, and 12 staff assistants. Volunteers, if possible, from regiments, should accompany them, together with one spring-cart for each regiment and six for a reserve; in all 18. Under the belief that 24,000 men will probably suffer little more in one action than half their numbers, if opposed to a superior force.

Rewards for good service.

29. Medical men will not work well without some hope of reward. The promotion on all death or retired vacancies should be granted to those who have worked; not by seniority, but by desert; the medical inspector and the General commanding must judge of their merits. The director-general at home should not have a veto.

Preference given to regimental hospitals.

30. In the early part of the Pensinsular war the establishment of general hospitals, in preference to regimental or divisional hospitals, was most approved.

In the latter part, regimental or divisional hospitals were considered to be most advantageous. General hospitals should be looked upon as necessary evils, becoming even pest-houses sometimes; and, unless under vigorous management, they impair very materially the efficiency of an army.

Topography, prevailing diseases, and capabilities.

31. The Inspector-general should make himself acquainted with the topography, prevailing diseases, and the capabilities of every kind of each place he visits, what it can furnish which the army may require, and the price of each article; so that nothing may be imported from England which can be procured upon the spot on more advantageous terms.

32. The accounts of the hospitals in the Peninsula were made out by the purveyor-general after a form ordered by the Treasury, which form could not be complied with without falsifying every figure in and every voucher and receipt attached to them; nevertheless, these accounts, amounting, it is said, to two or three millions or more, were duly examined in London at a subsequent period, and approved.

Accounts, how to be made up.

33. All accounts of general hospitals, whether on the field or afterwards, should be made up weekly, added together monthly, and finally settled quarterly, by an accountant of repute upon the spot, never to be re-opened; he should not be a person who contracts, nor one who pays.

Contracts, &c.

34. The contracts should be approved, as well as the payments, by the principal medical officer of each station, who should also examine and approve the weekly account of each separate hospital establishment of the station, whatever may be their number. There is little difficulty in doing this, if the principal medical officer have a clerk who understands accounts, and a deputy purveyor who is willing to do his duty.

G. J. G.

Appendix, No. 2.

Appendix, No. 2.

COPY of a LETTER, and its Enclosures, from Commissary-General *Filder* to Field Marshal the Lord *Raglan*, relating to part of the EVIDENCE given by the Earl of *Lucan* before the SELECT COMMITTEE on the *Army before Sebastopol.*

My Lord, Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 21 April 1855.

IN the printed copy of the evidence given before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Army before Sebastopol, which your Lordship was pleased to refer to me confidentially, I perceive it to have been stated by Lord Lucan, that no reply was given to the letter which he quotes in his answer to Question No. 6371.

I had not observed this answer in the newspaper reports of the proceedings of the Committee, or I should have noticed it in the letter which I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship on the 29th ultimo, on another point of Lord Lucan's evidence.

An answer to his Lordship's report was returned by me on the 6th February, in a letter addressed to the Quartermaster-general, and which was referred by him to Lord Lucan.

It must therefore have escaped his Lordship's recollection, not only that he received an answer, but also that he assembled the Quartermasters of the different regiments composing the Heavy Brigade of Cavalry, who had signed the certificate which accompanied my letter, and reprimanded them, I am informed, on the ground of what he deemed an informality in granting such a document.

I now beg to submit to your Lordship a copy of the answer in question, as well as of the correspondence which preceded it; and, if your Lordship should see no objection to such a course, I would respectfully request that these papers may be transmitted to the Secretary of State for War, with a view to their being communicated to the Committee in such manner as may be deemed proper.

I have, &c.

Field Marshal the Lord Raglan, G. C. B. (signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Sir, Cavalry Head Quarters, 15 December 1855.

IN reference to the conversation you had with me, and the correspondence which has passed since, I am bound to say that you have not established against the Dragoons, that having the hay at their disposal, they left it on the quay to save themselves the trouble of removing it.

I have myself visited the landing wharf, and am quite satisfied that there has been a deficiency of hay landed, and that the troops have received short rations, and have severely suffered in consequence.

I have, &c.

The Commissary-general, &c. &c &c. (signed) *Lucan*, Lieut.-General Commanding Cavalry Division.

My Lord, Balaklava, 26 December 1855.

THE inquiries which I deemed it proper to institute into the alleged deficiencies in the issues of forage to the cavalry division, have caused a delay in returning an answer to the letter under date of 16th instant, which I had the honour of receiving from your Lordship on this subject.

As it would naturally occur that forage might be landed when your Lordship was not present at the wharf, I considered it necessary to call for a return from the Commissary officers attached to the Cavalry Division of the quantity of corn and hay issued to the several regiments from the 4th to the 16th instant, which dates will, I believe, embrace the whole of the period during which you had visited the landing place, and I now beg to enclose, for your Lordship's information, an abstract of these issues.

From this document it will be seen, that, instead of a deficiency, the issues have been in excess to all the regiments, excepting the 5th Dragoon Guards and 1st Dragoons; and, with respect to those two corps, I have to observe, that a deficiency occurred nearly every day throughout the whole of the period, although the same means were available to them for receiving their full allowance of forage as to the other regiments.

Up to the period when the conversation to which your Lordship alludes took place, the forage was issued on the east side of Balaklava Harbour, and I had personally frequent opportunities of observing that hay remained over on the wharf unissued on days on which a deficiency was reported, a fact of which evidence can be produced. Such deficiencies, therefore, to whatever other cause they may be attributed, cannot have been owing to a sufficient quantity of hay not having been landed.

(signed) *W. Filder*, C. G.

Lieut.-General the Earl of Lucan, &c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 2.

STATEMENT of FORAGE Drawn by the several Regiments of the CAVALRY DIVISION from the 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive.

REGIMENT.	Total Number of Horses.		Established Ration.		Rations actually Established.		Surplus.		Deficient.	
	Chargers.	Bât.	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.
			Lbs.	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
11th Hussars - -	1,203	172	15,914	10,688	15,674	14,288	- -	3,600	240	—
13th Light Dragoons -	1,142	65	14,289	9,536	16,884	12,511	2,595	2,975	—	—
4th „ -	1,161	68	14,544	9,688	14,934	13,888	390	4,200	—	—
8th „ -	1,088	98	13,920	9,320	14,970	11,694	1,050	2,374	—	—
17th Lancers - -	1,068	52	13,284	8,864	14,664	12,388	1,380	3,524	—	—
4th Dragoon Guards	2,941	207	37,155	23,528	42,309	21,615	5,154	- -	- -	1,913
Scots Greys - -	2,873	216	36,420	22,984	46,003	24,779	9,583	1,795	—	—
6th Dragoons - -	2,124	130	26,658	16,992	32,028	14,957	5,370	- -	- -	2,035
5th Dragoon Guards -	2,131	367	28,875	17,048	24,034	15,561	- -	- -	4,841	1,487
1st Royal Dragoons -	2,014	377	27,561	16,112	22,220	14,271	- -	- -	5,341	1,841

Balaklava, 26 December 1854. (signed) *Wm. Filder*, C. G.

(G. 3382.)

Sir,

Cavalry Camp, 10 January 1855.

Copy of this statement had been laid by me before the Commander of the Forces.

(signed) *W. F.*

Refer to Mr. Filder. If there are four commissaries attached to the cavalry, they ought to attend to the issues in turn.

(signed) *Raglan.*

There has been for a long time past an officer appointed to this duty, one alternately from each brigade.

16 January. (signed) *W. F.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a statement of forage issued to the cavaly, referred to me by the Field Marshal's orders for my remarks.

I observe that the Commissary-general has cleverly enough taken a period of 12 days, from the 4th to the 16th ultimo, when the horses were foraged with extraordinary regularity, and unprecedented liberality. The Light Cavalry Brigade having been allowed, during a few days, to draw an unlimited amount of forage in discharge of the great arrears due to them, and to endeavour, as far as possible, to repair the emaciation, from positive starvation, which they were suffering. The Heavy Brigade were also allowed to draw some of the large quantity of forage owing to them. During these short 12 days there was no cause of complaint, and no complaint was made, and I was enabled, when expressing my regret of the necessity of giving the Cavalry transport duties, to state, that the improvement in the condition of the horses from the time the Cavalry had removed down the Hill was incredibly great.

Undoubtedly the Light Cavalry Brigade, which had been for a long period receiving short rations, and during some days none at all, were, after the 4th, for a very short time, as it was stopped by Mr. Filder's orders, drawing more than the daily allowance, and to some of the heavy regiments, though to a much less extent, was given some of the forage owing to them.

I am accepting the Commissary-general's statement as correct; but I should remark, that the quantities of forage issued cannot be known correctly by the regimental officers attending, from the absence of all scales and measures; indeed nothing can be more irregular and disorderly than is the issue of forage; no commissariat officer attends; the duty is left entirely to issuers, a very low class of officer; and from the fact that no forage is ever in advance, there is great delay, great scrambling, and the greatest uncertainty what quantity of forage, and whether any at all, will be got.

If Commissary-general Filder wishes to show by the statement before me that the incessant complaints I have been compelled to make are not founded in fact, I am bound to state, that the forage issued to the cavalry under my immediate observation, whether in Turkey or the Crimea, has been most irregular, and altogether insufficient. At Varna it was so irregular and uncertain, that I was driven to confine the duties of one of my aides-de-camp exclusively to the superintendence of the foraging of the regiments.

I have throughout felt the inconvenience of having no Commissariat officer of rank; it certainly has appeared to me most extraordinary that the cavalry division, when the duties must be more important and onerous, it alone of all the divisions should be left without a responsible Assistant Commissariat-general, whose opinions and recommendations would legitimately command more attention and respect than those of the young, inexperienced officers of the lowest rank, to whom the whole of the Commissariat duties of the cavalry division have been confided.

Whenever

Appendix, No. 2.

Whenever the Commissary-general shall think it prudent broadly to affirm what I suppose this statement is intended to imply, that my many complaints are not well grounded, I shall be prepared to establish, by the unanimous evidence of every individual, of all ranks, in the cavalry division, that the foraging of the cavalry, perhaps excepting a few days, has been irregular and deficient, and that the troop and officers' horses have unhappily most severely suffered in consequence.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Lucan*,
Lieutenant-general Commanding Cavalry Division.

Quartermaster-general,
&c. &c. &c.

Sir, Balaklava, 6 February 1855.

I HAVE the honour to return herewith the statement of deficiencies in the issues of forage to the cavalry division for the 13 days comprised in the period from 4th to 16th December, which you transmitted to me with Lieutenant-general the Earl of Lucan's letter of 10th January, also returned enclosed.

Copy of this statement has been laid by me before the Commander of the Forces.—*W. F.*

The above dates were selected by me because they embrace the period during which Lord Lucan stated that he had visited the wharves, and was satisfied that enough hay for the daily issues had not been landed, and that the cavalry were without rations in consequence.

As, however, his Lordship appears to consider that the period above mentioned exhibits an unusually favourable state of the issues, I called, on the receipt of his letter of 10th January, for statements of the deficiencies up to that date; and I now transmit, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, an abstract, showing the result.

There no doubt was a deficiency of forage from about the 22d to 30th November, but that was owing to our having lost nearly all the hay we possessed in the hurricane of the 14th of that month, and for which, therefore, the Commissariat can in no degree be considered responsible.

The brigade of light cavalry experienced a deficiency of forage also on their being moved to the front, at a time when the roads were utterly impracticable for carts; and the cavalry horses were not allowed, either on account of the distance, or for some military reason, to be sent to Balaklava to bring up their own forage.

(signed) *Wm. Filder.*

STATEMENT of FORAGE drawn by the several Regiments of the CAVALRY DIVISION, from 17th December 1854 to 10th January 1855, inclusive, embracing a period of 25 Days.

REGIMENT.	Established Ration.		Actually Issued.		Surplus.		Deficient.	
	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.	Corn.	Hay.
Light Cavalry:	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
11th Hussars - -	26,783	19,528	26,665	16,473	- -	- -	118	3,055
13th Light Dragoons -	24,435	16,498	26,553	12,786	2,118	- -	- -	3,712
4th Light Dragoons -	32,869	23,040	32,679	18,226	- -	- -	190	4,814
8th Hussars - -	25,676	17,488	27,083	16,649	1,407	- -	- -	839
17th Lancers - -	23,161	15,960	29,901	16,009	6,740	49	—	—
TOTAL - -	132,924	92,514	142,881	80,143	10,265	49	308	12,420
Heavy Cavalry:								
4th Dragoon Guards -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -			Nil. *Vide* Certificate and Explanation annexed.
Scots Greys - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -			
6th Dragoons - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	
5th Dragoon Guards -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -			
1st Royal Dragoons -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -			

(signed) *William Filder*, C. G.

Balaklava, 6 February 1855.

I certify,

Appendix, No. 2.

I certify, that between 17th December 1854 and the 10th January 1855 the full amount of forage was drawn.

When hay could not be obtained, an equivalent in barley, or chopped straw, was drawn.

(signed) *John G. Drake*,
Quartermaster, 4th Dragoon Guards.
J. W. Blockey,
Quartermaster, 5th Dragoon Guards.
William Scott,
Quartermaster, 1st Dragoons.
James Marshall,
Quartermaster, 6th Dragoons.

Camp Kadakoi, 29 January 1855.

(signed) *Robert Irvine*,
Paymaster-Sergeant Major, Scots Greys, Acting for Quartermaster M'Bean.

Light Cavalry Camp, Crimea,
28 January 1855.

Sir,

In preparing the statement required of me by you of the forage drawn by this brigade from the 17th December to 10th January inclusive, I have found it quite impossible to arrive at any true conclusion of surplusses or deficiencies.

The total for the five regiments shows a surplus of 8,067 lbs. corn drawn, and a deficiency of 13,371 lbs. hay, and 6,412 lbs. chaff.

This I have arrived at by comparing the quantities due day by day to each regiment, and the quantities receipted for by the parties drawing the forage on the wharf.

The occasional want of hay has required that horses should receive chopped straw in lieu; but the majority of the regimental officers do not care to draw that kind of forage for their own horses (now, within two, equal in number to the troop horses); and, again, regiments have not the means of transport for a sufficiency of it. Added to this, chopped straw has occasionally been drawn, and no receipt given.

All this swells the apparent deficiencies; and I am inclined to believe that no regiment, willing and able to take chopped straw, has wanted that portion of the forage ration.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Crookshank*, Deputy Acting,
Light Cavalry Brigade.

Commissary-general Filder, C. B.
&c. &c. &c.

War Department,
15 May 1855.

FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 3.

Extract of a LETTER from Sir *John F. Burgoyne*, dated 2 May 1855.

Appendix, No. 3.

There is great danger in many of the measures which were hastily adopted for the relief of the troops being made into a precedent for future occasions; if the proceedings of the Committee are to be useful as a guide for the future, and not solely to attach culpability for the past, it would be very desirable that such a mistake, if, as I think, it be so, should be pointed out. Extraordinary means were applied, in a hurried manner, for an extraordinary occasion; and it was not unnatural that mistakes should be made, as, I think, was the case in sending out the huts, as well as the railway, &c.

With regard to the huts, for instance, it was an excessive effort of precaution, to think of sending out barracks (for such they may be considered) to an army in the field, when an equally good effect could have been produced, as regarded the welfare and comfort of the troops, by an additional provision of tents, and a little planking to cover the damp ground. By doubling the tents, the old tent being one of the two, they were made warm; and the planking, framed for the purpose, would have formed a dry sleeping-place. The huts weighed at the rate of two hundred-weight for each man, while the second tent and boards would not have exceeded one-tenth of that weight; a matter of immense importance. They could have been more rapidly provided, and they would have been removable, which the huts were not, and would have remained subsequently an useful article of military store. A moderate supply of the huts might have been useful for a few temporary hospitals, as well as at Balaklava, for stores, stabling, &c.

I had an opportunity of stating my opinion, in answer to one question, that I thought that if means were to be sent from England for the purpose, it would have been better to have expended them in making an ordinary road, and adding more means of ordinary transport, than in the construction of a railway, and I think it cannot be too strongly enforced. One great

great advantage of that arrangement would have been, that so large a portion of the means employed, namely, the whole of the carts and horses, &c. would have been generally and subsequently available in a matter where the greatest want is felt, and not definitively fixed to one precise locality.

The employment of masses of civilians, for work or other purposes, with an army is most inconvenient and objectionable. There was some excuse for applying it as an expedient on this particular occasion, from the inadequacy of our army to meet those necessary demands; but an additional number of troops, even for these services of labour, would be far preferable, and a very large number of sappers would be of peculiar utility for the many services they could render, while they, or any description of troops, would add to the strength in the field against the enemy whenever requisite; while the 400 or 500 fine manly fellows of "navvies," I found, were to have remained of no service, with their arms folded, and rather an incumbrance than otherwise, even if Balaklava itself, in which they were residing, were attacked. Turkish and Tartar workmen were even much worse, in many respects.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS delivered in by Capt. *Milne.*

AN ABSTRACT of the SERVICES performed by the TRANSPORTS in conveying TROOPS, STORES, &c., to the EAST, from 9th February 1854 to the 27th April 1855.

NUMBER of STEAM VESSELS employed at present, 113; Tonnage, 127,208; Horse power, 27,112.
NUMBER of SAILING VESSELS employed at present, 103; Tonnage, 90,958.
NUMBER of OFFICERS and MEN employed in them, about 9,500.

Description of Troops embarked, and from whence, to the East.	No. of Officers.	No. of Men.	No. of Horses.	Provisions for Army.	Provisions for Navy.	Army and Ordnance Stores.	Navy Stores.	Provisions sent from Malta.
				Tons.	*Tons.*	*Tons.*	*Tons.*	*Tons.*
British Troops from England, and removed from Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu	2,646	67,134	7,464	42,000	25,930	27,238	4,285	8,687
French Troops from Marseilles in December 1854	466	15,574	225	- - -	- - -	8,868	—	—
Turkish Troops from Varna, Burgos, &c. to Eupatoria, in January, February, and March	- -	41,117	2,946	With 97 guns, and all the material for war of this army, including provisions, the supply to be kept up by English transports.				
Previously moved in September 1854	- -	10,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
French Troops from Marseilles in April 1855, part of 12,000	- -	8,600	About 200	- - -	- - -	About 2,000	—	—
Sardinian Contingent, now in course of embarkation	- -	15,500	2,000	With all the material and provisions for three to four months for this army; also 36 guns, 264 waggons, &c.				
10th Hussars, Alexandria	50	About 650	775	—	—	—	—	—
Sick and wounded, embarked at Balaklava, Scutari, &c., from 30 September 1854 to 15 February 1855	- -	13,724	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS	3,162	172,299	13,790	42,000	25,930	38,105	4,285	8,687
Baltic Service—								
French Troops	437	12,888	21	—	—	—	—	—
„ English Troops	- -	- -	- -	- - -	11,667	886	265	—

In addition to the services enumerated in the foregoing Table, the Steam and Sailing Transports have been employed as Magazine, Naval, and Commissariat Store-ships, and in conveying ammunition and stores from Gibraltar and Malta to the East.

Since the disembarkation of the army in the Crimea, they have been employed conveying stores, provisions, guns, ammunition, and troops from Malta and Corfu; cattle from the coasts of the Black Sea; coals, charcoal, and wood, provisions, and other stores from Constantinople; embarking French cavalry from Varna and Burgos to the Crimea; Turkish troops from Varna to Eupatoria; conveying the sick and wounded to Scutari, and invalids from thence to Malta and England, and French troops, horses, and stores from Marseilles, as enumerated in the above Table.

Transport Office, 1 May 1855. (signed) *E. Giffard.*

RETURN of the Number of FREIGHT SHIPS engaged for the CONVEYANCE of STORES between the undermentione Places, from the 1st January 1854 to the 31st March 1855, together with the Tonnage of the Stores conveyed.

Date of Engagement.	FROM ENGLAND TO								TOTALS.	
	Malta.		Constantinople.		Varna (*a*).		Crimea.			
1854:	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*
January	2	746	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	746
February	6	1,486	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1,486
March	3	833	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	833
April	5	961	1	265	-	-	-	-	6	1,226
May	5	2,002	1	100	-	-	-	-	6	2,102
June	4	1,592	2	342	2	420 942*	-	-	8	3,296
July	4	1,100	-	-	9	2,322 1,458*	-	-	13	4,880
August	-	-	3	960	-	-	-	-	3	960
September	2	450	1	350	1	254	-	-	4	1,054
October	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
November	3	226 379*	-	-	-	-	7	2,881*	10	3,486
December	16	1,111 2,906*	1	336	-	-	8	752 2,448*	25	7,553
1855:										
January	6	1,302	-	-	-	-	21	465 7,629*	27	9,396
February	12	1,453 2,397*	-	-	-	-	6	1,051 1,225*	18	6,126
March	8	2,101*	3	709	-	-	6	500 1,246*	14	4,556
TOTALS	76	21,045	12	3,042	12	5,396	48	18,197	145	47,700

Date of Engagement.	FROM MALTA TO						TOTALS.	
	Constantinople.		Varna.		Crimea.			
1854:	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*	*Ships.*	*Tons.*
January	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
February	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
April	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
June	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
July	-	-	1	422*	-	-	1	422*
August	-	-	2	804*	-	-	2	804*
September	1	501*	7	645 1,756*	-	-	8	645 2,257*
October	3	1,042*	-	-	2	756*	5	1,798*
November	1	291	-	-	5	1,368*	6	1,659*
December	-	-	-	-	2	698*	2	698*
1855:								
January	-	-	-	-	3	1,056*	3	1,056*
February	-	-	-	-	3	1,220*	3	1,220*
March	1	300	-	-	3	941*	4	1,241
TOTALS	6	300 1,834*	10	645 2,982*	18	6,039*	34	11,800

The above is exclusive of 42 ships taken up at Malta to convey 14,581 tons of coals.

10 May 1855. (signed) *E. Giffard.*

(*a*) Nearly all the ships engaged to go to Varna were ordered on to the Crimea.

* Register tonnage, the ships having been engaged to take full cargoes.

MONTH.	TAKEN UP.				WRECKED, BURNT, OR DISCHARGED FROM THE SERVICE.								NUMBER OF VESSELS.				REMARKS.
	STEAM.		SAILING.		STEAM.				SAILING.				STEAM.		SAILING.		
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	Wrecked.	Burnt.	Discharged.	Tonnage.	Wrecked.	Burnt.	Discharged.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	
1854:																	
January	- -	- -	4*	3,249	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4	3,249	
February	4	7,135	4	3,056	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4	7,135	8	6,305	
March	9	13,333	35	31,421	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	13	20,468	43	37,726	
April	8	11,244	29	24,922	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	21	31,712	72	62,648	
May	5	7,520	12	9,790	- -	- -	1	1,165	- -	1	- -	841	25	38,067	83	71,597	13 Sailing transports taken up in July (amounting to 12,565 tons) and four in August (amounting to 3,228 tons) taken-up for the conveyance of a number of French troops to the Baltic; the remainder being conveyed in French and English ships of war.
June	- -	- -	1	653	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	84	72,250	
July	6	9,405	13	12,565	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	31	47,472	97	84,815	
August	- -	- -	5	4,060	- -	- -	1	3,508	- -	- -	1	788	30	43,964	101	88,087	
September	2	1,793	3	291	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2	1,358	32	45,757	102	89,020	
October	6	8,467	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3	2,278	38	54,224	99	86,742	
November	23	27,751	4	3,059	- -	- -	- -	- -	14	- -	- -	11,269	61	81,975	84	77,691	
									- -	- -	1	841					
December	18	14,490	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1	1,099	79	96,465	85	75,203	
									- -	1	- -	663					
									1	- -	- -	726					
									1	- -	- -	833					
1855:																	
January	18	20,464	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2	1,401	97	116,929	82	72,969	
February	6	5,219	- -	- -	- -	- -	2	4,970	- -	- -	- -	- -	101	117,178	- -	72,969	
March	14	13,348	15	12,813	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1	1,389	115	130,526	96	84,393	
† April	2	1,231	6	6,280	- -	1	1	1,650	- -	- -	1	957	115	127,408	101	89,716	† Two ships purchased by Government in this month, to be employed as troop ships.
							- -	2,699									
May	8	10,678	1	479	- -	- -	1	1,896	- -	- -	- -	- -	122	136,190	102	90,195	
TOTALS	129	152,078	132	114,638	- -	1	6	15,888	16	2	12	24,443					

* These vessels are included in the Return, having been employed as transports for the service of the Army in the East.

Admiralty, 10 May 1855.

(signed) *E. Giffard.*

Appendix, No. 5.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPERS delivered in by Sir *Hew Ross*.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

		Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Total ordered to the East since the commencement of the war to the present time, two troops of horse artillery and 37 companies of artillery		285	7,972	4,769
Landed in the Crimea		207	5,612	2,484
Casualties while in Turkey		1	156	185
Now on passage to the Crimea		40	1,017	885
Under orders to embark for the Crimea		37	1,187	1,215
Casualties since landing in the Crimea	Killed	8	74	104
	Died	5	572	1,286
	Invalided	18	601	—
	Removed on promotion	15	1	—
Effective force on 1st February (deducting sick and wounded)		123	2,463	1,140
Effective by last return (deducting sick and wounded)		159	2,539	1,698

The horses shown in this return include those obtained from Gibraltar, and all other sources, as well as those from England.

Deputy Adjutant-general's Office,
Woolwich, 4 May 1855.

H. Palliser,
Assistant Adjutant-general, R. A.

BATTERING TRAINS.

	Number of Pieces.	Companies.	Officers.	Men.	
First	40	3	15	402	*
Second	40	3	15	402	
Third	50	7	28	938	
Fourth	48	2	10	300	

The Fourth Battering Train has been partly embarked and sailed; the whole of the officers and men attached to it have sailed, and a ship is loading with the rest of the battering train.

* In addition to these numbers for siege purposes, the Four Reserve Companies have been attached to the siege, and officers and men from the troops of horse artillery and field batteries have also been employed in the siege batteries when they could be spared from field service.

Deputy Adjutant-general's Office,
Woolwich, 3 May 1855.

H. Palliser,
Assistant Adjutant-general.

Appendix, No. 5.

RETURN of Siege Artillery embarked for the East.

	8-Inch Guns.	24-Pounder Guns.	32-Pounder Guns.	10-Inch Mortars.	13-Inch Mortars.	5½-Inch Mortars.	Total Pieces.	
1st Battering-train -	*10	15	- -	5	- -	10	40	* Four of Lancaster's guns included.
2d - ditto - -	10	15	- -	5	- -	10	40	
3d - ditto - -	10	- -	20	10	- -	10	50	
4th - ditto - -	†18	- -	20	10	- -	- -	48	† Three of Lancaster's included.
Total - -	48	30	40	30	- -	30	178	
Sent from Malta - -	- -	10	- -	5	11	—	—	

Deputy Adjutant-general's Office,
Woolwich, 3 May 1855.

(signed) *H. Palliser,*
Assistant Adjutant-general.

RETURN of the Number of Guns forming the Siege Train before *Sebastopol* on the 17th October 1854.

—	24-Pounders.	8-Inch Guns.	10-Inch Mortars.	Lancaster Guns.	Total Pieces.	—
Right Attack - -	6	7	5	1	19	Taken from the Morning Reports of the officer commanding Royal Artillery in the Crimea.
Left Attack - -	24	9	5	3	41	
Total - - -	30	16	10	4	60	

Deputy Adjutant-general's Office,
Woolwich, 4 May 1855.

H. Palliser,
Assistant Adjutant-general, R. A.

Appendix, No. 6.

Appendix, No. 6.

RETURN of STORES of all Descriptions specially provided for the Use of the ARMY in the EAST (excluding Military Weapons and Ammunition) in the TOWER of *London*, on the 1st February 1855; showing the Quantity of each Description, the Name of the Tradesman or Contractor by whom they were furnished, and the Date when they were Delivered at the Tower.

IN STORE ON THE 1ST FEBRUARY 1855.	DATES WHEN RECEIVED.	NAME OF CONTRACTORS.	REMARKS.
7,000 pairs brown leather winter boots.	Between the 12th Dec. 1854 and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Hebbert & Co., Pall-Mall, East.	
30,000 cholera belts, flannel	Between the 21st Dec. 1854 and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Gilpin & Co., Northumberland-street, Strand.	
918 cholera belts, elastic	Between the 1st and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Kynaston, 4, Gresham-street.	
11,064 gauntlets - -	Between the 13th Dec. 1854 and 12th Jan. 1855.	G. & W. Almond, 14, St. James's-street, London	
9,964 mitts - - -			
23,559 shirts, cotton -	Between the 1st and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Hebbert, Pall-Mall, East.	
2,716 shirts, flannel -			
268 gowns, blue serge -	Between the 5th and 22d Jan. 1855.	H. Piggott & Co., Fore-street, Cripplegate.	
9,533 pairs drawers, woollen.	Between the 11th and 30th Jan. 1855.	J. Kynaston, 4, Gresham-street.	
1,117 fur caps, with peaks	Between the 24th and 31st Jan. 1855.	G. & W. Almond, St. James's-street.	
1,294 blue worsted caps -	Between the 19th Dec. 1854 and 31st Jan. 1855.	Ditto.	
9,684 Jersey frocks, woollen - - -	19th Dec. 1854 - -	Messrs. Neville & Co., Gresham-street.	
5,812 sheets, waterproof -	22d Jan. 1855 - -	Messrs. Mackintosh.	
41 blanket covers, waterproof.	12th Dec. 1854 - -	Messrs. Mackintosh & Co.	
25,270 pairs socks, worsted	Between the 11th and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Hebbert & Co., Pall-Mall, East.	
21,235 pairs stockings, worsted - -	22d Jan. 1855 - -	J. Kynaston, 4, Gresham-street.	
1,942 pairs gloves, woollen	8th Dec. 1854 - -	Messrs. Hine, Parker & Co.	
925 trowsers, blue serge, H. P.	Between the 8th Dec. 1854 and 23d Jan. 1855.	H. Piggott, Cripplegate.	
8,297 black cotton handkerchiefs - -	27th Jan. 1855 - -	G. & W. Almond, 14, St. James's-street.	
2,413 waistcoats, blue serge, H. P.	Between the 5th and 20th Jan. 1855.	H. Piggott, Cripplegate.	
242 buffalo skins - -	27th Jan. 1855 - -	Messrs. Cuthbert & Co.	
4,000 large double-breasted over-coats.	Between the 20th and 31st Jan. 1855.	Messrs. Hebbert & Co., Pall-Mall, East.	
700 waterproof capes -	28th Jan. 1855 - -	Messrs. G. & W. Almond, St. James's-street.	
25 watch coats, grey cloth - - -	25th Nov. 1854 - -	Messrs. Stephens & Co., Paul's Wharf, Upper Thames-street.	
48 cooking stoves -	24th Jan. 1855 - -	Messrs. Cottam & Hallen.	
100 camp stoves - -	29th Jan. 1855 - -	Mr. T. C. Williams, London-street, Reading.	

N. B.—A quantity of camp equipage, tools, bedsteads, and bedding, and many articles of miscellaneous store, having been provided to meet demands for all services, are not included in this Return.

Storekeeper's Office, Tower of London,
26 April 1855.

Amos Hodgson,
Deputy Storekeeper.

By order of the Board of Ordnance,

Office of Ordnance,
3 May 1855.

J. Wood,
Secretary.

Appendix, No. 7.

PAPERS delivered in by Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., 4 May 1855. Appendix, No. 7.

STATEMENT of such APPLICATIONS to the Admiralty for TONNAGE to the EAST, as were Repeated in consequence of the Delay in the Appointment of a Conveyance.

Date of First Application.	Tonnage.	Dates of Repetition.	Date of First Application.	Tonnage.	Dates of Repetition.
	Tons.			*Tons.*	
10 May 1854 -	400	22 May 1854.	20 Dec. 1854 -	300	26 Dec. 1854.
7 Aug. „ -	100		23 — „ -	180	26 Dec. 1854.
12 — „ -	10		15 Jan. 1855 -	250	7 Mar. 1855.
14 — „ -	96				
25 — „ -	200	15 Sept. 1854.	27 — „ -	200	1st, 7th, & 17th March 1855.
2 Sept. „ -	200				
8 — „ -	89		28 Feb. „ -	20	7 Mar. 1855.
9 — „ -	75				
13 — „ -	5		6 Mar. „ -	340	14 Mar. 1855.
15 — „ -	200	30 Sept. 1854.	6 — „ -	72	14 April 1855.
16 — „ -	87		28 — „ -	150	11 April 1855.

Store Account Office, Pall Mall, 3 May 1855.

Sam. Roper, Chief Clerk.

STATEMENT of APPLICATIONS to the Admiralty for TONNAGE to the EAST, in which it was mentioned that a Conveyance was URGENTLY Required.

DATES.	TONNAGE.	DATES.	TONNAGE.
	Tons.		*Tons.*
31 March 1854 - -	755	4 December 1854 - -	155
19 April „ - -	59	5 — „ - -	207
20 — „ - -	80	11 — „ - -	198
27 — „ - -	60	16 — „ - -	89
		30 — „ - -	25
1 May „ - -	50		
8 — „ - -	98	20 January 1855 - -	3
9 — „ - -	105	30 — „ - -	15
29 June „ - -	755		
		28 February „ - -	20
26 July „ - -	50		
29 — „ - -	4	1 March „ - -	4
		5 — „ - -	507
16 September 1854 - -	87	6 — „ - -	437
4 October 1854 - -	200	14 — „ - -	29
14 — „ - -	108	30 — „ - -	8
10 November 1854 - -	256		
17 — „ - -	100	12 April „ - -	43
18 — „ - -	14	17 — „ - -	233
24 — „ - -	273	26 — „ - -	18

Store Account Office, Pall Mall, 3 May 1855.

Sam. Roper.

Appendix, No. 7.

WARM CLOTHING.

Date of first requisition from the Secretary of State for War for warm clothing, and the number of articles.	5 July 1854. 150,000 worsted socks; 90,000 woollen frocks; 50,000 flannel drawers.
Date of application to contractors.	7 July 1854; for 100,000 pairs of socks; 90,000 woollen frocks.
Date of delivery at the Tower.	2 August 1854.
Date of application to the Admiralty for transport.	7 August 1854; and repeated 15th September 1854.
Whether described as urgent.	No.
Date of putting on board.	The precise day cannot be stated, but after the 17 September 1854, on which day a ship was allotted.
Date of sailing.	18 October 1854.

Ordnance, 3 May 1855.

T. Hastings.

Sir,

Office of Ordnance, 3 February 1855.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Lieutenant general and Board of Ordnance, to transmit lists of stores supplied, and services performed by their orders, without the regular official authority of the Secretary for War, and I have their commands to request that a covering authority for the same may be given.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. Wood.*

Colonel Mundy,
&c. &c. &c.

LIST of ARTICLES which have been obtained by the BOARD of ORDNANCE without regular official authority from the Minister for War.

20 November 1854,	(O—5144)	- -	300 cast iron stoves.
20 „ „	(O—5137)	- -	25,000 fur caps.
21 „ „	(O—5146)	- -	300 heather stoves.
22 „ „	(O—2356)	- -	300 - ditto.
22 „ „	(O—2355)	- -	100 - ditto.
23 „ „	(I—2349)	- -	5,000 seal-skin boots.
24 „ „	(O—2369)	- -	15,000 pairs brown leather boots.
21 „ „	(A—3977)	- -	20,000 waterproof capes.
24 „ „	(O—2363)	- -	20,000 - - ditto.
24 „ „	(O—2361)	- -	1,500 paletots and 40,000 fur coats.
25 „ „	(O—5162)	- -	3,000 pairs seal-skin boots, 6,000 pairs of seal-skin mitts, and further 6,000 pairs of mitts.
25 „ „	(O—2376)	- -	40,000 leggings.
28 „ „	(O—2397)	- -	10,000 flannel shirts.
8 „ „	(O—2385)	- -	3,000 horse-cloths.
23 „ „	(O—5150)	- -	80,000 pairs long worsted stockings.
12 December „	(O—2440)	- -	10,000 sheets vulcanised India rubber.
11 „ „	(O—2431)	- -	2,000 sheep-skin coats.
23 „ „	(O—2475)	- -	20,000 cholera bands.
29 November „	(O—2387)	- -	1,000 seal-skin clothing.
24 October „	(K—424)	- -	80,000 pairs gloves.
24 November „	(O—2365)	- -	30,000 cholera belts.
23 „ „	(O—3127)	- -	10,000 warm gloves.
4 December „	(M—4020)	- -	2,000 blankets.
5 „ „	(O—2416)	- -	40,000 hoods.

For

For Royal Artillery proceeding to the Crimea:

6,666 fur caps	20 November 1854 (A—1293). 11 December 1854 (A—4162). 6 December 1854 (A—4166) (A—4176).
6,666 mitts	
6,666 gauntlets	
6,666 long boots	
6,666 long stockings	
1,333 waistcoats, chamois leather	
1,333 waterproof capes	
4,500 overstockings	
2,000 waistcoats, chamois	
4,500 Guernseys	
2,500 waistcoats	
300 pairs gloves, gauntlets	
4,500 muffitees	
4,000 night-caps	
45,000 jackets, working	
4,500 sheets	
100 long boots	
120 leather boots	
600 goloshes	
600 leggings	
1,300 pilot coats (lined)	*See* orders previously quoted.
2,000 over coats	
4,500 strap coats	
40 cwt. dubbing	

40,000 Minié rifle muskets at Liege	20,000, 31 October 1854 (C—3626); 20,000 subsequently.
4,000 artillery carbines at Liege	2,000, 10 November 1854 (O—3637); 2,000 subsequently.
3,000 cavalry swords at Liege	26 December 1854.
12,000 barrels of gunpowder in Belgium	December 1854.

5 January 1855, 20,000 barrels of gunpowder in the United States.

SERVICE undertaken without a regular official authority from the SECRETARY FOR WAR.

18 November 1854, a shell foundry at Woolwich, at an expense of 10,000 *l.*

(Certified true copy.)

Office of Ordnance, 4 May 1855.

J. Wood, Secretary.

Sir, War Department, 7 February 1855.

HAVING laid before the Duke of Newcastle your letter of the 3d instant, with the lists therein enclosed of stores supplied, and services performed, without formal authority,

I am directed to request you will convey to the Board of Ordnance his Grace's sanction for the step which they have taken, of sending out these several articles to the Crimea upon verbal orders only.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Henry Roberts.*

J. Wood, Esq., Secretary.

(Certified.)

Ordnance Office, 4 May 1855.

J. Wood.

Appendix, No. 8.

Appendix, No. 8.

PAPERS delivered in by Captain Sir *T. Hastings*, R. N., 7 May 1855.

MEMORANDUM on Reserve Camp Stores in Lord *Raglan's* Army.

The following Estimate was forwarded to the Board of Ordnance on 22d March, and stores were shipped accordingly †:—

† It was so understood.

8 Regiments of Cavalry, 295 rank and file, 250 horses		2,360
3 Battalions of Guards 22 Battalions of the Line	25 × 912	22,820
		25,160 ‡

‡ This total was erroneously computed, 26,160.

Tents, 300. (The regiments being fully supplied with tents, viz., according to regulation of 15 men to a tent, it was supposed that they could not all be carried into the field; hence the smallness of the reserve.)

Blankets	10,000
Great coats	10,000
Camp kettles and bags	3,000
Canteens	10,000
*Nose bags	700
*Corn sacks	700
*Picket — Ropes	100
*Picket — Poles	500
*Picket — Mallets	50
*Leather water buckets	100
Felling axes, with caps and slings	20
*Forage cords	1,000
*Forage nets	500
*Sickles or reaping hooks	200
Medicine panniers, pairs	12
Pack saddles, &c.	6
Bridles for bât horses for ditto	6
Pack saddles for armourer	6
Bridles for bât horses for ditto	6

Intrenching tools:

Spades, Shovels, Pickaxes, Felling-axes, Bill-hooks	Of these it is understood a sufficient reserve will be sent with the Ordnance military stores.
Ankle boots, pairs	30,000
Shoes „	5,000
Horseshoes and nails, sets	4,000
Eight tons of bar-mitre iron for (With additional nails in proportion.)	4,000

The above are exclusive of the Ordnance reserve.

It was also recommended that the supplies should be kept up to the above proportion from the depôt at home, more especially those of boots and shoes for the men, and horseshoes and nails for the cavalry.

In considering the subject of reserve camp stores, it is safer to take the army as a whole, and not to estimate separately for the Ordnance.

Underneath

Underneath is therefore, in round numbers, the strength of Lord Raglan's Army :— Appendix, No. 8.

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.
25 battalions of infantry	775	22,800	350
16 squadrons of cavalry	368	2,368	2,368
Artillery	99	2,430	1,664
Engineers	27	403	27
Ambulance corps	3	324	165
Staff	86	-	266
Commissariat corps	33	-	33
Medical corps	50	-	60
TOTAL	1,441	28,325	4,933
And reinforcements are under orders to the amount of	50	3,750	150
TOTAL	1,491	32,075	5,083

Allowing for casualties, it will be safe to calculate upon 1,400 officers, 30,000 men, and 5,000 horses.

It will, therefore, be better to increase the reserve of tents to 500, and that of horse camp stores (marked * in the preceding list) as follows, viz. :—

Nose bags	1,500	Forage cords	3,000
Corn sacks	1,500	Forage nets	1,500
Picket ropes	150	Leather buckets	200
Picket poles	900	Sickles	1,500

It is understood that excellent pack saddles and equipment can be obtained in the country, better, perhaps, adapted for service there than ours.

A reserve of hospital marquees has been shipped, in consequence of arrangements made by the Director-general.

The intrenching tools may safely be left to the engineers to provide for.

The reserve of shoes, boots, horse-shoes, nails, and iron appear to have been sufficient for the first shipment, but it is recommended that the numbers which follow be sent out in addition with the least delay, viz. :—

Boots	30,000
Shoes	5,000
Horse-shoes and nails	4,000 sets.
Iron, and nails for	4,000 sets.

It will be remembered that the proportion of fore-shoes should exceed that of hind-shoes in the proportion of three to two.

Recapitulation of stores to be sent out in addition to those contained in the Quartermaster-general's memorandum of 22d March.

Tents, &c., complete	200	Forage nets	1,000
Nose-bags	800	Sickles	1,300
Corn sacks	800	Ankle boots	30,000
Picket ropes	50	Shoes	5,000
Picket poles	400	Horse shoes and nails	4,000 sets.
Leather buckets	100	Iron and nails for do.	4,000 „
Forage cords	2,000		

A communication to the above effect will be made to Lord Raglan, and his Lordship will be requested to cause periodical requisitions to be forwarded to England for such supplies as he may require, in order to keep his reserve of camp stores in the highest state of efficiency.

Horse Guards,
7 June 1854.

J. Freeth, Q. M. G.

Appendix, No. 8.

A RETURN of the Total Number of Rifled Arms (*à la Minié*) which have been ordered to be Set up, the Numbers completed, and remaining to be made.

	To be Set up.	Completed.	Remaining to be made.
Rifled Muskets.			
Altered Pattern { Long, for Royal Marines	29,396	15,671	13,725
1842 { Short, for Seamen	14,860	10,296	4,564
Pattern 1851, for the Army	34,000	34,000	—
Pattern 1853, ditto	80,900	25,084	55,816
Note.—Of the 55,816 Pattern 1853 in the column "Remaining to be made," about 40,000 are expected to be completed by the end of August, and the remainder by the end of October. In addition to the total number (80,900) Pattern 1853 already ordered to be set up in this country, Materials for 70,000 more are in course of provision, making a Total of 150,900 Muskets of that pattern to be set up in this country.			
Rifled Carbines.			
For the Royal Artillery	6,000	2,633	3,367
Oval-bored, for Royal Sappers and Miners	2,842		2,842

In addition to the above, steps have been taken to procure from abroad the following, viz.:—
40,000 Muskets, Pattern 1853, from Liege, and 20,000 from America, which, with those to be furnished by our own manufacture, will make a total of 210,900.
Also, 4,000 Artillery Carbines are being made at Liege, which, with the 6,000 making in this country, will make 10,000.

Store Account Office,
28 April 1855.

Thomas Hastings.

A STATEMENT of the Disposal of Rifled Muskets, Pattern 1853.

Number completed, as per Return, 28 April 1855	25,084
Since reported as complete	7,494
Total complete	32,578

Disposal.		Number.	Date of Issue.
Issued to Scutari	3,000		6 January 1855.
Ditto	3,000		20 „ „
Ditto	2,000		22 „ „
Ditto	2,000		17 March „
Issued to the Crimea	8,000		Now shipping.
		18,000	
Issued to Malta (exclusive of 100 sent there for two regiments)	400		7 March 1855.
Issued to Malta for depôts	3,000		26 April „
Issued to Malta for practice	500		
		3,900	
Issued to regiments and depôts at home, Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, and the Cape	4,458		At various dates.
Issued to Hythe School of Musketry	200		
Issued to various individuals	20		
Total issue		26,578	
Remain in store		6,000	
Total completed		32,578	

It being expected that 2,000 more will very shortly be completed, application has been made to the Transport Board for the conveyance of 8,000 more to the East, which will complete the 26,000 to be supplied for the army in the Crimea.

A STATEMENT

Appendix, No. 8.

A STATEMENT of the AMMUNITION for the RIFLED MUSKETS, Pattern 1853, issued to *Scutari*, the *Crimea*, and *Malta*.

DISPOSAL.	QUANTITY.	DATE OF ISSUE.
Issued to Scutari	2,800,000	20 January 1855.
Ditto	600,000	17 March „
Issued to the Crimea	1,000,000	Now shipping.
TOTAL	4,400,000	

Applications have been made to the Transport Board for the conveyance of 2,000,000 more of this ammunition to the Crimea.

DISPOSAL.	QUANTITY.	DATE OF ISSUE.
Issued to Malta	500,500	29 March 1855.
Ditto	500,000	26 April „
TOTAL	1,000,500	

Application will be made this day for the conveyance of the remainder of the ammunition under orders for Malta, viz. 1,250,000 rounds.

Store Account Office,
2 May 1855.

Sam. Roper,
Chief Clerk.

RIFLED ARMS.

RETURN of the Number Received into STORE at the *Tower;* the Number issued from 7th to 21st April 1855; and also the Number remaining in Store on the last-mentioned Date.—B. O. 29 December 1852 (0—1,173), No. 5,048.

	MUSKETS.				CARBINES.
	1851.	1842.	Sea Service.	1853.	Royal Artillery.
Remaining in Store on 7th April 1855	544	2,421	1,598	10,066	1
Received since from Enfield	—	—	—	—	—
Received since from Birmingham	-	-	-	3,180	—
Received since from London Gunmakers	-	1,073	885	-	180
	544	3,494	2,483	13,246	181
Issued since	487	-	-	412	180
Remain in Store at the Tower on 21st April 1855	57	3,494	2,483	12,834	1

For Detail of Issues, *vide* Guard Book.

Appendix, No. 8.

STATEMENT of Number Completed and in Progress; Number Received and Remaining in Store, and Number Issued to Service.

	Muskets.				Carbines.
	1851.	1842.	Sea Service.	1853.	Royal Artillery.
Number to be set up - - -	34,400	26,396	14,860	90,900	6,000
Number to be completed - -	34,430	17,091	11,331	29,658	2,793
Number due from contractors - -	- -	9,305	3,529	61,242	3,207
Received into Store at the Tower as per last Return - - - - -	34,430	16,018	10,446	26,427	2,613
Received since from Enfield - -	—	—	—	—	—
Birmingham -	- -	- -	- -	3,180	—
London Gun-makers -	- -	1,073	885	- -	180
Total Receipts - - -	34,430	17,091	11,331	29,607	2,793
Total Issues - - -	34,373	13,597	8,848	16,773	2,792
Remain in Store on 21st April 1855 - - - - - - -	57	3,494	2,483	12,834	1

Store Account Office, 24 April 1855.

T. Hastings.

STATEMENT of the Dates of the Applications for Tonnage to the Admiralty for which the "Prince" and the "Jura" were appointed as the Conveyances.

Date of Application.	Name of Vessel.	Date of Appointment.
7 August 1854 -	"Prince" - - - - -	19 September 1854.
12 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
14 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
25 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
2 September „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
8 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
8 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
9 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
13 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	19 „ „
15 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	2 October „
16 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	2 „ „
22 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	25 September „
25 „ „ -	„ - - - - -	25 „ „
No application referred to.*	"Jura" - - - - -	13 October „

* *See* enclosed letter from the Admiralty, appointing that vessel to receive about 400 or 500 tons of stores; 300 tons embarked.

Store Account Office, Pall Mall, 5 May 1855.

Sam. Roper, Chief Clerk.

The applications for the shipment of warm clothing, made in August and September last, were not marked as urgent or pressing, because the army being then at Varna, it was known a steamer could reach that place in about three weeks, while the warm clothing would not probably be required before the middle or end of November, thus leaving abundant time for the voyage, as steam vessels only were engaged in that service.

5 May 1855. *Sam. Roper.*

Appendix, No. 8.

Sir, Admiralty, 13 October 1854.

Their Lordships having engaged the "Jura" steamer for the conveyance of troops to the East, and there being spare tonnage in her to the amount of about 400 or 500 tons, I beg to acquaint you that any quantity of warm clothing the Board of Ordnance may be desirous of sending to Turkey may be shipped in this vessel, observing that it will be necessary the same should be sent to Liverpool, where she is lying, not later than 20th instant.

In the event of any clothing being put on board the "Jura," I request you will be pleased to inform me of the tonnage.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Wm. Leyburn*,
For Compt. for Transport Services.

J. Wood, Esq.

RETURN of "Intrenching Tools" in Store at Malta on 31st December 1853, being the latest Date to which Accounts have been received in this Department prior to the breaking out of the War:—

Axes	Broad		11
	Felling	6½ lbs. head	59
		4½ „ „	56
	Pick	6½ „ „	4
		5 „ „	200
Barrows	Wheel		75
	Hand		131
Billhooks			2,679
Shovels, Common			500
Spades			79

Sam. Roper,
Chief Clerk.

Store Account Office,
2 May 1855.

INTRENCHING TOOLS,

Complaints against, received, and Means taken to rectify.

1st Complaint from the Guards, dated Scutari, 13 May 1854, was received the latter end of that month;—that the spades were too light; felling and pickaxes wanting in steel; billhooks generally good. — 1st complaint, 13 May 1854.

2d Report, dated 1st September, received through the Inspector-general of Fortifications, of a survey held at Varna, by order of Brigadier-general Tylden, Commanding Royal Engineers: billhooks badly tempered; carpenters', sawyers', and smiths' tools inferior; pickaxes good, though rather heavy; shovels and spades very good; felling-axes good in shape, quality, and weight. — 2d, 1 September 1854.

3d, 19th September, Boards of Survey held by different divisions of the army, received through the Duke of Newcastle. These reports varied in character; general opinion may be said to be unfavourable, tools being spoken of as inferior in metal, and of too slight construction.

On the 22d June a committee was appointed, consisting of Major-general (then Colonel) Jones, R.E., Major-general (then Colonel) Torrens, Assistant Quartermaster-general, and Mr. Stacey, Ordnance Storekeeper at the Tower, to examine the patterns and specifications. — Committee appointed 22 June 1854.

On investigating the first complaint, the patterns were found to be those established by two committees in 1827; the first consisting of the late General Miller, the Chief Clerk under the principal Storekeeper, the Storekeeper of the Royal Arsenal, and the Storekeeper at the Military Depôt, Tooley-street; and the second, comprising Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, General (then Lieut.-colonel) Paisley, Colonel Sir John Jones, and Brigade-major Rice Jones. Certain alterations were suggested by the above committee, and ordered to be carried on the 13th September 1854. — Memorandum. A committee also revised certain pattern spades and shovels in 1844. Specification, No. 1, annexed. Committee suggest alterations. Ordered to be carried out, 13 September 1854.

The tools were supplied between the years 1848 and 1854 by various contractors; viz., pickaxes by Mr. Perks, Wolverhampton; Messrs. Sandford, Owen, and Watson, Rotherham; shovels by Messrs. Sandford, Owen, and Watson, and Mr. George Robinson, of Stourbridge; billhooks and felling-axes by Mr. Elwell, Wednesbury. The patterns were produced and approved. — Tools supplied between 1848 and 1854.

Tests.—The quantity and quality of the steel were tested by filing, gauging, weighing, grinding, and breaking.

The Board ordered this committee to institute an examination of all tools at Woolwich, Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, Chester, Edinburgh, Dublin, and Cork, on 19 September 1854. The serviceable and unserviceable were separated; the condemned to be replaced by patterns to be approved.

Appendix, No. 8.

An experienced officer of engineers, Major Ord, and Mr. Stacey were selected to examine all tools, both in respect to pattern and quality, and to report what improvements could be made to obtain really good and efficient articles; to examine practical persons, civil and military, if required.

They have been constantly engaged in the necessary inquiries, and lists of various tools recommended by them from time to time, for general army and engineer field service, have been approved and ordered to be adopted to govern future supplies.

Observations.—Intrenching tools and axes were issued to all regiments on embarkation as part of their camp equipage, according to established proportion; but no spare supplies were sent out expressly as regimental reserves. Such reserves were to be obtained from those demanded by the Inspector-General of Fortifications for the Royal Engineer Department.

These reserves were considerable, including every description of intrenching tools; a considerable proportion had also been ordered to be kept as a depôt at Malta.

Large numbers of troops for Turkey embarked at Portsmouth, Devonport, Dublin, Cork Harbour, and Leith, from which places the tools for camp equipment were issued, and not from Woolwich and the Tower. These stores comprised, in part, tools provided many years ago, and probably some of the pattern and quality of the Peninsular war. Those sent to the Engineer Department were supplied from the Tower and Woolwich, and are of a superior kind.

The complaints alleged against the quality of the tools are so universal as not to admit of denial in general terms. Looking into the question, it will be found that little blame attaches to the Ordnance.

The tools of which complaint is made are termed intrenching tools and pioneer implements, and are supplied in part by the Government, for camp purposes of a regiment, and in part by the colonel of the regiment.

Proportions of tools supplied to each infantry regiment by the Ordnance and by the Colonel.

Proportion of intrenching tools supplied to each infantry regiment by the Ordnance; viz. shovels, 5; spades, 5; pickaxes, 5; felling axes, 5; billhooks, 1 to every five men.

Pioneers' tools supplied to each regiment of infantry by the Colonel, viz., spades, 8; pickaxes and mattocks, 6; axes, felling and broad, 5; billhooks, 11; saws, 5.

From this it will be seen that more than one-half of the whole proportion is supplied and furnished by the Colonel, and is in no way subject to the control of the Ordnance.

It has long been admitted in the service that nothing can well be conceived more inefficient than pioneers' tools; a cause, then, for which the Ordnance are in no way responsible, has operated largely in giving rise to the complaints that have been made.

Referring to the tools supplied to regiments by the Ordnance, of which the general opinion is unfavourable, it is to be observed that the use to which this small number of tools is subjected, by soldiers unaccustomed to handle such implements, is hardly to be taken as fair evidence. The Quartermaster-general, Major-general Freeth, remarks (17 July 1854) as follows:—"It may be observed, the spade only is intended for rough work, the shovel being properly used for throwing out the earth loosened by the spade, and the pickaxe is purposely made light to save labour." And Lieutenant-general Sir John Burgoyne observes (Sebastopol 29 October 1854), "Great caution should be used in drawing results from trials at Chatham and Woolwich, where the work is not under trying circumstances; the use that a clever sapper, an artisan full of health and vigour, and in broad daylight, easy soil, and everything wanted at hand, makes of his tools, is no trial of what is required by an ordinary soldier, jaded and weak, on a dark night, in a very rocky soil, and, perhaps, under fire; the same tools used over and over again, and very roughly used."

Major-gen. Freeth, 17 July 1854.

Lieut.-general Sir John Burgoyne. Sebastopol, 29 Oct. 1854.

Brigade-major of Artillery, dated Varna, 14 August 1854.

The report of the Brigade-major of Artillery (dated Varna 14 August) states, "the tools supplied to the artillery, except billhooks, are generally serviceable."

Committee of Engineer Officers, Varna, 8 August 1854.

The strongest evidence of the character of the tools is found in the report of the committee of Engineer Officers, dated Varna, 8 August 1854. The quantity to which it refers is not stated, but it must have been considerable in proportion to those reported on by the various regiments. After objecting to the billhooks it proceeds to pronounce the pickaxe, shovel, and spade to be useful and good.

Major Edward Wellesley, 25 Aug. 1854.

The following remark, dated Varna 25 August 1854, was made by the Acting Quartermaster-general, Major Edward Wellesley, on the reports of the Boards of Survey on Entrenching Tools, and affords further evidence of their quality, viz.: "From these reports it will be seen that a different and better description of intrenching tool is issued to the Royal Engineer Department; also that the last supplies from the Tower are of an improved pattern."

Major Ord on tools at Woolwich, dated 19 December 1854.

Major Ord who, by desire of the Board, reported (19 December 1854) on the character of the tools at Woolwich, states that the pickaxes, shovels, spades, and axes then in store, and all those received since the first complaints were made, are of good quality.

Extract from report from Brigade of Guards on billhooks.

With regard to the billhooks, it is to be observed that they are woodcutters' tools, and only calculated for cutting brushwood; whereas, by the report of a Board of Field Officers of the Brigade of Guards, it appears that "they are liable to very hard usage from cutting and splitting wood, frequently of a large size."

Not any tools of the new pattern have been sent out to the East; contracts are about to be entered into for the approved patterns.

OPINION of the Inspector-General of Fortifications,

Appendix, No. 8.

26 April 1855.

Made in accordance with the desire of the Honourable Board, on a Letter from the Minister for War, as to the character of the Tools at present issued to the Army in the East, and also whether it might not be expedient that Private Contracts should be entered into by the Government for a supply of the best Tools.

"I have no reason to believe that the tools issued by the Ordnance Department for the use of the army are habitually of a very inferior description. Reports have occasionally been made (from of old) on defects in tools, and the Board of Ordnance have universally applied a remedy. I believe there cannot be a better system than at present practised of making contracts with respectable manufacturers on good specifications. It is only necessary to have a proper examination of the articles when delivered to see that they are according to agreement.

"Sappers and men who understand the use of tools find much less fault with them than those who, not understanding, misuse them."

INTRENCHING TOOLS sent out to the East from *Woolwich* from the Commencement of the War.

Issued in each of the following Months.	Axes with Helves.			Barrows.		Bills, Hand.	Hatchets, Hand.	Helves, Spare.				Shovels.			Spades.	Wheels, Spare, for Barrows.
	Felling, 4½ lbs.	Pick.		Hand.	Wheel.			Axe.		Shovels.	Spade.	Common.	Field.	Sap.		
		6½	5					Felling.	Pick.							
March 1854	50	50	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	50	- -	- -	50	—
April „	112	3,012	80	300	200	12	- -	62	632	269	- -	2,412	- -	- -	1,024	10
May „	15	30	- -	15	15	- -	30	8	8	- -	- -	15	- -	- -	15	1
June „	92	1,092	- -	6	- -	92	- -	12	312	60	- -	1,612	100	20	184	—
July „	Nil.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
August „	15	30	- -	15	15	30	30	8	1,215	315	15	30	- -	- -	30	1
September „	50	1,150	- -	- -	- -	50	50	25	25	70	200	2,050	- -	- -	550	—
October „	109	1,410	- -	50	100	306	- -	56	6	150	243	906	- -	20	114	5
November „	- -	300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
December „	22	1,732	1,000	14	14	32	20	6	510	- -	20	4,020	- -	- -	2,044	—
January 1855	5	10	- -	6	6	10	10	2	5	- -	10	10	- -	- -	10	1
February „	Nil.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
March „	50	2,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	400	750	- -	2,000	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	520	10,816	1,080	406	350	532	140	179	3,113	1,614	488	13,105	100	40	4,021	18

SPECIFICATION for the supply of SPADES and SHOVELS, approved by B. O., 11 June 1827 and 27 March 1844 (P—768).

Shovels.—Field service pattern, with straight T handle, properly fitted into the socket, and nailed in.

Shovels.—Common pattern, with curved or bent handles properly fitted into the pan, with side blocks, rivetted in and rounded at corners.

Shovels or navigating spades, with straight T handle, properly fitted into the pan, with side blocks, and rivetted in.

Spades.—Common pattern, with curved or bent handles, properly fitted into the pan, with side blocks, rivetted in, and iron.

The whole to be made of the best iron, properly steeled; the steel to be of good quality, and inserted between the two plates of iron to the height of four and a half inches from the bottom edge of each article.

A portion of each will be cut or dissected to ascertain the goodness of the iron and steel; and should such as are cut or dissected prove inferior to the patterns, or contrary to this specification, the same shall be rejected, together with the whole parcel or delivery to which they belong.

The handles and blocks to be made of prime English ash timber, well seasoned and straight-grained, and well fitted into the pan or socket of each article; and it must be particularly understood that they are free from cross knots, and not made from tender outside plank.

Appendix, No. 8.

SPECIFICATION for the Supply of the following Tools approved by the B. O., dated 13 December 1854 (C—3678).

Axes - 3,156.—Canadian Pattern. To weigh 4½ lbs., and to be steeled 2½ inches from the edge, the steel being laid in.

„ - 3,152 (Felling).—To weigh 6 lbs., to be steeled 2½ inches from the edge, the steel being laid in, and the pole to be steeled ⅜ of an inch thick, the steel being laid in.

„ - 1,427 (Broad).—To weigh 5 lbs., to be steeled 2½ inches from the edge, the steel being laid in, and the pole to be steeled ⅜ of an inch thick, the steel being laid on.

„ - 1,429 (Hand).—To weigh 3 lbs., to be steeled 2 inches from the edge, the steel being laid in, and the pole to be steeled ¼ inch thick, the steel being laid on.

The whole of the foregoing tools to be made of the best British iron, and best cast steel properly tempered; to be ground sharp, fit for immediate use; the 4½ lb. felling-axes to be polished and varnished, but not blued; the 6 lb. felling-axes, the broad-axe, and hand-axe, to be scorched and oiled, but not blacked. The whole to be in all respects equal to the pattern.

Pickaxes 3,155.—To weigh 9 lbs., to be steeled on the point and flat end, 4 inches high; the steel being laid in at the point and laid on at the flat end.

„ 3,154.—To weigh 6½ lbs., to be steeled on the point and flat end, 3½ inches; the steel being laid in at the point and laid on at the flat end.

„ 3,153.—To weigh 5 lbs., to be steeled on the point and flat end 3 inches high; the steel being laid in at the point and laid on at the flat end.

The whole of the foregoing tools to be made of the best British iron and best cast steel.

Billhooks, 3,165.—To weigh 1 lb. 12 oz., and to be steeled 2 inches from the edge, the steel being laid in; the handles to be of prime English ash, thoroughly seasoned. To be made of the best British iron and best cast steel, properly tempered; to be ground sharp and fit for immediate use, and to be in all respects equal to the pattern.

Shovels and Spades } 3,200.—Shovel, field service, T handle, straight and properly fitted into the socket, and nailed in; the pan to be slightly rounded at the shoulder, where the socket is inserted. To weigh 4½ lbs.

„ 3,201.—Shovel, barrack pattern, curved handle, properly fitted to the pan, with side blocks, rivetted in. To weigh 5 lbs.

„ 3,204.—Spade, with curved handle, properly fitted into the pan, with side blocks rivetted in. To weigh 5 lbs.

„ 3,204 (A).—Spade, but to show the quality and thickness of the iron and steel.

The whole of the foregoing tools to be made of the best British iron, and best cast steel inserted between the plates of iron to the height of 4½ inches from the bottom edge of each article, and to be of the thickness shown in the cut pattern; the handles and blocks to be of prime English ash, well seasoned, straight-grained, and free from knots, and not made from tender outside planks; and every handle to be well fitted into the pan or socket; the whole to be in all respects equal to the pattern.

ADDITIONAL CLAUSE, applicable to the whole of the foregoing Tools.

If considered necessary, any of the foregoing tools will be cut or broken, or tried in the fire, to ascertain whether they are made in a proper manner, and in conformity to the terms of the specifications; and should it prove on trial or examination that 5 articles in 100 are found to fail, either from the iron or steel being of inferior quality or workmanship, badly steeled or badly tempered, the articles so tried or examined will be rejected, together with the whole of the parcel or delivery to which they belong.

PROPORTION

PROPORTION of TENTS and CAMP NECESSARIES for a Regiment of Infantry, approved by Board's Order, 16 February 1848 (C.—54).

Round tents, with poles and valises		One for 15 men, and four extra per regiment or battalion for Guards, viz., three for the quarter and one for the rear guard.
Tent pins		Forty-two per tent.
Valise for tent pins		One for two tents.
Mallets		Two per tent.
Billhooks		One per five men.
Camp colours complete, with poles, flags, and covers		One per company, and two extra per regiment or battalion, viz., one for the quarter and the other for the rear guard.
Blankets		One per man.
Haversacks		One per man.
Canteens and straps		One per man.
Light camp kettles, with bags		One per five men.
Hospital marquee complete, with poles in eight pieces, inside and outside roof, eight walls, 184 pins, two mallets, valise for marquee, and bag for pins		One per regiment or battalion.
Medicine panniers	for the surgeon	Two per regiment or battalion.
Pack saddle, with baggage straps	for ditto	One per - ditto - ditto.
Bridle bât horse	for ditto	One per - ditto - ditto.
Pack saddle, with baggage straps	for the serjeant armourer	One per - ditto - ditto.
Bridle bât horse	for - ditto	One per - ditto - ditto.
Intrenching tools	Spades	Five per - ditto - ditto.
	Shovels	Five per - ditto - ditto.
	Pickaxes	Five per - ditto - ditto.
	Felling axes	Five per - ditto - ditto.

Note.—In Ireland the Flanders' kettle may be issued with the light camp kettle in the following proportion, viz.:—

Light camp kettles	One per four men.
Flanders' kettles	One per six men.

PROPORTION of TENTS and CAMP NECESSARIES for a Regiment of Cavalry, approved by Board's Order, 16 February 1848 (C.—54.)

Round tents, with poles and valises	One for 12 men, and four extra per regiment for Guards, viz., three for the standard, and one for the rear guard.
Tent pins	Forty-two per tent.
Valise for tent pins	One per two tents.
Mallets	Two per tent.
Billhooks	One per five men.
Camp colours complete, with poles, flags, and covers	One per troop, and two extra per regiment, viz., one for the Standard, and one for the Rear Guard.
Blankets	One per man.

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Haversacks	One per man.
Canteens and straps	One per man.
Light camp kettles, with bags	One per five men.
Corn sacks	One per horse.
Nose bags	One per horse.
Forage cords	Two pair per horse.
or	
Forage nets	One pair per horse.
Picket — Ropes	One per nine horses.
Picket — Poles	Six to each rope.
Picket — Mallets	One per troop.
Leather water buckets	Two per tent.
Felling axes, with leather cap and sling	One per troop.
Hospital marquee complete, with poles in eight pieces, inside and outside roof, eight walls, 184 pins, two mallets, valise for marquee, and bag for pins	One per regiment.
Medicine panniers — for the surgeon	Two per regiment.
Pack saddle, with baggage straps — for ditto	One per ditto.
Bridle bât horse — for ditto	One per ditto.
Pack saddle, with baggage straps — for the serjeant armourer	One per ditto.
Bridle bât horse — for ditto	One per ditto.
Intrenching tools — Spades	Eight per ditto.
Intrenching tools — Shovels	Eight per ditto.
Intrenching tools — Pickaxes	Four per ditto.
Intrenching tools — Felling axes	Four per ditto.

Note.—In Ireland the Flanders' kettle may be issued with the light camp kettle in the following proportion, viz. :

Light camp kettles	One per four men.
Flanders' kettles	One per six men.

Dates with regard to warm clothing?	First requisition from the Secretary for War for warm clothing, 5 July 1854.
Was there any record of the proceedings about putting an end to Kynaston's contract?	
Date as to the time waterproof capes were ordered?	17 November 1854; received 24 November 1854.
When were socks sent to the hospital, Scutari?	13 and 27 January 1855, 12 and 21 February 1855.
Report of the tools at the Cape?	Yes; dated 28 December 1854 and 5 February 1855.

DATES of Requistions for STORES, with the Number and Description.

DATES OF REQUISITIONS.	Number.	DESCRIPTION OF STORES.
13 March - 1854	7,266	Bedding for 22 canteens.
23 „ - „	7,509	Hospital marquees, 70.
23 „ - „	7,510	25 proportion (2d Division).
24 „ - „	7,517	Ventilators for tents.
14 „ - „	26	Cholera belts.
29 „ - „	7,770	Hospital bedsteads.
Qy. - - -	18	Medical comforts and utensils.
10 April - 1854	260	Medicine chests, canteens, &c.
27 „ - „	674	Bedsteads, 100; panniers, 6.
8 May - „	934	Panniers, 10.
9 „ - „	1,000	Tarpaulins.
11 „ - „	1,033	Pickaxes.
24 „ - „	7,616	Port wine, &c. &c., by Admiralty.
6 June - „	1,733	Agitable lamps.
8 „ - „	1,734	Marquees and 84 sets of bedding.
12 „ - „	1,812	Filtering machines.
3 July - „	2,344	Empty panniers to convey and remove.
12 „ - „	2,486	Bedsteads and mattresses.
18 „ - „	2,579	Hospital canteens and bearers for sick.
24 „ - „	2,749	Field instruments and pack saddles.
20 „ - „	2,665	Hospital bedding and dresses.
2 Sept. - „	3,418	Port wine, &c. &c., Admiralty.
21 Oct. - „	4,216	Hospital bedding and dresses.
4 Nov. - „	4,510	2,000 iron bedsteads.
18 „ - „	4,752	Hospital bedsteads, bedding, and dresses.
23 „ - „	4,876	Cancelled, Qy. 60,000 shirts; 40,000 shirts and socks.
17 „ - „	4,684	Stoves, 200, &c.
28 „ - „	5,018	60,000 shirts, sheets, and socks.
11 Dec. - „	5,372	Hospital stores.
22 Jan. - 1855	6,476	2,000 bedsteads.
30 Nov. - 1854	5,052	Hospital panniers.
9 Dec. - „	5,296	40,000 flannel belts.
28 „ - „	5,789	200 bedsteads and bedding.
1 Jan. - 1855	5,844	Knives and forks, &c.
12 „ - „	6,309	A large quantity of hospital bedding and utensils of all kinds.
5 Feb. - „	7,164	Scutari - - ditto - - ditto.
7 March - „	7,873	Field panniers.
21 Feb. - „	7,619	Ambulance waggons and carts.
28 Nov. - 1854	5,740	Cholera belts.
23 Jan. - 1855	6,512	Smyrna, large quantity of bedding and stores.
24 „ - „	6,587	Large quantity of bedding and dresses, Crimea.
15 Feb. - „	7,288	Canteen, 6, and bearers, 30.
23 Jan. - „	6,476	Bedsteads.
17 Feb. - „	7,459	Canteen, 1, bearers, 5.
22 March - „	8,404	ditto 2, ditto 10.
27 Feb. - „	7,766	Medicine panniers and canteen.
19 April - „	703	Brushes, combs, &c. &c.
24 „ - „	677	Bedding, &c. &c., Gozo.
22 „ - „	677	Fire engines, 6.
3 „ - „	105	Hospital canteens.

T. Hastings.

Appendix, No. 8.

RETURN of the Number of Boots and Shoes sent to the Army in the East.

How many boots and shoes have been sent to the army in the East, and when?

Boots, Regulation.

10,000	pairs	shipped per	Balbec	-	27 April 1854.
5,000	„	„	Candia	-	4 June „
5,040	„	„	Taurus	-	12 June „
6,160	„	„	Kangaroo	-	27 June „
1,200	„	„	Jason	-	28 July „
13,920	„	„	Medway	-	4 Aug. „
960	„	„	Golden Fleece	-	8 Aug. „
2,800	„	„	Stromboli	-	2 Sept. „
12,880	„	„	Prince	-	16 Oct. „
13,680	„	„	Jura	-	21 Oct. „
9,520	„	„	Rob Lowe	-	23 Nov. „
23,000	„	„	Gauntlet	-	21 April 1855.
104,160	Total Regulation Boots.				

Shoes.

1,000	pairs	shipped per	Candia	-	4 June 1854.
500	„	„	Taurus	-	12 June „
400	„	„	Kangaroo	-	27 June „
900	„	„	Medway	-	4 Aug. „
1,810	„	„	Prince	-	16 Oct. „
2,940	„	„	Jura	-	21 Oct. „
2,250	„	„	Gauntlet	-	21 April 1855.
9,800	Total Regulation Shoes.				

RETURN of the Number of Socks sent to the Hospital at *Scutari*.

When were socks sent to the hospital at Scutari?

Socks, when issued to Scutari, viz.:—

35,700	pairs	shipped per	Prince	-	16 Oct. 1854.
16,200	„	„	Jura	-	21 Oct. „
18,000	„	„	Cleopatra	-	2 Nov. „
17,156	„	„	Ottawa	-	6 Nov. „
5,400	„	„	Manilla	-	14 Nov. „
3,540	„	„	Rob Lowe	-	20 Nov. „
1,464	„	„	Oscar	-	20 Jan. 1855.
25,200	„	„	Eagle	-	13 Jan. „

S. Roper.

Amos Hodgson, L. S.

5 May 1855.

Appendix, No. 9.

LETTER from Sir *Thomas Hastings* to Rear-Admiral the Hon. *M. F. F. Berkeley*, C. B., M. P.

My dear Admiral, Ordnance, 15 May 1855.

Appendix, No. 9.

I REGRET very much that there should be any difference of opinion between us as to the period at which application was made for a conveyance of warm clothing to the East, and I hoped that the papers I sent you a few days since would have satisfied you as to the general correctness of my evidence before the Committee upon that point.

It is true that warm clothing was not explicitly mentioned in any of our applications for tonnage in the months of August and September last; but it is equally true, that on the 7th September 1854, a note was addressed to Mr. Leyburn (of which a copy is again enclosed), calling his attention to those applications, which then included upwards of 600 tons, and requesting that a conveyance might be appointed as early as possible.

It was also stated in the same note, that 100 tons additional per week would be ready for shipment.

In answer to a memorandum from Mr. Leyburn, as to the difficulty of procuring a conveyance for these stores, except in sailing vessels, that gentleman was informed on the 8th September 1854, that if no other mode could be obtained, arrangements had better be at once made to send the stores in question by sailing vessels.

On the 15th September a more formal application was made to the Secretary to the Admiralty, "urging the great importance of appointing vessels with the utmost dispatch to convey upwards of 1,000 tons to the East, 956 of which were light stores." No mention was indeed made of warm clothing on these occasions, but the anxiety then repeatedly expressed to dispatch the stores clearly showed how much importance the Board of Ordnance attached to the subject.

On or about the 25th September, and subsequently to the appointment of the "Prince," a memorandum (of which a copy is enclosed) was submitted to Mr. Leyburn, in which it is stated that not a moment should be lost in sending out warm clothing, blankets, &c., and wishing to know how 537 tons then ready could be forwarded, and for which the "Jura" was appointed, which steamer reached Balaklava soon after the loss of the "Prince."

Here it will be seen that warm clothing is explicitly named, and I have no doubt that in the frequent communications I had with Captain Milne upon the subject of the conveyance of stores to the East, I must have stated previously even to that date how desirous the Board was to forward articles of that description as quickly as possible to their destination.

Could it have been dispatched by steamers early in October, it is clear it might have reached Balaklava early in November, if not by the end of October.

I was so fully impressed with the conviction that the Admiralty could not obtain steam conveyance at an earlier period, that I stated in my evidence that I believed no blame could be attached to that Board; and I have no doubt if the "Prince" had not been lost, that the stores of warm clothing sent out in her and the "Jura" would have met all the wants of the army, and in ample time.

I am, &c.

(signed) *Thomas Hastings.*

P. S.—It is obvious, with reference to the probable wants of the army in the East, that the application for warm clothing did not become urgent until the latter end of September.

Appendix, No. 10.

PAPER delivered in by *W. Monsell*, Esq., M. P.

Cash Account Office, 11 May 1855.

Appendix, No. 10. MEMORANDUM of the Amount Voted by Parliament, and authorised by the Treasury, and of the Expenditure, on Account of MACHINERY and IMPROVEMENTS in the Royal Laboratory, *Woolwich*, 1854–55.

	£.
Voted by Parliament - - - - - - -	33,000
Sanctioned by Treasury - - - - - -	14,100
£.	47,100

The Amount expended in 1854–55, on the above Services, was 49,325 *l.* 19 *s.* 3 *d.*, which may be classed as under:

	£.	s.	d.
For Machinery and Improvements in part of the general plans recommended by the Laboratory Committee, and which are to be completed during the present year - - - -	40,109	18	2
For Machinery and Improvements projected by Captain Boxer -	6,984	11	10
£.	47,094	10	1
For Contractors' Bills on the same General Account passed during the last three or four days of March 1855, but properly belonging to the Votes for 1855–56 - - - - - -	2,231	9	2
TOTAL - - - - £.	49,325	19	3

In explanation of the last item, I must state that, in the press of business arising from an influx of bills much greater than usual, towards the end of March 1855, 16 claims on account of laboratory improvements, amounting together to 2,231 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.*, were inadvertently put forward in March for payment, instead of being detained till 1st April, when they would have been charged to 1855–56.

These bills were perfectly regular in every other respect, being in part of continuous services, which had been voted on 5th March 1855. The effect (financially) of their having been by a few days prematurely ordered for payment, will be to diminish the amount chargeable against the vote for 1855–56 by the 2,231 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.* in question.

I may perhaps be allowed to add, that a saving, amounting to more than 16,000 *l.*, has arisen upon the vote for wages at the Royal Laboratory, 1854–55, mainly attributable to the improvements introduced by Captain Boxer, which will more than repay the cost of the machinery purchased on his responsibility.

(signed) *Henry Smith*,
Chief Clerk.

William Monsell, Esq., M.P.

Appendix, No. 11.

PAPERS delivered in by Mr. *Sidney Herbert*, 9 May 1855.

FIRST MEMORANDUM on the Embodiment of the Militia.—6 November 1854.

LAST spring we found ourselves engaged in very extensive warlike operations, at very short notice, with an army on a peace establishment, scattered all over the world.

We have, however, sent to the East, under Lord Raglan, 35 battalions of infantry, and three more are under orders for embarkation. The casualties in these battalions have been very great, the loss from sickness and the sword, having amounted, up to October 26th, say from 6,000 to 7,000, of whom there were probably killed or died from sickness or wounds, 3,500.

Since which date, however, we hear of heavy losses encountered in subsequent engagements with the enemy. We may further estimate for a large number, say 5,000, for a time at least, inefficient from sickness and severe wounds.

Many of these will, from the nature of their injuries, be permanently lost to the service.

I do not believe that I over-estimate, in saying that it will require at the least 10,000 men to reproduce those 35 battalions in a state of efficiency for the opening of the campaign in 1855.

To bring these battalions up to the numbers at which they stood at the commencement of the campaign of 1854, many other regiments were robbed of their own men by volunteering, and the whole stream of the recruiting has been turned into the depôts of the regiments in the East.

We have, therefore, not only to recover the losses of the present campaign, but to restore to a state fit for service the regiments which remain at home.

Since the 1st of February last, we have raised 23,613 men, being, say 14,500 more than the ordinary number which has to be raised in time of peace, to replace the usual casualties and discharges, but only 7,000 more than the ordinary loss, together with the estimated loss from the extraordinary casualties of the army of the East, assuming that the ordinary loss of Lord Raglan's 38 battalions, if at home, would have been about 2,500.

The net augmentation therefore of the army, has only amounted to 7,000 men towards the 40,000 which we have received authority from Parliament to raise before April next.

Of this force so raised, about 5,000 have received discharges from militia regiments, in order to enable them to enter the line. Besides this number, many enlisted without asking permission, and have been put under stoppages on that account, from which stoppages, however, they have been since relieved, and many have fraudulently enlisted without detection. It is impossible to state the number of these latter, but 1,700 are known to have been put under stoppages, and rather more have probably entered without previous detection; judging from the number now declaring themselves, but no returns of whom have, of course, yet been received from the regiments composing Lord Raglan's army.

Whatever the gross number of militiamen, however, may be who have enlisted in the line, whether they amount to 9,000 or more, it is my belief that the greater portion of them would never have entered the army had they not previously entered the militia; and that the militia, so far from competing with and depriving the line of recruits, has on the contrary, by infusing a military spirit into the men who entered it from local and county feeling, greatly contributed to the recruiting of the regular army.

But the militia, when unassembled, contributes comparatively few recruits to the army; once dispersed to their homes, they can only be picked up singly at the plough-tail by the recruiting serjeant; they no longer encourage one another to enlist and come in bodies. The week before last, the Middlesex Rifles were out for exercise, and 68 men came together to the Coldstream Guards and the Rifles; while, scattered at their own homes, I am not aware that the regiment sent any men to the line. I might quote many other such cases, some in which larger numbers were given.

All the English regiments, however, have now been trained, except one or two in process of formation, and they will not again be called out till next spring.

The embodied regiments have hitherto been unvisited by the recruiting parties of the regulars. As the regiments were about to perform the duties of a regiment of the line, for which purpose they required unremitting attention to bring them into a sufficient state of discipline, the colonels requested that these regiments might be protected from the indiscipline and debauchery which the presence of active recruiting parties engender.

We have, however, at this moment 18 regiments, with a strength of nearly 12,000 rank and file, of embodied militia in a very advanced state of discipline, and many of them

Appendix, No. 11.

quite fit to take the duty of our Mediterranean garrisons, and release a corresponding number of regiments of the line, so soon as the latter can be recruited up to the number which would enable them to take the field.

But these embodied militia regiments, some of which will ultimately replace the line regiments, are, in the meanwhile, the only source from which the latter can obtain the necessary augmentation.

The number of the embodied regiments, however, is too small, or rather their gross strength is too small, to enable them both to spare enough men now to augment the line regiments in the Mediterranean, and then to replace them, when so augmented, in the spring.

I propose, therefore, that the number of embodied regiments should be increased, with a view to diminish from each the pressure of the measures which, it appears to me, must be applied to them, with a view to obtain from them a considerable accession of men to the regular army.

Lord Palmerston has given me a list, which I append, of the regiments which are available for embodiment, every one of which I understand has asked so to serve.

I also append a list of the barracks in which they might be placed.

When first the embodiment of militia commenced, we avoided placing them in large towns where their comparative want of discipline made them more subject than the regulars to collision with a large population, and we avoided breaking them up into detachments in small barracks, which, for the same reason, is more trying to them than to troops of the line.

These precautions were quite justifiable, so long as they were possible; but wanting men, and soon, for men we must now run risks which at other times we should avoid; and I believe that, at this moment, the conviction in the public mind that such steps are necessary, and their anxiety to second the efforts of the Government, would prevent the ill results which at other times might occur. Should we, however, not be able to get barrack accommodation enough, it may become necessary to keep some regiments in billets for a time.

Having thus extended the field of embodied regiments on which we can operate, I propose then to withdraw the restrictions hitherto imposed on recruiting parties, so far as the embodied regiments are concerned, and to allow them to recruit from them up to one-fourth of their strength, and desiring them to remain with the regiments until that limit is attained; offering, at the same time, to the colonels an ensigncy in the line, without purchase, for every 75 men raised. As an inducement to the men, I would offer, say, 1 *l.* in addition to the ordinary line bounty, which has already been augmented by 2 *l.*, inasmuch as the militiaman is well worth the additional sum, in consideration of the training he has already acquired. I would, at the same time, authorise the militia regiments to continue to recruit up their own numbers.

By taking all the men from each militia regiment, so far as it is possible, to some one line regiment, say the one which bears the name of their county, a connexion will be established which will tend greatly to encourage the continuous stream from the one to the other afterwards. Even if this were to succeed beyond my expectation, there is no fear of the Commander-in-Chief being burdened by too great a number of subaltern officers requiring admission into the army; for it will be impossible to continue the system of fighting our regiments in the field without supernumerary subalterns. It never has before been attempted; and, in a campaign so severe as the present, the result is, that the regiments are unduly short of officers, not only for the field in action, but for numberless duties which require for their proper performance the detaching of an officer to overlook them.

The moment they are not wanted they are easily absorbed, provided this augmentation is not extended to the captains.

I am quite conscious that the proceeding I contemplate will give much dissatisfaction to the commanding officers of militia. No man who takes a pride in the efficiency of his regiment likes to see it deprived of his best men, and broken into and weakened when he has, by great exertion, got it into a state of efficiency.

But the emergency is great; the necessity of organising a considerable addition to our army presses; and the efficiency of the regular army, by whom the work is to be done, is so important, that the efficiency of the militia must be held subordinate to it. If the war in which we are engaged were one of a character to tempt invasion of our own shores, the efficiency of the militia would be as important as that of our regular regiments; but when the operations to be conducted are 3,000 miles off, the use of the militia at home is to feed and maintain the numbers of the army abroad.

I have great confidence, too, in the patriotic feeling of the militia officers, who have shown so much devotion to the public service, and so much willingness to sacrifice their own habits and comforts to it.

Lord Hardinge concurs with this proposal.

(signed) *S. Herbert.*

APPENDIX to FIRST MEMORANDUM. Appendix, No. 11.

THE undermentioned regiments of militia appear to be the fittest to be embodied, regard being had to the number of field officers and captains who have served in the army, the number of men present at the last training, and the efficiency as reported by the inspecting officer.

	Field Officers.	Captains.	Men Present.	
1st Cheshire	2	6	785	
1st Derby	2	1	542	
1st Devon	1	5	713	
Dorset	3	4	602	
West Essex	2	2	635	
2d Lancashire	1	2	901	
4th Lancashire	3	2	933	
East Norfolk	-	2	665	
Northumberland	2	-	623	
Notts	2	2	808	
Oxford	-	3	627	
Salop	4	5	749	
Sussex	2	2	498	
West Suffolk	2	-	649	
Worcester	2	6	785	
1st West York	3	1	744	to be made Rifles.
North York Rifles	2	3	658	
	33	46	11,917	

All regiments of militia have expressed their readiness to be embodied. There are urgent applications to-day from the 4th Lancashire and the Sussex.

VACANT BARRACKS available for MILITIA in *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, 6 November 1854.

VACANT BARRACKS in *Great Britain*.

SCOTLAND.

Aberdeen Barracks - - - - - 390
Stirling and Dundee „ - - - - - - 561
Dundee „ - - - - - - 310

are occupied by three Highland depôts of regiments now in the Crimea;

And Perth Barracks - - - - - 466

by the depôt of the 69th;

Dumbarton - - - - - - - 60

non-commissioned officers and men.

At present there is abundance of room, but, when completed, they will barely accommodate the depôts.

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ENGLAND.

North	Bradford	about 200
	Burnley	„ 250
	Chester	„ 250
Midland	Birmingham	„ 200
	Coventry	„ 150
	Northampton	„ 200
South	Trowbridge	„ 148
	Bristol	„ 300
	Taunton	„ 62

WALES.

Cardiff	„ 165

BARRACKS in *Ireland*.

*	Kinsale	accommodation for 472 men.	
*	Charles Fort	„ 339 „	
	Naas	„ 388 „	vacant.
	Boyle	„ 248 „	„
	Clare Castle	„ 221 „	„
	Dundalk	„ 100 „	„
	Cavan	„ 113 „	„
	Carrick-Shannon	„ 125 „	„
	Westport	„ 114 „	„
*	Armagh	„ 143 „	„
	Cashel	„ 131 „	„
	Oughterarde	„ 142 „	„
	Roscrea	„ 132 „	„
	Shannon Bridge	„ 122 „	„
	Nenagh	„ 171 „	„
	Wexford	„ 118 „	„
	Youghal	„ 168 „	„
*	Drogheda	„ 168 „	
	Castle Camer	„ 105 „	„

N.B. Those marked * are pensioner stations, with 1 serjeant and 6 men in each.

Fermoy, Templemore and Birr are, and either Buttevant or Belfast will be, occupied by consolidated depôts.

Buttevant	931	59th depôt	12 men.		
Mullingar	915	14th	„	243	„
Newry	706	3d	„	121	„
Galway	584	40th	„	325	„

There are various small barracks, ranging from 98 to 31 men each, 27 in number, of which five only are occupied; viz.

Camden Fort Barracks	91	59th	91 men.		
Raubawline „	95	39th	87	„	
Carlisle Fort „	87	91st	79	„	
Carrickfergus „	73	62d	23	„	
Maryborough „	66	90th	62	„	

SECOND MEMORANDUM on Embodiment of the Militia.—23 November 1854.

IN accordance with the plan explained in the memorandum which I circulated last week, I have set in motion the machinery for obtaining recruits from the embodied regiments of militia.

It is too soon yet to judge of the results of the measure but I have reason to think that, to the limited extent to which it is yet being tried, it will succeed.

Nine fresh regiments of militia have received notice to embody. It takes, however, some days to get them together. The remainder on the list which was attached to the memorandum will be immediately called out.

But the barrack-room is altogether exhausted.

We have 18 regiments who have been embodied for some months, and who are in a high state of discipline. There are 18 sources from which the regular army draws its supplies of men.

The additional regiments I have mentioned will be so many additional sources; but so long as we embody no more regiments than we have barrack-room for, we shall not have availed ourselves of all the means in our power, and we shall have deprived the army of men whom we could otherwise have obtained.

I propose, therefore, to embody all the regiments that are so far advanced in their formation as to have men to give, and to keep them in billets in their respective counties. Regiments not well reported of might merely be trained for the 16 days remaining from the 56 authorised by the proclamation.

When a regiment is embodied with a view to the performance of Line duty, the sooner it is moved into barracks, and out of its own county, the better; but if it remain in billets, those on whom they are billeted submit to that tax more willingly for their own countymen than for strangers; and a militia regiment recruits better in its own county.

So far as the militia force itself is concerned, the billet system, as compared to barracks, is prejudicial to discipline.

But we have no option; and our object, at this moment, is not the efficiency of the militia but the recruiting of the army.

The other objection to the billet is the inconvenience and annoyance it inflicts on the publican, who has to provide beds without remuneration.

Under the Mutiny Act, the publican receives only one halfpenny ($\frac{1}{2}$ *d.*) a day per man to cover the use of salt, pepper and the fire for cooking; in point of fact, however, I believe that even this halfpenny is not received by the publican, but is kept by the militia-man to whom it is issued. The publican reimburses himself by the expenditure of the militia-man in his house.

At this moment, I believe that this or any other inconvenience would be cheerfully submitted to. The people are determined that Lord Raglan's army shall be supported, and advantage ought to be taken of this spirit, while it exists, to create a fresh army for the purpose, for that is what is really wanted.

But it is not politic to tax this spirit too high, or to run the risk of exhausting it when the struggle in which we are engaged is but begun; and I therefore propose to make an addition to this payment for billets in all cases where the billets are of a permanent character.

I have consulted Sir R. Mayne on this subject, and he has, through the sergeants of the police force, made inquiry as to the amount of daily payment which would be, if not a compensation to the publican, still an alleviation of his burden. They are of opinion, that in the country, were the billet-money augmented to $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* or 2 *d.*, the publicans would be perfectly contented, but that double that sum would not compensate the same class in London, where house-room is so valuable. It would be necessary, likewise, to issue the $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* direct to the publican, so as to ensure his getting it. Two-pence a day is the allowance for lodging-money to a married soldier; $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* or $10\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* a week would probably, therefore, be an equitable payment for the lodging of the single man.

The summary of my proposals is, therefore:—

1st. To embody, forthwith, all regiments of militia which are of sufficient strength to make it worth while to apply to them the process under which the existing embodied regiments are giving volunteers to the Line.

2dly. To increase the daily sum payable to the publican on whom the man is billeted from $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* to $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d.*, so that there may be some compensation for the burthen imposed.

It is true that there will be a difficulty and inconvenience in calling out this large force. The militia requires new clothing, and I have been obliged, under the pressure of the moment,

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to send to the Crimea great coats and trousers which had been prepared for them; but there is no time to be lost. A man enlisted now is worth five enlisted next year.

Our army is exhausted, and we have a new army to create.

Believing, therefore, that the militia is the force from which alone it can be recruited, either by drafts or by the creation of second battalions, or even of new regiments, if all other plans should fail, I am of opinion that we should, as soon as possible, call out all our available militia regiments, and draw from them all the strength we can for the Line.

If the Government approve of that course, I will ascertain what regiments Lord Palmerston thinks should first be called out.

(signed) *Sidney Herbert.*

THIRD MEMORANDUM on Augmentation of the Army.—27 November 1854.

WE have now 61 regiments of militia embodied, including 18 who have been for some months doing garrison duty, and who are, with the exception of the knowledge of the Minié, well advanced in their training.

This week will show how far the plan of recruiting from the militia is successful, so far as these 18 regiments are concerned.

There are improvements to be effected in the mode of proceeding, which will make the process less detrimental to the discipline of the regiments, and less disagreeable to their commanding officers.

From the newly embodied regiments a larger proportion than 25 per cent. may, I think, be asked for. These regiments, though they have had two and some of them three trainings, have not been permanently together as the long embodied regiments have, and have not consequently that *esprit de corps* which prevents many from leaving their regiment, and their officers, to whom they have become attached. Nor has that amount of labour and care been yet bestowed upon them, which makes one hesitate to impair efficiency which it has cost their officers so much pains to produce.

Again, it is from the 18 long-embodied regiments that the battalions for Mediterranean service, say six or nine, will be selected, and not from those now for the first time embodied. We may, therefore, I hope, reckon on still larger numbers from the new than we expect to obtain from the old regiments.

It is not possible to estimate very accurately the number of men whom the embodiment of the militia will produce. The embodiment of a regiment produces fewer men than the training, as the training produces fewer than the enrolment. Whatever be the numbers, however, the military feeling of the country is awakened, and we may hope that a very large proportion of them will volunteer for the regular army.

It is necessary, therefore, to decide, without loss of time, what will be the best method of dealing with the recruiting from the militia.

Two objects must be kept in view. We want to attract the largest number of men from the militia, and having got them, so to dispose of them as to give the greatest and most permanent strength to the army which they recruit.

The immediate wants of Lord Raglan's army are the first, but by no means the only thing to be considered.

England has not usually been very successful at the commencement of her wars; for the reason, that she does not in time of peace maintain an army large enough to be capable of lasting as well as sudden extension. It is possible, as this year has shown, to create, at very short notice, a very efficient and for us considerable army; but it is quite another thing to maintain those numbers and that efficiency. The army of the east has been created by discounting the future. Every regiment at home, or within reach, and not forming a part of that army, has been robbed to complete it. The depôts of the battalions under Lord Raglan have been similarly treated.

These depôts consist only of men who have ceased to be, and recruits who have not yet become, fit for foreign service, and the drain upon them is so great and so immediate, that the four depôt companies at home are too weak to feed, as they ought, the eight service companies abroad.

The casualties in Lord Raglan's army by death, sickness and wounds, amounted, up to November 6, to 10,000 men, of whom some 2,000 will probably return to the ranks; but in the interim we have to replace them; and though you may recruit 20,000 men in six months, and even train them to all the duties of a soldier, you cannot in that time make of the mere boys who come to us seasoned men.

Clearly the war with Russia will not be the affair of a year. It is clear likewise that Lord Raglan's

Raglan's army is in a position in which reinforcements sent now, though indispensable to its safety, will be useless, so far as ultimate success is concerned, unless they are followed by further constant and large supplies of men.

We must, therefore, at once establish a further and a good reserve on which to draw. The first thing to do is of course to restore to their former numbers the shattered battalions in the Crimea. But we must do more than that, if that army, once restored, is to be permanently maintained in a state of efficiency. We must augment the four company depôts to a strength which will enable them adequately to meet the drain of the eight service companies exposed to all the risks and casualties of war, and for this a plan is preparing, which will, in a few days, be submitted to the consideration of the Government.

(signed) *Sidney Herbert.*

Dear Lord William, War Office, 18 January 1855.

You will have received, some days back, the instructions of the Duke of Newcastle. Though there was in them nothing, I believe, which you had not already received, in private letters from him or myself, yet he thought you would feel yourself strengthened by detailed instructions, in a public despatch, pointing out some of the principal things to which your attention should be turned without delay, and on which the powers with which you are entrusted should be exercised.

The Duke of Newcastle is so much pressed, that I fear he may be unable to write to you by this mail, and I therefore do so.

I understand that you have now got a small steamer at your disposal, to ply to Constantinople for provisions, vegetables, and stores of all kinds, as well as to assist in landing the sick. Is this so? I trust it is. If not, it ought to be got, if possible, whether by borrowing, hiring, or buying.

I hear that the pier is now mended, and advanced into the sea. I hope this is done solidly and effectually. They say there is plenty of stone close by. Wood only got knocked to pieces by every surf.

I hear that you also have the wash-house, or bath-house, at the hospital, now clear of straw and forage, and available for its proper purposes.

We have sent out some washing and wringing machines, with men to work them. I hope you will give an impetus to the quick utilitation of these men and articles the moment they arrive.

Additional clerks are on their way for the purveyor's department, and I have seven more about to start.

I am trying to get civilians to aid as ward-masters, issuers, &c., and permanent orderlies, in lieu of your present ever-changing body. Some are gone out.

I dare say many of the new comers will prove inefficient, for there are no analogous employments in civil life in England from which to select them. You must weed out the bad ones. This the medical officers and purveyor will be able to do, if encouraged and authorised by you.

We have ordered great-coats, fatigue jackets, trousers, and flannel shirts, drawers, and socks, for 10,000 men to be sent to you, for the use of convalescents. But if you can get clothing elsewhere, do not wait for this supply, which, after all, will soon be exhausted. But whenever you are in a position to do it, from having enough blankets, hospital dresses, &c. &c., in store, for the use of the hospital, then the clothes of the sick should be taken from them, on arrival, and, with the blankets, should be purified and washed (or burnt), and the men put into hospital dresses, blankets, &c., which should not leave the hospital with them, but remain ready for the next comer, the convalescent receiving back his own things, made up, if deficient, from your store.

All this implies a building at the entrance of the hospital for the reception of these things, which should be washed, numbered, and kept sorted, for re-issue, if fit for further use, and destroyed, if not so, but accounted for to the man, by giving him a similar article from the general store.

I enter into all these details with you, because I feel convinced that unless you insist on these things, and see, with your own eyes, that they are carried out, nothing will be done.

But this brings me to the subject of buildings, which is the most urgent and pressing of all.

Our hospitals are full, nay, they are much more than full, they are crowded to an extent dangerous to human life, should any epidemic break out.

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I believe that great improvements have been effected, but still we are not ahead of the demand upon us. I see you have a new hospital at Seraglio Point, but the new comers or the convalescents fill it.

I hope you will have felt the urgency of this question.

There is room in the barracks for the proper accommodation of about one half of the number of patients; some would say one-third, some, perhaps, less. In the general hospital the same. Think what it will be in hot weather.

The new hospital at the Serail will not, I am told, be healthy beyond May, owing to its situation. The same is said of Abydos.

You know how rapid is the march of sickness before Sebastopol, and what an assault, or any great action, might any day bring you of wounded.

You cannot put, therefore, the requirements of the army for hospital accommodation at less than treble what you now have. If you seek for the transfer of new buildings from the Turks, there is endless delay, and you do not get what you want, or you do not get it when you want it. Your hospital staff medical commissariat purveying has to be broken up, and all is again disorganised.

The true thing is to build where you are unless you have a better place. They tell me the French temporary hospitals are very good buildings, made of wood and battened and plastered inside. Each building holds 50 sick. This is the usual style of Turkish building, which they are therefore used to make. What the French have done, we can do. If wards for 100 are better than for 50, the same construction will answer the purpose, taking care that there is sufficient height for ventilation.

If these buildings be erected on the parade-ground adjoining the barracks, you can have the new temporary hospitals served by the same staff, merely adding what is necessary for extra kitchens, washing-places, surgeries, depôts, &c.; connecting them by covered ways, or what is thought best. I may be quite wrong as to details. You, who are on the spot, will judge best with the aid of the engineer and the medical officers. I trust you will have anticipated all this, and have begun these erections in accordance with the same suggestions which I have made before. If not, do not lose a moment in commencing. It requires no intervention of the Turkish Government. You need only at once begin: 30 buildings, holding 100 beds each, would enable you to clear the corridors in the present hospitals, and place the beds throughout at a proper distance apart, besides taking in some fresh cases.

Again, ought there not to be sheds and store-houses at the waterside? Are there existing houses which can be procured for store-rooms?

The Government here will furnish everything from home which you wish for. I judge by some answers made by the purveyor, that he never looks forward; does not anticipate future demands; does not ever attempt to procure what he wants at Constantinople.

The purveyor ought to write home constantly, telling us what he has in store; how much he will want of each article, and how soon; and every effort ought to be made by him to get at Constantinople what can be procured there; for instance, Mr. Joscelyne Percy told me that they are short of chamber-pots in the hospital, and that they can be purchased in Constantinople. He may be wrong in this latter statement, but surely some earthenware vessels of some kind could have been procured.

This must apply to a great many things. It is most important that no opportunity should be missed of sending home the invalids who are fit for the voyage.

I understand that two or three men-of-war left lately without taking any, though they offered to do so, but sailed before any arrangement was made. Pray come to a good understanding with Commodore Grey on this point; it is most important.

There are other minor details and suggestions which I have not time for to-day.

These are the main points:—

1. A thorough reformation of the whole means of disembarking the sick, for which a good solid stone pier, good boats, good means of carrying the sick up to the hospital (a covered way?) are necessary.

2. A small steamer very important.

3. A thorough reformation of the system of receiving and issuing the stores.

4. Erection of buildings for that purpose.

5. Reclothing convalescents, and washing and storing their own clothes.

6. An extended system of cooking, so that there may be not only plenty, but served punctually and hot, and in a proper state, to the patients.

7. Above

7. Above and before all, the immediate erection of additional hospitals or wards, with everything necessary in the way of store-room, surgery, privies, &c., &c.

Will you be kind enough to let me know exactly what has been done on these points, and what is doing.

The Duke of Newcastle wishes for a weekly report of the progress of all the works.

The Government entrust to you full powers to order and execute whatever is right or necessary in your opinion, and they feel that in placing this responsibility on you, they can rely on your energy and determination to overcome the difficulties of the task, and to create, not only really efficient hospitals, but surplus accommodation to meet the demand which we know must be made upon them.

I enclose you a copy of my letter to Major Sillery, of the 11th December, which was an iteration of previous similar letters, showing how much those things have been already pressed, and how little has been done.

Pray let me hear from you on these subjects as immediately as possible.

If you want clerks or interpreters, and have the means of procuring them, pray do; if you have not, I will take care that you have them sent out, if you will only let me know.

Believe me, &c.

Brigadier-General Lord W. Paulet. (signed) *Sidney Herbert.*

19 January.

P.S.—I have just received your interesting letter of the 8th January; it is too late to answer it in detail. I have a very full letter also from Miss Nightingale, full of excellent suggestions; you will find her most valuable.

I will attend instantly to all you suggest.

If you are deficient of timber at Constantinople, I should think you would get it by sending to Trieste.

I am glad you are making use of Mr. Black. I believe he will be of great service.

I will write again as soon as I can tell you what we have succeeded in doing.

* * * * * *

Pray recollect that you have full power to send home any one whose inefficiency is marring the public service.

Dear Dr. Smith, 24 December 1854.

There are several matters which require immediate consideration.

1st. Have you yet provided yourself with, or have you in your eye, any person who would be a fit successor to your late assistant, Dr. Spence? In the present state of business, and the immense pressure produced by the war in every branch of the department, it is very unadvisable to allow a place so important to remain unfilled a moment longer than is indispensable for the inquiries necessary to ensure a good appointment. In all departments in which promotion in appointment goes by selection, and not by seniority, the choice is watched with much jealousy as well as vigilance, and it is most important that the selection you make for your assistant should be one which should stand criticism, and be, on public grounds, the best that can be made. Pray think of this.

I had a long letter yesterday from General Estcourt; he says that the two-wheeled ambulance carts sway about, and are liable to upset on rough ground, and are therefore, he thinks, inferior to your four-wheeled ones; but all are useless now that the roads are become impassable, and they are borrowing French mules and panniers to carry the sick down to Balaklava. He wants similar pads and panniers sent out immediately. I do not know if you have the model here, but I have written to the Duke of Newcastle and asked him to apply to the French Government to let us have a supply, if they are in stock, we undertaking to replace them, and also to send us a model. I will show you General Estcourt's letter when I return, also one from Dr. Cumming, and one from Mr. Maxwell. It is clear that Scutari is fast getting into order, but they are full, and we must organise another hospital as soon as we can; before, however, I go to this, I would say that all the authorities concur as to the entire failure of the system of hospital orderlies. All press for the substitution of a permanent establishment devoted to this work, and to this only. I think we should lose no time in creating such an establishment, and should immediately look out for persons who would undertake the duties of wardmasters, orderlies, &c. There is no necessity for their now being soldiers, any more than there is for the purveyors and

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the Commissariat being soldiers. Will you consider what rates of pay ought to be given, and how the men should be procured. I have asked Mr. Hawes to try the mercantile houses for purveyors' clerks, issuers, &c.; cooks must also be sent out.

I come back now to the question of additional hospital accommodation. Lord Raglan has now upwards of 10,000 sick between Sebastopol and the Bosphorus. The number is rapidly augmenting. The Duke of Newcastle writes about Smyrna, but that would only relieve us by withdrawing the convalescents from Scutari, but not on a scale which would meet the requirements of another battle, or an assault, nor even of the cholera and dysentery now prevailing. Another barrack was given up to us by the Turks, at a place called Kullili, five miles up the Bosphorus, and this, if suitable, ought to be converted into an hospital as soon as possible; and medical men, purveyors, stores of all kinds, sent to it from Scutari, unless we can provide them from elsewhere. Have you any good purveyors' clerks who could be promoted to this affair? If not, we must get some one well recommended from some of our great mercantile houses. I come now to the last question, which is raised by * * * * * letter (* * * * *). We may ultimately be reduced to have hospitals managed by civilians, just as we have sometimes depôts, and even regiments, attended by civilians. It is however undeniable that the evil of which he complains, exists. We are filling our hospitals, *ex necessitate rei*, with very young assistant-surgeons, and this proposed shortening of the course for the avowed purpose of giving us a quicker supply, is an admission, first, that we have drained the class who will accept the acting assistant-surgeons' places; and, secondly, that we are going to admit men at a younger age, and with a slender, and therefore a less complete education, than we think it right to require in time of peace, when the service to be performed is far less important. There will soon be an outcry on this subject, which I should not mind, if it were unfounded, but it will be a just one.

Ten thousand or 11,000 sick, out of whom some 3,000 or 4,000 are wounded, require, and will exhaust, not only all the medical ability of our army, but of the medical profession generally; and we must get the best advice and skill that can be got, so long as it is to be got; clearly we do not do that if we exclude from our ranks all but those who are young enough, or needy enough, to accept an acting assistant surgeon's commission. I revert then to the opinion I have formerly expressed to you, that we must carry the introduction of civilians, with acting commissions, one step higher, and take in acting surgeons. I do not see how it need interfere with the prospects of the assistant surgeons, who would still have the promotion to surgeoncies as before, as the civilians would always continue acting; an acting assistant surgeon might be promoted to be an acting surgeon, and you might even promote him to be an acting deputy inspector. When the war ceases, the whole of their acting medical establishment would disappear, and you would not be burthened with a long list of men whom it would be impossible to employ. We are complaining of men standing on forms and departmental dignities, but do not let us set the example of doing the same thing; when great emergencies arise routine must give way, and vigorous measures be adopted, whether precedents exist or not. I should propose to recall, on full pay, men now on half-pay, if there was anything to be gained by it, but I do not suppose there is, as the men are probably too old, and if one man who is too old overlooks another who is too young, they will not make a good operation between them. If you do not have recourse to acting commissions in a higher grade than assistant surgeons, we shall have our hospitals deluged with inexperienced boys. The great number of cases are not surgical, but medical, and can be as well treated by a civilian, with an acting commission, as any army surgeon, sometimes better; but with mere lads, many precious lives will be sacrificed whilst they are learning their business. These acting commissions must of course be confined to general hospitals. It would be quite possible so to distribute the acting surgeons that none but acting assistants should be under them; but once it is understood that they are not interfering with the promotion of the assistants, the difficulties would, I think, soon disappear. I return to town on Tuesday. In the meanwhile pray think over the question of a hospital corps, and the acting commissions.

Believe me, &c.
(signed) *S. Herbert.*

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PAPERS delivered in by Sir *J. Graham.*

ORDERS issued to Admiral *Boxer,* dated 8 April 1854. Appendix, No. 12.

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. &c.

WHEREAS we have thought proper to appoint you to take charge of all naval and victualling stores at Constantinople, you are hereby required and directed to proceed, without loss of time, to Constantinople accordingly, and to hoist your flag for the time on board any vessel of war which you may find in the Bosphorus, and to follow such directions as you may from time to time receive from us, or from Vice-Admiral Dundas, the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's ships and vessels in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, with whom you will keep up a constant correspondence on all matters relating to your department.

We have appointed Captain Christie to take charge of the Transport Department in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. He will be instructed to defer to you in all cases where his duties may bring him in communication with you, and he will be instructed to attend to any suggestions you may make to him for carrying out the service upon which you are mutually employed.

We further acquaint you, that we have appointed Commander Borlase to be additional commander of the "Ceylon," with the intention that he should be employed under your orders for the purpose of assisting you in your correspondence and communications with the Turkish authorities, or other duties in which you may require his assistance; and from his acquaintance with the country and his experience of the Turkish service, we do not doubt that you will find him a useful officer.

You will therefore take Commander Borlase under your orders accordingly. Further communications will be sent to you in regard to your pay, allowances, &c.

Given under our hands this 8th day of April 1854.

(signed) *Alex. Milne.*
W. Cowper.

Edward Boxer, Esq., C. B.,
&c. &c.,
Rear-Admiral of the Blue.

By command of their Lordships,

(signed) *W. A. B. Hamilton.*

REPORT of Captain *Milne,* dated Admiralty, 10 May 1855.

THE statement that requisitions were made for tonnage for warm clothing, and marked immediate, is incorrect. The requisitions are as follows:

7 Aug. 1854. 100 tons light Ordnance stores for Varna, to be ready in about a fortnight.
12 Aug. „ 10 tons light stores, 7½ of which is ammunition.
14 Aug. „ 96 tons light stores, 50 of which is ammunition.
25 Aug. „ 200 tons light stores, in addition to the requisitions of the 7th, 12th, and 14th August.

Note.—An additional 200 tons in about a fortnight.

2 Sept. „ 200 light stores, in addition to 300 tons, 7th and 25th August.
8 Sept. „ 70 tons heavy shot and shell, and iron.
8 Sept. „ 44 tons, light, 4 tool chests shut out of Hue's supply, and 34 tons of filled cartridges and combustible stores.
9 Sept. „ 15 tons heavy (for the East) shot.
9 Sept. „ 60 light, including 29½ tons of filled cartridges and combustible stores.
13 Sept. „ 6 tons heavy. Constantinople, shot and shell.
13 Sept. „ 4 tons heavy. Varna, horseshoes.
13 Sept. „ 1 ton light forges.
15 Sept. Duplicate, immediate, 200 tons light. Varna.

Note.—On the 12th of September the "Prince" was appropriated for these stores.

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Not one word was said to the Admiralty that these requisitions were for warm clothing, nor was any of them marked urgent or immediate until 15 September; had it been so, we could have shipped some of them in the following steamers, which were then loading for Varna:

London,	-	sailed 3 Sept., with beef, pork, &c.
H. M. S. Supply	-	4 Sept., shot, shell, ammunition.
Vifredo -	- -	21 Sept., beef, pork, biscuit, &c.
Briton -	- -	22 Sept., ditto, ditto - ditto.
Faith -	- -	28 Sept., ditto, ditto - rum.
Lion -	- -	13 Oct., ditto, ditto - ditto.

A steamer, certainly not a very eligible one, was declined on the 18th of August, because there appeared to be no urgency in the requisitions. Had the Admiralty been told that the requisitions of the Ordnance were pressing, this vessel could have been chartered.

Some of the stores shipping by these vessels could have been left out had any urgency been expressed for these light stores being immediately required to be sent out. The first requisition was not to be ready until about the 22d of August, and as these stores were accumulating, it required a large vessel to convey them. When the "Prince" came from the Baltic, on the 11th September, she was at once appropriated for this service. She did not get to the River until the 15th or 16th September, and was to have sailed the 4th of October, but owing to the very large amount of Ordnance stores to be shipped, 1,287 tons, besides the 46th Regiment, she did not get away until the 16th of October, and was wrecked on the 14th November. In her the following clothing was lost:

Woollen socks	- - -	35,700 pair
„ frocks	- - -	53,000 „
„ drawers	- - -	17,000 „
Watch coats -	- - -	2,500 „
Blankets	- - - -	16,100 „
Rugs -	- - - - -	3,700 „

Had this ship not been lost, no inconvenience would have been felt in regard to warm clothing.

The first requisition at the Admiralty received to send out warm clothing was on the 18th October—for 300 tons, light stores (warm clothing), which was shipped in "Jura" on the 22d October, at Liverpool, and that ship could have taken 100 tons more had it been sent. The other requisitions were as follows:

Date of Requisition.	Department.	Particulars.	Tonnage.	Address.	When Shipped.	—
1 Nov. -	Ordnance -	Artillery clothing	66	East - -	17 Nov.	
4 - -	- ditto -	Great coats -	150	ditto - -	17 Nov.	
4 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	150	ditto - -	17 -	
4 - -	War Office -	Clothing - -	82	ditto - -	12 -	
4 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	40	ditto - -	12 -	
7 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	172	ditto - -	1 Dec. -	- - A ship specially chartered.
7 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	15½	ditto - -	17 Nov.	
9 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	13	ditto - -	1 Dec.	
11 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	1 20	ditto - -	1 -	
11 - -	Ordnance -	Artillery clothing	39	Turkey - -	1 -	
13 - -	War Office -	Clothing - -	13	East - -	1 -	
18 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	22½	Turkey - -	1 -	
18 - -	Ordnance -	Sappers' clothing	14	Constantinople	1 -	
24 - -	War Office -	Buffalo hides -	247	Crimea - -	14 -	
29 - -	Ordnance -	Artillery clothing	20	- ditto - -	14 -	
25 - -	War Office -	Clothing - -	160	- ditto - -	1 -	
25 - -	- ditto -	- ditto - -	5	- ditto - -	—	

This Return only embraces the month of November; supplies were continued and sent out on requisitions sent to the Admiralty in December and January, and very great difficulty was experienced in procuring steam vessels for this and other pressing services. The amount of stores required to be sent to the east, being to the following enormous quantities:

Nov. 12,600 Tons.
Dec. 15,000 „
Jan. 10,650 „

A. Milne.

RETURN of the Arrivals of the Small Cargo Steamers at *Balaklava*, and of their subsequent Proceedings, dated 14 March 1855.

er l.	NAME.	Date of Arrival.	NATURE OF CARGO.	Date of Sailing.	Number of Days in Port.	REMARKS as to Delay, or present Employment.
e.	Holyrood - -	23 Dec. 1854	Warm clothing, shot, shell, and powder.	8 Feb. 1855	47	Has made one trip to Constantinople for commissariat stores, at the requisition of the Field Marshal.
	Gottenburg -	9 Jan. 1855	Warm clothing of fleet and army, 300 barrels powder, Fortnam & Mason's stores, 7,500 shot.	29 Jan. „	20	Transferred to Commissary-general by requisition, and has made two trips to Constantinople.
	Manilla - -	26 Dec. 1854	Warm clothing, shot, shell, and ammunition.	7 Feb. „	43	Has been employed conveying provisions to Turkish Army at Eupatoria from Bourgas, by order of Commander-in-chief.
	Esk - -	10 Dec. „	Rum, lime-juice, and planking -	15 Jan. „	27	Has been employed conveying provisions to Turkish Army at Eupatoria from Constantinople, per order of Commander-in chief.
	Sidney Hall -	23 Jan. 1855	Warm clothing, rice, sugar, rum, and coffee.	27 Feb. „	35	Sent to Constantinople on commissariat service, by requisition of Field Marshal.
	Metropolitan -	25 Dec. 1854	75 huts, 86 stoves, 385 bales, 120 cases, 7,500 shot.	23 Jan. „	20	Has made one trip to Constantinople on commissariat service, by requisition of Field Marshal, and is about to proceed again.
	William Hatt -	6 Jan. 1855	104 huts, 99 stoves, 107 packages for fleet.	21 Feb. „	46	Has made one trip to Constantinople by order of Rear-Admiral Boxer, and returned with firewood.
	Cumberland -	9 Jan. „	90 huts, stoves, and warm clothing.	13 Feb. „	35	Has made several trips as a cattle ship, transferred to Commissary-general by requisition of Field Marshal.
	Sir John Easthope.	5 Jan. „	70 huts, 70 stoves, sundry bales of regimental clothing.	27 Feb. „	53	Sent to Constantinople on commissariat service, by requisition of Field Marshal.
	Firefly - -	23 Jan. „	Part of third battering train, warm clothing, &c.	- - -	50	Has been to Kameish Bay and transferred mortars to French authorities; has returned to this port to land powder and shells, for which there was no place of deposit; will now be cleared in a few days.
	Norman - -	31 Dec. 1854	80 huts, 87 stoves, sundry packages for the army.	14 Mar. 1855	73	Sailed with stores to fleet; required for commissariat service by request of Field Marshal.
	Hetton - -	28 Dec. „	80 huts, 88 stoves, sundry packages for the army.	16 Feb. „	50	Has made one trip to Constantinople by order of Rear-Admiral Boxer, and returned with coals.
7	Cosmopolitan -	27 Dec. „	80 huts, chevaux-de-frise, warm clothing.	2 Feb. „	36	Has made one trip to Constantinople on commissariat service, by requisition of Field Marshal, and about to proceed again on the same service.
	Oscar - -	21 Jan. 1855	Tram-way for Heraclea, warm clothing, &c., 1,000 barrels of powder.	- - -	52	Has been cleared upwards of a month, except 1,000 barrels of powder, for which there was no place of deposit; will now be cleared in a day or two.
	John Bowes -	6 Jan. „	80 huts, 80 stoves, sundry packages.	17 Feb. 1855	42	Transferred to Commissary-general, by order of Rear-Admiral Boxer, as a coal vessel.
	Black Prince -	4 Feb. „	Part of a battering train, warm clothing, &c.	- -	38	Greater part of cargo still on board waiting orders and a place of deposit; now to be cleared in a few days.
	East Anglian -	9 Feb. „	Part of third battering train, sundry packages for the army.	- - -	33	- - Ditto - - ditto.
	Alster - -	7 Jan. „	90 huts, 90 stoves, waterproof clothing.	- - -	66	Cleared, and receiving stores for the fleet; then to proceed on commissariat service, by requisition of Field Marshal.
	Royal Victoria -	28 Jan. „	44 officers' huts, 46 soldiers' huts, 134 stoves, stores for the officers of the army.	6 Mar. 1855	37	Transferred to Commissary-general as a cattle ship, by order of Commander-in-chief, in lieu of Cormorant, ordered home.
	Lady Eglintoun	30 Jan. „	Field train and reserves, sundry packages for army.	- - -	43	Part of stores landed, remainder waiting orders.
	Union - -	1 Feb. „	60 huts, 30 tons of shot - -	- - -	42	Landing huts as fast as they can be received on shore.
	Foyle - -	27 Jan. „	100 huts, stoves, and warm clothing.	11 Mar. 1855	43	Transferred to Commissary-general as a cattle ship, in lieu of Albatross, ordered home.
	Prompt - -	9 Feb. „	Part of third battering train, warm clothing, wine, spirits, &c.	- - -	33	Has been to Kameish Bay, and transferred mortars to French authorities; returned again to this port, waiting orders for disposal of powder.
	Marley Hill -	10 Feb. „	106 huts, 212 stoves, 13 casks of coffee.	- - -	32	Landing huts as fast as they can be received on shore.
70	Kangaroo -	9 Feb. „	Warm and waterproof clothing, spirits, and wine for the army.	- - -	33	Landing and transhipping warm clothing as fast as practicable.
72	Peninsular -	13 Mar. „	Boots, warm clothing, chevaux-de-frise, 2,734 barrels of powder.	- - -	1	Not commenced to discharge.

(*continued*)

Number of Vessel.	NAME.	Date of Arrival.	NATURE OF CARGO.	Date of Sailing.	Number of Days in Port.	REMARKS as to Delay, or present Employment.
*173	Black Boy -	6 Feb. 1855	80 huts, 80 stoves, sundry packages for the fleet.	- - -	36	Landing huts as fast as they can be receiv on shore.
*175	Cochrane - -	18 Feb. „	Warm clothing, boots, horse-shoes, 1,400 barrels ball cartridge.	- - -	24	Cleared of everything except powder, whi will be landed immediately.
*177	Amity - -	15 Feb. „	55 officers' huts, 45 soldiers' huts, warm clothing, and sundry packages for army.	- - -	27	Landing huts as fast as they can be receiv on shore.
*179	Durham - -	22 Feb. „	Waterproof clothing, dried vegetables, victualling stores for sale to army.	- - -	20	Clearing as fast as practicable.
*181	Rajah - -	15 Feb. „	75 huts, 142 stoves, bales of clothing, 60 casks of coffee, 57 cases coffee.	- - -	27	
*182	Chester - -	27 Feb. „	7 hospital huts and warm clothing.	- - -	15	
184	Telegraph -	14 Mar. „	Warm clothing, 671 tins of coffee, 70 casks of coffee.	- - -	–	Just arrived.
*190	Snowdown -	22 Feb. „	26 huts, 160 casks of coffee, 242 tins of coffee, bread, &c.	- - -	20	Landed small packages.

(signed) *P. Christie*,
Captain, and Principal Agent of Transports.

LETTER from Lord *Wodehouse* to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, Foreign Office, 2 November 1854.

THE Earl of Clarendon having forwarded to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris a copy of your letter of the 25th ultimo, containing the instructions which have been addressed to Admiral Dundas relative to the blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea, I am directed by his Lordship to state to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys will invite the French Minister of Marine to send instructions to Admiral Hamelin similar to those which have been addressed by the Admiralty to Admiral Dundas, on the subject of the above-mentioned blockade.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Wodehouse.*

Appendix, No. 13.

RETURN of Provisions, &c. Shipped by the Victualling Department of the Navy for the use of the Army in the East.—(Referred to in Question 17674.)

SHIPPED		Biscuit.	Rum.	SALT MEAT.		Coffee, Raw.	COFFEE.		Sugar.	Rice.	Tea.	Chocolate.	Port Wine.	Brandy.	Boiled Mutton.	Essence of Beef.	Sago.	Arrowroot.	Oatmeal.	Prepared Cocoa.	Concentrated Milk.	Chocolate Paste.	Scotch Barley.	Preserved Beef.	Preserved
On the	In the			Beef.	Pork.		Roasted Whole.	Roasted Ground.																	
		Lbs.	*Galls.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Dozen.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	¼ *Pints.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*Pints.*	*Pints.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
13 Mar. 1854	Saxon			24,016	46,080	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15 — —	Hope (S.)	193,000	4,612	49,856	49,920	12,320			18,032	32,256	2,730	3,477											3,500		9,9
31 — —	Wild Wave	249,984	10,029																						10,0
10 April — —	Sovereign (S.)	158,600	2,192			12,320			18,032	32,256	2,768	3,414											3,500		
11 — —	Bride	148,400	13,088	100,016	100,160	29,680			65,576	135,408	3,365	3,063	100	50	224	900	224	224					3,560		31,0
15 — —	Euxine (S.)			72,264	146,880	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
19 — —	Martha Miles					26,040	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
22 — —	Albatross (S.)	49,280	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
1 May — —	Balbec (S.)																								
25 May to 6 June 1854	Arthur the Great			73,264	146,560				3,080		1,410		500	258	896	3,584	448	448					1,120		3,2
2 June 1854	Taurus (S.)								100,084		8,003	10,048	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
17 — —	Tynemouth																								
17 — —	Ripon (S.)					53,200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
8 July to 14 July 1854	Marmion									9,184														27,390	
14 July 1854	Progress																								
15 — —	Manilla (S.)					26,880	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
15 — —	Orinoco (S.)	31,360	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
22 — —	Pettoma	448,000																							
27 — —	Sibyl	168,224																							
29 — —	Sea Nymph (S.)	267,680		41,040	43,200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
13 July to 3 August 1854	Industry (S.)	400,176					5,000		111,440	2,828	15,029												10,043		
2 Aug. 1854	Phantom	134,176																							
7 — —	Harbinger (S.)																								
9 — —	Cottingham (S.)	550,928								13,600													18,400		
10 — —	Wild Irish Girl								38,556	33,576													21,274		
12 — —	Robert Ingham																								
14 — —	Tanjore																								
14 — —	Mauritius (S.)																								
17 — —	Indian Queen																1,120	560	104	—	—	—	—	—	
1 Sept. — —	London (S.)			152,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
6 — —	Helen Mary																								
12 — —	Rockliffe	304,864	—	—	—	79,940	—	—	150,000	64,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,520	—	39
2 to 20 Sept. 1854	Vifrido (S.)	14,784		84,208	104,000				2,016		413		300		672	4,480	446	336	40		559	559	20,000		1
21 and 22 Sept. 1854	Bucephalus	271,824	—	—	—	21,000	—	—	5,040	40,000	—	—	300	230	—	—	462	896					29,932		
22 Sept. 1854	Choice	291,872	12,785	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
24 — —	Faith (S.)	221,536	18,290	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
27 and 28 Sept. 1854	Lion (S.)	528,080	7,312	37,696	56,320	39,534				50,000															
4 Oct. 1854	Columba									40,000															
4 — —	Belgravia			72,352	96,000																				
16 Oct. to 7 Nov. 1854	Robert Lowe (S.)								7,056		409		600	207	672	4,480	2,016	1,788	140		560	560			1
1 Nov. 1854	Alipore	5,600	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
10 — —	Blake	5,600	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
10 — —	Brandon (S.)																								
11 — —	Cleopatra (S.)	35,840		42,560	47,600				7,056		422		600	226	672	4,480	2,016	1,792	140		560	560			1
11 — —	True Briton	324,464		78,128	93,760	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
12 — —	Chapman	248,640		60,800	63,680	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
12 — —	Clifton	109,760	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
14 — —	Rajah (S.)	56,784	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
16 — —	Holyrood (S.)																								
21 — —	Edward	262,304		200,896	203,360	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
23 — —	Esk (S.)	33,600	10,001																						
23 — —	Helen	143,360	4,036	89,984	89,952																				
29 — —	Elizabeth	122,640	4,053	60,800	60,800																				
1 Dec. — —	British Lion																								
2 — —	Dinapore		9,093	176,016	100,160	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
2 — —	John Bull	289,072	5,081	76,000	76,112																				
6 — —	Britannia			91,024	95,360																				
11 — —	Adelaide (S.)																								
16 — —	Sydney Hall (S.)	28,490							137,200	98,800															
16 — —	Glenco			58,704	57,600				100,744	56,160															
19 — —	Tilla and Isie	10,017		76,000	80,000																				
19 — —	Lady Eglinton (S.)																								
20 — —	Lilly Dale																								
23 — —	Dinapore	9,999	9,728	10,240																					
23 — —	Lady Franklin	332,416	2,031	91,200	91,520																				

Appendix, No. 13.—RETURN of Provisions, &c. Shipped by the Victualling Department of the Navy for the use of the Army in the East—*continued.*

Biscuit.	Rum.	SALT MEAT. Beef.	SALT MEAT. Pork.	Coffee, Raw.	COFFEE. Roasted Whole.	COFFEE. Roasted Ground.	Sugar.	Rice.	Tea.	Chocolate.	Port Wine.	Brandy.	Boiled Mutton.	Essence of Beef.	Sago.	Arrowroot.	Oatmeal.	Prepared Cocoa.	Concentrated Milk.	Chocolate Paste.	Scotch Barley.	Preserved Beef.	POTATOES. Preserved.	POTATOES. Dried.	Onion Powder.	Dried Vegetable Ration.	Lemon Juice.	Hay.
Lbs.	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Dozen.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*¼ Pints.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Gallons.*	*Lbs.*	*Pints.*	*Pints.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*	*Ration.*	*Lbs.*	*Lbs.*
59,136	- -	- -	- -	- -	33,162	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
118,608	5,000	114,000	113,920	- -	- -	- -	39,200	46,800	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	115,328
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	5,600	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	19,152	38,080	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	58,064	71,024	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	87,688
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	1,560	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	5,600	—	—	—	—	—
235,200	10,097	30,400	32,000	- -	- -	- -	100,016	36,140	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	11,200	- -	- -	106,000	- -	44,478
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	20,256
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	408,458
139,888	5,009	55,776	57,600	- -	22,080	784	50,064	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
200,480	5,025	9,120	9,600	- -	- -	- -	39,200	20,840	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	22,761
142,016	2,029	7,600	8,000	- -	14,820	- -	50,064	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
196,224	10,033	30,400	32,000	- -	- -	- -	100,072	36,120	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	101,157
137,088	2,012	34,720	36,240	- -	5,000	1,350	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	3,000	2,850	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	19,980	32,592	- -	- -	1,012,720	—	—
134,176	4,999	66,880	70,400	- -	- -	- -	5,040	36,048	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	23,203
138,880	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	9,000	8,300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
129,696	2,008	60,800	64,000	- -	- -	- -	50,064	50,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
159,096	5,003	38,000	40,000	- -	188	- -	49,952	50,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	5,002	57,152	59,840	- -	- -	- -	- -	50,064	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2,247	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	3,640	16,775	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
79,296	2,049	60,800	64,000	- -	22,146	- -	20,048	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	57,79
127,568	- -	86,400	94,560	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	14,63
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	20,700	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
440,720	9,993	76,000	80,000	- -	- -	- -	84,896	150,080	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	9,32
- - -	- - -	51,680	138,560	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	30,400	64,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
451,136	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	40,736	85,120	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
254,072	5,007	45,600	48,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	118,944	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	38,000	80,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
225,064	5,017	106,432	112,112	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
76,608	5,003	76,000	80,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	50,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	24,34
198,800	3,019	60,800	79,200	- -	- -	8,456	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	10,045	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	50,064	9,970	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1,764	557,920	—	—
- - -	- - -	81,168	169,600	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	48,640	102,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
140,840	3,001	51,136	51,200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
117,600	2,007	15,200	16,000	- -	- -	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	9,992	24,928	24,960	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
227,360	5,007	103,360	104,000	- -	- -	15,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
224,112	5,006	74,000	76,800	- -	- -	15,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
192,864	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
185,136	5,006	76,000	80,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	44,800	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	6,497	- -
- - -	- - -	31,616	28,160	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
52,472	9,992	50,160	49,920	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	40,035	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
184,800	6,017	31,920	33,600	- -	- -	- -	94,224	- -	- -	10,019	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
151,424	3,001	106,400	80,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
224,000	- -	- - -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	51,500	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
144,648	5,025	60,864	64,160	- -	- -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
211,120	4,006	60,800	64,000	—	- -	15,200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
181,888	4,014	76,016	80,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
161,672	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	102,752	211,840	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
199,024	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
276,080	9,133	152,000	160,000	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	32,760	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
- - -	9,995	15,200	16,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	31,616	28,160	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	101,536	213,120	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
85,120	5,001	37,088	35,360	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- - -	- - -	80,864	120,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
300,160	4,995	132,800	138,400	- -	- -	56,500	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13,414,440	843,039	4,718,416	5,365,200	300,914	216,016	311,639	1,352,528	1,347,968	94,573	20,002	2,400	971	3,136	17,924	6,732	6,044	424	32,760	1,679	1,679	116,849	47,370	153,380	30,070	4,011	1,676,640	46,493	5,204,0

Thomas Tassel Grant,
Comptroller of Vic

Appendix, No. 14.

Appendix, No. 14

RETURN of the Number of RECRUITS finally Approved of for the CAVALRY, INFANTRY, and ARTILLERY, in each Month, commencing the 1st of March 1854, distinguishing those who Enlisted while Enrolled in the MILITIA, and the Number who Volunteered from the EMBODIED MILITIA.

MONTHS.	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		ARTILLERY.			GENERAL TOTAL Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery.
	Recruits Joined.	Volunteers from Militia.	Recruits Joined.	Volunteers from Militia.	Ordinary Recruits.	Enlisted when Enrolled.	Volunteers from Embodied Militia.	
1854:								
March - -	168	Previously to November, the men received from the Militia were not distinguished from ordinary recruits.	3,080	Previously to November, the men received from the Militia were not distinguished from ordinary recruits.	488	37	- -	3,773
April - - -	138		2,335		450	37	- -	2,960
May - - -	179		2,510		360	55	- -	3,104
June - - -	218		2,658		335	136	- -	3,347
July - - -	199		2,195		101	30	- -	2,525
August - -	199		1,942		151	16	- -	2,308
September - -	162		1,606		148	8	4	1,928
October - -	201		1,724		141	20	5	2,091
November - -	401	13	4,199	458	238	33	32	5,374
December - -	459	121	4,296	1,350	271	64	39	6,600
1855:								
January - -	527	126	4,375	1,064	345	38	78	6,553
February - -	365	93	2,538	572	378	24	103	4,073
March - -	478	59	2,720	667	437	7	146	4,514
TOTAL - -	3,694	412	36,178	4,111	3,843	505	407	49,150

Adjutant-general's Office, Horse Guards, 24 April 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. G.

RETURN of the several Amounts of Levy Money Authorised, with the Dates on which the Alterati took place.

DISTRIBUTION.	In Operation on							
	1 March 1854.		30 October 1854.		22 January 1855	
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infan
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s
To the Recruit:						
On being attested, in cash	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 5 –	– 5
On intermediate approval, in cash and necessaries	– 7 6	– 7 6	– 7 6	– 7 6	– 15 –	– 15
On final approval, in cash and necessaries	5 5 6	3 10 –	7 5 6	5 10 –	9 – –	7 –
Amount of Bounty	5 15 6	4 – –	7 15 6	6 – –	10 – –	8 –
To the Superintending Officer:						
On intermediate approval, to cover the expenses of postage, stationery, &c.	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5
For attesting	– 1 –	– 1 –	– 1 –	– 1 –	– 1 –	– 1
Surgical examination (not to be charged when the recruit is examined by a military surgeon)	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2
To the Bringer:						
On intermediate approval	– 2 –	– 2 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5
On final approval	– 3 6	– 5 6	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5 –	– 5
(On the 16th June 1854, the allowance to bringers of recruits for regiments in the East only, was increased to 12 *s.* 6 *d.*)			(5*s.* extra allowed to bringers of recruits for regiments in the East).			
To the Party:						
On intermediate approval	– 3 –	– 3 –	– 3 –	– 3 –	– 3 –	– 3
On final approval	– 4 –	– 4 6	– 4 –	– 4 6	– 4 –	– 4
For conducting the recruit to place of final approval	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2
Total Levy Money (British Currency) £.	6 19 –	5 6 –	9 3 6	7 8 6	11 8 –	9 8

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

	£. s. d.
The amount of Levy Money authorised previous to November 1854, was	7 4 –
Added per Lieutenant-general and Board's Order of 18th November 1854 (A–1254)	2 4 0
	9 8 0
Added per Lieutenant-general and Board's Order of 27th January 1855 (M–34)	2 6 –
Present Levy Money £.	11 14 0

Note.—For Militiamen enlisted since the 13th December 1854, the sum of 1 *l.*, in addition to the above, has allowed.

Recruiting Department, Adjutant-general's Office, Horse Guards, 24 April 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. C

Appendix, No. 14.

RETURN showing the REGULATION STANDARD of HEIGHT, with the Dates on which the Standard was Lowered.

CAVALRY.

1st March 1854.

Heavy Cavalry: Men 5 feet 7 to 5 feet 10; lads 5 feet 6 ½ to 5 feet 8.
Light Cavalry: Men 5 feet 7 to 5 feet 9; lads 5 feet 6 to 5 feet 7.
Cavalry in India: Men 5 feet 6 to 5 feet 9.

24th March 1854.

Heavy Cavalry: Men 5 feet 6 ½ to 5 feet 9; lads 5 feet 6 to 5 feet 8.
Light Cavalry: Men 5 feet 6 ½ to 5 feet 8; lads 5 feet 6 to 5 feet 7.

27th April 1854.

Cavalry in India: Men 5 feet 6 to 5 feet 8.

21st July 1854.

Standard for farriers reduced at the discretion of inspecting field officers of districts; this description of men being urgently required.

30th October 1854.

Heavy Cavalry: Men and lads 5 feet 5 ½ to 5 feet 9.
Light Cavalry: Men and lads 5 feet 5 ½ to 5 feet 8.
Cavalry in India: 5 feet 5 ½ to 5 feet 8.

INFANTRY.

1st March 1854.

Men 5 feet 5 ½; growing lads 5 feet 5 ½.
In India: Men from 5 feet 5 ½.

30th October 1854.

Men and lads not below 5 feet 4 ½.

19th December 1854.

Men and lads not below 5 feet 4.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

The standard for the Royal Artillery previous to July 1854 was 5 feet 7 inches.
Lowered on 21st July 1854 to 5 feet 6 ½ inches.
Lowered on 23d October 1854 to 5 feet 6 inches, at which it remains.

Note.—A limited number of men of 5 feet 4 inches in height, and not less than 20 years of age, accustomed to horses, have been enlisted since the 9th January 1855, on the special authority of the Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance.

Adjutant-general's Office (Recruiting Department), Horse Guards, 24 April 1855.

G. A. Wetherall, A. G.

War Department, 10 May 1855.

FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 15.

Appendix, No. 15.

STATEMENT of the MEDICAL SCHOOLS in which the Medical Officers of British Civil Hospital, *Smyrna*, have Studied, and the Nature of the Certificates, showing their respective Qualifications.

MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT:		
John Meyer - - -	Doctor of Medicine of Heidelberg; Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London.	Heidelberg; Guy's Hospital, London; Paris.
PHYSICIANS:		
Arthur Leared - -	M. R. C. P. London; B. A., M. B. Trin. Coll. Dublin; M. Royal Irish Academy, Dublin.	Brompton Hospital; Dublin.
John Barclay - - -	M. R. C. P. London; M. D. Edinburgh.	Edinburgh; Berlin; Vienna; Paris; St. George's Hospital.
Septimus Gibbon - -	M. R. C. P. London; M. B. Cambridge.	Cambridge; Bristol; St. Bartholomew's, London.
SURGEONS:		
T. Spencer Wells - -	Fellow R. C. S. London - -	Dublin; St. Thomas's Hospital, London; Paris.
Holmes Coote - - -	Fellow R. C. S. London - -	St. Bartholomew's, London.
J. Cawood Wordsworth -	M. R. C. S. London - - -	London Hospital.
G. H. B. M'Leod - -	M. R. C. S. Edinburgh; M. B. Glasgow; Licentiate of the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons, Glasgow.	Glasgow; Edinburgh; Vienna; Padua.
Carsten Holthouse - -	Fellow R. C. S. London; Professor of Surgical Anatomy and Assistant Surgeon, Westminster Hospital.	St. Bartholomew's and Paris.
ASSISTANT PHYSICIANS:		
Charles Thomas Coote -	M. R. C. P. Lond.; M. A. Oxon; M. D. Oxon; Radcliffe Fellow of University, Oxon.	St. Bartholomew's; Paris; Vienna; Berlin; Wartzburg.
Robert Martin - - -	M. R. C. P. Lond.; M. B. and L. M. Cambridge; Assist. Physician, St. Bartholomew's Hospital.	Cambridge; St. Bartholomew's; Paris; Vienna; Berlin.
Barnes Wood - - -	M. R. C. P. Lond.; B. A., S. C. L. Oxon.	Oxford; St. George's Hospital.
William Henry Cullen -	M. R. C. S. Lond.; M. D. London	St. Thomas's Hospital, London; Edinburgh; Paris.
Richard Wilkinson - -	M. R. C. S. Lond.; M. B. London	King's College, London.
George Rolleston - -	M. A. Oxon; M. B. Oxon; Fellow of Pembroke, Oxon.	St. Bartholomew's Hospital; Paris.
ASSISTANT SURGEONS:		
John Falconer - - -	M. R. C. S. London - - -	Edinburgh.
John Whittaker Hulke -	M. R. C. S. London; L. S. A. London.	King's College, London; Royal Westminster Ophthalmic Hospital.
John Fremlyn Streatfield -	M. R. C. S. London - - -	London Hospital.
Edward Atkinson - -	M. R. C. S. London; L. S. A. -	King's College, London; Dublin.

William Eddowes - -	M. R. C. S. London; L. S. A. -	University College, London; Paris; Shrewsbury.
Thomas King Hornidge -	Fellow R. C. S. London; M. B. London.	St. George's Hospital.
Robert Macdonnell - -	Fellow R. C. S. Ireland; M. B. Trin. Coll. Dublin.	Dublin; Edinburgh; Paris; Vienna.
Edward John Complin -	M. R. C. S. London; L. S. A. -	St. Thomas's Hospital; H. M. S. Dreadnought.
James Henry Lakin - -	M. R. C. S. London; M. B. London; L. S. A.	King's College, London; H. M. S. Dreadnought; Dublin.
John Lee Jardine - -	M. R. C. S. London; L. S. A. -	St. Thomas's Hospital, London
Resident Medical Officer:		
Henry Ranke - - -	M. R. C. S. London; M. D. Erlangen.	Berlin, Leipsic, Erlangen.

M. R. C. P. - - - - Member of Royal College of Physicians.
Fellow R. C. S. - - - Fellow of Royal College of Surgeons.
M. R. C. S. - - - - Member of Royal College of Surgeons.
B. A.; M. A. - - - Bachelor of Arts; Master of Arts.
M. B. - - - - - Bachelor of Medicine.
M. D. - - - - - Doctor of Medicine.
L. S. A. - - - - - Licentiate of Apothecaries Company.
L. M. - - - - - Licentiate of Medicine.

War Department, 10 May 1855.

FREDERICK PEEL.

Appendix, No. 16.

LETTER from Lord *John Russell* to Lord *Aberdeen*.

My dear Lord Aberdeen, Pembroke Lodge, 17 November 1854.

I said the other day that I would speak to you upon the subject of the personal arrangements connected with the War Department; I believe, however, I can put the matter more clearly in writing.

I will treat the subject in its two points of view: first, as to the official arrangements for the new department, with a view to the general efficiency of the public service; secondly, as to the immediate requirements of the great war in which we are engaged.

In the first point of view, I have already said that I do not think a Secretary-at-War can be maintained together with a Secretary of State for War. Sidney Herbert has, in the fairest and handsomest manner, said nearly the same thing.

I have also told you, however, that I do not think the War Estimates ought to be brought forward in the House of Commons by a person of a rank and position inferior to a Secretary-at-War. It is of great importance when questions relating to the discipline or promotion, favour or punishment of officers and soldiers, are brought forward in the House of Commons, to have a Privy Councillor or Minister either in the Cabinet, or next in rank to the Cabinet, to satisfy the House of Commons upon points which are determined by military officers sitting at the Horse Guards.

But even supposing that in time of peace, with a man of the high authority of the Duke of Wellington Commander-in-Chief, an Under Secretary of State might suffice for the House of Commons, such is not the present state of affairs. Every new arrangement will be sharply criticised; there are several men in the House of Commons who are well qualified to lead the opinion of The House upon matters of military administration; authority and experience, and high official rank, are therefore required in the organ of the Government on military affairs.

Appendix, No. 16.

The discussions which have taken place in the public press upon the discipline of the army lead to the same conclusion. A Cabinet Minister, strong in public support, is required to encounter objections to our present modes of trial for military offences, and, if necessary, to improve those modes.

I come therefore, on this head, to the conclusion that the Secretary of State for the War Department must be in the House of Commons.

From the other point of view the prospect is equally clear.

We are in the midst of a great war. In order to carry on that war with efficiency, either the Prime Minister must be constantly urging, hastening, completing the military preparations, or the Minister of War must be strong enough to control other departments. Every objection of other Ministers, the plea of foreign interests to be attended to, of naval preparations not yet complete, and a thousand others, justifiable in the separate heads of departments, must be forced to yield to the paramount necessity of carrying on the war with efficiency of each service and completeness of means to the end in view.

This great duty may be performed, as I have said, either by the Prime Minister or a Minister acting in a department. We have examples of both: Lord Godolphin, in the first way, supported the campaigns of Marlborough; Lord Chatham, in the other, guided the operations of the Seven Years' War.

In the present case it seems to me that the last example is the most applicable.

If, therefore, the first considerations here presented lead to the conclusion that the Secretary of State for the War Department must be in the House of Commons, the latter considerations point to the necessity of having in that office a man who, from experience of military details, from inherent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House of Commons, can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and success.

There is only one person belonging to the Government who combines these advantages.

My conclusion is, that before Parliament meets, Lord Palmerston should be entrusted with the seals of the War Department. With respect to other arrangements, I can feel no doubt that your influence with your colleagues would induce them to acquiesce in such a distribution of offices as you might think most advantageous for the Crown and the country.

I remain,
My dear Lord Aberdeen,
Yours very truly,
(signed) *J. Russell.*

LETTER from Lord *Aberdeen* to Lord *John Russell.*

My dear Lord John, Blackheath, 18 November 1854.

The letter which I received from you yesterday, just before the meeting of the Cabinet, contained a proposal so unexpected, and which may have such important consequences, that you will not be surprised if I am unable, at the first moment, to express a decided opinion. But as any suggestion made by you deserves the best attention, and as you do not call for an immediate answer, I will give the subject the most mature consideration, and will let you know the opinion I may form.

Ever truly yours,
(signed) *Aberdeen.*

LETTER from Lord *John Russell* to Lord *Aberdeen.*

My dear Lord Aberdeen, Council Office, 18 November 1854.

I did not expect any immediate answer to my letter of yesterday, and think it quite right that you should have time to reflect.

I wish, however, that before you decide, you should show my letter to the Duke of Newcastle. It was my intention in writing the letter to avoid throwing any blame upon him; indeed, I think he deserves very great credit for the exertions he has made; but he has not had the authority requisite for so great a sphere, and has not been able to do all that might have been done with larger powers of control.

I remain,
Yours very truly,
(signed) *J. Russell.*

LETTER

LETTER from Lord *Aberdeen* to Lord *John Russell.* Appendix, No. 16.

My dear Lord John, Downing-street, 21 November 1854.

I HAVE shown your letter to the Duke of Newcastle, and also to Sidney Herbert. They both, as might have been expected, strongly urged me to adopt any such arrangement with respect to their offices as should be thought most conducive to the public service. Unquestionably, this is the first object; but, on full consideration, I entertain great doubts whether, in the present state of affairs, your proposal would prove advantageous or desirable. It is mainly founded on the assumption that Herbert ought not to move the Estimates next Session in the House of Commons. Now, I fully agree with you in thinking that the office of Secretary-at-War, as at present constituted, cannot be maintained together with a Secretary of State for the War Department. It is also perfectly true that Herbert expressed a similar opinion in the House of Commons; but I think he spoke of this as a permanent arrangement, and that he offered to continue his own services as long as they could be useful, especially with reference to the duration of the war.

It is quite clear that an Under-Secretary of State could not with any degree of propriety move the Estimates; but looking at the present state of things as temporary, I do not see why a Privy Councillor's office should not in future be constituted, charged with all the financial concerns of the army, and who might very properly move the Estimates. If this should not be the case, your proposal would involve the absolute necessity of the Secretary of State for War always being a Member of the House of Commons. This, I think, would be objectionable in principle, and might be inconvenient in practice.

I can scarcely imagine that the House of Commons, being assured of the temporary nature of the present arrangement, would insist on the suppression of the War Office in the first year of a war, bringing greatly increased labour and responsibility. In the meantime, therefore, and until a final arrangement shall take place, Herbert might continue to move the Estimates, and I should think that he would do so with the acceptance of The House, in which, I believe, he is deservedly popular, and likely to find favour.

Your proposal being founded on the supposed impropriety of Herbert moving the Estimates, and the consequent necessity of the Secretary of State for War being in the House of Commons, would render the removal of the Duke of Newcastle from his present office unavoidable; but although you would regard this as the inevitable result of an official arrangement, it is not to be supposed that it would be considered in this light by the public, or indeed by any impartial person. The dislocation of the Government would be so great, and the reason assigned for it apparently so inadequate, that it could only be considered as a mode of substituting one man for another. Although you may be far from entertaining any such desire, the transaction could receive no other interpretation. In justice to the Duke, I do not think that his colleagues, without very strong grounds, would wish to place him in such a position.

Now, with respect to Palmerston; I do not know whether aware of the burthen you are disposed to lay upon him; but if not, I should greatly doubt his inclination to undertake it. Palmerston, within a few months, is as old as I am; and without disparaging his inherent vigour of mind, he possesses no immunity from the effects of age. When I look at the laborious and complicated duties discharged by the Duke of Newcastle, and by Herbert, and anticipate others which must shortly be added to them, I fear that I could not honestly advise the Queen to entrust Palmerston, or any other man, with so great a responsibility.

I said in my former letter, that your proposal was unexpected by me; because my strong impression had been, from various conversations, that you greatly preferred the nomination of the Duke of Newcastle to the War Department, instead of Palmerston, which had been canvassed at the time in the press, and in the House of Commons. But I suppose that I must have been mistaken in this respect. It is useless, however, to enter into the qualifications of different men, for as I do not perceive the immediate necessity for the abolition of Herbert's office, and the extinction of his functions, I cannot consider the proposed change as imperatively called for.

I do not know that we gain much by a reference to the times of Lord Godolphin or Lord Chatham. Godolphin, as Prime Minister, undoubtedly gave great assistance to the Duke of Marlborough in the War of Succession, and Chatham, as the head of a department, may almost exclusively have originated the war measures of the Government. It would be absurd if I were to pretend to take any active part in the preparation of military details, or the direction of military measures, which I can only very humbly assist and promote. But after all, instead of referring to these old times, perhaps it is more to the purpose to recollect that in our own day the greatest, the most glorious, and by far the most successful war ever carried on by this country, was directed by Lord Castlereagh and Lord Bathurst, under the superintendence of a Minister who was certainly not very warlike in his character, although he lived to see his threatened march to Paris carried into effect. During the last years of this great struggle the War Minister was in the House of Lords, whilst Palmerston, as Secretary-at-War, although not in the Cabinet, moved the Estimates in the House of Commons.

Ever my dear Lord John,
Sincerely yours,
(signed) *Aberdeen.*

Appendix, No. 16.

LETTER from Lord *John Russell* to Lord *Aberdeen.*

My dear Lord Aberdeen, Chesham-place, 23 Nov. 1854.

I HAVE just received your answer to my letter of the 17th. I have not hitherto spoken to Palmerston on the subject, but on his return I shall communicate to him our correspondence, and consult with him upon it.

I remain
Yours truly,
J. Russell.

LETTER from Lord *John Russell* to Lord *Aberdeen.*

My dear Lord Aberdeen, Pembroke Lodge, 28 Nov. 1854.

As Palmerston's return is delayed, I will take the opportunity of answering your letter of the 21st instant, which I received on the 23d.

You begin by saying, that my proposal is mainly founded on the assumption that Herbert ought not to move the Estimates next Session in the House of Commons. This is a mistake: my proposal was founded on a combined consideration of the official arrangements for the new department, with a view to the general efficiency of the public service, and the immediate requirements of the great war in which we are engaged.

It is obvious that the last of these two objects is the greatest, and that the adjustment of official arrangements may, and should be made subordinate to the immediate requirements of the war.

In respect to the first head, I am happy to see there is no irreconcilable difference between us. You agree with me that the office of Secretary-at-War, as at present constituted, cannot be maintained together with a Secretary of State for the War Department. You also agree with me, that an Under-Secretary of State could not, with any propriety, move the Estimates.

You only differ with me in the opinion I expressed, that the change ought to be made in the Estimates of next year. I had thought that Herbert might hold the office of Paymaster, such as I held it from 1830 to 1834, and such as Macaulay held it from 1846 to 1847, and thus be connected with the War Department without moving the Estimates.

Had you asked my opinion concerning the distribution of offices, this is the suggestion I should have made.

You, looking upon the present state of things as temporary, think that Herbert might continue to move the Estimates, as Secretary-at-War, and that he would do so with the acceptance of The House, in which he is deservedly popular.

Although I am of opinion that the House of Commons would expect, after six or seven months of deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department, yet the difference between us is not so great that I could not yield to your wish, and the decision of the Cabinet upon this part of the subject.

I will only say, therefore, that I see no objection in principle, or in practice, to a rule, that the Secretary of State for the War Department should, like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary-at-War, be always a member of the House of Commons.

I come to the second part of the question.

Here you meet me *in limine* by saying that the transaction would be considered only as a mode of substituting one man for another, and that in justice to the Duke of Newcastle, you do not think that his colleagues, without very strong grounds, would wish to place him in such position.

Now, I had understood that your Administration was founded on the principle of doing what was best for the public service, without regard to the self-love, or even the acquired position of individuals. The Duke of Newcastle would, I think, be the last man to wish for an exception to this rule in his favour.

Your next objection is to Lord Palmerston's age, but when I see the vigour of his mind and body, I cannot attach much weight to this argument.

You next say that it was your strong impression, from various conversations, that at the time of the separation of the War Department, I greatly preferred the nomination of the Duke of Newcastle to that of Palmerston. You are mistaken in this respect. But it is true my opinion fluctuated very much, and it was only determined by the strong wish which I understood had been expressed by the Duke of Newcastle, to complete in the War Department the preparations he had so well begun. I thought it due to him to presume in favour of his efficiency.

I come therefore, having cleared the ground of all these obstructions, to the real question, "What are the requirements of the great war in which we are engaged?"

Setting aside all historical references, both on your part and mine, I think it is clear, either that the Prime Minister must be himself the active and moving spirit of the whole machine, or the Minister of War must have delegated authority to control other departments.

Neither is the case under the present arrangement. I will give you an instance but too pregnant with warning.

Early

Early in October I wrote to the Duke of Newcastle on the subject of transferring the 97th Regiment, then at the Piræus, to the Crimea. He informed me in answer, that he had wished to do so, and that he had also wished to send between 2,000 and 3,000 men, the drafts of various regiments, to the Crimea. Appendix, No. 16.

Now, why was he not able to carry his intentions into effect? Because he could not remove the obstacles put in his way by other departments, and because the Prime Minister did not at once overcome those obstacles.

At a much later time the 97th was moved, and it is only to-day that I see, by a telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford, dated on the 18th instant, that the "Orinoco" (which conveys that regiment) had left Constantinople for the Crimea.

But in the meantime Lord Raglan had reported that he wished he had been able to place in the position of Balaklava, on the 26th of October, a more considerable force, and also that on the 5th of November the Heights of Inkermann were defended by no more than 8,000 British infantry. What can be done by a single British regiment was seen on the 25th of October, when the 93d alone saved the position of Balaklava by their firmness and gallantry. Had 5,000 more men been at Lord Raglan's disposal on the 25th of October and the 5th of November, how much more fruitful, though not more glorious, might have been those memorable days.

The Cabinet has, it is true, in its recent meetings, done much to repair omissions; but a Cabinet is a cumbrous and unwieldy instrument for carrying on war; it can furnish suggestions, or make a decision upon a measure submitted to it, but it cannot administer.

What you want therefore, I must repeat, is a Minister of War, of vigour and authority. As the welfare of the Empire, and the success of our present conflict are concerned, I have no scruple in saying so.

Keep up, if you think right, as a temporary arrangement, a Secretary-at-War; make it clear that it is temporary; that is to say, only to last till more complete consolidation can take place. But let Parliament and the country be assured that you have placed the conduct of the war in the hands of the fittest man who can be found for that duty.

I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,
Yours very truly,
(signed) *J. Russell.*

LETTER from Lord *Aberdeen* to Lord *John Russell.*

My dear Lord John, Downing-street, 30 November 1854.

THERE are two or three points in your letter, received yesterday, to which I think it as well to advert without further delay, in order that before you see Palmerston the whole subject may be placed in a condition to be fully understood.

I am glad that it is no longer necessary to enter into any consideration at present of Herbert's position. I agree with you in thinking, that in consequence of the creation of a Secretary of State for the War Department, the office of Secretary-at-War must be modified; but I am still of opinion that a Privy Councillor's office may be constituted, by the occupant of which the Estimates should be moved, and who should control the whole expenditure and financial concerns of the army. Regarding Herbert's present situation as temporary, I need say nothing further respecting it; but I must altogether demur to your declaration that you see no objection, in principle or in practice, to a rule, that the Secretary of State for the War Department should, like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary at War, be always a Member of the House of Commons. Such an opinion, if adopted, I think would manifestly be at variance with the public interest. It is probable that it might very often be desirable to appoint a military man to the office of Secretary of State for the War Department, and it is equally probable that such a man might be found in the House of Lords. Officers who by long service and merit have received the honour of a peerage, might be the persons of all others whom it would be most important to select for this office, and it is difficult to conceive why a seat in the House of Lords should operate as a disqualification.

I think that the office ought to stand upon the same footing as that of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who may be either a peer or a commoner, as the public interest may require.

You complain that the Duke of Newcastle has not a sufficient control over the departments with which he is in contact, and that he does not possess a delegated authority sufficient to enable him to perform his duties satisfactorily. I do not exactly know what is meant by a delegated authority, but I apprehend that he possesses all the authority with which he, or any other person, could properly be invested.

The instances you adduce of this want of control are wholly inapplicable, and fail to establish the fact. You say that you wrote to the Duke in October, and recommended him to send the 97th Regiment to the Crimea, and that he replied it was his wish to have done so, as well as to send 2,000 troops then ready for embarkation. You conclude, therefore, that he did not do it because he could not remove the obstacles put in his way by other departments, and because the Prime Minister did not at once overcome those obstacles. Now, allow me to say, that before a Prime Minister can remove obstacles he must be informed of their existence; and if it was imagined that he possessed any such power, it might easily have been put to the test by calling upon him to exercise it.

Appendix, No. 16.

In this case, however, it is not easy to say what the Prime Minister or any one else could have done. The Duke of Newcastle wished to send the 97th Regiment from the Piræus to the Crimea, and proposed to Clarendon to do so. Clarendon protested against it, and said that the tranquillity of Greece depended upon the regiment remaining at Athens. The Duke, I think very properly, at the time acquiesced; and subsequently sent a weak regiment to replace the 97th in Greece.

The obstacle to sending the 2,000 men arose from Lord Raglan himself. When the Duke informed Lord Raglan that he had this number of recruits to send him, Lord Raglan replied that those last sent were so young, and unformed, that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away "like flies." He preferred therefore to wait. I do not know what a Prime Minister could have done in such a case; but I must submit that in all this there is no evidence of any want of authority on the part of the Duke.

After all, I think your letter plainly reduces the question to the simple issue of a personal preference, and the substitution of one man for another.

In answer to my suggestion that some consideration was due to the Duke on the part of his colleagues, you say that you understood the Administration was founded on the principle of doing what was best for the public service, without regard to the self-love, or even the acquired position of individuals. Undoubtedly, this was the case; and I fully agree in thinking that the Duke of Newcastle would be the last man to wish for any exception to this rule in his favour.

But I must observe that, at the formation of the Government, no such office as the War Department was contemplated; and when, subsequently, the Colonial Office was divided, no objection whatever was made to the choice of the War Department by the Duke; nor as far as I am aware, up to this moment, to his management of the office.

Now I think you will admit, that although another person might perhaps have been preferred on the first constitution of an office, it is a very different thing to displace a man who has discharged its duties ably and honourably, merely in the belief that another might possibly be found still more efficient. Undoubtedly the public service must be the first object; but in the absence of any proved defect, or alleged incapacity, I can see no sufficient reason for such a change, which indeed I think is forbidden by a sense of justice and good faith.

You say that I made an objection to Palmerston's age; but this is not quite correct. As my acquaintance with Palmerston commenced very many years ago, I rejoice as much as any one to see the vigour of his mind and body; but when I mentioned his age, it had reference to the notion of entrusting him with the duties now discharged by the Duke of Newcastle and by Herbert. It would be a delusion to suppose that any man, old or young could attempt such a task with advantage to the public. At the formation of the Government, I proposed to Palmerston to take the Admiralty, but he preferred the Home Office; and as he told me himself that the Foreign Office had become too much for him, I am sure that he would never think of undertaking the business of the two offices in question.

On the whole, then, believing that any change like that proposed would be of doubtful advantage to the public; feeling very strongly that it would be an act of unfairness and injustice towards a colleague; and thinking also that all such changes, unless absolutely necessary, only tend to weaken a government, I must repeat that I could not honestly recommend it to the Queen.

I am, my dear Lord John,
Very truly yours,
(signed) *Aberdeen.*

LETTER from Lord *John Russell* to Lord *Aberdeen.*

My dear Lord Aberdeen, Pembroke Lodge, 3 December 1854.

I HAVE not seen Lord Palmerston, or heard from him. But after your last letter, I have no hesitation in saying that I revert to my original opinion, and must propose to the Cabinet that the office of Minister of War should absorb that of Secretary-at-War; and that the office should, for the present at least, be held by a Member of the House of Commons.

I remain
Yours truly,
(signed) *J. Russell.*

FIFTH REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL;

WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

AND

AN APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
18 *June* 1855.

Lunæ, 29° *die Januarii*, 1855.

Ordered, That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the Condition of our Army before *Sebastopol*, and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army.

Veneris, 23° *die Februarii*, 1855.

Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Roebuck.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir George Lewis.
Sir John Pakington.	General Peel.
Colonel Lindsay.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Ellice.	

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, That Seven be the Quorum of the Committee.

Jovis, 1° *die Martii*, 1855.

Ordered, That the Committee have Power to report Resolutions, and their Minutes of Proceedings, from time to time, to The House.

Ordered, That Sir John Hanmer be added to the Committee.

Veneris, 30° *die Martii*, 1855.

Ordered, That the Committee have Power to report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House.

Veneris, 20° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

Ordered, That Mr. John Ball be discharged from further attendance on the Committee.

Lunæ, 23° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

Ordered, That Captain Gladstone be added to the Committee.

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FIFTH REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to Inquire into the Condition of our ARMY before SEBASTOPOL, and into the Conduct of those Departments of the Government whose Duty it has been to minister to the Wants of that Army, and who were empowered to report their Opinion and the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, from time to time, to The House;—— HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

THE complicated nature of this inquiry, the variety of subjects investigated, the number of witnesses examined, and the frequent inconsistency and contrariety of the evidence, render it no easy task to present a clear, definite and just exposition of the matters submitted to your Committee.

The difficulty of this task has been enhanced by the impossibility of summoning some persons as witnesses, who might have furnished important information. From the same cause, some persons are left under imputations, in regard to which your Committee regret that they can pronounce no conclusive opinion. The fulness of the investigation has, moreover, been restricted by considerations of state policy, so that in the outset of this Report, your Committee must admit that they have been compelled to end an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete. 14435.

Having offered this preliminary explanation, your Committee will endeavour to state, as shortly as the subject will allow, the opinions which they have formed in regard to the following heads of their inquiry, namely: —

1st. The Condition of the Army before Sebastopol.

2d. The Conduct of the Departments both at Home and Abroad whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that Army.

I.

THE CONDITION OF OUR ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL.

AN army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe winter in besieging a fortress which, from want of numbers, it could not invest, was necessarily placed in a situation where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be endured. Your Committee are, however, of opinion that this amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by causes hereafter enumerated, and which are mainly to be attributed to dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition. In arriving at this opinion, they have made allowance for the unexpected severity of the storm on the 14th of November, and they have not been unmindful of the difficulties which a long period of peace must inevitably produce at the commencement of a campaign. 14450.

In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful condition of our army, the evidence must be perused; and your Committee will only refer to such details as may be requisite to sustain their opinions.

From the 16th of September, when the army landed in the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as some witnesses state, until about the middle of November, 416. 828. 914. 1209. 1323. 3859.

November, the troops suffered from overwork and from dysentery, but were not, upon the whole, ill provided with food: even at this period there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and a painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded. As the season advanced, the causes of sickness increased, and the army, with its number of effective men daily diminishing, became more and more disproportioned to the amount of duty which it had to perform.

827. 848. 946. 3407. 5472.

From the middle of November this army was, during a period of many weeks, reduced to a condition which it is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured both by officers and men with a fortitude and heroism unsurpassed in the annals of war. They were exposed, under single canvas, to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold, rain, mud, and snow, on high ground and in the depth of winter. They suffered from fatigue, exposure, want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accommodation for the sick.

5481.

The excessive fatigue necessarily resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of the siege, the extent of front to be defended, the positions to be maintained, and the works to be undertaken, depended on military considerations, and were decided upon in conjunction with our allies. Your Committee regard these matters as beyond the limits of their inquiry.

737. 3415.

The other causes of suffering will be reviewed under the following heads:

II.

THE CONDUCT OF THE DEPARTMENTS BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD WHOSE DUTY IT HAS BEEN TO MINISTER TO THE WANTS OF THE ARMY.

The Conduct of the Government at Home.

14422.

The responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea rests upon the Home Government. The Duke of Newcastle, in his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan on 10th April 1854, "directs careful, but secret 'inquiry' to be made into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol." And his Grace further observes, that "*before the siege of a fortress so strong can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied on shall be obtained upon many points on which little or nothing is at present known.*" A second despatch, dated the 29th June, directs that the safety of Constantinople having been secured, whatever might be the movement of the Russian forces, no campaign in the Principalities should be undertaken, but that measures should be at once concerted for the siege of Sebastopol. "There is," it is added, "no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed." The despatch leaves to Lord Raglan a discretion only "in case of some insuperable impediment, such as a want of ample preparation by either army, or of the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it."

17275. *See* Extracts from Lord Raglan's Despatch, 19 July, in Appendix.

21306. 15183. 19777.

The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success. Lord Aberdeen states it to have been their impression, that Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a coup-de-main. The Duke of Newcastle says, that he expected the army, after capturing Sebastopol, would winter there, or else, after destroying the fortress, would return to winter on the shores of the Bosphorus. Sir James Graham has the strongest opinion, that the order for the expedition was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time.

21263.

This Report shows the results which ensued upon the frustration of these expectations. Your Committee have inquired what information the Government had obtained which induced them to order this expedition. In regard to this matter, it may be observed, that the Duke of Newcastle had, in his despatch of the 10th April, estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 30,000 men, and he

14422.

he believes that when the expedition was ordered, no more reliable accounts had been received. Sir James Graham says, however, that at a later period, namely, the last week in July, he had obtained "from a Crimean authority a complete account of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was estimated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which were cavalry, 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebastopol, and the remaining 30,000 were dispersed through the Crimea." Vice-Admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May 1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon information which he had obtained, he estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. The Embassies at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople were unable to furnish any information upon these important subjects.

15041. 21239. 20456. 20375.

Lord Raglan, in his despatch of the 19th July, states, that "the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or to their state of preparation."

See Despatch in Appendix.

The terms of reference do not call upon your Committee to pronounce any opinion in regard to the policy of the Government in ordering the expedition to the Crimea; but it is their duty to report how far the preparations made were adequate to the operations which had been ordered.

20860. 15073.

The general direction of the war was in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle, who, in the spring of 1854, held the office of Secretary for War and Colonies. In July these departments were divided, and the Duke being relieved from colonial duties, undertook the immediate conduct of the war.

14340. 20158.

When this important change was effected, it does not appear that any Order in Council, Minute, or other document was prepared, defining the special duties of the War Department. The Duke, as Secretary of State, had undoubtedly, before as well as after the change, ample powers; he considered himself officially responsible for all the departments under his control, and he could issue such orders as he thought fit for their guidance. He states, however, that he felt his means to be insufficient for the due performance of his separate duties as Secretary of State for War; he considered the organization of all the war departments and their relation to each other to be in an unsatisfactory state; but he felt it to be impossible, consistently with attention to pressing business, to attempt their re-organization.

15099. 14763. 14911. 15233.

In making the separation between the Secretaryships of War and Colonies, together with the transference of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the Secretary for War, the Cabinet considered that they had adopted measures initiatory to other changes which would necessarily follow. The members of the Cabinet did not however hold any consultations upon the changes to be made, or the best mode of effecting them; they separated, as usual, at the close of the Parliamentary Session in August, and, as they were not summoned to a meeting, they did not re-assemble in council until the second week of October. At a later period of the year Lord John Russell expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of the War Department, and suggested Lord Palmerston as the fittest person for the office of Secretary for War. He adduced some cases wherein he said there had been a want of vigour in the exercise of authority, although the Cabinet, he added, "had done much in its recent meetings to repair omissions." Your Committee notice with regret that the Cabinet did not meet in August or September, when these omissions might have been sooner remedied. Lord John Russell also observes, that "the House of Commons would expect, after six or seven months' deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department." Your Committee can find no trace of these deliberations, and any evils that may have resulted from delay in such arrangements, are therefore properly laid to the charge of the Cabinet.

21367. 21351. 15230. 15102. 15177. 15316.

See Correspondence in Appendix.

21341.

21392.

At the date of the expedition to the East, no reserve was provided at home adequate to the undertaking. Mr. Sidney Herbert states, in his memorandum of the 27th of November, "the army in the East has been created by discounting

the future. Every regiment at home, or within reach, and not forming part of that army, has been robbed to complete it. The depôts of battalions under Lord Raglan have been similarly treated."

The men sent out to reinforce the army were recruits who had not yet become fit for foreign service, and the depôts at home were too weak to feed the companies abroad.

14473. The order to attack Sebastopol was sent to Lord Raglan on the 29th of June: the formation of a reserve at Malta was not determined upon until early in November.

It will be seen from the correspondence between Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen, that Lord Raglan had reported that "he wished he had been able to place in the position of Balaclava on the 26th of October, a more considerable force," and also, "that on the 5th of November the heights of Inkermann were defended by no more than 8,000 British infantry." When the Duke of Newcastle informed Lord Raglan that he had 2,000 recruits to send him, he replied, that "those last sent were so young, and unformed, that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away 'like flies.' He preferred to wait."

In December the power of reinforcing the army with efficient soldiers was so reduced, that the Government thought it necessary to introduce a Foreign Enlistment Bill, for the purpose of raising a foreign legion.

Your Committee must express their regret that the formation of a large reserve at home, and also in the proximity of the seat of war, was not considered at a much earlier period; and that the Government, well knowing the limited numbers of the British army, the nature of the climate in the East, as well as the power we were about to encounter, did not at the commencement of the war take means to augment the ranks of the army beyond the ordinary recruiting, and also that earlier steps were not taken to render the militia available both for the purpose of obtaining supplies of men, and also, in case of necessity, for the relief of regiments of the line stationed in garrisons in the Mediterranean—measures which they found themselves compelled to adopt at a later period.

The Secretary of State for War.

21399. 15070. On accepting the Secretaryship for War, the Duke of Newcastle found himself in this disadvantageous position: he had no separate office for his department, no document prescribing his new duties, no precedents for his guidance, and his Under-Secretaries were new to the work. In this situation he undertook the superintendence of numerous departments, with whose internal organization he was dissatisfied, and the management of a war urgently requiring prompt and vigorous operations.

21407.

See Memorandum by Mr. S. Herbert, in Appendix. 9365–9367. 19357. 14700. 14471–14587. 14912. 14473–14478. The Duke was imperfectly acquainted with the best mode of exercising his authority over the subordinate departments, and these departments were not officially informed of their relative position, or of their new duties towards the Minister for War. His interference was sought for in matters of detail, wherein his time should not have been occupied, and he was left unacquainted with transactions of which he should have received official cognizance. Feeling his large responsibilities, he took upon himself to remedy innumerable deficiencies which were brought to his notice, and in the meantime matters of paramount importance were postponed.

20099. 14474. 14631. 14629. 21362. 21357–21360. 19943. The evidence, moreover, shows that the Duke was long left in ignorance, or was misinformed respecting the progress of affairs in the East. He was not, until a late period, made acquainted with the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and the horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were conveyed from Balaclava to the Bosphorus. Lord Aberdeen has significantly observed, that the Government were left in ignorance, longer than they ought to have been, of the real state of matters in the East. The Ministers, he says, were informed of the condition of the army from public papers and private sources long before they heard it officially, and not hearing it officially, they discredited the

the rumours around them. Thus, whilst the whole country was dismayed by reports, and was eagerly looking for some gleam of official intelligence, the Cabinet, according to the statement of Ministers, was in darkness.

Harassed by these rumours, and perplexed by the indiscreet silence of those who should have enlightened him, the Duke sent a commission to inquire into the state of the hospitals at Scutari and in the Crimea. The commission was issued in October; it did not report until April. A form of proceeding suited to redress grievances at home, or to become a basis for legislative measures, was ill adapted to relieve the pressing wants of 5,000 men suffering under mismanagement and neglect. 14635. 12951. 19924.

With the same benevolent intention, the Duke, through the channel of the Foreign Office, requested Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to take upon himself, in addition to his many onerous duties, a certain amount of supervision and assistance of these hospitals. 14844–19850. 14633.

The clothing of the troops was not within the province of the Secretary of State, and the Duke of Newcastle says it was extremely doubtful whether he had any right to interfere. The soldiers had received the ordinary supply for the year; yet the peculiar circumstances in which the army had been placed induced the Duke to recommend to the Commander-in-chief that an extra supply should be furnished, and, in addition to this, warm clothing should be prepared to meet the inclemency of the weather. The system of clothing the army was then, and still is, in a state of transition; whenever the existing contracts cease, the clothing will be supplied by the Ordnance, or by a clothing department. 14664. 14736. 20031. 20807–20815.

The warm clothing was considered so important that, upon hearing of the loss of the "Prince" steamer, all the military departments were occupied with this supply; the Secretary-for-War issued orders; the Secretary-at-War was constantly at the Ordnance, urging and hastening these proceedings: clothing was bought also in Austria and in Switzerland. Ambassadors, ministers, consuls, agents were applied to for assistance; money was profusely expended, and at a later period in the winter the troops must have received a supply far larger than was required for their reduced numbers. 20009. 20016–20018.

The Secretary-at-War.

The duties of the Secretary-at-War are shortly stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert: they will be found more fully enumerated in a memorandum, which was given in evidence before the Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure in 1850. 19756. *See* Evidence of Right Hon. Fox Maule in Report of 1850.

The division of the Secretaryship of War and Colonies, though technically it did not alter the position of the Secretary-at-War, yet practically diminished the exercise of his power, and tended to limit his functions to the original duties of his office, namely, the financial business of the army. Even in these matters the authority of a Secretary of State, when exerted, must necessarily over-ride the control of a Secretary-at-War. Mr. Sidney Herbert, as Secretary-at-War, had no power to originate anything; but from praiseworthy motives, and with a view to relieve the Duke of Newcastle, he undertook to do a good deal which was not the business of his office. Thus, in December, having learnt from private sources, the deplorable condition of the hospitals, he wrote to the commandant, to the chief medical officer, and to the purveyor, urging and authorizing them to procure whatever might be wanted, assistants, supplies, or additional buildings; promising them his approbation for such outlay, and placing unlimited funds at their disposal. 19755. 19788. 19781. 19816. 20850. 19821. 19848.

While expenditure was thus encouraged, some financial regulations were still enforced, suited to a time of peace, but inapplicable to a period of war, and operating unjustly on the soldiers who had been wounded or afflicted with sickness in the Crimea. According to these regulations, every soldier coming into a hospital is obliged to bring with him his kit; but though the troops, upon landing in the Crimea, had been deprived of their knapsacks, which in many cases were never restored, yet no order had been issued to furnish another set in lieu of those articles which the soldier had been compelled to relinquish, and which are essential to his cleanliness and comfort. Again, upon leaving the hospital, 8987–8989. 13168.

hospital, men were exposed to a recurrence of sickness from insufficient clothing, and no proper arrangement had been made to furnish this supply.

20903. 16961. An improvement, involving some outlay, has been suggested to your Committee, which deserves the attention of the executive Government. The general hospital at Chatham is said to be inconveniently situated, and ill-suited for the reception of invalids from the seat of war. Vessels of large size cannot go there, and consequently the sick and wounded have either to be removed to a smaller ship, or sent by other means to the place of their destination. At the same time your Committee may remark, that whilst hospitals are provided for the reception of officers in the navy returning sick or wounded, no such accommodation exists for officers of the army.

Your Committee may here also express a hope, that the evils which have arisen from allowing soldiers' wives to accompany an army in the field will prevent a repetition of this error.

See Appendix. 20166. A memorandum will be found in the Appendix, "purporting to be by the Duke of Newcastle," but written by Mr. Sidney Herbert in January last. His views upon the best mode of constituting the War Department, and giving to it an effective control over the subordinate departments, are here explained, as far at least as he deems it advisable to introduce change during the pressure of war, which leaves little leisure for re-constituting the military departments.

The Ordnance Department.

18012. 18015. 17983. Your Committee deem it unnecessary to state the various duties of the Ordnance Department, nor need they enter into details with the view of proving that upon the efficiency of this department the naval and military services depend.

17958. 21374. 21378. In April 1854 Lord Raglan, the Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the Forces in the East, and shortly afterwards Sir Hew Ross was named Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, an office which had been for many years abolished, but which was now revived.

Lord Aberdeen, in making this appointment, had to some extent in view the abolition of the office of Master-General; this subject had not, however, been 21373. considered by the Cabinet, and in the meantime the Ministers believed that 20175. the Lieutenant-General would have all the authority of Master-General.

17964. 20217. The Lieutenant-General does not possess this power; he is only a Board officer, and while in reference to military duties he exercises the authority of Master-General, yet as regards the civil functions of the Ordnance he acts only as a member of the Board.

See Report on Army and Ordnance in 1849. 20208. The Board of Ordnance, moreover, differs from other Boards in this respect, namely, that, according to the practice or to the regulations of the department, the presence of one Board officer constitutes a Board. During the summer and autumn of 1854, a Board officer, the Surveyor-General, was also employed abroad; so that during a period when the pressure of business was heavier, and when the expenditure of this department was larger than in any previous year, 14717. two officers were wanting whose functions the most economical Administrations had been unable to dispense with in times of peace.

20216. 20635. 20699. 20639. The Ordnance, even with its peculiar constitution, may work efficiently while under the superintendence of a vigilant Master-General, who has supreme authority, and who is, therefore, justly held responsible for all its proceedings; but the substitution of a Lieutenant-General changes the whole system of the office; its duties are then divided amongst the members of the Board without 19195. 19265. any supervising authority, and the business commenced by one member may be taken up or interrupted by another without unity of purpose, and without due responsibility.

18839. The evils arising from the absence of the Master-General are abundantly exhibited in the evidence. The statements of Sir T. Hastings, the Comptroller of Stores, and of Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, amply prove the unsatisfactory state of this department; while it would seem, from the language of

of Sir Hew Ross, that he was imperfectly acquainted with the constitution of the Board of which he was a member. 17978.

From the evidence it will be seen that a conflict of authority arose between the members of this Board. At a time when urgent business required their attention, they were engaged in disputes, in preparing statements, and in making appeals to the Secretary of State for War. Sir Thomas Hastings says, that although he made more than one application, informing the Secretary of State that he had important communications to make to him, he received no answer to his letters. Mr. Monsell, when he differed from the other members of his Board, applied to the Secretary of State, who, by lending his sanction to the Clerk of the Ordnance, enabled him to overrule both his colleagues, and thus interfered in a matter involving questions of military discipline, as well as of departmental subordination In noticing the unseemly conduct of this Board, and the differences which were brought prominently forward in the evidence, your Committee observe with regret, that the public service has suffered from the want of judgment and temper on the part of officers who were entrusted during a critical period with important public duties. 18743. 19047. 19068. 19080. 19312. 19320. 19350. 19360. 14744. 19080. 19350.

Your Committee consider that it was detrimental to the public service that the office of Surveyor-general should have remained so long vacant, and that the duties attached to that office should have been consequently imposed upon officers of the department who had already as much upon their hands as they were able to perform efficiently. 18853–18854. 18922.

Your Committee believe that Lord Aberdeen would have acted more beneficially for the public service if he had appointed another Master-General when Lord Raglan could no longer discharge the duties of the office, and they are of opinion that a vague intention of remodelling the Ordnance Office affords no justification for the course pursued. If this office were deemed to be imperfect and ill-adapted for its functions, there was the more need during its continued existence of an able man to superintend its proceedings. The Ordnance Office strikingly exemplifies the disordered state into which a department may fall when there is no able hand to guide it. 21372. 19595. 14763. 15081. 21242. 15115.

After perusing the evidence, it will excite no surprise to find that the arrangements attempted by this office in reference to warm clothing, huts and Minié rifles, were imperfect and dilatory. Huts were ordered by the directions of the Secretary of State at Constantinople and at Trieste, as well as in this country. The first order here was issued on the 17th November. When the huts at length arrived at Balaclava, the exhausted transport service was unable to convey them to the camp. Your Committee are of opinion, as some witnesses have suggested, that if canvas had been sent for doubling the tents, and planks for flooring, effectual shelter for the troops would have been provided at a much earlier period, and at a smaller cost, though a small supply of huts would have been useful for temporary hospitals, as well as for stores and stabling. It is impossible not to believe that, by these means, much sickness and suffering might have been prevented. 19660. 19637. 19746. 17247. 17250. *See* letter of Sir J. Burgoyne in Appendix. 19693.

Your Committee must express their dissatisfaction with the administration of the contract system under this department, and they consider that no change will be effective which does not lead to a revisal and amendment of this branch of the office.

The tools supplied to the army are stated to be of bad quality. Under a recent order, the Ordnance furnishes all tools. The pioneers' tools were heretofore supplied by the colonels of regiments. For this last supply the Ordnance is not responsible. The officers examined almost uniformly describe the tools supplied to the army as unserviceable. Sir Thomas Hastings, on the other hand, states, that "he believes the great mass of tools were good, but thinks that many have been ill treated, and that good tools in the hands of men who do not understand them may be readily destroyed." There is, however, no doubt, that upon previous occasions, as well as in the present campaign, these articles of field equipment have been condemned. In this country, under a proper system of contract and inspection, there can be no difficulty in obtaining tools of the best quality. The supply of inferior tools must be ascribed to carelessness or dishonesty on the part of the persons responsible for the supply. 18465. 18549. 822. 1787. 1944. 1951. 4113. 4740. 5568. 18500. 18516. 17499. 17483.

Your Committee cannot too forcibly express their opinion of the importance of placing in the hands of the soldiers the very best articles that can be provided.

While the Committee have felt it their duty to make these observations on the inadequate and disordered state of this department, and its failure in some important functions, they feel bound, at the same time, to mention the admirable equipment of the corps of artillery attached to the army, and the testimony generally given to the efficient armament provided for the navy.

The Transport Department at Home.

21043. 16361. 16358. 21187. The sea transport between this country and the seat of war has been conducted by the Board of Admiralty, under the immediate superintendence of Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty. This business was formerly transacted by a Transport Board, which was abolished many years since. During the past year, requisitions for transport were sent to the Admiralty from several different quarters: the inconvenience of this system was so great, that Sir James Graham says he deemed it indispensable, with the view to regularity and promptitude, to bring these requisitions to one common centre, from which the Admiralty might receive orders. This change had not, however, been completed before he left office. The Duke of Newcastle says, that no system will work well until the sea transport is placed under the management of the Minister for War. Such a course Sir J. Graham and Captain Milne consider objectionable; it would, they say, divide authority, increase correspondence, and lead to confusion; whereas now the whole service afloat is united together in one link of responsibility.

21040.

21042.

15167.

16563. 21189. 16572. Sir J. Graham was, however, induced to re-constitute the Transport Board, for the reasons which will be found in his evidence.

16370. 16677. 16682. 16695. The mode in which ships were taken up is described by Captain Milne, and, considering the urgent pressure of the public service, this duty appears to have been ably performed. In pronouncing this opinion, your Committee advert to the magnitude of the operations executed. Within a year, somewhere about 150,000 men, and above 7,000 horses were conveyed principally by steam, a large portion of them to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country; besides which, vessels had to be provided for stores to an enormous amount, for the purposes of war, for the sustenance of both army and navy, and for the effective maintenance of a steam-fleet: sudden requisitions for huts, and other urgent necessaries, had also to be met.

21116.

21105. There is, it is said, an obvious error in comparing the transport service between England and the Crimea to a mercantile arrangement for the conveyance and delivery of a given amount of tonnage. The transports, when sent to the Crimea, could not deliver their stores, and return; a large number were permanently detained, from military considerations, and many others were kept at Balaclava, because there were no warehouses on shore to receive their cargo.

16824. 16819.

Many complaints were made to your Committee of the mode in which stores were sent to the East. The mode in which stores were sent depended on the nature of the requisition. Naval stores were apparently sent under a satisfactory system. When the Ordnance Board apply, a vessel is placed at their disposal, provided they require it; and latterly a similar system has been adopted with the medical department. The chief complaints have arisen in reference to mixed cargoes. The captains of the vessels, according to the Admiralty instructions, have charge of the cargo; but it is admitted, that when large passenger steamers were employed in this service, the captains were often unaccustomed to these duties, and in such cases the appointment of a supercargo would have been beneficial. Until December it appears that a cargo-book was not regularly kept. A Treasury Minute, dated 12th December 1854, states, that some articles sent out to the Crimea have been taken back to England in the same vessels, and brought out again to the Crimea, before they have been delivered; and that in other cases, where the vessels have remained with the army, it has been three or four months before they have been received by the Commissariat. Ships were also so loaded, that on arriving at the port to which part of the cargo

16787–16801. 16806. 16811.

16733–16739.

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16738.

See page 398 of Appendix No. 3, in 3d Report.

cargo was destined, the position of that part of the cargo was unknown, and the ship had to proceed on her voyage, carrying with her things that ought to have been delivered at the intermediate port. Much suffering was the consequence of this faulty mode of proceeding, the sick at Scutari being in need of stores, which, in consequence of bad arrangements, were carried to Balaclava.

Your Committee inquired why ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded had not been prepared at an early period of the war? Sir J. Graham had no knowledge of any application for such vessels until after the battle of the Alma. Captain Milne thought it odd that no such requisition had been made. 21126. 21127. 16558.

There was mismanagement and delay in regard to these vessels, which should have been prepared as soon at least as it had been determined to establish a general hospital at Scutari. The unnecessary sufferings of the soldiers directly referable to this neglect form one of the most painful portions of the evidence; but on what department the blame should rest, whether on the office of the Commander-in-Chief, or of the Secretary-at-War, or of the Secretary of State for War, your Committee are unable to decide. 20003. 16902.

Dr. Menzies had also, in a report to Major Sillery, the commandant, dated the 7th August, directed attention to this subject. 10685. 10686.

No steps having apparently been taken in pursuance of this suggestion, or of that of Dr. A. Smith to the Military Secretary on the 25th May 1854, Sir J. Graham, on the 25th of October, at the instigation of the Duke of Newcastle, wrote a private letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, requesting him, after conferring with Lord Raglan, to have two large steamers fitted for this service. On the receipt of this letter, Admiral Dundas did not, as he states, act, because every one expected to be in Sebastopol in a few days, and moreover he did not consider the transports to be under his superintendence. 21136. 20575. 20583. 20576–20597. 16864. 16869. 20495.

Thus it appears that the preparation of ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded was at first forgotten, and subsequently neglected. When it is remembered, that out of the limited number of the British army, 13,800 were removed sick or wounded between the 30th September and the 17th of February, the dreadful consequences of this neglect may be imagined. No foresight, it is said, could have provided for this large number. Some ships should, however, have been specially fitted for a service which it must have been known the casualties of war would render indispensable. 21179.

The Transport Service in the Black Sea.

The evidence exhibits a marked contrariety of opinion as to the responsibility for the transport service in the Black Sea. Sir James Graham said that the naval commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Dundas, had, under the Queen's regulations, authority over the whole of the transports, and he cited, in confirmation of this statement, sundry minutes of the Board of Admiralty; and he added, that Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority over this service. 21047. 21048. 21059. 21161. 21164. 20495.

Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the contrary, alleged that he had nothing to do with the transports. According to his assertions, they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Rear Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie. 20573. 20562. 20590.

Captain Milne, the member of the Board of Admiralty who had the superintendence of the transport department, stated, that the Admiral commanding in the Black Sea was responsible for the transport service in that sea. A supreme power was, however, given to Lord Raglan, who had a veto over the movement of all the transports, and a concurrent authority with the naval commander-in-chief. 16873. 21156. 21083.

The difficulties of performing various services connected with the army, are ascribed to the want of sea-transport: while the evidence of Captain Milne shows that no application was made to the Admiralty for additional transports in the Black Sea. Numerous witnesses testify to the want of arrangement in the harbour of Balaclava, and to the disorder of the shore from the want of any sufficient landing places and wharves. 16825. 16914.

In Balaclava there was a division of authority; the transports were under the immediate direction of Captain Christie; the harbour was under the management of another naval officer, and the shore was subject to military authority.
16938. Absence of regularity and arrangement on the shore or in the harbour, necessarily delayed the service of the transports; and in such cases it was not easy to ascertain on which of these three authorities the blame should rest.

The narrow limits of the harbour, which is described by Admiral Dundas as a mere ditch, rendered it, under the best system of arrangement, an inconvenient place for landing the vast quantities of stores required for the army, including guns, ammunition, engineer stores, fascines, gabions, camp equipage, Quartermaster-general's stores, and commissariat supplies.

The want of system which prevailed on the shore is generally admitted: the harbour was not governed with the authority necessary for the maintenance of order, and the transports were compelled to anchor outside the harbour, an anchorage which naval men justly considered to be unsafe.

The Transport Service in the Bosphorus.

16828. All transports, upon their arrival in the Bosphorus, were placed under the
16733. orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer. This officer had been specially selected for this
21054. duty by Sir James Graham, on account of his professional character and experience in matters connected with the embarkation and disembarkation of troops.
21057. He was placed, in the first instance, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Dundas; but a separate power was afterwards given to him within the limits of the Bosphorus, subject always to his reporting to the naval commander-in-chief.

21097. As early as the 8th of September, Rear-Admiral Boxer applied for a ship to
16848. be attached to himself, with an experienced master, three good warrant officers, and a small gang of artificers and mechanics. A compliance with this request would, he said, obviate delay and unnecessary expense in works which could otherwise only be executed by hired artificers. To this application the Board
21099. of Admiralty replied, that "the service being temporary, they were not prepared to send out a receiving ship, with its establishment." On the 20th of November he repeated his application; but before it had been received, the Board had reconsidered its decision, and had ordered a vessel, the "Melampus," to be got ready for this service. The "Melampus" accordingly sailed
21098. in December. Sir James Graham says he regrets that the first application was not acceded to; and when the hurricane of the 14th November, with all its disastrous consequences, is remembered, it is obvious that this unfortunate decision may have increased the difficulties of that deplorable crisis, and may have subjected Rear-Admiral Boxer to some of the charges brought against him.

16833. It must be observed, however, that Rear-Admiral Boxer had permitted Com-
16831. mander Borlase, on account of his knowledge in gunnery, to join the forces in the Crimea, although this officer, having been for three years in the Turkish service, had been specially chosen to assist him. The Rear-Admiral thus lost the person best fitted to communicate with the Turkish authorities, at a time when his assistance would have been most useful.

Under such disadvantages he was required to repair the damages of the
15692–15702. hurricane, and to forward to the Crimea supplies of every kind in lieu of those
15742–15768. which had been lost. Deputy Commissary-general Smith, anxious to fulfil the
15788–15888. duties of his office, thought that vessels were delayed for coaling and watering,
15889. and that they were left in positions where the loading was rendered unnecessarily difficult. This mismanagement he ascribed to Admiral Boxer; hence differences
15904. arose between them, and both Lord Raglan and Commissary-general Filder were
15890–15908. applied to on the subject.

Your Committee are of opinion that there was some unnecessary detention
15906. of transports at Constantinople, and that the arrangements for coaling were very deficient; but as they have not been able to examine Admiral Boxer, they cannot pronounce an opinion as to his share of the responsibility. His letters in the Appendix show that he exerted himself strenuously to discharge duties, for which it is admitted that his means were inadequate, and if he failed under these

these difficulties, his subsequent endeavours in the harbour of Balaclava appear to have been successful.

The Commissariat at Home.

The Commissariat has been, during many years, a subordinate department of the Treasury; and although nominally transferred to the Secretary for War in the summer of 1854, it was not placed under his immediate control until the 22d of last December; when a Treasury Minute was issued, authorizing this arrangement. 13417.

Up to that period, Sir C. Trevelyan, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was practically the head of this department. He stated that the forms of the Commissariat had been improved and simplified some years since, and that although persons might misunderstand any regulations, yet he did not believe these forms were to be blamed. He would willingly submit them to any practised accountant for his opinion. Deputy Commissary-general Smith says, that as long as regulations are required, none could be made of a more simple form than those applicable to the Commissariat; and he had never heard any complaints arising out of the observance of these forms. 14128. 14903. 14301. 14304. 16001. 15630. 15632. 15642.

The Commissariat in the East.

It is the duty of the Commissariat to furnish the army, when in the field, with provisions for the men, forage for the animals, and land-transport.

Commissary-general Filder was appointed by the Treasury to superintend the establishment of the Commissariat in the East. He was selected, it is said, on account of his experience and special fitness for the charge; and authority was given to him to provide such persons as might be required for the service; ample funds were also placed at his disposal, and ships were provided and ordered to act under his exclusive directions. 13423. 13453. 13454. 13469. 13502. 13701. 14230. 14296. 14688. 15762.

With these large powers, heavy duties were imposed upon him according to an arrangement, which appears to have been injudiciously adopted at the commencement of the campaign. It was determined that there should be only one store department with the army, and that this should be under the care of the Commissariat. From this decision it followed as a consequence, that the Commissariat was expected to make good the deficiencies of many distinct departments. All the miscellaneous articles of equipment which come under the name of Quartermaster-general's stores were given in charge to the Commissariat, and, in addition to these extraneous duties, this department was required not only to keep a large amount of Ordnance stores, but also to purchase materials and tools in the East for the purposes of the siege. 13567. 20886. 14539. 13573. 13644. 15946. 15666. 13646.

The military system in this country affords the Commissariat no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the army, or of ministering to its wants; so that in a campaign the officers of this department find themselves called upon to furnish supplies, in regard to which they may have had no experience; while the officers and men, being often ignorant of the proper duties of the Commissariat, consider this department responsible for every thing they may require. 15948. 14106. 14126. 14195.

Land Transport.

From the first the system of the land transport was found to be imperfect. No adequate measures were adopted for its improvement, so that the army, when encamped before Sebastopol, depended for all its supplies upon a service defective in its organization and in its superintendence. 15597. 1811. 13511.

The army landed in the Crimea without the animals necessary for the conveyance of the baggage, or for the removal of the sick and wounded; much inconvenience and suffering resulted from this deficiency; but if, as stated to your Committee, every available vessel was employed for other purposes, the Commissariat cannot be held responsible. 13660. 13701. 13717. 1332.

13731. When the army had encamped before Sebastopol, mules and baggage animals were brought over from Varna. On the 5th October Commissary-general Filder asserted that he had transport sufficient for all the purposes of the army, and submitted to Lord Raglan a scheme for disposing of above 2,000 animals, which were at Varna, and which he said were not wanted, and would only be an incumbrance in the Crimea. During this same period, Sir Edmund Lyons writes, that the transport animals, though in fair condition, were not sufficient in number.

2036. 863. 16655.

13739. 13796. 13799. On the 8th of November Commissary-general Filder was informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Crimea. At this period he still possessed a large number of baggage animals, and a considerable amount of hay and forage, on board ships, in or near the harbour of Balaclava.

13804. 13808. 14034. About this period the Commissary-general became alarmed, foreseeing that the conveyance of guns and ammunition for the siege and for the defence of our position, the removal of the sick and wounded, the distribution of rations, of forage, of clothing, of fuel, of medicines, and of medical comforts, besides numerous other supplies, which, in the position of the army, were scarcely less important, would all be emperilled by a failure in the land transport; while the service was itself seriously endangered from the want of shelter and forage for the animals during the approaching winter, and from the bad condition of the roads between Balaclava and the camp.

13772. 17241–17244. 17376. 13869. 6493. Your Committee are not aware that any measures were adopted for the protection of the animals from the inclemency of the season; Sir John Burgoyne thinks there was a great want of care, and that in a few instances, where the animals were attended to, they were preserved. The drivers were inefficient; and, being without proper superintendence, lost, or indolently neglected, the animals entrusted to their charge.

The Road.

13865. 4660. 6505. So much of the suffering of the troops has been ascribed to the wretched, or, as some witnesses state, the almost impassable condition of the seven miles between Balaclava and the camp, that your Committee endeavoured to ascertain who was responsible for the maintenance of the roads, and what insuperable obstacles impeded their repair.

13910. 14213. 14314.

444. 1203. 1207. 87322. 1390. 4397. 3836. 3780. 4082. 17214. 17222. When the army reached the heights above Sebastopol they found two principal roads from Balaclava to Sebastopol, one the fine government road, called the Woronzoff road; the other further to the left, a useful farm-road. The army held the Woronzoff road up to the time of the battle of Balaclava, in October. Immediately after that action it became necessary to draw in the outposts, which lost to the army the use of that road: the other road, however, remained, and was available for all purposes until the rains commenced.

17329. 17397.

13804. 13867. 13895. On the 13th of November Commissary-general Filder wrote to the Quartermaster-general, expressing his apprehension, and calling attention to this important subject.

17390. 20875. 17285. 1392. 3824. 17237. 17345. 17516. 13895. The duty of making and maintaining roads for the army falls upon the department of the Quartermaster-general. This officer was about this time disabled by severe illness. Sir J. Burgoyne, the Chief Engineer Officer on the staff, and other military authorities, state, that the soldiers could not be withdrawn from the trenches for the repair of the road; the men were already overtasked by military duties; they were growing weaker from day to day, while their difficulties were increasing. An attempt was made to employ Turkish troops on this work, but it was soon abandoned.

13869. 13889. 6490. From the 14th of November, the date of the hurricane, the land-transport was gradually reduced in strength, until it almost ceased to exist. The Commissary-general writes: "The men and beasts perished owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling through the deep mud with supplies, and from exposure to wet and cold." To repair these losses, recourse was had to the depôt at Constantinople; but the waste and consumption of animals exceeded the

the supply, and the service of the land-transport could no longer be performed by the Commissariat.

The horses of the cavalry were then employed, and thus valuable animals, trained for the duties of the cavalry and artillery, were used and worked to death in services which should have been performed by animals purchased for about 5 *l.* or 7 *l.* each. 4744. 14070. 6464–6466. 6478.

The broken road, and the want of land-transport, increased the confusion of the harbour. Sir E. Lyons ascribes the crowded state of the harbour, and its attendant inconveniences, to the delay in removing cargoes from the ships to the camp. 16655. 16819. 16939.

As far as the information obtained enables your Committee to form an opinion, it appears to them that in this matter there was a want of due foresight and decision. Early in November, when the probable necessity of wintering in the Crimea was contemplated, energetic means should have been taken to provide and maintain an effective communication between the camp and Balaclava. The road had then already been injured by the traffic, and its condition had excited the apprehensions of the Commissary-general, who had called attention to the subject: if a military force could not be spared, measures should have been taken to obtain other labour in the East, or application should have been made to the Home Government, who might have sent labourers from England. Such precaution would have saved much loss of time, and many valuable lives, and would have contributed to maintain the land transport service in an effective condition. The probable failure of the communication was not, however, brought to the notice of the Duke of Newcastle until too late to enable him to take measures in England to prevent the serious calamities which subsequently arose. 17369. 14593. 14582

Depôts in the East.

The consequences resulting from the failure of the transport service would have been in some degree obviated by the formation of depôts in the neighbourhood of the camp, or between the camp and Balaclava. 13839.

The establishment of depôts is a duty specially noticed in the Commissariat regulations. Sir C. Trevelyan states, that in October Commissary-general Filder was engaged in the formation of a depôt near the camp, in order that he might be secure against the contingencies of weather; but after the action of Balaclava, the Commissariat chest was ordered on board ship, and the transports were sent out of the harbour. At this time the abandonment of Balaclava was contemplated. After this followed the battle of Inkerman, when the transport service was occupied in bringing up ammunition, and a few days later came "the hurricane and the catastrophe." From this time forward all the available animals were employed for the daily requirements of the army, and the establishment of depôts was relinquished. 14043. 13842. 2045. 6322. 14039. 14316. 860.

At Constantinople Deputy Commissary General Smith established extensive magazines; he states, that the supplies under his charge were sufficient, and the arrangements for the custody and delivery of stores unobjectionable. In August, or early in September, he entered into contracts for a supply of fuel, and could have procured enough for the army throughout the winter, but he was not able to obtain transports for its conveyance; at the same time the quantity which did reach Balaclava was more than could be carried to the camp. 15617–15626. 15809–15812. 15846–15865. 15869. 15862.

He tried to hire native vessels for this service; but after the hurricane the masters of these vessels could not be induced to attempt the voyage. According to his evidence, it would appear, that at Constantinople he had in store all the supplies which the army could require; no blame can justly be attached to Deputy Commissary-general Smith, nor can he be held responsible for the difficulties and distress which occurred in the Crimea. 15858. 15905. 15684. 15620. 15621.

Commissariat Supplies.

Food for the Men.

The Commissariat Department obtained an abundant supply of salt meat, biscuit and rum from England. This was furnished by the victualling department of the Admiralty, on requisition from the Treasury, and the duty of the Commissariat, as to these supplies, consisted merely in keeping the account and in arranging the distribution. Fresh meat was chiefly procured from Eupatoria, from Constantinople, and from Smyrna. Deputy Commissary-general Smith stated that he had at Constantinople 4,000 head of cattle during the winter ready for the consumption of the army, besides 2,000 at Smyrna, and that if he could have obtained sea transport, he thinks he could have sent a regular supply to the army.

16648. 14201. 15750. 14218.

The witnesses are not agreed as to the quantity of fresh meat supplied to the army; the regularity of the distribution depended partly on the zeal and energy of the several Commissariat officers, and also on the position occupied by the troops. Until the end of October the rations, it is said, were furnished with regularity, and consisted of fresh meat twice or thrice in the week. Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Division from the 28th of November till the 23d of January, states, that during this period the hospitals were supplied with fresh meat almost every day; but the troops did not receive it, he thinks, above once a week: he never knew them, however, to be without rations. Other witnesses say, that the soldiers, during the winter months, suffered occasionally from want of their rations, and more frequently from the irregularity of the issue. In the Appendix, a statement by a board of officers will be found, in which it is affirmed, that the men, for days and weeks together, went to the trenches with an insufficient meal, and oftentimes with none at all, save a little biscuit and rum. Any result derived from an average of rations issued is delusive, because privation on one day is not compensated by superfluity on another. Even when the men received a sufficient meal, the proportion of salt meat without an accompanying supply of vegetables was greater than was consistent with the health of the troops. This deficiency of fresh meat, the most wholesome, as well as the cheapest food, is ascribed to the failure of the sea-transport, the ships having been disabled by storms, and then delayed for repairs; in one instance all the cattle on board perished from the inclemency of the weather, or from the violence of the waves.

1175. 1209. 1955. 4670. 5472. 496. 827. 1321. 1906. 3840. 5745. 6379. 6380.

3287.

See Appendix, No. 3, of Third Report.

3330. 3429. 3839. 466. 5731. 557. 828. 1323. 3431. 4092. 13863. 15689.

15756.

Vegetables, which, according to the intentions of the Government, should have been issued gratuitously, were very scantily supplied; indeed, several witnesses assert that none were ever seen in the camp. One ship-load of vegetables was detained in the harbour until the cargo was decayed; and at Eupatoria, it is said, there was an immense store of onions lying on the wharf, whilst disease, from want of vegetables, was spreading through the camp. The Deputy Commissary-general states that he had an abundant stock of rice at Constantinople during the time when it was wanted even for the hospitals in the Crimea. Preserved potatoes were, it is said, early in the autumn offered to the soldiers, but rejected; later in the winter, when the supply of vegetables was essential, it does not appear that the offer was repeated. Coffee, which had been ordered as an extra ration, was distributed to the troops in a green state, and (there being no means of roasting it) was of little use. The explanation offered to your Committee on this point is not satisfactory. The more immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, whilst ingenious arguments on the volatile aroma of the berry, and on the Turkish mode of packing coffee, were passing backwards and forwards between Commissary-general Filder and the Treasury.

13792. 15741. 20101. 14287. 15647. 14281. 15655. 13620. 15737. 15741.

14547. 1314. 2032. 3333. 4446. 4288. 15664. 7632–12071.

See Papers, No. 43, of Session 1854–55. 13631, and Appendix there referred to.

Forage.

When the army first encamped before Sebastopol. stacks of forage were found in the neighbourhood; these were soon consumed, and henceforward there appears to have been much difficulty in obtaining fodder for the horses. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who left the heights on the 7th

6320. 5716.

4055.

7th November, said that his baggage animals were frequently without food, and that on one occasion he was obliged to kill 24 ammunition ponies, which he had not the means of feeding. The Earl of Lucan, commanding the Cavalry Division, complained repeatedly, from the 29th of September to the date of his departure, of the condition to which the horses were reduced from want of food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but did not find the pressure so severe until after the 5th of November, when his brigade was posted on the heights. After the hurricane, the supply of forage failed, and, under the combined effects of work, exposure and insufficient food, the cavalry gradually ceased to exist as an effective force.

3875. 6352. 14063. 13799. 5721. 5922. 1329. 1409. 6478. 6509.

To what extent the Commissariat is responsible for the deficiency in all these supplies is a question to which it is not easy to give a definite answer.

Sir C. Trevelyan, speaking as the head of the Commissariat, and desirous of relieving the department from responsibility, affirms their conduct throughout to have been irreproachable, and ascribes blame to other persons. According to his opinion, the Quartermaster-general, for whose good intentions he made full allowance, ought to bear the chief responsibility. "This officer," he says, "is responsible for the road to the camp, and for the road along the border of the harbour at Balaclava. By him also buildings should have been appropriated for magazines, and stables for the baggage animals should have been provided."

14323. 14315–14318.

Sir C. Trevelyan also states, that the endeavours of the Commissariat were frustrated by the mismanagement of the transports, that there was a want of proper arrangements in the harbour of Balaclava, and still worse disorder at Constantinople. "Rear-Admiral Boxer did not," he says, "possess the administrative qualifications requisite for that important station, and he delayed the transports in the Bosphorus, or appropriated them to other services." In confirmation of this statement, he mentioned the "Rockliffe" transport, and the "Jason," which last, he said, had been detained three weeks at Constantinople. Some letters from Rear-Admiral Boxer will be found in the Appendix, denying this assertion. Admiral Boxer also, it appears, in December, remonstrated respecting the irregular system pursued by the Commissariat in the Crimea, and requested the interference of the Commander of the Forces. He suggested that some of the largest transports should be strongly moored in Balaclava harbour, as floating depôts, and that the smaller steamers should be told off for the special duty of conveying supplies.

13320–13904. 13876. 13853. 13903. *See* Appendix.

Your Committee have not been able to examine Commissary-General Filder, or Rear-Admiral Boxer, and they cannot therefore decide upon whom this blame should rest.

Both these officers were apparently convinced that the transport system in the Black Sea had been ill-conducted. Whether, however, the vessels had been injudiciously detained as store-depôts by the Commissariat, or improperly employed in other services by the Admiral at Constantinople, are questions which your Committee cannot satisfactorily answer. These arrangements might, with propriety, have been reviewed by the high naval and military authorities. They alone had the means of deciding these differences, and of enforcing such a system as might best secure the conveyance of supplies with regularity and despatch.

Before closing their observations on the Commissariat department in the East, your Committee notice with pleasure the willing testimony which many witnesses have borne to the zeal and energy which some subordinate officers of the Commissariat displayed in procuring supplies, and in relieving, as far as they were able, the distress of the troops during a period of trying exigencies.

468. 469. 1321.

The Medical Department at Home.

The Medical Department of the Army and Ordnance is under a Director-General, who has an assistant to aid him in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the Director-General, states, that he was under the immediate authority of five

7961. 7980. 7987. 8041. 8113.

8115. 9365. 9370. 14902. 14677. 8319. different superiors—the Commander-in-chief, the Secretary of State, the Secretary-at-War, the Master-General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He further states, that upon the separation of the two departments of War and Colonies, he received no communication ordering him to correspond directly with the Secretary for War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that in August last he himself told Dr. Smith that the Secretary of State for War was his real and only master. Had such an arrangement been earlier adopted, Dr. Smith says it would have saved labour, whilst the service would have been more efficiently conducted. The Director-General states, that when he first heard of the probability that a force would be sent to Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the troops: this suggestion was adopted. He also selected surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them directions for their guidance. He recommended that ambulances should be prepared, and an ambulance corps appointed: for this purpose he advised that able-bodied soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Hardinge objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting men, and pensioners were employed instead. Dr. Smith remonstrated in vain.

8278. 8135. 8142. 8218. 8228. 14990. 14991.

The entire failure of this corps and the consequent sufferings of the army are abundantly proved.

8271. 8657. In May 1854, Dr. Smith addressed a letter to the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-chief, recommending that "in the event of the hospitals being established at a distance from the army, ships should be fitted for the transport of the sick and wounded." This application was not attended to.

20800. 14820.

19811. Before the army left England, the most experienced purveyors were assembled by the order of the Secretary-at-War; and, after consultation with the Director-general of the Medical Department, they drew up a report in regard to the stores required for the medical treatment of the troops.

8200. 8054. 8121. 8885. Dr. Smith states, that he issued orders to the druggists for a supply of medicines; he made requisitions on the Ordnance for the hospital stores, and through the Ordnance to the Admiralty for the supply of medical comforts. The system pursued as to medical comforts was altered after September, when Dr. Smith provided this supply. Respecting the hospital stores, Dr. Smith says, that when he had made his requisition on the Ordnance, his duty ended; his office had no further information on the subject: that he occasionally applied or sent to ascertain what had been done; but that this was out-stepping the functions of his department.

8064. 8886. 8063.

8200. The strict economy enforced during a long period of peace, by means of a rigid system of audit and account, may doubtless, at the first outbreak of war, have still fettered Dr. Smith, as well as other public servants, who dreaded to incur responsibility for any expenditure, however urgent, which was not guarded by all the forms and documents usually required. An excess of caution, in the first instance, led probably to some evils, which a lavish outlay could not afterwards repair. The letters of the Secretary-at-War, read by him in his evidence, forcibly illustrate this observation. In many cases instructions on this matter might have been useful to public servants whose experience was wholly founded on the methods rightly insisted upon during peace.

19966. 7833.

The Medical Department in the East.

8813. 498. 1183. 1189. 1897. 3285. 5742. 3789. The army, when sent to the East, had a greater number of medical men in proportion to the number of the troops, than ever before accompanied a British army, and the witnesses generally concur in testifying to their zeal and efficiency; many of these were, however, disabled by sickness before the descent on the Crimea, so that after each of the actions at Alma and Inkerman, some regiments had not the requisite number of medical men. The ambulances for the conveyance of the sick and wounded were too heavy, and ill adapted for their purpose.

7505. 8998. 6985. 3284. 3285. The treatment of the sick and wounded in the camp, at Balaclava, and at Scutari, has already formed the subject of a lengthened Report by Commissioners specially appointed for this purpose: further information upon this point will be

be found in the evidence already presented to the House. The condition of the tent-hospitals, as described by Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Division, was, from the 28th of November to the 23d of January, the period of his stay in the Crimea, so wretched and painful to hear, that your Committee gladly avoid repeating these deplorable details. The medical men, it is said, were indefatigable in their attention; but so great was the want of the commonest necessaries, even of bedding, as well as of medicines and medical comforts, that they sorrowfully admitted their services to be of little avail. 3291. 3433. 10053. 10055. 11626. 3294. 11553. 11697. 11707.

The hospital at Balaclava had an advantage, inasmuch as it was nearer to the limited supplies which were on board ship; but the uncertainty whether or not Balaclava could be retained, disconcerted the arrangements of this hospital, and upon one occasion the patients were removed. In regard to its subsequent condition, there is a difference of opinion, depending probably upon the dates of the several visits; but the prevailing testimony is to the effect, that this hospital was for many weeks in a discreditable state. 11477. 11499. 6246. 7617. 155.

Allowance must be made for the circumstances in which the continued possession of Balaclava was held, and for the difficulty of establishing a hospital in such buildings as were found there. The want of proper orderlies, the insufficiency of medicines, especially of opium; of medical comforts, some of which were essential to the health of the men, and the great want of purveyor's stores, have been so fully set forth in the Report of the Commissioners, that your Committee deem it superfluous to adduce further evidence in corroboration of their statements. They will, therefore, proceed to observe upon 1060. 11878. 11867. 8239.

The Hospitals at Scutari.

When the army arrived in the East, various places were suggested for hospitals, but Scutari was eventually decided upon as fittest for the purpose. 14615.

The system of regimental hospitals was adopted in the first instance, and the general hospital was not established until the army moved to Varna. 8148. 8150. 20905.

The Duke of Newcastle says that he did not issue any instructions as to hospitals; he left that to be executed by the Medical Board. Dr. Smith, the Director-general of the Medical Department of the Army, says, that he had nothing to do with these hospitals, and that his interference could only have caused confusion. He selected medical men for the hospitals, and he sent to the Ordnance a requisition to provide hospital furniture proportioned to the amount of force, and there his duties ended. 14616. 14800. 8099. 8105. 8892. 14613.

Your Committee, after hearing evidence affirming the disgraceful state of the hospitals at Scutari, endeavoured to ascertain by whom the chief authority was exercised, and on whom the responsibility must rest. 14647.

Major Sillery was commandant, and had sole military charge of the hospitals. Dr. Menzies was superintendent of all the hospitals, having immediate charge of the Turkish hospital, with Dr. M'Gregor under his orders, in charge of the barrack hospital. Dr. Menzies was appointed by Lord Raglan, on the recommendation of Dr. Dumbreck and Dr. Hall, and remained superintendent from the 26th June 1854 to 2d January 1855. He alleges that during a portion of this time he was placed in an anomalous position, by the arrival, on the 4th of November, of Dr. Cuming, his superior officer, who had been sent from England as member of the Commission of Inquiry, and to supersede him in his office when the inquiry of that Commission had been brought to a close. 9698. 10253. 10056. 10619. 11393. 11423. 10804. 11398. 10802. 10813. 10480. 11465. 14896.

When the expedition sailed for the Crimea, Major Sillery gave instructions to Dr. Menzies, in pursuance, it is said, of directions through Rear-admiral Boxer, from the Duke of Newcastle, repeated by Lieutenant-general Sir George Brown, to report on the accommodation that could be provided in the hospitals for the sick and wounded who might be expected from the first operations of the army; Dr. Menzies' report, dated 7 August, will be found in the Evidence. Dr. Menzies in this report impresses on the local military authorities, as Dr. A. Smith had before done in his letter to the Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, 8271.

Guards, the necessity of providing fit transports for the conveyance of the sick and wounded.

Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general of the Army, was sent by Lord Raglan to inspect the hospitals in October. He remained at Scutari about three weeks, and then reported them "to be in as good a state as could be reasonably expected." Dr. Menzies reported periodically to Dr. Hall, as his official chief. Dr. Menzies, although concurring in the opinion of Dr. Hall, appears subsequently to have made several appeals to the commandant and to the purveyor for means of improving the condition of the hospitals; but either no measures, or no efficient and adequate measures, seem to have been adopted for the purpose.

9907. 9908. 9743. 10320–10330.

In justice to Dr. Menzies, it must be admitted that he was engaged in incessant and onerous duties. He was consulted in all difficult surgical cases; he performed the most serious operations himself. His time was occupied in invaliding men, holding boards, making monthly returns and quarterly returns, daily reports and weekly reports; reports to Dr. Hall, who was satisfied with the hospitals; reports to Dr. Smith, who could not interfere; reports to the Duke of Newcastle, who was never informed of the real state of things. Amidst all these labours, he had no time left for that which should have been his principal duty, the proper superintendence of these hospitals.

10610. 10611. 10346. 10991. 11229. 11181. 11166. 11176. 11084. 11004. 11134. 11006. 14810. 14829. 14631. 19817.

Dr. Menzies states, "that he was overwhelmed by the work of three deputy inspectors when he gave up his charge," "his health being then broken down." This statement is confirmed by Dr. Dumbreck, who, having heard Dr. Menzies' evidence, says, "the clashing of responsibility and confusion that existed in the administration of the hospitals was not creditable to our system; we seem to have fallen into a state of inanition; we had no purveyors, no orderlies, no hospital corps. Dr. Menzies I believe to have been clearly over-worked, and put in a position that no one man was able to cope with."

11181. 10615. 11420.

The duties of Dr. Menzies were further obstructed by a conflict of authority with the purveyor, who claimed to act independently, under the instructions of the Secretary-at-War. When one purveyor had been pronounced by a medical board unfit for the active duties of his office, and was about to be removed, he was retained in this responsible situation by superior authority. All doubt as to the authority of the purveyor would have been removed by proper instructions from the Secretary-at-War. These were not, however, sent until the 14th of November.

11010. 8962. 19821. 10504. 8282. 8298.

Your Committee must declare it to be their opinion, that blame attaches to Dr. Menzies, inasmuch as he did not report correctly the circumstances of the hospital; he stated that he wanted nothing in the shape of stores or medical comforts at the time when his patients were destitute of the commonest necessaries.

19971. 7004–7007. 9797–9800. 9814–9825.

With this confirmation by Dr. Dumbreck, Deputy Inspector-general of Hospitals, of the whole testimony relating to this painful subject, your Committee are totally at a loss to comprehend the report of Dr. Hall, more especially with regard to the barrack hospital, the scene of so much misery and suffering. The Duke of Newcastle states, "that the disgraceful condition of the hospitals was first brought under his notice in the middle of October." Dr. Hall was at Scutari from the 3d to the 23d of that month. Dr. Hall's report seems to have misled both Lord Raglan and the Government at home, and to have occasioned much delay in measures taken afterwards for the remedy of evils which might have been arrested earlier in their progress.

15134. 19835. 20838–20845.

The office of purveyor had been, with four exceptions, discontinued for many years, and there was difficulty in finding a person competent to perform these duties. The selection of Mr. Ward for this post was not fortunate; amongst other proofs of his unfitness, it appears, that when an inquiry was instituted into the amount of the purveyor's stores, no account could be produced of any stores later than the end of August. When it is remembered that the insufficiency of these stores was a source of much suffering, if not of more fatal results, it must be observed, that heavy responsibility attaches to the Commander-

13041. Appendix, No. 1. Third Report. 8282.

Commander-in-chief of the Forces, who, acting on the representation of the Quartermaster-general, retained Mr. Ward in his office, after he had been pronounced unfit to discharge its duties. The Secretary-at-War had said, "There can be no objection to try Mr. Ward, as I will promise, if he is not efficient, we will remove him." When, however, the appointment had been made, the Commander of the Forces had the sole authority, and overruled the decision of the Medical Board. The appointment of Mr. Wreford, who was sent out as purveyor in chief, did not remove these difficulties. The distinct duties of Mr. Wreford and Mr. Ward were not understood by these officers, and the confusion was increased by new uncertainty. Mr. Maxwell, the Commissioner who was sent to inquire, seems to have returned undecided in opinion as to which of these two officers was answerable for the supply of stores. 8304. 12970. 8253. 12989. 8843. 13035. 13049. 13055.

The apothecary's department at Scutari was in no better condition; his store was the general depôt, not only for the hospitals, but for the army in the East; yet he had no account of his stores, and never made an entry in his books from the 24th of September to the 28th of November. Your Committee are not aware under what instructions he was acting; but the late Secretary-at-War admits that such conduct was a gross dereliction of duty. It is moreover manifest that the Government had been deceived in regard to these hospital stores; since Mr. S. Herbert had stated in the House of Commons, "There have been all manner of forms to be gone through before these stores could be issued; with plenty of materials, the forms were so cumbrous, that they never could be produced with the rapidity necessary for the purposes of a military hospital." It is now proved that if there were cumbrous forms inconveniencing the service of the hospital, and aggravating the sufferings of the patients, there were at least no forms to protect the public purse against negligence or peculation. The distress in these hospitals would have been more severe, and the sufferings more acute, if private charity had not stepped in to redress the evils of official mismanagement. Assistance which had been discouraged as superfluous, was eventually found to be essential for the lives of the patients. 13028. 19847. 19897.

When the quantities of hospital stores which were sent from England are contrasted with the scarcity, or rather the absolute dearth of them at Scutari; and when the state of the purveyor's accounts is remembered, it is impossible not to harbour a suspicion that some dishonesty has been practised in regard to these stores. From the returns in the Appendix, it appears that before the 24th July, 5,717 bedsteads, 9,000 beds and palliasses, 7,140 complete hospital dresses, 5,000 linen and flannel shirts, with a full proportion of other articles, and utensils of all descriptions, were ordered by the Medical Board to be supplied and shipped by the Board of Ordnance. A Committee of the House could not efficiently prosecute an investigation into the disappearance of these stores; but the subject well deserves the consideration of the executive Government. 11886.

In order to show the dreadful discomfort of the men, and the neglect on the part of the authorities, it may be sufficient to state, that in the barrack hospital at Scutari, during the month of November, while there were about 2,000 patients in that hospital, the whole number of shirts washed was only six. At a later period, it is fair to add, that this glaring evil was mitigated. *See* Appendix. 11128. 11131.

Major Sillery, either unprovided with special instructions for such an emergency, or unacquainted with his powers and authority as military commandant, appears to have been completely paralysed in his attempts to govern the hospitals under his orders. He was unprovided with staff. Mr. Stafford states, that Major Sillery was afraid to incur the responsibility of directing payment for the labour of sixteen Turks, required for the removal of the worst nuisances. There is abundant proof throughout the evidence that the military officer in command at any stations where general hospitals are established, possesses authority to direct expenditure, and to meet all cases of emergency or necessity beyond those provided for by the established regulations of the War Office. 7832. 19835. 8199–8200. 19739. 8197. 14626. 19848.

The immediate measures taken by the authorities at home—when the condition of the hospitals was more truly brought to their knowledge by the press and by private information than it had been by the medical officers—

were the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry, and the Instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, which will be found in the Appendix. The Committee consider this last step to have been as injudicious as it was unavailing for the purpose for which it was intended. If the division and uncertainty of responsibility was a serious evil, the evil could only be increased by the interference of another authority, having neither relation to nor connexion with our military administration. The instruction to the Ambassador to provide on application money and supplies for the wants of the hospitals, would seem to imply that the authorities at home were as little aware as the commandant himself of the powers he possessed over the commissaries, and purveyors.

The want of an energetic governing authority, with an adequate staff to maintain constant inspection and efficient discipline, appears to your Committee to have been the chief cause of all the evils: 5,000 or 6,000 men, although in hospital, require the care, superintendence, and control of an efficient general officer, as much as the same number in the field. Mr. Herbert says, that "Major Sillery ought not to have been left in the command of the hospital; his military rank was not sufficient"; that his "belief was, that Major
19832. Sillery worked very indefatigably in his department, according to his own light, but that he was not a man of the rank in the army and the weight which he ought to have had, to be at the head of an establishment of such a gigantic character"; that a general officer ought to have been appointed from this country, with full authority. Lord Hardinge states, "that the command at
19931. Scutari ought to have been entrusted to an officer of higher rank and greater influence." And Mr. Herbert further states, that the great pressure upon these hospitals, and the great calamities that occurred in them, took place while they were under the command of Major Sillery.

It may not have been possible for Lord Raglan to have spared such an officer, with a sufficient staff for this service, in the pressing circumstances of his position in the Crimea. Your Committee regret that measures were not earlier taken either to reinforce the staff under Lord Raglan, so as to have enabled him to provide more efficiently for this command, or to send out, on the emergency,
14633. a general officer of sufficient rank from England. While the matter was subsequently under consideration at home, Lord Raglan appointed Lord William Paulet, who superseded Major Sillery in the beginning of December. The Duke of Newcastle sent especial instructions to Lord William Paulet on the 5th January, which were followed by Mr. Herbert's further instructions on
Appendix 441. the 18th. It is fair to Lord William Paulet to add, that a gradual amendment in the state of the hospital took place from the time of his assuming the command.

Your Committee, in conclusion, cannot but remark, that the first real improvements in the lamentable condition of the hospitals at Scutari, are to be attributed to private suggestions, private exertions, and private benevolence. Miss Nightingale, at the suggestion of the Secretary-at-War, with admirable devotion, organized a band of nurses, and undertook the care of the sick and wounded. A fund, raised by public subscription, was administered by the proprietors of the "Times" newspaper, through Mr. M'Donald, an intelligent and zealous agent. The Hon. and Rev. Sidney Godolphin Osborne, Mr. Augustus Stafford, and the Hon. Josceline Percy, after a personal inspection of the hospitals, furnished valuable reports and suggestions to the Government. By these means much suffering was alleviated, the spirits of the men were raised, and many lives were saved.

Your Committee have now adverted to the chief points contained in the replies to above 21,000 questions, and in noticing these various subjects, they have divided them under distinct heads, in order fairly to apportion the responsibility.

It appears that the sufferings of the army resulted mainly from the circumstances in which the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken and executed.

The

The Administration which ordered that expedition had no adequate information as to the amount of force in the Crimea or Sebastopol. They were not acquainted with the strength of the fortresses to be attacked, or with the resources of the country to be invaded. They hoped and expected that the expedition would be immediately successful, and, as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle, they made no provision for a winter campaign; what was planned and undertaken without sufficient information, was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befel our army.

The patience and fortitude of the army demand the admiration and gratitude of the nation, on whose behalf they have fought, bled and suffered. Their heroic valour, and equally heroic patience under sufferings and privations, have given them claims upon their country, which will be long remembered and gratefully acknowledged.

Your Committee will now close their Report, with a hope that every British army may in future display the great qualities which this noble army has displayed, and that none may hereafter be exposed to such sufferings as are recorded in these pages.

18 *June* 1855.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Lunæ, 26° *die Februarii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord Seymour.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Layard.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Drummond.
General Peel.	Mr. Bramston.

Mr. *Roebuck* was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to Wednesday next, at Two o'clock.

Mercurii, 28° *die Februarii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Lord Seymour.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir J. Pakington.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.

The following Resolution was proposed by Sir *J. Pakington*:—

"That in the opinion of this Committee the objects for which they have been appointed will be best attained, the danger of injustice to individuals be prevented, and the public interests best protected, if the Committee be a Committee of Secrecy."

Further consideration of the foregoing resolution postponed until to-morrow, and the Committee to be specially summoned for that purpose.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Two o'clock.

Jovis, 1° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	Sir J. Pakington.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Mr. John Ball.	Mr. Ellice.

Motion made (Sir *J. Pakington*), "That in the opinion of this Committee the objects for which they have been appointed will be best attained, the danger of injustice to individuals be

be prevented, and the public interests best protected, if the Committee be a Committee of Secrecy." Question put; the Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 2.
Mr. Bramston.	Lord Seymour.
General Peel.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Layard.	
Mr. Drummond.	
Mr. John Ball.	
Sir J. Pakington.	

Ordered, "That the Chairman be instructed to report the foregoing Resolution and Minutes of this day's Proceedings to The House, and to move The House that this Committee be a Committee of Secrecy."

[Adjourned till Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 5° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Lord Seymour.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Edward Ellice.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Sir J. Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Drummond.

Mr. *George Dundas,* M. P., and General Sir *De Lacy Evans,* M. P., Examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 6° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. John Ball.	

General Sir *De Lacy Evans,* M. P., and Mr. *George Dundas,* M. P., further examined.

Captain the Honourable *Ashley Ponsonby,* M. P., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 7° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir J. Pakington.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Lord Seymour.

General *Bentinck*, Mr. *Stephen Owen*, and Captain *Wrottesley*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 8° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Lord Seymour.	Mr. Drummond.
Sir John Hanmer.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. John Ball.	General Peel.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir J. Pakington.

General *Bentinck*, further examined.

Dr. *James Vaux*, and Mr. *Layard*, M. P., a Member of the Committee, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 9° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. John Ball.	Colonel Lindsay.

Mr. *Richard Clay*, the Reverend *Edward George Parker*, and Mr. *Henry Vellacott*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 12° die Martii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Lord Seymour.	Mr. Drummond.
Sir John Hanmer.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	General Peel.
Mr. John Ball.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Ellice.

His Royal Highness the Duke of *Cambridge*, Colonel *Wilson*, and Captain *Blakeley*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 13° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Layard.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Bramston.	Lord Seymour.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Ellice.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. John Ball.	Mr. Drummond.

Captain *Shakespear*, Mr. *J. Crowe*, Captain *Kellock*, Colonel *Sparkes*, and Sergeant *Thomas Dawson*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 14° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.
Colonel Lindsay.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Pakington.

Colonel *Kinlock*, the Earl of *Cardigan*, and Mr. *T. C. Macdonald*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 15° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. John Ball.
General Peel.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Earl of *Lucan*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 16° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Drummond.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. John Ball.
Sir John Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.

Mr. *Thomas M. Mackay*, and Mr. *Richard Green*, examined.

Mr. *T. C. Macdonald*, further Examined.

Mr. *Thomas Stickney*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 19° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. John Ball.
Sir John Hanmer.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.

Mr. *Augustus Stafford*, M.P., and the Hon. *Joceline Percy*, M.P., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 20° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.

Dr. *Andrew Smith*, examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 22° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Pakington.

Dr. *Andrew Smith*, further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 23° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Hon. and Rev. *Sidney Godolphin Osborne*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 26° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Lord Seymour.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Hanmer.	

Dr. *Andrew Smith*, further examined.

Dr. *Menzies*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 27° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. John Ball.
Sir John Pakington.	

Mr. *William Henry Flower*, examined.

Dr. *Menzies*, further examined.

Motion made (Lord *Seymour*), "That the Committee do report the Evidence taken before them up to the adjournment of The House for the Easter holidays." Question put, and agreed to.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 28° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Mr. John Ball.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	

Dr. *Menzies*, further examined.

Dr. *Dumbreck*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 29° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. John Ball.
Mr. Layard.	

Dr. *Forrest*, Captain *Bamford*, Captain *Muir*, Captain *Stewart*, Captain *Freeman*, Captain *Darke*, and Captain *Ellison*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 30° *die Martii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. John Ball.

Dr. *Smith*, further examined.

Mr. *Maxwell*, examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday, the 17th April, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 17° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Layard.
Mr. Ellice.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	

Mr. *Maxwell*, further examined.

Lieutenant-colonel *Horsford*, and Sir *Charles Trevelyan*, K. C. B., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Ellice.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	

Sir *Charles Trevelyan*, K.C.B., further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 19° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Lord Seymour.	General Peel.
Sir John Hanmer.	

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 20° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Ellice.
General Peel.	Mr. Layard.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.

Sir *Charles Trevelyan*, K.C.B., further examined.

Resolved,—"That Sir Charles Trevelyan's Evidence (Q. 13849 to 13864) be forwarded to the Admiralty with the view of enabling them to order an immediate inquiry into the causes of the detention of the 'Jason' transport at Constantinople for three weeks in November (which is stated as one instance out of many), and if such detention was necessary, to ascertain why another transport was not ordered to perform a duty which was described as being necessary for the safety of the army."

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 23° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.

His Grace the *Duke of Newcastle*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 24° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

His Grace the *Duke of Newcastle*, further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 25° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Sir John Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.
Captain Gladstone.	

His Grace the *Duke of Newcastle,* further examined.

[Adjourned till to-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 26° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	Sir John Pakington.
Captain Gladstone.	

Mr. *Richard Potter,* and Mr. *John W. Smith,* examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 27° die Aprilis, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	General Peel.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Layard.
Sir John Hanmer.	Sir John Pakington.
Captain Gladstone.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Bramston.	

Motion made (Mr. *Layard*), "That the foreign witness called be now examined." Question put, and negatived.

Captain *Dacres,* R.N., and Captain *Milne,* R.N., examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 30° *die Aprilis*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Captain Gladstone.	

Captain *Milne*, R.N., and Sir *Charles Trevelyan*, further examined.

Captain *Tallan*, and Captain *Hillyar*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 31° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Captain Gladstone.	

Lieutenant-general Sir *John Burgoyne*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 2° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Captain Gladstone.	Colonel Lindsay.

Mr. *Thomas T. Grant*, Lieutenant-general Sir *Hew Ross*, and Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R.N., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 3° *die Maii*, 1855

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
General Peel.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Captain Gladstone.	

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R.N., and Mr. *Thomas T. Grant*, further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 4° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Pakington.	

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., further examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 7° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Ellice.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Layard.	Lord Seymour.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., further examined.

Mr. *William Monsell*, M. P., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 8° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

Captain Sir *Thomas Hastings*, R. N., and Mr. *William Monsell*, M. P., further examined.

Major-general Sir *J. M. Frederick Smith*, examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Mercurii, 9° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	General Peel.
Captain Gladstone.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Right Honorable *Sidney Herbert*, M. P., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 10° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	General Peel.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Layard.
Captain Gladstone.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir John Hanmer.	Sir John Pakington.
Lord Seymour.	

Mr. *Joseph Wood*, and Admiral *Deans Dundas*, examined.

Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 11° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

Viscount *Hardinge*, and Dr. *Mapleton*, examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 14° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.

Sir *James Graham*, Bart., M. P., examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 15° *die Maii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Sir John Pakington.
General Peel.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Layard.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Earl of *Aberdeen*, examined.

[Adjourned.

Mercurii, 6° die Junii, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ROEBUCK, in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	Captain Gladstone.
Mr. Drummond.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Seymour.

Draft Resolutions proposed by the *Chairman* read 1°, as follows:—

18. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 156. 159. 161. 162. 219. 220. 223. 224. 318. 365. 419. 422. 453. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 494. 557. 587. 520.

"1. THE state of our army, from its arrival in the Crimea to the period at which we were appointed to inquire into its condition, was one of almost unparalleled hardship, privation and suffering.

737. 738. 739. 740. 790. 791.

"2. The men, when on duty, were over-worked, were badly fed, badly clothed, badly housed, and were exposed in this unprotected state, without the comfort of fire, to cold, wet and tempest.

610. 628. 629. 630. 631; and *see, passim.* the evidence of Messrs. Stafford, Macdonald, and Osborne.

"3. The men in hospital, on account of wounds or sickness, in addition to much of this misery, had to suffer from insufficient medical attendance, and insufficient medicine, and an absence of medical comforts.

792. 793. 1187. 1189 3745. 3789. 3790. 3791. 5882. 5883. 5884.

"4. When wounded, the men had often to remain for a long period deprived of medical aid. This suffering was produced mainly by the want of an effective ambulance, and partly from the insufficient supply of surgeons.

The Administration.

773. 774.

796.

868. 21. 306.

"5. This calamitous state of things was the result mainly of the circumstances in which the expedition to the Crimea was planned and executed. The Administration which authorised that expedition, had no adequate information as to the amount of force in the Crimea and Sebastopol; they knew nothing of the strength of the fortresses to be attacked, or of the resources of the country to be invaded. In this state of ignorance they threw our army upon the shores of the Crimea, relying confidently on the valour of the troops and the fortunes of England. They hoped and expected that the expedition would be immediately successful; and as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle, they made no provision for a winter campaign. What was planned and undertaken in ignorance was conducted without sufficient care or forethought.

The Commander of the Forces.

I refer to the whole evidence in support of the conclusions I here state as respects Lord Raglan.

"6. The want of knowledge and forethought on the part of those who planned the expedition was not supplied by the energy and ability of those whose duty it was to execute this ill-devised measure. The Commander of the Forces, Lord Raglan, by his want of vigour and foresight, is in a great degree responsible for the sufferings of the army. Had the requisite firmness and prudence been shown by him, much of the misery resulting from the want of land transport, from the want of a road from Balaclava to the camp, from the want of an efficient ambulance, from insufficient and improper food, from the want of shelter, clothing and fuel, might have been prevented.

21357. 21358. 21359. 21360. 21362. 21363.

"7. It is but too plain that Lord Raglan did not keep the Administration at home duly informed of the actual condition of the army under his command. By the statement of Lord Aberdeen himself, it appears that the Commander of the Forces failed in this part of his duty, and, therefore, in so far as the wants and sufferings of the army resulted from the continued ignorance of the Administration, Lord Raglan is responsible for the misery which was the consequence of that ignorance.

The Staff.

"8. Lord Raglan appears also to have been without the assistance of an able and effective staff; indeed, there seems to have been no head to conceive what was needed for the army, and no hand to execute the thing needed, even had it been foreseen. The men died from over-work, insufficient and bad food, cold and exposure; while their leaders looked on in helpless imbecility or culpable apathy.

The Medical Department.

For the evidence in support of my conclusions on this head, I must refer to the testimony, *passim*, of Messrs. Stafford, Macdonald, Osborne, and Maxwell, also to that of Dr. A. Smith and Dr. Menzies.

"9. Among the first duties of those who plan a campaign, is providing for the due care of the sick and wounded of the army. This great duty the Administration, and those in authority, signally failed to perform. The condition of the hospitals at Scutari and Balaclava, and of the hospitals on the field before Sebastopol, during the whole period to which our inquiry is confined, was a disgrace to a civilized people, and to any body of men taking upon themselves the government of the concerns of such a people. The persons set over the medical department of the army, were wholly incompetent to the task imposed on them. They were ignorant for the most part of the duties of their office, and what they did know they had not courage or capacity to perform. Here, again, we see that the men

men suffered and died from the incompetence of those whose duty it was to watch over them.

"10. The duties of the Commissariat were inadequately performed. The resources of the countries adjacent to the Crimea were not made available for supplying the wants of the army. When, by the exercise of forethought and activity, the army might have been provided with fresh meat and vegetables, and sickness by this means might have been in a great measure prevented or cured, the soldiers were kept on salt and unwholesome food; and this food, from the same want of forethought and activity, they were compelled often to eat uncooked. Coffee was served out to the men raw, no provision being made of wood or other fuel wherewith to roast it, and thus render it fit for human food.

The Commissariat.
495. 828. 6321. 6324. 6327. 6343. 6344. 6345. 6352. 6355. 6360. 6365. 6366. 6368. 6371. 6373.
See also the evidence of the Duke of Newcastle, generally.

"11. The sea transport was also insufficient for the wants of the army. When the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken, the Commander of the Forces and all the military authorities were utterly ignorant of the capabilities of the country to which the army was going to supply them with the means of transport. In this state of things it was the part of prudence to carry to the Crimea that which possibly the Crimea would be unable to supply, viz., land transport. But this could not be done, because of the insufficiency of sea transport; and this insufficiency arose in spite of there being a period of three months afforded in which to supply the requisite shipping. The absence of land transport was the cause of great suffering and great loss; and it may indeed be considered among the most efficient of the proximate causes of calamity to the army.

Transport.

"12. The transport also of the sick and wounded from Balaclava to Scutari was marked by the want of precaution of every description. The ships were unprepared for the reception of the sick and wounded; the men were crowded into the holds of the vessels, often without beds, generally without proper ventilation, and, for the most part, insufficiently attended. The suffering, consequently, was intense during the transit; while the horrors of the passage were often increased by the unnecessary delay that occurred in putting the men on shore and in hospital after their arrival at the Bosphorus.

Transport of Sick to Scutari.
See evidence of Mr. Dundas, p. 58, 59, 60.

"13. The civil duties of the Board of Ordnance were also very imperfectly performed. The stores needed by the army were seldom adequate, and were not for the most part furnished in time, and when furnished, were despatched without order or proper precaution. Cargoes destined for Scutari were often carried to Balaclava, and detained for months on board the transports, because no one had authority to receive them. Ships were also so loaded, that on arriving at the port to which part of the cargo was destined, the portion of that part of the cargo was unknown, and the ship had to proceed onwards in her course, carrying with her things that ought to have been delivered at the intermediate port. Much suffering was the consequence of this faulty mode of proceeding, the sick at Scutari being in need of stores, which, in consequence of the improvident manner in which they were put on board of the vessels transporting them, were carried to Balaclava.

Ordnance.
I refer, for the evidence in justification of this opinion respecting the conduct of the Board of Ordnance, to the testimony of Captain Milne, Sir T. Hastings, Sir Hew Ross.

"14. Much of this confusion and error is doubtless owing to the state in which the Board of Ordnance was placed by the injudicious proceedings of the Administration with respect to it. Just at the time when the Board was called upon for extraordinary exertion and efficiency, viz., at the commencement of a great war, the Master-general of the Ordnance was appointed to the command of the Forces in the East, and sent 3,000 miles from England. A Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance was appointed in his place, with inferior power, and without the influence which his high office gave the Master-general. The members of the Board, no longer under the superintending control of a superior, differed among themselves, and the public service suffered because of this dissension.

See Lord Aberdeen's evidence, from 21371 to 21384.

"15. Much of delay, confusion, and inefficiency has resulted from the faulty distribution of power among the different departments of the public service, and from the want of certainty and precision as to the precise nature and extent of the separate authority of each. The forms of office, too, have been made effective to produce delay and confusion, and have seldom contributed to the security of the public. Intricate routine has enabled the timid and supine to avoid responsibility, has been effective as an obstruction, but has seldom or never acted as a safeguard or check upon dishonesty. The intricacy and confusion that prevail in every part of the business of the public departments are of themselves sufficient to account for the failures and disasters that have occurred in the proceedings of all of them.

See the evidence of Dr. A. Smith, the Duke of Newcastle, Sir C. Trevelyan, Sir T. Hastings, Mr. Grant and Sir H. Ross.

"16. There is, however, one bright spot in this dark picture. The patience and fortitude of the army, which has been the victim of all this incompetence and error, demand the admiration and gratitude of the nation on whose behalf they have fought, bled, and suffered. Their heroic valour, and still more heroic patience under suffering and privation, have given them claims upon their country, which a grateful nation will doubtless be eager to satisfy, in the hope of atoning in some measure for the misery to which, by incompetence and improvidence, they have been unduly subjected."

Draft Report proposed by Lord *Seymour* read 1°, as follows:—

"The complicated nature of this inquiry, the variety of subjects investigated, the number of witnesses examined, and the frequent inconsistency and contrariety of the evidence, render

render it no easy task to present a clear, definite, and just exposition of the matters submitted to your Committee.

"The difficulty of this task has been enhanced by the impossibility of summoning some persons as witnesses, who might have furnished important information, and others, who are now left under imputations, in regard to which your Committee regret that they can
14435. pronounce no conclusive opinion. The fulness of the investigation has, moreover, been restricted by considerations of state policy, so that in the outset of this Report, your Committee must admit that they have been compelled to end an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete.

"Having offered this preliminary explanation, your Committee will endeavour to state, as shortly as the subject will allow, the opinions which they have formed in regard to the following heads of their inquiry, namely:

"The Condition of the Army before Sebastopol.

"The Conduct of the Official Persons and Departments in the East who ministered to the wants of that Army.

14422. "And, lastly, the conduct of the various branches of the Government at home, to which was intrusted the duty of superintending its operations, and of providing for its efficient maintenance.

"The Condition of our Army before Sebastopol.

"An army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe winter in besieging a fortress which it could not invest, was
14450. necessarily placed in a situation where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be endured. Your Committee are, however, of opinion that this amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition. In arriving at this opinion, they have made allowance for the occurrence of disasters (such as storms and sickness, to an extent which could not be foreseen), and they have not been unmindful of the difficulties which a long period of peace must inevitably produce at the commencement of a campaign.

"In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful condition of our army, the evidence must be perused; and your Committee will only glance at such details as may be requisite to sustain the opinion they have pronounced.

416. "From the 16th of September, when the army landed in the Crimea, until the end of
828. 914. 1209. October, or, as some witnesses state, until about the middle of November, the troops,
1323. 3859. though already suffering from overwork and from dysentery, were not ill provided with
848. 946. 3407. food; but even at this period there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and a painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded. As the season advanced, the causes of sickness increased, and the army, with its number of effective men daily diminishing, was compelled to perform an amount of duty disproportioned to its strength.

"From the middle of November this army was, during a period of many weeks, reduced to a condition which it is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured with an
5481. exemplary fortitude and an heroism unsurpassed in the annals of war. This condition must be ascribed to the following causes: fatigue, exposure, unwholesome diet, want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accommodation for the sick.

737. 3415. "The fatigue necessarily resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it, namely, the work of the siege, and the extent of front to be defended.

"The other causes of suffering will be reviewed under the following heads:

"The Commissariat Department in the East.

"It is the duty of the Commissariat to furnish the army, when in the field, with provisions for the men, and forage for the animals; it is also the duty of this department to provide the land transport which may be required for the use of the army.

"When therefore witnesses stated to your Committee that the army suffered from the failure of the land transport, and from a consequent insufficiency of supplies, the whole blame appeared, in the first instance, to attach to the Commissariat.

13423. "Commissary-general Filder was appointed by the Treasury to superintend the establish-
13453. ment of the Commissariat in the East. He was selected, it is said, on account of his
13454. experience and special fitness for the charge; and authority was given to him to provde
13469. such persons as might be required for the service; ample funds were also placed at
13502. his disposal, and ships were specially provided and ordered to act under his exclusive
14688. directions.

"With

"With these large powers, heavy duties were imposed upon him, according to an arrangement, which appears to have been injudiciously adopted at the commencement of the campaign. It was determined that there should be only one store department with the army, and that this should be under the care of the Commissariat. From this decision it followed as a consequence, that the Commissariat was expected to make good the deficiencies of many distinct departments in the army. All the miscellaneous articles of equipment which come under the name of Quartermaster-general's stores, were given in charge to the Commissariat; and, in addition to these extraneous duties, this department was required not only to keep a large amount of Ordnance stores, but also to purchase materials and tools for the purposes of the siege. 13567. 20886. 14539. 13573. 13644. 13646.

"The military system in this country affords the Commissariat no opportunity of becoming acquainted with the army, or of ministering to its wants; so that in a campaign the officers of this department find themselves called upon to furnish supplies, in regard to which they may have had no experience; while the soldiers, being often ignorant of the proper duties of the Commissariat, consider this department responsible for everything they may require.

"Land Transport.

"From the time when the army landed at Varna, the system of the land transport was found to be imperfectly organised. The measures adopted for the improvement of the system could not readily be brought into operation, so that the army, when encamped before Sebastopol, depended for all its supplies upon a service defective in its organisation and in its superintendence. 1811. 13511.

"Complaints were made to your Committee that the army landed in the Crimea without the animals necessary for the conveyance of the baggage, or for the removal of the sick and wounded; much inconvenience and suffering resulted from this deficiency; but every available vessel had been employed for other purposes, so that the Commissariat cannot be held responsible for this arrangement. 13660. 13701. 13717. 1332.

"When the army had encamped before Sebastopol, the mules and baggage animals were brought over from Varna; so that on the 5th October Commissary-general Filder asserted that he had transport sufficient for all the purposes of the army, and submitted to Lord Raglan a scheme for disposing of above 2,000 animals, which were at Varna, and which he said were not wanted, and would only be an incumbrance in the Crimea. During this same period, Sir Edmund Lyons writes, that the transport animals, though in good condition, were not sufficient in number. 13731. 2036. 863. 16655.

"Until the end of October the wants of the army were supplied without much difficulty; but on the 8th of November Commissary-general Filder was informed that he must prepare for wintering in the Crimea. 13739.

"At this period he still possessed a large number of baggage animals, and a considerable amount of hay and forage; the greater portion of this supply was, however, on board ship, in or near the harbour of Balaclava. The land-transport service was now threatened with risk of failure from two sources of difficulty: 13796. 13799.

"First, the want of shelter for the animals during the approaching winter; next, the bad condition of the roads between Balaclava and the camp.

"The Commissary-general apparently foresaw that a failure in the land-transport service would impair the efficiency, if it did not endanger the existence of the army. The conveyance of ammunition for the siege and for the defence of our position, the removal of the sick and wounded, the distribution of rations, of forage, of clothing, of medicines, and of medical comforts for the hospitals, besides numerous lesser supplies, which, in the position of the army, were scarcely less important, depended on the maintenance of an effective system of land-transport. 13804.

"As regards the protection of the animals from the inclemency of the season, your Committee are not aware what measures were adopted; Sir John Burgoyne thinks there was a great want of care, and that in a few instances, where the animals were attended to, they were preserved. The drivers, however, were inefficient; they designedly lost, or indolently neglected, the animals entrusted to their charge. 13772. 17241–17244. 17376. 13869. 6493.

"*The Road.*

"As regards the road from Balaclava to the camp, so much of the suffering of the troops has been ascribed to the wretched, or, as some witnesses state, the almost impassable condition of these seven miles, that your Committee endeavoured to ascertain who was responsible for the maintenance of the road, and what insuperable obstacles impeded its repair. 13865. 4660. 6505.

"On the 13th of November Commissary-general Filder wrote to the Quartermaster-general, expressing his apprehension, and calling attention to this important subject. 13804. 13867.

17390. 20875. 17395. "The duty of making and maintaining roads for the army falls upon the department of the Quartermaster-general. This officer was then disabled by illness; his duties therefore devolved upon his subordinates; an attempt was made to employ Turkish troops on this work, but the effort was soon abandoned.

17285. 17364. "Your Committee asked Sir J. Burgoyne, the Chief Engineer Officer on the staff, whether any consultation was held at head quarters as to the best course to be adopted for the repair of this road; no such consultation, he says, was held: the army was growing weaker from day to day, while the difficulties were increasing.

1392. 3824. 17237. 17345. "The troops could not be withdrawn from the trenches for the repair of the road. Military duties could not be neglected, and these duties already over-tasked the strength of the army.

13869. "From the 14th of November, the date of the hurricane, the land-transport grew weaker, until it almost ceased to exist. The Commissary-general writes: 'The men and beasts perished owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling through the deep mud with supplies, and from exposure to wet and cold.' To repair these losses, recourse was had to the depôt at Constantinople; but the waste and consumption of animals exceeded the supply, and the service of the land-transport could no longer be performed by the Commissariat.

6464–6466. 6478. "The horses of the cavalry were then employed, and many of these perished from the labour to which they were subjected.

16655. 16819. 16939. "The broken road, and the want of land-transport, increased the confusion of the harbour. Sir E. Lyons ascribes the crowded state of the harbour, and its attendant inconveniences, to the delay in removing cargoes from the ships to the camp.

"As far as the information obtained enables your Committee to form an opinion, it appears to them that in this matter there was a want of due foresight, or of decision. Early in November, when the probable necessity of wintering in the Crimea was contemplated, the means of maintaining a communication between the camp and Balaclava should have been considered at head quarters. The road had then already been injured by the traffic, and its condition had excited the apprehensions of the Commissary-general, who had called attention to the subject: if a military force could not be spared, an application should have been made to the Home Government, who might have sent 17369. labourers from England. Sir J. Burgoyne says, that a common road, constructed by such means, would have been more useful than the railway which was afterwards undertaken. The condition of this road was not, however, mentioned to the Duke of Newcastle, 14593. 14582. until the serious calamities arising from its failure were brought to his notice.

"Depôts in the East.

13839. "The sad consequences resulting from the failure of the transport service would have been in some degree obviated by the formation of depôts in the neighbourhood of the camp, or between the camp and Balaclava.

"The establishment of depôts is a duty specially noticed in the Commissariat regulations. 13842. Sir C. Trevelyan states, that in October Commissary-general Filder was engaged 2045. in the formation of a depôt near the camp, in order that he might be secure against 6322. the contingencies of weather; but after the action of Balaclava, the Commissariat chest was ordered on board ship, and the transports were sent out of the harbour. At this time the abandonment of Balaclava was contemplated. After this followed the battle of Inkermann, when the transport service was occupied in bringing up ammunition, and a 860. few days later came the hurricane and the catastrophe. From this time forward all the available animals were employed for the daily requirements of the army, and every effort for the establishment of depôts was necessarily relinquished.

"Commissariat Supplies.

"*Food for the Men.*

"The Commissariat Department obtained an abundant supply of salt meat from England. This was furnished by the victualling department of the Admiralty, and the duty of the Commissariat consisted merely in keeping the account and in arranging the 15750. distribution. Fresh meat was procured from Eupatoria, from Constantinople, and from Smyrna. Deputy Commissary-general Smith stated that he had 4,000 head of cattle during the winter ready for the consumption of the army.

1175. 1209. 1955. 4670. 5472. 496. 827. 1321. 1906. 3840. 5745. 6379. 6380. "In reference to the quantity of fresh meat supplied to the army, the witnesses are not agreed; the amount actually furnished to the troops depended on the zeal and energy of the several Commissariat officers, and also on the position occupied by the troops. Until the end of October the rations, it is said, were furnished with regularity, and consisted of fresh meat twice or thrice in the week. Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Division, says, that

that until the date of his departure from the Crimea, on the 23d January, the hospitals were supplied with fresh meat almost every day; but the troops did not receive it, he thinks, above once a week: he never knew them, however, to be without rations. This statement is confirmed by other evidence. The proportion of salt meat without an accompanying supply of vegetables during the winter months was greater, according to the testimony of most witnesses, than was consistent with the health of the troops. The failure of the sea-transport is said to have occasioned this deficiency of fresh meat, the ships having been disabled by storms, and then delayed for repairs; in one instance, all the cattle on board perished from the inclemency of the weather, or the violence of the waves.

3287. 3330. 3429. 3839. 4667. 5731. 557. 828. 1323. 3431. 4092. 13863. 15689. 15756.

"After making allowance for the interruption of the communication by sea, and the obvious difficulty of having a depôt of cattle at or near Balaclava, your Committee do not think that any blame attaches to the Commissariat for the imperfect supply of fresh meat; and they notice with pleasure the willing testimony which several witnesses have borne to the exertions of the Commissariat officers in procuring supplies during a period of great emergency.

15394.

"The supply of vegetables and of rice was very insufficient; indeed, several witnesses assert that such articles were never seen in the camp. One shipload of vegetables was detained in the harbour until the cargo was decayed; and at Eupatoria, it is said, there was an immense store of onions lying on the wharf, whilst disease, from want of vegetables, was spreading through the camp. The Deputy Commissary-general states that he had an abundant stock of rice at Constantinople during the time when it was wanted even for the hospitals in the Crimea. Preserved potatoes were, it is said, offered to the soldiers, but rejected. A complaint, respecting the state in which coffee was distributed to the troops, has attracted much observation. No satisfactory explanation has been afforded to your Committee on this point. The more immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, whilst ingenious arguments on the volatile aroma of the berry, and on the Turkish mode of packing coffee, were passing backwards and forwards between Commissary-general Filder and the Treasury. The concurrent testimony of numerous witnesses has convinced your Committee, that, in regard to this class of supplies, there was mismanagement and reprehensible delay; but without a further examination of details, and without hearing the evidence of Commissary-general Filder, your Committee cannot distinctly assert on whom, in these several instances, the responsibility should rest

15737.

14547.

1314. 2032. 3333. 4446. 4288. 15664. 7632–12071.

See Papers No. 43 of Session 1854–55. 13631, and Appendix there referred to.

11883.

"*Forage.*

"When the army first encamped before Sebastopol, stacks of forage were found in the neighbourhood; but after a few weeks these were consumed; and henceforward there appears to have been much difficulty in obtaining fodder for the horses. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who left the heights on the 7th November, said that his baggage animals were frequently without food, and that on one occasion he was obliged to kill 21 ammunition ponies, which he had not the means of feeding. The Earl of Lucan, commanding the Cavalry Division, complained repeatedly, from the 29th of September to the date of his departure, of the dreadful condition to which the horses were reduced from want of food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but did not find the pressure so severe until after the 5th of November, when his brigade was posted on the heights. After the hurricane, the supply of forage was necessarily postponed for the sake of more urgent demands, and the cavalry ceased to exist as an effective force.

6320. 5716. 4055. 3875. 6352. 5721. 5922. 1329. 1409. 6478. 6509.

"The Medical Department in the East.

"The army, when sent to the East, had a greater number of medical men in proportion to the number of the troops, than ever before accompanied a British army, and the witnesses generally concur in testifying to their zeal and efficiency; many of these were, however, disabled by sickness before the descent on the Crimea, so that after each of the actions at Alma and Inkermann, some regiments had not the requisite number of medical men. The ambulances for the conveyance of the sick and wounded were too heavy, and ill adapted for their purpose.

8813. 498. 1183. 1189. 1897. 3285. 5742. 3789.

"The treatment of the sick and wounded in the camp at Balaclava, and at Scutari, has already formed the subject of a lengthened Report by Commissioners specially appointed for this purpose; further information upon this point will be found in the evidence already presented to the House. The condition of the tent-hospitals, as described by Mr. Parker, chaplain to the First Division, was, from the 28th of November to the 23d of January, the period of his stay in the Crimea, so wretched and painful to hear, that your Committee gladly avoid repeating these deplorable details. The medical men, it is said, were indefatigable in their attention; but so great was the want of the commonest necessaries, as well as of medicines and medical comforts, that they sorrowfully admitted their services to be of little avail.

7505. 8998. 6985. 3284. 3285. 3291. 3433. 10053. 10055. 11626. 3294. 11553. 11697. 11707.

"The hospital at Balaclava had an advantage, inasmuch as it was nearer to the limited supplies which were on board ship; but the uncertainty whether or not Balaclava could

11477. 11499.

6246. 7617. 155. be retained, disconcerted the arrangements of this hospital, and upon one occasion the patients were removed. In regard to its subsequent condition, there is a difference of opinion, depending probably upon the dates of the several visits; but the prevailing testimony is to the effect, that this hospital was for many weeks in an unsatisfactory state.

11873. 11867. "Allowance must be made for the circumstances in which the continued possession of Balaclava was held, and for the difficulty of establishing a hospital in such buildings as were found there. The insufficiency of medicines, especially of opium; of medical comforts, some of which were essential to the health of the men, and the great want of purveyor's stores, have been so fully set forth in the Report of the Commissioners, that your Committee deem it superfluous to adduce further evidence in corroboration of their statements. They will, therefore, proceed to observe upon

"The Hospitals at Scutari.

14615. "When the army arrived in the East, various places were suggested for hospitals, but Scutari was eventually decided upon as fittest for the purpose.

8148. 8150. 20905. "The system of regimental hospitals was adopted in the first instance, and the general hospital was not established until the army moved to Varna.

14616. 14800. 8099. 8105. 8892. 14613. "The Duke of Newcastle says that he did not issue any instructions as to hospitals; he left that to be executed by the Medical Board. Dr. Smith, the Director-general of the Medical Department of the Army, says, that he had nothing to do with these hospitals, and that his interference could only have caused confusion. He selected medical men for the hospitals, and he sent to the Ordnance a requisition to provide hospital furniture proportioned to the amount of force, and there his duties ended.

14647. "Your Committee, after hearing evidence affirming the disgraceful state of the hospitals at Scutari, endeavoured to ascertain by whom the chief authority was exercised, and on whom the responsibility must rest.

9698. 10823. 10813. 19848. 11393. 11398. 14896. "In regard to the government of the hospitals, Major Sillery was the commandant, and had the sole military charge; the medical superintendence was under the chief medical officer; and Dr. Menzies, from the 26th of June 1854 until the 2d of January 1855, occupied this position; though during a portion of this time the arrival of Dr. Cuming placed him, as he says, in an anomalous situation.

10939. 10945. 10942. "When the expedition sailed for the Crimea, Major Sillery gave instructions to Dr. Menzies to make preparations for the wounded. These instructions came, it is said, from the Duke of Newcastle, through Rear-Admiral Boxer, for the commandant.

10598. 8233. 8589. 8593. 11493. 11181. "Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general, and supreme authority over all the hospitals, visited Scutari in October, and left it in November, when he reported to Lord Raglan that the hospitals were in as good a condition as could reasonably be expected. To him, as his official chief, Dr. Menzies reported periodically upon the state of the hospitals; and as Dr. Hall had approved of them when he left, Dr. Menzies did not apparently deem it necessary to improve their condition.

10610. 10611. 11229. 11181. 11166. 11176. 11084. 11004. 11134. 11006. 14829. 14631. "In justice to Dr. Menzies, it must be admitted that he was engaged in incessant and onerous duties. His time was occupied in invaliding men, holding boards, making monthly returns and quarterly returns, daily reports and weekly reports; reports to Dr. Hall, who was satisfied with the hospitals; reports to Dr. Smith, who could not interfere; reports to the Duke of Newcastle, who was never informed of the truth. Amidst all these labours, he had no time left for that which should have been his principal duty, the proper superintendence of these hospitals.

11010. 8962. 10504. 8282. 8298. "His attention was further distracted by a conflict of authority with the purveyors, which disturbed the arrangements of the hospital; and when, by means of a medical board, one purveyor had been pronounced unfit for his duties, and was about to be removed, the highest military authorities interfered, and replaced this officer in his situation.

See Letters in Appendix. 8978. 8980. "The evils arising from the conflict of authority between the chief medical officer and the purveyor might have been prevented, if proper instructions had been given to the purveyor on his appointment. This course the Director-general of the medical department had suggested, but suggested in vain, and it was not until the 14th of November that the War Office issued instructions which gave to the chief medical officer distinct authority over the purveyor.

8569. 8282. 13041. "The office of purveyor had been, with four exceptions, discontinued for many years and there was difficulty in finding a person competent to perform these duties. The selection of Mr. Ward for this post was not fortunate, since it appears, that when an inquiry was instituted into the amount of the purveyor's stores, no account could be produced of any stores later than the end of August. When it is remembered that the insufficiency of these stores was a source of much suffering, if not of more fatal results, it must be observed that heavy responsibility attaches to the Commander-in-chief of the Forces for retaining this person in his office, after he had been pronounced unfit to discharge its duties. The Secretary-

Secretary-at-War had said, 'There can be no objection to try Mr. Ward, as I will promise, if he is not efficient, we will remove him.' When, however, the appointment had been made, the Commander of the Forces had the sole authority, and influenced by motives of mistaken benevolence, he injudiciously retained him as purveyor until his death. 8282. 8304.

"The apothecary's department at Scutari was in no better condition; his store was the general depôt, not only for the hospitals, but for the army in the East; yet he had no account of his stores, and never made an entry in his books from the 24th of September to the 28th of November. Your Committee are not aware under what instructions he was acting; but the late Secretary-at-War admits that such conduct was a gross dereliction of duty. It is moreover manifest that the Government had been deceived in regard to these hospital stores; since Mr. S. Herbert had stated in the House of Commons, 'There have been all manner of forms to be gone through before these stores could be issued; with plenty of materials, the forms were so cumbrous, that they never could be produced with the rapidity necessary for the purposes of a military hospital.' Now it is proved that if there were cumbrous forms inconveniencing the service of the hospital, and aggravating the sufferings of the patients, there were at least no forms to protect the public purse against negligence or peculation. 12979. 8253. 12989. 13028. 19847. 19897.

"When the quantities of hospital stores which were sent from England are contrasted with the scarcity, or rather the absolute dearth of them, at Scutari; and when the state of the purveyor's accounts is remembered, it is impossible not to harbour a suspicion that some dishonesty has been practised in the transfer of these stores between England, Varna and Scutari, or in the custody of them after they had been received into depôt. A Committee of the House could not efficiently prosecute such an investigation; and after the time which has elapsed, such a search may be impossible; but the subject well deserves the consideration of the executive Government. 11886.

"From the return in the Appendix, it appears

Another return shows, that in the barrack hospital at Scutari, during the month of November, the whole amount of the washing was six shirts. 11131.

"Lord Raglan having been misinformed by Dr. Hall, cannot be deemed responsible for the condition of these hospitals. The commander, Major Sillery, had not, as it seems, the energy, or the administrative abilities, required in his situation. Your Committee have not, however, had an opportunity of examining this officer, and cannot, therefore, pronounce any further opinion upon his conduct. The want of a vigorous governing authority was, it is said, the chief source of all the evils; organization under a single head was the remedy required. 20838. 14859. 14844. 7539. 6177.

"Lord Hardinge admits it to be his opinion that the command at Scutari ought to have been entrusted to an officer of higher rank in the army, and of greater influence. Five thousand soldiers, although in hospital, should have a military chief over them, to control the discipline of the establishment, to abate nuisances, and to take care that matters which are under his authority, are administered with due regard to the honour of our country, and for the interest of the brave men who have been wounded in her service. 20830. 20820.

"The Transport Service in the Black Sea.

"The evidence exhibits a marked contrariety of opinion as to the responsibility for the transport service in the Black Sea. Sir James Graham said that the naval commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Dundas, had, under the Queen's regulations, authority over the whole of the transports, and he cited, in confirmation of this statement, sundry minutes of the Board of Admiralty. 21048. 21059. 21161. 21164. 20495. 20562.

"Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the contrary, alleged that he had nothing to do with the transports. According to his assertions, they were entirely under the management of Lord Raglan, Rear-Admiral Boxer, and Captain Christie. 20573. 16358. 16873.

"Captain Milne, the member of the Board of Admiralty who had the superintendence of the transport department, stated, that the Admiral commanding in the Black Sea was responsible for the transport service in that sea. A supreme power was, however, given to Lord Raglan, who had a veto over the movement of all the transports, and a concurrent authority with the naval commander-in-chief. 21156. 21083.

"The Transport Service in the Bosphorus.

"All transports, upon their arrival in the Bosphorus, were placed under the orders of Rear-Admiral Boxer. This officer had been specially selected for this duty by Sir James Graham, on account of his experience in matters connected with the embarkation and disembarkation of troops. He was placed, in the first instance, under the orders of Vice- 16828. 16733. 21054.

21057. Admiral Dundas; but a separate power was afterwards given to him, within the limits of the Bosphorus, subject always to his reporting to the naval commander-in-chief.

21097. "As early as the 8th of September, Rear-Admiral Boxer applied for a ship to be
16848. attached to himself, with an experienced master, three good warrant officers, and a small gang of artificers and mechanics. A compliance with this request would, he said, obviate
21099. delay and unnecessary expense in works which could otherwise only be executed by hired artificers. To this application the Board of Admiralty replied, that 'the service being temporary, they were not prepared to send out a receiving ship, with its establishment.' On the 20th of November he repeated his application; but before this letter had been received, the Board had reconsidered its decision, and had ordered a vessel, the 'Melampus,' to be got ready for this service. The 'Melampus' accordingly sailed in
21098. December. Sir James Graham says he regrets that the requisition was not acceded to at the time; and when the hurricane of the 14th November, with all its disastrous consequences, is remembered, it is obvious that this unfortunate decision may have increased the difficulties of that deplorable crisis, and may have subjected Rear-Admiral Boxer to some of the charges which have been so unsparingly brought against him.

16833. "It must be observed, however, that Rear-Admiral Boxer had permitted Commander Borlase to join the forces in the Crimea, although this officer, having been for three years
16831. in the Turkish service, had been specially chosen to assist him. The Rear-Admiral thus lost the person best fitted to communicate with the Turkish authorities, at a time when his assistance would have been most useful.

"The Conduct of the Departments at Home.

14422. "The responsibility of ordering the expedition to the Crimea rests upon the Home Government. The despatch from the Secretary of State for War, dated the 29th June, pronounces the opinion of the Government, and declares, that the safety of Constantinople had been secured; that, whatever might be the movement of the Russian forces, no campaign in the Principalities should be undertaken, but that measures should be at once concerted for the siege of Sebastopol. There is, it is added, 'no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed.' The
17275. despatch leaves to Lord Raglan a discretion in only one contingency, namely, if he should
See Extracts from Lord Raglan's Despatch, 19 July, in Appendix. have ascertained that there was in the Crimea a force greatly outnumbering that which could be brought against it, or some other such insuperable impediment to success.

21306. "The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success. Lord Aberdeen states it to
15183. have been their impression, that Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a coup-de-main. The Duke of Newcastle says, that he expected the army, after capturing
21263. Sebastopol, would winter there, or else, after destroying the fortress, would return to winter on the shores of the Bosphorus. Sir James Graham has the strongest opinion, that the order for the expedition was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time.

"The foregoing pages of this Report have shown the results which ensued upon the frustration of these oversanguine expectations. Your Committee have inquired what information the Government had obtained which induced them to order this expedition. In
14422. regard to this matter, it may be observed, that the Duke of Newcastle had, in his previous despatch of the 10th April, estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 30,000 men, and he believes that when the expedition was ordered, no more reliable accounts had been
15041. received. Sir James Graham says, however, that at a later period, namely, the last week
21239. in July, he had obtained 'from a Crimean authority a complete account of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was estimated by him at 70,000 men, 8,000 of which were cavalry, 40,000 of which constituted the garrison of Sebastopol, and the remaining 30,000 were dispersed through the Crimea.'

20456. "Vice-Admiral Dundas had on the 10th of May 1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon information which he had obtained, he estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. This account did not receive much credit either from the Government or from Lord Raglan, since the latter, in his despatch of the 19th July,
See Despatch in Appendix. states, that 'the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or to their state of preparation.'

20860. "The terms of reference do not call upon your Committee to pronounce any opinion in
15073. regard to the policy of the Government in ordering the expedition to the Crimea; but it is their duty to report how far the preparations made by the Government were adequate to the operations which had been ordered.

14340. "The general direction of the war was in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle, who, in the spring of 1854, held the office of Secretary for War and Colonies. At a later period in the summer these departments were divided, and the Duke being relieved from colonial
20158. duties, was enabled to devote his time exclusively to the business of the war.

"When

"When this important change was effected, it does not appear that any Order in Council, Minute, or other document was prepared, defining the special duties of the War Department. The Duke, as Secretary of State, had undoubtedly ample powers; he considered himself officially responsible for all the departments under his control, and he could issue such orders as he thought fit for their guidance. He states, however, that he felt his means to be insufficient for the due performance of his duties; he considered the organization of all the war departments, and their relation to each other, far from satisfactory; but he felt it to be impossible, consistently with attention to pressing business, to attempt their re-organization. 15099. 14763. 14911. 15233.

"In making the separation between the Secretaryships of War and Colonies, together with the transference of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the Secretary for War, the Cabinet considered that they had adopted measures initiatory to other changes which would necessarily follow. The members of the Cabinet did not, however, hold any consultations upon the changes to be made, or the best mode of effecting them; they separated, as usual, at the close of the Parliamentary Session in August, and, as they were not summoned to a meeting, they did not re-assemble in Council until the second week of October. At a later period of the year, Lord John Russell expressed his dissatisfaction with the Duke of Newcastle, and suggested Lord Palmerston as the fittest person for the office of Secretary for War; but from his correspondence, it might be inferred that his views were directed rather to the business of the administration in the House of Commons than to the vigorous re-organization of the departments. Where personal considerations are involved, the views of the writer are often rendered less perspicuous by the courtesy of his language, and consequently the full meaning of the writer may not be expressed. His letters, however, state, that 'the recent meetings of the Cabinet had done much to repair omissions:' your Committee think it their duty to notice with regret that the Cabinet did not meet in August or September, when these omissions might have been prevented, or sooner remedied. Lord John Russell also observes, that 'the House of Commons would expect, after six or seven months' deliberation, a final arrangement of the War Department.' Your Committee can find no trace of these deliberations, and any evils that may have resulted from delay in such arrangements, are therefore properly laid to the charge of the Cabinet. 21367. 21351. 15230. 15102. 15177. *See* Correspondence in Appendix. 21341. 21392.

"The Office of Secretary of State for War.

"The Duke of Newcastle devoted himself with zeal and assiduity to the duties of his office. On accepting the Secretaryship for War, he found himself in this disadvantageous position: with no official residence, with no document prescribing his new duties, with no precedents for his guidance, and with Under-Secretaries who were new to the work. In this situation he undertook the superintendence of numerous departments, with whose internal organization he was dissatisfied, and the management of a war urgently requiring immediate and vigorous operations. 21399. 15070.

"The Ordnance Department.

"Your Committee deem it unnecessary to state the various duties of the Ordnance Department, nor need they enter into details with the view of proving that upon the efficiency of this department the naval and military services depend. 18012. 18015. 17983.

"In April 1854, Lord Raglan, the Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed to the command of the Forces in the East, and shortly afterwards Sir Hew Ross was named Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, an office which had been for many years abolished, but which was now revived. 17958. 21374. 21378.

"Lord Aberdeen, in making this appointment, had more or less in view the abolition of the office of Master-general. This subject had not, however, been considered by the Cabinet, and in the meantime Lord Aberdeen understood that the Lieutenant-general would have all the authority of Master-general. 21373. 20175.

"The Lieutenant-General does not possess this power; he is only a Board officer; and while in reference to military duties he exercises the authority of Master-general, yet as regards the civil functions of the Ordnance he acts only as a member of the Board. 17964.

"The Board of Ordnance, moreover, differs from other Boards in this respect, namely, that, according to the practice or to the regulations of the department, the presence of one Board officer constitutes a Board. During the summer and autumn of 1854, a Board officer, the Surveyor-General, was also employed abroad; so that during a period when the pressure of business was heavier, and when the expenditure of this department was larger than in any previous year, two officers were wanting, whose functions the most economical Administrations had been unable to dispense with in times of profound peace. *See* Report on Army and Ordnance in 1849. 14717.

"The Ordnance, even with its peculiar constitution, may work efficiently while under the superintendence of a vigilant Master-General, who has supreme authority, and who is, therefore, justly held responsible for all its proceedings; but the substitution of a Lieutenant-General changes the whole system of the office; its duties are then divided amongst 20635. 20699. 20639.

19195. 19265. the members of the Board without any supervising authority, and the business commenced by one member may be taken up or interrupted by another without unity of purpose, and without due responsibility.

18839. "The evils arising from the absence of the Master-General are abundantly exhibited in the evidence. The statements of Sir T. Hastings, the Comptroller of Stores, and of Mr. Monsell, the Clerk of the Ordnance, amply prove the unsatisfactory state of this depart-
17978. ment; while it would seem, from the language of Sir Hew Ross, that he was imperfectly acquainted with the constitution of the Board of which he was a member.

"In noticing the unseemly conduct of this Board, and the differences which were
19080. brought prominently forward in the evidence, your Committee observe with regret, that the
19350. public service has suffered from the want of judgment and temper on the part of officers who were entrusted during a critical period with important public duties. The difficulties arising from a conflict of authority were at last put an end to by the interposition of the
14744. Secretary of State, who by lending his sanction to the Clerk of the Ordnance, enabled him to overrule both his colleagues, and thus interfered with the details of an office in a matter involving questions of military discipline, as well as of departmental subordination.

"Your Committee believe that Lord Aberdeen would have acted more beneficially for
21372. the public service if he had appointed another Master-General in the place of Lord Raglan, who could no longer discharge its duties, and they are of opinion that a vague intention of
14763. remodelling the Ordnance Department affords no justification for the course pursued.

15081. "If the office was deemed to be imperfect and ill-adapted for its functions, there was the
21242. more need during its continued existence of an able man to superintend its proceedings.
15115. An experienced witness has stated, 'I do not think that it is the composition or construction of a particular department which renders it efficient, so much as the hands which wield it.' The Ordnance Office strikingly exemplifies the disordered state into which a department may fall when there is no able hand to guide it.

"After perusing the evidence upon this point, it will excite no surprise to find that the arrangements attempted by this office in reference to warm clothing, huts and Minié rifles, were imperfect and dilatory: but your Committee must further express their dissatisfaction with the administration of the contract system under this department, and they consider that no change in the office will be satisfactory which does not lead to a revisal and amendment of this branch of the office.

"The Transport Department at Home.

21043. 16361. "The sea transport between this country and the seat of war was conducted by the
16358. Board of Admiralty; but its management was specially under the superintendence of
21187. Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty. This business was formerly transacted by a Transport Board, which was abolished many years since. During the late military
21040. operations in the East, requisitions for transport were sent to the Admiralty from several different quarters: the inconvenience of this system was so great, that Sir James Graham says he deemed it indispensable, with the view to regularity and promptitude, to bring these
21042. requisitions to one common centre. This change had not, however, been completed before he left office. The Duke of Newcastle says that no system will work well until the sea
15167. transport is placed under the management of the Minister for War. Such a course Sir J. Graham and Captain Milne consider objectionable; it would, they say, divide authority, increase correspondence, and lead to confusion; whereas now the whole service afloat is united together in one link of responsibility.

16563. "Sir J. Graham was, however, induced to re-constitute the Transport Board, for the
21189. 16572. reasons which will be found in his evidence.

16370. 16677. "The mode in which ships were taken up is stated by Captain Milne, and, considering
16682. 16695. the urgent pressure of the public service, this business appears to have been both ably and economically conducted. In pronouncing this opinion, your Committee advert to the magnitude of the operations executed. During the course of a year, somewhere about
21116. 150,000 men, and above 7,000 horses were conveyed principally by steam, the larger portion of them to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country; besides which, vessels had to be provided for stores to an enormous amount, for the purposes of war, as well as for the sustenance of both army and navy, and for the effective maintenance of a steam-fleet: sudden requisitions for huts, and other urgent necessaries, had also to be met.

21105. "There is, it is said, an obvious error in comparing the transport service between England and the Crimea to a mercantile arrangement for the conveyance and delivery of a given amount of tonnage. The transports, when sent to the Crimea, could not deliver their
16824. stores, and return; a large number were permanently detained at Balaclava from military
16819. considerations, and many others were employed there as storehouses and receptacles for all the supplies of the army.

"Many complaints were made to your Committee of the mode in which stores were sent to the East. The mode in which stores were sent depended on the nature of the
16787–16801. requisition. Naval stores were apparently sent under a satisfactory system. When the
16806. Ordnance Board apply a vessel is placed at their disposal, provided they require it; and
16811. latterly

latterly a similar system has been adopted with the medical department. The chief complaints arose in reference to mixed cargoes. The captains of the vessels, according to the Admiralty instructions, have charge of the cargo; but it is admitted, that when large passenger steamers were employed in this service, the captains were often unaccustomed to these duties, and in such cases the appointment of a supercargo might have been beneficial. 16733-16738. 21110.

"The evidence proves that many errors occurred in the delivery of cargoes, and in December last the Admiralty ordered a cargo-book to be kept, and the bills of lading to be produced. 16780.

"Your Committee inquired why ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded had not been prepared at an early period of the war? Sir J. Graham has no knowledge of any application for such vessels until after the battle of Alma. Captain Milne thought it odd that no such requisition had been made. 21126. 16558.

"It seems, that on the 25th of October Sir J. Graham, after communication with the Duke of Newcastle, wrote a private letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, requesting him to have two large steamers fitted for this service. 21136.

"There was mismanagement and delay in preparing these vessels; much unnecessary suffering to the sick and wounded resulted from this culpable neglect; but on what department the blame, in the first instance, should rest, whether on the office of the Commander-in-Chief, or of the Secretary-at-War, or of the Secretary for War, your Committee cannot determine. On the receipt of the letter from Sir J. Graham, Admiral Dundas did not, as he states, act; first, because every one expected to be in Sebastopol in a few days; next, because there were obstacles; and, lastly, because he did not consider it his business. 20575-20593. 20583-20581.

"The course pursued by Admiral Dundas in this matter is much to be regretted, since it leaves upon him a heavy share of this responsibility.

"The Medical Department at Home.

"The Medical Department of the Army and Ordnance is under a Director-General, who has an assistant to aid him in his multifarious duties. Dr. Smith, the Director-General, states, that he was under the immediate authority of five different superiors—the Commander-in-chief, the Secretary of War, the Secretary-at-War, the Master-General of the Ordnance, and the Board of Ordnance. He further states, that upon the separation of the two departments of War and Colonies, he received no communication ordering him to correspond directly with the Secretary for War. The Duke of Newcastle says, that at a very early stage of the war he himself told Dr. Smith that the Secretary of State for War was his real and only master. Such a course, Dr. Smith says, would have saved labour, and been more efficient. The Director-General states, that when he first heard of the probability that a force would be sent to Turkey, he proposed that three medical officers should be sent to make inquiries which might be beneficial to the troops: this suggestion was adopted. He also selected surgeons to be attached to regiments, and gave them directions for their guidance. He recommended that ambulances should be prepared, and an ambulance corps appointed: for this purpose he advised that able-bodied soldiers should be selected. Lord Raglan and Lord Hardinge objected to taking from the ranks effective fighting men, and, in lieu of these, they suggested pensioners. Dr. Smith remonstrated in vain. 7961. 7980. 7987. 8041. 8113. 8115. 9365. 9370. 14902. 14677. 8319. 8278. 8135. 8142. 8218. 8228. 14990. 14991.

"The entire failure of this corps is abundantly proved by the evidence.

"In May 1854, Dr. Smith addressed a letter to the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-chief, recommending that 'in the event of the hospitals being established at a distance from the army, ships should be fitted for the transport of the sick and wounded.' This application was unsuccessful, and it is not clear that the letter was even sent to the Duke of Newcastle. 8271. 8657. 20800. 14820.

"With regard to medicines, medical comforts, and hospital stores, Dr. Smith states, that he issued orders to the druggists for the supply of medicines; he made requisitions on the Ordnance for the hospital stores, and through the Ordnance to the Admiralty for the supply of medical comforts. The system pursued as to medical comforts was altered in August or September, after which, Dr. Smith provided this supply. Respecting the hospital stores, Dr. Smith says, that when he had made his requisition on the Ordnance, his duty ended; his office had no further information on the subject: he occasionally applied or sent to ascertain what had been done; but this was out-stepping the functions of his department. 8200. 8054. 8121. 8885. 8064. 8886. 8063.

"It is, perhaps, needless to enter further into the details of this department. It is evident that the arrangements were bad, and should have been revised. It is further manifest that Dr. Smith's suggestions, where they might have been useful, met with little encouragement. The responsibility for this state of affairs must rest on the Secretary of State, who had full power to amend it.

"Your Committee have now adverted to the several subjects referred to them, and they have divided these subjects under distinct heads, in order that the responsibility might be

fairly apportioned. The departments at home are not to be charged with errors and mismanagement which may have been committed by officers separated from their immediate control; nor are these again to be held responsible for the evil consequences occasioned by want of means or assistance, if such means or assistance have been withheld from them by superior authorities in this country. A general rumour has prevailed that a too strict adherence to forms and official routine has been the source of delay and of embarrassment, and thus become an obstruction to measures which plain and unfettered common sense might at once have adopted.

"In military service all discipline is routine: in civil offices practice has usually taught men the readiest modes of performing their duty; and when the customary forms and habitual track are departed from, confusion is frequently the consequence. The late 20163. Secretary-at-War has observed, that even the change made with regard to the Secretary for War has, though beneficial, produced partial inconvenience, by disturbing the routine of some of the offices. The civil service, he says, is like a Russian horn-band, where each man plays one note, and plays it well; whence the whole result is harmony; but if one man is taken from his part, discord is the inevitable consequence. The events of the last autumn and winter might serve to illustrate this observation; ministers high in office undertook duties which in no way belonged to them. The Secretary of State imposed upon the 14635. Ambassador at Constantinople a task which might have been properly entrusted to the 14633. Commandant at Scutari; he sent a lawyer to report upon military hospitals; and he gave 14693. 14697. directions to a military officer over whom he had no direct authority; not to mention that in one instance he seems to have sent his instructions to a commandant through an admiral. The Secretary-at-War set aside routine with the view of assisting his colleague. The 19673. Commander-in-chief took some of the duties of the Ordnance. And whatever fault may be found with the Ordnance Department, their misconduct assuredly did not arise from any overweening attachment to routine.

"The voluminous evidence which your Committee have received in the replies to above 21,000 questions, has convinced them that the errors which have occurred cannot justly be ascribed to the maintenance of obsolete systems, or to routine. They believe that they have pointed out the chief sources of the calamitous events into which they have been appointed to inquire, and they will now briefly enumerate them:—

"1. The expedition to the Crimea was undertaken with means inadequate for the military operations which had eventually to be performed.

"2. No provision was made in time for the wintering of the army.

"3. No measures were taken for rendering effective the offices on whose vigorous administration the success of all operations and the maintenance of the army depended.

"4. There was a want of timely information as to the state of affairs in the Crimea and at Scutari.

"5. One department, the Commissariat, was made to perform the duties of several departments.

"6. An unfortunate selection was made of officers for important services before the daily increasing magnitude of the operations was foreseen.

"The foregoing pages have shown, as far as your Committee are able, on whom the responsibility in different degrees justly rests; and they will now conclude their Report with a hope that every British army may in future display the valour which this noble army has displayed, and that none may hereafter have to encounter such afflictions as are recorded in these pages.

Draft Report proposed by Mr. *Drummond* read 1°, as follows:

14375. 14381. "It appears from the evidence taken before Your Committee, that the Queen's Ministers resolved, on the 9th of February 1854, to send out a military force to protect Constantinople. A Convention with Turkey having been entered into, 10,000 men were ordered to proceed in that month to Malta, and the ships which conveyed them to return and take out other 15,000 men, so that the whole might be landed on some part of the Turkish shores with the greatest possible expedition. Engineer officers had been previously de- 14382. spatched in January to select the best sites for encampment, and these fixed upon Gallipoli 1618–1623. and Varna. The officers and men of the regiments which composed this force were in the 19774. highest state of efficiency.

13417. "The Commissariat had been long in the hands of Sir Charles Trevelyan and other 502. 669*. clerks of the Treasury, who, however competent to the supply of troops in garrison in time 1793. 1822. 1844. of peace, were necessarily ignorant of what is required for the supply of an army in the 680. 682. 3751. 3840–3844. field, and of the means of procuring it. They laid down a theory, that the country must 1633, 1634. 1641. furnish these wants, which was proved to be absurd; yet their approbation was more 1643. 1651. looked to by the junior officers in the field than the requirements of the troops. There 14239. 6691. were, however, some very efficient commissaries among them. The waggon-train, organised 1663. with so much care by Lord Wellington in the Peninsula, had been abandoned on the plea 788. 463. 1132. of

of economy during the peace by the continued pressure of the House of Commons; and no other means of land transport was provided preparatory to the breaking out of hostilities. There was great deficiency of fodder for horses, mules, &c., and none of the commissaries were acquainted with the languages of the inhabitants of the countries to which they were sent.

13439. 13446. 13501-4 13506. 590. 779. 1265. 1735. 4023. 700. 507.

"Nearly twice as many able surgeons were sent out than had ever accompanied any other British army. The medical necessaries for a campaign were well foreseen by Dr. Smith, and enumerated by him in papers submitted to the Government; and an abundant supply of such necessaries and comforts were provided. Buildings were taken at Scutari for hospitals, but sufficient energy was not used by the Commandant in charge of them (Major Sillery) in making necessary alterations and repairs, and in properly arranging the bedding and stores as they arrived. Dr. Hall, the Inspector-general, had neglected to look after the medicines and medical comforts. No orderlies were provided. On the 27th June 1854, the siege of Silistria was raised, and on the news reaching England, the French and English Governments sent orders to invade the Russian territory. From that period the inefficiency of all the departments, and especially the Commissariat and Medical Departments, became painfully apparent. Hospital accommodation had been provided for only 25,000 men instead of 50,000 men.

793. 1886–1898. 8813. 19904. April 15. 518. 386. 19797. 1653. 502. 2023. 2025. 2491. 3843–3858. 8943–8959.

"The force was increased without a corresponding increase of means for its supply. In the course of one year, 60,000 British soldiers were sent 3,000 miles from this country; 6,000 horses and 30,000 French troops from Marseilles to the Crimea. Twelve thousand French soldiers were also sent to the Baltic, besides cannon, balls, powder, shells, and ammunition of every description. Every month there is now going out 1,250,000 lbs. of biscuit, 50,000 gallons of rum, 2,500 tons of salt meat and sugar, and 10,000 tons of coal.

21116.

"In 1853, Admiral Dundas in vain endeavoured to induce Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to take steps towards procuring information respecting the strength of the Russian fleet in the harbour of Sebastopol, and the nature of the fortifications by which it was protected. The Queen's Ambassadors at Petersburgh and Constantinople had procured no information respecting the Crimea, notwithstanding the large staff attached to those embassies, the secret service money annually voted by Parliament, and the notorious corruption of every Russian official. The principal intelligence on which the English Government relied was that from a man who told them he had never been in Sebastopol but one day, and that was in the year 1846, which material fact, however, Sir J. Graham, in quoting his authority, omits to mention. The Duke of Newcastle, in his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan on 10th April 1854, 'directs careful but secret 'inquiry' to be made into the present amount 'and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of 'Sebastopol.' And his Grace further observes, that '*before the siege of a fortress so strong* '*can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied on shall be obtained* '*upon many points on which little or nothing is at present known.*' This despatch further directs Lord Raglan to 'concert measures with Marshal St. Arnaud and Admirals Dundas and Hamelin' for the siege of Sebastopol, unless with 'the information in your possession, 'but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could 'not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success.' After war had been proclaimed, with the Turks indifferent to the success of the Allies, the Greeks opposed to them, and spies from Russia abounding in every quarter, it was impossible for Lord Raglan to obtain any information whatever; and although the Commanders, both naval and military, were of opinion that it was rash and unwise to undertake the siege without an army of 50,000 to invest the fortress, and another of equal force to protect the besieging army, the strong language of the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, no doubt in unison with instructions forwarded also by the French Government, compelled them to attempt it.

21240. 21239. 17532-17536. 14422.

"*Without that information*, then, *which could be relied on*, and which the Duke of Newcastle declared to be *necessary before the siege of a fortress so strong could be attempted*, the allied army of 50,000 men left Varna, and was landed in the Crimea without loss or damage of any kind, with all their guns, shot, shell and ammunition, horses, stores and provisions, in one day, the unprecedented success of which operation reflects the highest credit on the naval officers. The soldiers were obliged to land without their knapsacks on account of the forced marches they were about to undertake; the Commissariat had provided no means of transport for the baggage; nor were there any ambulances or other means of conveyance for the sick and wounded, although cholera, dysentery, and fever were raging amongst the troops. The battle of the Alma being fought on 20th September, the army could not immediately move forward, because, amongst other reasons, the sick and wounded would have been all murdered by the Cossacks, and these were all taken on board the ships by the naval medical officers and sailors. The army, at the suggestion of the engineer officers, moved round the town of Sebastopol to Balaklava, off which place the fleet arrived also, conveying the baggage of the army; this, however, could not be transferred from the ships to its owners because the commissariat officers had provided no means of transport.

418. 419. 815. 590. 1163. 1168. 2023. 3793. 1722. 10239. 10244. 17519. 20577. 5981. 422. 835. 2023. 1844.

"When the army reached the heights above Sebastopol they found two roads from Balaklava to Sebastopol, one the fine government road, called the Woronzoff-road; the other further to the left, a useful farm-road. The army held the Woronzoff-road up to the

444. 1203. 1207. 17322. 1390. 1397. 3835. 3780. 4082. 17214. 17222.

17329. 17397. 3824. 17341. 17358. 449. 451. 1209. 1217. 1362. 17212. 17234. 938. 17370. 17412. 17446. 17228.

time of the battle of Balaklava, in October. Immediately after that action it became necessary to draw in the outposts, which lost to the army the use of the Woronzoff-road; the other road, however, remained, and was fully sufficient for all purposes until November 14th, when the torrents of rain that fell during a storm of unprecedented severity, caused the whole country to be a foot deep, or more, in mud. It was impossible to employ soldiers then to make a road, because the men were already overworked, there not being sufficient force to invest the town, which was found to be infinitely more formidable than the Queen's Ministers had anticipated; and if men had been withdrawn for this purpose from the advanced works of the siege, the Russians would have occupied the ground, thereby endangering the whole of the English position, and commanding the camp with their fire. The season, the nature of the soil, and the immensity of traffic which necessarily took place between Balaklava and the camp, rendered the formation of the road of 11 miles impossible; a tramway or a railroad was the only kind of road that it was possible to construct, and although the employment of civilians in an army is not an advisable measure in ordinary circumstances, it would have been well if it had been resorted to in November. The French indeed made a road from the coast of Chersonese up to their camp, but the distance was only two miles, up easy slopes, and formed during the fine weather, they having no use of the Woronzoff-road, as the English originally had, whereas the English did not require theirs until after the bad weather had set in, and their position was intersected by steep ravines; it was therefore on every account impossible to spare soldiers to make the road, and its badness would not have been of great importance if there had been sufficient animals to convey stores to the camp, and sufficient food and shelter for them.

19777. 17217. 17219. 17628. 2556. 4070. 21204. 3879-3881. 4091. 4092. 5769. 5782. 6371. 463-465. 665. 666. 796. 799. 835. 17250. *See* Mr. Filder's Correspondence in Appendix to Third Report, particularly p. 409. 467. 700. 790. 791. 817. 914. 1209. 1217. 1323. 1362. 1920. 1967. 20093. 20099. 2587. 6582. 6595. 796. 808. 867. 868. 610. 1213.

"The expectation of the English Government was, that the town would fall by a *coup de main*; the possibility of its holding out appears never to have entered into their calculations, and the whole fate of the expedition was risked upon one chance. The idea of carrying the town, by immediately storming it, was abandoned, upon the assurance of the French and English engineers that it could speedily be reduced by regular approaches, thus saving the carnage inevitably consequent upon an assault. These expectations failing, the army could not re-embark, and it was compelled to winter on hostile soil, in a most rigorous climate, without other resources than could be supplied from the ships. Constantinople became, of necessity, the base of the military operations, where general hospitals and stores had to be established, to which the wounded and sick must be sent, although it was at a distance of 280 miles. The troops were too few for the work they had to do, and instead of their strength being kept up by extra food, through the neglect of Commissary-general Filder in providing beasts to convey it, and fodder for the sustenance of the beasts, weakness, induced by these privations, rendered the men very susceptible of disease; and sufficient hospital accommodation was not supplied in the field. The more sickness prevailed the more work was required of those who remained fit for service, who, in their turn, gave way under the increased pressure. All the witnesses agree in saying that the men suffered more from overwork than from any other cause. The reinforcements sent out were principally levies of mere boys, far too young to bear fatigue and exposure to the rigour of such a climate. No reserve was provided at home adequate to the greatness of the undertaking, and the militia, from the ranks of which it might have been drawn, was not called out in time to be available for this purpose. No proper field-hospitals were established at the camp, although planks might easily have been obtained for the purpose. The obvious inadequacy of all the means induced the general belief in the army, that the Government at home never seriously contemplated a war.

4070. 21179.

"The hospital at Scutari might have been put in good order between February and November, and would have been, in that case, sufficient for the ordinary casualties of the army. But as it had been neglected, and was in a most inefficient state, it was wholly incapable of receiving an unexpected accession of 13,800 sick men who arrived there between the 13th of September and the 17th of February. No staff of regular orderlies had been provided, nor were the kitchens, wash-houses, and other offices sufficient. Dr. Menzies, an able surgeon, and skilful in operation, was quite unfit for the task of managing the details necessary for a military hospital, nor had he the support of an active military Commandant. Dr. Hall, when sent down by Lord Raglan to inquire into the condition of the hospital, reported it in a satisfactory state, although the patients were unprovided with the most ordinary requirements, which had been sent from this country, and were at hand in lavish profusion.

709. 710. 1822. 2583. 20149. 1663. 1828. 17417. 1136. 3859. 3860.

"War is a science which can only be acquired, like all other sciences, by practice, and it unfortunately happens that practice can only be exercised by experiments on the limbs and lives of thousands of human beings. The Government of England, which is in the hands of a dozen civilians, did not know the difference between a number of well-disciplined regiments and an army; they were ignorant of the necessary means of moving the food and baggage of troops; they forgot to be as well prepared for the failure as the success of a military operation, and for every other contingency; they forgot to provide for the probability of a winter campaign in an enemy's country, where there were neither towns, villages, nor shelter of any kind; they forgot the notorious insalubrity of the shores of the Black Sea, and the inclemency of the climate, and the consequence has been a great loss of life by sickness, and, above all, by overwork. The whole preparations, which were adequate to the defence of Constantinople, were insufficient to the far greater task of invading Russia; the troops sent were too few; the Commissariat was inefficient, and, therefore,

therefore, the men were ill fed; not enough beasts, and these starved; no depôts provided, nor adequate means of moving baggage and military stores. The hospitals were inefficient; the men at the head of them overwhelmed with labour, not anticipated; and many lives were lost by want of orderlies to attend to the sick. It is, therefore, the Ministers at home, and not the officers who were sent to do impossible things, and laboured beyond their powers, mental and physical, who are to be blamed for whatever sufferings, beyond the necessary sufferings involved in all wars, which the troops endured. 17568.

"So soon, however, as errors were discovered, they were remedied from home with the greatest alacrity. No want of zeal or anxiety for the public service can be justly attributed to any one. The Duke of Newcastle laboured indefatigably; but he did not receive the honest and cordial support from some of his colleagues, which, in such unprecedented circumstances, he had a right to expect. The surgeons and commissaries laboured hard also, but none had the means of effectually accomplishing what he had to perform. 700. 790. 791. 1209. 1323. 17634. 17636. 1920. 3858. 4092. 4200. 20158. 1186. 1187.

"On the other hand, idle civilians, ignorant of the realities of war, which, under the most favourable circumstances, are horrid to witness, painted with colours more vivid than accurate, all they saw, as if human suffering was peculiar to this campaign, or could be effectually prevented by any care or foresight whatever. They did not know how to discriminate between that which is the necessary, though dreadful consequences of every war, and that which is unnecessary, extra, and induced by neglect or incapacity. Their evidence, therefore, must be received with considerable drawbacks, and it will be observed, that the more ignorant the witnesses are of the concomitants of all war, the more is the testimony exaggerated, whilst soldiers who have spent their lives on the battle field speak of the hardships which all endured in terms far less condemnatory of those who are accused of having caused them, and in far less severe language of the evils themselves. A striking example of exaggerated description is to be found in the testimony concerning the harbour of Balaklava, the correctness of which is denied by a more competent witness; and even if true on a certain day, is only a state which will be found to be equally true at particular times in any harbour which is not tidal, and which all travellers who have visited those of Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, must have repeatedly witnessed whenever the wind sets into them. 19887. 805. 806. 2495. 2523. 1822. 1832. 4123. 17239. 1981. 1900. 1904. 1911. 1926. 1930. 462. 466. 532. 614. 627. 628. 637. 1275. 6179.

"Some of the witnesses have remarked how much less quick and intelligent in resources those soldiers were who had never seen service before, than those who had been in the field at the Cape, in India, or elsewhere. A remarkable instance of this is found in the fact that whilst the troops were suffering from being under single canvas, with rain and snow driving through it, and whilst the cavalry horses were frozen to the ground when they laid down, owing to their being picketed in the open air; and although there were not less than 10,000 horses, camels, mules, asses, oxen, buffaloes, &c., had died, no one thought of skinning these animals, and putting the skins over the canvas, nor of making a shelter for the cavalry horses. Moreover, there can scarcely have been less than 5,000 sheep slaughtered daily, yet no one took the skins with which to protect themselves from the wind, the frost, and the snow. 2487. 2583. 2618. 794. 4099.

"The ignorance of the embassies of Petersburgh and Constantinople of the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol; of the nature of the fortifications; of the number of guns it could mount; of the number and size of the ships in the harbour; of the disposition of the inhabitants; of the abundance or deficiency of water, &c., prove the necessity of an active revision of the mode in which the diplomatic service of the country is neglected. There can be no justification for the most accurate and full particulars relating to all countries in which such expensive establishments are kept up not being always ready whenever they may be required."

Draft Resolutions proposed by General *Peel* read 1°, as follows:—

"1st. That the state of our army in the Crimea, from about the middle of November to the period at which we were appointed to inquire into its condition, was one of much hardship, privation, and suffering.

"2d. The men were overworked, occasionally not well fed, had not sufficient clothing, and were exposed, under single canvas, to wet, cold, and the mud, and inconveniences, arising from the nature of the soil.

"3d. The men in hospital, in addition to much of this suffering, were not adequately provided with sufficient medical attendance, medicine, and medical comforts.

"4th. There was some delay in removing the wounded from the field, after the battle of the Alma, and as it always must have been contemplated to employ vessels to convey the sick and wounded from the Crimea, there appears to have been great neglect in not properly preparing any for the purpose.

"5th. This calamitous state of things was the result, mainly, of the Administration having unwisely engaged in great military operations with reduced peace establishments, and having, with inadequate means, undertaken more than they were able to perform. The British Army landed in the Crimea was composed of all the trained soldiers that could, at that time, be made available, and the reinforcements sent out were so young and 790, 791. 3860.

20793. 753, 754. *See* Appendix 16 to 4th Report, page 360.

and unformed, that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away 'like flies,' leaving the army quite incapable of carrying on the siege operations, and executing the works desirable, for the defence of the position, and necessary, to maintain, in good order, the communication with Balaklava.

"6th. The state of the hospitals at Scutari and Balaklava, and of the hospitals in the field before Sebastopol, was most unsatisfactory. The reduction of the medical department during the long peace, had rendered it inadequate to perform the onerous duties, imposed upon it, by the unusual amount of sickness and casualties. The course of events placed persons, in situations, they were not competent to fill; but they appear to have been more to blame, for concealing the state of things, than for any want of zeal or attention in discharging their duties, to the best of their abilities. Our system of orderlies, or attendants upon the sick, appears to be very imperfect.

"7th. The reduced state of the Commissariat Department, on the breaking out of the war, and the consequent scarcity of experienced officers, caused some of the duties devolving upon it to be inadequately performed.

1956. "8th. The necessity of employing all the sea transports, in the conveyance of combatants, to the exclusion of land transport, and the impossibility of procuring the latter in the Crimea, was the cause of much suffering and loss.

"9th. The enormous amount of duties, thrown on the Civil Department of the Ordnance, and the inadequate strength of the Board (as then constituted) to perform them, caused irregularities and delays.

"10th. It is to be regretted that when the sudden transition, from peace to war, proved the various departments to be out of order, and incapable of performing the duties imposed upon them, that endeavours were not made, to remodel and restore them, rather than having recourse to unusual means, and adopting unusual channels, to supply deficiencies, which nothing but the efficient state of the departments, in which they occurred, could rectify.

The Ambassador at Constantinople.

"11th. There is, however, one bright spot in this dark picture. The patience and fortitude of the army demand the admiration and gratitude of the nation on whose behalf they have fought, bled, and suffered. Their heroic valour, and equally heroic patience under suffering and privation, have given them claims upon their country, which a grateful nation will doubtless be eager to satisfy."

Motion made, "That the Draft Resolutions, proposed by the *Chairman*, be now read a second time:"—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Ellice*), to leave out the words, "Resolutions proposed by the *Chairman*," and to insert the words, "Report proposed by Lord *Seymour*," instead thereof. Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put and negatived.

Question proposed, "That the words, 'Report proposed by Lord *Seymour*,' be there inserted":—Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment (Mr. *Drummond*), "To leave out the words, 'Lord *Seymour*,' and to insert the words 'Mr. *Drummond*' instead thereof:"—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the proposed amendment," put and agreed to.

Words, "Report proposed by Lord *Seymour*," inserted.

Another Amendment proposed, "To leave out all the words after the words 'Lord *Seymour*,' and to add the words 'be postponed for the purpose of reading a second time the Draft Resolutions proposed by General *Peel*," instead thereof:—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put and agreed to.

Question as amended, "That the Draft Report proposed by Lord *Seymour* be now read a second time," put and agreed to.

Draft Report proposed by Lord *Seymour* read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

The Committee proceeded in the same with amendments.

[Adjourned till Friday, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 8° *die Junii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	General Peel.
Mr. Ellice.	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Bramston.	Captain Gladstone.
Sir J. Pakington.	Lord Seymour.

The Committee proceeded in the Draft Report, with amendments.

[Adjourned till Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 11° *die Junii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	General Peel.
Mr. Ellice,	Colonel Lindsay.
Mr. Layard.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Bramston.	Captain Gladstone.
Sir John Pakington.	Lord Seymour.

The Committee proceeded in the Draft Report, with amendments.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.

Martis, 12° *die Junii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir John Hanmer.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Committee proceeded in the Draft Report, with amendments.

[Adjourned till Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 14° *die Junii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck, in the Chair.

Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	Captain Gladstone.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Lord Seymour.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir John Hanmer.	Colonel Lindsay.

The Committee proceeded in the Draft Report, with amendments.

[Adjourned till Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 18° *die Junii*, 1855.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Roebuck in the Chair.

Mr. Bramston.	Mr. Layard.
General Peel.	Sir John Pakington.
Colonel Lindsay.	Sir John Hanmer.
Mr. Drummond.	Lord Seymour.
Mr. Ellice.	Captain Gladstone.

The Committee proceeded in the Draft Report, with amendments.

Last paragraph of the Draft Report read and negatived.

Paragraph inserted as follows: "Your Committee have now adverted to the chief points contained in the replies to above 21,000 questions, and in noticing these various subjects, they have divided them under distinct heads, in order fairly to apportion the responsibility."

Motion made (*Chairman*), after the word "responsibility," to add the following paragraph:—"Your Committee believe that they would be shrinking from their duty were they to close their Report without naming to the House those whom the evidence points out as chiefly answerable for the great calamities to which our army in the Crimea was unduly subjected." Question, "That this paragraph be there added," put. The Committee divided:

Aye, 1.	Noes, 9.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston.
	General Peel.
	Colonel Lindsay.
	Mr. Drummond.
	Mr. Ellice.
	Sir John Pakington.
	Sir John Hanmer.
	Lord Seymour.
	Captain Gladstone.

Motion made (*Chairman*), after the word "responsibility," to add the following paragraph:—"It appears that the sufferings of the army resulted mainly from the circumstances in which the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken and executed. The Administration which ordered that expedition had no adequate information as to the amount of force in the Crimea, or Sebastopol. They were not acquainted with the strength of the fortresses to be attacked, or with the resources of the country to be invaded. They hoped and expected that the expedition would be immediately successful, and as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle, they made no provision for a winter campaign. What was planned and undertaken without sufficient information, was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befel our army." Question, "That this paragraph be there inserted," put. The Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 5.
Mr. Drummond.	Mr. Bramston.
Mr. Layard.	General Peel.
Sir John Pakington.	Colonel Lindsay.
Sir John Hanmer.	Mr. Ellice.
Captain Gladstone.	Lord Seymour.

The Chairman gave his vote with the Ayes,

Motion made (*Chairman*), "After the word 'army' to add the following paragraphs":

"This want of knowledge on the part of those who planned the expedition was not supplied by the energy and ability of those whose duty it was to execute their scheme, thus improvidently undertaken. The Commander of the Forces, Lord Raglan, is in a great degree immediately responsible for the sufferings of the army. Had the requisite firmness and foresight been shown by him, much of the misery resulting from the want of land transport, from the want of a road from Balaklava to the camp, from the want of an efficient ambulance, from insufficient and improper food, from the want of shelter, clothing and fuel might have been prevented.

"It is but too plain that Lord Raglan did not keep the Administration duly informed of the actual condition of the army under his command. By the statement of Lord Aberdeen himself, it appears that the Commander of the Forces failed in this part of his duty,

and

and therefore, in so far as the wants and sufferings of the army resulted from the continued ignorance of the Administration, Lord Raglan is responsible for the misery which was the consequence of that ignorance.

"Lord Raglan appears also to have been without the assistance of an able and effective staff; indeed there seems to have been no head to conceive what was needed for the army, and no hand to execute the thing needed, even if it had been foreseen. The men died from over-work, insufficient and bad food, cold and exposure."

Question, "That these paragraphs be there added," put. The Committee divided

Aye, 1.	Noes, 9.
Mr. Layard.	Mr. Bramston. General Peel. Colonel Lindsay. Mr. Drummond. Mr. Ellice. Sir John Pakington. Sir John Hanmer. Lord Seymour. Captain Gladstone.

Two other paragraphs added.

Draft Report, as amended, agreed to.

Ordered to report.

EXPENSES OF WITNESSES.

NAME OF WITNESS.	Number of Days absent from Home under orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Mr. James Vaux	4	– 10 –	4 4 –	4 14 –
Mr. Henry Vellacott	3	– 10 –	3 3 –	3 13 –
Captain Killock	3	2 – –	3 3 –	5 3 –
Mr. Thomas Stickney	4	6 12 –	4 4 –	10 16 –
The Rev. S. G. Osborne		3 5 –		3 5 –
Mr. William H. Fowler	3	2 – –	3 3 –	5 3 –
Dr. Menzies	12		12 12 –	12 12 –
Dr. Forest	14	2 2 –	14 14 –	16 16 –
Captain Stewart	4	2 – –	4 4 –	6 4 –
Captain Freeman	2	– 10 –	2 2 –	2 12 –
Captain Ellison	3	5 15 –	3 3 –	8 18 –
Mr. John Rees	8		8 8 –	8 8 –
Major Hardinge	2	1 10 –	2 2 –	3 12 –
Captain Hillyar	4	5 – –	4 4 –	9 4 –
Lieutenant Day	4	12 – –	4 4 –	16 4 –
Mr. Francis Parker	6	2 19 6	6 6 –	9 5 6
			£.	126 9 6

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APPENDIX.

Appendix, No. 1.

EXTRACTS from the Answer of Lord *Raglan* to the Despatch of the Duke of *Newcastle*, dated the 29th June 1854. Appendix, No. 1.

(Secret.)

My Lord Duke, Varna, 19 July 1854.

I HAD the honour on the 16th instant to receive your Grace's despatch, marked "Secret," of the 29th June, forbidding any further advance of the British army into Bulgaria, and instructing me to concert measures for the invasion of the Crimea and the attack of Sebastopol, it being the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the reduction of that fortress shall have been effected, and the fleet which is sheltered in its harbour shall have been taken or destroyed, and therefore it is on all accounts most important that nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of preparation by either army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent its being decided at an early period to undertake the operation.

With a view to forward the object of your Grace's instructions, I lost no time in communicating your despatch to Marshal St. Arnaud and to Vice-Admiral Dundas; and the latter, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, having, in consequence, come down from Baltchik yesterday, a conference took place at the Marshal's, which was attended by them, and by Admirals Hamelin and Bruat.

The discussion lasted more than four hours, and it was at length determined that the operation should be undertaken so soon as boats of a peculiar construction, called "chalands," calculated to contain and disembark horses and guns, and which are now building at Constantinople by the carpenters of the French fleet, aided by the Turkish workmen of the arsenal, shall be completed.

Admiral Dundas is of opinion that the arrangements he is making will secure the supply of a sufficient number of boats for the use of the British army.

It is calculated that the French army will have their boats ready in from ten to twelve days; and in the meanwhile officers of the staff, and of the engineers and artillery, will be despatched to examine the coast of the Crimea, and to ascertain, as far as may be possible, the points where a landing can best be effected.

Eupatoria is one to which their attention will be directed, and between that town and Cape Lookoot; and they will be instructed to continue their inspection as far as Jaffa, and to return here as soon as they shall have satisfied them that they have fulfilled the objects of the mission entrusted to them.

The English and French admirals will supply the vessels for this survey. It was proposed yesterday that two screw line-of-battle ships should be employed upon it, as well as several smaller steam-vessels; but the expediency of sending such large ships upon a duty of this description was somewhat questioned, and possibly another arrangement may be considered preferable.

Having stated to your Grace the result of the discussion which took place yesterday, and which was carried on in a manner quite satisfactory to all the parties present, it becomes my duty to acquaint you, that it was more in deference to the views of the British Government, as conveyed to me in your Grace's despatch, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or to their state of preparation, that the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was adopted.

* * * * * * * *

Appendix, No. 1.

As regards the state of preparation of the two armies, your Grace is aware that I have in this bay the first portion of the battering train intended to be supplied, and that the remaining portion can hardly be expected for some time. Your Grace has announced to me that it would be prepared for embarkation on the 4th instant, but it has not been stated that a steam-vessel has been provided for its conveyance.

The French *batterie de siège* was by the last accounts ready to put on board ship, but no order had been given for its being despatched, nor, as it appears by a letter from Toulon, which I heard read yesterday, had a ship been appointed for it.

Thus it would seem that we shall in all probability have to rely chiefly upon the battering train actually at my disposal, although, of course, every assistance in this respect will be afforded by the combined fleets that can be given without impairing their efficiency.

I have taken measures to ascertain what supply, either of artillerymen or heavy ordnance, can be furnished by the Turkish Government.

The preparations which must necessarily be made for the embarkation of the troops will, of course, show that a plan of operations, distinct from the support of Omer Pasha and the passage of the Danube, is in contemplation; and, in order to conceal the object of the allies as far as possible, it was determined yesterday that it should be given out that Odessa was the point it had been resolved to attack. The larger and more important operation has been so much discussed in the newspapers, and is so generally advocated, that I doubt much credence being given to the rumour it is proposed to circulate.

* * * * * * * *

I have, &c.
(signed) *Raglan.*

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle,
&c. &c. &c.

War Department,
25 May 1855.

Frederick Peel.

Appendix, No. 2.

Appendix, No. 2.

MEMORANDUM purporting to be from the Duke of *Newcastle*, regarding the NEW WAR BOARD.

It is important that the attention of the Government should immediately be drawn to the state of the relations between the War Department and the various military departments which are subordinate to it, with a view to decide what steps it is necessary to take, in order more clearly to define those relations, and to give an authoritative character to that form of proceeding which it has been found necessary to adopt in the transaction of the business, the due execution of which requires concert and co-operation between the officers who administer those departments.

When the War Department was constituted, in 1854, the views of the Government as to the ultimate re-constitution of the military departments were explicitly stated in both Houses of Parliament. The objects they had in view were explained to be, the consolidation of all the departments under one central direction; preserving, however, the subdivision of duties in detail, which is indispensable for their efficient performance.

With this view, they pointed to the placing under one and the same financial control all these departments, for the same reasons, and on the same principle, as they prepared to place all under one executive control.

Thus they indicated that the Ordnance and the Commissariat should ultimately be placed under the same control, as regards their expenditure, as is now exercised over the Horse Guards; by which arrangement the Secretary-at-War would move the Estimates for all three departments, namely, the Horse Guards, the Ordnance, and the Commissariat, and would thus be able to present at one view to the House of Commons the whole military expenditure of the empire.

In these discussions, however, the Government dwelt on the impossibility of at once recasting all the existing military departments while the progress of the war was taxing to the utmost the energies and exertions of them all, without serious risk of throwing the whole into such confusion as to imperil the efficiency of the public service at a critical moment. It was clearly impossible to throw the machine out of gear for the purpose of entire reconstruction, and to work it at one and the same time.

It was stated, however, that much immediate advantage was likely to result from the creation of a separate Secretary of State, who should give his undivided attention to the conduct of the war, and reconcile, under one supreme authority, habitually exercised, the various independent departments through whom the military business of the country is conducted.

One branch only of the military executive was at that time independent of the authority of the Secretary for War and Colonies, though placed in war under the immediate order of the General commanding an army in the field.

The Commissariat is the department upon the efficiency of which the safety, if not the existence, of an army mainly depends, but it was at that time independent altogether of the authority of the Secretary of State, who issues the instructions, and is responsible for the conduct of operations, to the success of which an efficient Commissariat is indispensable.

The immediate transfer, therefore, of the direction of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Minister appeared to the Government to be necessary.

This, in accordance with the promise given to Parliament, has now been effected, and the Secretary of State has been engaged, since the Commissariat has come under his authority, in remodelling the system of land transport, to the due execution of which service experience has shown that the Commissariat, as now constituted, is unequal.

It is, however, to the former portion of the subject, namely, to the advantage to be derived from the greater authority to be constantly exercised over the different military departments, that the attention of the Government should be directed.

There is no doubt that it would have been impossible for any one man to execute the duties of a Colonial Minister, and at the same time to transact the various and complicated business incidental to the conduct of a war, with that attention to details without which the general direction cannot be efficient.

There is, therefore, every reason to think that the expectations we formed, and held out to Parliament, of the advantage to be gained by enabling the Secretary of State to give an undivided attention to his duties as War Minister, have been fully realised.

No change has been made by the separation of the functions of the Minister for War and Colonies in the nature or extent of the authority exercised by the Secretary of State over the military departments; that always has been and is undoubted, unlimited, and therefore sufficient for its purpose.

The change consists simply in the more constant and habitual exercise of that authority than heretofore by a Minister enabled, for the first time, to give his undivided attention to the direction of the measures dependent for their execution on the co-operation of the military departments.

It is but just to take this opportunity of bearing testimony to the willingness with which that authority has been recognised, and the anxiety evinced, and the exertions made, by the officers at the head of the military departments to give effect to the orders which it has been the duty of the Secretary of State to convey to them.

The modes of proceeding which have been adopted with a view to the most rapid and accurate transmission of those orders, and to the due co-operation of the departments who have to contribute to their punctual execution, are with our limited experience necessarily of a tentative character. But, though limited in time, the experience we have gained is extensive as regards the variety and the importance of the business transacted, and there is reason to think that that business has been greatly expedited and facilitated, and that the concert of the various departments interested can best be secured by the practice which has been adopted of summoning periodical meetings of the heads of those departments, who then receive the instructions by which each is to be guided in the execution of the measures upon which the Secretary of State has determined, and report the progress made by each in his own department towards the completion of the services for which orders had been given at previous meetings.

These instructions being thus given to each, and their reports being made by each in the presence of all, the head of each department has a full knowledge of what all the other departments are doing, the nature of the instructions given to them, the progress made in their execution, and the exact course to be taken by himself, with a view to the combination of the means at the disposal of all to the common end in view. He is also thus enabled at any stage of the transaction to suggest any change in the course of the operation which may become necessary with a view to its better completion.

Hitherto, however, although minutes have been taken of the proceedings, upon which minutes written instructions are afterwards drawn, in accordance with the preconcerted arrangement, and despatched to each department; and although copies of those minutes are sent for information, both to the First Lord of the Treasury and the Leader of the House of Commons, yet those minutes have at present no authoritative character, but are simply unofficial records of results arrived at, and arrangements made at, unofficial meetings of official persons.

It is, however, important, both for the immediate transaction of the public business, and as a step towards the reconstitution of the military departments on a more effective footing, and

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the clearer defining of their relations to one another, and their subordination to one common head, to invest these meetings with a permanent, formal, and authoritative character.

I propose, therefore, to constitute a Board for the transaction of all business between the Secretary of State and the military departments, on the one hand and between the military departments themselves on the other.

I propose that this Board shall be presided over by the Secretary of State, and shall consist of the Commander-in-Chief, the Master-General of the Ordnance, and the Secretary-at-War; one of the Under Secretaries of State acting as Secretary to the Board.

Whether a Commissary-General, representing the Commissariat Department, should likewise be a member of the Board is a question which must remain for future decision; but in the meanwhile that department, being now under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State, is less in want of a representative at the Board than was the case when the Duke of Richmond, in his draft report, recommended the addition of a Commissary-General to his proposed Army Board.

This proposed Board would thus be composed of the officers through whom the whole army is governed, and its organization regulated, namely,—

The Commander-in-Chief to govern the army.

The Master-General of the Ordnance to arm and equip the army.

The Secretary-at-War to control the finance of the army.

The whole presided over and directed by the Secretary of State who has under his control the Commissariat to feed the army.

It is not proposed that this Board should have any collective executive character. Its members would meet for the purpose of assisting the Secretary of State by their advice and information regarding the details of their own departments, and of receiving his instructions for the execution of the services by him deemed necessary to be undertaken.

The agenda for each meeting would therefore be prepared by the directions of the Secretary of State, each member of the Board sending, for previous consideration, any matter which he may wish to bring under its cognizance; but the production of such matter, or its reservation for private discussion, should rest entirely with the discretion of the Secretary of State.

This restriction of the general functions of the Board is important; without it its members might appear, through the constitution of the Board, to be invested with co-ordinate authority with that of the Secretary of State, to whom all the military departments are subordinate.

It is important, likewise, that no opening should be given to the members of the Board to convert its meetings into a Council of War, and thus to arrogate to themselves any share of the power or responsibility devolving on Her Majesty's Government alone, as regards the direction of the operations of war.

The Secretary of State will, of course, continue to enjoy as now the advantage of calling upon these officers, either individually or collectively, to give him their opinions or advise upon any point connected with such operations, or their general conduct, but they will give such advice or opinion as individual officers, and not as members of a Board which is convened for a different purpose.

The members of the Board, on the other hand, will continue to exercise their own authority over the respective departments, subject to the general direction of the Secretary of State.

It is not necessary to enter at this moment on the subject of the further changes which it will be necessary to make in the constitution of the military departments; but it is assumed that the Government concur in the opinion that the command of the artillery corps ought to be transferred from the Ordnance to the Commander-in-Chief, placing the whole *personnel* of the army under the latter, and confining the former exclusively to the providing of the *materiel*; a change which may shortly be undertaken with the corresponding transfer of financial powers to the Secretary-at-War.

As regards the constitution of the civil branches of the military administration, however, looking at the immense pressure which the conduct of the war entails upon them, and the danger of throwing their whole business into confusion by any too hasty disturbance of the machinery at a moment when every exertion is required of them, this proposal is confined to that which experience has shown to be not only without danger to, but directly conducive to the efficiency and expedition of the public business.

A draft O. C. has been prepared, with a view, if the measures now proposed meet with the approbation of the Government, to an immediate application to Her Majesty's Council for the necessary authority to carry it into execution.

Sidney Herbert.

Appendix, No. 3.

LETTER from *T. Phinn*, Esq. to *A. Roebuck*, Esq., M.P., Chairman. Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, Admiralty, 1 June 1855.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you a copy of Admiral Boxer's report on the causes of the detention of the "Jason," transport, which was called for in consequence of the resolution of the Committee on the 20th of April last; also, a further report from Admiral Boxer, explaining the reason why the medical stores on board the late steam-ship "Prince," were not landed at Scutari in November last.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Thomas Phinn.*

LETTER from Rear Admiral *Lyons* to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, "Royal Albert," off Sevastopol, 18 May.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 23d ult., I transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a letter and its enclosures from Rear Admiral Boxer, explaining the causes of the detention of the "Jason" (steam transport), at Constantinople, in November last, for three weeks, as stated by Sir C. Trevelyan in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons.

It would appear from the Rear Admiral's statement, that the "Jason" was detained 16 days, and not three weeks; that not only was the "Jason" not docked during that detention, but that there was actually no dock large enough to receive her, and that the horses were not ready for shipment until some days after the "Jason's" arrival.

(signed) *E. Lyons,*
Rear Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

REPORT of Admiral *Boxer*, on the Causes of the Detention of the "Jason" Transport; with Enclosures.

Sir, "Diamond," Balaclava, 16 May 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 9th inst., requesting me to furnish you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with any explanation in my power relative to the detention of the "Jason" (steam transport) at Constantinople for three weeks in November last, which I have much pleasure in doing as follows:

The "Jason" arrived at Constantinople on 28 November to coal and take up mules, and left on 14 December for Balaclava with 250 horses, and a large quantity of military stores, baggage, and warm clothing, after a stay of 16 days instead of three weeks, as stated.

As regards the allegation in Question 13853, that the "Jason" was detained at Constantinople in consequence of her captain having persuaded me that it was necessary to put her in dock, I have to remark that there is no dock at Constantinople capable of receiving so long a ship; that, to the best of my recollection, the "Jason" has never required any repairs since she has been on the station, and her captain is one of the most active and zealous officers in the transport service. I have never interfered with any of the transports under the orders of the Commissariat, beyond affording them supplies.

The "Jason" arrived at a period of unusually stormy weather, and on many days the lighters could not get alongside to coal. During her stay, upwards of 30 steam-vessels arrived and sailed, which all had to be completed, as their services were also urgently required. On the subject of coaling, I beg to refer their Lordships to my letter of 22 January. It seems to me, that people in England, accustomed to see labour reduced by every appliance which science can furnish, consider that the same facilities exist in the East; but every kind of work is executed by manual labour, the workmen difficult to procure and to manage, and after all the trouble, one English labourer will do as much in one day as the men in Turkey can do in two days.

As the horses were not ready for shipment for some days after the "Jason's" arrival (they had been marched from Varna, a distance of 150 miles), I directed her to receive a quantity of materials for stable huts, most urgently demanded, and the Commissariat also put on board warm clothing. No delay took place on my part. Arrangements were made for the "Jason" to embark the horses on the 11th, and her orders were dated the following day.

The "Jason" having left Constantinople on 14 December, arrived at Balaclava on 16th, where she remained till 1 January, when she sailed for Constantinople with sick, and to

Appendix, No. 3.

take up horses and firewood. Although the demand for horses was to the full, as urgent as on the former occasion, and the Commissariat had the entire control of the ship, she remained 18 days the second trip, and left on the 21st with 350 horses and 600 tons of firewood from the Sea of Marmora. I beg to enclose a copy of my letter to you of 8 January, which will, I trust, show their Lordships that I had no object in delaying the ship, but the contrary.

I also beg to enclose copies of letters marked 2, 3, and 4, which will show my anxiety to provide for the wants of the army.

In Question No. 13876, a letter is produced from Lord Raglan, relative to the detention of the Rockcliff, and it is asked in No. 13880 what notice was taken of the letter? I beg to enclose an extract from my reply relative thereto; No. 5.

In concluding this explanation, I beg to state, that during the period I was employed at Constantinople, my whole time was devoted to considerations for the welfare of our army. I was always afloat in the morning by six o'clock, regularly calling alongside of every ship to ascertain their wants, and that the work of coaling and watering was proceeding with dispatch, and the last to leave at night; and it is a bitter reflection that at the close of a long servitude of 57 years (a record of which is in their Lordships' possession) I should be considered wanting in my duty at a crisis so momentous.

I have the honour to return the enclosures to your letter.

I have, &c.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. Lyons. (signed) *E. Boxer*, R. A.

"Harpy," at Constantinople,

Sir, 8 January 1855.

Captain Christie has signified to me your desire that I should send four horse transports to Varna to remove Turkish cavalry and artillery to Eupatoria. I regret to inform you that I have not been able to comply with this requisition, as all the transports sent down from the Black Sea were those ordered to be sent to England, and at the time of receiving your wishes all these vessels had their Government stores removed, and many of them had sailed for England. The "Joseph Sheppard" (horse-ship), the only one here, I have directed to proceed on the above service; but, from the continuance of northerly winds, it is very uncertain when she may arrive even at Varna.

At this season of the year the passage from this port to the Crimea, *viâ* Varna, is so very uncertain and dangerous for horses (upwards of 240 having been killed in a gale in three ships even in the month of September), that if Captain Christie could have appropriated a steam transport for the above service, a great saving of time would have been effected.

The "Jason," horse steam transport, was sent down here by Captain Christie a few days ago to take up wood, charcoal, and horses for the army, under special orders from the Commissariat, which will keep her at least a fortnight at Constantinople. Any other steam-vessel would have done equally well to convey the fuel; and at the present time, when horses are so much required, and several cargo and infantry steamers are available, it seems a waste of time to appropriate a ship like the "Jason," capable of conveying 300 horses, to any other purpose. Had the "Jason" been ordered to take up horses only, she might have landed them, and conveyed at one trip from Varna more horses than the four sailing ships I am directed to send there, and in less time than it will now take to carry her present orders into effect.

I hope you will excuse my making the above observations, but the urgency of the case will, I trust, be my best apology.

(signed) *E. Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral.

"Harpy," Constantinople,

Sir, 27 November 1854.

In reply to your letter of 22d instant, I beg to acquaint you that I will take care that no supplies of any kind be sent to England in any of the returning transports. I have not been unmindful of this; I am now removing the hay and forage from the "Talavera" to the "Palmerston," loading with forage for the army.

I hope the opportune arrival of the "Belgravia," after a rapid passage of 16 days from England with 20 days' hay for 2,000 horses, will relieve the present wants of the cavalry; she sailed yesterday with a fair wind.

I have ordered two small forage vessels to be towed to Balaklava by the steamers "Ottawa" and "Cleopatra," and two transports. The "Lady McNaughten" and "Arabia" are loading with forage, charcoal, and plank, in addition to the "Palmerston."

I have, &c.

W. Filder, Esq., (signed) *E. Boxer*,
&c. &c. &c. Rear-Admiral.

Appendix, No. 3.

"Harpy," at Constantinople,
3 December 1854.

Sir,

I BEG leave earnestly to call your attention to the following statement, in the hope that you will be enabled to recommend to the General Commanding the Forces that one universal system be adopted of demanding supplies, to avoid the confusion which now exists in that respect.

Within a very short time simultaneous demands have been received at Malta by the Commissary of the Field Train Department here, and by myself, for shot, shell, and ammunition. These have been all complied with; three ship loads have been sent from Malta, and I suppose an equal quantity from Constantinople. It is the same as regards provisions and stores; "send up everything" is the order; the consequence is, that the coast of the Crimea and the small harbours become full of vessels with supplies, most vital to the welfare of the armies, which in the event of a similar gale to that of 14th November may again lead to like serious consequences.

I would therefore urgently recommend that a certain number of the largest transports be strongly moored in Balaclava harbour, as floating depôts for all manner of stores, forage, provisions, and ammunition; and that timely demand be made to me to keep up the supplies, which can readily be done by small cargo steamers selected for the purpose.

The stores and provisions on their arrival at Balaclava could then at once be removed to the floating depôts till required, and the vessels sent back immediately, which is of importance.

By the above means the coast and harbours would be kept clear of vessels waiting to be discharged, heavy demurrage would be avoided, as well as unnecessary accumulation of valuable stores, and the recurrence of heavy gales might be looked for without anxiety.

Vice-Admiral Dundas, C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

(signed) *E. Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral, Superintendent.

"Harpy," at Constantinople, 5 December 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of 28th ultimo, requesting me to communicate with Mr. Smith, the senior commissariat officer at Constantinople, and to forward immediately, by means of steam conveyance, such supplies as he may wish to send to the army.

I can assure your Lordship that I have the greatest anxiety to forward the public service, and to secure the comforts of our brave troops by every means in my power; but I regret to state that at this moment I have not one available steam vessel at my disposal, and, very much against my inclination, I was obliged to send up yesterday a portion of the 34th regiment in a sailing transport. I have on several occasions pointed out the necessity of some of the smaller cargo steamers, such as the "Sea Nymph" and "Cottenham," being told off for the special duty of enabling me to keep up the supplies of the army.

On 20th of October I despatched the "Sea Nymph" to Balaclava with a cargo of charcoal, and requested her immediate return, but she only made her appearance on 2d instant. I also requested that the "Sovereign," which sailed on 5th November, might be sent back, but she is still absent. (Arrived 12th December.)

If four vessels, the two I have named, and two others, the "Sovereign" and "Emperor," could be placed at my entire disposal for army service, I will answer that their wants are supplied with regularity and despatch; but unless some such system be observed, great inconvenience must be caused, particularly at this advanced season of the year.

(signed) *E. Boxer*,
Rear-Admiral.

His Excellency General Lord Raglan, G. C. B.

"Harpy," Constantinople, 29 December 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 14th instant.

Regarding the steam vessels sent to Marseilles for French troops, I beg to state that I only sent four, as directed by Vice-Admiral Dundas, and urged by Her Majesty's Ambassador, as, I understood, by your Lordship's particular desire. I am not aware of any inconvenience having been experienced from their absence on that service, but of that your Excellency must be the best judge.

The "Rockcliff" was voluntarily transferred by me to the Commissariat, her cargo having been appropriated mostly for naval service; but as several transports had sailed a few days previously with provisions for the army, I did not consider it necessary to tow her up to the Crimea, particularly as a fair wind was blowing at the time, independent of which I had no vessel to tow her.

Every exertion is made by me to forward troops, provisions, and stores with the least possible delay, and the service would be much expedited if the steam transports, when unloaded at Balaclava, were, as already represented, immediately despatched to Constantinople, having rarely means at my disposal to meet the numerous demands made on me by various departments of the public service.

Appendix, No. 3.

Deputy Commissary-general Smith is in error in stating that the "Wrangler" left for the Crimea on the 3d instant without anything in tow. The "Wrangler" proceeded to the Dardanelles to assist a transport on shore; and to show my anxiety on the subject of forwarding supplies, I may mention that I fowarded the two barley vessels by the "Snake" and "Wrangler" on 14th and 16th instant, one of which carried the mail. * * * * * * * At the date of Mr. Smith's letter I had placed at his disposal the "Negociator," "Palmerston," and "Arabia" transports, and he has now the "Sydney," "Echunga," "Eveline," and "Gomelza."

The steam transport "Medway" has sailed with commissariat supplies.

In concluding this letter, I bring to your Excellency's notice, that since 1st November upwards of 15,000 British troops have been forwarded from Constantinople to the Crimea without accident or delay.

His Excellency Lord Raglan, G. C. B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *E. Boxer.*

"Baraguay d'Hilliers."
"Walmer Castle."
"Morayshire."

P. S.—Since concluding this letter I have placed at the disposal of Deputy Commissary-general Smith, for army service, the three transports named in the margin, with full cargoes of provisions sent from England for the navy.

LETTER from Rear-Admiral *Lyons* to the Directors of the Transport Board.

"Royal Albert," off Sebastopol,
Gentlemen, 16 May 1855.

13 May 1855.

In compliance with directions contained in your letter of the 21st ultimo, I enclose for your information a letter from Rear-Admiral Boxer, explaining the reason why the medical stores on board the late steamer, "Prince," were not landed at Scutari in November last.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Edmund Lyons,*
Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

Further REPORT of Admiral *Boxer* relating to the Medical Stores on board the late Steamship "Prince," with Enclosures.

Sir, "Diamond," at Balaklava, 13 May 1855.

In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, No. 93, relative to certain medical stores not having been landed at Scutari from the "Prince," steam transport, I have the honour to inform you that the "Prince" arrived at Constantinople from England on the 5th November last, and started for Balaklava the following day. I enclose a copy of the Admiralty Agent's letter reporting his arrival. (No. 1.)

The agent of the "Prince" was directed, first, to report himself to the military authorities at Scutari, and after they had done with the vessel to follow my orders. Commander Baynton having reported himself to me, I gave him orders to proceed to the Crimea, a copy whereof I herewith forward. (No. 2.)

Having given the necessary explanation on this subject, I beg further to observe, that the "Prince" arrived at Constantinople at a period when every extra man was most valuable to the British Army. Lord Raglan had sent to Gallipoli, and Volas in Thessaly, for French and Turkish troops, and our own soldiers, sick and overworked, required reinforcements and winter clothing, Is it surprising, in this emergency, that on the arrival of a ship with a regiment fresh from England, and a large supply of warm clothes, I should have been most anxious to send forward, with as little delay as possible, so welcome a relief?

The treasure for the Turkish Government I landed in person, and took upon myself the responsibility of giving receipts for more than 100,000 *l.*, in order that the ship should not be delayed; and no application having been made to me to detain the ship, she was sent forward with every possible expedition.

The inconvenience was caused by the loss of that unfortunate ship, and not because the medical stores were not landed at Scutari.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Edward Boxer,*
Rear-Admiral.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart., G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief.

(No. 1.)

Steam Transport Ship "Prince,"
Constantinople, 5 Nov. 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report my arrival here, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, after a passage of 20 days from Greenhithe, River Thames, with specie for the Turkish Government and British Commissary-general, and a full cargo, ordnance stores, and clothing for the army, with the 46th Regiment, and 18 horses, one of which had to be destroyed on the passage from injuries received during a severe gale of wind from the north-east.

We have likewise about 13 tons of apparatus connected with diving operations, with men to work the same, with staff assistant surgeons, and commissary clerks, to be landed where the authorities may direct.

During the first week of the passage, the ship passed through the Gut of Gibraltar; the second week made Cape Matapan; since which encountered continued gales of wind from N. E. until yesterday.

We fortunately found good anchorage in Karysto Bay (Island of Negropont), where we remained two days, making, during that time, two trials to make our passage, but were driven back each time.

I am happy to say that the ship is quite ready to perform any service you may require, and the health of the officers and troops has not suffered during the passage.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Benj. Baynton*,
Commander and Agent for Transports.

Rear-Admiral Boxer,
Constantinople.

(No. 2.)

(Memorandum.)

"Canterbury," at Constantinople,
5 November 1855.

IMMEDIATELY you have landed the treasure consigned to the Commissariat and Turkish Government, the military authorities having no orders for you, and having 12 days coal on board, you are hereby required and directed to proceed, with as much expedition as possible, to join the flag of the Vice-Admiral Commander-in-chief off Sebastopol, from whom you will receive further orders.

(signed) *Edward Boxer*,
Rear Admiral, Superintendent.

Commander B. Baynton, Admiralty Agent,
of Steam-transport "Prince."

FIFTH REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPO

WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTE

AND

AN APPENDIX.

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ON

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2. *Cumbrous and inconvenient Character of the Vehicles.*
3. *Official Documents on the Subject.*
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2. *Medical Promotions.*
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4. *Navy:*

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Arnott, Dr. Impression as to Government having communicated with Dr. Arnott, who declined to go out and look after the Smyrna hospital, *Dr. A. Smith* 8526–8531——Non-employment of Dr. Arnott adverted to, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19994–19998.

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2. *Amount of the Force sent out.*
3. *Commissariat Arrangements.*
4. *Medical Department.*
5. *Efficiency of the Service.*

1. *Means of Transport to the East:*

Particulars as to the transport arrangements made for the conveyance of the artillery, for which service eighteen vessels were taken up, *Milne* 16408, 16409.

2. *Amount of the Force sent out:*

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4. *Medical Department:*

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5. *Efficiency of the Service:*

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Very defective state of the field artillery in 1852; steps taken by witness, as Master-general of the Ordnance, to remedy the same, *Lord Hardinge* 20641, 20642——Excellent condition of the field batteries in the Crimea; there are at the present time seventy-eight guns of different calibre, *ib.* 20642, 20643——Admirable manner in which the military arrangements at home in regard to the artillery were carried out, *ib.* 20795, 20796——Opinion that at the present time the artillery service of this country is equal, if not superior, to any other, *ib.* 20796.

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Asia Minor. Inadequacy of the Greek and Turkish vessels passing to and fro in the Bosphorus to have supplied the events of the Crimean army from Asia Minor, &c., *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1768–1771.

Neglect of certain suggestions by witness to Lord Raglan and Commissary Filder, for forming depôts of food at Sinope and other places, *Layard* 2498–2501. 2632. 2686–2688. 2690. 2698——Contracts entered into by the French for procuring supplies from Asia Minor, *ib.* 2502–2504——Witness did not make any practical suggestions about depôts to Mr. Smith, Commissary at Constantinople, *ib.* 2685, 2686. 2689——Difficulty about employing the most suitable persons as agents of the Commissariat in Asia Minor, *ib.* 2690——Advantages of Sinope and Samsoun as places of depôt, *ib.* 2698——Fertility of Asia Minor adverted to, *ib.* 2717, 2718.

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"Avon," The. Want of preparation, and great suffering of the sick on board the "Avon" steam transport during a passage from Balaklava to Scutari, *Stafford* 7645–7649. 7851, 7852; *Bamford* 12002–12005. 12011. 12074–12076——Defective cooking for the sick on board; reference specially to the state of the pea-soup as served out to the men, *Stafford* 7649–7652——Great delay after the flank march in procuring bedding and baggage from on board the "Avon," *Flower* 10009–10014. 10084–10087.

Witness was commander of the "Avon" steamer, of 2,061 tons, belonging to the West India Mail Company, *Ellison* 12748. 12751–12753——Left Cork on the 23d of July 1854 with nearly 1,300 men, who were landed opposite Therapia, in the Bosphorus, *ib.* 12749, 12750. 12754, 12755——Went with the expedition to the Crimea, *ib.* 12756, 12757——Services of the "Avon," in the Black Sea, up to the period of the storm, *ib.* 12758–12776. 12855, 12856——During the storm witness ran his ship into the harbour, and contrived to save her; damages inflicted on her by the gale, *ib.* 12777–12782. 12797–12805. 12854.

Particulars as to the accommodation and general arrangements for between 300 and 400 sick and wounded on board the "Avon," at Balaklava, from about the 18th November to the 4th of December; also when on the passage subsequently to Scutari, *Ellison* 12806–12853. 12874–12876——Insufficient number of beds provided, *ib.* 12812–12816——Filthy state for some time of the vessel and the men; improvement on a sufficient number of orderlies having been sent on board, *ib.* 12817–12825. 12829. 12834. 12852, 12853——Sufficient supply of medical comforts on board, *ib.* 12824. 12875, 12876——Inquiry directed by Lord Raglan into the state of the sick; steps taken thereon, *ib.* 12826–12834——Insufficient number of medical men till after the inquiry, *ib.* 12829–12833.

"*Avon*," *The*—continued.

There was no unnecessary delay in the landing at Scutari, *Ellison* 12850, 12851—— The "Avon" was ordered to Malta for repairs by Admiral Boxer, and thence home by Admiral Stewart, *ib.* 12854.

Return showing the death of 50 men on board during the passage to Scutari, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 706.

Azof, Sea of. Plan of operations in the Sea of Azof suggested by witness in his despatch to Lord Raglan of 29th June 1854; similar instructions by Sir J. Graham to Admiral Dundas, *Duke of Newcastle* 14422. 14768, 14769——The fleet could not prevent the communication across the Sea of Azof without the co-operation of a land force, *Vice-Admiral Dundas*, 20451-20454. 20618-20620——Belief that the Russians were principally supplied by the way of the Sea of Azof, *Sir J. Graham* 21281, 21282——A blockade of the Sea of Azof was rendered impossible by the passage through the strait of Kertch having been stopped by sunken vessels, *ib.* 21283, 21284.

B.

Baggage. See *Baggage Animals. Officers. Officers' Horses. Regiments of the Line*, 2.

Baggage Animals. The baggage animals were left behind on embarking from Varna for the Crimea, *Gen. Bentinck* 1154, 1155—— Employment in the Crimea of all the baggage animals of the several regiments in bringing up food and fuel to the camp, *Sparks* 5331-5338.

Baggage ponies (each as useful for transport as four cavalry horses), might have been purchased in Turkey for from 4 *l.* to 7 *l.* each, *Lord Lucan* 6462-6464——Letter from witness to the Adjutant-general, dated 17 January, relative to the overwork of the horses, and the pecuniary sacrifice thereby, and advocating the employment of baggage ponies; no notice was taken of this representation, *ib.* 6466. 6477-6479.

The regimental bât animals, about twenty-four to each regiment, were provided at Varna by the Government, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13581-13583——Doubt as to the manner in which the officers' baggage animals were provided, *ib.* 13584-13586——Distinction between regimental bât horses and officers' baggage horses, *ib.* 13662, 13663. 13665-13677.

Explanation as to many bât horses having been left at Varna for want of means of transport to Old Fort, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20480 *et seq.* 20519-20525.

Statement by Commissary-general Filder, dated 2 September 1854, as to the number of bât animals then purchased, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 381.

See also *Officers' Horses.*

Baines, James, & Co. Witness represents the firm of James Baines & Company, of Liverpool, *Mackay* 6720——Extensive business of the firm as shipowners, &c., *ib.* 6721, 6722. 6724——None of their vessels were engaged by the Government till very recently, *ib.* 6723, 6724.

Evidence in explanation of a tender made by witness to the Government for provisioning the army in the Crimea from April 1855, at the rate of 3 *s.* 6 *d.* per man per day, *Mackay* 6774-6805. 6836-6846. 6872-6875. 6878-6881—— Articles of diet, and quantities of each, included in the tender, *ib.* 6776, 6777——It was calculated that four large steamers plying direct between England and the Crimea, and four small steamers plying in the Black Sea, would have conveyed an ample supply, *ib.* 6778, 6779. 6788-6791. 6844, 6845——The tender applied to any part of the Crimea, *ib.* 6780-6782——Intended means of transport from the ships to the camp, *ib.* 6781. 6787——Contemplated cooking arrangements, *ib.* 6784-6786——Facilities for discharging the cargoes, *ib.* 6790. 6872-6875. 6880, 6881.

Experience of witness's firm with respect to the provisioning of emigrants to Australia, &c., *Mackay* 6783, 6792-6802——Reference to two ships now being fitted up for Government by witness's firm; one of these, the "Great Tasmania," is to contain 1,000 berths, *ib.* 6811. 6815-6817. 6864-6868.

Difficulty in a regular daily supply of fresh meat to the army; proposal made by Messrs. Baines & Co., of Liverpool, adverted to hereon, *Duke of Newcastle* 15395-15397.

Bakeries. Extensive bakeries of the French army adverted to, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1712-1716.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 8 November 1854, suggesting the establishment of a floating steam mill and bakery for the army, *App.* (*Third Rep.*), *p.* 390, 391—— Treasury Minute, dated 28 November 1854, sanctioning the adoption of the foregoing suggestion, *ib.* 391.

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BALAKLAVA:

1. *Generally as to the Arrangements within the Harbour.*
2. *The Arrangements considered in connexion with the Storm.*
3. *Filthy State of the Harbour at different Periods.*
4. *Dangerous Anchorage outside the Harbour.*
5. *Very deficient Landing, Wharfage, and Storage Accommodation.*
6. *Defective Street Regulations.*
7. *Non-appropriation of Houses, &c., when the Town was taken.*
8. *Authorities in charge of the Harbour; their Responsibility considered.*

1. *Generally as to the Arrangements within the Harbour:*

Evidence showing how far the arrangements were defective in November, *Owen* 1488 *et seq.*——Authorities at Balaklava in October who gave directions for the anchorage of the vessels, *Vaux* 2239–2249——Want of order in the harbour towards the end of October, *Layard* 2523.

Efficient discharge of the duties of harbour-master in December, *Clay* 2770–2775. 3216–3218——Particulars relative to the general conduct of matters by Captain Christie and the Commissariat; disorganization and confusion existing, *ib.* 2925–2976——Witness did not observe much confusion in the harbour with respect to the positions of the transports which were lying athwart; approval of such position, *ib.* 3014–3018. 3189–3192——With proper organization, everytihng might have been set right at Balaklava, &c., *ib.* 3082, 3083.

Better arrangement of the ships in the harbour after the date of the storm, *Crowe* 4955-4957——Irregularity in the harbour with respect to the anchorage and discharging of the vessels, *Kellock* 5172–5179. 5186, 5187. 5189——Great improvement in the state of things since December; want of arrangements previously, *Muir* 12192–12204. 12261–12265——Want of system and of order in the harbour when witness was there, *Stewart* 12431, 12432. 12484–12487. 12555–12559——Crowded and disorderly state of the harbour in October, *Darke* 12660——Representation privately by witness to Sir James Graham relative to Balaklava, about the condition and management of which he had received private complaints, *Duke of Newcastle* 14601–14607.

Instructions to witness on the evening of the 27th of October to get all the vessels into the harbour that had first been ordered out, in consequence of the battle of Balaklava; complinace therewith, *Dacres* 16088–16093——Mode in which the ships were anchored in the harbour; approval thereof, *ib.* 16100–16103. 16268. 16296. 16349——The master of the "Sanspareil" superintended the anchoring, *ib.* 16105. 16269. 16270. 16292——Different occasions on which the evacuation of the harbour was intended, *ib.* 16149–16151. 16279, 16280——Regulations with regard to anchorage, *ib.* 16269–16277. 16291–16294——Practice in regard to transports being ordered in and out of the harbour, *ib.* 16271–16281——When ordered out, they were always towed out to a safe distance from the shore, *ib.* 16282–16284.

Reference to the regulations issued in regard to the harbour by the persons in charge as having been satisfactory to the Admiralty, *Milne* 16924–16930——Unavoidably exceptionable state of the harbour on account of the large number of transports constantly in it, *ib.* 16940–16942.

The only complaint made to witness in regard to Balaklava was, that the harbour was too small; he sent very able men to command there, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20544–20547. 20570–20574.

Want of arrangement in the harbour and want of system on shore adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 11, 12.

2. *The Arrangements considered in connexion with the Storm:*

Statement relative to the arrangements within the harbour, and the deficiency thereof, about the period of the storm, *Owen* 1488–1498. 1508. 1549–1569——Mal-arrangement in placing the ships across the harbour, instead of fore and aft, *ib.* 1490. 1559–1569——Utter confusion in the harbour the day after the storm, *ib.* 1505–1507——If the ships had been properly moored, the harbour would have held double the number, with less danger of damage, *ib.* 1508. 1165–1569——The ships lost would have escaped if in the harbour, or if previously allowed to be off the coast, *ib.* 1613–1615.

Number of transports seen by witness at one time in the harbour; opinion that there were a great many more than twenty-five on the day of the storm, *Vaux* 2399. 2403–2408——Damaged condition of the transports in the harbour after the storm, *Clay* 2759–2761——There was about sixty vessels in the harbour on the day of the storm, and sixteen at anchor outside; impracticability of taking any more vessels into the harbour, which was in a very crowded state, *Vellacott* 3549–3551. 3651–3656. 3701–3704——Mention of several transports which were outside the harbour on the 14th of November, *ib.* 3562–3575——Condition of the harbour before and after the storm, *ib.* 3586–3593——Approval of the position of the ships in the harbour, *ib.* 3705, 3706.

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BALAKLAVA—continued.

2. *The Arrangements considered in connexion with the Storm*—continued.

Number of vessels outside the harbour of Balaklava on the day of the storm, *Duke of Cambridge* 4035-4037——Warning on the night before the storm of the danger of anchoring outside, *ib.* 4038-4044——Improper moorings of the vessels at the time of the storm, *Muir* 12206, 12207——Opinion that half the damage consequent on the storm might have been obviated by a proper arrangement of the transports in the harbour, *Darke* 12742-12747.

Crowded state of the harbour at the time of the storm, *Dacres* 16111. 16113. 16123. 16279——Impracticability of the sailing vessels going out to sea, or being towed out during the storm, *ib.* 16128. 16312-16323. 16343. 16347, 16348——Damage done in the harbour by the "Andes" running in during the storm, *ib.* 16349.

3. *Filthy State of the Harbour at different Periods:*

The water in the harbour was in a very dirty state in December, *G. Dundas* 96——Filthy state of the harbour when witness left, which was on the 17th of November, *Layard* 2479-2481——Beautiful condition of the harbour when the place was taken possession of, *ib.* 2559-2561——The harbour was badly arranged and in a filthy state about the middle of October, *ib.* 2571-2576.

Filthy state of the harbour at different periods in December, *Clay* 2749, 2750; *Lord Cardigan* 5787-5791; *Stafford* 7706——State of the harbour further adverted to; difficulty of removing the filth, *Clay* 2960-2976——Facility with which the harbour might have been cleaned, *Clay* 3108-3110. 3219; *Lord Cardigan* 5792-5795; *Macdonald* 6181-6185; *Stafford* 7707-7709——Reasons why witness did not suggest to Captain Christie any means for keeping the harbour clean, *Clay* 3220-3223.

Offensive state of Balaklava harbour when witness left it on 3d February, *Crowe* 4900-4905. 4957——Evidence showing the dirty state of the harbour in October, *Kellock* 5161-5163——Extremely filthy and pestiferous state of Balaklava harbour in February, *Macdonald* 6178-6180, 6184——Dirty state of the harbour on 30th December, *Darke* 12740, 12741.

Particulars as to the state of the harbour whilst witness was in charge in October and November; care taken to keep it free from filth and floating offal, &c.; denial of statements hereon by Captain Kellock and others, *Dacres* 16095-16099. 16247, 16248. 16256-16267——Captain Kellock, of the "Himalaya," was never inside the harbour at all, *ib.* 16350, 16351.

4. *Dangerous Anchorage outside the Harbour:*

Evidence in proof of the very dangerous character of the anchorage outside Balaklava, *Clay* 2762-2765; *Kellock* 5146-5160; *Muir* 12205. 12208-12210; *Stewart* 12352-12362. 12389-12393; *Ellison* 12783——Representation made by witness to Captain Christie as to the danger of anchoring outside the harbour, *Clay* 2762, 2763; *Stewart* 12358. 12390-12392——Witness told his own captain never to anchor there, *Clay* 2764, 2765——Repeated representations were made by witness as to the danger of the anchorage, *Dacre* 16127——Reason for ships anchoring in so dangerous a position, *ib.* 16128-16130. 16324-16331——The anchorage adverted to in connexion with the deficiencies for unloading in the harbour, *ib.* 16129-16148.

5. *Very deficient Landing, Wharfage, and Storage Accommodation:*

The landing place in December was composed chiefly of a few trusses of hay, *G. Dundas*, 133-135. 293-295; *Clay* 2752——There were no permanent mechanical arrangements for unloading the boats, *G. Dundas* 136-139——Insufficiency of the wharfage accommodation, *Owen* 1599-1603; *Dacres* 16146-16148. 16297-16301——Absence at first of any regulations with respect to the disembarkation of troops or stores, *Layard* 2472, 2473. 2477, 2478.

Bran and barley, in bags, and other stores, were lying about without any covering, *Clay* 2753-2757——Some vessels with cargoes for Balaklava have left the port without discharging them, *ib.* 2912-2915——Want of a properly organized system for discharging cargoes adverted to as causing the employment of many more transports than otherwise would have been necessary, *ib.* 2989-3002——Manner in which a cargo of bullocks was landed from the "Emperor," *ib.* 3212-3215.

Waste and destruction of different kind of stores, *Vellacott* 3637-3650——Crowded state of the quay about the end of January, *Crowe* 4844-4850. 4956——Inconvenience from want of proper landing places, *ib.* 4851-4854——Facility for unloading the cargoes in the harbour, by employing the crews of the numerous vessels there, *ib.* 4867-4872——Bad arrangement at first in not using large empty houses as stores; this was being done about the 1st of February, *ib.* 4931-4936.

Facility with which the harbour, quays, and streets might have been cleansed, *Kellock* 5167-5169——Want of arrangement on the quays, *ib.* 5170——Want of system in not always unloading the vessels, and placing the cargoes on shore under tarpaulins, or some other

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5. *Very deficient Landing, Wharfage, and Storage Accommodation*—continued.

other shelter, *Lord Cardigan* 5804-5807——Landing places were being made at Balaklava on the 30th of December, when witness was last there, *Darke* 12737-12740.

Inadequacy of the ground available for landing, &c. purposes, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13933. 13951——Measures adopted by witness for remedying the evils complained of in the landing and warehousing of the stores, *Duke of Newcastle* 15072——Process of unloading the transports; sufficiency of boats for this purpose, *Dacres* 16285-16290.

Inconvenience at Balaklava through the want of proper wharves, &c., adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 11, 12——Natural inconvenience of the harbour for landing the vast quantities of stores required for the Army, *ib.* 12.

6. *Defective Street Regulations:*

Great want of arrangement of traffic in the main street, *Geo. Dundas* 140-149——Dirty and crowded state of the streets, *Vaux* 2321-2325; *Clay* 2977, 2978; *Crowe* 4855-4857——No attention seemed to be paid to the sanitary condition of the place, *Clay* 2980, 2981——Unhealthiness generally of Balaklava, *Parker* 3479, 3480——Very bad state of the town, chiefly through the wretched condition of the Turks, *Dacres* 16152-16155.

7. *Non-appropriation of Houses, &c., when the Town was taken:*

Irregularity of the proceedings when Balaklava was taken possession of, there having been no appropriation of houses, &c., *G. Dundas* 120-129. 131; *Layard* 2468-2472——After the place was taken, some disorder occurred, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 636-638——Allotment of houses to the commanding officers, *ib.* 640——Want of arrangement at the period of witness's departure from the Crimea, *ib.* 641-648.

Circumstance of a large house marked as Lord Raglan's head quarters having been occupied merely by the men who shod the horses, *Vaux* 2313-2320——There were at first many houses which might have been used for stores, *Layard* 2562-2572——Mode of appropriation of the houses adverted to, *Clay* 3027-3035; *Duke of Cambridge* 3089——Reference to a large house, with Lord Raglan's name on it, of which no use was made, *Parker* 3380-3385——Tolerably good order in the town subsequently to its capture, *Duke of Cambridge* 3811.

Appropriation of a large house as Lord Raglan's headquarters; this was afterwards unoccupied, though there was a want of cover for the sick, *Duke of Cambridge* 3812-3821. 3828-3834——The house in Balaklava called "headquarters," was by no means large, *Maxwell* 13253——Explanation as to the use made of the building retained possession of by Lord Raglan, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17609-17615.

8. *Authorities in charge of the Harbour; their Responsibility considered:*

Captain Dacres was the chief naval officer within the harbour at the time of the storm, *Vellacott* 3553-3558. 3586——Impression that the naval commander-in-chief should have seen to the state of the harbour, *Kellock* 5177——Authorities to whom witness, as Captain of the "Himalaya," considered it necessary to make official communications, and to apply for orders, *ib.* 5188. 5196-5204——Different authorities adverted to as causing a want of proper regulations, *Lord Cardigan* 5796-5809——One supreme authority with greater powers than Captain Christie should have absolute control in Balaklava port, *ib.* 5808, 5809.

Opinion that much better regulations might from the first have been enforced if there had been a thoroughly competent authority in charge, *Stewart* 12555-12559——Responsibility of the Admiralty primarily, and of Captain Christie immediately, with respect to the organization of the vessels in the harbour, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14318-14320——Witness took charge of Balaklava harbour on the 27th of October, *Dacres* 16079-16087——Responsibility of witness in regard to the condition of, and arrangements in, the harbour, *ib.* 16094, 16271-16275, 16295.

Several authorities in charge of the harbour up to the arrival of Admiral Boxer on the 29th January, *Milne* 16914-16923——Witness sent Sir Edmund Lyons and other able officers to command at Balaklava, but did not visit the place himself after the landing of the expedition, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20526-20528. 20542-20544——Different naval officers appointed by Admiral Dundas to command in the harbour; they were all well-qualified men, *Sir J. Graham* 21095, 21096.

Division of authority in Balaklava, and evils consequent thereon, adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 12.

See also *Boxer, Rear-Admiral Edward,* C. B. *Christie, Captain,* R. N. *Coaling. Depôts. Heath, Captain,* R. N. *Lyons, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund. Mends, Captain,* R. N. *Powell, Captain,* R. N. *"Prince," The.* 1. *Pritchard, Mr. "Resolute," The. Tatham, Captain,* R. N.

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Balaklava Hospital. See *Hospitals,* II.

Ball-Cartridges. Exertions necessary to provide ball-cartridges for the Minié rifle at the commencement of the war, *Monsell* 19629.

Bamford, Captain Robert Carter. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is in the 63d regiment, 11959——Embarked at Cork on the 23d of July, and left the army before Sebastopol on the 18th of November, 11960, 11961——Was wounded at Inkermann, 11962——Correction of Mr. Flower's statement (*Q.* 10084 *et seq.*) with respect to the knapsacks of the regiment, 11963-11968. 11971-11992. 12056-12060——Copy of letter, dated 1 December, received by witness when at Scutari from Colonel Dalzell, of the 63d, commissioning him to purchase some ponies and carts, and sundry articles for the use of the regiment, 11969, 11970——Explanation as to the holes for the tents dug by order of Colonel Dalzell, 11976-11984. 11993-11997.

Inconvenient character of the ambulance waggons, 11998-12001——Convenience of the French ambulance mules, 12000, 12001——Want of accommodation for the sick on board the "Avon" from Balaklava to Scutari, 12002-12005. 12011. 12074-12076——Utter want of conveniences for the sick on board the "Trent," in which vessel witness left Balaklava, 12006-12012. 12072-12074——Landing of the sick from the "Trent" at Scutari, where means were at hand to convey them to the hospitals, 12013-12018.

Rations of witness in the barrack hospital, 12019, 12020——Want of cooking arrangements for the officers in the hospital, 12020-12028——Great attention displayed by Dr. Calder, 12026——Linen was not supplied to witness, 12029——There were no visits from the officer of the day, 12030-12034——Duty performed by the convalescents till removed to the Crimea, 12035——Doubt as to the correctness of the statements concerning the reduction in the strength of witness's regiment, 12036-12043. 12054, 12055——Sickness in the regiment consequent on working in the trenches when they were not healthy, 12044.

Want of medicines in the Crimea, 12045. 12089-12092——Want of some medicines when witness was at Scutari, 12046-12050——Good character of the tents of the 63d in the Crimea, 12051-12053——Character of the rations of the Fourth Division; it was worse off than any other division, 12061-12071——Condition of some potatoes brought from the "Harbinger," 12068. 12081, 12082——Belief as to there having been one or two deaths on board the "Trent," 12077-12080——Privilege to witness in being allowed to take a pony to the Crimea for the use of his company, 12082-12088.

Bands. Exhilarating effect produced on the men by the French bands, *Clay* 2823, 2824; *Wilson* 4359——Circumstance of the English bands not having played before Sebastopol, *Wilson* 4356-4358.

Barley. Statement as to some barley in harbour at Balaklava not having been landed, and placed in store, *Lord Lucan* 6322-6331——Large quantity of barley destroyed by the fire at Varna, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13649——Abundance of barley at Balaklava on all occasions, *J. W. Smith* 15884. 15886, 15887.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Captain Christie, dated 18 December 1854, complaining of delay in the landing of some barley, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 405.

See also *Chopped Straw and Barley. Forage.*

Barrack Hospital (*Scutari*). See *Hospitals,* I.

Barracks. Steps taken by witness to procure barracks at Constantinople; good condition of these barracks, *J. W. Smith* 15578-15587.

Barrett, Dr. Offer of gratuitous medical services made by Dr. Barrett, of Aix-la-Chapelle, *Dr. A. Smith* 12925.

Bartlett, Mr. Exertions of Mr. Bartlett, Commissariat officer to the First Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, *Horsford* 13385, 13386.

Bashi Bazouks. Attempts made by witness, through Lord Raglan, &c., for organising a body of Bashi Bazouks, underGeneral Beatson and other English officers; failure generally of the steps taken on this subject, *Duke of Newcastle* 15018-15024. 15028.

Bât Horses. See *Baggage Animals. Officers' Horses.*

Baths. Want of baths in the English hospitals at Scutari, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9353, 9354——There were some regular baths at the general hospital, *Menzies* 10624. 10626——Explanation as to some baths at the barrack hospital having been for a time in disuse, and as to tubs having been substituted for them, *ib.* 10625-10632.

Baynes, Mr. Reference to the appointment to the Commissariat in Turkey of the son of Sir Edward Baynes, Consul at Tunis, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14175, 14176.

Bearskin Caps. Irksome character of the bearskin cap in being too heavy, &c., *Bentinck* 1938-1942——Approval of the present low bearskin cap of the Guards and of the bonnet of the Highlanders, *Duke of Cambridge* 4100-4103. 4190-4191——Dislike of the men to the bearskin cap, *Dawson* 5545-5547.

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Beds and Bedding:

1. *Deficient Supply, more especially at Scutari.*
2. *Official Explanation on the subject.*

1. *Deficient Supply, more especially at Scutari:*

Supply through witness out of the "Times" fund of bedding in the Crimea, *Macdonald* 6095——Ample supplies of beds or bedding might have been procured at Constantinople, *Macdonald* 7029-7032; *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9270——Want of linen and sheets at Balaklava, though they might easily have been procured at Constantinople, *Stafford* 7841–7848——Improper bedsteads in use at Scutari, though 10,000 iron ones had been sent out from England, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7892. 7894–7896. 7907.

Want of linen in the barrack hospital, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9010–9012——Suffering consequent upon the delay before the sick after landing at Scutari could be provided with beds; illustration thereof, *ib.* 9071–9074——Written suggestions by witness to Lord William Paulet relative to the patients' beds, *ib.* 9094——Though the men were obliged to lie on rotten boards, there were some iron bedsteads which might have been used, but that the mattresses were not of a proper size, *ib.* 9121, 9122. 9258–9269——Doubt as to there being any bedsteads in store at Scutari, except about three dozen iron ones, which were not used, *ib.* 9258–9264.

2. *Official Explanation on the subject:*

Supply of beds by the Ordnance on requisition from witness; quantity sent out, *Dr. A. Smith* 9441–9447—— Five thousand beds were first sent out in the spring, *ib.* 9444, 9445——Quantity of bedding, palliasses, &c. left at Varna, and not duly forwarded to Scutari, *ib.* 9621.

Deficient supply of bedding at Scutari after the battle of Inkermann, *Menzies* 9750, 9751. 9757——Want of bedding through the non-transmission of stores from Varna; steps taken to remedy the same, *ib.* 9742——Deficiency of beds in the barrack hospital; they were included in a list of articles applied for to Lord Stratford, *ib.* 10530–10536. 10552——Sufficient supply of bedding in the hospital at Varna, *Dumbreck* 11316, 11317. 11606, 11607——Supply of beds and bedding in store at Balaklava, though much wanted in the camp, *ib.* 11557–11563.

Explanation relative to some bedsteads for Scutari hospital, the legs for which were not forthcoming, or were not found to fit, *Sir T. Hastings* 18379——Statement showing that the bedsteads sent out in the "Robert Lowe" and the "Manilla" were shipped in a complete state, *ib.* 18573–18578.

Sundry requisitions made by the Medical Department on the Ordnance Department for bedding for the hospitals, *App.* (*Third Rep.*), *p.* 494–502.

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"*Belgravia*," *The.* Discharge of a cargo of hay from the "Belgravia" adverted to; this vessel was five weeks in Balaklava harbour, *Vaux* 2105–2109. 2306–2312–2312; *Vellacott* 3683–3689.

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Bentinck, Major-General Henry J. W. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Commanded the brigade of Guards in the East, 1114, 1115——Left England on 22d February, and Malta on 22d April, 1116, 1117——Went subsequently to Scutari and Varna, and thence embarked for the Crimea, 1117, 1118——Sufficiency of the lodging and food provided for the troops at Scutari, 1119–1122——Satisfactory conduct of the transport to Varna, 1123–1125——Encampment of the Guards at Varna under canvas, 1126, 1127. 1131——Adequacy of the supplies of food at Varna, 1128, 1129. 1132.

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Arrangements for a proper supply of food during the march to the Alma, 1174–1175——Measures taken after the battle of Alma to remove the wounded, 1177–1181——Inadequacy at Alma of the medical staff of the Guards' brigade, some of the surgeons having invalided in Bulgaria, 1182–1191——Particulars as to the flank march from Alma to Balaklava, 1192–1199. 1203——Position of the encampment of the Guards before Sebastopol, 1200–1202——Description of the Woronzoff road from Balaklava to the camp, 1204–1207.

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Bentinck, Major-General Henry J. W. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Up to the 8th of November, when witness left the army, the weather was not severe, 1208——Sufferings of the troops from hard work, 1209——Sufficiency of the supply of food up to November 8th, 1209——Difficulties felt in procuring adequate quantities of fuel, 1210. 1215-1217——Explanation as to the Guards' clothing having been better than that of the line regiments, 1211——Supply of fresh clothing to the Guards some time in December, 1211-1214.

Belief that being without tents for about fourteen days after the battle of Alma was not productive of sickness, 1218-1221——Delay before the knapsacks not disembarked at Old Fort were restored to the men, 1225-1229——The men carried a change of nearly everything on disembarking, but the officers were many weeks without any change of clothing, 1230-1235——No depôts were established at Scutari or Constantinople, 1236, 1237——Tolerable efficiency of an interpreter attached to witness's brigade, 1238-1242.

Resources of Bulgaria with respect to provisions and means of transport, 1257-1263——Limited means of transport at the command of the army at Varna, 1264-1266——Greater capacity of the English than of the French transports from Varna to Old Fort, 1268-1271——Want of analogy between the French and English knapsack, 1277-1279——Unsuitableness of the ambulance waggons for removing the wounded, 1280-1284——Danger in removing the wounded on mules' backs, as adopted by the French, 1285——Measures taken for moving on any men who on the march were unable to proceed, 1286, 1287.

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Non-distribution of tea to the men, as it might have been spoiled by the wet, 1313-1315——Explanation as to the supply of green coffee, about the preparation of which there was no difficulty before going to the Crimea, 1314, 1315——Occasional supply of rice to the army, 1317, 1318——Non-supply of any vegetables, 1317. 1319. 1320——The sickness was mainly caused by overwork in the trenches and on picket, 1323. 1361, 1362.

The officers, when at Scutari, &c., were obliged to pay for their horses, and afterwards to leave them at Varna without any compensation, 1325-1327——No horses in witness's brigade died through want of forage in the Crimea, 1328-1331——Great suffering among the officers in being obliged to carry their own effects, 1332-1338——Small foraging caps were usually worn by the French, the shakos having been left in France, 1340-1342——Usefulness of the cap worn by the Guards in the Crimea, 1344, 1345——Duties of the Adjutant-general, 1347——Duties of the Quartermaster-general, 1348-1350.

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Regulations as to collecting brushwood for fuel, 1406-1409——Reason for not forming depôts of any kind when the camp was being established, 1409——There were provisions enough for two or three days in camp in the event of the communication with Balaklava having been cut off, which, however, was hardly feasible, 1410-1413——When witness left the army there was no special want of transport between Balaklava and the camp, 1414-1416.

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Further explanation as to the knapsacks having been left behind on the landing at Old Fort, 1926–1930——Weight of the knapsack adverted to, 1931–1933——The French soldiers seemed to carry more than the English, 1935–1937——Irksome character of the bearskin cap in being too heavy, &c., 1938–1942——Very inferior quality of the trenching tools, &c.; they were condemned by a Board at Scutari, and were precisely the same as those used at Chobham, where witness made an official complaint against them, 1944–1954. 2049–2050.

The want of a regular transport service alone caused the sufferings experienced between the landing at Old Fort and the arrival before Sabastopol, 1955–1958——Further statement relative to the Guards' clothing; condemnation of the clothing of the Scotch Fusiliers in London, and consequent delay in supplying the regiment, 1959–1963. 1968–1970. 1976–1984—— Strength of the Guards at Varna and in the Crimea, with particulars as to their losses from sickness and battle, 1964. 1994–2009.

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Reason for witness not having made representations concerning the communication from Balaklava to the camp, 2036–2038——Further statement relative to the sickness among the Guards, when encamped at Aladyn, near Varna, 2039–2044——Doubt as to the expediency of large depôts of provisions at the camp before Sebastopol, 2045–2048——Date at which the Highland Brigade were marched down from the heights to Balaklava; the trenches had previously been opened, 2056–2059——Most of the Fusilier Guards had their knapsacks when witness left the army, 2060, 2061.

Berkeley, Colonel. Explanaton of the delay in complying with the application of Colonel Berkeley for a medical board at Constantinople, where he was lying with a wound in the leg, which prevented his going to Scutari, *Menzies* 11231–11244.

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Belief that the bill-hooks and other tools complained of were not properly used or fairly treated, *Sir T. Hastings* 18498–18507. 18516. 18541–18543. 18549——Reference to some bill-hooks returned as inferior, but which, on trial, proved excellent tools, *ib.* 18498, 18499.

Bills of Lading. Security afforded by the bill of lading received by witness in the case of each consignment to him, *J. W. Smith* 15712–15715——The bills of lading were forwarded by the Admiralty direct to Mr. Smith at Constantinople, no duplicate being sent to the Treasury, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13827–13833.

Biscuit. Reference to the landing of a cargo of biscuit from the "Lion," *Vaux* 2116–2121——Waste of biscuit landed at Balaklava, and remaining uncovered on shore, *Vaux* 2297–2305; *Vellacott* 3645, 3646.

Loss of biscuit by the fire at Varna; steps taken to supply the same, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13649. 13659——Transmission of biscuit by the Admiralty in November, and subsequently, *ib.* 13742–13744——Letter from Mr. Filder, dated 23d October, requesting, as a precautionary measure, a continuous supply of biscuit, *ib.* 13742——Supply monthly of 1,000,000 pounds of biscuits as required by Mr. Filder; steps taken to provide the same, *ib.* 13742–13744——Increased supply of biscuit ordered through the Admiralty on the 28th of November, in accordance with a request to that effect from Mr. Filder, *ib.* 13782. 13786——Supply in store, &c. at Balaklava on 13th November, *ib.* 13797, 13798. 13801.

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Supply by the Admiralty, up to 1st May 1855, of 13,414,440 lbs. of biscuit for the army, *Grant* 17674–17677——Engagement of the Admiralty to send out 1,250,000 lbs. of biscuit monthly, *ib.* 17678.

Copies of letters from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 23d October and 8th November 1854, relative to the monthly supply of biscuit, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 388, 389——Treasury Minutes, dated 7th November and 28th November 1854, in compliance with the foregoing, *ib.*

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Black Sea. Advantage to the army in the command of the Black Sea, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 809. 830–832.——*See* also *Blockade* (*Black Sea*).

Blackwood, Mr. Testimonies to the zeal and intelligence of Mr. Blackwood, Commissariat officer attached to the First Division, *Bentinck*, 1909; *Parker* 3308. 3423, 3424; *Duke of Cambridge* 3840. 4123.

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Blakeley, Captain Alex nder Theophilus. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Captain on half-pay; went to the East in February 1854, to offer his services there, 4455–4457——Was at Gallipoli when the first detachment of the army arrived on the 9th or 10th of April, 4458, 4459——No definite Commissariat preparations seemed to have been made for the landing or reception of the troops; notification of such landing adverted to, 4460–4473——On landing, the army marched about eight miles inland, and encamped in tents, 4475–4481——Circumstances under which there was occasionally a short supply of rations, notwithstanding the labour of the Commissariat officers, 4488.

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Letter of remonstrance from Commissary-general Filder to Captain Christie, dated 18th December, about the want of boats in landing supplies, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13951, 13952——Examination as to the relative responsibility of the Commissariat department and of the Admiralty for the provision of boats and the landing of supplies at Balaklava, *ib.* 13955–13970——Complaint by the Commissariat department in the Crimea about the want of boats for landing the supplies as soon as such want was known, *ib.* 13958–13961——Employment of Commissariat boats in landing all supplies at Malta, Halifax, &c., *ib.* 13961–13963——Sufficient provision of small boats for the landing of the sick without delay, *J. W. Smith* 15932–15935.

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"*Bombay*," *The.* Letters in December 1854 between Lord de Redcliffe and Admiral Boxer, relative to deficient accommodation on board the "Bombay" and the Turkish hulk in the Bosphorus, *Sir J. Graham* 21134-21136.——*See* also *Floating Hospitals*, 3.

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1. *Inadequacy of the Supply: Delay in landing some Cargoes.*
2. *Official Explanation on the subject.*

1. *Inadequacy of the Supply: Delay in landing some Cargoes:*

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2. *Official Explanation on the subject:*

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Borlase, Captain, R.N. Circumstance of Captain Borlase, though exceedingly useful when attached to Admiral Boxer, in the Bosphorus, having been allowed by him to serve in the Crimea, as likely to be still more useful there; he is now employed at Constantinople, *Milne* 16831–16846.

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Boxer, Rear-Admiral Edward, c.b :

1. *Explanation relative to his Appointment at Constantinople and at Balaklava.*
2. *Generally as to his Duties and Powers.*
3. *Complaints relative to the Mode in which he exercised his Command.*
4. *His Conduct of the Service in the Bosphorus and at Balaklava explained and defended.*
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1. *Explanation relative to his Appointment at Constantinople and at Balaklava :*

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2. *Generally as to his Duties and Powers :*

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Duty of Admiral Boxer to have reported any want of transport to Lord Raglan or to witness, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20599–20602——Admiral Boxer was in charge of the transports in the Bosphorus, but was subject to Admiral Dundas, *Sir J. Graham* 21050, 21051. 21057–21059——Extracts from the instructions issued to Admiral Boxer; these instructions delivered in, *ib.* 21056–21059, *and App. p.* 345——Power of Admiral Dundas to have superseded Admiral Boxer, *ib.* 21100. 21177–21179.

3. *Complaints as to the Mode in which he exercised his Command :*

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4. *His Conduct of the Service in the Bosphorus and at Balaklava explained and defended:*

Positions in which the transports and other vessels lay in Constantinople harbour; doubt whether they could be better arranged, *Vaux* 2199–2214——Admiral Boxer was frequently on board the "Himalaya," at Constantinople, and gave orders, *Kellock* 5211, 5212. 5231——Witness, as administrator of the "Times" Fund, had no complaint against Admiral Boxer, *Macdonald* 7149, 7150. 7401, 7402——Kind and gentlemanlike conduct of Admiral Boxer towards witness, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9183——Willingness generally of Admiral Boxer to attend to applications from witness, *Menzies* 10757–10763——Admiral Boxer always treated witness very kindly, *Ellison* 12862, 12863.

No official complaints have been sent to the Admiralty against Admiral Boxer, *Milne* 16488–16490. 16496, 16497; *Sir J. Graham* 21097. 21166–21168——Nature of the reports made by him to the Admiralty with regard to the transport service at Constantinople, *Milne* 16516–16523. 16528——Regulations in regard to Balaklava harbour issued by Admiral Boxer, dated 6th March 1855, *Milne* 16924. 16929, 16930. *and App. (Third Rep.) p.* 447–451——Admiral Boxer is a very zealous and meritorious officer, and has risen to his present position entirely by his own merits, *ib.* 16933. 16996–17002——His first rating was as able seaman, but he entered the service as a gentleman, and had received a liberal education, *ib.* 16999.

With regard to Admiral Boxer, who was a most intelligent and useful officer, witness heard no official complaint against him, and had no reason to represent his conduct to Lord Raglan, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20562–20569——So far as he had control in regard to transports for the expedition, he exercised it to the satisfaction of witness, *ib.* 20435–20437.

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Summary of cavalry embarked for service in the East up to the 8th of February 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 687.

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Chaplains. Limited number of chaplains attached to the army in the Crimea, *Parker* 3313-3315——There were altogether only eight chaplains in the Crimea when witness left in January, *ib.* 3314——Arrangements made for the accommodation of the chaplains, *ib.* 3316-3324.

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Evidence relative to some 650 sacks of charcoal shipped in the "Himalaya" at Constantinople in September, and consigned to Captain Christie, transport agent at Balaklava, where it could not be landed, and was subsequently brought back to Constantinople, *Kelloch* 5077-5095. 5104, 5105. 5244-5248——Representations by witness relative to the charcoal cargo, *ib.* 5090. 5095——The charcoal was given over to Admiral Boxer, who sent lighters for it to the "Himalaya," *ib.* 5090-5094——Advantage if the medical men had required the use of charcoal in the hospitals at Scutari, *Stafford* 7838-7840.

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Chloride of Lime. Occasional use of chloride of lime in the hospital tents, *Parker* 3440–3443——Neglect in not using chloride of lime to prevent the effluvia from the latrines or necessaries at Scutari, *Stafford* 7754–7756——A large quantity of chloride of lime was sent from England early in 1854, *Dr. A. Smith* 8695, 8696——Complaint by Mrs. Bracebridge and Miss Nightingale of the want of chloride of lime in the barrack hospital at Scutari, whereas there was plenty in the apothecary's store, *Maxwell* 12996–12998. 13001–13003.

Chloroform. Consideration of the propriety of an order issued by Dr. Hall advising that chloroform should not be much resorted to in the case of severely wounded men; approval of the order, *Dr. A. Smith* 8596-8603. 8618, 8820——Disapproval of Dr. Hall's order with respect to chloroform, which however was frequently and successfully used, *Flower* 10193–10202——Beneficial use of chloroform at Scutari, *Menzies* 10638–10640——Discretion allowed under Dr. Hall's order with respect to chloroform, *Dumbreck* 11577——Constant use of chloroform in the army, *ib.* 11576, 11577.

Chobham Encampment. Reference to the Chobham encampment, and to the representations and suggestions made thereon, *Duke of Cambridge* 4165-4171——The encampment did not lead to any improvements in the equipments, &c., of the army, *Wilson* 4114–4118——Witness did not receive any report as a result of the encampment at Chobham, *Duke of Newcastle* 15064–15067.

Cholera. Death of only sixty men in the Second Division when at Varna from cholera; the division numbered 6,200 men, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 402–406——Prevalence of cholera in the "Himalaya" during the transport from Varna to Old Fort, *Kellock* 5241, 5242——Witness issued no instructions relative to cholera in the army, Dr. Hall being fully competent to take any precautions on the subject, *Dr. A. Smith* 8627-8634——How far advisable to have taken more precautionary measures against cholera in Turkey, *Dumbreck* 11469–11476——Loss of several men from cholera on board the "Andes" in conveying troops from Varna to Old Fort, *Muir* 12132–12137.

Cholera Belts. Delay in the delivery of 40,000 cholera belts sent out with the army, *Duke of Newcastle* 14813——Exemption of the medical department from responsibility in the matter, *ib.*——Order of cholera belts by the clerk of the Ordnance out of the usual course, *Sir T. Hastings* 18635, 18636——Circumstance of cholera belts having been ordered in March and November 1854 upon the signature of Sir T. Hastings only, *Monsell* 19510–19513.

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Chopped Straw and Barley. Use mainly of chopped straw and barley for feeding mules in Spain, *Kinloch* 5629. 5634——Approval of chopped straw and barley as provender for cavalry horses, *Lord Cardigan* 5814-5818; *Lord Lucan* 6390, 6391——Belief that chopped straw could not have been regularly supplied from Bulgaria, *Lord Cardigan* 5820——Sixteen pounds of chopped straw are preferable to eight pounds of hay, *Lord Lucan* 6391——Opportunities for obtaining chopped straw in Bulgaria, &c., *ib.* 6392–6395——Supply of chopped straw since the beginning of the year, *ib.* 6397-6406——Loan in November of 30 days' supply of chopped straw from the French, who were much inconvenienced by the delay in returning the loan, *ib.* 6398, 6399. 6412-6415.

Considerable quantity of barley and chopped straw in the Crimea at all times, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13747. 13765–13770. 14192——Objection made by the cavalry and artillery officers to the use of chopped straw, *ib.* 13753. 13758. 13764, 13765. 14047——Failure of an experiment for pressing the chopped straw, *ib.* 14192.

Contract entered into by witness at Constantinople for supplies of chopped straw, which was the forage of the country, and of which an ample supply was procured, *J. W. Smith* 15608–15613——There was no difficulty at any time at Constantinople in procuring

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chopped straw and barley, *J. W. Smith* 15834, 15835. 15886, 15887——Supplies of chopped straw at Balaklava, with the exception of a few days after the storm, *ib.* 15884, 15885.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Military Secretary to Lord Raglan, dated 17 January 1855, with respect to a supply of chopped straw lent by the French army after 14th November, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 405——Statement by Commissary-general Filder, dated 19 January and 27 January 1855, explaining that there has always been a supply of chopped straw in ship at Balaklava, *ib.* 406.

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Christie, Captain, R.N. Statements as to Captain Christie, when at Balaklava, having been living on board the "Melbourne," which was anchored outside the harbour, but rode through the storm, *Owen* 1532-1538. 1604-1611; *Vellacott* 3583, 3584; *Kellock* 5188-5195——Circumstances under which Captain Christie and his staff resided on board the "Harbinger" for about a month and a half, *Vaux* 2273-2286——Strong opinion expressed by Captain Christie against ships remaining outside the harbour, *ib.* 2400-2402——Captain Christie was at the head of the transport service at Balaklava; how appointed, *Layard* 2518-2522, 2577-2579. 2706, 2707——He resided first on board the "Emperor," and subsequently on board the "Harbinger," *Clay* 2916-2924.

Captain Christie often came on board the "Himalaya," *Kellock* 5209, 5210——Orders issued by Captain Christie (since October) that no vessel should enter Balaklava harbour unless by signal, *ib.* 5243——Nature of the authority exercised by Captain Christie, *Lord Cardigan* 5799-5802. 5808——Witness never had any complaints about Captain Christie, *Dacres* 16196, 16197——Reference to the age of Captain Christie as about fifty-five or fifty-six, *ib.* 16249-16251.

The appointment of Captain Christie was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, after approval by the Naval Board, *Milne* 16504-16507——Report by Sir Edmund Lyons as to the loss of the "Resolute" and the "Prince," in consequence of which a court-martial has been ordered on Captain Christie, *ib.* 16508-16513——Irresponsibility of Captain Christie in regard to the condition of Balaklava harbour, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20621-20624; *Sir J. Graham* 21064-21066.

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Copy of the instructions, dated 6 April 1854, given by the Board of Admiralty to Captain Christie, as principal agent of transports in the Mediterranean, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 728, 729.

See also *Balaklava*, 1. 2. 3. 8. *"Harbinger," The. "Prince," The*, 1. *"Resolute," The.*

Circassia. Course adopted by the Government for opening communications with the Circassian chiefs; agents employed, *Duke of Newcastle* 15029-15039.

See also *Brock, Captain, R.N.*

"City of London," The. The horses of Sir De Lacy Evans and his staff, as well as those of witness, were conveyed to the East, without accidents, in the "City of London" steamer, *Duke of Cambridge* 4212-4214——Arrangement as to monthly rate of payment upon which this steamer was taken up in February 1854, *Milne* 16375, 16376. 16671, 16672. 16679.

Civil Practitioners (*Medical Department*). See *Medical Officers*, 3.

Clay, Richard. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Shipowner, 2728——Chartered the steamer "Emperor" in March 1854, at 655 *l.* per week, to convey Lord Raglan's horses and servants from Woolwich to the East, 2729, 2730. 2895. 3137-3141——The vessels from Woolwich were not so well fitted up for the transport of horses as those from Hull, 2731-2734——After much difficulty, it was decided that the "Emperor" should be fitted up on the Hull plan, 2735-2740. 3142-3145. 3149——Has since chartered two other vessels, the "Cottingham" and the "Alster," for the conveyance of stores to the East, 2741-2745. 3170-3173.

Witness arrived at Balaklava early in December, and found two of his vessels, the "Emperor" and "Cottingham," already there, 2746-2748. 2758——Filthy state of the harbour at that period, 2749, 2750——The landing place was composed chiefly of a few trusses of hay, 2752——Bran and barley in bags, and other stores, were lying about, without

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Clay, Richard. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

without any covering, 2753–2757——Damaged condition of the transports in the harbour after the storm, 2759–2761——Representation made by witness to Captain Christie as to the danger of anchoring outside the harbour, 2762, 2763——Witness told his own captain never to anchor there, 2764, 2765.

There was a great deal of hay, probably from the wrecks, floating about in the harbour, 2766, 2767——Sickly condition of the crews of witness's vessels, 2768, 2769——The harbour-masters at Balaklava were extremely active, 2770–2775——The "Cottingham," loaded with planks, from Sinope, was for some weeks at Balaklava before she was discharged, 2776–2790——Authorities at Balaklava to whom she was consigned, 2781, 2782——Inferior character of the wood in question, 2785. 3019–3024.

Dreadful condition of the roads from Balaklava to the camp, 2791, 2792——Description of the transport waggons, 2793, 2794——Death of many of the transport horses from overwork, 2795, 2796——Ragged and dirty state of the men at the cavalry camp, 2798. 2809, 2810——They were fed chiefly upon salt provisions, 2798–2800——Some of the privates ate their food raw, 2801, 2802. 3060, 3061. 3226–3228——Miserable condition of the cavalry horses, from want of forage, &c., 2803–2808. 2819. 3057–3059——Comfortable state of the French troops, 2812, 2813——Huts were built by the French, not only for themselves, but for the British, 2814–2816——The English sick were brought from the camp by French mules, 2820–2822——Exhilarating effect produced upon the men by the French bands, 2823, 2824.

Excellent state of the Commissariat at Varna and Eupatoria about the end of December, 2825–2828——Witness left Balaklava on the 5th of January, 2829——Great number of deaths on board the "Monarchy," laden with sick from Balaklava to Scutari, 2830–2834. 3070–3072——Very defective arrangements at Constantinople and Balaklava for coaling the steamers, there being no properly organised body of men to do the work, 2838–2851. 3003–3013. 3073–3081. 3197–3199——Excellent arrangements at Malta for putting coals on board, 2844. 2846, 2847. 3004–3006. 3193–3196.

Loss of many horses of the 17th Light Dragoons, through the improper mode of shipping them, 2852–2854——Representations by witness and others to Captain Milne of the Admiralty, and to the Transport Board, in favour of shipping horses as at Hull, 2855–2859. 3148. 3158–3160. 3255–3258. 3277——Description of the Hull mode of shipment, and its advantages, 2860–2868. 3146–3159. 3166–3169——Manner in which the ships are fitted up, and the horses cared for, on the Government plan, 2869–2872. 2875–2892.

Nature of the Government contract for the three steamers sent out by witness, 2893–2903——Difficulty of stating the amount of work performed by these vessels, 2904–2911——Some vessels with cargoes for Balaklava have left the port without discharging them, 2912–2915——Captain Christie, who had charge of the transport service at Balaklava, resided first on board the "Emperor," and subsequently on board the "Harbinger," 2916–2924.

Particulars relative to the general conduct of matters in the harbour, by Captain Christie and the Commissariat; disorganization and confusion existing, 2925–2976——Filthy state of the harbour further adverted to; difficulty of removing the filth, 2960–2976——The streets also were in a very bad state, 2977, 2978——No attention seemed to be paid to the sanitary condition of the place, 2980, 2981——Unsuitable position selected for the English burying-ground near Balaklava, 2982–2985——Want of a properly-organised system for discharging cargoes at Balaklava adverted to, as causing the employment of many more transports than otherwise would have been necessary, 2989–3002——Witness did not observe much confusion in the harbour with respect to the position of the transports, which were lying athwart; approval of such position, 3014–3018. 3189–3192.

Huts were not erected when witness left, 3025, 3026——Appropriation of the houses in Balaklava adverted to, 3027–3035——Condition of the Turks at Balaklava, 3039–3047——Manner in which the cavalry horses were picketed, 3049–3056——The dead horses were for the most part buried, 3063, 3064——Hay was occasionally procured from ports in the Black Sea, 3066——With proper organization, every thing might have been set right, 3082, 3083——Unfitness of Admiral Boxer as successor of Captain Christie at Balaklava port, 3084–3091. 3237–3241——Character of the Golden Horn roadstead at Constantinople, 3095–3107.

Feasibility of thoroughly clearing the harbour at Balaklava, if proper regulations had been enforced, 3108–3110. 3219——Circumstance of there having been two vessels at Balaklava loaded with hay, which could not be discharged, while at the same time (early in February), Lord Raglan was complaining of want of forage, 3111–3120——In the French camp there seemed to be an adequate supply of fuel, which was procured from the adjoining hills, 3123–3130——Landing of a French regiment in Kamiesch Bay adverted to, 3131, 3132. 3263, 3264——Experience of Mr. Goodwin, veterinary surgeon, adverted to as being in favour of the Hull mode of shipping horses, 3150–3158. 3258.

Witness arrived at Balaklava on the 2d of December, and subsequently went backwards and forwards in his vessels to Varna, Eupatoria, &c., to fetch supplies, 3174–3181.

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Clay, Richard. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

3200, 3201——The "Emperor" had previously brought some bullocks from Eupatoria, but no more could be had when witness went there, 3181, 3182. 3208-3212——Large quantity of onions which might have been procured at Eupatoria towards the end of December, 3183, 3184. 3206, 3207——Want of forage at Varna about that time, 3186-3188——Valuable services rendered by Major Gardiner, Commissariat officer at Eupatoria, 3202, 3203.

Manner in which the cargo of bullocks was landed from the "Emperor," 3212-3215——Efficient discharge of the duties of harbour-master at Balaklava, 3216-3218——Reasons why witness did not suggest to Captain Christie any means for keeping the harbour clear, 3220-3223——Scarcity of fuel among the officers encamped near Balaklava, 3229-3234——The "Emperor" took out 60 horses from Woolwich without any casualty on board, 3242-3244——The communication between Balaklava and the camps, about two miles distance, was very tolerable in December, 3245-3248.

Witness's vessels were taken up by the measurement tonnage, a mode quite usual among commercial firms, 3250-3254. 3275, 3276——Propriety of applying the Hull method of shipping horses to any such cargoes yet to be sent out, 3259-3262——Intended return of witness to Balaklava, 3268——Attention paid by Sir Edmund Lyons and Captain Christie to the captains of merchant vessels at Balaklava, 3271-3274.

"*Cleopatra,*" *The.* Circumstance of the "Cleopatra" steamer having accompanied the "Victoria" from Balaklava in December, the latter vessel being in a disabled state; provision for the sick on board the "Cleopatra," *Flower* 10180. 10187-10192.

Clerk of the Ordnance. See *Laboratory* (*Woolwich*). *Ordnance Department,* 5. 9. *Shell Foundry* (*Woolwich*). "*Talbot,*" *The.*

Climate of the Crimea. Explanation as to Lord Raglan having expressed some dread of the Crimean climate in winter, and as to witness having sent him a pamphlet on the subject, by Dr. Lee, *Duke of Newcastle* 15269. 15270.

CLOTHING:

I. *Practice as to the Supply of the Army generally.*

II. *Condition and Mode of Distribution of the Clothing in the Crimea:*

1. Wretched State of the Clothing generally.
2. Mode of Distribution, &c.
3. Artillery.
4. Cavalry.
5. Guards.

III. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities to provide an adequate Supply of Warm Clothing:*

1. Suggestions by Drs. A. Smith and Dumbreck adverted to.
2. Supply through the Board of Ordnance.
3. Contract with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons.
4. Requisitions on the Admiralty for Transport.
5. Supply through the Minister for War.
6. Provision of Transport by the Admiralty.

IV. *Supply through means of the "Times" Fund.*

V. *Supply obtained at Constantinople.*

I. *Practice as to the Supply of the Army generally:*

Present system as to the supply of clothing to the army at home, *Bentinck* 1977-1975. 1985-1993——Very inferior quality of the cloth used in the English army, *Stafford* 7697, 7698——Circumstance of the Ordnance not supplying clothing for the army, though witness understands that the system of supply by the colonels is abolished, *Sir T. Hastings* 18105-18111——All extra clothing is supplied through the Ordnance, *ib.* 18327.

Abolition in 1854 of the system of providing regimental clothing through the colonels; explanation as to the new system not yet being in full operation, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20030, 20031——New system of providing clothing; advantages thereof, *ib.* 20031-20033. 20036, 20037——Belief that under the former system the colonels did not make an undue profit at the expense of the men, *ib.* 20034, 20035——Improved arrangements being made in regard to clothing for the cavalry, *Lord Hardinge* 20907-20909.

II. *Condition and Mode of Distribution of the Clothing in the Crimea:*

1. Wretched State of the Clothing generally:

Ragged and wretched condition of the clothing in December, *G. Dundas* 22; *Vaux* 2133-2135; *Blakeley* 4495; *Stafford* 7695-7699——Up to the time of witness's departure, there was not any very pressing want of clothing, which was, however, in an indifferent

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CLOTHING—continued.

II. *Condition and Mode of Distribution of the Clothing in the Crimea*—continued.

1. Wretched State of the Clothing generally—*continued.*

ferent condition, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 458-461. 717-719. 848——Long period for which a great portion of the army were without any change of clothing, *ib.* 621——Some detachments who had recently joined were still in summer trowsers, *ib.* 622——No special clothing was at first sent to the Crimea for the army, *ib.* 715, 716——Witness did not see any French clothing on the English troops, *ib.* 802, 803——No use was made of the skins of the animals who died, *ib.* 835-837——Belief that the Second Division are now (March 1855) fairly off for clothing, *ib.* 852.

Description of the men's clothing up to January, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1056-1059. 1086-1093——No special winter clothing had been received up to the period when witness left the Crimea, *Bentinck* 1355-1360——The clothing was much worse in some regiments than in others in November, *Layard* 2492——Slight additional clothing (for the sentries only) which was received up to the middle of January, *Parker* 3298. 3406. 3533. 3535——Wretched state of the First Division, with respect to clothing, up to the middle of January, *ib.* 3406-3413.

Deficiency of clothing about the end of January, *Rowe* 4796——Worn and ragged state of the men's clothing in November, *Dawson* 5554-5561——Filthy state of the clothes of the sick and wounded who were landed at Scutari, *Stafford* 7590. 7788——Mention by Dr. Hall, in his reports, of the insufficiency of the men's clothing, *Dr. A. Smith* 8785-8789——The men had no change of clothing till the end of December, *Forrest* 11624——Suffering through the want of proper clothing, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17636-17638.

2. Mode of Distribution, &c.:

Though the men were very badly clothed, there was some winter clothing in the harbour which could not be forwarded to the camp; some of this was issued to the troops, *G. Dundas* 179-182. 349-353——There seemed no reason why the men should not have marched to Balaklava, and have there changed their ragged clothes for proper clothing, *ib.* 179-183——Requisitions made for a share of extra clothing, whenever any such arrived at Balaklava, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 849-853——Duty of the Adjutant-general to attend to the distribution of the clothing in the field, *ib.* 946.

There was warm clothing at Balaklava, which could not be forwarded to the camp, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1060——Surprise was expressed, that the men were not marched to Balaklava, and there clothed, *ib.* 1061, 1062——Witness never heard of the distribution of any warm clothing from the "Royal Albert," which arrived about the 20th of December, *Parker* 3536-3539——Explanation as to winter clothing for the First Division not having been applied for up to the 7th of November, *Duke of Cambridge* 4052-4055.

Serviceable extra winter clothing, including sheep-skin coats, served out to the men before witness left in February, *Sparks* 5312-5318. 5366-5371. 5378-5381——Delay before the distribution of the warm clothing, which arrived about the end of November, *Horsford* 13307-13316. 13347. 13362——The clothing was supplied pretty equally to each division, *ib.* 13312-13316——Impossibility of marching the men to Balaklava, and clothing them there, *ib.*

3. Artillery:

Extra clothing received by the men of the horse artillery at different periods, up to the end of January; sufficiency thereof, *Shakespear* 4681, 4682. 4690-4693. 4724, 4725. 4749, 4750——Sufficiency of the clothing of the artillery in the Crimea, as supplied by the Ordnance, *Sir H. D. Ross* 18046-18054——Practice at the Board of Ordnance in deciding upon the clothing to be sent out to the artillery, *Sir T. Hastings* 18425, 18426——Opportunities made use of for expediting the transmission of the clothing, *ib.* 18427, 18428.

4. Cavalry:

Very bad state of the men's clothing in the beginning of December, *Lord Cardigan* 5746, 5747——Delay in the return of some non-commissioned officers sent to Constantinople, about the 25th of November, for warm clothing and boots, &c., *ib.* 5748-5757. 5775, 5776. 5964-5966——Representations by witness relative to the clothing of his brigade, *ib.* 5772, 5773——Very good clothing was supplied to the cavalry in December, at which time the men were much in want of it, *Lord Lucan* 6383, 6384.

5. Guards:

Explanation as to the Guards' clothing having been better than that of the Line regiments, *Bentinck* 1211——Supply of fresh clothing to the Guards some time in December, *ib.* 1211-1214——Further statement relative to the Guards' clothing; condemnation of the clothing of the Scots Fusiliers in London, and consequent delay in supplying the regiment, *ib.* 1959-1963. 6968-1973. 1976-1984——Miserable state of the clothing of the Coldstream Guards in November, the clothing for 1854 not having then been received, *Wilson* 4362-4374. 4422-4427.

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Clothing—continued.

III. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities to provide an adequate Supply of Warm Clothing:*

1. Suggestions by Drs. A. Smith and Dumbreck adverted to:

Letter from witness to the Military Secretary, dated 28 April 1854, with reference to winter clothing for the army, as founded on a report by Dr. Dumbreck, *Dr. A. Smith* 8769-8771——Recommendations by witness relative to the clothing of the army further adverted to; reference to a letter by him on the subject on 13 April 1854, *ib.* 8926-8938——Non-adoption of a suggestion by witness, that the whole of the army should be clothed in woollen from the end of September till May, *Dumbreck* 11410-11413.

Belief that the letter from Dr. Smith to the Military Secretary early in 1854, with respect to the clothing, &c. of the troops, never came before witness, *Duke of Newcastle* 14658, 14659. 14662, 14663. 14667. 14674-14676——Duty of Dr. Smith rather than of the Military Secretary to have presented the letters in question to witness, if the recommendations therein were not attended to, *ib.* 14664-14667. 14670. 14677-14681——Considerable alterations were made with regard to the clothing of the army of the east, *ib.* 15407.

Description of clothing suggested by Dr. A. Smith, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20012-20014——Explanation of the course adopted by witness with reference to Dr. A. Smith's suggested alterations in the clothing of the expeditionary army; letter to Dr. Smith, in reply to his suggestions, showing how far they were adopted, *Lord Hardinge* 20806-20818. 20822——Grounds upon which it was concluded that the red coat should not be altered for a lighter garment in Turkey, *ib.* 20807. 20813. 20816, 20817——Approval of the same clothing for the soldiers in Turkey as in England, *Mapleton* 20963.

Copy of letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Military Secretary, dated 13 April 1854, and marked "pressing and immediate," containing sundry recommendations relative to clothing for the soldiers, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 695, 696.

2. Supply through the Board of Ordnance:

Urgent steps taken in May to provide the necessary warm clothing; delay in the arrival of the same in the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8772-8782.

Applications first made to the Ordnance in June or July 1854 for a supply of warm clothing; nature of this supply, *Sir T. Hastings* 18115-18118——System for the inspection of the warm clothing when received at the Tower, *ib.* 18119. 18124-18126——List of further articles of winter clothing supplied by the Ordnance, besides those applied for in June, *ib.* 18145——Further statement as to the dates of the requisitions made to the Board of Ordnance on the part of the Secretary of War for warm clothing, *ib.* 18146-18162.

Reference to a paper prepared by Mr. Stacey, storekeeper at the Tower, containing sundry particulars as to the orders for and the supply of warm clothing, *Sir T. Hastings* 18224-18239——Delay about patterns before the contractor could proceed with his contract, *ib.* 18226-18238——Delivery at the Tower of portion of the articles of warm clothing before the 7th of August, application for tonnage having been made to the Admiralty on that day, *ib.* 18240-18245. 18259-18264——Quantity of warm clothing which had arrived at Balaklava by 30th November, *ib.* 18311——Means by which the Ordnance are informed of the arrival of warm clothing which is consigned to the Commissariat department, *ib.* 18312-18320.

The regimental clothing for 1855 was sent out between the 6th and 22d December, *Sir T. Hastings* 18320. 18326——Practice in regard to the supply and conveyance of the regimental clothing; change lately made, *ib.* 18321-18326——Since the 16th November each draft to the Crimea has taken out a supply of warm clothing, *ib.* 18328——Explanation as to some winter clothing reported to have been recently detained at Portsmouth, &c., *ib.* 18462, 18463——Authority given to Messrs. Neville & Co. to replace the clothing lost in the "Prince," *ib.* 18593, 18594.

First requisition on the Ordnance for warm clothing on 5 July 1854, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 318. 330.

3. Contract with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons:

Adoption by the Ordnance of patterns of warm clothing submitted by Messrs. Kynaston & Sons, from whom a supply was ordered to be furnished about the beginning of August, *Sir T. Hastings* 18119-18123——Examination relative to the clerk of the Ordnance having interfered to stop the agreement entered into by the Board with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons; maintenance of the agreement after a short delay, through the intervention of witness, *ib.* 18162-18205. 18214-18223——Absence of any material delay in ordering or procuring the warm clothing from Messrs. Kynaston, *ib.* 18585-18593.

Examination relative to the supplies of warm clothing contracted for with Messrs. Kynaston, and to the suspension of the supply by witness in order that the patterns might be submitted to Dr. A. Smith, *Monsell* 19180-19199——Belief that the power exercised by

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III. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities, &c.*—continued.

3. Contract with Messrs. Kynaston & Sons—*continued.*

by witness in staying the supply was not irregular, *Monsell* 19183–19186——Date of the first agreement with Messrs. Kynaston, and date and manner of witness's suspension of the same, *ib.* 19187–19195——Supply of a better description of warm clothing in consequence of the steps taken by witness, *ib.* 19192. 19196.

4. Requisitions on the Admiralty for Transport:

Mode and form of application to the Admiralty for the transport of the warm clothing, *Sir T. Hastings* 18127–18132. 18141–18144. 18266–18279. 18281——Sundry requisitions made for tonnage before the sailing of the "Prince" in October, *ib.* 18274. 18284–18291——Though warm clothing was ready on the 7th of August, the first shipment was not made till the 16th of October in the "Prince," *ib.* 18280. 18296, 18297.

Reference to several vessels which sailed for the East in August, but which could not convey warm clothing, *Sir T. Hastings* 18293–18295——Mention of several vessels which sailed with warm clothing in October and November, *ib.* 18306–18311——Exoneration of the Admiralty if they could not get steamers till 16th October, so as to comply with requisitions from the Ordnance on 7th August and subsequently for transport of warm clothing, *ib.* 18578–18585. 18600–18602——Dates supplied with reference to the warm clothing, the date of sailing being the 18th October, *ib.* 18585 and *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 318.

Delay till 18th October in the shipment of the clothing for which tonnage was applied about 7th August; steps taken to supply fresh clothing by the contractor, to whom application was made on the loss of the "Prince," *Monsell* 19518–19522.

Letter from Sir Thomas Hastings to Rear-Admiral M. F. F. Berkeley, with reference to the date at which the Ordnance department made requisition for the transport of warm clothing, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 333.

5. Supply through the Minister for War:

Departure from the usual course in regard to supplies of warm clothing, the Minister for War having procured several articles independently of the Ordnance, *Sir T. Hastings* 18635——Enhancement of the price through some articles being obtained by the War Minister, *ib.* 18636–18638——The first suggestion by the Minister for War relative to warm clothing was on 21st June 1854, *Monsell* 19182——Supplies of warm clothing procured from Hawick, &c., in July 1854, *ib.* 19514–19516.

Part taken by witness and the Secretary of State for War in providing clothing for the army, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20009. 20020–20024——Description of warm clothing sent out; whence procured, &c., *ib.* 20010–20019. 20025–20029. 20038–20040——Mode of purchase of the clothing obtained in Austria, Switzerland, &c., the Ordnance not being responsible, *ib.* 20018. 20025–20029——There not only have been no complaints from the Crimea as to the character of the clothing, but mention has been made of the liberality of the supply, *ib.* 20019——Detail arrangements as to clothing were left to the Ordnance, *ib.* 20020–20024——Explanation of statements by Sir T. Hastings (*Q.* 18635–18638) as to the War Department having competed with the Ordnance in procuring warm clothing, *ib.* 20038–20040.

Large quantity of warm clothing ordered in August, and additional quantities ordered at a later period, *Duke of Newcastle* 14454–14458——Active steps taken by witness to supply afresh the warm clothing lost in the "Prince;" belief as to the reception in due time of such supply, *ib.* 14518–14523.

Reference by the Committee to the steps taken by the Duke of Newcastle in regard to supplies of extra clothing, *Fifth Rep. p.* 7—— Considerable efforts made to provide warm clothing upon the news of the loss of the "Prince," *ib.*

6. Provision of Transport by the Admiralty:

Explanation relative to the conveyance of warm clothing to the East, to the effect that, prior to the 18th October 1854, the words "warm clothing," or "urgent," were never marked on the Ordnance requisitions for transport, *Sir J. Graham* 21180–21184—— Opportunities for sending out warm clothing before October, had the Admiralty been told of the urgency, *ib.* 21183. 21186.

Report of Captain Milne, dated Admiralty, 10 May 1855, with respect to requisitions for the conveyance of warm clothing, and stating that no urgent demand was made for such conveyance until 15 September, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 345, 346——Particulars relative to the date, &c., of the several requisitions, and the date of shipment, *ib.* 346.

IV. *Supply through means of the "Times" Fund:*

Particulars relative to the supply by witness out of the sick and wounded fund of warm under-clothing for the 39th regiment, *Macdonald* 7182–7217. 7351–7355——

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IV. *Supply through means of the "Times" Fund*—continued.

Application from Mr. Woodman, surgeon of the regiment, on wich the clothing was supplied, *Macdonald* 7186–7188. 7203, 7204——Facility with which witness procured a large supply of warm under-clothing at Constantinople, *ib.* 7198–7201.

Explanation of the circumstances under which the 39th regiment were supplied with warm clothing out of the "Times" fund, *Duke of Newcastle* 14862–14866——If not supplied by the "Times" Commissioner, the regiment must have gone on to Balaklava, where they would have been supplied, all the warm clothing having been consigned thither, *ib.* 14862. 14865——Supply by the "Times" Commissioner of warm clothing to some invalids coming home, which should have been supplied by the Commandant at the Bosphorus, *ib.* 14867-14870.

V. *Supply obtained at Constantinople:*

After the storm of November, 50,000 *l.* were placed at the disposal of witness, and warm clothing was purchased as far as Constantinople would admit of, *J. W. Smith* 15922—— Delay in providing transport at Constantinople for the winter clothing thus provided, *ib.* 15922, 15923.

See also *Hospitals*, I., 2. vi., 4. iii. *"Jura," The.* *"Prince," The.* *Socks.* *Waterproof Clothing.* *Young, Mr.*

Coaling. Evidence relative to the very defective system of coaling at Constantinople, *Clay* 2838 *et seq.*; *Parker* 3511–3522; *Muir* 12234–12237; *Stewart* 12433–12435. 12439–12442; *Ellison* 12857–12861; *Tallan* 17141, 17142——Defective arrangements, both at Constantinople and Balaklava, for coaling the steamers, there being no properly organized body of men to do the work, *Clay* 2838–2851. 3003–3013. 3073–3081. 3197–3199——Illustration of the loss arising from the great delay in coaling, *ib.* 2844—— Excellent arrangements at Malta for putting coals on board, *Clay* 2844. 2846, 2847. 3004–3006. 3193–3196; *Vellacott* 3672; *Dacres* 16307——Imperfect system of coaling at Constantinople, as compared with Malta, *Kellock* 5213–5226; *J. W. Smith* 15767–15774. 15790, 15791.

Facilities for coaling at Constantinople if vessels were allowed to pass out of the Golden Horn, and above the two bridges, *Kellock* 5227–5231 —— Want of coaling arrangements at Balaklava, *Muir* 12254–12256; *Dacres* 16351–16353——Improvement if the coaling had been carried on at Beikos Bay, *Stewart* 12436–12438——Want of arrangements, both at Varna and Balaklava, with regard to coaling, *ib.* 12516–12522—— Defective coaling arrangements at Constantinople, and in the Bosphorus, *Dacres* 16302–16306. 16308–16310. 16354, 16355.

Responsibility of Admiral Boxer for the coaling arrangements at Constantinople, *Milne* 16539, 16540. 16548, 16549. 16630, 16631——Difficulties in the way of a better system of coaling at Constantinople, *ib.* 16628–16632——At Balaklava coals were taken out of the colliers, which went alongside each vessel in want of them, *ib.* 16633, 16634——Reference to a letter from Admiral Boxer, dated 22d January 1855, showing the steps taken by him for coaling, and the difficulties still existing, *ib.* 16849——Authority of Admiral Boxer from the first to have employed the crews of Her Majesty's ships in coaling, *ib.* 16850–16853.

Information by Rear-admiral Boxer, dated 27 January 1855, with regard to coaling arrangements, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 444——Reference by Admiral Boxer, in a letter, dated 16 May 1855, to the difficulties of coaling at Constantinople, *App.* (*Fifth Rep.*) *p.* 61.

Deficiency of the coaling arrangements at Constantinople adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 12.

Coals. English steamers were frequently detained at Constantinople early in 1854, for want of coals, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1774–1779——The coal supplied in the East was generally pretty good, *Muir* 12257, 12258——Inferior quality of the Turkish coal, *ib.* 12259, 12260——Statement relative to the want of coals for the navy in September, and at other periods, *Dacres* 16167–16189.

Steps taken by the Admiralty to provide a sufficient quantity of coal for the fleet in the Black Sea, *Milne* 16541–16549——Impossibility of including the cost of the coal in the price for transports, *ib.* 16687——Inadequacy at times of the supply of coal for the steamers, for which, however, the weather alone was blameable, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20539–20541. 20548–20561.

Cocoa. Objection of the soldiers to cocoa as a ration, *Bentinck* 1314——Opinion that cocoa, rather than coffee, should have been substituted for tea, by the Board who inquired into the matter in Bulgaria, *Duke of Cambridge* 4156, 4157——Complaints made by the menagainst cocoa, *Dawson* 5474.

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COFFEE:

1. *Inconvenience and Difficulty, &c., through the Issue of Green Coffee.*
2. *Official Explanations on the Subject generally.*
3. *How far the Green Coffee was formally complained against.*
4. *Quantity of different Kinds of Coffee sent out.*

1. *Inconvenience and Difficulty, &c., through the Issue of Green Coffee:*

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Explanation as to a fixed ration of Coffee having been substituted at Varna for tea at cost price, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13613-13620——Supply of unroasted coffee during the Kaffir war without complaint, *ib.* 13625-13628. 13631 —— Reasons in justification of the issue at first of unroasted coffee in the Crimea, *ib.* 13627-13631——Supply of unroasted coffee to the navy, also to the French army, *ib.* 13627. 13631——When the difficulty of roasting the coffee was known, coffee was at once sent out roasted, *ib.* 13627.

Letter from Mr. Filder, dated Crimea, 25th March 1855, with respect to the issue of green coffee, and explaining why it was not roasted at Constantinople, *C. E. Trevelyan* 13697——Obstacles to the grinding, &c., of the coffee in the Crimea, through means of regular Turkish grinders, *ib.* 13698——Exceptional causes which led to the want of fuel, and the consequent inconvenience in roasting the green coffee, *ib.* 14299.

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Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Deputy Secretary-at-War, dated 24 January 1855, recommending the transmission of ground coffee and of tea to the army in the Crimea, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 704.

Correspondence relating to the issue of coffee as part of the field ration during the last Kaffir war, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 355-357.

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Commissariat:

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5. *Transport Arrangements in the Black Sea*—continued.

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6. *Staff; how far competent*—continued.

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8. *Cost of Establishment:*

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10. *Financial Arrangements*—continued.

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The Commissariat was not fully transferred to the charge of the Duke of Newcastle till towards the end of December, on account of the want of sufficient house accommodation for the clerks, *Lord Aberdeen* 21399-21406——Transfer of the Commissariat adverted to, as having been decided upon independently of the Duke of Newcastle's opinion in favour of the change, *ib.* 21407——Witness was somewhat opposed to the removal of the Commissarist from the Treasury, the Duke of Wellington having been adverse to such removal, *ib.* 21408–21414——As First Lord of the Treasury witness did not concern himself with the finance of the Commissariat, *ib.* 21415, 21416.

12. *Military Organization of the Service recommended:*

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Recommendation that the civil administration of the English army be re-cast on the model of the French system of the *Intendance Militaire*; advantages of such system, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13952–13954. 14018–14022——Opinion in favour of retaining the civil character of the Commissariat service, though advisable to make an adoption of the French system of the *Intendance Militaire*, *ib.* 14022——Main points of difference between the French Intendance system and the English Commissariat, *ib.* 14105–14107——In the English system, but not in the French, the majority of the military officers are quite unused to act with the Commissariat; evil thereof, *ib.* 14106, 14107. 14195. 14303.

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Commission of Inquiry (*Hospitals*):

1. *Constitution and Powers of the Commission.*
2. *Manner in which they exercised their Functions.*

1. *Constitution and Powers of the Commission:*

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Witness was a member of the Commission sent out to inspect the state of the hospitals at Scutari; circumstances under which appointed, *Maxwell* 12936–12946——Interviews with Dr. Andrew Smith adverted to, at which witness was told that there was no specific written instructions for him, *ib.* 12937–12939. 12946——Witness at first was offered the secretaryship to the Commission, but declined to accept it, *ib.* 12937. 12940, 12941. 12944–12946——Interview with the Duke of Newcastle on the 23d of October, who impressed upon witness the necessity of a searching investigation, and stated that written instructions should follow him to Constantinople, *ib.* 12942, 12943. 12946, 12947. 12950, 12951——Reference to the Commission, and the instructions in it, under which witness and his colleagues acted, *ib.* 12948–12953.

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Power of the Commission to obtain evidence and to report, but not to enforce any order, *Maxwell* 12976–12979. 12987. 13142–13144. 13195. 13200–13202——Explanation as to the Commissioners not having made any suggestions to the hospital authorities till after the receipt of a communication from the Duke of Newcastle in January empowering them so to do; this communication read, *ib.* 13145–13164——Reference to a letter from Mr. Herbert to witness, dated 29 November 1854, recommending suggestions to be made, *ib.* 13148, 13149. 13160–13162——The Commission was not gazetted, *ib.* 13222. 13226.

Further examination relative to the instructions received by witness before his departure to the East, and to the indefinite nature of the same, *Maxwell* 13277–13303——Witness had no special communication before leaving England with Dr. Cumming or Dr. Spence, *ib.* 13285–13288——Interviews before departure with the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith further adverted to, *ib.* 13289. 13290. 13296–13303.

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Commission of Inquiry (Hospitals)—continued.

2. *Manner in which they exercised their Functions*—continued.

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Reasons assigned for making suggestions to Lord Paulet only, and for confining those suggestions merely to the military organization of the hospitals, *Maxwell* 13154–13159. 13163–13193. 13194–13202——Copy of the first letter of suggestions written by the Commissioners to Lord W. Paulet, *ib.* 13168——Witness frequently spoke to Dr. Menzies about the want of things, but did not *ex officio* make any suggestions to him, *ib.* 13193——Statement as to the temporary obstacle to the inquiries of the Commissioners after their arrival at Balaklava, *ib.* 13203–13227——The Commission visited nearly every field hospital before Sebastopol, &c., *ib.* 13228.

Explanation as to the temporary obstacles to the operation of the Commission in the Crimea, *Duke of Newcastle* 14653–14657. 14660, 14661.

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Communication with the Seat of War. Obstacles to a fast and regular communication between the army in the East and the Home Government, *Duke of Newcastle* 15045–15050.

Comptroller of Ordnance Stores. See *Ordnance Department*, 4.

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Difficulty and delay before the Cabinet became informed of the distressed state of the army, the authorities in the East being responsible for not affording direct information on the subject, *Lord Aberdeen* 21357–21363.

Conclusions of the Committee as to the extent to which the sufferings of the army were unavoidable, or were attributable to dilatory and insufficient arrangements, *Fifth Rep. p.* 3 *et seq.*——Several causes to which the sufferings of the army are attributable, *ib.* 3, 4. 14 *et seq.*——Circumstance of the Government having been kept in ignorance longer than they ought to have been of the real state of matters in the East, *ib.* 6, 7——The Committee report, in conclusion, that the sufferings of the army resulted mainly from the circumstances under which the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken and executed, *ib.* 22, 23.

See also *Clothing. Famine. Field Hospitals. Food. Forage. Fuel. Horses. Hospitals. Medicines and Medical Comforts*, II. *Overwork. Peninsular War. Resignation under Suffering. Roads*, I. *Sick and Wounded. Sickness and Mortality. Turkish Army. Women (Wives of Soldiers).*

Consignment of Stores. See *Bills of Lading. Stores*, 1. 2. 3. 4.

Constantinople. Facilities for obtaining clothing, bedding, and other necessaries at the Constantinople bazaars, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 526–531——Purchase by witness at Constantinople

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stantinople of almost all the things supplied by him to the hospitals, *Macdonald* 6089, 6090——Ample opportunity at Constantinople for procuring the several things required, *Macdonald* 6090. 6220, 6221. 6224. 7010–7014. 7017; *Stafford* 7704, 7705——Facilities at Constantinople for procuring sundry articles for the army in the Crimea, and for shipping them thither, *Macdonald* 7026–7039.

Difficulty to be met with in procuring at Constantinople supplies for the army and the hospitals, *Stickney* 7439-7450——Probable facilities for purchasing hospital requirements at Constantinople, *Dr. A. Smith* 8129——It was not contemplated that anything need be purchased at Constantinople for the hospitals, *ib.* 8130——Mention of sundry wants supplied by Mr. Macdonald, mainly from the Constantinople markets, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9186–9191——Delay experienced in procuring at Constantinople sundry articles wanted for the hospitals, *Menzies* 9821, 9822——Sufficiency of such hospital supplies as were contracted for by witness at Constantinople, *J. W. Smith* 15777–15781. 15978.

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Convalescent Ships. See *Floating Hospitals.*

Convalescents. Conveyance of some convalescents in the "Himalaya" from Scutari to the Crimea about the end of September; very sickly and unserviceable state of these men, *Kellock* 5125–5145——Comfortable accommodation for the men on board, *ib.* 5128——Remonstration by witness, on which twenty-five or thirty of the men were sent back to Scutari, *ib.* 5128. 5134, 5135——They were sent on board by order of Major Sillery, commandant of Scutari, *ib.* 5132——Circumstance of Dr. Hall having gone to the Crimea at the same time with the convalescents, *ib.* 5139. 5141–5144.

Unfitness for service of convalescents sent back to the Crimea from the hospitals, *Sparks* 5353–5355; *Macdonald* 7232, 7233; *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9200–9202——Nature of the things supplied by witness to the convalescents going home, as applied for by the Rev. Mr. Sabine, chaplain at Scutari hospital, *Macdonald* 7226–7231——Unserviceable condition of three hundred men intended to be removed as convalescent to the Crimea in the "Valorous," *Stratford* 7824–7826——Reason why witness did not remonstrate against the untimely removal of the convalescents, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9203, 9204.

Responsibility of the military officer, rather than of the medical officer, in the case of convalescents, who, on being discharged from hospital, were sent back to the Crimea before they were fit for active service, *Dr. A. Smith* 8991–8997——Practice relative to the discharge of patients as convalescents; responsibility in the matter of the medical officer appointed by witness to inquire into their condition before discharge, *Menzies* 10385–10409——Some discharged patients have been sent back to the hospital as unfit to go to the Crimea, but it was never reported to witness that twenty or thirty were returned upon one occasion, *ib.* 10400–10404——There was a numerical return daily of those discharged from the hospitals as convalescent, *ib.* 11251–11253——Blame attaching to any surgeon who described as fit for service men who were really in an unserviceable state, *ib.* 11254–11257——Duty in hospital performed by the convalescents till removed to the Crimea, *Bamford* 12035.

Return, dated 2 March 1855, showing (approximately) the number of officers and men who, having been in hospital at Scutari, Abydos, and Smyrna, have been invalided or have returned to duty, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 689.

Cookesley, Mr. Reference to Mr. Cookesley, of the Commissariat attached to the cavalry division, as totally inexperienced, *Lord Lucan* 6263–6269.

Copy of letter from Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Cookesley to Commissary-general Filder, dated 29 March 1855, complaining of the foregoing statement, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 354.

Cooking. Manner in which the cooking for the army was managed, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 720, 721; *Wilson* 4258–4267. 4280, 4281. 4285–4288. 4291, 4292. 4428, 4429——There was no difficulty about the cooking in the Grenadier Guards, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1074–1077——The cooking for the French was much better managed than that for the English, *Layard* 2617–2620; *Wilson* 4279——Description of the cooking utensils of the English, *Duke of Cambridge* 3966. 3972. 4066——Great difficulty in cooking on arriving before Sebastopol, the men having for the most part thrown away their camp kettles during the flank march, *Wilson* 4258–4267. 4428, 4429.

See also *Camp Kettles. Coffee*, 1. *Food*, 3. *Hospitals*, I. 5.

Cooper, Dr. Creditable state into which Dr. Cooper, of the Fourth Dragoons, brought the hospital at Balaklava when it was first made use of, *Dumbreck* 11499.

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"*Cormorant*," *The.* Reference to the "Cormorant" transport, as carrying provisions about which should have been landed in the Crimea, *Darke* 12726–12729.

Correspondence. Unnecessarily large amount of correspondence entailed by the present constitution of the War departments, *Duke of Newcastle* 14719, 14720. 15119——Recommendation that all the military departments be concentrated under the same roof as the War departments, so as to facilitate verbal communications, and diminish unnecessary correspondence, *ib.* 15120.——*See* also *War Department*, 3.

"*Courier*," *The.* Witness left England on 17 August 1854 in the "Courier" sailing vessel, in charge of a cargo of about 550 tons of provisions, &c., for the supply of twenty-one or twenty-two transports in the service of Government, *Darke* 12644–12654. 12685–12690. 12712——Arrived outside Balaklava about 19 October, *ib.* 12655–12657——Delay before Captain Christie and Captain Baker allowed the "Courier" to enter the harbour, *ib.* 12657–12659.

Particulars as to witness, when unable to distribute his cargo as intended, having first offered to sell it to a Commissariat officer at Constantinople, and afterwards to Mr. Filder, at Balaklava, who both refused to purchase; sale of the cargo, except the tea, eventually to the French at Kamiesch, *Darke* 12661–12684. 12691–12701——Subsequent refusal of the English Commissariat at Balaklava to buy the tea, *ib.* 12702–12705——Sale of more than half the tea to Mr. Jenner for the hospitals, *ib.* 12706–12711.

Cox, Colonel. Belief that the death of Colonel Cox was owing to his having been obliged to carry his own effects on the march from Old Fort to Balaklava, *Bentinck* 1332, 1333; *Wilson* 4352.

"*Cottingham*," *The.* The "Cottingham" transport, loaded with planks, from Sinope, was for some weeks at Balaklava, before she was discharged, *Clay* 2776–2790——Authorities at Balaklava to whom she was consigned, *ib.* 2781, 2782.

Crookshank, Mr. Experience of Mr. Crookshank, Commissariat officer attached to the Light Brigade of Cavalry, *Lord Lucan* 6689.

Crowe, J. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Arrived in the Crimea on 25 September, and left it finally on 3 February, 4783, 4784——Opportunities whilst there of observing the state of the army, 4785–4795——Quantity of mud in the tents about the end of January 4796——Deficiency of clothing at that time, *ib.*——The sanitary state of the army was very bad, 4797, 4798——Accommodation in the hospital huts at Balaklava, 4799–4805——Want of accommodation for the sick placed on board ship in the harbour, 4805.

Witness lived on board the "Trent" for some days before he left Balaklava, 4806, 4807——Delay in landing 240 mules brought by "the Trent" from Malta for the Commissariat, 4808–4812. 4873. 4885——Some fodder which was on board for the mules could not be landed by the Commissariat, and was taken back to Constantinople, 4813–4825. 4877–4884——Difficulty and delay in landing some platforms and tools from the "Trent" for the artillery, 4825–4831. 4874–4876——The cavalry made no application for the fodder, though they were much in want of it, 4832–4837.

Crowded state of the quay at Balaklava about the end of January, 4844–4850. 4956——Inconvenience from want of proper landing places, 4851–4854——Muddy and crowded state of the main street, 4855–4857——There were no depôts of provisions, 4858. 4894——Arrangements made for the sick and wounded from 5 to 15 November, 4860–4866——Facility of unloading the cargoes in the harbour by employing the crews of the numerous vessels there, 4867–4872.

Quantity of hay in the "Trent" in October, which was not landed at Balaklava till the vessel had twice returned thither from Varna, 4885–4891. 4897–4899——Tonnage and horse power of the "Trent," which is a paddle-wheel steamer belonging to the West India Mail Company, 4892–4895——Offensive state of Balaklava Harbour when witness left it, 4900–4905. 7957——Improper ground selected for burial-places, 4906. 4907——Opportunities for establishing depôts at Varna from the resources of Bulgaria, 4908–4915. 4970, 4971.

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Want of accommodation at Balaklava for the sick brought down from the camp by the French mules, 4937–4947——Uselessness of the English ambulances when the roads were bad, 4948, 4949——Better arrangement of the ships in the harbour after the date of the storm, 4955. 4957——Good state of the road from Kamiesch Bay to the French camp, 4963, 4964——Convenience respectively of Kamiesch Bay and of Balaklava for landing materials, 4965–4968.

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Cruikshank, Dr. Circumstances under which Dr. Cruikshank became head of the medical department at Scutari and was afterwards superseded, *Macdonald* 7416-7418——Dr. Cruikshank did duty at Scutari whilst witness was sick, before the arrival of Dr. Lawson in January, *Forrest* 11677. 11683-11687.

Cumming, Dr. Appointment of Dr. Cumming as Inspector-general of the hospitals at Scutari, in lieu of Dr. Menzies, whose position did not give him sufficient authority, *Macdonald* 6192. 6208-6213——The appointment was made as not likely to be interfered with by any senior officer arriving at Scutari, *Dr. A. Smith* 8509——Great error in the delay of the appointment of Dr. Cumming as head of the hospitals, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9026.

Responsibility of Dr. Cumming as senior officer to witness, *Menzies* 10472-10480. 10590-10593. 10802-10870——Witness considered that he had no right to dispute any orders given by Dr. Cumming as senior officer, though not attached to the hospital, *ib.* 10802 *et seq.*——Dr. Cumming took the charge from Dr. Lawson on 1st February, *Forrest* 11674.

Explanation of the selection of Dr. Cumming as one of the Commission of Inquiry into the hospitals, and also as the medical head of the hospitals at Scutari, *Duke of Newcastle* 14888, 14889——Position at first of Dr. Cumming adverted to as not interfering with that of Dr. Menzies, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19921, 19922——Letter from witness to Dr. Cumming, dated 29 November 1855, urging constant attention to the state and conduct of the hospitals, *ib.* 19966.

Custom House, Constantinople. Great abuse through the detention in the Turkish Custom-house of private stores for the English army, *Macdonald* 7057-7068——Belief that stores in Government ships were exempted from Custom-house interference at Constantinople, *ib.* 7057. 7068——Great delay in passing parcels for officers through the Custom-house, *J. W. Smith* 15950-15955.

Custom House Officers. Number of lockers and weighers, &c. sent out from the Customs departments, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13944-13949——Supply of Custom-house officers sent to Balaklava at the suggestion of witness, to attend to the landing and warehousing of the stores, *Duke of Newcastle* 15072.

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Dacres, Captain Sidney Colpoys, R.N. (Analysis of his Evidence).—Was in command of the "Sanspareil" in the Black Sea from the 25th June to the 17th November 1854, 16003-16007——Extent to which there was a deficiency of boats for the embarkation of the army at Varna, and the disembarkation at Old Fort, 16008-16033——Notwithstanding the insufficency of boats, no time was lost, nor was there any accident, 16021-16033.

The conveyance of the sick and wounded to the ships after the battle of the Alma was superintended by witness, 16034——Assistance given by the navy in conveying the sick and wounded adverted to, in connexion with the deficient means of conveyance possessed by the army, 16035-16060. 16071-16073——Greater facilities and less delay in bringing down the wounded of the French than of the English army, 16048-16051. 16074-16078——Nature of the medical attendance on the English wounded; assistance afforded by the navy surgeons, 16061, 16062. 16332-16341——Care taken in placing the sick and wounded on board, 16063, 16064——Belief that there was no special hospital ship for the wounded, 16065. 16070——Case of the "Kangaroo" adverted to, 16066-16069.

Witness took charge of Balaklava Harbour on the 27th of October, 16079-16087——Instructions to witness, on the evening of 27th October, to get all the vessels into the harbour that had first been ordered out in consequence of the battle of Balaklava; compliance therewith, 16088-16093——Responsibility of witness in regard to the condition of and arrangements in the harbour, 16094. 16271-16275. 16295——Particulars as to the state of the harbour whilst witness was in charge; care taken to keep it free from filth and floating offal, &c; denial of statements hereon by Captain Kellock and others, 16095-16099. 16247, 16248. 16256-16267.

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With respect to the "Prince," Captain Christie wished her, if possible, to enter the harbour so as to avoid the storm, 16124. 16252-16255——Loss of the "Prince" attributed to her anchoring just outside the harbour, with only one anchor, 16124-16126——Repeated representations were made by witness as to the danger of the anchorage, 16127——Reason for ships anchoring in so dangerous a position, 16128. 16130. 16324-16631——

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With regard to Admiral Boxer, who was a most intelligent and useful officer, witness heard no official complaints against him, and had no reason to represent his conduct to Lord Raglan, 20562-20569——Witness was first desired to provide a hospital ship, in a private letter from Sir J. Graham, after the battle of the Alma, 20575, 20576. 20587-20590——Letter from a surgeon of the fleet to witness describing the manner in which those wounded at Alma were provided for, and showing the great assistance given by the navy medical officers, 20577——Reasons for not having specially fitted up vessels as transports for the sick and wounded; non-responsibility of witness hereon; no application was made to him on the subject, 20578-20597. 20599-20602.

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Hardship upon the general officers in not being allowed to bring more than two horses with them to the Crimea, 579——Advantage in the regimental officers being enabled to ride with their men when on a march, 580-582——About 5,000 baggage animals belonging to officers were left behind at Varna; great inconvenience and pecuniary loss to the officers thereby, 583-589——Insufficient number of animals landed at Old Fort for purposes of transport, 590, 591——Ambulances were available shortly after landing, 594-599——The ambulance carts are very heavy, and not well adapted to the removal of sick

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There was no depôt for provisions or fodder at the camp upon which the army might rely in the event of the communication with Balaklava being cut off, 649-651——No serious effort has been made by the Russians to gain possession of the main road to the camp, 652-655——Means by which the artillery and cavalry horses attached to the Second Division were provided with forage, 656-663——Opportunities for providing means of transport between the army and the camp, 664——Explanation as to witness having never made any complaints to Mr. Commissary-general Filder, 665-667.

Evidence relative to the inefficiency of the Commissariat Department, as shown more especially by their neglect to procure means of transport, &c., at Malta, Scutari and Varna, 669. 779-781——Circumstance of Mr. Filder never having visited witness's division either at Scutari or Sebastopol, 669. 673-677——Impression in the Commissariat department that there would be no war and no special demand for their services, 669——Inability of the army to have moved on to the Danube, as requested by Omer Pasha, through want of the means of transport, 669. 742, 743. 869-873——Confusion at Varna with respect to Commissariat issues, 669. 689. 762——Employment of non-commissioned officers on the Commissariat at Varna, 669——Advantge derived at Varna from a suggestion by witness, that two volunteer officers from the army should assist the Commissariat, *ib.*

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No special clothing was at first sent to the Crimea for the army, 715, 716——Up to the time of witness's departure there was not any very pressing want of clothing, 717-719. 848——The sickness and suffering were mainly caused by overwork in the trenches, &c.; amount of such work, 717. 719. 737-741. 790, 791. 914——Manner in which the cooking of provisions was carried on, 720, 721——Practice relative to the collection of firewood, of which there was a good deal on the heights, 724, 725——Unhealthy condition of the army during the period of its being without tents, 731-736——Inadequacy of the means of transport landed at Old Fort further adverted to, 744-746.

There was no absolute deficiency of the medical staff with respect to the army in the field, but there probably was as regards the sick or wounded removed to the ships, &c.,

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747. 792——The Second Division, which numbered 6,200 men in Bulgaria, and about 4,500 on landing at Old Fort, and which afterwards received draughts to the amount of 600 or 700, was reduced to about 2,000 after the battle of Inkermann, 748–758——The reinforcements consisted of very young and inefficient troops, 753–755——In their passages at sea the troops were well cared for, 759, 760.

Whilst at Scutari there was an ample supply of fresh provisions, but the modes of issue were very irregular, 761, 762——Witness first secured the experienced services of Mr. Power at Varna, 763–765——Necessity of interpreters if interior operations had been undertaken, 766——Further reference to the landing of the tents a few days after the disembarkation at Old Fort, 773, 774——Witness was obliged to leave twelve animals (including four mules) at Varna, but they were subsequently restored to him 775–778——More mules should have been taken to the Crimea for transport purposes, 779–781.

Distance of the first and second positions occupied by the Second Division from Balaklava, and from Kamiesch Bay, 782–786——Stringent regulations as to the signing of documents on the issue of forage further adverted to, 787. 788——Character of the water supply to the Second and other Divisions, 789——With respect to the medical department, it was quite as inadequate in the Peninsula as in the Crimea, 793——Witness was never before engaged in a regular winter campaign, 794. 810——Inconsiderable loss from sickness during the partly winter campaigns on the Pyrenees in 1813 adverted to, 794.

Impossibility of providing cover for the horses of the artillery or cavalry after the landing in the Crimea, 795–797——There was no actual depôt of provisions for the Second Division, it having been found impossible to form one, through want of the means of transport, 798–800. 860–863——Mode of selection of the burial-places near Balaklava, 801——Witness did not see any French clothing on English troops, 802, 803——Present of 20,000 rations of bread from the French adverted to, 803——Difficulties equal to those encountered by witness in the Crimea have been met with by him in former campaigns, 804–809. 827——Deficiency in the supply of fresh meat, vegetables, and rice, 804. 828. 854, 855——Advantage to the army in the command of the Black Sea, 809. 830–832.

The carriage of the tents from Old Fort would have greatly embarrassed the army, 811–816——Inefficiency of the tools used in the Crimea, 821–823. 937——Indifferent state of the shoes of the men in the Second Division, 824——Unserviceable character of some cargoes of shoes sent out from time to time, 825, 826——Respects in which the Second Division suffered through the inefficiency of the Commissariat, 828–832——Favourable opinion of the merits of the regimental officers, 833——Witness was never consulted relative to the expedition to Sebastopol, 834——No use was made of the skins of the animals who died, 835–837——Witness has not heard that any French troops were lost in landing, 838–840——Young and active persons required on the personal staff of a General, 841–845.

Relative merits of the French and English tents, 846——The British force was better tented than the French, 847——Requisitions made for a share of extra clothing whenever any such arrived at Balaklava, 849–853——Belief that the Second Division are now fairly off for clothing, 852——Explanation as to no formal complaint having been made that the coffee was not issued roasted, 856–859——The deficiency of transport to the camp was apparent to every one in the army, 863. 865.

Grounds for the belief that Government did not anticipate actual hostilities, 867, 868——Witness has not kept copies of his correspondence with Lord Raglan relative to the deficiencies of the Commissariat, 874, 875——Usefulness of examinations as a test of head qualifications in staff and regimental officers, 876–878——Explanation as to the capture of Eupatoria, and its subsequent occupation at the request of Admiral Dundas, 879, 880——Supplies of fresh provisions and vegetables obtained for some time from Eupatoria, 880, 881. 927–933——How far an interpreter, who spoke Turkish, would have been useful in the Crimea, 882–885.

English line-of-battle ships were not used to any extent as transports to Old Fort, 886, 887——Reference to sundry inventions within the last forty years, and to the extent to which adopted in the Crimean expedition, 888–899——Non-distribution of waterproof clothing, such as Mackintoshes, adverted to, 891–899——There was not any constant supply of fresh meat from Asia Minor, or Turkey in Europe, 902, 903——Fresh bread was baked by the French, but not by the English, 908–910——The Second Division were all supplied with the Minié rifle, 913——Provisions could regularly have been supplied if there were adequate means of transport from Balaklava, 915, 916.

The Second Division was visited by the Quartermaster-general, Adjutant-general, and Lord Raglan, 918–920——Date at which orders were given for the embarkation from Varna, 922–926——Sufficiency, on the whole, of the supply of ammunition to the Second Division, 934, 935——Approval of the Minié rifle, 936——Very unsatisfactory nature of the soil in the trenches, 938, 939——Responsibility of the Commissariat department for the supply of food, 944, 945——Duty of the Adjutant-general to attend to the clothing, 946——The proper lodging of the troops rests with the Quartermaster-general, 947, 948.

Examinations

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Examinations of Officers. Usefulness of examinations as a test of head qualifications in staff and regimental officers, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 876-878.

EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA:

1. *Instructions by the Home Government.*
2. *Military Opinions consulted.*
3. *Date of Departure from Varna.*
4. *Amount of the Force landed at Old Fort.*
5. *Policy of the Expedition considered by the Committee.*

1. *Instructions by the Home Government:*

On the 29th of June 1854, two days after the raising of the siege of Silistria was known to the Government, a despatch was sent by witness to Lord Raglan, instructing him, amongst other things, to concert measures for an expedition to the Crimea and the siege of Sebastopol (production of this despatch decided on by the Committee) *Duke of Newcastle* 14417-14421——Copy of despatch, dated 10th April, previously forwarded to Lord Raglan, directing inquiry to be made, with a view to an expedition against Sebastopol, *ib.* 14421, 14422——Copy of the despatch of the 29th of June, *ib.* 14422——There was no second despatch to Lord Raglan, pressing upon him the expedition to the Crimea, *ib.* 15152, 15153——The expedition was undertaken solely under the direction of the Home Governments, *ib.* 15275-15278.

Date of the order to Lord Raglan in regard to the expedition, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19769-19772——Preparations made in anticipation of the expedition, *ib.* 19773-19778——Expectation that the attack on Sebastopol would be a *coup de main*, *ib.* 19777, 19778.

2. *Military Opinions consulted:*

Period at which witness became aware of the expedition to the Crimea; he was never consulted as to its expediency, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 399-401. 834——Submission of witness's despatch of 29th June to Lord Hardinge, *Duke of Newcastle* 14423-14425——Adverse military opinions were not offered to witness by Lord Hardinge and Lord Seaton against the expedition to Sebastopol, *ib.* 15073——How far witness was consulted, or offered any opinion upon the policy of the expedition to the Crimea, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17529-17537. 17625-17627——Extract from the answer of Lord Raglan to the despatch of 29th June, *App.* (*Fifth Rep.*) *p.* 57, 58.

3. *Date of Departure from Varna:*

Period at which orders were given for the embarkation from Varna, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 922-926——Departure of the expedition on the 7th of September, *Duke of Newcastle* 14433——The expedition sailed much later than was expected, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19785-19787.

Examination relative to the period which elapsed before the date at which the expedition to the Crimea was decided on, and the date at which it left Varna; there was no unavoidable delay on the part of the fleet, *Sir J. Graham* 21245-21262——Opinion that the expedition was undertaken at the proper time, *ib.* 21263, 21294——Unexpected delay in the sailing of the expedition; it was, however, in sufficient time, *Lord Aberdeen* 21301. 21310-21315.

4. *Amount of the Force landed at Old Fort:*

Number of ammunition arrivals, and of troops embarked at Varna, for the expedition to the Crimea, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13660. 13666——Landing at Old Fort of 27,000 English, including artillery and cavalry, *Duke of Newcastle* 15170-15172.

Return of the total number of officers and men of all arms who landed in the Crimea before the battle of the Alma, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 473.

5. *Policy of the Expedition considered by the Committee:*

Responsibility of the Home Government for the expedition; remarks thereon by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 3-5——Confidence of the Cabinet as to the success of the expedition, *ib.* 4——Strictures upon the conduct of the Administration in ordering the expedition, as the first and chief cause of the calamities which subsequently befel the army, *ib.* 23.

See also *Disembarkation at Old Fort. Horses*, V. 2. *Raglan, Lord*, 3. *Transport Service*, 9.

Expedition to the East. Gradual increase to 25,000 men of the 10,000 first sent out, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13455——The first order for sending troops to Malta, to be subsequently sent on to Turkey, was given on the 9th of February 1854, *Duke of Newcastle* 14375-14377——Original object of the expedition, *ib.* 14378——The first order for sending on to Turkey the 10,000 men which were landed at Malta, was given about the 21st of March, *ib.* 14381——Grounds upon which a force of 25,000 men was determined upon; addition

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Expedition to the East—continued.

subsequently of a reserve under Sir George Cathcart, *Duke of Newcastle* 14489–14494——Statement that 25,000 men comprised the entire force intended at first to be sent to the East, *Lord Hardinge* 20766–20770.

Return of the number of officers and men of cavalry and infantry sent to the East from England, Ireland, or the colonies, before the army under the command of Lord Raglan proceeded to the Crimea in the beginning of September 1854, specifying the several regiments, with the dates of embarkation, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 472——Abstract return hereof, *ib.* 479.

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Famine. Conviction that the diarrhœa suffered by the men at Scutari was a species of famine, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9225.

Unqualified contradiction of Mr. Osborne's evidence as to the patients having died of starvation, through want of medical comforts, *Menzies* 10970.

Fergusson, Mr. Difference between the system of fortification advocated by Mr. Fergusson, and of that adopted by the Russians for the defence of Sebastopol, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17598–17607.

Field Hospitals:

1. *Bell Tents; their Inadequacy.*
2. *Marquees.*
3. *Wooden Hospitals, or Huts.*

1. *Bell Tents; their Inadequacy:*

Wretched accommodation in the hospital tents at the camp, *G. Dundas* 160–164; *Parker* 3284. 3295–3302. 3324. 3485–3495; *Lord Cardigan* 5733–5738; *Flower* 10055–10059; *Forest* 11735–11751; *Maxwell* 13229. 13237–13248——Partial approval of the hospital tents; they were, however, very inadequately provided with beds or mattresses, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 625–632——Arrangements made for the accommodation of the sick in the tents, *Bentinck*, 1363–1366. 1900–1904; *Dumbreck* 11543–11547. 11552–11556——Scantiness of the accommodation, *Bentinck* 1363–1366——Approval on the whole of the hospital tents, *Bentinck* 1899, 1900; *Duke of Cambridge* 3946.

In both French and English tents the sick lay upon the ground, *Layard* 2606–2610——Dreadful effluvia in the tents, from the want of accommodation for the sick, *Parker* 3299–3302——Provision made for cooking, *ib.* 3345–3348——Crowded state of the men in the tents, *Parker* 3349. 3359; *Wilson* 4375–4377.

Improvement after a time of the state of the men in the tents, *Parker* 3416–3418; *Sparks* 5341——Representations made by witness as to the state of the tents, *Parker* 3458–3461——Efforts made by witness to keep the water out of the hospital tents, *ib.* 3490–3493——Insufficient number of hospital tents, *Duke of Cambridge* 3947–3952——Attention paid to the comfort of the sick in the tents, *Shakespear* 4717–4720——Responsibility of the medical officer with reference to the hospital tents under his charge, *Dumbreck* 11548–11551.

Unsuitableness of bell tents for the sick, *Maxwell* 13237——Different arrangements in nearly every tent, *ib.* 13239, 13240——Supply of medicines and medical comforts in the hospital tents, *ib.* 13241–13244. 13248. 13256–13258. 13271, 13272——Also of fuel, *ib.* 13245——Also of utensils for the sick, *ib.* 13246, 13247——Discomfort of the hospital tents, *Horsford* 13341, 13342.

Reference by the Committee to the deplorable state of the sick and wounded in the tent hospitals through the want of the commonest necessaries, *Fifth Rep. p.* 19.

2. *Marquees:*

Applications made by witness and others for additional hospital marquees, which were forwarded as soon as they arrived, *Parker* 3461–3469. 3530–3532——Mode of treatment in the hospital tent or marquee, *Dawson* 5524–5528——Suitableness of the marquees for the accommodation of the sick, *Dr. A. Smith* 8913——A marquee was sent out for every regiment, besides seventy spare ones, *ib.* 8914.

The hospital marquees, though good in quality, were not suitable for winter, *Dumbreck* 11564–11567——Proportion of the sick under bell tents, and under hospital tents, 11569–11571——The hospital marquees were very good, *Forrest* 11626. 11846–11849.

Exceedingly defective accommodation of the sick in the marquees, &c., *Maxwell* 13237–13240——Many of the regiments had no marquees, *ib.* 13237.

3. *Wooden Hospitals, or Huts:*

No wooden hospitals were erected by the English when witness was in the Crimea, *Layard* 2655——Manner in which the French formed hospital huts, *Parker* 3473——

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FIELD HOSPITALS—continued.

3. *Wooden Hospitals, &c.*—continued.

Reference to a wooden hospital, constructed by the French shortly after their arrival before Sebastapol, *Duke of Cambridge* 3998-4000——There was no discussion about erecting wooden hospitals on arriving before Sebastapol, *ib.* 4158, 4159.

Nature of the accommodation in the hospital huts at Balaklava, *Crowe* 4799-4805; *Lord Lucan* 6610-6612——Erection latterly of wooden houses for the sick, *Sparks* 5341, 5342——Advisableness, under certain circumstances, of wooden or other hospitals as substitutes for marquees or tents, *Dr. A. Smith* 8913-8918——Steps taken when witness was in office with regard to wooden hospitals, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19974. 19977-19980.

FILDER, COMMISSARY-GENERAL, C. B.:

1. *Extent to which blamed for his Conduct of the Commissariat.*
2. *Defence of the Appointment and Services of Mr. Filder.*
3. *Letters from Mr. Filder in Explanation of his Proceedings.*

1. *Extent to which blamed for his Conduct of the Commissariat.*

Explanation as to witness having never made any complaints to Mr. Commissary-general Filder, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 665-667——Circumstance of Mr. Filder never having visited witness's division, either at Scutari or Sebastopol, *ib.* 669. 673-677——Advanced age of Mr. Filder, who served in the Peninsula, *ib.* 670——Unwillingness of Mr. Filder to attend to suggestions from any quarter, *Layard* 2688.

Mr. Filder did not seem to take much notice of a representation by witness as to the inconvenience of the printed forms, *Duke of Cambridge* 3844——The condition of the First Division was never inspected by Mr. Filder, *ib.* 4030-4033——There was no communication from Mr. Filder to witness relative to the Commissariat supplies, *ib.* 4154-4155.

Opinion that Mr. Commissary-general Filder was not blameable in not visiting witness's encampment, *Lord Cardigan* 5856, 5857——Representations about forage made by witness directly and indirectly to Mr. Filder, but without effect, *Lord Lucan* 6327-6331. 6345-6377. 6466-6479. 6692 —— Mr. Commissary-general Filder never attended to witness's representations, *ib.* 6692.

Places where Mr. Filder was stationed in June and August, and subsequently, *Stickney* 7428. 7457. 7460.

Reference by the Committee to the appointment of Commissary-general Filder, and the authority vested in him, *Fifth Rep. p.* 13.

2. *Defence of the Appointment and Services of Mr. Filder:*

Appointment of Mr. Filder as Commissary-general, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13424-13426——Mr. Filder left England on the 4th of April 1854, and arrived at Constantinople on the 22d of the same month, *ib.* 13433-13442——When appointed, he was sixty-four years of age, *ib.* 13452——He was deliberately selected on account of his great experience and activity, and as being a man of tried and approved qualities, *ib.* 13453, 13454——Authority of Mr. Filder to employ as many qualified persons as he thought necessary, *ib.* 13468-13470.

Copy of a letter from witness to Lord Raglan, dated 13th February 1854, and of the reply thereto, dated 15th February, delivered in, as indicating the spirit in which the appointment of Mr. Filder was made and accepted, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14023——Truthful character of Mr. Filder, *ib.* 14221. 14270-14272——Reason for Mr. Filder not having held any interview with Sir De Lacy Evans at Scutari, *ib.* 14243-14245.

Concurrence of witness in the appointment of Commissary-general Filder, as recommended by Sir C. Trevelyan, *Duke of Newcastle* 14985.

3. *Letters from Mr. Filder in Explanation of his Proceedings:*

Sundry letters from Mr. Filder relative to the Commissariat service, and the supply of the army, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 373, *et seq.*——Letter, dated 24 August 1854, containing statements and suggestions relative to the Commissariat staff, *ib.* 373, 374——Treasury Minute on the foregoing, dated 8 September 1854, *ib.* 377, 378.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 22 September 1854, with regard to Commissariat supplies at that period, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 384.

Estimate, by Mr. Filder, of provisions, &c., required from England for the use of the army in the East, for three months, from 1 November 1854, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 393.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 3 December 1854, with regard generally to the supply of the army at that period, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 401.

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3. *Letters from Mr Filder in Explanation of his Proceedings*—continued.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 8th October 1854, with respect to Commissariat supplies since 22d September, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 385.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 13 December 1844, in further explanation of the supply of the army, and referring specially to the impassable state of the roads, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 402.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Lord Raglan, dated 6 December 1854, in explanation of certain deficiencies in the supply of the army, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 403, 404.

See also *Commissariat. Food. Forage. Land Transport. Roads*, II.

Fire at Varna. Loss of Commissariat stores and of Quartermaster-general's stores by the fire at Varna, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13647-13650——Steps taken to provide for the stores destroyed by the fire, *ib.* 13651-13652.

"Firefly," The. Explanation as to the "Firefly," which took out a portion of the battering train from Woolwich, having been obliged to put into Plymouth, *Milne* 17010, 17011.

First Division. There were five or six deaths daily in the First Division in December, &c., *Parker* 3303——Sufficient supply generally of food to the division, *ib.* 3308. 3423-3429.

Number of horses attached to the First Division in Bulgaria, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3735-3739——Cholera and mortality among the division before it embarked for the Crimea on the 29th of August, *ib.* 3740-3744. 3754-3762. 3914-3935——Deficiency in the strength of the medical staff of the division, *ib.* 3745, 3746. 4088, 4089——On arriving at Balaklava, the First Division encamped outside the town, *ib.* 3805-3808.

Means of communication between the final position of the First Division and Balaklava, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3835—3838——Activity of the Commissariat officers attached to the division, *ib.* 3840. 3847. 4123, 4124——The medical staff attached to witness was very good, *ib.* 3898. 4090——Representations made by witness through the Commissary of his division with respect to the supplies of food and of forage, *ib.* 4142-4146.

Letter from Colonel Lockyer to the Adjutant-general of the Forces, dated 9 December 1854, stating that the First Division has never been without its full daily ration of meat, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 407.

Letter from Deputy-assistant Commissary-general Rolleston, dated 20 March 1855, showing the almost total absence of deficiency in the rations of the First Division during November and December 1854, and January 1855, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 416.

FLANK MARCH:

1. *Generally.*
2. *Sufferings on the March; Causes thereof.*
3. *Officers.*
4. *Cavalry.*

1. *Generally:*

Particulars as to the march from the Alma to Balaklava, *Bentinck* 1192-1199, 1203——Measures taken for moving on any men who on the march were unable to proceed, *ib.* 1286, 1287——Means of transport of the tents and baggage of the French, *Duke of Cambridge* 3961-3965——Great advantage if the tents could have been carried on the march, *Flower* 10230-10232. 10238——Circumstance of the men having carried on their persons only one day's rations, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13711. 13714-13716.

The flank march to Balaklava was suggested by witness, who still considers it to have been a judicious movement, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17628, 17629.

2. *Sufferings on the March; Causes thereof:*

The want of a regular transport service alone caused the sufferings experienced between the landing at Old Fort, and the arrival before Sebastopol, *Bentinck* 1955-1958——Sufferings of the French from cholera on the flank march, though they carried their *tentes d'abri*, *Duke of Cambridge* 4121, 4122——Inconvenience of the bundles carried by the soldiers in lieu of their knapsacks, *Wilson* 4337-4339. 4439——The sick on the march were carried on stretchers, *ib.* 4353-4355.

Sufferings of the men on the flank march from exposure to the weather, *Dawson* 5502-5506; *Flower* 10005-10008. 10053, 10054. 10206-10211——Further reference to the sickness on the march, and to its probable causes, *Dawson* 5531-5536. 5539-5544. 5552, 5553——Warning on the flank march that the men should not eat abundantly of the grapes in the vineyards on the route, *ib.* 5535. 5552, 5553——Belief as to many sick men having died from being left behind through want of means of conveyance, *Flower* 10018-100023——Cholera in the 63d Regiment during the march, *ib.* 10209-10211.

3. *Sufferings*

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Flank March—continued.

3. *Officers:*

Suffering and incapacity of the officers in having to carry their own baggage on the flank march, *Wilson* 4348–4352. 4430——Circumstance of the French officers having been enabled to carry a great portion of their baggage on the march, *Flower* 10232–10234——Necessity of the officers carrying their own baggage and provisions, the regimental bât animals not having been landed, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13726. 13729–13731.

4. *Cavalry:*

March of the light brigade of cavalry from Alma to Balaklava, where they arrived about the 25th of September, *Lord Cardigan* 5707, 5708——Strength of the cavalry on the march, *Lord Lucan* 6307, 6308——Number of dismounted and led horses of the cavalry from the landing at Old Fort till the arrival at Balaklava; non-employment of these in carrying baggage or tents, *ib.* 6312–6319.

See also *Cox, Colonel.* *Knapsacks*, 2. *Officers.* *Valises* (*Cavalry*).

Flannel Shirts. Remarks on Dr. A. Smith's suggestions with reference to cotton and flannel shirts, &c., *Lord Hardinge* 20813.

Fleet (*Mediterranean*). See *Navy, The.*

Floating Hospitals:

1. *Suggestions made to Government relative to their establishment.*
2. *Official explanation as to their non-establishment till late in* 1854
3. *Conduct of the Hulks at Constantinople.*

1. *Suggestions made to Government relative to their establishment:*

Suggestion made by witness to Government, but not acted upon, relative to hospital ships; explanation thereof, *Mackay* 6864–6868——Advantage if there had been from the first floating hospitals for the sick, *Macdonald* 7114–7118; *Menzies* 10680. 10701–10703——Facilities for establishing permanent naval hospitals at Balaklava, *Stafford* 7710–7712.

Letter from witness to the Military Secretary, dated 11 May 1854, and representations subsequently with regard to hospital hulks, &c., *Dr. A. Smith* 8271–8276, *and App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 693, 694——Fitting up eventually of the "Severn" and another hospital ship, *Dr. A. Smith* 8273, 8274.

Extent to which witness represented the expediency of floating hospitals, *Menzies* 10681–10700. 10946——Recommendation by witness, in his report of 7 August 1854, of floating hospitals for convalescents, *ib.* 10946.

2. *Official explanation as to their non-establishment till late in* 1854:

Steps taken by witness to prepare hospital ships, to which subject his attention was not drawn till long after the letter of Dr. Smith on the subject in May, *Duke of Newcastle* 14672, 14973——Power of the military authorities in the Black Sea to have obtained ships for hospital purposes, *Milne* 16861–16863. 16902. 16905.

Steps taken by the Admiralty in the autumn of 1854 to fit up vessels for the sick, *Milne* 16864–16869——Time necessary to fit up a vessel as a hospital ship, *ib.* 16867. 16869——Circumstance of no requisition having been made to the Admiralty to provide hospital ships, *ib.* 16899–16904.

Witness is not aware of any communication from the commander-in-chief in regard to hospital ships, &c., as suggested by Dr. Smith, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20003, 20004.

Witness was first desired to provide a hospital ship in a private letter from Sir J. Graham after the battle of the Alma, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20575, 20576. 20587–20590.

Belief as to the letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Military Secretary on the 18th May 1854, having been forwarded to the War Department or to Lord Raglan, *Lord Hardinge* 20800–20803. 20819–20826.

Dr. A. Smith's letter relative to hospital ships, &c. was not brought before witness, *Sir J. Graham* 21126. 21158——Attention given by witness to the question of floating hospitals, though he much preferred hospitals on shore, *ib.* 21126. 21159, 21160.

3. *Conduct of the Hulks at Constantinople:*

Mode of superintendence of the two hulks in the harbour, *Macdonald* 6014. 7135, 7136——Great want of accommodation in November for the sick and wounded in the Turkish convalescent "hulk," and the "Bombay convalescent ship," *ib.* 6050–6060——Discharge of men from the "convalescent" ships before they were in proper health, *ib.* 7234.

Excellent means taken by the officers of the hospital ship at Constantinople to procure medical comforts, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9028, 9029——The Turkish hulk was

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Floating Hospitals—continued.

3. *Conduct of the Hulks at Constantinople*—continued.

intended for about 500 convalescents, *Menzies* 9722——There was a want of sheets, &c. on board the hulks when visited by witness, and the washing was very imperfect, *Maxwell* 13132, 13133.

See also *Sick and Wounded*, 10. 11. 12.

Flour. Witness cannot say what became of some Russian convoys of flour captured in the Crimea, *Sir De Lacy Evans*, 690, 691——Reference to some flour at Balaklava which was spoiled by placing charcoal on the top of it, *Vaux* 2177–2180. 2415–2420——Possession taken by the Allies of large magazines of flour at Eupatoria, *Layard* 2443, 2444——Quantity of wheat in store at Eupatoria, and not removed to Balaklava, *Freeman* 12602–12606——Reference to some flour at Eupatoria which was served out among the ships, *Dacres* 16220–16224.

Flower, William Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence).—Assistant-surgeon in the 63d regiment, 9970, 9971——The regiment left Ireland for the East on the 23d of July 1854, 9972, 9973——Strength of the regiment on leaving England and on landing in the Crimea, 9974–9977——Sufficiency of the medical staff, 9978–9982——Supply of medicines as contained in the regimental medicine chest, and in two panniers, the latter only being carried with the regiment in the field, 9983–10001.——Insufficiency of the supply of opium on the march from Old Fort and before Sebastopol, 9993, 9994. 10061–10066——Doubt as to the period of a further supply of medicines in the Crimea after the panniers were exhausted, 9995–9998——Witness left the Crimea on the 12th of December, 10002.

One bell tent only was taken with witness's regiment on the landing in the Crimea; there were no other tents for about three weeks, 10003–10006. 10051–10054——Sufferings of the men on the flank march from exposure to the weather, 10005–10008. 10053, 10054. 10206–10211——Great delay in procuring the bedding and baggage, &c., from on board the "Avon," 10009–10014. 10084–10087——Inadequate means for the removal or conveyance of the sick of the regiment, 10015–10028. 10038, 10039. 10204. Inconvenient character of the ambulance waggons, 10029–10032——Complaints by the men with respect to the packs carried in lieu of their knapsacks on the flank march, 10033, 10034——Great sickness in the 63d regiment after the battle of the Alma, 10035–10037——Difficulty in removing the sick to the ships, 10038——Inconvenience of the araba waggons, 10039.

Very defective arrangements of the English as compared with those of the French for the treatment of the wounded after the battle of the Alma, 10042–10050——Extremely wretched condition of the sick in the hospital tents before Sebastopol, 10055–10059——Inexperience of the orderlies in the hospital tents, 10060——Constant want of proper medicines, 10061. 10070——Requisitions for medicines were constantly being sent to the purveyor at Balaklava, who frequently had not what was wanted, 10067, 10068. 10235–10237——Supply of fresh meat to the sick men, 10071. 10078, 10079——Sufficiency latterly of the supply of medical comforts, 10072–10074——Manner in which the fresh meat for the sick was cooked, 10076, 10077.

Great increase of sickness in witness's regiment since the end of October; causes thereof, 10080–10083. 10107——The men were without any change of clothing for three months, 10083, 10084. 10108–10110——Explanation as to the knapsacks of the regiment not having been restored when witness left in December, though they had been for some time in the camp, 10084. 10087–10104——Delay before the officers of the regiment procured their baggage from Balaklava, 10085, 10086. 10105. 10232——Enormous reduction in the strength of the regiment since its departure from Ireland, 10111–10117.

Removal latterly of the sick from the camp by the French mules, 10118–10120——Extreme overwork of the 63d regiment in the trenches, 10121–10128——Particulars relative to the rations of the regiment; deficient supply of rice, vegetables, meat, &c., 10129–10152——Unwholesome character of the green coffee, 10131–10137——Great inconvenience of the forms necessary before a sick officer could be removed from the camp, 10153–10161——Delay before witness could leave the army; recourse ultimately to a Medical Board, 10154–10160——Sufferings of witness and of all the sick in the tents during the storm of the 14th of November, 10162–10165.

Particulars relative to the passage of witness and about 300 sick in the "Victoria" steamer from Balaklava to Scutari; utter want of accommodation on board, and consequent suffering, 10166–10186——Long time occupied in the passage, and in getting from the mouth of the Bosphorus to Scutari, 10169. 10180, 10181. 10213–10218——Death of twenty-four or twenty-five men on board, 10176. 10182, 10183. 10213–10224——Circumstance of the "Cleopatra" steamer having accompanied the "Victoria" from Balaklava, the latter vessel being in a disabled state; provision for the sick on board the "Cleopatra," 10180. 10187–10192.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Flower, William Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Disapproval of Dr. Hall's order with respect to chloroform, which however was frequently and successfully used, 10193–10202——Care of the wounded after the battle of the Alma further adverted to; delay before they were all removed from the field, 10203–10205. 10239–10249——Witness never saw any roasted coffee served out to his regiment, 10212——The great mortality in the regiment arose to a great extent from the men having been chiefly recruits and never on foreign service before, 10225–10229——Great advantage if the tents could have been carried on the flank march, 10230–10232. 10238——Circumstance of the French officers having been enabled to carry a great portion of their baggage on the march, 10232–10234.

Fodder. See *Forage.*

Food:

1. *Evidence as to the deficiency of the Supply.*
2. *Evidence to a contrary purport.*
3. *Question as to Meat having been eaten raw.*
4. *Other Evidence generally.*

1. *Evidence as to the deficiency of the Supply:*

The rations of the men were frequently very short in December, the arrears being never made up, *G. Dundas* 22, 23. 223, 224——Constant pressure as regards food, through the inefficient transport from Balaklava, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 462, 463——Deficiency in the supply of fresh meat, vegetables, and rice, *ib.* 828. 854, 855——Particulars relative to the rations of the 63d regiment; deficient supply of rice, vegetables, meat, &c., *Flower* 10129–10152——Want of provisions for the army at the time that the Commissariat were offered 550 tons of them in the "Courier," *Darke* 12712, 12713.

Statements as to the deficiencies of rations of the 21st regiment, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 432, 433.

Document, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel West and Major Hamilton, showing the suffering from deficient or irregular supply of provisions, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 432, 433.

2. *Evidence to a contrary purport:*

Sufficiency of the supply of food up to 8 November, *Bentinck* 3209——Sufficient supply of food to the First Division, *Duke of Cambridge* 3839, 3840. 4123——Up to 8 December, when witness left the army, there was no deficiency in the supply of food to the men, *Lord Cardigan* 5731, 5732——Reference to a letter from the Commissary-general, dated 28 November, stating that up to the period of the storm the army was abundantly supplied with provisions of excellent quality, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14219——Exaggeration in regard to the deficiency of provisions, &c. for the men, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17239. 17635, 17636—— Limited extent of suffering from deficient food, *ib.* 17635, 17636.

Statement by Mr. Filder, dated 19 January 1855, as to the exaggerated nature of the reports of deficient rations, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 408——Copy of a memorandum by Commissary-general Filder, dated 27 January 1855, in explanation of certain statements as to the deficient supplies of rations, *ib.* 406——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Under-Secretary of State for the War Department, dated 28 January 1855, with reference to the deficiencies of provisions from 1 December to 24 December, *ib.* 416——Statements by Commissary-general Filder, dated 16 February and 11 March 1855, with reference to the deficiencies of rations, and the exaggerated statements thereof, *ib.* 429. 432.

Consideration of the deficient supplies generally, and of the explanations offered for the same, *Fifth Rep. p.* 16.

3. *Question as to Meat having been eaten raw:*

Impression as to the soldiers having sometimes being obliged to eat their rations raw, *G. Dundas* 358, 359——Deleterious effects of uncooked meat, as stated to have been eaten in the camp, *Vaux* 2155, 2156——Some of the privates ate their food raw, *Clay* 2801, 2802. 3060, 3061. 3226–3228——Witness has heard that food was sometimes eaten raw, *Wilson* 4292——Doubt as to the rations having been eaten raw at any time, *Sparks* 5352——Pork was often eaten raw in the 63d regiment, *Bamford* 12069——Witness is not aware of any instance in which his men were obliged to eat their food raw, *Horsford* 13335, 13336.

4. *Other Evidence generally:*

Unsuitable character of the food issued to the men, *G. Dundas* 224–226——Provisions could regularly have been sppplied, if there were adequate means of transport from Balaklava, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 915, 916——Manner in which the rations were supplied to the horse artillery, *Shakespear* 4658–4660——Character of the provisions supplied to the men under witness's command, *ib.* 4670–4676. 4756–4759——Details relative to the provisions supplied to witness's regiment, *Dawson* 5462–5466. 5472–5478.

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Food—continued.

4. *Other Evidence generally*—continued.

Circumstance of the cavalry, when encamped near Balaklava, not having been sent thither for food when in want of it, *Lord Cardigan* 5853-5855——Supply of fresh and salt meat to the cavalry division, *Lord Lucan* 6379, 6380.

Sundry recommendations by witness in November last as to the rations in the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8329-8332——Practice with regard to the supply of food to the hospital at Scutari; responsibility of both the purveyor and medical officer as to the quality of the food, *ib.* 9456-9458——Arrangements made for the supply of extra articles of diet at cost prices to the army when at Varna, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13611-13613.

Reference to the supplies furnished from England, *Fifth Rep. p.* 16——Supplies of fresh meat procured in the East, *ib.*

See also Baines, James & Co. Biscuit. Bread. Cocoa. Coffee. Commissariat. Cooking. Depôts. First Division. Fourth Division. Fresh Meat. Hospitals, I. 4, 5. *Light Division. Preserved Meats and Vegetables. Rice. Salt Meat. Second Division. Stoppages for Rations. Tea. Third Division. Turkish Army. Varna,* 1. *Vegetables. Victualling Department (Admiralty).*

Forage:

1. *Want of Forage for the Cavalry, &c. in the Crimea.*
2. *Official Explanations on the Subject.*
3. *Supply when at Varna.*
4. *Supply for the French Army.*

1. *Want of Forage for the Cavalry, &c. in the Crimea:*

The cavalry horses had in December, for the most part, eaten off each other's manes and tails, *G. Dundas* 8; *Clay* 2807. 3057-3059——Witness heard, from good authority, that there was in December much forage in the harbour, though greatly wanted at the cavalry camp, *G. Dundas* 10. 370, 371——There is an abundance of provender for horses in Turkey, *ib.* 47-50——Means by which the artillery and cavalry horses attached to the Second Division were provided with forage, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 656-663——No horses in witness's brigade of Guards died through want of forage, *Bentinck* 1328-1321——Great difficulty experienced by witness in procuring forage for his horses, *ib.* 1915.

Great irregularity and insufficiency of the Commissariat supply for the horses attached to the first division, *Duke of Cambridge* 3845. 3847. 3872-3877——Blame attributable to the Commissary-general and his department with respect to the want of forage, stores of which might have been formed at Varna and elsewhere, *ib.* 3847-3857. 3879-3883——Witness ordered twenty-four of the reserve ammunition ponies to be shot one morning on account of their starved condition, *ib.* 1875-1877.

Occasional want of forage for the horse artillery; practice in supplying it, *Shakespear* 4630-4634. 4745——Some fodder which was on board the "Trent" for the mules, brought from Malta, could not be landed by the Commissariat, and was taken back to Constantinople, *Crewe* 4813-4825. 4877-4884——The cavalry made no application for the fodder, though they were much in want of it, *ib.* 4832-4837.

Great want of forage for the cavalry after the latter end of October, up to which period the supply was adequate, *Lord Cardigan* 5713. 5716-5725. 5769, 5770. 5917-5928——Impracticability of a constant supply of forage, *ib.* 5722, 5723. 5975-5977——How far imprudent to have depended upon England for forage, *ib.* 5822——There were no large stores of forage landed at Balaklava, *ib.* 5929-5931.

Particulars relative to the difficulties about forage for the cavalry division before Balaklava, *Lord Lucan* 6320 *et seq.* 6390-6426. 6684-6687——Blame attributed to the Commissariat officers, *ib.* 6327-6331. 6342 *et seq.*, 6687. 6692——Difficulty and delay in the process of obtaining forage at Balaklava, *ib.* 6334-6340——Management in the forage having been issued by a very low class Commissariat officer, *ib.* 6352. 6371. 6634-6636——Great mistake in depending on England for forage, *ib.* 6395, 6396.

Loan of thirty days' supply of chopped straw from the French army adverted to, *Lord Lucan,* 6398, 6399. 6412-6415——The English cavalry horses always drew their own forage from Balaklava, *ib.* 6416-6417——Propriety of the cavalry fetching their supplies if not more than three miles from the place of issue, *ib.* 6430. 6660——Short supply of forage from the time of the landing till the arrival at Balaklava, *ib.* 6649.

2. *Official Explanations on the Subject:*

Reason for not relying more upon chopped straw or barley as obviating the necessity of procuring hay and oats from England, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13753-13768——Deficiency of forage towards the end of November, *ib.* 14047——Reasons for the deficiency, 14191——Calculations of the Commissariat with respect to obtaining forage supplies in the Crimea, *ib.* 14325-14332——Difficulty at Scutari in regard to the issue of forage, *J. W. Smith* 15607.

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Forage—continued.

2. *Official Explanations on the Subject*—continued.

The supply of forage by the Admiralty was a new service; system on which conducted, *Grant* 17720–17734. 17914, 17915.

Letter from Mr. Filder, dated 29 March 1855, in correction of a statement by the Earl of Lucan as to a loan of thirty days' fodder from the French army to the English Commissariat, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 355. 433——Commissariat stores of forage on 31st August 1854, *ib.* 383——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Quartermaster-general, dated 14 December 1854, in explanation of the deficiencies in the issue of forage to Captain Morris's battery of artillery, *ib.* 404.

Copy of a letter and its enclosures from Commissary-general Filder to Lord Raglan, relating to evidence given by the Earl of Lucan before the Committee with respect to deficient supplies of forage for the cavalry, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 307–310——Statement of forage drawn by the several regiments of the cavalry division, from the 4 to 16 December inclusive, and from 17 December to 10 January 1855 inclusive, *ib.* 308, 309.

Resumé by the Committee of statements in regard to the want of forage, *Fifth Rep. p.* 17.

3. *Supply when at Varna:*

Want of forage at Varna about the end of December, *Clay* 3186–3188——Delay and difficulty in obtaining forage at Varna, *Lord Lucan* 6277–6279——Ample supply of forage till the army had left for the Crimea, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13529–13531.

4. *Supply for the French Army:*

There were large depôts of forage at Kamiesch Bay, *Crowe* 4921. 4950–4953; *Lord Lucan* 6407–6412.

See also *Barley. Bran. Chopped Straw and Barley. Commissariat. Depôts. Hay. Horses. Oats. Officers' Horses. Samsoun. Sinope. Sulla and Straw.*

Foraging Caps. Small foraging caps were usually worn by the French, the shakos having been left in France, *Bentinck* 1340–1342——Convenience of the forage cap of the brigade of Guards, though disliked by the men, *Bentinck* 1344, 1345; *Duke of Cambridge* 4178–4182——Approval of the forage cap worn by the men, *Dawson* 5548–5551.

Ford, Captain. The coaling at Constantinople was at one time superintended by Captain Ford, *Kelloch* 5221–5223.

Foreign Legion. No steps were taken to enlist foreigners till after the passing of the Foreigners Enlistment Act, *Duke of Newcastle* 14507, 14508——Favourable information received as to the power of obtaining foreign troops, *ib.* 14509–14511——Reference to the Foreign Legion and to the nationalities to be employed therein, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20107–20120.

See also *Chesney, General. Italian Troops. Polish Troops. Spanish Guerillas.*

Foreigners Enlistment Bill. Reluctance of many respectable foreigners to enlist on account of the severe language made use of during the debate on the Bill, *Duke of Newcastle* 14512.

Forms. See *Commissariat*, 3. *Correspondence. Deviation from System. War Department*, 3, 4.

Forrest, John, M.D. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was with the army at Varna and in the Crimea as deputy inspector-general of hospitals, in charge of the Third Division, 11618, 11619. 11621——There was no want of hospital stores at Varna, 11620——There was no want of medical stores for the Third Division after the battle of the Alma, 11622——Witness left the Crimea on 28 December, 11623——Use of salt provisions, chiefly after 14 November, 11624——The men had no change of clothing till the end of December, *ib.*——Defective state of the bell-tents; effect thereof upon the health of the men, 11625–11629. 11633–11635. 11805–11814. 11845——The hospital marquees were very good, 11626. 11846–11849——Explanation as to witness not having formally represented the state of the bell-tents, 11628–11637.

Particulars as to witness having been sent from the camp in bad health to relieve Dr. Menzies at Scutari on 1 January, 11638–11640. 11680–11691——Witness had charge at Scutari for about ten days, 11638. 11646. 11674–11677——Overcrowded state of the barrack hospital at this period, 11641——There was no offensive smell from the privies, which were kept as clean as was possible, 11642–11652——There was an abundance of medical stores and comforts, 11653–11655——Proper provision for a dispensary, 11656, 11657——Good state of the kitchens, 11658, 11659——There was an operating room in one of the corridors, 11660–11662——There were some operating tables, but not regular ones, 11663–11665.

Circumstances under which Dr. Lawson relieved witness, being sick, as chief officer at Scutari, on 18 or 19 January, 11666–11679——Dr. Cumming took the charge from Dr. Lawson

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Forrest, John, M.D (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Lawson on 1 February, 11674——Dr. Cruikshank did duty while witness was sick, before the arrival of Dr. Lawson, 11677. 11683-11687——Witness was appointed to relieve Dr. Menzies, who was obliged to apply for a medical board and return home, 11688-11692.

Want of opium and sugar-of-lead for the third division after the end of November, other medicines being very fairly supplied, 11693-11708. 11729, 11730——Divisional supply of medicines out of which witness supplied the regimental surgeons for a considerable time after the landing in the Crimea, 11702. 11709-11728——The third division was very healthy, 11731——Abundant surgical appliances after the battle of Inkermann, 11732-11734——Very inadequate accommodation for the sick in the hospital tents, 11735-11751.

Position of the dead-house in the barrack hospital and in the general hospital; alteration of the former by witness, 11752-11771.——Reference to some medical stores piled up in the corridor at the barrack hospital, whence witness had them removed, 11772-11774——Readiness with which witness's applications were attended to at Scutari, 11774-11776——On ships arriving from the Crimea with sickness, a surgeon was sent off to examine them, 11777, 11778.

Delay in the landing of the sick at Scutari from the "Queen of the South," in which vessel witness left Balaklava; number of deaths on board; accommodation for the sick, &c., 11780-11797. 11815-11821——Want of hospital accommodation at Scutari at the end of December, 11796-11799——The sickness of witness attributed to exposure to the weather, 11800-11804——Improvement by witness in the system of returns relative to the deaths, and state of the sick on the passage from Balaklava, 11822-11829——Satisfactory condition in which, whilst witness was at Scutari, the sick were conveyed thither from the Crimea, 11830-11833.

Issue of the tents of the Third Division; they came out of store at Malta, 11834-11839——Witness arrived at Gallipoli on 2 May 1854, but had nothing to do with the general hospitals at that period, 11841-11844——Supply of porter and bitter ale to the Third Division at Varna, 11850-11853. 11925-11927——Ample supply also of tea, 11854-11859——Also of port wine for the men in hospital, 11860-11864. 11925-11927——Want of rice in the Crimea, 11866——Also of lime-juice, till about the middle of November; doubt whether any large supply could have arrived from England, 11867-11872. 11883-11886.

Deficiency in the supply of sago and arrow-root, &c. for the Third Division in the Crimea, 11873, 11874——Supply of tea for the sick, 11874. 11924——Supply of medicines and medical comforts taken by witness as divisional officer to the Crimea, 11875-11879. 11915——Delay before the "John Masterman," with medical stores, arrived at Balaklava, 11880-11882. 11919-11922——Witness's requisitions to Dr. Hall were often not complied with before the arrival of the "John Masterman," 11882. 11916-11918. 11923.

Respective duty and responsibility of the commandant, and of the principal medical officer at Scutari, 11888-11898——There was not the slightest conflict of authority between witness and Lord W. Paulet, 11891-11893——Mr. Wreford, as purveyor, was most amenable to any suggestion made by witness, 11899-11901——Duties of witness in making up returns, &c., and in inspecting the hospital, adverted to, as altogether too much for one person, 11902-11913. 11947-11950——Compliance of Dr. Smith with an application by witness for thirty additional medical officers, 11904, 11905——There should be a separate medical officer to attend to the invaliding, and to the general duties of Scutari station, 11914. 11948. 11951.

State of the soldiers' wives with the army; at Gallipoli they lived in tents with their husbands, 11928-11937——Proper cooking for the patients whilst witness was at Scutari, 11941-11943——Irregularity in the distribution of the patients' food; remedy of the same by witness, 11944. 11956-11958——Importance of the returns by the chief medical officer at Scutari, 11949——There were 800 orderlies at Scutari on witness's arrival, or one to every seven patients, but they were not organized, 11952-11955——Witness attempted to introduce order generally, and when he left in January things were going on very satisfactorily, 11957, 11958.

Fortifications. See *Earthworks.* *Fergusson, Mr.* *Siege Operations.*

Fourth Division. Encampment ground of the Fourth Division after the battle of Alma, *Duke of Cambridge* 3973-3978——Character of the rations of the division before Sebastopol; it was worse off than any other division, *Bamford* 12061-12071——Suffering chiefly through the division having been specially badly off for means of transport to and from Balaklava, *Horsford* 13349-13351. 13363, 13364. 13386.

Statement of rations issued to the several regiments and corps composing the Fourth Division between 1 and 31 December 1854, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 423——Statement of the rations delivered to the Division between 1 and 26 January 1855, *ib.* 424.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Freeman, Captain Benjamin. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Commanded the "Pyrenees" sailing transport of 832 tons, belonging to Mr. Duncan Dunbar, 12560-12563. 12567——Took part of a troop of horse artillery from Woolwich in March 1854 to Scutari, and thence to Varna, 12564-12569——Subsequently took other troops from Scutari to Varna, 12570-12572——Conveyed some horse artillery from Varna to Old Fort; how landed, 12573-12577. 12587, 12588——Satisfactory mode in which the horses were conveyed in the "Pyrenees," which was fitted up at Deptford, 12578-12586.

Stay of the "Pyrenees" at Eupatoria for five weeks after the 20th of September with provision stores on board, which were never landed, and were lost with the vessel, 12589-12592——Large quantity of onions at Eupatoria, which were not removed thence, 12595-12601. 12608-12613. 12625-12629——Conveyance of 900 sheep in the "Pyrenees" from Eupatoria to Balaklava, about the beginning of November, after which she returned to the Katscha, 12597. 12614-12617—— Quantity of wheat in store at Eupatoria, and not removed to Balaklava, 12602-12606—— Particulars relative to the wreck of the "Pyrenees" off the Katscha; there was room for her at the time in Balaklava harbour, 12618-12643.

French Army. See *Ambulances*, 4. *Bakeries. Bread. Chasseur d'Afrique. Commissariat*, 12. *Condition of the Army. Forage*, 4. *Horses*, IV. *Huts*, 6. *Kamiesch. Land Transport*, I. 2. *Roads*, II. *Tents*, 4.

French Hospitals. See *Hospitals.*

French Military System. Circumstance of witness having sent a commission to Paris with a view to the adaptation from the French military system of such parts as tend to the improvement of the English system, *Duke of Newcastle* 15448, 15449.

FRESH MEAT:

1. *Irregularity and Inadequacy of the Supply.*
2. *The Deficiency in the Supply attributed to the want of Transport from Constantinople.*

1. *Irregularity and Inadequacy of the Supply:*

There was not any constant supply of fresh meat from Asia Minor or Turkey in Europe, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 902, 903—Uncertainty in the supply of fresh meat to the different regiments, *Layard* 2496, 2497——Character of the fresh meat which might have been procured at Sinope, as suggested by witness, *ib.* 2621-2624——Rare supply of fresh meat to the First Division in December, &c., *Parker* 3430, 3431——Supply of fresh meat to the sick men in the Crimea, *Flower* 10071. 10078, 10079——Irregularity in the supply of meat to the 63d regiment, *ib.* 10138-10145——Good character of the meat at Varna, *Dumbreck* 11313, 11314——Contracts which were entered into at Varna, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13532.

Non-fulfilment of the intended regular supply of fresh meat, as in winter it was sometimes not supplied more than twice a week, *Duke of Newcastle* 14541. 14550, 14551—— Large supplies of fresh meat were at first procured from Eupatoria, *ib.* 15299—— Considerable extent to which, on the whole, the army has been supplied with fresh meat, *ib.* 15394——Supply of meat to the army at Scutari; stipulation as to the quality, *J. W. Smith* 15601-15606——Want of fresh meat chiefly during the latter part of November, *ib.* 15764, 15765. 15843——Inadequate supply of good fresh meat for the fleet; explanation hereon, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20610-20617——Difficulty of getting good meat by contracts in Turkey, *Mapleton* 20962.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder, dated 28 February 1855, and from Lord Raglan, dated 25 February 1855, relative to the supply of fresh meat, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 380. 431, 432.

Consideration by the Committee of the deficiency in the supply of fresh meat to the army, *Fifth Rep. p.* 16.

2. *The Deficiency in the Supply attributed to the want of Transport from Constantinople:*

Difficulties experienced with respect to a regular supply of fresh meat on account of the frequent detention of the transport vessels at Constantinople, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13843-13847. 14047——Depôts of live cattle at Smyrna, Constantinople, and Varna, from which supplies of fresh meat might regularly have been issued to the army but for the defective arrangements relative to the steam transports, *ib.* 14200-14218——Consideration of the accuracy of a statement by Mr. Filder that, up to the period of the storm, fresh meat was issued on alternate days, 14221, 14221*.

Attention of the Commissariat drawn by witness to the supply of fresh meat which was very regularly provided up to the commencement of the siege, *Duke of Newcastle* 14467——Causes of the deficient supply of fresh meat; large number of transports available for that and other purposes, *ib.* 14552-14557.

Specific orders from the Commissary-general on which witness provided supplies of cattle at Constantinople for the army in the Crimea to be forwarded thither when sent for,

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Fresh Meat—continued.

2. *The Deficiency in the Supply attributed to the want of Transport, &c.*—continued.

J. W. Smith 15682-15688——Want of fresh meat in the Crimea till the return of the "Tonning" and the "Albatross" thither from Constantinople, *ib.* 15702——Further reference to the supplies of cattle at Constantinople, as showing that the army could have been regularly supplied with fresh meat but for the want of sufficient transport vessels, *ib.* 15750-15761. 15809-15813. 15825-15827——The want of transport ceased about the beginning of December, after which the supply was regular, *ib.* 15755, 15762-15766.

See also *Commissariat*, 5.

Fuel:

1. *Want of Fuel, and consequent suffering.*
2. *Means by which the want might have been remedied.*
3. *Supply provided by the Commissariat.*

1. *Want of Fuel, and consequent suffering:*

Deficient supply of fuel in December, &c.; difficulty in procuring it, *G. Dundas* 26, 27; *Bentinck* 1210. 1215-1217; *Layard* 2527. 2636, 2637. 2640; *Parker* 3309, 3310. 3399-3405; *Duke of Cambridge* 4125-4128; *Blakeley* 4498; *Bamford* 12069, 12070; *Horsford* 13333, 13334. 13369——Considerable suffering occasioned by the want of fuel, *G. Dundas* 216-219——Deficiency in the Commissariat supply of fuel to the Second Division; supply obtained from other sources, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 454-457——Practice with respect to the collection of firewood, of which there was a good deal on the heights, *ib.* 724, 725.

There was at first a sufficiency of fuel in the neighbourhood of the camp, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1041-1043——Order with respect to the collection of brushwood, *Bentinck* 1406-1409; *Layard* 2642, 2643. 2676-2678——No formal representation was made about fuel, as every one knew there was no remedy, *Bentinck* 2026-2028——Scarcity of fuel among the officers encamped near Balaklava in December, *Clay* 3229-3234——Doubt as to any representations being made about the want of fuel, *Parker* 3445-3450.

Partial want of fuel in the army when witness left in November, *Duke of Cambridge* 4050, 4051. 4125——Supply of brushwood adverted to, *Dawson* 5468-5471——Fuel obtained by the men after landing at Old Fort, *Lord Cardigan* 5704-5706.

2. *Means by which the want might have been remedied:*

An abundance of fuel might have been provided by landing the broken timber which was floating about in the harbour, &c. from the wrecks on 14 November, *G. Dundas* 28, 29. 91-95, 210, 211. 305-309——Facility with which wood fuel might have been provided from the Turkish coasts, *ib.* 85-90——Many of the steamers in the harbour discharged their cinders into the water, *ib.* 296-298.

There was an order against using the fuel that arose from the wrecks during the storm, *Vaux* 2160-2162. 2344, 2345——Means by which the difficulty about fuel might have been overcome, *Layard* 2638-2641——In the French camp there seemed to be in December an adequate supply of fuel, which was procured from the adjoining hills, *Clay* 3123-3130——No planking was used as firewood in the Cavalry Division, *Lord Lucan* 6599.

3. *Supply provided by the Commissariat:*

Course pursued in order to provide fuel, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14030, 14031——Particulars as to the supplies of fuel available at Constantinople, but not regularly forwarded to the Crimea through want of transport vessels, *J. W. Smith* 15846-15883——Large supply of firewood placed in store at Constantinople in September, *ib.* 15847-15850——Supplies of firewood forwarded to Balaklava, *ib.* 15852. 15861-15869.

Reference to the stores of fuel provided at Constantinople and forwarded to Balaklava, *Fifth Rep. p.* 15.

See also *Charcoal.* *Commissariat*, 1.

Fur Caps. Advance in the price to the Ordnance of fur caps on account of some having been procured on direct order from the Secretary for War, *Sir T. Hastings* 18637, 18638——Probability of the contract for the more expensive fur caps having been carried out by witness's signature, *ib.* 19153.

Misconception of Sir T. Hastings in making the foregoing statement, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20039, 20040.

Fuses. Bad condition of the fuses as used on the right attack, *Layard* 2528-2530——Character of the fuses adverted to as being in part defective, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17576. 17583-17585——The complaints made in the Crimea with regard to fuses referred only to those of the thirteen-inch mortars, *Sir H. D. Ross* 18000-18004——General Cator has received a report from the Crimea relative to the fuses, *Sir T. Hastings* 19156-19158——Insufficient stores of fuses at the commencement of the war, *Monsell* 19561. 19626.

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G.

GALLIPOLI:

1. *Occupation of Gallipoli explained.*
2. *Generally as to the Preparations made for the Reception of the Army.*
3. *Landing Arrangements.*
4. *Want of Land Transport.*

1. *Occupation of Gallipoli explained:*

The selection of Gallipoli for occupation was recommended by witness; explanation hereon, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17554. 17621-17624——Occupation of Gallipoli upon the joint recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent of the French service, *Duke of Newcastle* 14382. 14386. 14397.

2. *Generally as to the Preparations made for the Reception of the Army:*

Witness went with three or four officers to Gallipoli in January 1854, to prepare for the reception of the English troops, *Hon. G. Wrottesley*, 1619, 1620. 1622, 1623——The Greek quarter of Gallipoli was reserved for the English army, *ib.* 1624. 1841, 1842——Further statement as to witness having been sent in January to Constantinople and Gallipoli before war was proclaimed against Russia; his duties at those places, *ib.* 1674-1685. 783-1785. 1839-1843.

Preparations made by Captain Wrottesley as deputed by General Tylden, *Blakeley* 4460. 4466. 4471——On landing the army marched about eight miles inland and encamped in tents, *ib.* 4475-4481——Circumstance under which there was occasionally a short supply of rations, notwithstanding the labour of three Commissariat officers, *ib.* 4484-4488.

On hearing that troops were to be encamped at Gallipoli, witness despatched Dr. Forrest thither to make medical arrangements, *Dr. A. Smith* 8093——Directions given for the provision of Commissariat supplies at Gallipoli, and steps taken to provide the same, *Duke of Newcastle* 14384, 14385-14387-14401——Preparations made by witness for the arrival of the troops, *J. W. Smith* 15589-15597——Information first obtained through witness by General Tylden and others as to troops being sent to Gallipoli, *ib.* 15940-15945——Witness was at Gallipoli two or three times, but is not aware of the preparations subsequently made for the arrival of the troops there, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17550-17555.

3. *Landing Arrangements:*

Landing of the troops at Gallipoli without recourse to the French boats, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1702, 1703—No very definite Commissariat arrangements had been made for the landing or reception of the troops; delay in landing, *Blakeley* 4460-4473——Notification of the landing adverted to, *ib.* 4466-4469——There were no difficulties in the landing of witness's regiment, *Sparks* 5280, 5281.

4. *Want of Land Transport:*

Great inconvenience on the arrival of the army on account of the want of transport, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1625-1627——Adequate means of transport of the French, *ib.* 1628——Provision made by Mr. Smith for land transport at Gallipoli, but not for the army generally, it not being part of his instructions so to do, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13439. 13446-13450——Explanation as to the deficient means of transport, *Duke of Newcastle* 14400, 14401; *J. W. Smith* 15596, 15597. 15805-15808.

Gardiner, Major. Valuable services rendered by Major Gardiner, Commissariat officer at Eupatoria, *Clay* 3202, 3203.

Garrison Hospitals. Direction of witness over the principal garrison hospitals in England and Ireland, and partially over the colonial hospitals, *Dr. A. Smith* 8007-8014——System of local requisition to witness upon which medicines and medical stores are supplied, *ib.* 8015-8023——Different medical officers on the establishment of such an hospital as that at Chatham; their respective duties, *ib.* 8024-8028.

General Hospitals. Irresponsibility of witness in regard to the provision of general hospitals; authorities responsible, *Lord Hardinge* 20798-20800. 20804, 20805. 20827——Remarks upon the pressing want of military general hospitals at Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c., *ib.* 20903-20906.——*See* also *Hospitals.*

General Officers. Hardship upon the general officers in not having been allowed to bring more than two horses with them to the Crimea, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 579.

Duty devolving on commanding officers of divisions in the event of insufficiency of Commissariat supplies, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14248-14251.

Rule that in the appointment of general officers to command their names be submitted by the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary for War, in order to be approved by the Government before being recommended to the Queen, *Duke of Newcastle* 14348-14355.

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14360-14365——Exceptions to the foregoing rule in the cases of Lord Lucan and Brigadiers-general Torrens and Goldie, who were appointed directly by Lord Hardinge through an inadvertence; responsibility of witness with reference to these appointments, *Duke of Newcastle* 14354. 14356-14359. 14366-14371.

Gevreckler (*Bulgaria*). Continued sickness among the Guards after removing from Aladyn to Gevreckler, *Duke of Cambridge* 3751-3754; *Wilson* 4250-4253——Mortality among the Coldstreams at this place, *Dawson* 5423, 5424.

"*Golden Fleece,*" *The.* Witness commanded the "Golden Fleece" steam transport, of 2,500 tons, belonging to the General Screw Shipping Company, *Stewart* 12266, 12267. 12269, 12270——Conveyed the Fourth Regiment from Leith on 11 March 1854 to Malta, *ib.* 12268. 12271. 12278, 12279——The "Golden Fleece" was taken up by Government on the gross tonnage at about 50 *s.* per ton per month, *ib.* 12272-12277. 12312.

Particulars as to the services of the vessel whilst witness was in charge of her, in conveying troops from Malta to the East, and from Scutari to Varna, &c., *Stewart* 12280-12307——Return of the vessel to England for more troops, when witness changed over to the command of the "Mauritius," *ib.* 12307-12311.

Reference to some provisions on board the "Golden Fleece" and the "Mauritius," as having been with difficulty landed at Constantinople and at Balaklava, *ib.* 12471-12483.

Golden Horn. Character of the Golden Horn roadstead at Constantinople, *Clay* 3095-3107.

Goldner's Preserves. Reference to the insufficiency of the Admiralty examination test, in the case of Goldner's preserved meat, *Grant* 17925-17928.

Goodall, Captain. Grounds upon which Captain Goodall was appointed to and continued in the command of the "Prince," *Milne* 16602-16607——If Captain Goodall had not been lost in the storm, there would have been an inquiry into his conduct on that occasion, *ib.* 16608-16612.

Government, The. See *Cabinet Councils.* *Expedition to the Crimea,* 1. 5.

Graham, Right Hon. Sir James, (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was First Lord of the Admiralty from the breaking out of the war, and transacted the business of the Admiralty until 25 March 1855; 21032——Conduct by the Board of Admiralty of the naval service without any control on the part of the War Department, 21033-21035——Mode in which the First Lord exercises his functions; he has no power to overrule the Board's decisions, 21036, 21037——Illustration of the power exercised by Earl Spencer, as First Lord, when there was a majority of the Board against him, 21038——Useful council afforded by the instrumentality of the Board, 21039.

Several quarters whence up to a certain period requisitions for transport were made on the Admiralty; inconvenience thereof, 21040, 21041——Suggestions made by witness in order that the requisitions for transport might all proceed from the War Department, 21041——Steps which were taken before witness left office for the concentration of the requisitions, 21042——Responsibility taken by witness as First Lord for the Transport Service and everything else in the Naval Department, 21043. 21190.

There were only three ships belonging to the Crown which were available for conveying troops when the war commenced, 21044——Steps were forthwith taken to hire steam transports as much as possible; necessity, however, of taking up sailing vessels also, 21045, 21046. 21185——The naval Commander-in-Chief was, subject to certain limitations, responsible for the Transport service in the Black Sea, &c., 21047-21049. 21057-21061. 21083-21088. 21156, 21157. 21161-21165. 21174-21176——Admiral Boxer was in charge of the transports in the Bosphorus, but was subject to Admiral Dundas, 21050, 21051. 21057-21059—— Captain Christie had a similar charge in the Black Sea, 21052.

Impartial grounds on which Admiral Boxer was appointed by witness to the command in the Bosphorus, 21053, 21054——Extracts from the instructions issued to Admiral Boxer; these instructions delivered in, 21056-21059. and *App. p.* 345——Grounds upon which witness selected Captain Christie to command the transports in the Black Sea, 21062, 21063——Irresponsibility of Captain Christie in regard to the condition of Balaklava Harbour, 21064-21066——Captain Christie had no power within the harbour, nor could he of himself order transports to leave the harbour, 21064. 21070, 21071. 21080-21093——Consideration of the manner in which Captain Christie exercised his command on 14th November with reference to the "Prince" and other vessels, 21067-21082——Impending trial of Captain Christie by court martial adverted to, 21068. 21079. 21171.

Concurrent authority of Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas with regard to the movement,

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ment, &c. of transports, the former, however, having the supreme power, 21083, 21084. 21156, 21157. 21161–21165——Responsibility under which, in the absence of Admiral Dundas, the chief naval officer at any place would order the movement of transports, 21085–21088——Different naval officers appointed by Admiral Dundas to command at Balaklava; they were all well qualified and able men, 21095, 21096——No official complaints were made concerning Admiral Boxer, 21097. 21166–21168——Circumstances under which witness removed Admiral Boxer from the Bosphorus to Balaklava, 21097. 21166–21170.

Witness reads three letters from Admiral Boxer to the Admiralty in 1854, containing sundry suggestions for the better conduct of the transport service, &c. in the Bosphorus, more especially as regards the want of a receiving ship at Constantinople; compliance generally of the Admiralty with these suggestions; blame taken by witness to himself for some delay in placing a receiving ship at Admiral Boxer's disposal, 21097–21099.

Authority given to Admiral Dundas to deal as he pleased with any officers under his orders, 21100. 21171——Power of Admiral Dundas to have superseded Admiral Boxer, 21100. 21177–21179——No official complaints were made to the Admiralty in regard to the conduct of the transport service, 21101——Prudential grounds on which it was decided to keep a fleet of transports in the Black Sea, 21102–21108——Denial that any time was lost in this country in fitting up the transports, 21105——System of the Navy in regard to the loading and delivery of stores adverted to as very perfect, 21109——The recent use of a cargo book in the case of ordnance stores has worked well, 21110——Before leaving the Admiralty witness contemplated the employment of a supercargo on board the steam transports, *ib.*

Appropriation of transports in the Black Sea to the Commissariat; letter from Sir E. Lyons adverting thereto, 21111, 21112——With respect to the want of means to convey all the land transport from Varna to the Crimea, such want was unavoidable, all the vessels available as transports having been procured as quickly as possible, but being required for other duties, 21113–21125——Summary of duties performed by the transport service, 21116——Dr. A. Smith's letter relative to hospital ships, &c. was not brought before witness, 21126. 21158——Attention given by witness to the question of floating hospitals, though he much preferred hospitals on shore, like that established by Admiral Dundas at Therapia, which has worked admirably, 21126. 21159, 21160.

Letter from the Admiralty to Admiral Dundas on 28th December 1854, relative to transport vessels for conveying the sick and wounded from the Crimea, 21127——Reference in the foregoing to a private letter on the same subject from witness to Admiral Dundas on 25th October; this letter read, 21127. 21136–21138——Distinction drawn between a public and a private letter; examination hereon, 21127–21133. 21137–21155——Letters in December 1854 between Lord de Redcliffe and Admiral Boxer relative to deficient accommodation on board the "Bombay" and the Turkish hulk in the Bosphorus, 21134–21136.

Authorities responsible for the provision of boats in which to land the sick and wounded at Scutari, 21161——Large controlling powers and responsibilities vested in Admiral Dundas with respect to the transport service and the landing of stores, &c. at Balaklava; letters to him from the Admiralty in November and December 1854, requiring him to exercise such powers, 21161–21165. 21171–21177——Excellent effect of the regulations issued by Admiral Boxer in regard to Balaklava Harbour, 21161.

Letter from the Admiralty to Admiral Dundas on 20th December 1854, wherein he is directed to exercise a general superintendence over the whole of the duties of the several flag officers under his orders, 21171–21173——Communications from the Admiralty to Sir E. Lyons, showing the large authority and responsibility vested in him as successor to Admiral Dundas, 21173–21175——Removal of 13,800 of the British army from the Crimea as sick or wounded between the 30th September and the 17th February adverted to in explanation of the insufficiency of the available means of transport, 21179.

Explanation relative to the conveyance of warm clothing to the East, to the effect that prior to the 18th October 1854, the words "warm clothing," or "urgent," were never marked on the Ordnance requisitions for transport, 21180–21184——Opportunities for sending out warm clothing before October, had the Admiralty been told of the urgency, 21183. 21186——Statement delivered in containing particulars relative to the Ordnance requisitions for means of transport, 21184; and *App. p.* 345, 346.

Weighty reasons upon which witness, when at the Admiralty in former years, abolished the Transport Board during a time of peace, 21187, 21188——Very efficient management of the transport service by Captain Milne, 21189——Grounds upon which witness recommended the re-construction of the Transport Board, *ib.*——Impossibility of the public service being conducted more efficiently by any further re-construction of the Admiralty departments; testimony to the zeal and ability of the heads of the different departments, as well as of the clerks, 21190——Statement showing that there was always a full supply of assistant surgeons with the Black Sea Fleet, 21191——Grounds upon which

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which witness differed from the Duke of Newcastle's opinion that the whole of the transport service should be placed under the Minister for War, 21192, 21193.

Examination with reference to a strict blockade of the Black Sea not having been established at an earlier period; difficulties which prevented such blockade; exoneration of Admiral Dundas in the matter, 21194–21236——Measures taken for providing vessels of light draught to operate in shallow water, 21237, 21238——Accurate information obtained by witness in July 1854, with respect to the Crimea, and the strength of the Russian army therein, 21239, 21240——Difficulty in obtaining information in the East in regard to Russia or her resources, 21240——Information was also obtained by witness in regard to the harbour of Sebastopol, and the navigation of the Danube, *ib.*

Very short period for which witness was absent from London during 1854; 21241——Approval of the Ordnance department being conducted by a Board, with an efficient person at the head of the Board, 21242——Prejudice to the working of the Ordnance by the absence of its chief officer, 21243——Gigantic and successful efforts made by the Ordnance to provide naval stores, &c. 21244——Examination relative to the period which elapsed before the date at which the expedition to the Crimea was decided on, and the date at which it left Varna; there was no unavoidable delay on the part of the fleet, 21245–21262——Opinion that the expedition was undertaken at the proper time, 21263, 21264.

Reference to some differences of opinion between Lord de Redcliffe and Admiral Dundas; belief that no injury to the public service resulted therefrom, 21266–21272——Efforts necessary to dissuade the Turks, after the disaster at Sinope, from a blockade of the coast of Circassia, 21273–21276——Circumstance of witness not having heard till December or January last, of the road into the Crimea across part of the Putrid Sea, 21277–21281——Belief that the Russians were principally supplied by way of the Sea of Azof, 21281, 21282——A blockade of the Sea of Azof was rendered impossible by the passage through the Strait of Kertch having been stopped by sunken vessels, 21283, 21284.

Grant, Thomas Tassel. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Comptroller since 1851 of the Victualling department at Somerset House, 17641–17645——Was Comptroller of the Transport Service till the appointment of the new Transport Board, 17641–17646——Practice in regard to the system of tenders for the Transport Service, 17647–17656. 17811 *et seq.*——Similar practice in regard to tenders for victualling stores, *ib.*——Discretion exercised by the Admiralty in regard to the acceptance of the lowest tender, 17655, 17656.

System pursued of late years by which Custom-house officers are employed in judging of the samples accompanying the tenders for certain supplies for the Victualling department, 17657–17661. 17827. 17847. 17867——System for ascertaining whether the supply is in accordance with the sample; examination hereon, showing the checks upon any change of the original sample, and upon the supply of an inferior article, 17661. 17811–17892——Practice in regard to the supply and examination of salt beef and salt pork, which are not bought by sample, 17662–17668. 17921–17934——Condition made for the repayment of the value of the meat if condemned within twelve months from the date of its receipt, 17669.

Adoption of the foregoing system in regard to all supplies furnished by the Admiralty for the army in the Crimea, 17670——With the exception of the port wine first sent out the Admiralty supplies have never been complained of, 17671, 17672. 17698——Examination of the supplies furnished by the Admiralty for the army in the East from the middle of March 1854 to 1 May 1855; 17673–17681——Particulars relative to the port wine complained of; mode of selection and of subsequent investigation, 17682–17697. 17937——Practice of the Admiralty in regard to the purchase and examination of medical comforts for the army, 17696, 17697. 17899–17911. 17935.

Responsibility of the store-receivers for the quantity of each article supplied to the Admiralty; absence of fraud on this point, 17699–17704——Mode of shipment and consignment of supplies, 17699. 17735——System of communication from the Admiralty to the Treasury, or the Secretary for War, after the shipment has taken place, 17699. 17705–17719. 17735——The supply of forage by the Admiralty was a new service; system on which conducted, 17720–17734. 17914, 17915——Nature of the security that the supplies are duly delivered in the East; means by which the Admiralty are acquainted with their arrival and delivery, 17735–17751. 17916.

Reference to communications between witness and Commissary-general Filder, in February 1854, relative to the unroasted coffee, 17752–17756——Circumstance of Commissary-general Filder having requested, early in 1854, that all stores for the army should be sent out in small packages, 17757. 17780–17782. 17794, 17795——Proposal by witness, on 5th July 1854, for supplying small coffee-mills, which was met by a requisition for six mills only, 17758–17771.

Requisition by the Treasury for roasted coffee adverted to, 17772, 17773——Manner in which the roasted and unroasted coffee was packed, 17774. 17777–17784——Steps taken by witness for roasting and grinding the coffee in the Admiralty establishments, 17774——

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Grant, Thomas Tassel. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

17774——Ground coffee was first sent out on 6 January 1854; 17775, 17776——Reference to some roasted coffee sent out in July 1854; 17785-17790——The last consignment of unroasted coffee was on 4 October 1854; 17791-17793.

Quality of the rum supplied, 17796-17799——Explanation as to there having been but two supplies of preserved meat, one in July 1854 and one in January 1855; 17800-17804——Plan submitted to the Admiralty, but not adopted, for packing preserved meat, 17805, 17806——Means for ascertaining whether the Admiralty or the Ordnance is responsible for the delay in the sailing of any vessel with stores, 17808-17810——Much greater extent to which during the present war than in any former war the Admiralty have supplied the troops with provisions, 17894-17898.

Certain portion of medical comforts purchased and shipped direct by the Admiralty; conviction that the entire amount thus purchased has been duly forwarded, 17899-17911——With respect to medical comforts purchased and shipped by the Ordnance witness cannot give any information, 17911——Practice of the Admiralty to place the stores in charge of the master of the vessel without employing a supercargo or agent, 17912, 17913——Any remonstrances with regard to the detention of stores on board ship would not come under witness's notice, 17917-17920.

Nature of the security that the salt meat supplied is of good quality, 17921-17934——Insufficiency of the examination test in the case of Goldner's preserved meats, 17925-17928——Precautions adopted generally by the Admiralty to prevent fraud as to the quality of medical comforts, &c., 17935-17945——Considerable extent to which the Admiralty have adopted the system of manufacture of navy supplies, 17936——Explanation relative to some hay supplied some time since to the Admiralty, in one of the trusses of which a dead animal was found, 17946-17949.

Exertions successfully made by the Victualling Department of the Admiralty in order to comply with all the requisitions made upon it for the supply of the Army, 17952, 17953——Circumstance of witness having suggested, before the institution of the Transport Board, that the supervision of the transport service should be distinct from that of the Victualling department, 17954, 17955.

[Second Examination.]—Further statement as to the security against any change of the samples after the same have been accepted, 18550-18564——Remark made by Commissary-general Filder, to witness, that the roasting and grinding of the coffee would afford amusement and occupation to the soldiers, 18565-18567.

Great Coats. Circumstance of 2,000 great coats, sent out in the "Jason," having been taken across the Black Sea several times before they were landed at Balaklava, *Parker* 3534——Manner in which the French when marching carried their great coats and blankets, *Wilson* 4434-4436.

Green Coffee. See *Coffee.*

Green, Richard. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Shipowner at Blackwall, 6882, 6883——Three of witness's ships, the "Northumberland," the "Resolute," and the "Walmer Castle," have been engaged by Government as transports, 6884, 6885. 6984——Size of each of these vessels; terms upon which engaged, 6886-6903. 6927-6932——The "Northumberland" and the "Resolute" took out horses to the Crimea, and were fitted up on the Government plan; safety of the horses on the passage, 6904-6908. 6911. 6964-6970——Approval of the Government rather than the Hull system of fitting up horse transports for a voyage like that to the Crimea, 6909-6921. 6960, 6961.

Detention of the "Resolute" for four or five weeks in Balaklava harbour with a cargo of powder on board, taken in at Varna, 6922-6926——Circumstances under which witness has recently applied to the Government for the amount of his insurance (12,000 *l.*) on the "Resolute," which was lost on the 14th November, 6933-6938. 6971-6982——Periods for which the three vessels referred to were respectively at sea and in port, 6939-6956——By the terms of the contract with Government the crews can only be employed upon the ship's duty, 6983.

Grenadier Guards. Encampment ground of the Grenadier Guards on arriving at Balaklava, *Dawson* 5460, 5461. 5463——The men were under tents, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1036, 1037——They had no bedding, but had, after a time, two blankets, *ib.* 1038-1040——During witness's time with the army in November and December the Grenadier Guards were well supplied with provisions, but with little fresh meat or vegetables, *ib.* 1048-1050. 1078-1082. 1107.

Grey, Commodore. Better system in Constantinople harbour since Commodore Grey succeeded Admiral Boxer, *Parker* 3515, 3516. 3523.

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GUARDS' BRIGADE:

1. *Sickness and Mortality in the Brigade.*
2. *Medical Staff; its inadequacy.*
3. *Overwork in the Crimea.*
4. *Commissariat Officers.*
5. *Encampments in Bulgaria and the Crimea.*
6. *Regimental Officers.*

1. *Sickness and Mortality in the Brigade:*

Great reduction in the numerical strength of the division of Guards after its landing in the Crimea, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1104, 1105——Exposure to rain, &c., and want of vegetables, chiefly caused the sickness among the Guards, *ib.* 1106, 1107.

Strength of the Guards at Varna and in the Crimea, with particulars as to their losses from sickness and battle, *Bentinck* 1134–1144 *et seq.* 1964. 1994–2009——They were about 2,500 strong at Varna, about 2,000 at Old Fort, and about 1,000 after the battle of Inkermann, *ib.* 1134. 1144–1146. 1150. 1994. 1996. 2002–2006——Sufferings of the brigade from cholera and typhus mainly induced by overwork and exposure, *ib.* 1967. 2010–2015——More men were disabled by sickness than by wounds, *ib.* 2008, 2009.

Immense reduction in the strength of the Guards since December last, *Parker* 3414. 3419–3422——The Guards lost 170 men in Bulgaria from cholera and fever, *Duke of Cambridge* 3757. 3760——Unsatisfactory physical condition of the men on the morning of the battle of Inkermann, *ib.* 4045–4049.

Witness accompanied his regiment (the Coldstream Guards) in February 1854 to Malta, and thence, in April, to Scutari; good health of the regiment till it left Scutari on 15 June, *Wilson* 4221–4232——Encampment ground of the regiment at Varna and Aladyn, and sickness among the men at the latter place, *ib.* 4233–4242. 4250–4257.

2. *Medical Staff; its inadequacy:*

Inadequacy at Alma of the medical staff of the Guards brigade, some of the surgeons having invalided in Bulgaria, *Bentinck* 1182–1191——Deficiency of the medical staff attached to the brigade when at Scutari, *ib.* 1884–1887——Invaliding of two or three of the medical men in Bulgaria further adverted to, *ib.* 1888–1890——On arriving before Sebastopol the brigade had only six medical men instead of twelve, *ib.* 1897, 1898——Sickness, at one time, of all the medical men of the Scots Fusiliers before Sebastopol, *Parker* 3291.

3. *Overwork in the Crimea:*

Heavy work which devolved on the Guards in the trenches and on picket, *Hon. A. Ponsonby* 1047. 1102, 1103; *Bentinck* 1965, 1966; *Parker* 3414, 3415.

4. *Commissariat Officers:*

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HAY:

1. *Delay in the Landing of Hay at Balaklava.*
2. *Hay lost in the Storm.*
3. *Want of Hay at the Camp.*
4. *Steps taken by the Commissariat and the Admiralty to provide an adequate Supply.*

1. *Delay in the Landing of Hay at Balaklava:*

Circumstance of there having been two vessels at Balaklava loaded with hay, which could not be discharged, while at the same time (early in February) Lord Raglan was complaining of want of forage, *Clay* 3111–3120——Representation made by the captain of the "Trent" to Captain Christie and some Commissariat officers about the hay on board that vessel, *Crowe* 4827–4829. 4877–4881——Quantity of hay in the "Trent" in October wich was not landed at Balaklava till the vessel had twice returned thither from Varna, *ib.* 4885–4891. 4897–4899 —— Delay in the unloading at Balaklava adverted to, *Lord Cardigan* 5804. 5806.

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2. *Hay lost in the Storm:*

There was a great deal of hay floating about in the harbour of Balaklava in December, which, if properly taken on shore, might have been fit for use, *G. Dundas* 10. 37, 38; *Clay* 2766, 2767; *Lord Lucan* 6641–6645——Loss of 800,000 lbs. of hay in the "Progress," in the storm of the 14th of November, adverted to as a great calamity, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13799–13801.

3. *Want of Hay at the Camp:*

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4. *Steps taken by the Commissariat and the Admiralty to provide an adequate Supply:*

Hay was occasionally procured from ports in the Black Sea, *Clay* 3066——Failure of a contract at Constantinople for a large supply of hay, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13525–13529——Demand in October for hay, and transmission thereof in November and subsequently, *ib.* 13742–13746——Failure of attempts to procure hay from the ports in the Black Sea, 13748–13753——Steps taken by the Treasury, in a minute dated 28th of November, for the supply of hay, *ib.* 13786.

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Supply by the Admiralty, up to 1 May 1855, of 5,204,080 lbs. of hay; return containing particulars, *Grant* 17674; and *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 349, 350——System in regard to the supply of hay by the Admiralty; examination to which subjected, *Grant* 17724–17732. 17914, 17915——Explanation relative to some hay supplied some time since to the Admiralty, in one of the trusses of which a dead animal was found, *ib.* 17946–17949.

Letters from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 23 October and 8 November 1854, in which request is made for supplies of hay from England, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 388, 389——Treasury Minutes, dated 7 November and 28 November 1854, in compliance with the foregoing, *ib.* 388. 390——Treasury Minute, dated 5 December 1854, directing steps to be taken for a continuous supply of hay from England, *ib.* 394.

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Hayter & Howell, Messrs. Statement as to Messrs. Hayter & Howell being to a certain extent packers for the Ordnance, *Sir T. Hastings* 18298–18304——Report by them to the Ordnance, on the packing of any Ordnance stores, *ib.* 18305——Circumstances under which they have aided the Ordnance in inspecting, &c., *ib.* 18436–18439——Period for which they have been agents for the shipping of Government stores, *ib.* 19160.

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Hayward, Rev. Mr. Assistance kindly afforded by Mr. Hayward towards the application in the Crimea of portion of the "Times" Fund, *Macdonald* 7151. 7210. 7400.

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Head Quarters. Locality in December of the head quarters of Lord Raglan, and of General Canrobert, *G. Dundas* 267, 268——Poor accommodation in the head quarters of Lord Raglan, who had only one room to himself, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17616–17620.

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Heath, Captain, R. N. At the time of the storm in November, Captain Heath gave directions about anchoring in Balaklava harbour, *Owen* 1491–1493. 1570–1573——Belief that Captain Heath was the first harbour-master at Balaklava; his appointment adverted to, *Layard* 2475. 2703–2705——Substitution of Captain Heath for Captain Christie at Balaklava, *Milne* 16514, 16515——Testimony by Sir Edmund Lyons in December 1854 to the energy of Captain Heath, *ib.* 16655.

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Deficiencies at Scutari through delay in forwarding the hospital stores left by the army at Varna, 19797——Nature of the steps taken by the Duke of Newcastle and witness to remedy the hospital deficiencies in October, 19799——With respect to hospital arrangements before the date of the battle of the Alma, witness believes that the establishment of the general hospital at Scutari was settled by Lord Raglan and Mr. Hall, the inspector-general, 19800–19810——Reference to Dr. Guthrie's recommendation for general hospitals, 19809——Report procured by Dr. Smith from experienced purveyors as to the proper amount of hospital stores to be sent out, 19811–19813.

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Withdrawal of Dr. Menzies from Scutari on account of ill-health, 19888-19890——Belief as to Dr. Menzies being very skilful in his profession, and very zealous and attentive to his duty, but not possessed of the gift of organisation, 19890——Circumstance of Government not having at first sent out as commandant some one better qualified than Major Sillery, 19891-19896. 19901-19903. 19931-19935——Opinion as to the great zeal of the medical men at Scutari, 12897. 19900——Deficiency of the medical staff as originators of the hospital establishment, 19897-19900——Large proportion of medical men sent out with the English army, 19904.

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Witness is not aware of any communication from the Commander-in-Chief in regard to hospital ships, &c., as suggested by Dr. Smith, 20003, 20004——There was some non-official communication from Lord Stratford about the hospitals, 20005, 20006——Emergency upon which Lord Stratford was appointed to look after the hospitals, 20007, 20008.

Part taken by witness and the Secretary for War in providing clothing for the army, 20009. 20020–20024——Description of warm clothing sent out, whence procured, &c., 20010–20019. 20025–20029. 20038–20040——Belief that the boots supplied by the Ordnance were amply large, 20016——Probability of some of the ammunition boots having been too small, 20017——Mode of purchase of the clothing obtained in Austria, Switzerland, &c., the Ordnance not being responsible, 20018. 20025–20029.

Abolition in 1854 of the system of providing regimental clothing through the colonels; explanation as to the new system not yet being in full operation, 20030, 20031——New system of providing clothing; advantages thereof, 20031–20033. 20036, 20037——Belief that under the former system the colonels did not make an undue profit at the expense of the men, 20034, 20035——Explanation of statements by Sir T. Hastings (Q. 18635–18638) as to the War Department having competed with the Ordnance in procuring warm clothing, 20038–20040.

Error of Sir T. Hastings in stating that witness ordered no goods to be sent except in steam transports, 20041–20045——Reference to the abandonment of Dr. Smith's scheme of a native ambulance corps, 20046——Difficulty at first in adopting Dr. Smith's suggestions for a corps of hospital orderlies, 20047——Description of the present establishment of orderlies, 20047–20053——Origin of the purveying system, 20054——Abeyance of the system during the peace, 20055–20057——Opinion that the purveyor, rather than the medical officer, should have increased power, 20058. 20062, 20063——Duty and responsibility of the purveyor, 20059–20063.

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Impossibility of providing cover for the horses of the artillery or cavalry after the landing in the Crimea, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 795–797——Injury to the horses in some of the sheds or huts being too confined and hot, *Lord Cardigan* 5785. 5968, 5969——Impracticability of forming sheds for the cavalry horses by excavating the ground and by roofing, *ib.* 5978, 5979——Impracticability of using tarpaulins or old sails as coverings for the horses *ib.* 5849–5851——Impossibility of finding shelter in Balaklava, *ib.* 5860.

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Manner in which the ships are fitted up, and the horses cared for, on the Government plan, *Clay* 2869–2872. 2875–2892——Experience of Mr. Goodwin, veterinary surgeon, adverted to, as being in favour of the Hull mode of shipping horses, *ib.* 3150–3158. 3258——Propriety of applying the Hull method of shipping horses to any such cargoes yet to be sent out, *ib.* 3259–3262.

Out of 1,682 horses conveyed to the East by the "Himalaya," fitted up on the Government plan, only two were lost, *Kellock* 5020——Loss of two per cent. of the horses on their way from England, *Lord Cardigan* 5970–5972——Adequate provision for the cavalry horses on the passage from England to the East, *Lord Lucan* 6695.

Particulars relative to the fitting-up by Messrs. Baines & Co., early in 1854, of two horse transports, the "Echunga" and the "Glendalough," for Government, under the direction of Commander Boys, of the Admiralty; great and unnecessary cost of the fittings up, *Mackay* 6724–6765. 6825–6831——Unsafe character of the fittings, *ib.* 6759–6761. 6769–6772. 6832–6835 —— Improvement of late in the Government system of fitting up, *ib.* 6772, 6773——Advantage of the Hull system, *ib.* 6766–6768.

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2. From Varna, &c. to Old Fort and Balaklava; Losses on the Passage; Mode of Landing at Balaklava:

Manner in which the artillery horses were embarked at Varna, and disembarked at Old Fort, *Shakespear* 4576-4582. 4587, 4588——Some horses of the heavy brigade, but not of the light brigade, were thrown overboard from vessels from Varna to Balaklava, *Lord Cardigan* 5287——Great inconvenience in disembarking horses at Balaklava, *ib.* 5845-5848.

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Horsford, Lieutenant-colonel Alfred. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Went to the East as second in command of the first battalion of the Rifle Brigade, and became commanding officer on the 19th September, 13304——Left the Crimea at the end of January, 13305 ——Bad state of the clothing of witness's regiment after the battle of Inkermann; explanation hereon, 13306-13313. 13361-13364——Delay before the distribution of the warm clothing, which arrived about the end of November, 13307-13316. 13347. 13362——The clothing was supplied pretty equably to each division, 13312-13316.

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Witness was not consulted with reference to the establishment at Constantinople of general hospitals for the army, *Dr. A. Smith,* 8074. 8099, 8100——Establishment of the hospitals in the East simultaneously with the arrival of the troops, *ib.* 8083——Establishment of the general hospital at Scutari in June 1854, *ib.* 8148-8152——Establishment of the barrack hospital in August 1854, *ib.* 8158-8162. 8175, 8176——Belief that no letter was received by witness from Dr. Burrell or any one else, early in 1854, that Scutari was likely to be the head medical quarters of the army, *ib.* 9594-9602.

The barracks at Scutari were obtained by Mr. Smith about the 12th of April 1854, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13436, 13437. 13439——Requisition first made by witness for the use of the barrack hospital; compliance therewith, *J. W. Smith* 15936.

Formation of hospitals ordered by witness, *Duke of Newcastle* 14615, 14616——Provisional character of the arrangements first made for the establishment of hospitals, *ib.* 14794, 14795. 14833. 14835——Incorrectness of some statements by Dr. Smith, that witness had not given him instructions for the establishment of hospitals, *ib.* 14799-14804——No specific instructions were written by the War Office for the establishment of the hospitals at Scutari, *ib.* 14833-14837.

Responsibility of the inspector-general of hospitals with the army in regard to the establishment of hospitals, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19797, 19798——With respect to hospital arrangements before the date of the battle of the Alma, witness believes that the establishment of the general hospital at Scutari was settled by Lord Raglan and Mr. Hall, the inspector-general, *ib.* 19800-19810.

Reference by the Committee to the preliminary proceedings in regard to the establishment of the general hospitals at Scutari, *Fifth Rep. p.* 19.

2. Staff;

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

2. Staff; its Duties and Responsibilities:

i. Chief Medical Authorities in Charge:

Names of the different medical men who succeeded one another as chief of the Scutari hospitals, *Macdonald* 7119–7125; *Dr. A. Smith* 8498, 8499——Witness had a letter of introduction from Mr. Herbert to Dr. Cumming as head of the hospitals, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7928. 7931, 7932——Responsibility of Dr. Menzies for the management of the general hospital up to the 1 or 2 January 1855, *Dr. A. Smith* 8153–8157.

Witness was appointed deputy inspector-general of hospitals on 6 October, having gone out with the army in April as first class staff surgeon, *Menzies* 9648. 9652–9654. 9664–9670——Previous services of witness, who has been in the army medical department since 1827, *ib.* 9649–9651. 9655–9663——Medical authorities under whom witness acted for some time after arriving at Constantinople, *ib.* 9671–9679——Establishment of the general and barrack hospitals at Scutari adverted to, as showing that witness had charge of them directly or indirectly from 26 June 1854 to 1 January 1855, *ib.* 9675–9691. 9706–9709. 10250–10252——Appointment of witness to Scutari through the recommendation of Dr. Dumbreck to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 10553–10571. 10621, 10622——General directions only accompanied witness's appointment, *ib.* 10572–10579——The appointment of witness through Dr. Dumbreck was approved by Dr. Hall, *ib.* 10619, 10620.

Witness was principal medical officer at Constantinople from 16 to 30 April 1854; took charge as senior officer and deputy inspector-general of hospitals, *Dumbreck* 11279–11282. 11326. 11426——Explanation showing how far witness is responsible for the appointment of Dr. Menzies, *ib.* 11393–11397. 11421–11425.

Particulars as to witness having been sent from the camp in bad health to relieve Dr. Menzies at Scutari on 1 January, *Forrest* 11638–11640. 11680–11692——Witness had charge at Scutari for about ten days in January, *ib.* 11638. 11646. 11674–11677.

ii. Inadequacy, numerically, of the Medical Staff:

Evidence as to the insufficiency at different periods of the medical staff, *G. Dundas* 1015. 1023, 1024; *Macdonald* 6019–6021. 6250; *Menzies* 9723. 9727. 9734. 9742–9747; *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19874, 19875——Belief as to the frequent want at first of persons to make up the prescriptions, *Macdonald* 7175–7181——Inadequacy of any one medical man at the head of the hospital, unless he be provided with an efficient staff, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9019.

It has not been reported that the medical staff at Scutari was insufficient, *Dr. A. Smith* 9541, 9542——Witness on hearing that the staff was overworked, sent out considerable assistance, *ib.* 9542.

Average number of cases to which a medical man can attend, *Menzies* 9724, 9725——Gradual increase of the staff, which was rendered adequate by the time of the battle of Inkermann, *ib.* 9726–9728. 9747–9749——Staff on the establishment of the barrack hospital and the general hospital, *ib.* 9856–9866——Employment of seven civil practitioners from Malta and elsewhere, *ib.* 10261–10264. 10284–10286——Number of clerks under witness; how far competent, *ib.* 10374–10382.

Duties of witness in making up returns, and in inspecting the hospitals, adverted to as altogether too much for one person, *Forrest* 11902–11913. 11947–11950——Reference in a letter from witness to Major Sillery, dated 11 December, to the general insufficiency of the hospital staff, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19848.

iii. Dr. Menzies; his Duties, and how he exercised them:

Governance of the hospitals and hospital ships by Dr. Menzies, *Macdonald* 6016–6018; *Stafford* 7536——Nature of the reception met with by witness from Dr. Menzies, *Macdonald* 6994–7000. 7013. 7015. 7368–7371——Sundry wants supplied by witness out of the "Times" Fund after Dr. Menzies had told him that nothing was wanted, *ib.* 7001–7008——After having heard from Dr. Menzies that nothing was wanted, witness saw Miss Nightingale, who at once mentioned a number of wants, *ib.* 7368–7371.

Written statement made by witness on his return from Scutari to Dr. Andrew Smith, on the 14th of February 1855, showing the difficulties encountered by him as principal medical officer at Scutari, and the means taken to overcome the same, *Menzies* 9732–9734. 9742——Representations previously made by witness to Dr. Smith and Dr. Hall, *ib.* 9733, 9734. 9743. 9753–9755——Reports were constantly made by witness to Dr. Hall, and at a later period direct to Dr. Smith, *ib.* 9752–9756——Evidence in detail as to the overwhelming duties imposed on witness, which prevented his visiting the hospitals daily and inspecting them minutely, *ib.* 9763. 9854, 9855. 9902. 10607. 10611–10618. 10893–10895. 10971. 11166–11181——Reports as to the wants of the hospitals were received from the medical officers under him, *ib.* 9764, 9765. 9768. 9798–9807.

Probability of witness having reported to Dr. Smith that nothing was wanted for the hospitals, *Menzies* 9883–9888——Records kept by witness of official correspondence,

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

2. Staff; its Duties and Responsibilities—*continued.*

iii. Dr. Menzies; his Duties and how he exercised them—*continued.*

&c., about the hospitals, *Menzies* 10301–10310——Reports by witness to Dr. Hall relative to the unsatisfactory state of the hospitals, *ib.* 10342——Reports direct to Dr. Smith since the end of October, *ib.* 10342–10346.

Extent to which witness personally inspected the barrack hospital, *Menzies* 10482–10486. 10489, 10490——On his health failing, he applied for a Medical Board, *ib.* 10484, 10485——His attention had not been specially directed to the study of diseases in the East, *ib.* 10579–10582——Further statement as to requisitions for hospital wants having been made to Dr. Hall in the Crimea instead of direct to Dr. Smith, *ib.* 10601–10606——Restriction of the free action of witness by the forms imposed upon him, *ib.* 10608–10610.

Witness has been frequently up till twelve o'clock at night, and at work again at three and four in the morning, *Menzies* 10613——He left nothing undone, so far as his judgment went, for the benefit of the sick and wounded, *ib.* 10665——Allowances to be made for the trying position in which he was placed, *ib.* 10893–10896. 10931–10933——Impossibility of witness attending to all the arrangements in the barrack hospital, for which the local officers were responsible, *ib.* 10893. 10954. 10969——Reference to the dismissal by witness of one of his clerks as the only case of an official punished by him, *ib.* 10976, 10977——Statement by witness in December, relative to the cleanliness of the hospitals, *ib.* 11113——Extent to which witness's attention was occupied in furnishing returns and reports relative to the hospitals, *ib.* 11166–11181——Witness never refused the services of any medical man sent from Malta or elsewhere, *ib.* 11206–11210.

Experience of Dr. Menzies, *Dumbreck* 11398——Belief that Dr. Menzies was much overworked, and placed in a position that no one man was able to cope with, *ib.* 11420——Withdrawal of Dr. Menzies from Scutari on account of ill health, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19888–19890——Belief as to Dr. Menzies being very skilful in his profession, and very zealous and attentive to his duty, but not possessed of the gift of organization, *ib.* 19890.

Appointment of Dr. Menzies adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 19——Reference to the incessant and onerous duties devolving on Dr. Menzies, *ib.* 20——Obstruction to Dr. Menzies in the conflict of authority between him and the purveyor, *ib.*——The Committee consider that blame attaches to Dr. Menzies, inasmuch as he did not correctly report the circumstances of the hospital, *ib.*

iv. Zeal and Attention displayed by the Medical Men generally:

Exertions of the medical officers at Scutari, than whom none could have worked harder, *Stafford* 7609. 7662; *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9315; *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19897. 19900——Copy of Report, dated 29 September 1854, relative to the state and care of the wounded in the hospitals after the battle of the Alma, *Menzies* 10346——Satisfactory manner in which the medical officers invariably performed their hospital duties, *ib.* 10411, 10412——The officials of the hospital, as well as witness, used every exertion to supply the wants of the sick on arrival, *Stafford* 7784. 7790–7792——The patients at Scutari spoke well of their treatment by the doctors, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7910, 7911.

v. Major Sillery; his Appointment and Qualifications as Commandant:

Want of firmness displayed by Majory Sillery with regard to the cleansing of the necessaries of the barrack hospital; his responsibility in the matter, *Stafford* 7549. 7554–7557. 7575, 7576——Witness always found Major Sillery, though deficient in firmness, anxious to do everything that could improve the hospital, *ib.* 7556. 7833——Suggestion that the Committee ascertain the nature of the instructions to the commandant with respect to the formation and conduct of the hospitals, *ib.* 7575–7580.

Impression as to the timidity of Major Sillery with regard to supplying hospital requirements, *Dr. A. Smith* 8199——The commandant resided in the hospital, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9020, 9021——Exertions of the commandant, who did his best, and was not blameable for the condition of the hospital, *ib.* 9022——Control of Major Sillery over the hospitals, *Menzies* 9697, 9698——Responsibility to a certain degree of the commandant for the cleanliness of the hospitals, concerning which he must have been informed daily by the reports of the military officer of the day, *ib.* 11187–11191.

Appointment of the commandant by Lord Raglan; the same explained, *Duke of Newcastle* 14646. 15144, 15145——Sense in which witness was responsible for the appointment of the commandant, *ib.* 14646——Responsibility of the commandant for the whole management of the departments, *ib.*—— Blame attaching to the commandant for not having reported to Lord Raglan or to witness, *ib.* 14810, 14811. 15139, 15140——Qualifications of Major Sillery, *ib.* 15145——He wanted administrative ability, but not zeal or desire to do his duty, *ib.* 15145.

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HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

2. Staff; its Duties and Responsibilities—*continued.*

v. Major Sillery; his Appointment and Qualifications, &c.—*continued.*

Evidence relative to the recommendation by Government, though not till late in 1854, for the appointment of a commandant at Scutari in lieu of Major Sillery, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19828, 19829. 19891–19896. 19901–19903. 19931–19938. 19940, 19941; *Lord Hardinge* 20830–20832——Appointment in the interval of Lord William Paulet by Lord Raglan, *ib.* 19828——Belief that Major Sillery was indefatigable in his duties, but was not possessed of sufficient rank or authority, *ib.* 19830–19832——Insufficiency of the staff attached to him, *ib.* 19833–19836——Circumstance of Government not having at first sent out as commandant some one better qualified than Major Sillery, *ib.* 19891–19896. 19901–19903. 19931–19935.

Conclusions of the Committee as to the omission of Major Sillery to exercise proper authority over the hospitals, *Fifth Rep. p.* 21——Special reference to his dread of directing expenditure, though perfectly authorised to do so, *ib.*

Strictures upon the omission to appoint an officer of higher rank and greater influence than Majory Sillery, *Fifth Rep. p.* 22.

vi. Responsibility devolving on the Purveyor's Department:

Inadequacy of the purveyor's department at Scutari when under the charge of Mr. Wreford, who superseded Mr. Ward, *Macdonald* 6129–6133——The supply of bedding and other furniture for the hospitals rested with the purveyor, *ib.* 7146–7148——The amount entrusted to the purveyors of general hospitals for the six months ending the 30th of September 1854 was 1,541 *l.*, *Stickney* 7424–7426.

Responsibility mainly of the purveyor with reference to the cleanliness of the hospital, *Dr. A. Smith* 8744–8762. 9481–9488; *Menzies*, 9782–9787. 9790, 9791. 9879——Duty of the purveyor to provide linen sheets for the beds, *Dr. A. Smith* 9476–9478——Duty of the purveyor to see to the washing, and to report to witness if it was not properly done, *Dr. A. Smith* 9482–9488; *Menzies*, 9895–9897. 9906. 9909——Practice as to the supply of personal linen and hospital dresses for the patients, *Dr. A. Smith* 9489–9491——Responsibility of the purveyor for the conduct of the kitchen department, and the quality and distribution of the food, *ib.* 9527, 9528.

Duty of witness, and not of the purveyor, to see that the patients were properly clothed, *Menzies* 9816, 9817——Duty of the purveyor to see that the medical comforts, when ordered, were duly furnished, and in store, *ib.* 9817——Responsibility of the purveyor for delay and irregularity in the serving out of the patients' meals, concerning which witness complained to him, *ib.* 10454–10459——Duty of the purveyor to attend to the repairs of the hospitals, *ib.* 10623——Further evidence as to the responsibility of the purveyor for the provision of certain stores and medical comforts, *ib.* 11009–11034——Breach of duty in Mr. Wreford in not providing clean clothing, *ib.* 11139–11145.

With respect to the purveyor's stores, Mr. Ward, the purveyor, rather than Mr. Wreford, the purveyor-in-chief, was responsible for the charge of the same, *Maxwell* 13030–13038.

vii. Conflict of Authority generally, and Want of Definite Responsibility:

Independent authority of the medical officers in the hospitals, *Macdonald* 7129——Difficulty of ascertaining the superior authority, *Stafford* 7524. 7531–7540——Difficulty as to the relative powers of the purveyor and of the principal medical officer, *Dr. A. Smith* 8128. 8131–8134. 8194–8200——Witness had no power whatever to remedy the evils complained of, *ib.* 8180.

Consideration of the responsibility respectively of the purveyor, the principal medical officer, and the commandant, with respect to the supply of hospital wants, and the cleanliness of the hospitals, *Dr. A. Smith* 8194–8200. 8724–8762. 8960–8968——Illustration of the conflict of authority between the purveyor's department and that of the medical department, *ib.* 8197——Any wants in the hospital were owing not to the medical department, but to the transport service and to the purveyor, *ib.* 8369. 8383–8385——Conflict of authority between the purveyor and medical officer at Scutari adverted to in connexion with the supply of medical comforts, *ib.* 8960–8968. 8985.

Absence of a head authority at Scutari and Constantinople, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9018, 9019——Difficulty of concluding whether Dr. Menzies or Dr. Cumming was, during witness's visit, the head of the barrack hospital, *ib.* 9026, 9027——Respective authority and responsibility of the commandant and of the head medical officer, *ib.* 9071–9077.

Non-attendance to witness's orders by the purveyor, Mr. Wreford, who disputed his superior authority, *Menzies* 10460–10463. 10470——Complaints by witness to Dr. Cumming in November relative to the purveyor, *ib.* 10464–10471. 10481——Evidence relative to witness's position after the arrival of Dr. Cumming, to the effect that it was a very anomalous one, and that he was not wholly responsible, *ib.* 10472–10480. 10590–10593.

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

2. Staff; its Duties and Responsibilities—*continued.*

vii. Conflict of Authority generally, &c.—*continued.*

10802-10870——Further statement as to Mr. Wreford having, contrary to his instructions, opposed witness's authority; complaint thereon from witness to Dr. Smith, *Menzies* 11035-11048. 11062-11078.

Respective duty and responsibility of the commandant and of the principal medical officer at Scutari, *Forrest* 11888-11898——There was not the slightest conflict of authority between witness and Lord William Paulet, *ib.* 11891-11893——Respects in which the principal medical officers, rather than the commandant, may be considered the head of the hospitals, *Maxwell* 13181-13192——Witness considered the principal medical officer the real head, *ib.* 13185-13192.

Responsibility of the several local authorities, *Duke of Newcastle* 14845, 14846——Power of Dr. Smith, through the War Office, to have taken steps for the remedy of any evils complained of by Dr. Menzies, *ib.* 15854-15856——Difficulty of forming an opinion as to the person or persons really responsible for the several deficiencies in the Scutari hospitals, *ib.* 14858-14860—— Responsibility attaching to the majority of the hospital officials for the manner in which their duties were performed. *ib.* 14859. 14861——Authority of the chief medical officer at Scutari over the purveyor before the arrival of the instructions of the 14th November, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19918-19920.

Considerations by the Committee in regard to the several parties upon whom responsibility or blame attachès in regard to the hospitals at Scutari; reference specially to Dr. Menzies, Dr. Hall, and Major Sillery, *Fifth Rep. p.* 19-22——Responsibility respectively of the Duke of Newcastle and of Dr. Andrew Smith, *ib.* 19.

viii. Evils consequent on the Want of Responsibility:

Mismanagement of the hospitals ascribed to the want of organisation under a single head, *Macdonald* 6177——Evils consequent upon the want of harmony between the different departments, as also upon the severity of the routine, *Stafford* 7539, 7540. 7579, 7580——Constant change of the doctors, *ib.* 7609.

The chief of the hospitals was appointed by Dr. Hall, and sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief, but was liable to be superseded by any senior medical officer coming from the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8500-8508——Advantage if the head of the hospitals were not liable to be superseded by a senior officer, *ib.* 8509——No complaints have been made to witness that the medical authorities were impeded by the military, *ib.* 8763. 8766, 8767.

Utter absence of a controlling and directing local power adverted to as the root of all the evils in the treatment of the sick, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9059——Want of system at the hospital, and passive submission on all parts to total confusion, *ib.* 9074-9078——Great advantage if a proper person, with adequate powers, had been sent out at first to look after the hospitals, *ib.* 9164, 9165. 9332, 9333——Impropriety of the system by which the medical head of Scutari hospital might be superseded by any senior officer going thither from the Crimea, *ib.* 9166, 9167.

Great inconvenience arising from divided authority in the management of the hospital, *Dr. A. Smith* 9443, 9444——Witness was liable to be superseded at any time by the casual arrival of a senior officer, but never was so superseded, *Menzies* 10583-10597——Rule of the service that if any officer senior to Dr. Cumming had arrived at Scutari he would have superseded him, *Dumbreck* 11461-11467——Conflict of departments at the hospitals adverted to as a great evil, *Maxwell* 13073. 13077-13081——Defect in a good head having been wanting, *ib.* 13182. 13185.

Importance from the first of a medical head of the hospitals who should not have been liable to be superseded by the accidental arrival of a senior officer, *Duke of Newcastle* 14895-14897.

The want of an energetic governing authority, with an adequate staff, appear to have been the chief cause of all the evils, *Fifth Rep. p.* 22.

3. Building Accommodation and General Condition of the Hospitals:

i. Generally as to Deficiencies and Abuses at different Periods:

Description of the English hospitals at Scutari, as visited by witness in December; tolerable arrangements made, though very inferior to those of the French hospitals, *G. Dundas* 1012-1028——The wards were comparatively clean, and there was not any offensive smell, *ib.* 1017, 1018. 1025-1028——Condition and conduct of the Turkish or general hospital, as visited by witness early in November; the patients on the whole were tolerably well off, *Macdonald* 6022-6035——Very deficient accommodation in the barrack or supplementary hospital, *ib.* 6036-6043——Marked improvements in the state of the hospitals on witness's return from Balaklava on the 11th of February, *ib.* 6190-6195——Tendency of the bad atmosphere at the barrack hospital to affect the healthy soldiers not in the hospital, *ib.* 7082-7086.

Witness

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

3. Building Accommodation and General Condition, &c.—*continued.*

i. Generally as to Deficiencies and Abuses, &c.—*continued.*

Witness was a daily visitor at the Scutari hospitals during the latter part of November and the latter part of December, *Stafford* 7505, 7506——The beds were within a few inches of the ground, and masses of foul linen were constantly put under them to be out of the way, *ib.* 7603——The dirty clothes of the men were generally removed to a store-room, *ib.* 7785, 7786.

Very unfavourable reports received by witness from Dr. Menzies as to the state of the barrack hospital in September, *Dr. A. Smith* 8178——Doubt as to the hospital having been in the disgraceful condition which has been deposed to by some witnesses, *ib.* 8826.

Witness found the barrack hospital in a most disgraceful and filthy state early in November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 8999, 9000, 9001——The general hospital seemed the superior of the two, *ib.* 9000.

Filthy state at different times of the barrack hospital; representations thereon by witness to the commandant and to the purveyor, *Menzies* 9768-9784——Unsatisfactory character occasionally of Dr. M'Grigor's reports upon the barrack hospital, *ib.* 10255-10259. 10287-10294——Storeage of the clean linen after washing, *ib.* 10498-10501——Duty of the purveyor and of the medical officer to see that the foul linen was not stowed away under the beds, *ib.* 10521-10528——Concurrence with Dr. Hall in his report that the hospitals were in as good a condition as could reasonably be expected, *ib.* 10598-10600.

Personal inspection of the hospitals by witness; state in which he found them, *Maxwell* 13061 *et seq.*——Tolerable state of the hospitals as regards cleanliness, *ib.* 13065, 13066——Bad ventilation of the wards, *ib.* 13065.

Witness is now quite satisfied that the state of things in the hospital was anything but what it should have been, *Duke of Newcastle* 14827. 14829, 14830——Though too much was expected in regard to the hospitals, still too little was done, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19887——Belief that in November and December the state of the hospitals was but little creditable, *ib.* 19905——Great improvement of late in the state of the hospitals, *ib.* 19951.

ii. State of the Privies at the Barrack Hospital:

Particulars relative to a strong remonstrance by witness to Dr. M'Grigor, and subsequently to Major Sillery, commandant at Scutari, concerning the neglected state of the necessaries in November, *Stafford* 7522 *et seq.*——Excessive filth, and pestilential effects thereof, consequent upon the neglect, *ib.* 7523. 7573-7575——Improvement consequent on witness's representations, *ib.* 7552, 7553. 7564, 7565. 7571, 7572——Defective character of the water-closets or necessaries in December, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7894——Very defective state of the necessaries early in November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9116-9121.

Statement to the effect that the medical officers at the barrack hospital did all in their power to have the filthy condition of the privies amended, *Dr. A. Smith* 8201, 8202. 8207-8215——Reference to a communication made by witness to the military secretary in 1854, in anticipation of the character of the hospital privies, *ib.* 8203-8206——Unavoidably bad state of the necessaries on account of their mode of construction, *ib.* 8700.

Bad state of the necessaries in July, when witness first represented the matter; difficulty in properly repairing them, *Menzies* 9788, 9789. 10311-10328——Belief as to the filth arising from the condition of the privies having been exaggerated, *ib.* 9792-9794——Complaints made by Dr. M'Grigor, about the privies, which witness saw were in a bad state; representation thereon by witness to the commandant, who took measures to have them put in repair, *ib.* 10294. 10297-10301. 10310-10328. 10330, 10331——Letter from the sanitary officer, appointed by witness over the hospitals, dated the 4th of August 1854, relative to the improper state of the privies, *ib.* 10329, 10330.

Witness satisfied himself by personal inspection that after August due steps were taken in the matter complained of, *Menzies* 10331-10340——Dirty state of the privies, though witness never saw them so filthy as described by Mr. Stafford, *ib.* 10489-10496——Frequent representations upon the subject made by witness to the commandant, *ib.* 11164, 11165.

There was no offensive smell from the privies in January, which were kept as clean as possible, *Forrest* 11642-11652——Disagreeable effluvium from the privies, which witness examined only once, when he found them by no means in the state described by Mr. Stafford, *Maxwell* 13065. 13069-13071. 13074-13076——Belief that the filth arose chiefly from the slovenly habits of the soldiers, *ib.* 13071——Responsibility of the purveyor for the cleansing of the necessaries, *ib.* 13072, 13073——State of the hospitals at Scutari in May 1854; filth arising from the privies; steps taken to remedy the same, *Mapleton* 20918-20943.

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

3. Building Accommodation and General Condition, &c.—*continued.*

iii. Want of Repairs to the Windows, Floors, &c.:

The windows of the barrack hospital were much in want of repairs in December, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7892, 7893. 7896——Bad repair of the hospital generally, *ib.* 7896——Filthy and rotten state of part of the flooring of the hospital; difficulty about repairing it, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9060. 9116——Dilapidated condition of two of the corridors in the barrack hospital, *Maxwell* 13062-13064.

Reference to the letter written by witness in April 1854, recommending that proper workmen be sent to the East to carry out alterations and repairs of the hospitals, *Dr. A. Smith* 9466-9468——Alterations and repairs were suggested by witness in the case of the barrack hospital in August, and were duly carried out by the commandant, to whom the representations were made, *Menzies* 9700-9713——Communications between witness and Captain Gordon of the engineers concerning repairs to the hospitals, *ib.* 11118-11127——Authority of Captain Gordon to have drawn money from the Commissariat for any repairs ordered to the hospital, *ib.* 11192-11195——With regard to engineer work at the hospitals, the engineer would have no difficulty in procuring payment from the Commissariat, *Sir J. M. Smith* 19739.

iv. Accommodation available; its Insufficiency:

Deficiency of the accommodation in the barrack hospital, which contained on witness's arrival, on 6th November, from 1,500 to 1,800 patients, *Macdonald* 6036-6042——Calculation that in the beginning of November there were about 2,800 patients in the hulks and hospitals, *ib.* 6060-6065——Very insufficient accommodation and total want of proper organisation after the arrival of those wounded at Inkermann, *ib.* 6066-6074——Position of the barrack hospital, *ib.* 7052——Number of soldiers in the barracks where the hospital also was, *ib.* 7316, 7317——Number of floors in the hospital, and nature of the ventilation, *ib.* 7377-7381.

Number of patients in the hospitals in December, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7888——Very over crowded state of the hospitals, *ib.* 7894. 7944-7946——Accommodation at Scutari and Varna in proportion to the number of the sick up to the time of the landing in the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8164-8167.

Doubt as to the general hospital being in an unhealthy situation, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9244——On the 16th of November there were 2,159 patients in the barrack hospital, *ib.* 9346——Scanty accommodation for the chaplains and medical men, *ib.* 9362-9364.

Reference to witness's report in establishing the barrack hospital, as stating that accommodation could be provided for 2,000 patients, *Menzies* 9692. 9695, 9696. 9699——Inconvenience of the barrack hospital as a general hospital on account of its mode of construction, and the character of the privies, &c. *ib.* 9692-9694——Amount of accommodation in the hospitals and hulks at the time of the battle of the Alma, *ib.* 9714-9721——Length of the wards of the barrack hospital, *ib.* 10428-10434——Accommodation of all the wounded up to the date of the battle of Balaklava at the general hospital, *ib.* 10912-10920——Instructions to witness from the Duke of Newcastle, and from Sir George Brown, through Major Sillery, to ascertain what amount of accommodation could be provided at Scutari for the wounded; copy of report on the subject by witness, dated 7 August 1854, *ib.* 10936-10946——There were about 800 patients in the general hospital, and about 2,000 in the barrack hospital in November, *ib.* 11115-11117. 11128.

Want of hospital accommodation at Scutari at the end of December, *Forrest* 11796-11799——Overcrowded state of the barrack hospital in January, *ib.* 11641——Weekly statement of the number of patients in the barrack hospital in November, *Maxwell* 13108, 13109——Recommendation by the Commission of Inquiry of the removal of the military depôt from the barrack hospital, *ib.* 13168.

Return of patients in hospital at Scutari in November and December 1854, and in January 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 705.

v. Construction of Wooden Sheds and Additional Accommodation:

Great error in raising some shedding in the quadrangle of the barrack hospital at Scutari, *Macdonald* 7045-7049——Opportunity for erecting the shedding outside the hospital, *ib.* 7047. 7053-7055——Means taken to construct additional hospital room, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7950-7953.

Dr. Menzies repeatedly made applications for additional hospital accommodation, *Dr. A. Smith* 8159——Witness also constantly urged the necessity of additional accommodation, *ib.* 8161.

Confusion in the hospital in preparing for those wounded at Inkermann, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9022. 9155——Facility with which wooden houses might have been built for the sick, *ib.* 9247-9250——Unreasonableness of spending 30,000 *l.* on a wooden shed to hold 2,000 men, *ib.* 9251.

4. Supplies

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

4. Supplies of Medicines, Medical Comforts, and Hospital Stores:

i. Generally as to the Existence of Wants:

Worse condition of the hospitals than has elsewhere been deposed to by witness prior to the arrival of Miss Nightingale and her staff on the 4th of November, *Macdonald* 6202-6207——Gradual diminution in the wants first felt, *Stafford* 7701——Want of a great many things in the hospitals when witness arrived, though he was told by Lord Stratford as well as by Dr. Menzies that nothing was wanted, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9023-9025——Opinion of Government that witness on arriving at Scutari would not find that anything was wanted, *ib.* 9173, 9174.

Grounds for the statement made by witness to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the 26th of October, viz., that the present wants of the hospital were satisfactorily supplied, *Menzies* 9795-9815. 9823-9835——Statement of the surgeons that, generally speaking, there was no want in the hospitals after the battle of the Alma, *Maxwell* 12995, 12996.

Reference to sundry complaints made by witness to Dr. Smith relative to alleged deficiencies; Dr. Smith denying generally the correctness of such complaints, *Duke of Newcastle* 14808, 14809. 14812-14815. 15137, 15138.

ii. Want of Medicines and Medical Comforts, &c.:

Medical comforts rather than medicines were most wanted by the sick, *Stafford* 7767——Conclusions founded on the letters of Doctors Reade and Darrac, that there was no want of medicines or surgical appliances, *Dr. A. Smith* 8455-8462——General want in the barrack hospital of medicines, surgical appliances, &c. in November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9002-9007. 9010-9017——Want of medical comforts in the purveyor's stores, *ib.* 9061-9066. 9079, 9080.

Reference to a paper given to witness by the Duke of Newcastle, showing the very large quantity of port wine, brandy, sugar, and tea sent to the East between 18 February and 20 November 1854; supply nevertheless of port wine, &c., through the "Times" Fund, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9080-9086. 9350——Doubt as to the correctness of the statements by Mr. Reade and Mr. Darrac, *ib.* 9103-9111——Doubt as to any regular supply of rice and vegetables to the patients, *ib.* 9221-9223.

Further statement as to the sufficiency of the supply of medicines and surgical appliances, *Dr. A. Smith* 9469-9475. 9479, 9480——The letters before referred to of Messrs. Reade and Darrac applied to both the barrack and the general hospitals, *ib.* 9631.

Opinion that no patient died from want of proper medical comforts, *Menzies* 9840-9846——Belief as to there having been a sufficient supply of medicines on 26 October and during November and December, *ib.* 9867, 9868. 9912-9917——Practice in procuring medical comforts from the purveyor's stores, *ib.* 11028-11034.

There was an abundance of medical stores and comforts in January, *Forrest* 11653-11655——Want of some medicines when witness was at Scutari in January, *Bamford* 12046-12050——Opinion that, including the medical comforts supplied by Miss Nightingale, the patients were in the main properly supplied with them, *Maxwell* 13114——Statement of the average daily issue of extra diets, or medical comforts, supplied from Miss Nightingale's kitchen from 13 January to 13 February, *ib.*——Supply of several medical comforts (including port wine) by Miss Nightingale, without reference to the purveyor's stores, in which the same were not of good quality, *ib.* 13114, 13115——Witness was told there was no want of medicines or drugs, *ib.* 13263-13265.

iii. Want of Hospital Stores, such as Bedding, Shirts, &c.:

Deficiency of the purveyor's department with respect to the supply of shirts, &c., *Macdonald* 6118-6129——Large supply by witness out of the "Times" Fund of cotton and flannel sheets, which were greatly wanted, and might easily have been procured by the medical or other authorities, *ib.* 6118-6125——Want of necessary utensils in the hospital till supplied by the "Times" Fund, *Stafford* 7591-7593——The beds were ultimately provided with clean linen, of which at first there was none, *ib.* 7607——Want of beds still felt when witness left in December, *ib.* 7702——State in which the men were at one time placed in the beds; they had no shirts, *ib.* 7784. 7787, 7788——Great difficulty through the want of pillows, for which at first the men's boots were obliged to be used, *ib.* 7786.

Deficiency in December of chamber utensils, though a large number had been dispatched from England, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7908, 7909——Non-supply in December of knives and forks to some patients in the English hospitals, *ib.* 7919-7921——Good state in December of the linen, which was new, *ib.* 7922.

Deficiencies at Scutari through delay in forwarding the hospital stores left by the army at Varna, *Dr. A. Smith* 8184. 8187, 8188. 9603-9605. 9616-9621; *Menzies* 9742.

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

4. Supplies of Medicines, Medical Comforts, &c.—*continued.*

iii. Want of Hospital Stores, such as Bedding, &c.—*continued.*

9746; *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19797——There were large stores at Scutari left behind when the army proceeded thence, which might have been available for immediate use, *Dr. A. Smith* 8188——Want of chamber utensils for the patients through the difficulty about the purveyor's duty to provide them, *ib.* 8216, 8217——On receiving reports from Dr. Menzies, witness has constantly made verbal communications to the home authorities in order to have all wants remedied, *ib.* 8481–8497——There was an abundance of linen sheets, *ib.* 8827, 8828.

Filthy state of the men's linen in November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9087–9091——Doubt as to hospital deficiencies having been owing to the non-transmission of stores from Varna, *ib.* 9355–9358.

Belief as to the sufficiency of the supply of linen as a surgical appliance, *Dr. A. Smith* 9474, 9475——Transmission by witness, about October, of 5,000 hospital dresses, consigned to the purveyor at Scutari, *ib.* 9491–9500.

Want of hospital clothing for the patients, and directions thereon from witness to the purveyor to purchase the same, *Menzies* 9758–9762. 9766, 9767. 9804–9810——Witness frequently gave directions to the purveyor to provide clean shirts, &c., *ib.* 9899. 9902. 9907, 9908——The patients generally had clean linen and clean shirts in December, *ib.* 10347–10349. 10519–10521——Reference to the requisition to Lord Stratford for certain articles, to the effect that linen was not at any time requested, though some was sent by Lady Stratford, *ib.* 11182–11186——Linen was not supplied to witness at Scutari, *Bamford* 12029.

Discovery of some old linen in the purveyor's stores; at the same time there was an abundance in the apothecary's stores, which was the proper place for it, *Maxwell* 13013–13021——Very unsatisfactory condition of the linen sheets and shirts of the patients, *ib.* 13104, 13105. 13112, 13113.

Statement as to the date and nature of the provision of hospital stores at Scutari through means of the Board of Ordnance; return on the subject, *Sir T. Hastings* 19037–19041, and *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 331——Insufficient notice given to the purveyor by the medical man in regard to the things required, *Right Hon. S. Herbert,* 19920.

iv. Power to have purchased Supplies at Constantinople:

The Government supplies for the hospitals frequently ran out on account of the medical authorities not having resorted to the powers vested in Lord Stratford to purchase at Constantinople whatever was required, *Macdonald* 6079–6088. 6214–6221. 7009. 7013——Any deficiencies in December, &c., were not through want of funds; Mr. Herbert gave witness a letter which he was authorised to show, stating the willingness of Government to spare no expense for the hospitals or the sick, *Hon. J. W. Percy,* 7934, 7935. 7960.

Power of medical officers abroad to purchase hospital stores not sent from this country, *Dr. A. Smith* 8118, 8119. 8128——Mr. Wreford was told by witness to purchase anything that was wanted, *ib.* 8133. 8196——All temporary wants should, if possible, have been locally provided for, *ib.* 8189. 8193. 8831——Power given to Mr. Wreford to draw upon Lord Stratford for any amount of money necessary for the hospitals, *ib.* 8713–8718.

Responsibility of the head medical officer only for not applying to Lord Stratford for hospital supplies, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9316——Power to have purchased at Constantinople anything required for the English hospitals, *Duke of Newcastle* 14841–14843. 14854——Difficulty after the storm in procuring certain hospital supplies at Constantinople, *J. W. Smith* 15978–15983——There was no difficulty whatever in regard to funds for the purchase at Constantinople of medical comforts, &c., witness, on the part of the commissariat, having stated his readiness to advance money to any extent, *ib.* 15986. 15992–15994.

5. Cooking Arrangements and Distribution of Food:

Exceedingly defective cooking arrangements in the hospital, *Macdonald* 6126. 7258–7268. 7284–7286; *Stafford,* 7773–7779; *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne,* 9067–9069——Advantage of the extra diet kitchen established by Miss Nightingale, *Macdonald* 7268——Occasional delay of some hours before the food was served out, *Stafford* 7775, 7776.

Raw state in which the meat was frequently supplied in the hospitals, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9067–9069——Great irregularity with which the patients were fed, adverted to as having caused many deaths, *ib.* 9069——Food was often not supplied to some patients till five or six o'clock in the evening, *ib.*——Written suggestions by witness to Lord William Paulet relative to the cooking, *ib.* 9094——Manner in which the fresh meat for the sick was cooked, *Flower* 10076, 10077.

Insufficient

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

5. Cooking Arrangements and Distribution of Food—*continued.*

Insufficient size of the kitchen attached to the general hospital, *Menzies* 10358, 10359——Description of the kitchen adjoining the barrack hospital; its sufficiency considered, *ib.* 10360, 10361. 10426–10435. 10447–10454. 10487, 10488——Improper manner in which the food was sometimes cooked, *Menzies* 10362–10365; *Maxwell* 13101–13103——Complaints by witness to the purveyor about the cooking, *Menzies* 10366–10370——The purveyor explained that the kitchen was partly taken up by Miss Nightingale in cooking extra comforts for the sick, *ib.* 10371–10373——Delay and irregularity before the meals were served out to the men, *ib.* 10447–10454.

Good state of the kitchens and of the cooking in January, *Forrest* 11658, 11659. 11941–11943——Irregularity in the distribution of the patients' food in January; remedy of the same by witness, *ib.* 11944. 11956–11958——Rations of witness as patient in the barrack hospital, *Bamford* 12019, 12020——Want of cooking arrangements for the officers, *ib.* 12020–12028.

Detailed description of the system of issuing and distributing the patients' food, *Maxwell* 13103——Description of the kitchens; one was never fitted up, through some difficulty in getting coppers, *ib.* 13082, 13083. 13091–13096——Radically wrong system in the barrack hospital with respect to the cooking and the distribution of the patients' food, *ib.* 13097–13103——Blame attributable to the medical officers in regard to defective cooking, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19970–19972.

6. Washing:

There was no washing or laundry at any hospital, except the barrack hospital, for five weeks after witness's arrival on 6th November; great filth in consequence, *Macdonald* 6134–6147——Supply by witness out of the "Times" fund, at the request of Miss Nightingale, of appliances for washing, *ib.* 6139–6141. 6150, 6151——Great error in contracting for the washing, instead of using the laundry attached to the general hospital, *ib.* 6142–6147——Expenditure, through witness, of 60 *l.* for a washing-house, *ib.* 6150.

Great abuse at first in there being no washing, as there was at the French hospital, *Stafford* 7780–7783. 7798——Establishment by Miss Nightingale of a system of washing, *ib.* 7783. 7793–7797——A system of washing was in operation in December, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7923.

There was no system of washing, nor any Government laundry, in November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9088, 9089. 9091, 9092——Establishment of a laundry through means of the "Times" fund adverted to, *ib.* 9091——Written suggestions made by witness to Lord William Paulet relative to the establishment of a laundry, *ib.* 9094.

Large amount of washing done for the hospital, as reported by Mr. Wreford, *Dr. A. Smith* 8853, 8854——Letters, dated 12th February 1855, from Mr. Stuart, purveyor, and from Mr. Wreford, to the effect that there was no want of washing during November, December, and January, at the Scutari hospitals; the same considered, *ib.* 9512–9526.

Examination relative to the want of washing for the hospital, and to the steps taken by witness to remedy the same, *Menzies* 9889–9911——Manner in which the washing was conducted; complaint thereon by witness to Mr. Ward, *ib.* 10497–10522——With respect to the slight amount of washing done in November, and to the state of the patients' clothing, witness did not see the necessity of reporting the same to Dr. Hall or Dr. Smith, *ib.* 11129–11157.

Washing by contract in the general hospital; its insufficiency, *Maxwell* 13106, 13107. 13110–13113——Washing done privately and through means of Miss Nightingale over and above that included in the purveyor's return, *ib.* 13110, 13111——The clothes of the patients should have been boiled in washing in order to get rid of the vermin, *ib.* 13113——Communication from the Commission of Inquiry to the home authorities as to the want of washing and drying machines, *ib.* 13194. 13196.

Return of washing performed by contractors, &c., for the barrack hospital, Scutari, from 1st November 1854 to 31st January 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 705.

7. Non-Classification, &c. of Patients:

There was no classification of the patients, *Stafford* 7606. 7689. 7768–7770. 7772——Instance of a dying man having stated that his approaching end was owing to a mistake having been made in giving him lowering diet intended for another man, *ib.* 7768, 7769——Witness did not observe any system of diet lists in the barrack hospital, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9305, 9306——Reason why witness did not suggest to Dr. Menzies or Dr. M'Grigor the expediency of particular dietary for particular patients, *ib.* 9310–9314.

Witness never heard of a patient having died because he received by mistake a course of treatment intended for another man, *Menzies* 9847, 9848. 9853——Authorities responsible for seeing that on the death of any patient the ticket explaining his case is removed from the bed, *ib.* 9849–9852——Circumstance of the hospital beds not having been numbered, *ib.* 10422–10424.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

8. Orderlies:

The orderlies were badly selected and of indifferent character, *G. Dundas* 1022—— System of orderlies for procuring the issues of food for the sick; great delay and mischief of the system, *Macdonald* 7258-7268. 7284-7286——Frequent change of orderlies adverted to as a cause of complaint, *Stafford* 7692——Danger from the orderlies sleeping in the same room with the sick, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7896——Sufficient number of orderlies in December, *ib.* 7924——Witness never saw any of the orderlies drunk, *ib.* 7937-7940.

Frequent complaints received by witness relative to the system of orderlies, *Dr. A. Smith* 8677-8679. 8767——The local authorities are responsible for the appointment of a sufficient number of competent orderlies, *ib.* 8685-8688——The orderlies were mere invalids, and very unsuited to their duties, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9121. 9210-9212.

Complaints made by witness to the Commission of Inquiry, as well as previously to Dr. Hall and Dr. Smith, about the orderlies, *Menzies* 9880-9882——Irregularities at Scutari in consequence of having no fixed establishment of proper orderlies, *ib.* 9742——Deficiency of orderlies at the hospital; number in proportion to the sick, *ib.* 10436-10446.

Great drawback through the want of proper orderlies, *Dumbreck* 11580. 11599—— There were 800 orderlies at Scutari on witness's arrival in January, or one to every seven patients, but they were not organised, *Forrest* 11952-11955——Extremely bad attendance in the hospitals, the whole system of hospital orderlies being radically defective, *Maxwell* 13068——Suggestions by the Commission of Inquiry relative to the orderlies, *ib.* 13168.

9. Admission of Visitors:

Restriction with respect to the admission of visitors to the hospitals, *Macdonald*, 7070-7072. 7294-7300——Greater restriction in the case of the French than of the English hospitals, *ib.* 7074, 7075——Circumstances under which witness was constantly admitted without much or any difficulty, *ib.* 7297. 7301-7313——Witness, who was a daily visitor, was never interrupted in any of his visits, and was always treated with official civility, *Stafford* 7507. 7578. 7663, 7664. 7799. 7872.

10. Regulations and Management generally:

Absence in the beginning of November of any returns relative to the operations of the hospitals; discrepancy between the nominal returns and the actual deaths, *Macdonald* 6015. 7238-7246——Want of precaution in the English barrack hospital against the admission of spirits, *ib.* 7076-7081——Respects in which the book of regulations for medical men in the army was not obeyed, *ib.* 7343-7347——Better management, in some respects, of the general hospital than of the barrack hospital, *Stafford* 7682——Importance of all the officers connected with Scutari living on the south side of the Bosphorus on account of the difficulty of communication across in rough weather, *ib.* 7723-7727 ——Extremely defective register kept in the hospital; instance thereof, *ib.* 7771.

Exemption of the medical officers from blame with respect to hospital deficiencies, *Dr. A. Smith* 8472——Witness urged them to show more determination in communicating with the authorities on whom the responsibility rested, *ib.* 8473-8475——Remonstrances were made by Dr. Forrest and Dr. Menzies to the Transport department, *ib.* 8476-8480.

Difficulty of keeping up discipline in the barrack hospital on account of its enormous size, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9019. 9022.

Reference to the local regulations, published by Dr. Hall, as affecting only the Purveying department and the hospital servants, *Dr. A. Smith* 9382-9386——The accounts of the hospital were chiefly conducted by the purveyor, *Menzies* 10383, 10384——Great inconvenience through the want of a steamer to ply between Scutari and Constantinople; steps taken by witness to remedy the same, *ib.* 10660-10668——Store in the hospital for medical comforts, *ib.* 10964, 10965——Circumstance of a quantity of medical comforts having been piled up in the corridor, for which the purveyor rather than witness was responsible, *ib.* 10966-10969. 10972-10975——Mode of treatment pursued towards a patient on his arrival, *ib.* 11011——There was a numerical return daily of the state of the sick, *ib.* 11245-11253——There was also a daily numerical return of the deaths, *ib.* 11249, 11250.

Want of proper system at Scutari, *Dumbreck* 11420——Reference to some medical stores piled up in the corridor at the barrack hospital in January, whence witness had them removed, *Forrest* 11772-11774——Readiness with which witness's applications were attended to in January, *ib.* 11774-11776——Witness attempted to introduce order generally, and when he left, in January, things were going on very satisfactorily, *ib.* 11957, 11958——Importance of the returns by the chief medical officer, *ib.* 11949—— There were no visits in January from the officer of the day, *Bamford* 12030-12034.

Cumbrous forms at first required, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19913-19915——Extent to which the forms have been simplified, *ib.* 19913, 19914——Necessity of some form

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

10. Regulations and Management generally—*continued.*

before the issue of medicines, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19915, 19916——Difficulty at the commencement of the war in regard to the different instruments for carrying into effect good hospital arrangements, *ib.* 20065, 20066.

11. Want of Information by the Home Authorities in regard to Deficiencies:

Blame attributable to the medical officers at Scutari, if the hospital was in a disgraceful state, as they did not so report it, *Dr. A. Smith* 8823–8825.

No official reports were made to witness relative to the hospitals at Scutari, or to the passage thither from Balaklava, until after the appointment of Lord William Paulet to the superintendence of the hospitals in December, *Duke of Newcastle* 14626, 14627. 14629–14633——Except through the general in command, no complaints of deficient supplies could have reached witness, *ib.* 14692——Communications of a non-official nature first received by witness in October as to the deficient supplies, *ib.* 15134–15136.

Attention of witness first drawn to the state of the hospitals at the period of the arrival of the wounded from the Alma, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19796. 19855–19857——Assurances were received from the hospital authorities that no effort should be spared to remedy deficiencies, *ib.* 19849——Contradictory and insufficient information upon which witness grounded the complaints contained in his letters to the hospital officials, *ib.* 19872–19876. 19887——Official information upon which Dr. Smith naturally relied as to the state of the hospitals, *ib.* 19964–19966.

12. Salutary Operation of private Intervention:

Circumstance of witness having made sundry suggestions about the hospitals to the authorities at Constantinople, though he did not feel in a position to press for amendment, *Stafford* 7517–7521——Willingness, after a time, of the sick and wounded soldiers at Scutari to converse freely with witness, *ib.* 7581, 7582——Their opinions as to their treatment under different circumstances; their gratitude to Miss Nightingale and the nurses, *ib.* 7583. 7604——Instances of the personal attention of witness to the wants of the sick at Scutari, &c., *ib.* 7586. 7589. 7590. 7593. 7648, 7649. 7657. 7659. 7666. 7784. 7790.

Explanation as to witness having been sent for by Lord William Paulet on the 19th of December, and having drawn up a paper containing sundry suggestions relative to the hospitals, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9053–9055——Remedial measures suggested by witness in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle on 10th December, *ib.* 9055——Suggestions made by witness to Lord William Paulet relative to the inspection of the hospitals and the hulks, *ib.* 9094——Remedy of wants and abuses, through means of the "Times" fund, of Miss Nightingale and her nurses, and of witness, *ib.* 9168–9172.

Considerable benefit consequent upon the intervention of private charity and individual exertions, *Fifth Rep. p.* 21, 22——The first real improvements are to be attributed to private suggestions, private exertions, and private benevolence, *ib.* 22.

13. Steps taken by the War Department, &c. to effect Improvement:

Satisfaction expressed by the Duke of Newcastle with witness's anxiety about the hospitals, *Stafford* 7521——Reference to a private letter from witness whilst in the East, to the Duke of Newcastle, and to the reply thereto; great credit due to his Grace for the character of his reply, *ib.* 7667. 7836——Attention paid by Mr. Herbert and the Duke of Newcastle to the communications and suggestions of witness, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne,* 9321–9323——Delay before some of the improvements were carried out by the home authorities, *ib.* 9324.

Absence of any unnecessary delay in remedying the evils which existed after they became known to witness, *Duke of Newcastle* 14892–14894——Steps taken by witness on intelligence of the unsatisfactory state of things at Scutari, *ib.* 15141–15143.

Nature of the steps taken by the Duke of Newcastle and witness to remedy the hospital deficiencies in October, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19799——Frequent and urgent written representations by witness to the officers in charge at Scutari, that every exertion must be made, irrespective of forms or expense, to provide for the wants of the hospitals; sundry letters hereon quoted, *ib.* 19814–19816. 19820. 19827. 19840 *et seq.* 19966——In these communications witness probably found more fault than he was justified in doing, *ib.* 19816. 19872–19876. 19987.

Non-official character of witness's communications with Mr. Wreford and others; explanation hereon, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19822–19827. 19859–19865——Letter from witness to Major Sillery, dated 11th December 1854, pressing upon him to use every effort, irrespective of forms or of expense, to supply the wants of the hospital, *ib.* 19848——Witness commenced writing in November about the state of the hospitals, *ib.* 19855–19858.

How far interference by the home authorities in regard to the conduct of the hospital was advisable, *Lord Hardinge* 20833–20837. 20849–20854——Reason why witness did not

HOSPITALS—I. *Scutari*—continued.

13. Steps taken by the War Department, &c.—*continued.*

not write to Lord Raglan on hearing of the neglected state of the hospitals, *Lord Hardinge* 20182, 20863.

Copy of instructions issued by the War Department, &c. to medical, military, or commissariat officers, holding offices in the hospitals, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 486-489—— Letter from Mr. Sidney Herbert to Lord W. Paulet, dated 18th January 1855, containing suggestions in detail relative to the hospitals, *ib.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 341-343.

II. *Balaklava:*

Good accommodation in the Balaklava hospital when visited by witness in December, *G. Dundas*, 154, 155——Crowded state of the hospital at different periods, *Parker* 3378. 3379; *Stafford* 7631. 7694——Tolerable accommodation in the general hospital at Balaklava when seen by witness, *Macdonald* 6161-6163. 6245-6249——Different authorities responsible respectively for the clothing, medicines, and medical comforts in the hospital, *ib.* 6167-6176.

Visits of witness to the hospital; he was turned out by the doctors on the third visit, whereupon he obtained an order from Lord Raglan to visit at all times, *Stafford* 7613, 7614. 7870, 7871——The hospital was very badly arranged, badly ventilated, and badly conducted generally, *ib.* 7615-7626. 7631. 7693, 7694——Improper manner in which the orderlies behaved, *ib.* 7615. 7617——Some medical comforts offered to the hospital by witness (to be obtained from Miss Nightingale) were declined by the medical men, though they seemed to be wanted, *ib.* 7622-7625——Empty houses at Balaklava which might have been turned into hospitals, *ib.* 7627-7630.

The apothecary and head medical officer at Balaklava are blameable for not sending to Scutari for any medicines which may have been wanted in the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 9580-9582—— Description of the hospital as not approaching the state described by Mr. Stafford, *Dumbreck* 11498-11500——Respects in which the condition of the hospital was not satisfactory, *Maxwell* 13250, 13251——How far practicable to have appropriated any houses in Balaklava to hospital purposes, *ib.* 13252-13255.

List of articles which Mr. Stafford was authorised by Miss Nightingale to offer to the authorities at Balaklava for the use of the patients in the General Hospital there, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 695.

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2. *How far there was any unnecessary Delay in providing and transmitting them from England.*
3. *Irregularity in the Contract with Messrs. Price & Potter.*
4. *Sundry Particulars relative to Price, Quality, Quantity, &c.*
5. *Transport from Balaklava to the Camp.*
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Particulars as to the conveyance in the "Himalaya" of bât horses and of the first ambulance corps from Varna to Balaklava on the 8th of October, 5059-5076. 5107, 5108——Inefficiency of the old pensioners forming the ambulance corps, 5066. 5075, 5076——Evidence relative to some 650 sacks of charcoal shipped in the "Himalaya" at Constantinople in September, and consigned to Captain Christie, transport agent at Balaklava, where it could not be landed, and was subsequently brought back to Constantinople, 5077-5095. 5104, 5103. 5244-5248——Representations by witness to the Peninsular and Oriental Company as to the mismanagement of the vessel, 5095. 5101——Circumstances under which witness commanded the vessel for some time after her transfer to Government, 5096-5103.

Witness never saw any English depôts at Varna, 5109——The "Himalaya" could have carried large stores from Varna, as well as the ambulance and bât horses, 5110——On proceeding to Varna subsequently for another cargo, the vessel was found to be defective, 5111-5113——Official communications made thereon by witness, of which no notice having been taken, he delivered up the vessel to Admiral Boxer at Constantinople, whence she was sent to Malta for repairs, 5113-5123——Return of witness to England in the "Himalaya" as a passenger, 5119-5124.

Conveyance of some convalescents in the "Himalaya" from Scutari to the Crimea about the end of September; very sickly and unserviceable state of these men, 5125-5145——Very dangerous character of the anchorage outside Balaklava, especially for sailing ships, 5146-5160——Filthy state of Balaklava harbour in October, 5161-5163——Offensiveness of the burial places, 5164-5166——Facility with which the harbour, quays, and streets might have been cleaned, 5167-5169.

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Kellock, Captain Adam. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Constantinople, and gave orders, 5211, 5212. 5231——Delay in the system of coaling at Constantinople as compared with that at Malta, 5213–5226——Facilities for coaling at Constantinople if vessels were allowed to pass out of the Golden Horn and above the two bridges, 5224. 5226——Official superintendence in the harbour, 5227–5231.

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Kinloch, Colonel John. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was formerly in the army, 5575, 5576——Suggested to Government in March 1854 that mules should be purchased in Spain for the use of the army in the East, 5577, 5578. 5585——After a lapse of three months, was sent to Spain by the Treasury, having received written instructions from Sir C. Trevelyan, 5579–5590——Sent 300 mules from Barcelona to the East in August, and 200 from Alicant in December, 5591–5594——Excellent fittings-up and arrangements (on the Government plan) in the "Trent" steamer, which conveyed the mules from Barcelona, 5595–5597. 5623. 5635, 5636——Evidence relative to the mode of purchase and cost of the mules, as well as to the expense of keeping them before embarkation, 5598–5602. 5611. 5617, 5618. 5644.

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KNAPSACKS:

1. *Weight and Contents respectively of the English, French, and Russian Knapsacks.*
2. *Non-landing of Knapsacks at Old Fort; consequent Inconvenience on the Flank March, and on arriving before Sebastopol.*
3. *Neglect in the case of Knapsacks of Men in Hospital.*
4. *Practice in regard to Compensation for lost Knapsacks.*

1. *Weight and Contents respectively of the English, French, and Russian Knapsacks:*

Want of analogy between the French and English knapsacks, *Bentinck* 1277–1279——Weight of the English knapsack, *ib.* 1935–1933——The French soldiers deemed to carry on the whole more than the English, *ib.* 1935–1937——Equal weight carried by the French as by the English soldier, *Duke of Cambridge* 4117.

Superiority of the French knapsack, and its contents, to those of the English, *Wilson* 4340–4345——Numerous things carried in the Russian knapsacks, which are consequently very heavy, *ib.* 4448–4450——Greater weight of the English than of the French knapsack, *Dawson* 5437–5440.

2. *Non-landing of Knapsacks at Old Fort; consequent Inconvenience on the Flank March, and on arriving before Sebastopol:*

Circumstance of the majority of the troops having landed at Old Fort without their knapsacks; sufferings experienced in consequence, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 418, 419. 619. 621. 767–772; *Duke of Cambridge* 3796–3804. 3979. 4080–4082——Explanation as to the knapsacks having, for the most part, been left behind on the landing at Old Fort, *Bentinck* 1172, 1173. 1222–1224. 1275, 1276. 1926–1930——Most of the Fusilier Guards had their knapsacks when witness left the army, *ib.* 2060, 2061——Articles taken by the men on landing, *Dawson* 5432–5434——The men would rather have taken the complete knapsack, *Dawson* 5435, 5436. 5443; *Flower* 10033, 10034.

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2. *Non-landing of Knapsacks at Old Fort, &c.*—continued.

Explanation as to the knapsacks of the 63d Regiment not having been restored when witness left in December, though they had been for some time in the camp, *Flower* 10084. 10087-10104.

Correction of Mr. Flower's statement (*Q.* 10084, *et seq.*) with respect to the knapsacks of the regiment, *Bamford* 11963-11968. 11971-11992. 12056-12060——The knapsacks piled up belonged either to dead men, or to sick at Scutari, *ib.* 11975——The colonel had no authority to distribute the contents of the knapsacks of the dead men, *ib.* 11988, 11989.

Delay in transporting the knapsacks from Balaklava to the camp, *Horsford* 13365-13367——Delay before the knapsacks not disembarked at Old Fort were restored to the men, *General Bentinck* 1225-1229; *Duke of Cambridge* 4082. 4135-4137. 4194; *Wilson* 4437-4439——Great complaints expressed by the sick at Scutari about the loss of their knapsacks, which were left in the ships on the disembarkation at Old Fort, *Stafford* 7685-7688.

3. *Neglect in the case of Knapsacks of Men in Hospital:*

Circumstance of the clothes and knapsacks belonging to the men going into hospital having been placed in an unroofed building at Balaklava, *G. Dundas* 317——The knapsacks and clothing referred to were exposed to the rain, but were much worn, and were not again used by the men, *ib.* 375-379.

4. *Practice in regard to Compensation for lost Knapsacks:*

Compensation to soldiers if their knapsack, &c. be lost during field service, but not if lost through carelessness, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20070-20074.

Reference by the Committee to the omission to supply the soldiers in the Crimea with another set of the articles comprised in the knapsacks of which they had been deprived on landing, *Fifth Rep. p.* 7.

L.

LABORATORY (WOOLWICH):

1. *Expenditure of late Years.*
2. *Recent Enlargement of the Building considered.*
3. *Complaint in regard to the Interference of the Clerk of the Ordnance and the Minister of War with the Discipline of the Establishment.*
4. *The Interference complained of explained and defended.*

1. *Expenditure of late Years:*

Large expenditure on the Royal Laboratory for some years before the war, *Monsell* 19623-19625.

Memorandum, dated 11 May 1855, of the amount voted by Parliament, and authorised by the Treasury, and of expenditure on account of machinery and improvements in the Royal Laboratory, Woolwich, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 334.

2. *Recent Enlargement of the Building considered:*

Statement relative to the construction of the new Laboratory for the Ordnance, and to the addition of two bays to the building on the verbal order of Mr. Monsell without the sanction of the Board, *Sir Thos. Hastings* 18769-18790. 18799-18818. 18823-18837. 18959-18966——The construction of the bays in question has been very useful, *Sir T. Hastings* 18770; *Monsell* 19201——Captain Collinson, the engineer, said that he had the authority of the clerk of the Ordnance for building the two bays, *Sir T. Hastings* 18770.

Witness is quite confident that he never gave any order to the engineer for the building of the two bays in addition to the original contract, *Monsell* 19200, 19201. 19206, 19207. 19212. 19254-19257. 19406-19409——Contract or estimate in the matter of the additional building; Ordnance authority responsible for the adoption of the same, *ib.* 19202-19221. 19236-19252——Sanction not given by the Board till after the building had been commenced, *ib.* 19206. 19236-19238. 19243, 19244. 19251, 19252——Statement by Captain Collinson, the engineer, as to the authority for the erection of the bays, and their cost, &c., *ib.* 19209-19212. 19236. 19244——Witness was not in London when the contract was finally brought before the Board, and sanctioned, *ib.* 19222-19226. 19253——Payment by the Ordnance for the work in question; check upon the amount; *ib.* 19227-19236. 19249-19252.

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LABORATORY—continued.

2. *Recent Enlargement of the Building considered*—continued.

Correction of former evidence relative to the two bays at the Laboratory; witness shows by a statement of Captain Collinson that the greater part of the work was not undertaken till after the sanction of the Board, *Monsell* 19388–19405. 19410, 19411—— In no instance were the orders verbal in the matter, *ib.* 19452.

3. *Complaint in regard to the Interference of the Clerk of the Ordnance and the Minister for War with the Discipline of the Establishment:*

Steps recently taken by witness without effect to obtain an inquiry into the working of the offices of principal and assistant at the Laboratory, *Sir T. Hastings* 18838–18844—— Interference of the Minister for War, through the medium of Mr. Monsell, in the foregoing matter, notwithstanding that the appointments in question rest with the Master-general or Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, *ib.* 18839–18850. 18901–18903—— Comments on the interference in question, *ib.* 18839–18843. 19080.

Statement as to an official letter from Colonel Wilson, director of the Laboratory, to the Secretary of the Board of Ordnance, not having been laid before the Board, *Sir Thos. Hastings* 19019–19022——Circumstances under which witness coincided with Sir Hew Ross in passing a severe reprimand upon an officer in the Ordnance department, and subsequently declined to rescind the same, as requested by Mr. Monsell, who said he should place the matter in the hands of the War Minister; the reprimand has not been removed; *ib.* 19076–19084——Considerable insubordination of which one of the officers in question was guilty, *ib.* 19080——Mr. Monsell had more than once spoken of the insubordination of this officer, *ib.*——The reprimand was written by Sir Hew Ross, and subsequently signed also by witness, *ib.*

Authority of the Master-general of the Ordnance over all the officers in the Laboratory at Woolwich, *Lord Hardinge* 20681–20684.

4. *The Interference complained of explained and defended:*

Evidence in defence of the interference of witness, more especially as backed by the authority of the War Minister, in regard to the discipline of the Laboratory, *Monsell* 19350–19373——Details relative to the proceedings taken by witness in the matter of the conflict of authority between Captain Boxer and Colonel Wilson, as referred to by Sir Thomas Hastings (*Q.* 18839. 19080), *ib.*——Dereliction of duty if the Secretary for War had not interposed with respect to the working of the Laboratory, 19353–19359.

Letter from Colonel Wilson, director of the Laboratory, to the Board of Ordnance, dated 17 January 1855, enclosing correspondence between him and Captain Boxer, relative to appointments and dismissals, *Monsell* 19362——Minute of the Board, dated 20 January, passing a strong censure upon the insubordination displayed by Captain Boxer towards Colonel Wilson, *ib.* 19363——Slight character of the insubordination first charged against Captain Boxer, *ib.* 19364–19367——Power of the Director of the Laboratory in regard to the dismissal of officials, *ib.* 19368–19373.

Memorandum by witness, dated 30 January, submitted to the Board, stating the grounds upon which he dissented from the censure passed by the Board on Captain Boxer, and requested the withdrawal of the Minute of 17 January, *Monsell* 19373—— The recommendation that the censure be withdrawn, not having been adopted by the Board, decided witness in laying the whole matter before the Secretary for War, *ib.*—— Defence of the grounds upon which witness based his memorandum of 30 January, *ib.* 19454–19474——Defence of the reference of the matter to the Minister of War, *ib.* 19460. 19466–19470——Statement as to Captain Boxer having been authorised to carry out his views in regard to the particular factory entrusted to his charge without being subject to any interference whatever, *ib.* 19461–19464. 19475–19488.

Reference to letters by Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer consequent on the memorandum by witness, *Monsell* 19489——Insult intended to Captain Boxer by the Board's Minute of 20 January, *ib.* 19490–19492——Minute substituted by the Board for that of 20 January, in consequence of witness's memorandum and interference; it is much less severe in tone, *ib.* 19493–19499——The Lieutenant-general was a party to the second minute, and was said to have written the first, *ib.* 19499–19503.

Propriety of any reprimand upon Captain Boxer, though an artillery officer, being made by the Board, and not by the Lieutenant-general individually, *Monsell* 19504–19507——Opinion that the position of Captain Boxer, at the Laboratory, is not independent of the Director, *ib.* 19508——Period of office respectively of Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer, *ib.* 19509——Harmonious co-operation between Sir Hew Ross and witness till the recent differences about Captain Boxer, in which matter the view taken by Sir Hew Ross was only natural to him, *ib.* 19566. 19595. 19601, 19602.

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LAND TRANSPORT:

I. *In Turkey:*

1. Want of Means of Transport when the Army was at Varna.
2. Means of Transport of the French Army.
3. Evidence on the part of the Commissariat.

II. *Transport Animals left by the Army at Varna.*

III. *In the Crimea:*

1. Generally as to its Inadequacy.
2. Commissariat Explanations on the subject.

IV. *Transport procured from Malta.*
V. *Drivers; their Inefficiency.*
VI. *Land Transport Corps.*
VII. *Generally as to the Principles which guide the Commissariat in providing Transport.*
VIII. *Correspondence of Commissary-general Filder in Explanation of his Proceedings.*
IX. *Conclusions by the Committee.*

I. *In Turkey:*

1. Want of Means of Transport when the Army was at Varna:

Very inadequate arrangements of the Commissariat with respect to the means of transport in Turkey at the commencement of the campaign, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 502. 547–549——Inability of the army to have moved on to Silistria or the Danube, as requested by Omer Pasha, through the want of means of transport, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 669. 742, 743. 869–873; *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1734–1736. 1844–1848; *Duke of Cambridge* 4021–4029——Neglect in providing proper means of transport when the army was at Scutari and at Varna, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 669.

Limited means of transport at the command of the army of Varna, *Bentinck* 1264–1266——Impossibility when at Varna of obtaining draught horses from any quarter, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1650, 1651. 1724. 1752–1755——Want of proper means of transport with respect to ammunition, *ib.* 1664–1666. 1844——Supply of 2,000 ponies obtained by Colonel Dixon in Turkey, *ib.* 1724–1726——Dependence upon the artillery horses, or upon the horses of the country, if it had been decided to move the siege train to Silistria, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17563–17568.

2. Means of Transport of the French Army:

Advantages of the French over the English in regard to means of transport at Varna, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1641—— Adequate number of horses landed at Varna for the French army, *ib.* 1849, 1850——Efficient land transport of the French army at Gallipoli, &c., *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13448. 13504.

3. Evidence on the part of the Commissariat:

Examination as to the means of transport provided for the army after its arrival at Varna in June, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13471 *et seq.*——Calculation of Mr. Filder that 3,000 arabas, with animals to draw them, and 5,000 mules were sufficient to enable 25,000 men to take the field in Bulgaria, *ib.* 13474–13479——Letter from Mr. Filder, dated Varna, 27 July, showing the means of transport then provided, *ib.* 13480——Witness cannot undertake to say that the means of transport were sufficient to have enabled the army to take the field in Bulgaria, *ib.* 13482–13494.

The officers' baggage animals were not included in the animals purchased for the Commissariat, which numbered 5,659, besides the animals for 1,000 arabas, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13497–13500——5,659 transport animals were provided, besides 1,000 arabas, which are equal to 3,000 horses, *ib.* 13497–13500. 13677–13680——1,000 arabas were obtained through Omer Pasha, *ib.* 13497. 13500. 13685.

Further evidence relative to the means of transport available at Varna for field operations; reference to statement by Commissary-general Filder, and concurrence therein, that the army could have taken the field, if necessary, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13677–13696——Belief that 3,000 arabas might, if necessary, have been procured through Omer Pasha, *ib.* 13677. 13684–13689——Number of ambulance mules included in the 5,659 animals possessed by the Commissariat at Bulgaria, *ib.* 13694–13696——Different services to which the 5,659 animals in Bulgaria were appropriated, *ib.* 13699.

Examination relative to the means of transport with the army when at Varna to the effect that after a certain period, and before the raising of the siege of Silistria, the army was in a position to advance to that place, *Duke of Newcastle* 14930–14971. 14979. 14987, 14988——Inability of Captain Wrottesley, or any other officer of the army, except Lord Raglan, to have formed an accurate opinion as to the amount of transport available, *ib.* 14932. 14939–14945. 14962–14966. 14979——Reliance placed upon the information afforded

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Land Transport—continued.

I. *In Turkey.*—3. Evidence on the part of the Commissariat—*continued.*

afforded by Commissary-general Filder with regard to the means of transport at his disposal, *Duke of Newcastle* 14933–14938. 14967. 14970, 14971——Duty of Lord Raglan to have reported the want of transport, if such want had prevented him from advancing to Silistria, *ib.* 14967. 14687, 14988.

Payment through witness, when the army was at Varna, for all horses bought for the land transport, *J. W. Smith* 15669, 15670——How far the duty of the Commissariat to have provided means for moving the siege train, *ib.* 15671–15675——Advantage if a suggestion by witness for some light carts and Spanish mules had been adopted, *ib.* 15925–15929. 15931.

II. *Transport Animals left by the Army at Varna:*

Immense number of mules and bât horses left at first at Varna, and subsequently removed to the Crimea, *Lord Lucan* 6480-6487——Plan of proceeding of Mr. Filder with respect to the transport animals before going to the Crimea; letters from him on the subject, dated 2 September 1854, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13700-13711——Course adopted with respect to the transport animals at Varna not required for the Crimea, *ib.* 13731. 13738——Explanation as to the transport animals left at Varna having been sent to Constantinople, instead of the Crimea, *J. W. Smith* 15971–15977.

Memorandums by Lord Raglan, dated 6 October 1854, and by Commissary-general Filder, dated 5 October 1854, with regard to the disposal of the Commissariat transport animals left at Varna, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 386, 387.

III. *In the Crimea:*

1. Generally as to its Inadequacy:

Deficient means of transport in December between the harbour and the camp, *G. Dundas* 65. 365——Relative distances of the English and French lines from Balaklava and from Kamiesch Bay, *ib.* 247–249. 255–266. 341——The deficiency in the supply of food and forage was generally attributed to the defective transport between Balaklava and the camp, *ib.* 365——Service rendered by the Commissariat horses which were landed from the "Jason" in December, *ib.* 366, 367.

Inadequacy of the means of transport landed at Old Fort, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 590, 591. 744–746——Opportunities for providing means of transport, *ib.* 664——The deficiency of transport to the camp was apparent to every one in the army, *ib.* 863–865.

When witness left the army, there was no special want of transport between Balaklava and the camp, *Bentinck* 1414–1416——Description of the transport waggons, *Clay* 2793, 2794——Sundry particulars relative to the Commissariat horses, and to the losses occasioned by want of forage, exposure to the weather, and overwork, *Clay* 2795, 2796; *Lord Lucan* 6713–6716. 6719; *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17241–17247. 17372–17379. 17413–17425——Information received by witness from Lord Raglan and from the Commissary-general as to the want of land transport in the Crimea, *Duke of Newcastle* 14972–14978. 14980–14983.

2. Commissariat Explanations on the subject:

The means of transport landed with the army at Old Fort comprised 1,203 ammunition animals, and seventy carts, equipped with mules, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13712, 13713. 13717——Considerable additions made to the transport shortly after the first landing, *ib.* 13717, 13718. 13725, 13726. 13730, 13731——Number of carts and waggons obtained from the Tartars on landing, *ib.* 13717. 13725, 13726. 13730.

Reference to letter from the Commissary-general, dated 5 October, adverted to, as stating that there was then a sufficiency of land transport at Balaklava, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13731–13737——Means of transport on the 13th of November, *ib.* 13796, 13797. ——Constant draught of transport animals from Constantinople to the Crimea to supply the place of those which had died, *ib.* 13889. 13894——Statements by the Commissary-general on 16 January, in reply to a question as to the number of transport animals then possessed by him, and in what proportion appropriated to the several Divisions, *ib.* 13933–13940——Report from Mr. Smith to Mr. Filder, dated 11 January 1855, in which the deficiency of transport animals is accounted for, *ib.* 13942.

Unserviceable state of many of the transport animals sent from Constantinople to the Crimea, partly on account of the voyage, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13950, 13951——Opportunities for procuring animals from Constantinople adverted to, *ib.* 14072, 14073. 14100 ——Delay in procuring animals from Constantinople after they had been sent for, *ib.* 14074–14083. 14092.

Provision for land-transport made by witness in accordance with orders from the Commissary-general in August, *J. W. Smith* 15676-15678——Deficiencies of several supplies attributed to the want of transports, more especially after the storm, *ib.* 15820. 15860. 15883, 15884.

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LAND TRANSPORT—continued.

III. *In the Crimea.*—2. Commissariat Explanations on the subject—*continued.*

General return, dated 16 January 1855, of transports employed in the Crimea, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 411——Letter from Deputy-acting Commissary-general Smith to the Commissary-general, dated 11 January 1855, and observations of Commissary-general Filder and Deputy Commissary-general Adams thereon, *ib.* 412, 413——Statement of horses received and issued by Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general C. B. Smith since 16 December 1854, and remaining on 11 January 1855, *ib.* 414.

IV. *Transports procured from Malta:*

Comments on the neglect of the Commissariat to procure means of transport from Malta, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 669.

Steps taken to procure means of transport from Malta, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13431–13433. 13472, 13473. 13889–13893——Means adopted so as to forward thirty waggons, 220 Maltese carts, &c. to the Crimea, as requested by Commissary Filder in November, in anticipation of a Spring campaign, *ib.* 13889–13893——Reference to a statement by Sir De Lacy Evans, and also to a letter from Commissary-general Wild, dated Malta, 2 September 1854, as showing how far the Commissariat had availed itself of the transport resources of Malta, *ib.* 14237–14242.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 28 November 1854, with respect to a supply of Maltese carts, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 397, 398——Treasury minute thereon, *ib.* 398, 399.

Statement of carts and harness purchased in November and December at Malta, for the use of Lord Raglan's army, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 400.

V. *Drivers; their Inefficiency:*

Doubt as to the expediency of having employed the natives in Bulgaria, &c. as drivers, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1727–1733——Desertions arising among the Bulgarian drivers of the transport animals, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13508. 13517–13519——Steps taken by Mr. Filder for the superintendence of the native drivers; transmission for this purpose of draughts from the police force in England and Ireland, *ib.* 13509–13516.

Belief as to an adequate number of drivers having been provided for the animals taken to the Crimea, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13719–13724——Desertion and refusal to work, &c. of many of the drivers after the breaking up of the Balaklava road, *ib.* 13865. 13868, 13869——Steps taken to provide fresh and effective drivers; transmission of 350 from Ireland in January, in accordance with a suggestion by the Commissary-general on 8 November, *ib.* 13881–13889. 13942.

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 11 November 1854, containing suggestions with regard to the drivers attached to the land transport, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 391——Extract from a letter on 13 November on the same subject, *ib.* 392——Treasury minute, dated 28 November and 1 December 1854, containing directions in compliance with the foregoing suggestions, *ib.*

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Consideration of the want of shirts in the hospitals; witness reported on the subject, but made no suggestions for immediate adoption, 13134–13144. 13154–13157——Duty of witness merely to investigate and to report, 13142–13144——Explanation as to the Commissioners not having made suggestions to the hospital authorities till after the receipt of a communication from the Duke of Newcastle in January empowering them so to do; this communication read, 13145–13164——Reference to a letter from Mr. Herbert to witness, dated 29 November 1854, recommending suggestions to be made, 13148, 13149. 13160–13162.

Reasons assigned for making suggestions to Lord W. Paulet only, and for confining those suggestions merely to the military organisation of the hospitals, without any reference to the washing, &c., 13154–13159. 13163–13193——Copy of the first letter of suggestions written by the Commissioners to Lord W. Paulet, 13168——Respects in which witness considered the principal medical officer, rather than the Commandant, the real head of the hospitals, 13181–13192——Defect in a really good having been wanting, 13182. 13185——Witness frequently spoke to Dr. Menzies about the want of hospital requirements, but did not *ex officio* make any suggestions to him, 13193.

[Second Examination].—Further explanation as to witness not having reported to Lord W. Paulet with reference to the washing, 13194–13202——Statement as to the temporary obstacle to the inquiries of the Commissioners after their arrival at Balaklava, 13203–13227——The Commission visited nearly every field hospital before Sebastopol, &c., 13228——Very wretched condition of the field hospitals at this period (January) 13229. 13237–13248——Slight alterations made in the original report of the Commission, 13234–13236.

Exceedingly defective accommodation of the sick in the marquees and bell-tents, 13237–13240——Many of the regiments had no marquees, 13237——Want of medicines and medical comforts in the hospital tents, 13241–13244. 13248. 13256–13258. 13271, 13272——Also of fuel, 13245——Also of utensils for the sick, 13246, 13247——Adequate supply generally of surgeons, 13249——Respects in which the condition of the hospital in Balaklava was not satisfactory, 13250, 13251——How far practicable to have appropriated any houses in Balaklava to hospital purposes, 13252–13255.

Particulars as to Dr. Hall having sent requisitions to Scutari for opium, which requisitions were not properly complied with, 13256–13270——When witness was at Scutari, he was told that there was no want of medicines or drugs, 13263–13265——Witness did not consider it necessary to take an account of the actual stock or medicines in store at Balaklava, 13272——Course open to Dr. Hall when he found that he could not procure the necessary medicines from Scutari, 13273–13276.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Maxwell, Peter Benson. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Further examination relative to the instructions received by witness before his departure for the East, and to the indefinite nature of the same, 13277–13303——Witness had no special communication before leaving England with Dr. Cumming or Dr. Spence, 13285–13288——Interviews before departure with the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith further adverted to, 13289, 13290. 13296–13303.

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Medical Comforts. See *Medicines and Medical Comforts.*

Medical Department:

1. *Generally as to the Duties and Proceedings of Dr. Andrew Smith.*
2. *Arrangements for the Supply of the Force first sent to the East.*
3. *Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of Turkey.*
4. *Practice with regard to Requisitions on the Department.*
5. *Mode of Communication with the War Minister.*
6. *Suggestions for an amended Constitution of the Department.*

1. *Generally as to the Duties and Proceedings of Dr. Andrew Smith:*

Witness is Director-general of the Army and Ordnance Medical Department, *Dr. A. Smith* 7961——Entered the medical service of the army in 1815; services since that period, *ib.* 7962–7968——Succeeded Dr. Gordon as professional assistant to Sir James M'Grigor in 1845, and in 1851 succeeded Sir James M'Grigor as Director-general, *ib.* 7969–7976——Smaller salary of witness than of Sir James M'Grigor, *ib.* 7977–7979——Professional assistant of witness since the death of Dr. Spence in the "Prince," *ib.* 7981–7984——Salary of the assistant, *ib.* 7985, 7986.

Sundry authorities under whom witness acts, *Dr. A. Smith* 7987, 7988. 8206——Power of witness with respect to the appointment, promotion, and removal from station to station of medical officers, *ib.* 7989–7998. 8036–8040. 8113–8116——Conflict of authority relative to purveyor's stores for hospitals, also with respect to medicines for the Ordnance service; sundry authorities to which witness is subject on this point, *ib.* 8031–8048——Exceedingly onerous nature of witness's duties since the 25th of February 1853, when the business of the Ordnance Medical Department was thrown upon him, *ib.* 8312–8316.

Evils consequent upon the necessity of reference by witness to several authorities before his duties or orders can be fulfilled, *Dr. A. Smith* 8317–8322——Advantage if the Director-general of the Medical Department were responsible only to the Minister of War, or to some one superior authority, *ib.* 8319–8322——How far it is in contemplation that witness should resign his present office, *ib.* 8821, 8822——Reference to the steps taken by witness to furnish medical stores, as showing the responsibility respectively of the Medical Department and the Board of Ordnance, *ib.* 8891–8896.

Responsibility generally of Dr. Andrew Smith for the Medical Department of the army, *Duke of Newcastle* 14613, 14614——Responsibility to a certain extent of Dr. Smith for any deficiency of hospital accommodation, *ib.* 14804–14808——Limit to the responsibility of Dr. Smith, *ib.* 14858——Facility afforded for direct application by Dr. Smith to the Ordnance for hospital furniture, *Sir T. Hastings* 18363–18365.

Witness from the first urged Dr. Andrew Smith to extend the medical establishment and arrangements, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19789. 19794, 19795——Very high opinion entertained by witness of Dr. Smith, *Lord Hardinge* 20813. 20864.

System of direction and control of the department adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 17, 18——Recommendations and general proceedings of Dr. A. Smith adverted to, *ib.* 18——Probable evils which resulted in the conduct of the department through the system of economy and limited expenditure consequent on a long period of peace, *ib.*

2. *Arrangements for the Supply of the Force first sent to the East:*

Directions received by witness from the Government, on the 10th February 1854, to make provision for the medical wants of an army of 10,000 men about to proceed to Malta, *Dr. A. Smith,* 8049, 8050——Arrangements necessary, *ib.* 8051–8053——Further arrangements made on hearing, about the end of March 1854, that an army of about 25,000 men were to be sent to Constantinople, *ib.* 8071, *et seq.*——There is no compilation of actual orders for the medical arrangements for an army about to take the field, *ib.* 8910–8912.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT—continued.

3. *Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of Turkey:*

Circumstance of witness having arranged, in February 1854, that three of the senior medical officers of the expeditionary army, Doctors Dumbreck, Linton, and Mitchell, should go at once to the East, and inquire into the sanitary character and local diseases of different parts of the country; local inquiries and reports made by each of these officers, *Dr. A. Smith* 8075-8082.

Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Military Secretary, dated 21 March 1854, suggesting an inquiry by Doctors Dumbreck, Linton, and Mitchell, into the local diseases in the East, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 702, 703.

4. *Practice with regard to Requisitions on the Department:*

Official reports to witness from the East came direct through the War Office, except in the cases of requisitions for medicines or stores, *Dr. A. Smith*, 8421-8426——Arrangements by witness under which requisitions from Scutari for medicines or stores, though forwarded through the principal medical officer, Mr. Hall, are also sent direct to witness in duplicate, in a non-official form, *ib.* 8426-8434——Advantage of the direct non-official requisitions, *ib.* 4834-4839——Sufficient record kept in witness's office of all the business transacted, except that, as regards hospital stores, it contains the requisitions only, *ib.* 8882-8890.

5. *Mode of Communication with the War Minister:*

Course of the official communications of witness since the appointment of a Minister for War, and previously thereto, *Dr. A. Smith*, 8802-8812——Circumstance of no communication having been made to witness relative to the correspondence of his department on the separation, in 1854, of the two departments of the War and the Colonies, *ib.* 9365-9370.

Communications with the medical department were at first generally conducted through the Secretary-at-War, *Duke of Newcastle*, 14345. 14700. 15108——Circumstance of witness having told Dr. Andrew Smith, about the middle of August, that he must take his orders from witness as his real and only master, *ib.* 14902. 15108.

6. *Suggestions for an amended Constitution of the Department:*

Expediency of an amended constitution of the medical department, *Duke of Newcastle* 14853——Contemplated changes in the department when witness quitted office, *ib.* 14898-14901.

Letter from Mr. Sidney Herbert to Dr. Smith, dated 24th December 1854, containing sundry suggestions relative to the Medical Department in the East, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 343, 344.

See also *Ambulance Corps. Ambulances. Appointments and Promotions*, 2. *Artillery*, 4. *Clothing*, III. 1. *Dispensary* (*Scutari*). *Field Hospitals. Floating Hospitals. Guthrie, Dr. Hospitals. Medical Officers. Medicine Chests and Panniers. Medicines and Medical Comforts. Orderlies* (*Hospitals*). *Purveyors* (*Hospitals*). *Sick and Wounded. Smyrna Hospital*, 4. *"Times" Fund*, 2. *War Department*, 3, 4. *Ward, Mr. Wreford, Mr.*

MEDICAL OFFICERS:

1. *Generally as to Number, Age, Qualification, &c.*
2. *Steps taken by Dr. Andrew Smith to provide an adequte Supply.*
3. *Civil Practitioners.*
4. *Half-pay List.*
5. *Returns laid before the Committee.*

1. *Generally as to Number, Age, Qualification, &c.:*

There was no absolute deficiency of the Medical Staff with respect to the army in the field, but there probably was as regards the sick or wounded removed to the ships, &c., *Sir De Lacy Evans* 747. 792——The Medical Department was quite as inadequate in the Peninsula as in the Crimea, *ib.* 793——Want at Varna of subordinate officers in the Medical Department, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1653, 1654——Efficiency of the medical attendance in the hospital tents so far as it went, *Parker* 3285. 3291. 3430——Each regiment of 850 men should have one surgeon and three assistant surgeons during war, *Duke of Cambridge* 3745. 4086-4088——Satisfactory manner in which witness, who was wounded at Inkermann, was treated on the passage from Balaklava to Scutari, in Scutari hospital, and on his passage home, *Dawson* 5509-5519.

Witness was principal medical officer with the army from the 2d to the 26th of October, *Dumbreck* 11338——Return of several medical officers from the East on account of ill health, *ib.* 11385, 11386. 11391——Onerous duties of the different grades of medical officers, *ib.* 11387-11392.

Witness

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

MEDICAL OFFICERS—continued.

1. *Generally as to Number, Age, Qualification, &c.*—continued.

Witness was with the army at Varna, and in the Crimea, as deputy-general inspector of hospitals, in charge of the Third Division, *Forrest* 11618, 11619. 11621——Witness does not admit any neglect on the part of the medical staff in the East, *ib.* 11590——Experience of witness mainly as a regimental officer, *ib.* 11594-11598——Mode of disposing of the services of ten assistant surgeons taken in the "Mauritius" to the Katscha in September, *Stewart* 12325-12328——Adequate supply generally of surgeons for the hospital tents in January, *Maxwell* 13249.

Witness had no voice in the selection of medical officers, *Duke of Newcastle* 14612, 14613——Case of misconduct of a medical officer before the battle of the Alma adverted to, *ib.* 14617-14623——Failure of Dr. Guthrie's suggestion for the appointment of a third assistant-surgeon to every regiment, *ib.* 15092.

Adoption, by the decision of Lord Raglan, of a system of additional regimental surgeons, instead of additional staff surgeons, as recommended by Dr. Smith; impression that the latter plan would have worked better, *Right Hon. S. Herbert,* 19789-19793——Large proportion of medical men sent out with the English army, *ib.* 19904——The army surgeons were completely exhausted, 19990. 19993——The appointment practically of the regimental medical officers is not made by witness, *Lord Hardinge* 20722-20724.

Remarks by the Committee upon the zeal of the medical staff; reduction in their number by sickness, &c., *Fifth Rep. p.* 18.

2. *Steps taken by Dr. Andrew Smith to provide an adequate Supply:*

Necessity of recalling medical officers from abroad, in order to fill up the staff for the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8001——Hospital staff of medical men provided for the army of 10,000 as sent to Malta; addition to this staff when the army was increased, *ib.* 8101-8108——Sanction of the Commander-in-chief and of the Secretary of War required in the case of the medical appointments by witness for the purposes of the hospitals, *ib.* 8109-8116——Medical staff of each division, *ib.* 8143——There was an Inspector-general and a Deputy Inspector-general at head quarters; duty of the former, *ib.* 8144-8147.

Insufficiency of the army medical establishment during times of peace, *Dr. A. Smith* 8278, 8279——Immense difficulty of procuring an adequate supply of young medical officers when the war broke out, *ib.* 8280——Ages of some of those employed in the East, *ib.* 8281——Number of medical officers with the army of the East; their sufficiency, *ib.* 8558. 8559. 8813, 8814——Medical officers appointed to the Artillery and Sappers and Miners in the Crimea; belief as to their sufficiency, no more having been applied for, *ib.* 8578-8582.

Steps taken by witness to procure thoroughly qualified medical men, when he found that there must of necessity be a great number of new appointments, *Dr. A. Smith* 8880, 8881——Employment of 150 or 200 young assistants in the hospitals; terms at which engaged, *ib.* 9553-9558——Compliance of Dr. Smith with an application by witness for thirty additional medical officers, *Forrest* 11904, 11905.

3. *Civil Practitioners:*

Application by some medical men of the civil service for employment in the hospitals; offer by two gentlemen of their services gratuitously, *Dr. A. Smith* 9550-9552. 9559——Limited extent to which offers of gratuitous services were made to witness by civil practitioners, *ib.* 12924-12929——Steps taken by witness in accordance with a suggestion by Lord Stratford for employing civil practitioners in the barrack hospital, *Menzies* 10261-10286.

Explanation relative to the employment of civil practitioners at Smyrna, &c.; views respectively of Dr. Smith and witness hereon, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19986-20002——Inducements offered to civil practitioners to accept employment, *ib.* 19987-19990. 19993. 19999-20002——Justification of higher pay being given to the civil practitioners than to the army surgeons, *ib.* 19987-19989.

4. *Half-pay List:*

Large number of medical officers on the half-pay list who have not been called on for service in the East, *Dr. A. Smith* 8002-8005——Improbability of any persons receiving half-pay as medical officers who have died, *ib.* 8335-8337.

5. *Returns laid before the Committee:*

Paper showing the medical staff recommended by Dr. A. Smith, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 691, 692——Return, dated 20 March 1855, showing the ages, and the number at each age, of the medical officers, dispensers of medicines, and dressers sent to the East, *ib.* 694——Returns, dated 7 March 1855, relative to the total number of doctors, &c.,

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

MEDICAL OFFICERS—continued.

5. *Returns laid before the Committee*—continued.

sent to the East, the numbers died and invalided, and the number at present with the army, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 695.

Return stating the name of each person, not previously in the military medical service, appointed to proceed with the army to the East, or to join the army since it departed from this country; with a statement showing the medical schools in which such persons had studied, and the nature of the certificates, showing their respective qualifications, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 463-469——Names and qualifications of dressers appointed, *ib.* 469——Return of the number of surgeons, apothecaries, and nurses, during each month, from the landing of the army at Gallipoli, *ib.* 470.

See also *Guard's Brigade*, 2. *Guthrie, Dr.* *Hall, Dr. John.* *Hospitals.* *Lawson, Dr.* *Medical Department.* *Sick and Wounded.*

Medicine Chests and Panniers. Large and inconvenient size of the medicine chests, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1658-1660; *Lord Cardigan* 5901-5903; *Flower* 9984. 9986; *Forrest* 11716-11722——Irregular sizes of the chests, *Parker* 3369-3374.

Copy of circular, dated 3 March 1854, sent by witness to each regimental surgeon on leaving for the East, with respect to his medicine chest and surgical instruments, &c., for service in the field, *Dr. A. Smith* 8135, and *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 692——Arrangement by witness that two wicker-work panniers, or small medicine chests, should accompany each regiment into action, *ib.* 8136-8141. 9632-9641——The panniers, or substitutes for the detachment medicine chests, were sent along with most of the regiments, and should have been forthcoming in Bulgaria, *ib.* 8871-8877——The regimental chest contains medicine for 800 men for six months, *ib.* 8875——Document referred to professing to be an account of a regimental medicine chest, *ib.* 9606-9615.

Supply for the 63d Regiment of medicines as contained in the regimental medicine chest and in two panniers, the latter only being carried with the regiment in the field, *Flower* 9983-10001——Contents of the panniers; they were soon exhausted, *ib.* 9990-9994——Adequate supply contained in the medicine panniers, *Forrest* 11726——Every regiment on landing in the Crimea was provided with panniers, which were carried on horses, *ib.* 11727, 11728.

MEDICINES AND MEDICAL COMFORTS:

I. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities; Nature of the Supply:*
1. Medicines.
2. Medical Comforts.
3. Transport Arrangements.

II. *As supplied in the Crimea and Turkey:*
1. Insufficiency of the Supply.
2. Evidence to a contrary Purport.
3. Good Quality of the Medicines.
4. Land Transport and Local Issue.

I. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities; Nature of the Supply:*

1. Medicines:

Course adopted by witness to provide the necessary medicines, &c., and to see that they were shipped, *Dr. A. Smith* 8054-8065——Circumstances under which the stores thus sent to Malta were consigned to the principal medical officer there, and, not having arrived till the army had left for Gallipoli, were sent on to Constantinople, *ib.* 8066-8070——Medical stores sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, for six months, were sent out before the end of March 1854, *ib.* 8117. 8135.

Impossibility of its being known to witness what the medical wants of the army are until he receives requisitions for further supplies, *Dr. A. Smith*, 8117. 8135——Practice of witness's department to send medicines only, the Ordnance being responsible for all other necessaries and comforts, *ib.* 8119-8121——Two respectable firms in London and Apothecaries' Hall supplied all the medicines, *ib.* 8604——Date of the first receipt of medicines at Scutari, *ib.* 8621——Delay in the transmission of these medicines, which were sent out for the first 10,000 men, *ib.* 8621-8624.

Liberality with which medical supplies were furnished by the different departments, *Dr. A. Smith* 8897——Per-centage proportion of sick for which medical supplies and hospital requirements have been provided; sufficiency of such provision, both before and after the army took the field, *ib.* 8898-8909——Heavy outlay in medicines, surgical appliances, &c., consequent upon the expedition to the East, *ib.* 8906.

Improper classification of the medicines sent from England, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1655-1657——Opinion as to the sufficiency of preparation made by Dr. Smith for the wounded to be expected from the invasion of the Crimea, *Duke of Newcastle* 15154-15162.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

Medicines and Medical Comforts—continued.

I. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities; Nature of the Supply*—continued.

2. Medical Comforts:

Urgent steps taken by witness to despatch medical comforts when he heard that they were wanted; large amount sent out since the 21st of November, *Dr. A. Smith* 8370–8373 —— Supplies sent out previously to November, *ib.* 8374–8378.

Practice relative to the channel through which requisitions are made by the medical officers for medical comforts; doubt whether the Commissariat in the East would have complied with such requisitions, *Dr. A. Smith* 8730–8743 ——Complaints relative to the signing of requisitions for medical comforts; amendment of the practice by witness, *ib.* 8763–8765—— Circumstances under which the supply has been undertaken since August or September by the Medical department, instead of the Admiralty, *ib.* 8885.

Direct supply by witness, since October, without reference to the Admiralty, of all medical comforts, concerning the departure and arrival of which he can afford ample information, *Dr. A. Smith* 9412–9417. 9421–9428——Denial of statements, that, in November and December, there was not a sufficient supply of medical comforts in the hospital stores, *ib.* 9418–9420. 9429–9436——Mode of purchase of the medical comforts, *ib.* 9437, 9438.

Examination upon an office copy of a return, just furnished to Lord Panmure, of medical comforts sent to the East; inability of witness to explain the same in detail; *Dr. A. Smith* 12891–12922——Mention of Mr. Bridget, the purchaser of medical comforts, as able to explain the foregoing return, *ib.* 12911–12913. 12922.

With respect to complaints of insufficient medical comforts, witness thereon ordered a very large further supply, though assured by Dr. Smith that there could not be any deficiency, *Duke of Newcastle* 14628. 14693–14695——Statement as to witness having abolished certain forms, complained of by Dr. Smith, with reference to applications for medical comforts, *ib.* 14677. 14693–14700—— Appointment of a purveyor to assist Dr. Smith in making purchases, *ib.* 14700——Further reference to the complaints made by Dr. Andrew Smith, concerning the mode of supply of medical comforts, for the amendment of which a purveyor was specially allotted him, *ib.* 15121–15126.

Practice of the Admiralty in regard to the purchase and examination of medical comforts for the army, *Grant* 17696, 17697. 17899–17911. 17935—— Arrangements made in consequence of complaints by Dr. Smith as to the mode of purchase of medical comforts, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19960, 19961.

Return, dated 20 March 1855, showing a total expense of 38,496*l.* 1*s.* 6*d.*, incurred for the supply of medical comforts since the 21st of November 1854, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 694.

Return of medical comforts supplied for the army in the East, since the commencement of the war, up to 22 December 1854, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 462——Description of article, and price, *ib.*

Statement of medical stores and comforts forwarded to the East, in accordance with requisitions made by Dr. A. Smith, since February 1854, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 508–512,

3. Transport Arrangements:

Reference to an application made by witness in order to secure the regular transmission of medicines and medical comforts, and the acknowledgment of their receipt, *Dr. A. Smith* 8378–8382—— Witness at first applied to have two vessels placed entirely at his disposal, *ib.* 9454——Seven or eight vessels have from time to time been employed in conveying medical stores, *ib.* 9454, 9455.

Impracticability of Dr. Smith's suggestion for the allotment of ships for the conveyance of medical stores only, *Duke of Newcastle* 14818.

Reference to a requisition on the 21st of February 1854, for the conveyance of forty tons of medicines, *Milne* 16430, 16431—— Delay in the loading of these medicines in the "Wrights" sailing vessel, which did not sail till the 5th of April, *ib.* 16441–16449 ——Appropriation of five steam transports to the Medical department since November, *ib.* 16811——Loading of these transports in the London Docks, *ib.* 16812.

Certain portion of medical comforts purchased and shipped direct by the Admiralty; conviction that the entire amount thus purchased has been duly forwarded; *Grant* 17899–17911.

Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the principal medical officer in Turkey, dated 23 September 1854, recommending that all medicines and medical comforts be in the first instance forwarded to Scutari, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 703.

Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Deputy Secretary-at-War, dated 22 January 1855, requesting the use of two steamers for the conveyance exclusively of medicines, medical comforts, &c., to the East, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 703, 704.

Letter from Dr. A. Smith to Colonel Mundy, War Department, dated 28 October 1854, suggesting that a special steamer be placed at the disposal of Dr. Hall for the conveyance of hospital stores, &c., *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 504.

MEDICINES AND MEDICAL COMFORTS—continued.

I. *Steps taken by the Home Authorities; Nature of the Supply*—continued.

3. Transport Arrangements—*continued.*

Letters from Dr. A. Smith, to Colonel Mundy, dated 18 November and 15 December 1854, with regard to transport for the special conveyance of medical stores from this country, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 504, 505.

II. *As supplied in the Crimea:*

1. Insufficiency of the Supply:

Evidence as to the want of medicines and medical comforts in the Crimea at different periods, *G. Dundas* 156–159; *Bentinck* 1367–1371. 1922–1925; *Bamford* 12045. 12089–12092; *Layard* 2611, 2612. 2656–2664; *Sparks* 5345, 5346; *Macdonald* 6163–6166; *Flower* 10070——Considerable supply of medicines at Varna, which might have been transported to Balaklava, *Layard* 2664–2666. 2719–2721——Great want not only of medical comforts, but of opium, &c., in December, *Parker* 3286–3294. 3438——Want of medicines in December, &c., though there were depôts at Balaklava, *ib.* 3368. 3392–3398.

Insufficient supply of medicines to witness's troop of horse artillery in Bulgaria and at Balaklava, *Shakespear* 4548, 4549. 4679, 4680——Deficiency of medical stores for the Light Cavalry Brigade in Bulgaria, but not in the Crimea, *Lord Cardigan* 5891. 5906——Immediate remedy of the deficiency on a report by witness to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 5891–5893. 5906, 5907——Completeness of the French system of arrangement of medical stores, *Macdonald* 6243.

Doubt as to the period of a further supply of medicines in the Crimea after the panniers were exhausted, *Flower* 9995–9998——Requisitions for medicines were constantly being sent to the purveyor at Balaklava, who frequently had not what was wanted, *ib.* 10067, 10068. 10235–10237——Sufficiency of the supply of medical comforts in the Crimea about December, though there was a deficiency previously, *ib.* 10072–10074.

Divisional supply of medicines out of which witness supplied the regimental surgeons for a considerable time after the landing in the Crimea, *Forrest* 11702. 11709–11728——Deficiency in the supply of sago, arrow-root, &c., for the Third Division in the Crimea, *ib.* 11873, 11874——Insufficiency of the supply of medicines for the Rifle Brigade in the Crimea, *Horsford* 13413–13415.

2. Evidence to a contrary purport:

Adequate supply of medicines at Varna and Aladyn, *Duke of Cambridge* 3747–3751——Sufficiency generally of the supply of medicines whilst witness was with the army, *ib.* 4111.

Evidence relative to the stores left by the army at Scutari, and also to those left at Varna, and detained there for the want of transport, *Dr. A. Smith* 8184. 8187, 8188. 8463–8471——Belief as to the sufficiency for a given time of the supplies of medicines and medical comforts taken in two vessels from Varna to the Crimea for the use of the army there, *ib.* 8235–8252.

There was no want of medicines when the army was at Scutari, *Dumbreck* 11325——Large amount of medical comforts in the Crimea up to the 13th of November, *ib.* 11340——Provision of medical comforts, &c., at Scutari through the Commissariat department before the arrival of the purveyor's stores, *ib.* 11325–11333. 11372–11376——Ample supply of medical comforts at Varna, *ib.* 11377. 11606, 11607——Ample supply of medical comforts, so far as witness saw, in the Crimea, *ib.* 11378.

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1. *Generally as to the Supply of Mules for Transport Purposes:*

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2. *The general Mode of proceeding.*
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4. *Valuable Services rendered by her.*

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Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the Military Secretary-at-War, dated 4 April 1854, containing suggestions for the establishment of an hospital corps, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 692, 693.

Letter from Dr. A. Smith to the War Department, dated 26 March 1855, with respect to the insufficiency of the hospital orderlies in the East, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 704.

See also *Hospitals*, I, 8. IV.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:

1. *Generally as to the Constitution and working of the Board.*
2. *Master-General.*
3. *Lieutenant-General.*
4. *Comptroller of Stores and Principal Storekeeper.*
5. *Clerk of the Ordnance.*
6. *Surveyor-General.*
7. *Secretary.*
8. *Unsatisfactory State of the Board at different periods in* 1854.
9. *Change in the Action of the Board through the Intervention of the War Minister and the Clerk of the Ordnance.*
10. *How far desirable to have an Artillery Officer at the Board.*
11. *Duties of the Department; their Importance.*
12. *Practice in regard to Minutes and the signing of Papers.*
13. *Mode of Action with the Horse Guards.*
14. *Contracts.*
15. *Supply of Stores.*

1. *Generally as to the Constitution and working of the Board:*

Practice as to the control of the department, since the absence of Lord Raglan, who is still Master-General, *Duke of Newcastle* 14749–14755—— Revision necessary in the whole arrangements of the department, *ib.* 14762–14764. 15079–15081——Consultation occasionally by the Board of the Inspector-general of Fortifications, *Sir H. D. Ross* 17974 17976——Important change contemplated by witness in the Ordnance Department, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20160. 20164.* 20171.

Satisfactory working of the Ordnance Department in 1826, when witness was Clerk of the Ordnance and the Duke of Wellington was Master-General, *Lord Hardinge* 20691, 20692. 20696–20700——Certain alterations in the Ordnance Department, since witness was there in 1826, have worked well, but the clerks are much overworked, *ib.* 20701, 20702 ——Approval of the Ordnance Department being conducted by a Board with an efficient person at the head of the Board, *Sir J. Graham* 21242.

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2. *Master-General:*

Statement as to Lord Raglan's sanction not being required for appointments in the Ordnance, *Duke of Newcastle* 15203–15205——Retention of the office of Master-general adverted to as not necessary, if sufficient powers be entrusted to the Lieutenant-general, *Sir H. D. Ross* 18031–18033. 18039–18045——Responsibility of the Master-general, and not of the Secretary of War, for the conduct of the department, *Sir T. Hastings* 18851, 18852——Sanction of the Master-general necessary in regard to expenditure on works, *ib.* 19029. 19041–19046.

Incompatibility of the powers of Master-general and Secretary-for-War being co-existent, *Monsell* 19591——Greater power of the Master-general than of the Lieutenant-general, *ib.* 19600——Lord Raglan's decision on any point has not been sought since his absence, *ib.* 19615–19617——When the Master-general was in this country, records of the minutes in important cases were always submitted to him for approval, *Wood* 20213–20215.

Definition of the duties respectively of the Master-general of the Ordnance and of the Board; authority of the former to reverse any decisions of the latter, *Wood* 20216; *Lord Hardinge* 20632–20636 20648, 20649——Importance of the Master-general being a very able man, and not being absent in time of war, *Lord Hardinge* 20693–20695 ——Prejudice to the working of the Ordnance by the absence of its chief officer, *Sir J. Graham* 21243.

Evils consequent on the absence of the Master-general adverted to by the Committee, *5th Rep. p.* 8, 9——Urgent importance of an able man having been appointed as head of the department when Lord Raglan could no longer discharge the duties of Marshal-general, *ib.* 9.

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ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT—continued.

3. *Lieutenant-General:*

Witness was appointed Lieutenant-general of Ordnance on 6th of May 1854, the Master-general, Lord Raglan, having left the country about the middle of April preceding, *Sir H. D. Ross* 17956–17958——Duties devolving upon, or delegated to, witness, in the absence of Lord Raglan, adverted to, as showing how far such absence is the cause of any inconvenience in the conduct of the department, *ib.* 17958–17966. 17998, 17999. 18027–18033——Limited extent to which witness exercises superintendence over the supply of stores, *ib.* 17967–17969. 17977, 17978.

Similar powers possessed by the Lieutenant-general of Ordnance as by the Master-general, during the absence of the latter, *Sir T. Hastings* 19051, 19052. 19058, 19059——Excellent manner in which the military duties of the Ordnance have been discharged by Sir Hew Ross, *Monsell* 19599.

Grounds upon which, during the absence of Lord Raglan, it was deemed advisable to appoint Sir Hew Ross Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance, rather than to appoint another Master-general, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20172–20182; *Lord Aberdeen* 21370–21388——Belief as to the Lieutenant-general being vested with the powers of the Master-general during his absence, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20173–20175.

The Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance was always a member of the Board, *Wood* 20193, 20194——Abolition of the Lieutenant-generalship about 1831; and revival of the office in 1854, *ib.* 20195–20198——Performance by the Lieutenant-general, under warrant, of the duties of the Master-general during his absence, *ib.* 20199–20205——Less authority of the Lieutenant-general than of the Master-general, *ib.* 20217–20222.

The Lieutenant-general, as appointed in the absence of the Master-general, has no superior authority to that of the Board, *Lord Hardinge* 20637–20639.

Special reference by the Committee to the appointment of Lieutenant-general and to the evils resulting from the less authority possessed by him than by the Master-general, *Fifth Rep. p,* 8, 9.

4. *Comptroller of Stores and Principal Storekeeper:*

Witness is comptroller of Ordnance stores, and principal storekeeper; is *ex officio* a member of the Ordnance Board, *Sir T. Hastings,* 18096–18098——Experience of witness in regard to naval gunnery, *ib.* 18100——Constant attendance of witness at the Board adverted to, *ib.* 18759. 18854–18856——Laborious duties performed by witness; representations made by him thereon, *ib.* 18854–18856——Circumstance of witness having been practically the only Board officer for fifteen or sixteen weeks in 1854; *ib.* 18994–19001.

Advantage of the principal storekeeper of the Ordnance being a naval man, *Lord Hardinge* 20689.

5. *Clerk of the Ordnance:*

Witness has been clerk of the Ordnance since January 1853. *Monsell* 19170–19173——As member of the Board has no greater power generally than any other member, *ib.* 19174–19176——Is the medium of communication between the Board and the Minister for War; explanation hereon, *ib.* 19177. 19586——Was constantly at the Board in November and December, *ib.* 19575. 19578.

When obliged to be absent, witness more than once tendered his resignation to the Duke of Newcastle, who declined to accept it, *Monsell* 19575. 19603, 19604——For a short time in April 1854, witness was the only member at the Board, but he considers that the public service did not suffer thereby, *ib.* 19576–19578. 19596–19599.

6. *Surveyor-General:*

Performance mainly by witness of the duties of Surveyor-general during the interval between Colonel Maule's departure for the East, and Colonel Bruce's appointment; nature of such duties, *Sir T. Hastings* 18854. 18916–18922——Duties of the Surveyor-general; advantage of this officer being a military man, *Lord Hardinge* 20687–20690.

Evils consequent on the absence of the Surveyor-general, *Fifth Rep. p.* 8, 9.

7. *Secretary:*

Witness has been secretary to the Board of Ordnance for about eighteen months; has been in the service of the Ordnance for fifty-one years, *Wood* 20185–20192——Details relative to the business transacted by witness as secretary; system on which transacted, *ib.* 20209–20214. 20223 *et seq.*

8. *Unsatisfactory State of the Board at different periods in* 1854:

Very unsatisfactory state of the Board of Ordnance in August, when witness sent them the order for the warm clothing, *Duke of Newcastle* 15109–15115——The Master-general, the surveyor-general, and the chief engineer were all away at the time, *ib.* 15111–15113.

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8. *Unsatisfactory State of the Board at different periods in* 1854—continued.

Opinion that the Board of Ordnance towards the end of 1854 was not equal to all the work devolving upon them, *Sir T. Hastings* 18853——Conduct of business whilst the Master-general was at the Board; disorganisation and difficulty consequent on his absence, *ib.* 19024–19029. 19041–19046. 19050. 19059.

Harmonious working of the Board up to November, *Monsell* 19566. 19595. 19601, 19602——Officers of the Board permanently absent, *ib.* 19579–19585——Disorganisation in the department consequent on the absence of the Master-general, though up to November matters went on without much harm being done, *ib.* 19590, 19591. 19595–19602——Difference of opinion between Sir Hew Ross and witness in the matter only of Captain Boxer and Colonel Wilson, *ib.* 19660, 19661——Endeavour made by witness and Sir T. Hastings to lay aside all dissensions, which were, however, unfortunately revived by the differences about Colonel Wilson and Captain Boxer, *ib.* 19669.

Pressure under which there was irregularity occasionally in regard to giving orders to the Ordnance department, *Lord Hardinge* 20647.

Inadequate and disordered state of the department adverted to, *Fifth Rep. p.* 8–10——Strictures by the Committee upon the conflict of authority at the Board, on the part more especially of Sir Thomas Hastings and Mr. Monsell, *ib.* 8, 9.

9. *Change in the Action of the Board through the Intervention of the War Minister and the Clerk of the Ordnance:*

Communication from witness to the private secretary of the Duke of Newcastle, and recently direct to Lord Panmure, remonstrating against certain changes in the action of the Board; no answer was made to either communication, *Sir T. Hastings* 17840–17848——Practice introduced by the Duke of Newcastle, by which verbal requisitions were very frequently made on the Ordnance department; nature of the record of such requisitions, *ib.* 18147–18161. 18206–18213——Objections raised by witness to the change in the conduct of the Ordnance department, by which business is transacted on the verbal communications from the Secretary-of-War without due record being made of such communications, *ib.* 18206–18213.

Supply by the Ordnance of sundry articles without regular official authority from the Minister-at-War, from whom a covering order, dated 7th February 1855, was received, *Sir T. Hastings* 18646–18655, and *App. p.* 318, 319——Further examination upon and objection to the change in the constitution and practice of the Board, whereby the clerk of the Ordnance has frequently acted independently of the Board, *Sir T. Hastings* 18724. 18726 *et seq.*——Action of the Board, before the change, by a plurality of votes, everything being recorded, *ib.* 18727, 18728——No official communication was made relative to the changed constitution of the Board, *ib.* 18731. 18734–18737——Important matters transacted upon the verbal directions of the clerk of the Ordnance; instances in illustration, *ib.* 18733. 18769 *et seq.*

Date of the change in question, *Sir T. Hastings* 18759——No additional authority was given to the War Department over the Ordnance, when the new office of Secretary of State for War was established, though thenceforth the powers of the Master-general were to a great extent exercised by the War Minister, *ib.* 18760–18762. 18965, 18966——Practice of the Board after the change in its constitution still to communicate in writing, *ib.* 18763–18766——Practice in regard to payment by the Ordnance for works undertaken at the verbal direction of the clerk of the Ordnance, *ib.* 18781–18786. 18797–18801. 18814–18818.

Reason why witness did not represent to the Duke of Newcastle or Lord Panmure his great dissatisfaction with the altered working of the Board, *Sir T. Hastings* 18934. 18937–18940——Excellent working of the Ordnance Department during the ten year (witness's period of office) previous to the recent change in its constitution, *ib.* 18935, 18936——Further statement as to the powers of the Master-general having been exercised by the Minister for War, *ib.* 19047 *et seq.*——Regret expressed by witness that the statements made by him in regard to the conduct of the Ordnance Department should have been extracted from him by the Committee, instead of an opportunity being given him for laying them before the Secretary for War, *ib.* 19169.

Extent of witness's interference with the action of the Board of Ordnance in regard to the supply of stores, *Duke of Newcastle* 14372.

Cognizance of witness for the last year that changes were impending in the Ordnance department, *Monsell* 19567, 19568——Ill effect of the impression at the Board that its constitution was about being altered, *ib.* 19567. 19569, 19570——Change in the conduct of the Ordnance business after the separation of the colonies from the War department; justification of the increased powers (previously existing, though latent) exercised after such change by the War Minister over the Ordnance, *ib.* 19571–19574. 19591–19595. 19605–19608——Numerous official letters still from the War departments to the Board, *ib.* 19586, 19587.

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9. *Change in the Action of the Board, &c.*—continued.

List of articles which have been obtained by the Board of Ordnance without regular official authority from the Minister of War, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 318, 319.

10. *How far desirable to have an Artillery Officer at the Board:*

In re-organising the Board, an artillery officer should be placed at the head of one of the departments, *Duke of Newcastle* 14757-14762. 15081——Constitution of the Board of Ordnance considered; how far defective in regard to a knowledge of artillery, *Sir H. D. Ross* 17970-17997. 18011-18026. 18039-18046——Excepting witness, there is no artillery officer on the Board, *ib.* 17990-17994——Advantage of an artillery officer as head of the department, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20180, 20181——Witness does not see any advantage in having an artillery officer a member of the Board, *Lord Hardinge* 20707-20714.

11. *Duties of the Department: their Importance:*

Summary of duties devolving on the Ordnance, *Sir T. Hastings* 18100-18104——Responsibility of the Ordnance for the carrying out of Dr. Smith's applications to them, *ib.* 18378——The Ordnance is an executive department only, *ib.* 18644-18646——The duties of the Board are mainly of an executive character, *Monsell* 19178, 19179——Increase of late years in the duties of the department, *Lord Hardinge* 20703——Very difficult and very important character of the duties devolving on the Board, *ib.* 20692.

Great importance of efficiency in the department adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 8.

12. *Practice in regard to Minutes and the signing of Papers:*

Authorities under the Ordnance responsible for carrying out the minutes of the Board in their integrity, *Sir T. Hastings* 18791-18796. 18810——Exemption of the Board from any charge of misapplication of public money beyond the amount sanctioned by Parliament in the case of buildings, *ib.* 18946-18964——Explanation as to some papers having been put forward by the Ordnance on the signature of witness only, *ib.* 18994-19008——In the case of more important papers, or "Board papers," two signatures have been required, *ib.* 19006-19008——Practice in regard to papers being laid before the Board or being referred to the different departments, *ib.* 19023.

Practice at the Board in regard to Minutes, *Monsell* 19415-19429——System generally in regard to the passing of bills through the department, *ib.* 19430. 19435. 19442——Sundry instances of Sir T. Hastings having separately signed minutes ordering supplies, *ib.* 19510. 19513.

Practice and authority of one member of the Board, if alone present, to transact the business of the Board; exceptions to this rule, *Wood* 20206-20208. 20299-20305. 20324-20339——Practice in regard to the preparation of minutes, the same being recorded only in case of important matters, *ib.* 20211, 20212. 20223, *et seq.*——Explanation relative to the system of record, showing how far the same is a check on irregularity, *ib.* 20275-20298——System of consideration by the several members of the Board of the papers laid before them, *ib.* 20306-20319.

13. *Mode of Action with the Horse Guards:*

System of communication and action between the Horse Guards and the Ordnance, *Sir T. Hastings* 18941-18950——The communications are all in writing, *ib.* 18943-18945——Communication through witness with the Horse Guards, *Monsell* 19588——There are not many non-official communications with the Horse Guards, *ib.* 19589.

14. *Contracts:*

System adopted in order to insure that the articles supplied agree with the patterns approved of, *Sir T. Hastings* 18246-18256——Explanation generally of the course pursued by the Board in regard to contracts, *ib.* 18429-18433. 18442-18459——Non-re-employment of any contractor whose contract is badly executed, *ib.* 18442-18445. 18448, 18449——Exemption of the contractor from pecuniary penalty, but not from non-re-employment, if the articles pass the inspection, *ib.* 18446-18449. 18454-18459.

Delay occasionally before the badness of the article is detected, *Sir T. Hastings* 18450——If bad articles are supplied, the Ordnance are almost sure to be apprised of it, *ib.* 18452, 18453——Practice of the Ordnance in regard to contracts for buildings, and in regard to payments in accordance with the estimates, *ib.* 18796-18801——How far witness considers himself responsible for an Ordnance contract, an alteration in which has been made without his sanction, by any other member of the Board, *ib.* 18906-18914——Objection to a system of individual purchases for the Board, under their sanction, in lieu of a system of contract, *ib.* 19382. 19386.

System of triennial contract by the Board at a schedule of prices, *Monsell* 19393. 19448-19450——Approval of purchase by contract, unless in exceptional cases, *ib.* 19667.

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14. *Contracts*—continued.

Witness does not recollect any instance of an Ordnance building having been undertaken without the cognizance of the Master-general, *Wood* 20256–20262. 20293—— Practice generally at the Board in authorising new buildings, *ib.* 20267–20273—— Reference especially to the signing of contracts to the effect that a contract may be entered into by one member, and that such contract would be binding on the Board, *ib.* 20330–20343.

Dissatisfaction expressed by the Committee with the administration of the contract system under the Ordnance, *Fifth Rep. p.* 9.

15. *Supply of Stores:*

Considerable deficiencies of the department in regard to stores at the commencement of the war, *Monsell* 19559–19562. 19611–19614. 19622–19632——Responsibility of Government as much as of Parliament for the insufficiency of the department, *ib.* 19563–19565. 19612–19625——Preparation of stores by the Ordnance for some period before the war in anticipation thereof, *ib.* 19618–19620——Unusually large amount voted by Parliament for the Ordnance for some years previous to the war, *ib.* 19622–19625.

There was generally no deficiency of Ordnance stores when the war broke out, *Lord Hardinge* 20644, 20645, 20656–20658——Great advantage of the army as compared with other British armies in regard to stores and equipments, *ib.* 20882–20884——Successful efforts of the Ordnance to provide naval stores, *Sir J. Graham* 21244.

Return of stores of all descriptions specially provided for the use of the army in the East (excluding military weapons and ammunition) in the Tower of London, on 1 February 1855; showing the quantity of each description, the name of the tradesman or contractor by whom they were furnished, and the date when they were delivered at the Tower, *App.* (*4th Rep.*) *p.* 316.

Dates of requisitions on the Ordnance for stores, with the number and description, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 331.

See also *Aldershott. Appointments and Promotions*, 5. *Artillery. Boots and Shoes*, 2. *Bruce, Colonel. Clothing*, III., 2, 3, 4. *Hospitals*, I., 4, iii., V. *Howell and Hayter, Messrs. Huts. Inventions and Improvements. Iron. Laboratory* (*Woolwich*). *Minié Rifles. Quartermaster-General's Stores. Shell Foundry* (*Woolwich*). *Shells. Small Arms. Storekeeper* (*Tower*). *Stores. "Talbot," The. Tents. Tools. Transport Service*, 8. *War Department*, 3, 4. *Waterproof Clothing. Young, Mr.*

Osborne, Hon. and Rev. Sidney Godolphin. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Went to Scutari in a non-official capacity, 8998——Acted for a time as a sort of assistant chaplain, *ib.*—— Arrived at Scutari on the 8th of November, 8999. 9033——Found the barrack hospital in a most disgraceful and filthy state, 9000, 9001——The general hospital seemed much the superior of the two, 9000——Great want in the barrack hospital of medicines, surgical appliances, &c., 9002–9007. 9010–9017——Conversation between witness and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe relative to the wants of the hospitals, 9008, 9009. 9023, 9028—— Doubt as to there having been any want of lint, though asked for by Miss Nightingale under a mistake, 9010, 9011. 9013. 9155, 9156.

Absence of a head authority at Scutari and Constantinople, 9018, 9019——Difficulty of keeping up discipline in the barrack hospital on account of its enormous size, 9019. 9022——Inadequacy of any one medical man as head of the hospital, unless he be provided with an efficient staff, 9019——Major Sillery, the commandant, resided in the hospital, 9020, 9021——Exertions of Major Sillery, who did his best, and was not blameable for the condition of the hospital, 9022——Confusion in the hospital in preparing for those wounded at Inkermann, 9022. 9155.

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Evidence in explanation of the position occupied by witness, which, though sanctioned by the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Clarendon, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, was not official, 9028. 9030. 9097–9102——Letter from witness to Lord Stratford, laying before him the want of accommodation, &c. on board the hospital ships, and also representing strongly the neglect and sufferings of the sick and wounded on the passage from Balaklava to Scutari, 9028, 9029——Letter in reply from Lord Stratford, stating that he had written to Admiral Boxer and Lord Raglan on the matters complained of, 9030.

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upon him the necessity of immediate improvement in the transport of the sick and wounded, 9030——Absence of any such improvement before witness left Constantinople, 9031.

Circumstances under which witness on the 29th of November wrote to the commissioners sent out by the Duke of Newcastle, calling their attention to the grievances on board the transport ships from Balaklava; this letter read, 9031. 9035, 9036——Explanation of the delay before the Commission commenced business, 9032. 9035. 9281–9284——Names of the Commissioners, 9034——Loss in the "Prince" of one of the Commissioners, Dr. Spence, son-in-law to Dr. Andrew Smith, 9034, 9035——Reply by the Commissioners to witness's letter of the 29th of November, 9037.

Description of the state of the sick and wounded landed from the transports as horrible and heartrending, 9038——Consideration of the delay in the landing, and of the mortality during the detention, 9038–9044. 9192–9199——Inaccuracy of an official return relative to the vessels which arrived at Scutari with sick and wounded, between the 18th of September and the 13th of November, 9038–9040. 9192–9199——Very improper manner in which the Russian prisoners were treated in the hospitals; as also on their being removed thence by Turks, 9045–9050. 9129–9151.

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Reference to a paper given to witness by the Duke of Newcastle, showing the very large quantity of port wine, brandy, sugar, and tea sent to the East between the 18th of February and the 20th of November 1854; supply nevertheless of port wine, &c., through the "Times" Fund, 9080–9086. 9350——Demand on the "Times" Fund consequent upon the loss of the "Prince," 9080–9083. 9338–9344——Filthy state of the men's linen in the hospital, 9087–9091——There was no system of washing, nor any Government laundry, 9088, 9089. 9091, 9092——Establishment of a laundry through means of the "Times" Fund, 9091——Reference to a report made by witness to Lord William Paulet, containing sundry suggestions relative to the hospitals, and to the transport and landing of the sick; the same delivered in, 9093, 9094.

Position of the dead-house in the hospital, 9095, 9096——Reference to statements in November by Mr. Reade, late apothecary at the general hospital, and Mr. Darrac, surgeon at the hospital, that there was no want of medicines or surgical appliances; doubt as to the correctness of these statements, 9103–9111——Application made to the "Times" Fund for castor oil, 9106, 9107. 9112. 9176——Witness cannot give any detailed information relative to the general hospital, 9109——Impression that Miss Nightingale acted for all the hospitals, 9111——Evidence in refutation of a statement by Dr. Hall, that the hospitals in November were in as good a state as could, under the circumstances, be expected, 9113–9125.

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Reference to some Crim Tartar peasants shut up with the Russian prisoners; they were released in consequence of an application by witness to the Secretary-at-War, 9130–9133——Supply by witness, out of a private fund of his own, of medical comforts to the Russian sick, 9144. 9151——Want of interpreters for the Russian prisoners in hospital, 9146-9149——Proper manner in which the French treated their Russian prisoners, 9152–9154——Belief as to the willingness of Lord Stratford to attend to any applications for the hospital; immensity of business otherwise imposed upon him, 9157-9162——Great error in confiding to Lord Stratford the task of providing funds for the hospitals, 9163. 9319, 9320——Constant attention of Lady Stratford to the wants of the sick, 9157, 9158.

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2. *Crew of the Vessel.*
3. *Articles on Board; how Stowed.*

1. *Loss of this Transport in the Storm:*

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1. *Staff in the East; how appointed.*
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3. *Revised Regulations of* 14*th November* 1854:

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RAGLAN, LORD:

1. *His Authority as Commander-in-Chief in the East.*
2. *His Exercise of Authority in regard to the Commissariat and the Hospitals, &c.*
3. *His Views in regard to the Expedition to the Crimea.*

1. *His Authority as Commander-in-Chief in the East:*

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2. *His Exercise of Authority in regard to the Commissariat and the Hospitals, &c.*

During six weeks at the camp, witness never saw Lord Raglan nor other high authorities in the hospital tents, *Parker* 3453–3457——Some slight obstacle seemed to be made at first by Lord Raglan to the inquiries of the Commission sent out by the Duke of Newcastle, but on explanation of the objects of the Commission every facility was afforded for inquiry, *Maxwell* 13203–13208. 13216–13227——Great importance of the Commander-in-Chief of the army extending his confidence, encouragement, and support to the Commissary-general; practice of the Duke of Wellington on this point adverted to as more correct than that of Lord Raglan, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 14247. 14252.

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3. *His Views in regard to the Expedition to the Crimea:*

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REDCLIFFE, LORD STRATFORD DE:

1. *His Authority to supply Hospital Deficiencies.*
2. *Articles supplied through him on Requisition.*
3. *His Visits to the Hospitals.*
4. *His Responsibility in regard to his Exercise of the Power confided in him.*
5. *Injudicious Instructions under which he acted.*

1. *His Authority to supply Hospital Deficiencies:*

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1. *His Authority to supply Hospital Deficiencies*—continued.

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2. *Articles supplied through him on Requisition:*

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3. *His Visits to the Hospitals:*

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4. *His Responsibility in regard to his Exercise of the Power confided in him:*

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Cognizance of Lord Stratford, through Lord Clarendon, of any important communications between the Government and Lord Raglan, *Duke of Newcastle* 14443. 14445. 14448, 14449——Exemption of Lord Stratford from any responsibility with reference to the state of the hospitals, *ib.* 14844. 14847-14851——There was some non-official communication from Lord Stratford to the home authorities about the hospitals, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20005, 20006.

5. *Injudicious Instructions under which he acted:*

The commandant at Scutari should have had absolute control, without reference to Lord Stratford, *Stafford* 7830, 7831——Witness was not aware at first, nor does he think that Major Sillery was aware, that Lord Stratford had ample command of funds for the purposes of the hospitals, *ib.* 7832-7835——No complaints were made against Lord Stratford's authority to supply money, *Dr. A. Smith* 8720-8723.

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5. *Injudicious Instructions under which he acted*—continued.

Osborne 9060——Great error in confiding to Lord Stratford the task of providing funds for the hospitals, *ib.* 9163. 9319, 9320.

The Committee consider that the instructions sent by the home authorities to the Ambassador were as injudicious as they were unavailing for the purpose for which they were intended, *Fifth Rep. p.* 22.

See also *Hospitals*, I. 4. iv. *Navy, The.*

Redoubts. Redoubts were thrown up by the French, but not by the English, along the road from Balaklava to the camp, *Bentinck* 1379–1387. 1399; *Duke of Cambridge* 4058–4063.

Rees, Dr. Satisfactory state of the naval hospital at Therapia, as formed and arranged by Dr. Rees of the "Britannia," *Stafford* 7610, 7611. 7829.

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1. 38*th Regiment.*
2. 57*th Regiment.*
3. 63*d Regiment.*

1. 38*th Regiment:*

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2. 57*th Regiment:*

Circumstance of the tents of the 57th Regiment having been for three weeks in the "Mauritius" after the disembarkation at the Katscha, *Stewart* 12449–12452——Particulars as to a great portion of the baggage of the officers and soldiers of the regiment having been in the first instance landed at Constantinople, and detained there unnecessarily; also as to a portion having been left at Malta, after it had been three months on board; urgent want of this baggage at the time in the Crimea, *ib.* 12453–12470. 12540–12548.

3. 63*d Regiment:*

The regiment left Ireland for the East on the 23d July 1854, *Flower* 9972, 9973——Strength of the regiment on leaving England and on landing in the Crimea, *ib.* 9974–9977——The regiment was about 1,020 strong, and received a reinforcement of about 100 men; it was reduced in December to about 300 effective men, and has since been stated to be reduced to 30 effective men, including officers, *ib.* 9974. 10111–10117.

Sufficiency of the medical staff of the regiment, *Flower* 9978–9982——Great sickness in the regiment after the battle of the Alma, *ib.* 10035–10037——Increase of sickness since the end of October; causes thereof, *ib.* 10080–10083. 10107.

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Diminution in the amount of overwork, and in the sickness consequent thereon, if a reserve of troops had been formed at Malta, from which the strength of the army could have been increased, *Duke of Newcastle* 15002–15006. 15011–15013——Want of recruits for establishing a reserve at Malta, *ib.* 15007–15011——Advisableness of sending out at first as many as 25,000 men considered, a reserve of about 6,000 only being feasible, *ib.* 15014, 15015——Lord Hardinge was aware of every step taken for the reinforcement of the army, but did not specially represent the necessity of a reserve, *ib.* 15015–15017. 15169.

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"Resolute," The. Only eight others besides witness were saved from the wreck of this vessel, *Owen* 1417, 1418——The "Resolute," which was a sailing ship of 653 tons, arrived at Balaklava about the end of September, *ib.* 1419–1422. 1539——She lay off the harbour for the first night without anchoring, and went in the next morning, *ib.* 1423. 1430, 1431——The captain objected to anchor outside, the coast at Balaklava being iron-bound with very high cliffs; concurrence in this objection, *ib.* 1424–1429. 1447. 1487. 1526–1528.

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Regular supply of food to the first battalion up to the 14th November; occasional failure of rations after that period, *Horsford* 13332. 13337, 13338. 13352——Supply of tents to the battalion, *ib.* 13339, 13340——Explanation as to witness being unable to say how many men were lost by disease, *ib.* 13343-13346. 13371——Protection afforded by the huts erected by witness's battalion, *ib.* 13376-13379. 13383, 13384——Adequacy of the medical staff of the battalion, *ib.* 13411, 13412.

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"*Rip Van Winkle*," *The.* Loss of cavalry horses on the passage of this vessel from Varna to Balaklava, *Lord Lucan* 6533. 6539-6551——Document relative to the loss of horses on board, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 489-492.

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ROADS:

I. *From Balaklava to the Camp:*

1. Dreadful state of the Road, and Evils consequent thereon.
2. Representations on the matter by Mr. Filder.
3. Steps taken to repair the Road considered.

II. *French Roads at Kamiesch.*

III. *Russian Roads into the Crimea.*

I. *From Balaklava to the Camp:*

1. Dreadful state of the Road, and Evils consequent thereon:

Bad condition in December of the principal road from Balaklava to the camp, *G. Dundas* 66–75. 346. 356, 357; *Clay* 2791, 2792; *Blakeley* 4499——Before witness left the army the road was in a wretched state, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 493——When seen by witness the roads were in a very bad state, and in some places impassable, *Layard* 2494——Tolerable state at first of the roads, *ib.* 2592–2599.

The communication between Balaklava and the camps, about two miles distance, was very tolerable in December, *Clay* 3245–3248——Dreadful state of the road to Balaklava, to remedy which no steps were taken, *Shakespear* 4661–4669——The roads about the middle of January were in a very bad condition, *Lord Lucan* 6505, 6506——Many horses died in the mud, from which they could not extricate themselves, *ib.* 6506.

Reference to the breaking up of the road as diminishing the means of transport, and as causing the general breakdown of the expedition, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13864 *et seq.* 14101–14103. 14213–14216——Immense expense which has been incurred in consequence of the want of a proper road from Balaklava to the camp, *ib.* 13988——Availableness of the road so long as the fine weather continued, *ib.* 14103.

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2. Representations on the matter by Mr. Filder:

Extreme uneasiness of Mr. Filder about the state of the road; letter from him on the subject, dated 13th November, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13802–13804——Official representation made by Mr. Filder to the Quartermaster-general on the 13th November, relative to the Balaklava road, *ib.* 13808. 13809. 14034–14039——Breaking up of the road adverted to as the main cause of the difficulties of transport and supply; reference to letters from Commissary-general Filder hereon, *ib.* 13864, 13865. 13869. 13909–13911. 13915. 13933. 13951. 13988.

Memorandum submitted by Commissary-general Filder to Lord Raglan, dated 4th January 1855, with reference to the evils consequent on the bad state of the road along the quay at Balaklava, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 405.

3. Steps taken to repair the Road considered:

Scarcely any labour had, up to December, been expended on the Balaklava road, *G. Dundas* 347, 348——Reasons assigned for not employing soldiers on the road from Balaklava in order to make it permanently available; heavy duties devolving on them in the trenches, &c., *Sir De Lacy Evans* 446–451. 692–696. 817–820; *Bentinck* 2016, 2017; *Duke of Cambridge* 3822–3825. 4001, 4002——Impracticability of improving the roads, there being from the first a want of materials and of labour, *Bentinck* 1390–1399——Reason for witness not having made representations concerning the deficiency of the communication, *ib.* 2036–2038.

Non-employment of soldiers upon the roads after their arrival at Balaklava, *Layard* 2600–2605. 2655——Labourers from Constantinople might have been employed, *Duke of Cambridge* 4003, 4004——Witness represented the overwork of his men in the trenches, &c., but did not suggest employing labour from Constantinople on the roads to Balaklava, *ib.* 4147, 4148——Inexpediency of employing the soldiers on the roads from the camp to Balaklava after their arrival at the latter place, *Wilson* 4430–4433.

Attempted repair of the road by the employment of Turkish soldiers thereon, in November; failure thereof, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13895–13897; *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17395. 17409. 17411; *Lord Hardinge* 20871. 20876——Period at which witness became aware of the breaking up of the road to the camp, *Duke of Newcastle* 14582, 14592–14594.

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3. Steps taken to Repair the Road considered—*continued.*

Inexpediency of making a new road by employing the men engaged in the trenches, where their services were of more importance, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17230-17238. 17281-17287. 17410. 17445-17447——Reason for not employing the army in making a road after their arrival at Balaklava on the 27th of September, and before the commencement of the trenches on the 10th of October, *ib.* 17332-17346. 17441-17444——Explanation as to navvies not having been sent for to England to make a road to the camp, *ib.* 17365-17371——Witness did not remonstrate with the Quartermaster-general about the road, as he knew it could not be made, *ib.* 17392-17394. 17444.

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II. *French Roads at Kamiesch:*

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Roberts, Mr. Statement in justification of the appointment by witness of Mr. Roberts as temporary Under Secretary at the War department, *Duke of Newcastle* 15070.

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Rolleston, Mr. Efficiency of this officer, attached to the Commissariat of the First Division, *Bentinck* 1906; *Duke of Cambridge* 4123, 4124.

Testimony by Colonel Lockyer, dated 9th December 1854, and by the Duke of Cambridge, dated 29th December, to the merits of Mr. Rolleston, and his success in provisioning the First Division, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 407.

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Russian Ambulances. See *Ambulances*, 5.

Russian Cavalry Horses. Circumstance of some Russian cavalry horses which came into the English lines having been taken from the Light Brigade and given over to the artillery, for which they were better suited, *Lord Cardigan* 5861–5866.

Good condition of the Russian horses, *Lord Lucan* 6573, 6574——Explanation as to sixty-five Russian horses distributed by witness to the Light Brigade having been subsequently handed over to the artillery, for which they were far less suited, *ib.* 6576.

Russian Prisoners. There were some Russian prisoners at Scutari in December, who were not properly looked after, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7889–7892——Very improper manner in which the Russian prisoners were treated in the hospitals, as also on their being removed thence by the Turks, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9045–9050. 9129–9151——Witness and Mr. Maxwell were the only persons present to superintend the removal of Russian prisoners from Scutari to Kululee, *ib.* 9047. 9138, 9139.

Supply by witness, out of a private fund of his own, of medical comforts to the Russian sick, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne*, 9144. 9151——Want of interpreters for the Russian prisoners in hospital, *ib.* 9146–9149——Proper manner in which the French treated their Russian prisoners, *ib.* 9152–9154——Doubt as to the persons responsible for the manner in which the Russian sick were removed to the hospital, *ib.* 9302–9304.

Care taken by witness in order that the Russian sick and wounded might be properly attended to, *Menzies* 10350–10357——Explanation of the mode of treatment of the Russian prisoners on being removed from the barrack hospital to Kululee, and when in Kululee hospital; denial of Mr. Osborne's statemen hereon, *ib.* 10978–11008——A medical officer was appointed to superintend the removal, *ib.* 10985–10989——Belief as to bedding having been provided for the prisoners when at Kululee, *ib.* 11000–11008.

Conveyance of Russians wounded in the "Avon" from off the Alma to Odessa; accommodation on board, *Ellison* 12758–12764.

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Russian Resources. Statement by Lord Raglan of his inability to obtain information with regard to the strength of Russia in the Crimea, *Duke of Newcastle* 14442——Witness is not aware of certain offers having been made to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe with a view to obtain information concerning Sebastopol, *ib.* 14443–14447——Information supplied by the British Consuls in Russia, &c., relative to the Russian army, *ib.* 15040–15042——Further reference to the want of information respecting the resources of the Crimea and

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the strength of Sebastopol, *Duke of Newcastle* 15251–15268. 15271–15274——No proposal made through Admiral Dundas for obtaining information about Sebastopol, &c., ever came to the knowledge of witness; inaccurate information obtained by Admiral Dundas, *ib.* 15257–15268.

Very rough statements received by witness from the Admiralty and from the Ambassador as to the strength of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20355–20360——Steps taken by witness to procure information respecting Sebastopol and the Russian fleet, &c.; backwardness of Lord de Redcliffe hereon, *ib.* 20361–20385. 20401–20403——Statement with a view to the refutation of evidence by the Duke of Newcastle (*Q.* 15263), as to information by witness in regard to the Russian forces in the Crimea having been extremely inaccurate, *ib.* 20454–20468. 20627——Credible character of the information given to witness with respect to the force in the Crimea, *ib.* 20464. 20468. 20627.

Accurate information obtained by witness in July 1854 with respect to the Crimea, and the strength of the Russian army therein; this proceeded from a person recently there, *Sir J. Graham* 21239, 21240——Difficulty experienced in obtaining information, more especially in the East, in regard to the Russian forces, &c., *Sir J. Graham* 21240; *Lord Aberdeen* 21292. 21352——Information was also obtained by witness in regard to the harbour of Sebastopol and the navigation of the Danube, *Sir J. Graham* 21240——Accurate information received from a person in this country as to the strength of Russia in the Crimea; this person had recently been there, *Lord Aberdeen* 21292. 21352–21356. 21364. 21420, 21421.

Statement by Mr. Filder, and explanation thereon, as to the Russian army having employed 140,000 waggons during its operations in the Principalities, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 430, 431.

Remarks by the Committee upon the very inadequate information as to the resources of Russia in the Crimea upon which the expedition was undertaken, *Fifth Rep. p.* 4, 5. 23.

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Saddles. Approval of the easy hussar saddle, *Lord Cardigan* 5811——Use of the cavalry saddles instead of pack saddles when the horses were doing transport service, *Lord Lucan* 6512. 6513.

Sailing Orders (*Transport Service*). Object of the sailing orders that the stores should be delivered at the proper place, *Milne* 16733——Orders issued on 2d December, *Milne* 16378–16384, and *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 443.

Salt Meat. Salt rations were served out alike to officers and men in December, and were very good in quality, *G. Dundas* 310–314——How far the salt pork used at Varna may have been injurious to health, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 553*–557——The cavalry in the Crimea were fed chiefly upon salt provisions, *Clay* 2798–2800——Illness consequent on the constant use of salt meat, *Duke of Cambridge* 4092. 4096, 4097; *Wilson* 4381–4384——Much greater use of salt meat in the Crimea than in Bulgaria, *Wilson* 4379, 4380——Use of salt provisions chiefly after the 14th of November, *Forrest* 11624.

Supply of salt meat ordered through the Admiralty on the 28th of November, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13786——Supply in store, &c., at Balaklava on 13th November, *ib.* 13798. 13801——Embarrassment occasioned by the transport of salt meat, which would not have occurred if sufficient supplies of live cattle had been imported. *ib.* 14047——Large supply of salt beef and salt pork adverted to as necessary under the circumstances of the army, *Duke of Newcastle* 15297*–15300. 15394–15397——Advantages of fresh meat over salt meat, though advisable to provide a certain supply of the latter, *J. W. Smith* 15836–15843.

Practice of the Admiralty in regard to the supply and examination of salt beef and salt pork, which are not bought by sample, *Grant* 17662–17668. 17921–17934——Nature of the security that the salt meat supplied is of good quality, *ib.* 17669. 17921–17934——Condition made for the repayment of the value of the meat if condemned within twelve months from the date of its receipt, *ib.* 17669——Supply by the Admiralty, up to 1st of May 1855, of 4,700,000 lbs. of salt beef, and 5,000,000 lbs. of salt pork, *ib.* 17674——Engagement to send out monthly 600,000 lbs. of salt meat, *ib.* 17678.

Letter from Colonel Mundy to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 7th September 1854, with regard to the supply of salt pork and salt beef, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 384——Treasury minute on the foregoing, dated 8th September 1854, *ib.*

Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. E. Trevelyan, dated 30th September 1854, giving the preference to salt pork over salt beef as a ration, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 384——

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p. 384——Treasury Minute, dated 20th October 1854, directing a larger supply of salt pork than of salt beef, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 384.

Return of salt beef and salt pork shipped by the Victualling department in the several transports up to 1st May 1855, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 349, 350.

Samsoun. Supplies of forage corn obtained from Samsoun, *J. W. Smith* 15832–15834.

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Sanitary Arrangements. Inexpediency of attaching a sanitary officer to each division of the army, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 702, 703——Necessity of due precautions being taken to prevent sickness at Balaklava when the warm weather sets in, *Vaux* 2346–2353——The sanitary condition of the camp was very unsatisfactory in November, *Layard* 2495——Anticipated unhealthiness of Balaklava when the warm weather sets in, *Parker* 3475–3477——Understanding that measures are being taken to prevent the outbreak of plague from the unburied and putrid dead horses, &c., *ib.* 3478——Sanitary state of the camp of the First Division up to November, *Duke of Cambridge* 4112——The sanitary state of the army was very bad up to the end of January, *Crowe* 4797, 4798.

"*Sanspareil*," *H. M. S.* Explanation as to the slight suffering among the men of the "Sanspareil" in the Naval Brigade, *Dacres* 16228–16242.

Sappers and Miners. The number of sappers and miners attached to the army at Varna was very inadequate, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1800–1802. 1818——Usefulness of the sappers and miners; propriety of increasing the corps, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1819–1821. 1829–1831; *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17453. 17455–17460——Approval of an increase in the corps of sappers and miners rather than the employment of civilians, *Lord Hardinge* 20704–20706.

Summary of sappers embarked for service in the East up to the 8th of February 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 687.

Saw Mills. Reference to the provision made in the Crimea for sawing timber, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17586–17589.

Scots Fusilier Guards. See *Guards Brigade.*

Scots Greys. Especially bad condition of the horses at the camp near Balaklava in December last, *Dundas* 8; *Clay* 2804. 2808. 2819——Conveyance of the Scots Greys to the Bosphorus in the "Himalaya," *Kellock* 5030–5032——Landing subsequently at Katscha of the Scots Greys brought from the Bosphorus, *ib.* 5047. 5051–5053.

Scurvy. Witness did not see any cases of scurvy in December either in the army or on board the "Harbinger," *Vaux* 2338, 2339——Tendency of onions and potatoes to check scurvy, *ib.* 2341–2343——Prevalence of scurvy and other diseases through improper food and overwork, *Parker* 3328–3339——There was some scurvy when witness left in February, through a want of vegetables and of a larger supply of fresh meat, *Sparks* 5308–5311. 5327——Cases of scurvy in the army in October, *Dumbreck* 11352, 11353.

Scutari. Nature of the preparations made at Scutari for the reception of the army there, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 384–386——Great difficulty about the issue of rations, &c. when the army assembled at Scutari, *ib.* 669——Whilst at Scutari there was an ample supply of fresh provisions, but the modes of issue were very irregular, *ib.* 761, 762——Sufficiency of the lodgings and food provided for the troops, *General Bentinck* 1119–1122.

Appropriation of the Scutari barracks for the use of the English army on arrival, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1629–1631——Sufficiency of the Commissariat supplies of food at Scutari and at Gallipoli, *ib.* 1632, 1633——Some contracts for provisions were made at Scutari before the troops arrived there, *ib.* 1704–1710.

Satisfactory condition of the troops when at Scutari, *Duke of Cambridge* 3711–3713. 3717, 3718——They were well supplied with food, *ib.* 3714. 3716——There was much difficulty in the issue of forage, *ib.* 3715——No separate hospital arrangements were made for the army, *ib.* 4067–4070.

Improper state in December of the pier where the sick were landed at Scutari; Mr. Herbert had sent out orders for its repair, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7897–7905. 7955–7958——Considerable delay in the erection of proper wharves at Scutari, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9297, 9298; *Milne* 16906–16913——There should be a separate medical officer to attend to the invaliding and to the general duties of Scutari station, *Forrest* 11914. 11948. 11951.

Delay in landing troops at Scutari from the "Golden Fleece," on account of the roughness of the weather, want of boats, &c., *Stewart* 12289, 12290. 12549–12554.

Explanation as to the preparations made by witness, as head of the Commissariat at Constantinople, for supplying the troops at Scutari, *J. W. Smith* 15598–15613.

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Scutari, Commandant at. Major Sillery first and Lord William Paulet subsequently were the commandants at Scutari, *Macdonald* 7126–7128——Belief as to there being certain

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limits to the power of the commandant over the hospitals, *Maxwell* 13177–13191——Considerable responsibility devolving on the commandant, *Duke of Newcastle* 14646——Importance of influential and energetic persons as commandants at Scutari, *ib.* 14647——Necessity of a military commandant as the supreme authority at the hospitals, *ib.* 14895.——*See* also *Hospitals*, I. 2. v. 3. ii. *Paulet, Lord William.*

Scutari Hospitals. See *Hospitals*, I.

Sea Frock. Alteration in the soldier's sea-frock, or blouse, so that it might be worn by him when marching in hot weather; this frock is issued to every soldier when going from this country, *Lord Hardinge* 20807. 20813–20817.

"*Sea Nymph*," *The.* Witness commanded the "Sea Nymph" paddle steamer, of 703 tons, belonging to the Belfast and Liverpool Company, and taken up by Government, *Tallan* 17029. 17032–17035—— Left England on the 1st August 1854 with provisions for the army, *ib.* 17030, 17031. 17036–17039——Landing of some of the provisions at Varna, and some at Kalamita Bay, *ib.* 17040–17046——Details relative to the subsequent employment of the "Sea Nymph" in the Black Sea up to the 15th March 1855, when she sailed from Constantinople, *ib.* 17047–17139. 17145, 17146——Employment of the "Sea Nymph" in towing the "Bombay" and the "Courier" off the shoals in the Bosphorus, *ib.* 17054–17070——Cargo of charcoal landed by her at Balaklava in the beginning of November, *ib.* 17071–17074——Subsequent visits to Eupatoria, *ib.* 17075–17088——Details relative to a cargo of boots and shoes received on board on 22d August, when at Constantinople, *ib.* 17089–17136.

Sebastopol. See *Russian Resources. Siege Operations.*

Second Division. Much better state of the Second Division than of any other division before Sebastopol, in consequence of the valuable services of Lieutenant-colonel Herbert, of the Quartermaster-general's department, and Mr. Power, of the Commissariat, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 463–469——Great sickness in the division after landing in the Crimea, *ib.* 467. 477. 499, 500——Provision made for the medical department in the Second Division, *ib.* 477, 478. 497, 498.

The division, which numbered 6,200 in Bulgaria, and about 4,500 on landing at Old Fort, and which afterwards received drafts to the amount of 600 or 700, was reduced to about 2,000 after the battle of Inkermann, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 748–758——Distance of the first and second positions occupied by the division from Balaklava and from Kamiesch Bay, *ib.* 782–786——Respects in which the division suffered through the inefficiency of the Commissariat, *ib.* 828–832——The division was visited by the Quartermaster-general, Adjutant-general, and by Lord Raglan, *ib.* 918–920.

Return of rations deficient in the Second Division in the months of November and December 1854; explanation by Mr. Power, A. C. G. thereon, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 416, 417.

Secretary of State for War. See *War Department.*

Secretary-at-War. Witness was Secretary at-War under Lord Aberdeen's administration, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19750–19753——His position as Secretary-at-War was not technically affected by his being a Cabinet Minister, *ib.* 19754——Diminution in the exercise of power by the Secretary-at-War since the separation of the War and Colonial departments, *ib.* 19754, 19755—— Definition of the duties of the Secretary-at-War; they are strictly of a financial character, *ib.* 19756–19768. 19780 *et seq.*

The Secretaryship-at-War still exists, and is held by the Secretary of State for War, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 19763, 19764——Financial nature of the authority exercised by witness over the Medical department, *ib.* 19782–19784. 19788——Official attendance of witness during the recess of 1854, *ib.* 20079——Any communications received by witness from the East were not sufficiently important to be referred to his colleagues, *ib.* 20080–20089——Relations between the Secretary-at-War's department and the Horse Guards, *ib.* 20130——Contemplated preservation of the Secretary-at-War with enlarged financial duties, *ib.* 20161. 20165. 20171.

It is desirable that the Secretary-at-War should be a Cabinet Minister, *Lord Aberdeen* 21417——Expediency of continuing the office of Secretary-at-War, as a means of controlling the expenditure of the army, *ib.* 21418, 21419.

Reference by the Committee to evidence given before the Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure in 1850, as fully explaining the duties of the Secretary-at-War, *Fifth Rep. p.* 7——Manner in which Mr. Herbert performed his duties adverted to by the Committee, *ib.*

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Shakespear, Captain John. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Captain in the Horse Artillery, 4503——Joined his troop at Varna on the 23d of June, and left the Crimea on the 30th of January, 4504–4511——After joining at Varna, removed with his troop to Devno, and subsequently to Yenna Bazaar, 4513–4517. 4570–4573——On embarking for the Crimea

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Crimea the horses were in good condition, 4518, 4519. 4524, 4525——Number of guns, horses, and men in the troop which was under the command of Captain Maude, 4520-4526. 4540——Adequate Commissariat arrangements whilst the troop was in Bulgaria, 4527-4534. 4538, 4539——Sickness and mortality among the men at Yenna Bazaar, 4535-4544. 4574, 4575——Medical staff and supply of medicines, 4545-4561——Transport of the baggage and ammunition, 4562-4566.

Manner in which the horses were embarked at Varna and disembarked at Old Fort, 4576-4582. 4587, 4588——Number of men and horses on landing in the Crimea, 4583-4585——Efficiency of the troop, which was attached to the cavalry division, up to its arrival at Balaklava, 4586. 4590, 4591. 4603-4605——After the battle of Balaklava the command of the troop devolved on witness, 4592, 4593——Actions in which the troop was engaged, 4594-4602——Encampment of the troop without shelter up to December, 4606-4609. 4741-4743——Stabling built for the horses by the direction of witness about the middle of December, 4609-4616.

The men of witness's troop were all hutted by the beginning of February, 4617——Loss of about seventy horses previously to the erection of the stables, 4618-4626——Employment of the horses in bringing up guns and ammunition to the camp adverted to as the cause of their death, 4627-4629. 4644-4652. 4744-4748——Occasional want of forage; practice in supplying it, 4630-4643. 4745——Sickness and deaths among the men, and consequent impairment of their efficiency, 4653-4657——Manner in which the men's rations were supplied, 4658-4660——Dreadful state of the road to Balaklava, to remedy which no steps were taken, 4661-4669.

Character of the provisions supplied to the men under witness, 4670-4676. 4756-4759——Medical staff and supply of medicines at Balaklava, 4677-4680——Extra clothing received by the men of the horse artillery at different periods up to the end of January; sufficiency thereof, 4681, 4682, 4690-4693. 4724, 4725, 4749, 4750——Satisfactory delivery of the clothing by Mr. Young, commissary of the Ordnance, to whom, without reference to Mr. Filder, all Ordnance stores were consigned, 4683-4689. 4721-4723. 4749-4754. 4763-4765. 4769-4771——Comparative light duties of the men of the horse artillery, 4694. 4755. 4760——The men of witness's troop were in tents about the beginning of October, 4695-4701——Good condition of the tents, 4702, 4703. 4708——Reason for the Turkish tents being better able than the English to withstand storms, 4705, 4706.

Character of the supply of clothing for the horses of the troop, 4712-4715——Attention paid to the comfort of the sick in the hospital tents, 4717-4720——Healthy state of witness's troop when at Devno, 4727-4733——Effect of the storm upon the transport service, 4734, 4735——Bad quality of the tools; report by witness at Yenna Bazaar upon their inefficiency, 4736-4740. 4761, 4762. 4778-4781——State of the harness when witness left his troop, 4766-4768——Want of artillery ammunition stores in came and in action, though there were depôts at Balaklava, 4772-4777. 4782.

Shell Foundry, (Woolwich:

1. *Irregular Proceedings of the Clerk of the Ordnance in regard to the Enlargement of the Foundry.*
2. *Justification by Mr. Monsell of the Proceedings in question.*

1. *Irregular Proceedings of the Clerk of the Ordnance in regard to the Enlargement of the Foundry:*

Statement relative to the construction of a shell foundry at Woolwich upon a much larger scale, and at a greater expense, than the building justified by the Minute of the Board, which contemplated a model foundry only, *Sir T. Hastings* 18787-18790. 18819-18822. 18951-18958——Comments on the independent course taken by the Clerk of the Ordnance in the matter, *ib.* 18788-18790. 18819-18822. 18951-18958——Explanation as to witness having eventually sanctioned the construction of the enlarged foundry, *ib.* 18819-18822.

Examination relative to the shell foundry at Woolwich; irregularity of proceeding if the building were commenced before the sanction of the Board was given, *Wood* 20243 *et seq.*

2. *Justification by Mr. Monsell of the Proceedings in question:*

Origin of the erection of the shell foundry, *Monsell* 19258. 19261, 19262. 19271-19274——Grounds upon which witness, in May 1854, sanctioned Captain Boxer, of the Royal Artillery, Fire-master at the Royal Laboratory, to expend the sum of 7,000 *l.* in machinery and improvements for the construction of fusees and the bouching of shells, *ib.* 19258 *et seq.*——Authority of witness to have sanctioned the expenditure in question, *ib.* 19261-19265. 19275-19278. 19295-19300——Sanction afterwards given by Sir Hew Ross and Sir Thomas Hastings to the expenditure, *ib.* 19261. 19266-19270. 19295.

Reliance placed upon Captain Boxer in regard to his estimate of 7,000 *l.*, and the expenditure thereof, *Monsell* 19287-19294, 19301. 19306, 19307——Treasury sanction for the expenditure of the 7,000 *l.*, *ib.* 19302——Minute of the Board, dated 18 December 1854, sanctioning the construction of the shell foundry, *ib.* 19308——Statement of

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Shell Foundry (Woolwich)—continued.

2. *Justification by Mr. Monsell by the Proceedings in question*—continued.

Mr. Anderson, inspector of machinery, to the effect that the dimensions of the foundry were not altered from the original plan, *Monsell* 19308——Evidence to the same purport as Mr. Anderson's statement, the Minute of the 18th December providing only that the cost of the building should not cost more than 10,000 *l.*, *ib.* 19309-19316.

Reference to Captain Collinson's objection to the site of the foundry, as not having been made till the building was erected, *Monsell* 19317. 19323, 19324——Initiatory proceedings in regard to the foundry on the part of the Duke of Newcastle, who sanctioned the expenditure, *ib.* 19322-19328——Authority given to Captain Boxer and Mr. Anderson to purchase the machinery for the foundry; irregularity of this proceeding, *ib.* 19328-19333. 19338-19341. 19348——Reason why Captain Boxer instead of Colonel Wilson, his superior officer in the laboratory, was entrusted with the arrangements for the foundry, *ib.* 19329-19332.

Regularity of the proceedings in regard to the erection of the building being entrusted to Captain Collinson, *Monsell* 19333-19337. 19348, 19349——The greater portion of the 10,000 *l.* was spent in machinery, *ib.* 19340, 19341——Official authority first given in February last for the expenditure, *ib.* 19342, 19343——Sanction of the Duke of Newcastle given previously, though not formally, in December to the expenditure in question, *ib.* 19343, 19344——Objection on the part of Sir Thomas Hastings only, as member of the Board, to the proceedings connected with the foundry, *ib.* 19345-19347.

Correction of former statement as to witness having individually, in May 1854, sanctioned Captain Boxer to expend 7,000 *l.* on laboratory machinery; sanction of the Board collectively on this point, *Monsell* 19411-19414. 19430. 19452——Reference to the Minute of the Board upon which a letter was written approving of the purchase of the machinery purchased by Captain Boxer, *ib.* 19414-19429——Concurrence of Sir T. Hastings in a Minute, dated 11 May 1854, in the arrangements for the establishment of the factory, *ib.* 19429——Nature of the security that the 7,000 *l.* were fairly and judiciously expended by Captain Boxer; settlement of the account explained, *ib.* 19430 19447. 19453.

Witness delivers in an extract from the Minutes of the Board of Ordnance, dated 2 May 1854, showing the authority given to Captain Boxer in regard to the factory erected by him, *Monsell* 19749.

Shells. Good quality but insufficient quantity of shells before the erection of the foundry at Woolwich, *Monsell* 19298-19300——Insufficient store of shells at the commencement of the war, *ib.* 19614. 19626.

Shirts. Great want of shirts for a time in the hospital at Scutari, many of the kits having been lost or mislaid, *Dr. A. Smith* 8828-8830——Supply of shirts out of the "Times" Fund, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9186——Occasional want of shirts, and filthy state frequently of those worn by the patients, *Menzies* 9804-9809——Difficulty in procuring shirts at Constantinople, *ib.* 9811-9813——Consideration of the want of shirts in the hospitals; witness reported on the subject, but made no suggestion for immediate adoption, *Maxwell* 13134-13144. 13154-13157.——*See* also *Hospitals*, I. 4. iii.

Shoes. See *Boots and Shoes.*

Shovels. With reference to the army tools, the shovels were especially bad, *Dawson* 5572.

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Sick and Wounded:

1. *Arrangements for their Removal and Care after the Battle of the Alma; how far inadequate.*
2. *Removal from the Camp to Balaklava.*
3. *Want of Accommodation during the Transport from Balaklava to Scutari, &c.*
4. *Official Returns relative to the Casualties during Transport from the Crimea; their Inaccuracy.*
5. *Defective Arrangements at Scutari for the Landing and Removal to the Hospitals.*
6. *Parties responsible for the deficiency of the Arrangements generally.*
7. *Accommodation on board the "Himalaya."*
8. *Total Number conveyed from the Crimea.*
9. *Accommodation on Arrival at Portsmouth.*
10. *Special Transport Ships recommended by Dr. A. Smith.*
11. *Representations and Suggestions by Mr. S. G. Osborne.*
12. *Explanation on the part of the Home Authorities and of Admiral Boxer.*

1. *Arrangements for their Removal and Care after the Battle of the Alma; how far inadequate:*

Nature of the medical attendance on the wounded English; assistance afforded by the navy surgeons, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 434-438; *Dacres* 16061, 16062. 16332-16341——

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SICK AND WOUNDED—continued.

1. *Arrangements for their Removal and Care, &c.*—continued.

Means taken for the care of the wounded after the battle of Alma; how far inadequate, *Bentinck* 1177–1181; *Duke of Cambridge* 3786–3792; *Wilson* 4360, 4361; *Dawson* 5452–5459. 5520–5523——Difficulty in removing the sick to the ships, *Flower* 10038——Greater facilities and less delay in bringing down the wounded of the French than of the English army, *Flower* 10042–10050; *Dacres* 16048–16051. 16074–16078——Care of the wounded further adverted to; delay before they were all removed from the field, *Flower* 10203–10205. 10239–10249——By the night of the 22d of September all the wounded were removed from the field, *ib.* 10246–10248.

Denial that after the battle of the Alma several of the wounded were not attended to for some days, *Menzies* 11196–11205——Sufficiency of the medicines and surgical appliances after the battle, *Dumbreck* 11334, 11335——There was no want of medical stores for the Third Division, *Forrest* 11622——Inquiry called for by witness, through Dr. Smith, with respect to alleged cases of abuse in the conveyance of the wounded after the battle of the Alma, *Duke of Newcastle* 14813.

The conveyance of the sick and wounded to the ships after the battle of the Alma was superintended by witness, *Dacres* 16034——Assistance given by the navy in conveying the sick and wounded adverted to, in connexion with the deficient means of conveyance possessed by the army, *ib.* 16035–16060. 16071–16073——Care taken in placing the sick and wounded on board, *ib.* 16063, 16064——Belief that there was no special hospital ship for the wounded, *ib.* 16065. 16070.

Letter from a surgeon of the fleet to witness, describing the manner in which the wounded were provided for, and showing the great assistance given by the navy medical officers, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20577.

Letters from Dr. David Deas, of Her Majesty's ship "Queen," relative to the wounded after the battle of the Alma, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 708–712.

2. *Removal from the Camp to Balaklava:*

Particulars as to the means of conveyance in December of the sick from the camp to Balaklava, *G. Dundas* 227–246——Dependence partly upon the French for the conveyance of the English sick to Balaklava, *G. Dundas* 227; *Parker* 3351–3359; *Lord Lucan* 6602——The sick of the army were removed from the camp in the common ambulances and in arabas, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 479–481——Strong impression as to the inadequacy of the provision for the transport of the sick and wounded when the army landed in the Crimea, *ib.* 610——Means at different periods of conveying the sick from the camp to Balaklava, *Duke of Cambridge* 4206–4211.

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3. *Want of Accommodation during the Transport from Balaklava to Scutari, &c.:*

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3. *Want of Accommodation during the Transport, &c.*—continued.

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Satisfactory condition in which, whilst witness was at Scutari in January, the sick were conveyed thither from the Crimea, *Forrest* 11830–11833——Very inefficient orderlies for the wounded on board the "Mauritius;" services of ten of the crew in consequence, *Stewart* 12406–12409. 12446-12448—— Practice as to sending the things belonging to the sick men, with a list of the same, whenever the sick were removed from the camp to Balaklava, and thence to Scutari, *Hersford* 13353–13360.

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Mismanagement and delay in regard to the provision of proper vessels for the transport of the sick and wounded adverted to by the Committee, *Fifth Rep. p.* 11.

4. *Official Returns relative to the Casualties during Transport from the Crimea; their Inaccuracy:*

Inaccuracy of an official return relative to the vessels which arrived at Scutari with sick and wounded between the 18th of September and the 19th of November, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9038-9040. 9192-9199

Reference to the returns of the deaths, as including only those who died from the day of sailing to the day of arrival, *Dr. A. Smith* 9537-9541——Information was generally supplied to witness as to the state of the sick and wounded, and the casualties on the passage; verbal statements only were sometimes made to witness, *Menzies* 9931-9934. 11258-11270—— Examination upon a return, partly made by witness, showing the number of casualties on board the transports conveying the sick and wounded from the Crimea, between the date of the embarkation and of the arrival off Scutari; such return was correctly compiled from information afforded by the medical officers in charge, *ib.* 9940–9969.

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5. *Defective Arrangements at Scutari for the Landing and Removal to the Hospitals:*

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6. *Parties responsible for the Deficiency of the Arrangements generally:*

All applications for bedding, &c., for the sick, when in the transports at Constantinople, were made to Admiral Boxer, *Macdonald* 7139-7141——Authorities with whom rested the supply of food and medical comforts to the sick in the transports before landing at Constantinople, *ib.* 7142-7145——Difficulty in finding any persons responsible for the treatment of the sick and wounded generally, *Stafford* 7650-7652——Suggestion for ascertaining the party responsible for the care of the sick before they were landed, and for the conduct of the landing, *ib.* 7737. 7875—— Importance of ascertaining whether any regulations were in force which prevented the doctors in the transports or the hospitals from procuring whatever articles, and whatever quantities thereof, they might think proper, *ib.* 7855-7857——Regimental officers always accompanied the sick during the transport from the Crimea or from Scutari, *ib.* 7869.

Reference to a general order by Lord Raglan censuring the medical officers with respect to the embarkation of the sick, *Dr. A. Smith* 8392-8394——Duty of the medical officers and the local military authority to see that the vessels for transporting the sick were in a proper state, *ib.* 8655——Responsibility of the principal medical officers in the Crimea for the mode of transport of the sick, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9296——Different parties responsible for the provision of proper accommodation for the sick on the home voyage, in regard to clothing, bedding, &c., *Menzies* 11051-11061.

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7. *Accommodation on board the "Himalaya":*

Character of the accommodation and medical provision, &c., for the sick conveyed in the "Himalaya" from Constantinople to Malta (where witness left her), and from Malta to England, *Kellock* 5232-5239. 5251-5266——Every care was always taken of the sick during witness's command of the vessel, *ib.* 5236-5239——The arrangements were perfectly adequate as far as Malta, *ib.*——Great number of sick embarked at Malta; doubt as to the adequacy of the accommodation thence to England, *ib.* 5253-5266.

8. *Total Number conveyed from the Crimea:*

Return to this country up to the present time (22d March 1855) of nearly 2,000 wounded from the Crimea, *Dr. A. Smith* 8815——Removal of 13,800 of the British army from the Crimea as sick or wounded between the 30th September and the 17th February adverted to, in explanation of the inefficiency of the available means of transport, *Sir J. Graham* 21179.

9. *Accommodation on arrival at Portsmouth:*

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10. *Special Transport Ships recommended by Dr. A. Smith:*

Letter, dated 11th May 1854, from witness to the Military Secretary advocating a liberal supply of ships specially adapted for the transport of the sick and wounded, and for the purpose of hospital hulks; frequent representations by witness on these points, *Dr. A. Smith* 8271-8276——The letter referred to was not answered, *ib.* 8272——Orders sent out in November for the fitting up of four vessels specially for the transport of the sick, *ib.* 8662, 8663.

11. *Representations and Suggestions by Mr. S. G. Osborne:*

Letter from witness to Lord Stratford, laying before him the want of accommodation, &c., on board the hospital ships, and also representing strongly the neglect and sufferings of the sick and wounded on the passage from Balaklava to Scutari, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9028, 9029——Letter in reply from Lord Stratford, stating that he had written to Admiral Boxer and Lord Raglan on the matters complained of, *ib.* 9030——Further letter from witness to Lord Stratford, pressing upon him the necessity of immediate improvement in the transport of the sick and wounded, *ib.*

Letter on the 10th of December from witness to the Duke of Newcastle relative to the sufferings of the sick and wounded on the passage from Balaklava, and to the deficiencies and abuses of the hospital system at Scutari, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9055-9059——Remedial measures suggested in the foregoing letter with respect to the transport of the sick and wounded, *ib.* 9055——Recommendation by witness, in December, that two or three steamers should be fitted up as floating hospitals, and should be devoted to the transport of the sick and wounded from Balaklava to Scutari, *ib.* 9059.

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11. *Representations and Suggestions by Mr. S. G. Osborne*—continued.

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12. *Explanation on the part of the Home Authorities and of Admiral Boxer:*

Dr. Smith's recommendation for special transport ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded was not in the first instance made to witness, *Duke of Newcastle* 14816-14819——Delay in the fulfilment of instructions sent out after the battle of the Alma to Admiral Dundas for the appropriation of vessels to the conveyance of the sick and wounded, *ib.* 14820-14826.

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Explanation relative to Dr. A. Smith's letter not having been immediately acted upon by the home authorities, *Right Hon. S. Herbert* 20003, 20004; *Lord Hardinge* 20800-20803. 20819-20826; *Sir J. Graham* 21126. 21158——Reasons for not having specially fitted up vessels as transports for the sick and wounded; non-responsibility of witness hereon; no application was made to him on the subject, *Vice-Admiral Dundas* 20578-20597. 20599-20602——Representations made by witness in February last in regard to hospital ships for the purpose of bringing all the sick to England, *Mapleton* 20970-20984——Letter from the Admiralty to Admiral Dundas on 28th December 1854, relative to transport vessels for conveying the sick and wounded from the Crimea, *Sir J. Graham* 21127——Reference in the foregoing to a private letter on the same subject from witness to Admiral Dundas on 25th October; this letter read, *ib.* 21127. 21136-21138.

Statement by Rear-Admiral Boxer, dated 27 January 1855, with regard to the measures taken by him for the landing of the sick at Scutari, and the satisfaction given thereby, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 445.

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Sick and Wounded Fund. See *"Times" Fund.*

Sickness and Mortality. Great mortality in the army during witness's visit to the camp in December, *G. Dundas* 220——Prevailing diseases in December, *ib.* 221——Unhealthy condition of the army during the period of its being without tents, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 731-736——Sickly state of the troops in November, *Parker* 3282; *Crowe* 4866; *Lord Cardigan* 5730——Extent to which sickness and mortality may have arisen from improper food, as well as from overwork, and from the prevalence of cholera, *Duke of Cambridge* 4091-4099.

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Returns of deaths in Lord Raglan's army from the date of landing in Turkey to 6th of September 1854, and from 7th of September 1854 to 15th of February 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 688.

Returns showing the number of officers and men in each of the hospitals on certain days in February 1855, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 689.

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1. *Doubts as to Stores having been duly forwarded or duly delivered.*
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3. *Practice in regard to Shipment, &c.*
4. *Naval Stores.*
5. *Return to England of some Stores transmitted thence.*
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"*Talbot*," *The.* Statement relative to Mr. Monsell having, without the authority of the Board, ordered the "Talbot" to be brought from Chatham to Woolwich as a store depôt for the Royal Arsenal; steps taken by witness, upon which the unnecessary expense of fitting up this vessel as a store was prevented, *Sir T. Hastings* 19009-19018.

Tallan, Captain George Harris. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Commanded the "Sea Nymph" paddle steamer, of 703 tons, belonging to the Belfast and Liverpool Company, and taken up by Government, 17029. 17032-17035——Left England on the 1st of August 1854, with provisions for the army, 17030, 17031. 17036-17039——Landing of some of the provisions at Varna, and of some at Kalamita Bay, 17040-17046——Details relative to the subsequent employment of the "Sea Nymph" in the Black Sea, up to the 15th of March 1855, when she sailed from Constantinople, 17047-17139. 17145, 17146——Slowness of the coaling process at Constantinople, 17140, 17141——Uncomfortable state of the sick and wounded on board the transport vessels from Balaklava, 17142-17144.

"*Tamar*," *The.* Delay in the landing of the sick from this vessel at Scutari, *Hon. J. W. Percy* 7906. 7949.

Tartars. Reference to some Crim Tartar peasants shut up at Constantinople with the Russian prisoners; they were released in consequence of an application by witness to the Secretary-at-War, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9130-9133——Detention of some Tartars as prisoners adverted to, *Duke of Newcastle* 15056, 15057.

Tatham, Captain, R. N. Previously to witness's command in Balaklava Harbour, on 26th October, Captain Tatham was in charge in the "Simoom," *Dacres* 16086, 16087.

Taylor, Dr. Promotion of Dr. Taylor for merit, *Dr. A. Smith* 9630——Appointment of Dr. Taylor, as being a very able officer, to take charge of the Russian prisoners, *Menzies* 10352, 10353.

Tea. Non-distribution of tea to the men, as it might have been spoiled by the wet, *Bentinck* 1313-1315——Great want of tea in the army in December, *Parker* 3333-3336——Slight extent to which tea was supplied, though it was a very popular and wholesome ration, *Wilson* 4274-4278——The men much preferred tea to coffee, but did not have any in the Crimea, *Dawson* 5415. 5466. 5475, 5476.

Want of tea in the hospitals at Scutari, *Macdonald* 6090-6092——Ample supply of tea to the Third Division at Varna, *Forrest* 11854-11859——Supply of tea for the sick in the Crimea, *ib.* 11874. 11924——Constant supply of tea for the sick in the Third Division, *ib.* 11874.

There has not been any complaint in regard to the quality of the tea either for the army or navy, *Grant* 17939——Check upon fraud in regard to the tea as supplied to the Admiralty, *ib.* 17940, 17941.

See also "*Courier*," *The.*

TENTS:

1. *Inadequacy generally of the Bell Tents.*
2. *Want of Tents after landing at Old Fort, and on the Flank March; consequent Inconvenience.*
3. *Approval of the Quality of the Tents.*
4. *Merits of the French Tente d'Abri.*
5. *Supply by the Ordnance explained.*
6. *Approval of Double Tents, with Plank Flooring.*

1. *Inadequacy generally of the Bell Tents:*

Insufficient protection afforded by the tents, *G. Dundas* 25; *Sparks* 5349, 5350——Description of tent used by the officers, *G. Dundas* 165-168——Indifferent character of the tents, some of which had been used in the Peninsular war, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 624, 625. 940-943; *Layard* 2531-2533——Confusion produced in the camp by the storm of the 14th of November, which blew down nearly all the English tents, though the Turkish tents, being better pitched, were not blown down, *Layard* 2482-2489——The tents were pitched so closely as to be injurious to health, *ib.* 2495. 2681, 2682.

Superiority of the Turkish tents to those of the English, *Parker* 3324-3327——Better character of the marquee than of the bell tents, *ib.* 3433-3437. 3494, 3495——Reason for the Turkish tents being better able than the English to withstand storms, *Shakespear* 4705, 4706——Quantity of mud in the tents about the end of January, *Crowe* 4796——Sufferings of witness and of all the sick in the tents during the storm of the 14th of November, *Flower* 10162-10165——Bad quality of the tents at Varna and in the Crimea, *Dumbreck* 11311. 11318-11324. 11568. 11572-11575. 11601-11604.

Reports, 1855—*continued.*

TENTS—continued.

1. *Inadequacy generally of the Bell Tents*—continued.

Defective state of the bell tents; effect thereof upon the health of the men, *Forrest* 11625-11629. 11633-11635. 11805-11814. 11845——Explanation as to witness not having formally represented the state of the tents, *ib.* 11628-11637——Issue of the tents of the Third Division; they came out of store at Malta, *ib.* 11834-11839——The Naval Brigade were all in tents, some of which were very indifferent, *Hillyar* 17181, 17182. 17186-17188. 17198.

2. *Want of Tents after landing at Old Fort, and on the Flank March; consequent Inconvenience:*

The tents were not landed on the day of disembarkation at Old Fort, but were subsequently landed, and used till the march from Old Fort for the Alma, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 419-425. 773, 774——From the 18th to the 29th of September the army were without tents, *ib.* 432, 433——From the 29th of September till witness left the army, the troops lived in tents and suffered much, the weather occasionally being very severe, *ib.* 439-443 452, 453——Circumstance of the French officers having been enabled to pitch their tents the first night on landing in the Crimea, whereas there was hardly a tent in the whole English army, save one landed for witness by his staff, *ib.* 572-578——The tents were not generally in use till about the 2d of October, *ib.* 623.

The carriage of the tents from Old Fort would have greatly embarrassed the army, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 811-876; *Bentinck* 1305-1308——Explanation as to the tents not having been landed till a day or two before the departure of the army from Old Fort, *Bentinck* 1159-1170——Belief that being without tents for about fourteen days after the battle of Alma was not productive of sickness, *ib.* 1218-1221——Propriety of taking the tents from Old Fort to Balaklava if there had been sufficient transport; intention of Lord Raglan to have done so, *ib.* 2023-2025.

Circumstance of the army having been without tents for a day or two after the landing, and throughout the march from Old Fort to Balaklava; consequent suffering, *Duke of Cambridge* 3776-3785. 4118-4120——Cavalry tents were not landed at Old Fort, *Lord Cardigan* 5700-5703——The men in witness's troop of horse artillery were in tents about the beginning of October, *Shakespear* 4695-4701——One bell tent only was taken with witness's regiment on the landing in the Crimea; there were no other tents for about three weeks, *Flower* 10003-10006. 10051-10054.

3. *Approval of the Quality of the Tents:*

Opinion that the tents were mostly very good, *Bentinck* 1293-1296; *Duke of Cambridge* 3945. 4110; *Shakespear* 4702, 4073. 4708——Adequacy and good quality of the tents, both at Scutari and Varna, *Bentinck* 1878-1883——The tents of the Light Cavalry Brigade were not in any way defective, *Lord Cardigan* 5945-5948——Good character of tents of the 63d Regiment in the Crimea, *Bamford* 12051-12053.

4. *Merits of the French Tente d'Abri:*

Respects in which witness approves of the *tente d'abri*, as used by the French, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 633-635. 846——Objection to the small French tents being carried by the English soldiers, *Bentinck* 1297-1304——Advantage if the English soldier could carry a small tent like the *tente d'abri*, *Wilson* 4342, 4343. 4346, 4347——Use of the *tentes d'abri* in the French army at the end of January, *Crowe* 4916, 4917——Approval by the men of the light tents of the French, *Dawson* 5441, 5442. 5507, 5508——Relative merits of the French and English tents, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 847.

5. *Supply by the Ordnance explained:*

Stores of tents provided at home, as well as at Malta, in the colonies, &c., by the regulations of 1844, *Sir T. Hastings* 18343-18346. 18351-18353——Responsibility of the several storekeepers in regard to the quality of the tents, inasmuch as it is their duty yearly to make a report upon the state of their stores, *ib.* 18347, 18348. 18356, 18357——Belief as to the fitness of the tents sent out with the first 10,000 men, *ib.* 18349——Tents were taken from Malta by those regiments only serving there, *ib.* 18354, 18355.

Return of the number of tents issued for service of the army in the East, from the commencement of the war to the 31st March 1855, specifying the description of tent, the store from which issued, and where made, and whether they had been previously used, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 480.

6. *Approval of Double Tents, with Plank Flooring:*

Opinion that tents of double canvas would have been preferable to the huts, *Sir J. M. Smith* 19693-19695. 19710, 19711——Probability of double tents, with plank flooring, having answered instead of huts, *Lord Hardinge* 20914——Advantage if the double-roofed tents had been sent out, the single tents being utterly inadequate; representation was made by witness hereon, *Mapleton* 20990-21002.

Opinion

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TENTS—continued.

6. *Approval of Double Tents, with Plank Flooring*—continued.

Opinion expressed by the Committee that much sickness and suffering would have been prevented, if in lieu of huts, canvas had been sent out for doubling the tents, and planks for flooring, *Fifth Rep. p.* 9.

See also *Field Hospitals*, 1. 2.

"*Thames,*" *The.* Arrangements made for the transport of sick from Balaklava in the "Thames" transport, in which vessel witness left the Crimea, *Hon. A. Ponsonby*, 1094–1100.

Therapia Naval Hospital. Excellent manner in which the men were cared for at the naval hospital at Therapia, which contained about 250 patients, chiefly wounded, and sailors, *Macdonald* 7332–7342——Very satisfactory state of the hospital when visited by witness, *Stafford* 7610–7612. 7829——Admirable manner in which the hospital has worked, *Sir J. Graham* 21159, 21160.

Letter, dated 9 November 1854, from Dr. J. Davidson, relative to the wants of the temporary hospital, Therapia, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 718, 719——Other letters from Dr. Davidson, relative to hospital accommodation, and the treatment of the sick, &c., *ib.* 720–722. 725.

Return of the deaths in the hospital between the 1st February 1855 and the 1st March, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 724.

Suggestions by Rear-Admiral Boxer, dated 27 January 1855, with regard to the conduct of the hospital, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 445.

See also *Rees, Dr.*

Third Division. The Third Division was very healthy in the Crimea, *Forrest* 11731——Supply of medicines and medical comforts taken by witness, as divisional officer, to the Crimea, *ib.* 11875–11879. 11915.

Statement by Dr. David Deas, on 8th January 1855, and refutation thereof, with respect to the supply of rations to the division, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 719, 720.

Total deficiencies in the issue of rations to the division from 1st December 1854 to 26th January 1855, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 418——Statement of rations issued from 1st to 18th December 1854, showing all deficiencies; remarks in explanation, *ib.* 418. 427——Statement of rations issued from the 1st to the 19th December 1854, *ib.* 419.

Statement of rations issued to the division from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855, showing all deficiencies, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 419. 428——Statement of deficiencies in the issue of provisions from 19th December 1854 to 8th January 1855, as taken from the morning states, with Commissariat remarks as to the cause, *ib.* 420——Statement of rations issued from 9th to 24th January 1855, *ib.* 421. 428——Statement of rations issued from the 9th to 26th January 1855, *ib.* 422.

Total deficiencies in the issue of rations to the division from the 1st December 1854 to the 26th January 1855,—fifty-seven days, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 429.

Tice, Dr. Responsibility of Dr. Tice, under witness, and subsequently under Dr. Hall, for the hospitals at Balaklava, and for the embarkation of the sick and wounded, *Dumbreck* 11488–11497. 11501. 11513.

Tidewaiters. Transmission of some tidewaiters to the East at the suggestion of witness, *Dr. A. Smith* 8615–8620.

Tiflis. Suggestion, in witness's despatch of 29th June 1854, for a combined movement against the Russian army in and around Tiflis in the event of the expedition to the Crimea being delayed, *Duke of Newcastle* 14422.

"*Timandra,*" *The.* Communication from Assistant-surgeons E. Pearce and H. H. Smith, relative to the sick and wounded on board this vessel, *App.* (*Second Rep.*) *p.* 710–712.

"*TIMES*" *FUND:*

1. *Origin of the Sick and Wounded Fund.*
2. *Opinion expressed by the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith that the Fund would be found superfluous.*
3. *General Proceedings of the Administrator.*
4. *Different Modes of Application.*
5. *Sundry Wants at Scutari remedied through means of the Fund.*
6. *Mode of Distribution in the Crimea.*
7. *Distribution of the Fund declined by Mr. S. G. Osborne.*

1. *Origin of the Sick and Wounded Fund:*

The sick and wounded fund was the result of an appeal to the public by the "Times" newspaper for means wherewith to relieve the wants said to exist in the Scutari hospitals, *Macdonald* 6986–6988.

"*Times*" *Fund*—continued.

2. *Opinion expressed by the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith that the Fund would be found superfluous:*

Before leaving England, witness, as administrator of the fund, had communication with the Duke of Newcastle and Dr. Andrew Smith, who did not anticipate any benefit from the distribution of the fund, *Macdonald* 6010-6013——Dr. Smith seemed confident that any deficiency of supplies had long since been remedied, *ib.* 6013——Statement by the Duke of Newcastle that the fund would be useless, as the Ambassador at Constantinople had full power to supply all hospital wants whatsoever, *ib.* 7364, 7365. 7411.

Grounds for the opinion expressed by witness to Mr. Macdonald, that adequate means had been taken to provide all things necessary for the wants of the sick, and that the "Times" Fund would not be of any use to them, *Dr. A. Smith* 8182-8188——Advice given by witness to Mr. Macdonald relative to the fund, *ib.* 8186——Impression made upon witness by the distribution of the fund, *ib.* 8368.

Explanation of the interview between Mr. Macdonald and witness, to the effect that though witness expressed his opinion that the "Times" Fund would be useless, he did not dissuade Mr. Macdonald from his mission, *Duke of Newcastle* 14828, 14829.

3. *General Proceedings of the Administrator:*

Witness arrived at Scutari on the 6th November, *Macdonald* 6005 6007——Went from Scutari to the Crimea on the 1st of February, and returned thence on the 9th, *ib.* 6008, 6009. 6152-6154——After arriving in the Crimea witness twice visited the camp, *ib.* 6155, 6156——Object of his visit to the Crimea, *ib.* 6157, 6158.

Explanation as to witness not having remonstrated against abuses at Scutari, *Macdonald* 7050, 7051. 7087——Mode of proceeding adopted by witness in the outlay and application of the fund, which he distributed in three different directions, *ib.* 7151-7153. 7218-7231——No forms or vouchers were ever required, *ib.* 7152, 7153.

Witness visited the hospitals almost daily, *Macdonald* 7235, 7236——Passage of witness to the East by the ordinary conveyances, *ib.* 7361-7363——On arriving at Constantinople he called at once on Lord Stratford for advice, *ib.* 7366, 7367——Limitation of his mission to the administration of the fund, *ib.* 7408.

4. *Different Modes of Application:*

The fund was applied to the hospitals at Scutari, &c., to the transports going home with convalescents, and to the wants most felt in the Crimea, *Macdonald* 7157. 7218-7231.

5. *Sundry Wants at Scutari remedied through means of the Fund:*

Numerous medical comforts and necessary articles supplied through means of the "Sick and Wounded Fund;" summary of the same delivered in, *Macdonald* 6093-6095. 6148-6151——List of articles of diet supplied, *ib.* 6150——List of articles of clothing, &c. supplied, *ib.*——List of hospital appliances supplied, *ib.*

Probable result if the deficiencies at the hospitals had not been so largely supplied through the instrumentality of witness, *Macdonald* 6255, 6256——Considerable extent to which those wants of the army which gave rise to the fund still existed when witness arrived at Scutari, *ib.* 6989, 6990——Much better opportunities of the Government than of the agent of the "Times" for supplying the wants of the sick and wounded, *ib.* 6991-6993.

The medical men never stated that they were at all dependent upon the "Times" Fund for medical comforts, *Dr. A. Smith* 8367—— Distinction between medical comforts, as supplied through the fund, and medicines and surgical appliances, *ib.* 8457-8461.

Miscellaneous wants supplied at the request of Miss Nightingale through the "Times" Fund, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9009-9015——Purveying by Miss Nightingale, in December, of the medical comforts through means of the fund, *ib.* 9055. 9066. 9079——Demand on the "Times" Fund consequent on the loss of the "Prince," *ib.* 9080-9083. 9338-9344. 9350——Further reference to the demand on the "Times" Fund for port wine, &c., *ib.* 9338-9344, 9350.

Extent to which the patients were rendered more comfortable through the "Times" Fund, *Menzies* 10779. 10785-10793——Impression as to Mr. Macdonald having had only one interview with witness, who may have said that nothing was wanted, *ib.* 10780-10784. 10793-10795——Belief that the patients might have been made comfortable without the assistance of the "Times" supplies, *ib.* 10790-10792——Usefulness of the fund adverted to, *Duke of Newcastle* 14831, 14832. 14862-14865.

Statement by the Committee that the assistance, which had been discouraged as superfluous, was eventually found to be essential for the lives of the patients, *Fifth Rep. p.* 21, 22.

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"*Times*" *Fund*—continued.

6. *Mode of Distribution in the Crimea:*

The large quantities of things sent by witness to the Crimea were distributed at the direction of the medical officers of each regiment, *Macdonald* 7218-7225——Transmission of supplies for the Crimea without impediment at Constantinople or Balaklava, *ib.* 7400-7402.

7. *Distribution of the Fund declined by Mr. S. G. Osborne:*

Reason why witness declined the distribution of the "Times" Fund, *Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne* 9097.

See also *Beds and Bedding*, 1. *"Cambria," The. Castor Oil. Clothing*, IV. *Constantinople. Hayward, Rev. Mr. Hospitals*, I. 4. ii. iii. 6. 12. *Port Wine. Press, The. Shirts. Sugar. Welsh Flannel.*

"*Tonning," The.* Detention of this steamer at Constantinople adverted to, *Sir C. E. Trevelyan* 13872. 13876——The first vessel sent from the Crimea for cattle was the "Tonning," shortly after the 14th of November; statement as to a delay of twenty-one days in the execution of repairs, &c. before the return of the vessel from Constantinople, *J. W. Smith* 15688-15696. 15889.

Arrangement as to monthly rate of payment upon which the "Tonning" was taken up, in February 1854, *Milne* 16373-16375. 16671, 16672. 16679.

Tools:

1. *Complaints in regard to their Quality.*
2. *Official Explanations on the Subject.*

1. *Complaints in regard to their Quality:*

Inefficiency of the tools used in the Crimea, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 821-823. 937—— Some of the tools at Varna, &c. were of a useful kind, but the bill-hooks and the tools served out to the pioneers were very defective, *Hon. G. Wrottesley* 1785-1789. 1832-1836 ——Very inferior quality of the intrenching tools, &c., they were condemned by a Board at Scutari, and were precisely the same as those used at Chobham, where witness made an official complaint against them, *Bentinck* 1944-1954. 2049, 2050.

Uselessness of some of the tools supplied by the Ordnance department, though complained of at Chobham and Scutari, *Duke of Cambridge* 4113-4116. 4186-4189—— Bad quality of the tools; report by witness at Yenna Bazaar upon their inefficiency, *Shakespear* 4736-4740. 4761, 4762. 4778-4781——Complaint of the quality of the tools used by the men in the trenches, *Dawson* 5562-5572.

Complaints recently received from the Cape as to the quality of intrenching tools, *Sir T. Hastings* 18987-18993. 19169.

Remarks by the Committee upon the inferior quality of the tools, and the parties responsible for the same, *Fifth Rep. p.* 9——Great importance of the tools being the very best articles that can be provided, *ib.* 10.

2. *Official Explanations on the Subject:*

Steps taken by witness to remedy the defects of the intrenching tools; explanation by the Board of Ordnance as to the inferior description of those first sent out, *Duke of Newcastle* 15071.

No complaints were made to witness, when with the army, of the tools, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17253. 17271-17274——Large quantity of tools sent out, *ib.* 17254——Quality of the tools considered; opinion that the extent of complaint hereon is not just, *ib.* 17255-17270. 17482-17487. 17508——Responsibility of the storekeeper at Malta for the quality of those sent thence to the Crimea, *ib.* 17255. 17268. 17269. 17510, 17511.

Mode of supply of the several tools for the army, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 17488-17490—— Definition of pioneer's tools, *ib.* 17491-17493——Provision of the tools in the first instance by contract, *ib.* 17494-17498——Practice in regard to the receipt of the tools in store and to their subsequent examination, *ib.* 17499-17509.

Written opinion of the Inspector-general of Fortifications as to the inferior description of the tools, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 327——Approval by Sir J. Burgoyne of the system of contracts by the Ordnance, *ib.*

Statement of the several tools required to be supplied to each regiment of infantry, *Sir T. Hastings* 18465, 18466——Considerable portion of regimental tools supplied by the colonels, with regard to the quality of which tools the Ordnance is not in any respect responsible, *ib.* 18465. 18503. 18540-18549——Supply of regimental tools by the Ordnance; they are procured from the depôts, *ib.* 18465, 18466. 18469-18471——Supply of the intrenching tools through the Inspector-general of Fortifications, *ib.* 18468.

Steps taken by the Board of Ordnance in 1827, 1844, and subsequently, with a view to obtaining uniform patterns for tools, and to the introduction of modern improvements and inventions, *Sir T. Hastings* 18472-18484. 18527-18529——Persons responsible for

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Tools—2. *Official Explanations on the Subject*—continued.

the patterns, *Sir T. Hastings* 18473-18477. 18527, 18528. 18540——Check upon the quality of the iron used; tests applied, *ib.* 18484. 18497, 18498. 18521, 18522.

Nature of the annual survey of the tools in store, *Sir T. Hastings* 18485-18487——Belief that unserviceable tools cannot pass the inspection of the Ordnance viewers, *ib.* 18488-18498——Consideration of statements made to the Committee that the tools used in the East were of an inferior description; conclusion, nevertheless, that the tools issued by the Ordnance were generally good, *ib.* 18490-18528. 18549——Reference to reports made at Chobham, Varna, &c. upon the tools, in which they are to a considerable extent described as inferior, *ib.* 18508-18514. 18522-18527.

Names of the contractors for the several tools supplied to the Ordnance, *Sir T. Hastings* 18519-18521. 18529——Strictness of the Ordnance test, *ib.* 18521, 18522——Absence of complaints againt the intrenching tools previously to the expedition to the East, *ib.* 18530-18533*——Many of the tools supplied by the colonels are intended merely for show by the pioneers, *ib.* 18545, 18546. 18549——Approval of the present system of contract by the Ordnance, *ib.* 18549.

Statement by the Ordnance department as to the complaints received against the intrenching tools, and the means taken to rectify the same, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 325, 326.

Return of "intrenching tools" in store at Malta on the 31st December 1853, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 325——List of intrenching tools sent out to the East from Woolwich, from the commencement of the war, *ib.* 327.

Specification for the supply of spades and shovels, approved by the Board of Ordnance, 11th June 1827 and 27th March 1844, *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 327——Specification for the supply of certain tools, approved by the Board of Ordnance, dated 13th December 1854, *ib.* 328.

See also *Bill-hooks. Pick-axes. Shovels.*

Transport Board. See *Transport Service*, 6.

Transport Service:

1. *Generally as to the Conduct of the Service by the Admiralty.*
2. *Practice in taking up Vessels; Terms on which engaged.*
3. *System of Tender.*
4. *Purchase of Vessels.*
5. *System in regard to Requisitions on the Admiralty.*
6. *Discipline, &c. on board Transport Vessels; Regulations hereon.*
7. *Revival of the Transport Board.*
8. *Conveyance of Ordnance Stores.*
9. *Transport of the Army from Varna to Old Fort.*
10. *Arrangements generally in the Black Sea; Authorities responsible.*
11. *Question as to placing the Service under the War Minister.*
12. *Annual Cost of the Service.*
13. *Staff of Clerks in the Department.*
14. *Returns laid before the Committee.*

1. *Generally as to the Conduct of the Service by the Admiralty:*

Want of proper relations between the Board of Ordnance and the Transport department of the Admiralty, as lately constituted, *Duke of Newcastle* 14536, 14537——Remarks upon the working of the Transport department previously to the revival of the Transport Board; the result verified witness's anticipations of failure, *ib.* 15167.

Witness is responsible for the conduct of the transport service up to February 1855, having in February 1854 relieved Mr. Grant, Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport department, of the transport duties of his office, *Milne* 16357, 16358. 16361-16369——Requisitions made by the Secretary for War in February 1854 for the conveyance of troops, stores, and horses from this country, *ib.* 16358——Steps taken, under the direction of witness, to provide transport service, and to comply with the requisitions made in February, *ib.* 16358, 16359. 16370 *et seq.*

Provision made for sending out additional troops and stores in accordance with requisitions in March 1854, *Milne* 16452-16460——The transports at first were required to go to Malta only; provision for sending them on to Turkey, *ib.* 16461-16467.

Exception taken to the statement of the Duke of Newcastle that the Transport department had been an especial failure, *Milne* 16580——Reference to the heavy requisitions for transport in November, and to the difficulty of complying with them, *ib.* 16581-16587.

Further statement as to the amount of transport employed at different periods in 1554; amount now employed, *Milne* 16657-16666——The smallest amount was in February and March 1854, *ib.* 16661——The amount has gone on increasing, more especially since October, *ib.* 16662.

Inconvenience which has unavoidably arisen when a ship has been appropriated to convey certain stores, from a change in such appropriation, *Milne* 16792-16797——

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TRANSPORT SERVICE—continued.

1. *Generally as to the Conduct of the Service by the Admiralty*—continued.

Refutation of a statement as to a transport vessel having been detained in Dublin for thirty-five days, *Milne* 16813——Constant orders from the Admiralty, that any vessel not required in the East should be sent home, *ib.* 16824.

Witness was Comptroller of the transport service till the appointment of the new Transport Board, *Grant* 17641. 17646——Means for ascertaining whether the Admiralty or the Ordnance is responsible for the delay in the sailing of any vessel with stores, *ib.* 17808-17810.

Denial that any time was lost in this country in fitting up the transports, *Sir J. Graham* 21105——Summary of duties performed by the transport service, *ib.* 21116——Very efficient management of the service by Captain Milne, *ib.* 21189.

Consideration by the Committee of the conduct of the Transport department at home, and of the extent of responsibility attaching to the several authorities, *Fifth Rep. p.* 10, 11——Magnitude of the operations adverted to, *ib.* 10——Within a year about 150,000 men and above 7,000 horses were conveyed to a point 3,000 miles distant from this country, *ib.*

2. *Practice in taking up Vessels; Terms on which engaged:*

Nature of the Government's contract for the three steamers sent out by witness, (the "Emperor," "Cottingham," and "Alster"), *Clay* 2893–2903——Difficulty of stating the amount of work performed by these vessels, *ib.* 2904–2911——Witness's vessels were taken up by the measurement tonnage, a mode quite usual among commercial firms, *ib.* 3250–3254. 3275, 3276——Terms for which the "Echunga" and the "Glendalough," fitted up by witness's firm early in 1854, were chartered by Government, *Mackay* 6818–6824.

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There were only three ships belonging to the Crown which were available for conveying troops when the war commenced, *Sir J. Graham* 21044——Steps taken from the first to hire steam transports as much as possible; necessity, however, of taking up sailing vessels also, *ib.* 21045, 21046. 21185.

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3. *System of Tender;*

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5. *System in regard to Requisitions on the Admiralty:*

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6. *Discipline, &c. on board Transport Vessels; Regulations hereon:*

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7. *Revival of the Transport Board:*

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8. *Conveyance of Ordnance Stores:*

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9. *Transport of the Army from Varna to Old Fort:*

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9. *Transport of the Army from Varna to Old Fort*—continued.

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11. *Question as to placing the Service under the War Minister*—continued.

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"Trent," The. Transport of about 220 sick to Scutari in the "Trent;" character of the general arrangements on board, *Wilson* 4396–4413——Great attention shown by the medical officer, *ib.* 4396–4398——Defective accommodation, there being no beds or bedding, *ib.* 4399–4401——Character of the food and medical comforts supplied; kindness of Captain Ponsonby (of the "Trent") in the matter, *ib.* 4407–4413.

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1. *Generally as to the want of Vegetables, and the Steps taken to provide them:*
2. *Particulars as to the Cargo sent in the "Harbinger:"*

1. *Generally as to the want of Vegetables, and the Steps taken to provide them:*

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2. *Particulars as to the Cargo sent in the "Harbinger:"*

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"*Victoria, The.* Particulars relative to the passage of witness and about 300 sick in the "Victoria" steamer from Balaklava to Scutari; utter want of accommodation on board, and consequent suffering, *Flower* 10166-10186——Long time occupied in the passage, and in getting from the mouth of the Bosphorus to Scutari, *ib.* 10169. 10180, 10181. 10213-10218——Death of twenty-four or twenty-five men on board, *ib.* 10176. 10182, 10183. 10213-10224.

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Documents relative to the loss of horses on board this vessel, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 489–492.

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1. *Duties and Powers of the Duke of Newcastle as War Minister.*
2. *Separation of the War and Colonial Departments considered in connexion with the want of further Changes.*
3. *Mode of Communication between the War Minister and the several Departments subordinate to him.*
4. *Dissatisfaction felt by the Duke of Newcastle with the Constitution and Working of the Subordinate Departments.*
5. *Proposition by Mr. Sidney Herbert for holding Periodical Meetings of the Heads of the Military Departments.*
6. *Correspondence between Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen.*

1. *Duties and Powers of the Duke of Newcastle as War Minister:*

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2. *Separation of the War and Colonial Departments, &c.*—continued.

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3. *Mode of Communication between the War Minister and the several Departments subordinate to him:*

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4. *Dissatisfaction felt by the Duke of Newcastle with the Constitution and Working of the Subordinate Departments:*

Evidence in detail relative to the mode of transaction of business between witness and the subordinate departments, and to the difficulties arising from the forms to be gone through, *Duke of Newcastle* 14342 *et seq.* 14703–14723. 15105–15108. 15325, 15326 ——The difficulties as to forms continued to be equally felt after the separation of the Secretaryships for War and the Colonies, *ib.* 14704–14707——Witness has not been consulted by the present Government with reference to official reforms in the transaction of business, *ib.* 14722, 14723. 14742, 14743.

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5. *Proposition by Mr. Sidney Herbert for holding Periodical Meetings of the Heads of the Military Departments:*

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6. *Correspondence between Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen:*

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Opinion that Mr. Ward, the purveyor, was not upwards of seventy years old, *Dr. A. Smith* 8282——Reasons for appointing Mr. Ward notwithstanding his age, *ib.*——Report subsequently of a Medical Board, appointed by witness, that Mr. Ward was inefficient; retention nevertheless of his services on the representation of Lord Raglan and of another general officer, *ib.* 8282-8311——Supreme authority of Lord Raglan to have acted upon his own discretion concerning Mr. Ward's removal, *ib.* 8304-8308.

Circumstance of witness having ultimately pressed the removal of Mr. Ward, to make way for Mr. Wreford, *Dr. A. Smith* 8839-8843. 8851——Further reference to the letters from Lord Raglan and Lord De Ros (the other general officer), upon which Mr. Ward was continued in office, *ib.* 9390-9404.

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Letters from Lord De Ros to General Peel, dated 25th March and 29th March 1855, in explanation of his interference to prevent the removal of Mr. Ward, *App.* (*Third Rep.*) *p.* 353, 354.

Responsibility attaching to Lord Raglan in the matter, *Fifth Rep. p.* 20, 21——The selection of Mr. Ward as purveyor was not fortunate, *ib.* 21.

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Waterproof Clothing. Non-distribution of waterproof clothing, such as Macintoshes, *Sir De Lacy Evans* 891–899——Advantage if there had been some Macintosh cloth for the sick in the hospital tents to lie upon, *Parker* 3485–3488——Each soldier of the artillery had from the first a waterproof sheet at night, *Shakespear* 4724, 4725——Partial benefit of waterproof sheeting for horses, *Lord Lucan* 6569.

Circumstance of 6,000 waterproof over-coats having been ordered for the army in August, *Duke of Newcastle* 15399–15406——Date of requisition upon the Ordnance for waterproof capes and sheets adverted to, *Sir T. Hastings* 18330–18336. 19030–19036, and *App.* (*Fourth Rep.*) *p.* 330, 331——The date of the first requisition from the Secretary-at-War for the supply of waterproof capes was on the 17th November 1854, *Sir T. Hastings* 18982, 18983. 19167, 19168, and *App. p.* 330.

Weather in the Crimea. The weather was of a very uncertain description in December, *G. Dundas* 222——Up to the 8th of November, when witness left the army, the weather was not severe, *Bentinck* 1208.

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